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- Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University

MORRIS LLEWELLYN COOKE,

Consulting Engineer, Philadelphia

This book solves all problems of why, how, what, in science, religion,
and philosophy. Or, it gives an intelligible and unified statement of the
fundamentals of all things, and applies that to everyday life. It is addressed
to the average educated man, but is designed to meet the requirements
of experts in various branches. The book is experimentally verifiable.

Some of the particular things the book does are:-
Shows intelligihly what electricity, light, matter, energy, etc., are.

Gives birth, life, death of solar system.
Shows how to get energy out of atoms, etc.

Establishes a sound logic. The logic used by the ordinary man is
right; that used by Aristotle and nearly all books is wrong.

Removes the fundamental error from mathematics, and makes
mathematics simple; proves Euclid’s ‘‘axiom” about parallels, and intelligibly
solves the various problems of non-Euclidian and n-dimension space.

Revises and unifies the eqnations of physics. Completes conventional
“theories” of physics—about a dozen,—and makes a somewhat new one that
is easier: vortex whirls.

Shows how gravity works. Shows what is wrong with Newton's law
of gravity, and why. Makes Einstein's theory actually intelligible—showing
that it is one sort of possible language out of an infinite number of
possible valid languages or logics. 'The book shows that everyday language
(Enclid’s and Newton's and Christ’s) is valid, and the most economical and
practical — and uses it.

Extracts from the INTRODUCTIONS:-

Dr. JORDAN, one of the leading scientists of the world,
says:- “. .unique daring successful ...
Mr. Klyce makes no attempt to solve any scientific problem
by pure reason, but he would have us make rational use of
the knowledge we possess.”

Professor DEWEY, by many regarded as the leading
living philosopher and logician, says:- “. . .The sincerity
and power of the book, and the radical simplicity of its
unifying idea give it every claim to a hearing. . I hope
what has been said may indicate the extraordinary value of
Mr. Klyce’s work for philosophers, and, in connection with the
way in which he applies the formal unification outlined to the
mathematical, natural and social sciences, to all persons inter-
ested in reducing intellectual obfuscation and confusion. . :
. . .Mr. Klyce’s book is remarkable, noteworthy. If experts
in various lines shall find his special results as fruitful, as
illuminating, as his general treatment of knowledge and
technical philosophy has been to me, the remark just made
will turn out to be altogether too moderate. Any remark of
mine about the value of the book in anticipation of this result
will seem intemperately extravagant.”

That simple and easy physics is used in the last third of the book
to solve qualitatively the more complicated human problems—those of age,

growth, death, life, birth, sex,

medicine,

immortality,

good and evil,

freedom of will, religious experiences and ethics in general, money, taxes,

business principles, value, etc.

Proves that the Constitution is right, and shows what democracy is,
and proves that it ig right and that all other forms of government and

‘legal’ law are wrong.

Proves (verifiably, of course) the doctrines of Christ; disproves the
essential ones of Paul and theologians.

Mr. COOKE, a leading engineer, says:-

“The world

today needs broad generalizations, but even more it needs

counsel as to their application to specific situations.

This

book fulfils both these requirements in a very special way.
For this reason I am recommending it, not as a philosophical
treatise, but as a text book with an everyday usefulness for al]
those who are trying to bring some measure of reasonableness
and order and effectiveness into our turbulent industria]

life. .

The book as a whole, in spite of its austere mecha-

nics, is not hard reading. This does not mean that there are
not places—in fact whole sections—which I made no effo1t
to get and others which I read superficially. But the author
has developed quite a knack of using words in not only a
precise but a commonly accepted way, so that over a greater
part of the journey, a lack of mathematical and scientitic

training is not an insuperable handicap. . .

Of course, if one

readily understood and as readily agreed with everything in
a book like this, it would be too simple a document to merit

much attention. ..

I will be much surprised if to most

men a reading of ‘Universe’ will not make the struggle [of
life] a far simpler matter than it usually seems to be.”

Set up, printed, and published by
S. KLYCE,

Winchester, Mass.

Publisher’s price, to everybody:- $2 plus postage
FOSTAGE: op tou miles from Boston, Te; to 800, lOc;

ec; to 1000
1800, 33c; b

20e; to 1400, 26c; to
eyond, &8c.

Bookstore price, $3

Cornell University

Bleed ay)

The original of this book Is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

http://www. archive.org/details/cu31924029066343

UNIVERS E

BY

SCUDDER KLYCE

WITH THREE

INTRODUCTIONS

BY

DAVID STARR JORDAN

Chancellor Emeritus, Stanford University

JOHN DEWEY

Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University

MORRIS LLEWELLYN COOKE

Consulting Engineer, Philadelphia

Coryricut, 1921, sy ScuppER Ktiycr
Copyright in Great Britam

First Epirion. — 1000 copies. — Printed from
type and no plates made: plates can be made by
photographic processes later if they are needed.

Set up, printed, and published by
S. KLYCE
Winchester, Massachusetts

Publisher’s Price to everybody, $2 plus postage (Wt. 3 lbs.)
Bookstore price, $3 (see Preface, §F i).

192)

f
/

First Introduction by Joun Dewey.

Second Introduction by Davin Srarr JoRDAN.
Third Introduction by Morris LurweLtyn Cooke.
Preface.

—$_=_

InrropucrorY REMARKS.
CHAPTER
1 Summary of contents and their character.
II Order and relationship of contents.

Part One. Formal unification;
or Theory of Language.

ll] Nature of the general problem and its conventional
name; or, what apparent failure in unification
requires reconcilement.

IV Statement and proof of principles of langnage; ar,
logic.

V General statement and proof of how to apply language.

VI Names for logic, and chief application of valid logic
to men.

VII Statement and proof of valid logic from additional
points of view.
VIII Mechanical model of language.

1X Theory of language in terms of physical science; or,

general unification of “‘science.”’

CONTENTS

+

Parr Two. Concrete unification ;
or Physical Science.
CHAPTER
X General principles, and general mechanicai theories,
of science.
XI General whirl mechanics.
XII Astronomy.
XIN) Light.
XIV Electricity.
XV Heat, chemistry, etc.; and summary of Part Two by
practical applications.

—

Parr Turer. Spiritual Unification;
or Humanics.

XVI Biology.

XVII Psychology.

XVIII Ethies and economics.
XIX Sociology and economics.

Appendix A. Abbreviations.

Appendix B. Periodic table of elements.
Appendix C. Geologic time scale.
Index.

ERRATA

The errors in this following first list are those which the reader
can not readily see at once are errors, and see what is correct. The
second error in the list was made only in about half the copies.

S 42d line 8 Read stayed instead of stated.
74 line 832 Equation should be Density=MT-®.
76e line 14 do c=QmeT.
89b line 21. Read Reeve’s instead of Reeves’s.
9G6c line 2. + Read chapter instead of section.
98n line 34 Read or instead of of.
114d line 3 Read or instead of and.
132a line 9 Read lower instead of slower.
132e line 10 Read 1913 instead of 1903.
136c line 14 Read F instead of the second E.
Fovtnote 168h-iii line 37 Read good instead of 2nd_ poor.
do -v line 14 Read of instead of in.

This second list is a list of paragraphs in which typographical
errors occur that the reader can readily correct for himself if he not-
ices them. In a number of the listed cases I caught the error myself
and corrected it before printing all the 1000. 1 know that
there are some more-technical] errors ] haven’t listed; and probably
there are numbers of errors I haven’t found.

8S43ct, 44d, 47h. 49d, 50e, 59ne, 6Oi, 6la, 63c, running
head p. G1, 72d, 74b, 76e, 78a, 80c, 81h, 83e, 84b, 85b,
86cdh, 90c, footnote 98d, 98g, 99ab, 100g, 101b, 104b, 112a,
113c, 11Gb, 118e, 120ik, 122], 12Gbg, 133e, 136c, 144hi,
145¢ (two), 146k, 147fg, 148b, 149jq, 151a, 158d (two),
155b, 161b, 162fj, footnote 166d, 166nr, 167), 168dmnp,
170k, footnote 172c, running head p. 233, 175c, 176b, foot-
note 176d, 176e.

lii UNIVERSE

Dewey’s Introduction

THREE INTRODUCTIONS

FIRST INTRODUCTION
by
Joun Drwry

Mr. Klyce has invited me to write some prefatory words
for his book. In spite of my technical incompetency in
physica] sciences and realizing the handicap that imposes
upon me, I have gladly consented. For although the argu-
ment of the book as a whole must finally stand or fall with
the treatment of topics where my lack of knowledge makes it
impossible for me to have a real judgment, the sincerity and
power of the book, and the radical simplicity of its unifying
idea give it every claim to a hearing. And judging from the
parts where it is possible for me to follow intelligently, I
have a strong presentiment the other parts do not go far
wrong in substance:—-Mr. Klyce himself makes plenty of
allowance for deviations in special points.

Mr. Klyce says somewhere in effect that every reader of
this book will have in the end to rewrite it for himself. My
introductory remarks can not take any other form than re-
writing that portion of Part One which sets forth the funda-
mental logic—or method—of the book.

He says that the book “‘unifies or qualitatively solves
science, philosophy, and religion.’’ Many cultivated readers
will be likely to stop right here. While they tolerate or
laud classic philosophers for attempting such unification, they
associate, with painfully good reason, contemporary profes-
sions of such solutions with pretentious ignorance. To make
such a claim is the common sign of the incompetent amateur
in philosophy and science. My first rewriting is of this phrase.

Mr. Klyce emphasizes qualitattve unification. He ex-
pressly points out that concrete problems of science and
practical life are solved only in living them intelligently.
For the word qualitative, we may write the word formal, and
contrast it with material unifications. Then we note that
such attempts as are in unenviable repute owe their offensive
arrogance to claiming material unification. | Every philoso-
pher deals with the problem of formal unification, either
positively or negatively.

What is significant in this book is not, then, the claim of
unification but the way it is worked out. Every reader knows
how common are phrases that combine antithetical terms,
terms that taken separately oppose each other. Examples of
such pairs are:- rest and motion, space and time, matter and
energy, potential and actual, analysis and synthesis, one and
many, individual and society, common and proper noun,
cause and effect, freedom and authority, quantity and quali-
ty, prose and poetry, parts and whole, mind and body, flesh
and spirit, God and nature, purpose and mechanism, static
and dynamic; or upon a slightly more technical plane, dis-
crete and continuous, substance and properties, elements and
relations, existence and essence. Now the natural mind, the
commonsense mind in the best usage of that ambiguous
phrase, is not perplexed by those combinations of opposites.
They seem natural, complementary; expression is incomplete
without both.

Philosophic reflection begins with an express noting of the
opposition between the terms of such pairs. _‘It sets out to
reconcile them, to get a qualitative or formal unification. Or
it denies the possibility of any unification, and holds that all
knowledge since it goes on in such terms as motion and rest,

space and time, is relative.’’ Or, the apparatus of knowing
gets between us and the things to be known. Or it gener-
alizes the pairing off into a rigid dualism of the separate, in-
dependent forces, substances, principles. Or, like Hegel,
it takes the bull by the horns and declares that all ‘‘reality,”’
all ‘‘truth’’ is a union of contradictories.

Now it is a conceivable hypothesis that commonsense is
innocent of these contradictions because it always uses the
terms with reference in a context, to mark or point out
features in a situation, and with no other intent than calling
attention to them, either as memoranda for one’s self or as
guides for another. This supposition does not as yet explain
the opposed character of the terms, or why they go in pairs.
But it raises another interesting hypothesis. What would be
the effect if some one else reflecting on the agencies of point-
ing and marking forgot their directive use, and took them to
convey something otherwise than as pointers to observations?
May not this explain why the terms are effective in ordinary
usage and stumbling blocks to the philosopher?

This last paragraph is one way of rewriting another sen-
tence of his Introductory Remarks which will give offense to
some readers:- that the author’s method of complete formal
solution has to do with a “‘mere trick of words.’’ Unfortu-
nately, not all readers, or writers, take words as seriously as
Mr. Klyce does. He himself points out that a mere word is
but a passing sound or a patch of ink. What he is doing, as
he clearly points out in §2de, is to investigate the fact that
kuowledge is a statement or expression, and to investigate
this fact by the same experimental methods that have hither-
to been confined to the things stated or expressed. Now
language as a machine of expression or statement is something
quite different from a mere trick of words; and in §155 Mr.
Klyce vividly depicts the psychology that makes him from
time to time resort to such depreciatory phrases. The reader
must balance it with the term ““absolute unification of science,
philosophy, and religion,’’ as he is used to balancing the
terms rest and motion, whole and parts.

Let us return then to the hypothesis that in actual use
names call attention to features of a situation; that they are
tools for directing perception or experimental observations.
The first thing to be noted is that the “‘situation’’ is referred
to only in the (literally) most general way, as the limiting in-
cluding thing within which specific things are pointed out.
A gesture calls attention to a dog-fight. It doesn’t call at-
tention to the town, to the world or the sun and its light or
to the previous history of the animals or to the position and
expectations of the observer. And if some special feature
within the dog-fight is then pointed out, a broken leg, the
fight itself is no longer specified. It takes care of itself. It
is now the ‘‘situation’’ as the entire visible scene was form-
erly the situation within which the fight was discriminated.
The sttuatzon as such in short is taken for granted. IJ is not
stated or expressed. It is implicit, not explicit. Yet it sup-
plies meaning to all that is stated, pointed out, named. Its
presence makes the difference between sanity and insanity.
We may say if we will that it is ignored. But the ignoring
is not the ignorance of denial. Ignoring means ‘“‘under-
stood,’’ assumed as a matter of course as the background and
foreground which gives intelligibility and state-ability to
what is explicit, expressly pointed out. Now the implicit
situation cannot (save arbitrarily; that is, by some agreement
for a purpose) be stopped short of Everything. The setting,

Dewey’s Introduction

the implicit situation, shades off from the explicit, indefin-
itely and continuously. **Everything’’ is understood, im-
plied, then as the setting, or meaning-giving force, of what
we explicitly say or state.

Recur now to the actual naming or pointing. It discrimi-
nates, distingnishes something; makes it explicit, states or
expresses it. That which is pointed to gives the meaning of
the word or directive gesture. But the lone thing pointed at
has no meaning. We always distinguish one thing from
something. Al] explicit names point out then a comparison-
contrast of at least two things. A This by itself, as Mr.
Klyce points ont, has no meaning. It is not an expression
or statement, but merely another thing, a noise or figure.
This explicitly implies That; Here explicitly implies There;
Now, Then. In short, the simplest possible intelligible state-
ment explicitly implies a number-of-things-related-together,
while it implicitly implies a sum total, or an ‘Everything’
with which the related plurality of things is continuous. This
is a trick’’ of language just as a watch may be called a trick
of steel. It is the only way a thing can be done, in one case
keeping time, in another case giving direction to observations
of existence. Size and complexity in both cases may vary
indefinitely; and substitutes may be found for steel, and
different signs in language. But the way, the principle, re-
mains the same. Here isthe qualitative or formal unification.

This is one way in which one basic proposition of Mr.
Klyce may be rewritten. This way of writing will probably
appeal especially to those habituated to philosophical modes
of writing. For it suggests that the problem of statement,
or language, is identical with what in philosophical writing is
called the epistemological problem, the problem of know-
ledge. Science is the expression of experiments with things.
It isn’t the things over again, nor is it simply the experi-
ments. It is communication of them with their results in
consistent form. The simplest and most objective way then
to examine knowledge experimentally is to examine consistent
expression or statement experimentally—to see what happens
when we do or make it. The method as used by Mr. Klyce
getsrid of an enormous amount of cumbrous and largely effete
psychology. It cuts out an enormous mass of _ historical
reminiscence that obstructs the path of one who approaches
the subject in the traditional way. To philosophical readers
(to those who use that particular dialect) I would point out
the freshness and directness of Mr. Klyce’s method of ap-
proach to the old problem of the nature of knowledge.

This remark applies to his method irrespective of the re-
sults he has obtained by its use. Let us now return to an
inspection of these results. In any intelligible statement,
from a gesture to a complete discourse on science, there are
two kinds of implications, one implicit, the other explicit.
The explicit implication is that of relations between ele-
ments; that is, between distinguished parts. The implicit,
understood or taken for granted is, ultimately, as we have
seen nothing less than the universe or ‘‘Everything.’’

Now (1) this implicit implication is strictly ineffable. It
cannot be stated. For it is required to give meaning to any
statement. Yet it is convenient, and for consistent expres-
sion of complex matters it is necessary, to have a term to re-
fer to it. It is necessary to have a word which reminds us
that whatever we explicitly state has this implicit, unstate-
able, ineffable implication. Hence the terms which Mr.
Klyce calls One words, like all, nothing, only, being, every,
infinity, universe, whole, never, always. These words have
no (definite) meaning. In philosophical terminology they are
transcendental, noumenal, a_ priori. They are religious
terms, like God, eternity, perfect rest or peace, complete
salvation, An experimental realization of their meaning is

UNIVERSE

iv

had only emotionally, and the emotion may be BOS ie
thetic or in some cases mystic. Speaking in Dee
terminology, we have here revealed the truth and the eae O
the whole brood of absolutistic, transcendental philosop ae
They have had a genuine experience of All, which is mee
for the meaning of any consistent statement. But , ey ed
sert that these Oze terms themselves have a meaning; a at
they are terms of statement. Or if they are professional
mystics, the ineffable character is recognized, but the experi-
ence is regarded as a special, separated, not to say unique,

experience, instead of what is implicit, in some degree of

intensity, in every experience.

(2) The other side of statement is distinctions-in-relations,
Many words, and Relationship words. Here the ways of go-
ing wrong hy failing to observe what wedo when we state or
express or ‘know’ are more numerous. The most general
and fundamental one is to turn the ignoring of the Every-
thing or Universe (to take Mr. Klyce’s favorite term, tho to
some it is too indicative of the starry heavens) which is
equivalent to its implicit assertion into its explicit denial.
This is the root of all kinds of phenomenalism, relativism,
agnosticism. For it amounts to asserting that the very act
of making known (expressing) mutilates reality, puts a veil
or screen between us and reality, hides things-in-themselves
from us, perverts it in bringing it within our grasp. This is
the root of all agnosticism and subjectivism—the notion that
the process of knowing intervenes between us and the things
to be known. And Mr. Klyce’s examination of Statement
shows that this notion is due to failure to grasp all that is
done when we state; namely, refer to the Whole as the con-
text within which what is explicitly stated. falls as constitut-
ing its meaning.

Every statement (or knowledge) fully realized in its im-
port or logical form links us up with the Whole, instead of
cutting us off from it. And this is true when the statement
is materially wrong-~as every statement in its explicitness is
bound to be in some degree. For some of its implicit junc-
tions with the Whole may be rendered perceptible in further
statements. If the statement is sincerely taken, they not
only may but will be. Every intelligible statement contains
within itself, in other words, the conditions of its own recti- >
fication, provided we carry out the experiments it indicates.
1 think that those who appreciate the force of these remarks
and who find them verified in their own experience will agree
that Mr. Klyce understates rather than exaggerates the emo-
tional relief and expansion that may come with it.

Other fallacies which arise from failure to perceive fully
what happens when we state or make known (to ourselves or
others) are materialism and mechanism—as a wholesale "ism,
that is. This arises from observing that parts are discrimi-
nated and failing to observe that they are at the same time
related. The problem of relations and elements is a familiar
one in philosophical writings. Perhaps one need here only
call attention to the likeness and unlikeness of Mr. Klyce’s
treatment with that of Mr. Bradley. The latter also points
out that every statement both analyzes and synthesizes,
selects or partializes and also unifies. But he places those
functions over against each other. Selection mutilates the
living fullness of reality. Unification adds as it were insult
to injury; it falsifies, for the selected parts are not as such
capable of union. They unite only in the whole. From this
property of statement (judgment, in Mr. Bradley’s language)
he infers that everything we judge is compelled to take on
the form of appearance, because it involves self-contradiction,
and this cannot be found in reality.

All this is suggestive of Mr. Klyce’s insistence upon iden-
tity or “‘circular perception’”’ as the test of statement, and

Vv UNIVERSE

his pointing out of contradiction hetween the many and the
one in every statement. But where Mr. Bradley ends, Mr.
Klyce begins. He points out that this contradiction is itself
contradicted by the assertion (indication) of the implicit Every-
thing. The elements selected are so related in every
intelligible statement as to constitute the Whole; or, the
situation is so distinguished that it has an infinite number of
elements. And infinity is again a reference to the Whole.
This is the ‘verbal trick’’ in its simplest form. The infinite
regress of relation and element which Mr. Bradley points out
in judgment is to Mr. Bradley another sign that our know-
ledge does not get beyond Appearance. Mr. Klyce shows
that this infinite regress is the method hy which every state-
ment indicates or refers to the Whole. It negates the seem-
ing arbitrary selection of some parts by calling attention to
the fact that the Whole has an infinite number of other
parts: that is, is a whole.’

Another fallacy arises from confusing relationship terms
with many or one terms. In this case, we get pseudo-
idealism, pseudo-intellectualism, abstractionism in the sense
which Mr. James so vividly condemned. Mr. Klyce refers
as an instance to the fact that many writers dress up the re-
lationship word truth in shining armor, and exploit emotions
with it. All idealism of the self-conscious, professional type
is of this nature; all idealism, that is to say, that opposes
the ideal] to the actual, and throws contempt upon the actual
and concrete; which sets up ideals as something above and
too good for the common man in common experience. It is
the aristocratic vice par excellence. The ideal is the Whole
implicit (tho not implied in the ordinary logical sense of im-
plication) as the meaning of every intelligible experience.
Hegel doubtless saw this in a way, but made the typical
idealistic error of supposing that the task of philosophy was
to derive modes of statement superior in kind to those of
commonsense and science in which the implicit whole should
be rationally explicated. In fact, the philosopher has the
humbler task of pointing to the fact that every consistent
statement already refers to an ineffable whole. Realism,
especially modern analytic realism, on the other hand, ig-
nores entirely the implicit, and insists only upon logical im-
plications; that is, relationships which can be made explicit.
As a consequence its relations become only another and
strange kind of things or parts. An atomism results which
taken strictly forbids all statement whatever—as the Greek
critics of a similar view long ago pointed out.

A word may be added on Mr. Klyce’s elimination of the
bugaboo of subjectivism. Mr. Klyce gets rid of it by start-
ing with expression or statement as itself an objective fact
which can be observed like any other event. His method
may be said to assume or imply that expression is a ‘function’
of things just as heat is. But this assumption is, as Mr.
Klyce points out, merely formal in both cases. The meaning
of the ‘‘assumption’’ that heat or a statement is there (is
happening) is not found ix the statement about heat or ex-
pression but in the observation of the happening itself. A
finger-board on the road does not materially assume anything
about the town to which it points. It actually or materially
does nothing but point. The only ‘‘assumption’’ is that if
you take the road you will find what you will find; that

1In rewriting one part of Mr. Klyce from the standpoint of the
traditional! problems of the theory of knowledge, I am doing him an
injustice not only from the standpoint of the larger public not con-
cerned with technical philosophy but from the standpoint of profes-
sional philosophers. For reference to the positive development of
implications of space, time, energy, units of science, and the formu-
lae for their relations, in which Mr. Klyce makes his formal unifica-
tion fruitful is omitted.

Jordan’s Introduction

which you find is alone the real meaning of the sign-board.
The sign may lie; Mr. Klyce may be mistaken. But the
only way to find out either thing is to take the path indi-
cated. In the case of the book this means to observe, with
the guidance of its author, the thing or happening called ex-
pression. It takes a considerable amount of skill and a large
degree of vision and good will to follow the road, but that is all.

I hope what has been said may indicate the extraordinary
value of Mr. Klyce’s work for philosophers, and, in connec-
tion with the way in which he applies the formal unification
outlined to the mathematical, natural and social sciences, to
all persons interested in reducing intellectual obfuscation and
confusion. Many thinkers have had the laudable ambition
of exhibiting the connection of science and philosophy with
commonsense. But usually they have taken commonsense to
mean a mixture of the operation of sound sense with a body
of inherited engrained traditions and sophistications. Mr.
Klyce has taken commonsense in its radical and simplest
form, the form of stating or making anything known. He
has himself pointed out the reason why his thought is not
always easy to follow. The most difficult thing in the world
to learn to see is the obvious, the familiar, the universally
taken for granted. Taken asa sketch ofa certain way of
discovering the meaning of knowledge in general and in its
typical branches, Mr. Klyce’s book is remarkable, note-
worthy. If experts in various lines shall find his special re-
sults as fruitful, as illuminating, as his general treatment of
knowledge and technical philosophy has been to me, the re-
mark just made will turn out to be altogether too moderate.
Any remark of mine about the value of the book in anticipa-
tion of this result will seem intemperately extravagent.
After the result, it will, fortunately, be quite unnecessary.

Joun Dewey.

SECOND INTRODUCTION
by

Davin STARR JORDAN

The unique treatise for which I have been asked to write
a few words in introduction impresses me as a daring and
successful effort to aid straight thinking by the accurate use
of language. Its centra] purpose is to bring into the realm
of Science the philosophical conception that all that exists is
in a sense of one piece,—infmite variety embraced within
infinite unity. | Thus the Universe may be looked on as a
majestic Federation of Energies, an infinite machine in which
all parts fit and cooperate.

Oneness, however, does not imply tangible sameness,
though some apostles of Monism have insisted that underly-
ing unity inevitably postulates at least some measure of ob-
jective identity—as of matter and force, for example,—or
more concretely, of all the chemical elements, one with
another. But to be fundamentally “‘at one’’ does not neces-
sitate any such sameness. Matter and force must comple-
ment each other, in some positive sense, as the key fits the
lock. Indeed there are numberless intimate relations which
do not necessarily involve identity of origin, form and sub-
stance. In a harmonious universe (however we may describe
it) there might be (and we can know only by observing) a
million definitely distinct chemical elements, not interchange-
able and not derived from Haeckel’s fancied *’Protyl,’’ or
any other primitive world stuff, whether matter or spirit.
As to this and to al] other questions of fact, we shal] never
know the answer until we find it out by looking. Moreover,
the conception of the unity of the Universe need not ever

Jordan’s Introduction

reduce it to a single substance, nor even to a single definite
purpose. Pluralism (multiplicity in unity) is as true as one-
ness, in the meaning given by William James’s assertion :-
“‘No one can question that the Universe isin some sense one,
but the whole point lies in what that one is.’”’

Science is hnman experience tested and set in order; any
belief which neither demands nor permits verification lies
outside of Science. All propositions which can be proved by
deduction or even proved completely (see §35 of the book),
belong to the realm of expression or Logic, not to Science, —
conclusions being involved in premises. Pure mathematics,
for instance, is the logic of number and space, and its dem-
onstrations, however intricate, are derived from its defini-
tions. Similarly, a definition of the Universe can be framed
in such a way as to make its unity self-evident;—in fact no
other definition that is self-consistent is possible: but no
scientific conclusion can be deduced from proof thus obtained.
Details of reality—matter, force and life—would be nonearer
demonstration than before, for these we know only from the
coordinated results of hnman dealings with them.

Knowledge, never complete, may be relatively exact or
inexact according to the sufficiency of our data. Jn no field
has Science yet reached completion,—and it is in the nature
of things impossible that it ever can. It sees some things
very definitely; but the unknown lies as a trackless wilder-
ness on every hand. As details accumulate, generalizations
are possible—and even prophecy with some degree of cer-
tainty. In Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, relative ex-
actness prevails. The simpler the factors involved, the more
definite our mastery. Obstacles in the relatively exact
sciences are mainly our human limitations. The enormously
distant and the extremely small elude precise observations;
star and electron baffle alike; the bulk of the Universe is
beyond our definite seeing. ‘“‘Time is as long as space is
wide,’’ and no one can conceive a limit to either.

The sciences concerned with life deal also with the ele-
ments of matter and force, but in highly varying relations.
In any biological problem, conditions due to the relative po-
sition and relation of atoms and molecules, of cells and tis-
sues, of organisms and environment, are visibly varied almost
to infinity; data of one sort or another everywhere abound,
but the more we have, the more we see we need. Untested
problems crowd on every solution. In biology, therefore, to
a degree greater than in the more exact sciences we cannat
know what we know or what we do not know with complete-
ness or ultimate precision.

The only fina] test of a supposed fact is found in our
ability to proveit by trusting our lives to it, or to the method
by which it is gained. Simply to demonstrate that a propo-
sition will “‘work’’—that is, ““muddle along’”’ after a fashion
—is not enough; in all its parts it must stand a supreme
test, that of “‘liveableness.’? Such a direct and conclusive
proof, however, is not available in all life’s complex and im-
mediately pressing situations. The next resource is to test
the method behind the conclusion. The aggregate of know-
ledge, so tested, constitutes Science, which then becomes
the guide to conduct, though never infallible, because never
complete. In default of personal experimental knowledge
as to matters of fact or ideals of conduct we make the best
we can of the conclusions of others, trusting to the strength
of the method by which the conclusions are reached. We
thus have an acceptable hypothesis on which to act until the
returns from personal experience begin to come in.

Mr. Klyce makes no attempt to solve any scientific prob-
lem by pure reason, but he would have us make rational use
of the knowledge we possess. As to the fundamental! co-
ordination of all which exists, known or unknown,—any

UNIVERSE vi

consistent use of the word Universe implicitly asserts it.
Man himself is able with fair success to make his way in the
Cosmos; obviously then he is not utterly alien. Not only
does his continued existence prove him not alien, but further-
more, by taking thought, he can make headway against the
forces of nature and thus in some degree shape his own ca-
reer. A similar line of argument is shown to apply to every
concrete thing of which we are cognizant. The burden of
disproof of Mr. Klyce’s thesis lies on him who, within the
confines of the Universe, can conceive anything—matter,
spirit, life, space, or time—which lies outside it.
Davip Starr JoRDAN.
Stanford University, California,
March 20, 1920.

THIRD INTRODUCTION
by

Morris Liurwe_ityn Cooke

The world today needs broad generalizations, but even
more it needs counsel as to their application to specific situa-
tions. This book fulfils both these requirements in a very
special way. For this reason I am recommending it, not as
a philosophical treatise, but as a text book with an everyday
usefulness for all those who are trying to bring some measure
of reasonableness and order and effectiveness into our turbu-
lent industrial life.

Industry is not only still in the making, but it is in its
infancy rather than its adolescence. Just as we begin to
realize that civilization is dependent on industry for its very ex-
istence we have come to see that this same industry is really
not related to Life in any vital way. It is a perilous position
and no one claims that the path ahead is at all clearly de-
fined. The perpetnity of our institutions seems to depend
on whether in a generation or two we can come to have a
better understanding of this Juggernaut we have created.
For it is daily more apparent that all will not be well in the
world until each unit of the structure of industry is sympa-
thetically related to every other and to industry as a whole,
and that industry itself must understand in some measure its
relation to Ultimate Reality.

Our industry has been very largely a matter of trading.
But the barter hasis is disappearing with the advance of
science. More and more it is the trained engineer or the
man with engineering training who holds the key positions
in industry and commerce. But Engineering in the past
concerned itself very largely with things. Up to a genera-
tion ago engineers were for the most part either designers or
constructors of things, i.e., bridges, dams, railroads, power
plants, etc. Then the operation of these agencies began to
be included within the scope of Engineering. Only quite
recently has it come to be considered that in the operation
of most industrial enterprises the engineering method is apt to
be the most effective. Thus has been developed the engineer-
ing of men, sometimes called “human engineering’ in con-
trast with what has been the more technical engineering of
materials. This book, from the business man’s or engineer’s
point of view, undertakes to establish a proved and verifiable
scientific basis for this new branch of engineering which some
people prefer to call ‘efficiency engineering.’

The book as a whole, in spite of its austere mechanics, is
not hard reading. This does not mean that there are not
places—in fact whole sections—which I made no effort to
get and others which | read superficially. But the author
has developed quite a knack of using words in not only a
precise but « commonly accepted way, so that over a greater

vii UNIVERSE

part of the journey, a lack of mathematical and scientific
training is not an insuperable handicap. The author advises
readers—especially at certain places—not to work too hard to
get out al] the meaning. I dare say that the average reader
who will approach the book in this spirit will get about all
the author expects anyone to get on first reading and will
then be tempted to start all over again.

The reader should be on guard against being unduly
stirred by the author’s mannerisms. In some of his com-
ments on “‘theologians and Jawyers’’ for instance it seems to
me that he lapses from his general technique of tolerant expres-
sion and philosophy. Of course, if one readily understood
and as readily agreed with everything in a book like this, it
would be too simple a document to merit much attention.

It is altogether impossible to epitomize the conclusions of
any such book. But among many pithy phrases which Mr.
Klyce has coined, ““balanced co-operation’’ stands out as one
having special significance in the industrial field. It means
something more than doing unto the other fellow what you
would have him do to you. It seems to involve a measure
of action and reaction as between units and groups, which
will in every instance be conducive to well-being and growth
all around. During the War it would frequently have sug-
gested to organized labor the advantage of restraint in push-
ing wage claims, and at the present moment it should give
pause to those employers who tend to push their opposition
to labor unions beyond the checking of their obviously un-
toward tendencies. According to the author, democracy al-
lows or requires that each side to any discussion re-act to the
other. This is the exact opposite of the “‘We have nothing
to disenss’’ or the ““Public be damned’’ attitude.

After all, whether you are king or labor leader, business
man or priest, your master decision is as to whether you will
be—to use the language of the book—a ‘“‘dualist and an
autocrat’’ or whether, constantly studying the unity of all
modes and expression of life, you will seek through “‘bal-
anced co-operation’’ to participate in the execution of pur-
poses and a Purpose not your own.

Mr. Klyce has shown a ‘‘capacity for infinite pains’’ in
carrying his main thesis into so many different scientific
realms and there seeking to establish its truth. Too fre-
quently we have been asked to take judgments on scientific,
religious and philosophical matters from men who having
grown up in one group inherit points of view—even prejudices
—which would be dissipated by a larger outlook on life.

Vernon Kellogg says that while ‘“The biologist does have
a certain positive knowledge of some conditions or factors
that do help to determine the course of human life,’’ it is
also true that ‘‘the course of human life is partly determined
by a set of conditions which are, so far, at least, quite out-
side the specia] knowledge of the biologist. | He can guess
and wonder about them, just as other people do, but he has
no right to claim that he knows about them.’’ The same re-
mark obviously can profitably be made about any specialist.

Also, to any specialist is apt to come the moment—and
and it is one of possible, even soul-racking, disillusionment
—when the inadequacy of a narrow slant on life becomes

Preface §Ab

apparent. The more sincere the worker and the more funda-
mental his work the deeper the yearning to relate the indi-
vidual effort to the totality of things. The surest way to give
dignity to a simple act is to relate it to a purposeful life.
The surest way to endow our industria] system with vitality
is to scheme it out in harmony with all Life—to make the
paying of a wage and the doing of the day’s task in some
genuine fashion God’s service—to link them up with the
Ultimate Purpose.

Of course a great industry will only result from the
activities of great men. Most industrial leaders impress us
as being literally worn out fighting against a flood of isolated
facts and ideas. We need the unifying thought of this book.
To be effective we need above all to make our lives simple.
Men vary in their mental capacity, but it is undoubtedly
true that some men with great capacities are not the match
for men of ordinary abilities who ““see life steadily and see
it whole.’’ I will be much surprised if to most men a read-
ing of ““Universe’’ will not make the struggle a far simpler
matter than it usually seems to be.

The very familiarity which grows ont of usage has af-
forded in the past in all too generous measure, the authority
which we humans require to make us happy in our work and
play. But in so many ways—through education, through a
heightened individualism, and more immediately through the
shake-up of the Great War—the mass of men are questioning
all our procedures in a way heretofore unheard of. In the
depths of the mines, in the vast silences where the lumber-
jacks toil, on the seas and in our great manufacturing plants
near the centers of population, men are counseling together
as never before, on the meaning of life and the meaning of
industry and the relation of one to the other.

The idea that anyone knows in the old particularistic
sense is gone. Have we not read only yesterday of Einstein
and that theory of relativity that ““upsets’’ one of the surest
rocks on which our whole structure of knowledge has been
built? We know now as never before perhaps that, to use
the language of this book, ‘“There is no exact science.’’ And
yet our respect for science deepens and our sense of depend-
ence upon it has become altogether profound. This under-
standing of the place of science in industry and life is no
longer confined to the schools. The nations begin to appre-
ciate the hopelessness of preserving their identity except
through science. The owners of our industries perhaps feebly
—but altogether definitely—are studying in myriad ways the
application of science to the production of goods. And now
we detect the first beginnings of the same tendency in the
organization through which labor expresses its purposes.
Herein lies one of the great bopes of the race. When our
workers reach the point where they can well abandon force
and embrace science, humanity will be in fora new experience.

Buta science that is unrelated is even more fearsome than
an industry that is detached from life. Hence our obligation
to the author for a master generalization in which science is
made to seem but another manifestation of that Ultimate
Reality to which the human spirit itself is kinsman.

Morris Lirweittyn Cooke.

PREFACE

SA. Subject matter. —- a. This book unifies or qualita-
tively solves science, religion, and philosophy—basing every-
thing on experimental, verifiable evidence. The explicit
meaning of that statement is given in Chapters I and II. No
assumption is made (as is shown in §99).

b. The book is a condensed, preliminary rough draft of
that unification of knowledge. All the qualitative problems
set forth by the race—by “‘religion, science, and philosophy’’
——are herein positively, definitely, and verifiably solved. But
the application of those solutions consists of quantitative

SAb Preface

problems; and it is shown that zo quantitative solution may
be accurately expressed or given (§§25, 40-1, 50, etc.); also,
such solutions are infinite in “‘number’’ and may not be even
roughly expressed in a finite book. Hence, merely general
methods of the application of qualitative solutions to the
problems of how much? and how many? are given. And only
in so far as the reader is able to understand, verify, and ap-
ply those methods to his life has the book any value to him.
As each person differs from others (§§162i-j, 167m, 168p,
170p), the best book for one reader truistically can not be
the best for another. So this book can not possibly be final,
or the last word; other men can continually rewrite it bet-
ter, wholly or in part. And most emphatically, I propose to
no reader any creed, or “‘theory,’’ or ‘‘system’’ of truth, or
ritual of any sort. As will be seen (Part One), all such are
merely passing conveniences, tricks with words—and each
reader may best select his own words.

ec. The prime purpose of the book is to substitute posi-
tive knowledge for that aggressive ignorance which is named
agnosticism—thus eliminating agnosticism, the current pre-
vailing ““ism.’’ The accomplishment of that purpose results
in raising the standard and content of living—gives “‘life
more abundantly’’ (Chapter XVIII, on ethics).

SB. To whom addressed. — a. The book is addressed
to the general reader who has a fair education. Each sub-
ject is treated with the rigor that will, it is hoped, satisfy the
experts in that subject. | But because the book includes all
branches of knowledge, probably no one of the present day
would be competent to read it if it were written in highly
technical terms, and gave the minute details of each branch.
I certainly should not be. So in order to satisfy all the ex-
perts by giving each the complete grasp of his subject which
trnistically includes knowledge of its relations with the sub-
jects of other experts, it was necessary to avoid all but fairly
common technical terms, and to omit unnecessary details.
And that is equivalent to addressing the general reader.

b. That reader, as will be shown implicitly throughout
Parts One and Three, is quite competent to judge the validity
of this book. There is nothing esoteric or ‘“hard’’ about the
book in general. It is merely a description of things as they
are, However, it requires some work to read the book.
Some effort of attention will have to be made in places.

c. A competent scientist of wide and successful experi-
ence in writing for the general reader tells me that people
tend to be frightened away from a book that uses mathemati-
cal equations. I show that such a distrust and dislike of
mathematics is justified, and an evidence of the wisdom of
people in general: conventional mathematics contains funda-
mental errors (§§30, 43-4). I remove those disabilities of
conventional mathematics, and then use a few algebraic
equations which even the non-mathematical reader will nearly
surely approve, so obviously do they economize his attention.
I may add that the publishers I tried seem to disagree
with that: the reader may judge whether they underrate him.

SC. a. There is no originality in this book in any real or
important sense. Possibly some combinations of ideas are
partly new. But I myself have definitely found nearly all, ev-
en of the wider combinations, previously advanced by others.

b. Consequently, the reader need not anticipate being
repelled by any novelty or heresy of any importance; even
when at first there is some slightly distressing apparent nov-
elty, in the end it will turn out to be obviously an old belief.
E. g., it is shown that the earth is cold inside (§122i). That
does not happen to be the current conventional belief. But
it was a common view in the past; and if the reader will ex-
amine his views he will probably find that he has no more
real love for a hot inside than for a cold inside—but prefers,

UNIVERSE

Vill

as the important thing, the actual facts and the absence of
self-contradictory views. The perspicacious reader will soon
discover that I am very conservative—avoid being either
radical or reactionary.

ec. As there is no real originality in the book it follows
that I am indebted to others for the ideas set forth. I grate-
fully acknowledge that debt; but those creditors are so
numerous that I can name none without injustice to many
whose names I do not even know. In even greater measure
I am indebted, not only for ideas I have used, but for what
is more, personal aid and inspiration, to my wife, Laura
Kent Klyce, and to Frederick W. Taylor, David Starr Jor-
dan, John Dewey, T. W. Richards, Dorothy Canfield Fisher,
J. J. Thomson, and Gerald Stanley Lee.

SD. a. Some personal remarks may interest the reader,
and will give needed information :-

b. Inthe early summer of 1914 [ finished a book that
contained substantially what this one does. It was too long,
and contained literary defects quite too atrocious, for publi-
cation. It ran to about 700,000 words. Since then I have
written it over in whole or part continually—having much of
that competently criticized. | That work is here condensed
into a volume of reasonable size—I have struggled to keep
it down to 250,000 words (it has expanded in two rewritings
and probably will be about 325,000 when J finish setting it
up: this page is done in the middle of that job). That al-
most violent compression of such an obviously extensive sub-
ject was necessary chiefly because a long book in this day of
many good books frightens away readers, and because witha
subject of such a nature a long book would tend to have “so
many trees that it would hide the forest’ from the view of
the few who might have braved its length.

c. The reader can of course understand that it would
have given easier reading if some of the book had been ex-
panded into smaller and more familiar detail. | But the al-
most imperative need of brevity, which has just been pointed
out, has required the sacrifice of such ease. Quite possibly
no reader will be satisfied with the actual compromise that
has been made between such brevity and such local easy in-
telligibility. The most difficult thing about the actual writ-
ing of the book was to make that needed compromise in a
way that was even tolerable to the reader—to conserve both
his effort of attention and of memory.

SE. Typographical and similar formalities. — a. Cer-
tain arbitrary printing styles, which are not always used,
have been followed in this book. An explicit statement of
them here, if the reader keeps the statement casually in
mind, will save his attention.

b. The argument unifies knowledge. Consistently with
that idea, often when I have a formally plural subject, in my
view it is clearly unified, and I use a singular verb—some-
times oddly. Always in that as well as in other grammatical
constructions, I try to be conventional and hence inoffensive.
But when explicitness and clearness of expression seems to
require it, I deliberately sacrifice formal grammar.

ce. All names of books, articles, etc., are put in quota-
tion marks.

d. All algebraic symbols are given in italics.

e. All words, used as words, are printed in italics; no
quotation marks are placed around them unless the custom
for such marks (stated in the next paragraph) also applies to
them. Italics are also used for emphasizing a word or words
whenever it seems to me to make the text the least bit easier
to read. It would of course always be possible, by ingenious
literary circumlocutions, surely to indicate the desired em-
phasis without that mechanical use of italics. But the keen
reader will appreciate the brevity secured by italics, and will

ix UNIVERSE

readily perceive that I compliment him by taking it that he
does not need the literary flattery I could give him by letting
him waste energy finding the emphasis. This is not a book
for stupid readers, who require even literary flattery.

f. Quotations of others are marked thus:- “* ’’, ete.—in
the usual way. Quotations of myself are marked thus:- ‘ ’;
and such ‘quotation’ usually consists of my use of some word
or pbrase in a temporarily unusual sense. The ’’ marks
are similarly used at times to emphasize or indicate that I
am using a word or phrase quite conventionally.

g. This double mark :- is used “‘to introduce something
that the previous sentence or clause has definitely prepared
for and led up to,’’ so that it just precedes some remarks
that are to be expected. The ordinary colon : is reserved
for its other ordinary uses. When the :- is followed by a
word beginning with a small letter, it introduces merely the
remainder of the same sentence—when by a capital not other-
wise needed, the remainder of the paragraph, etc.

h. Economy of attention requires the conventional me-
chanical device of treating a single topic in a ‘‘paragraph.’’
Sometimes in this book such a natural topic needs a lengthy
paragraph which of itself contains sub-topics. If the long
paragraph were split into paragraphs to indicate its natural
subdivisions, it would, mechanically, at first give the reader
the erroneous and confusing idea that the chief topic changed.
So I split it into ‘little paragraphs’ by a dash :

i. Most algebraic ‘symbols’ used in this book are con-
ventional initial letters; bnt some are whole words. A list
of those symbols, ete., is given as Appendix A. The
chemical elements and periodic table are given as App. B.

j. The symbol! ... will be reserved for the single mean-
ing:- a continuing series, or infinite regress (§36n). An
omission in a quotation, which often is indicated by that
symbol, is indicated by ***,

k. When J needed to state the source of a quotation or
idea, or to indicate where fuller or analogous expression or
proof is given in this book, I have tried to avoid that distract-
ing and chopping up of the reader’s attention which would
have resulted from putting the reference in a footnote in the
more usual way, by putting it directly in the text in an ab-
breviated form, where the eye can recognize it at once for
just what it is, and yet inattentively slide over it unless it
is to be definitely used. For similar reasons | have tried to
get along without footnotes. Only when a needed parentheti-
cal statement seemed to make too violent a break if printed
in the text, have I put it as a footnote.

1. In preparing to set up this book myself I read several
books on typographical rules and practices. Then I followed
that practice which I thought would Jeast intrude itself upon
the attention of the usual reader, and at the same time would
cost him the least money. When there were two ways, ap-
parently equally good, I have used both ways—that giving
variety which I trust will please the reader as much as it did
me, and relief from remembering arbitrary rules, and a trial
of different ways to see if some actual preference develops.

SF. a. The reader may be interested in remarks on the
form of this book and the reasons for printing it myself:-

b. I finished what may perhaps be called the present
version in the spring of 1919 (it has been twice rewritten
since), and started to look for a publisher. I quickly found
that publishers were, so far as I could tell, afraid to risk any-
thing on their judgment of the soundness of the book. Sol
proceeded to get introductions by leading authorities in the
three main sorts of knowledge to vouch for its soundness.

e. While continuing trying publishers I tried a number
of endowed institutions and similar organizations formed for
the purpose of advancing knowledge in one way or another,

Preface §Ff

to see if they would help get the book published. So far as
I could judge from their evasive but nsually verbally cordial
letters, they believed the book couldn’t be sound—not one
would even look at a manuscript. There was one illuminat-
ing exception. I began corresponding with R. 8. Woodward,
a scientist then president of the Carnegie Institution of
Washington, in December, 1919, and continued until he
ceased to be president over a year later. Woodward made a
speech to the Congress of Arts and Sciences (convened at the
St. Louis exposition in 1904 to try to unify knowledge—
spending about $137,000 in the attempt), on the first page
of which he said in effect that a book like this is practically
impossible. He steadily, with a few exceptions in which he
tried safely to dodge my introductions by men with reputa-
tions of the highest, asserted in effect that he didn’t believe
I had a sound book; and steadily refused even to look at it.
He repeatedly referred me to his remarks on writers of what
he in effect claimed were similar books (in the Year Book,
1917, of his Institution, 21-7), which include these epithets :-
cranks, quacks, aliens, charlatans, mountebanks, arrogance,
audacity pushed to the extreme of mendacity [that’s a nice
phrase]. I began to think, after reading his letters, that if
my book was sound it must have extraordinary value. But
on second thought I decided that more likely Woodward was
a little timid in the presence of an idea.

d. I of course went over Woodward’s head to the Trus-
tees of his Institution twice. As soon as Merriam took on its
presidency the first of this year, | renewed my request to
him and he asked for a4 manuscript, and for months examined
it and had some of his colleagues examineit. After] found [
would have to wait for a decision | began to print the book
myself (see next par.), and asked the Institution to buy 350
copies for distribution to the libraries on its free list. They
are still deliberating on the matter.

e. I tried 18 publishers, and they were afraid to take the
commercial risk. It is a common practice for authors of
books to take the money risk. SoI finally had a reliable
publisher give me his lowest offer:- it was that I pay $10,000
for an edition of 2500—$4 a copy, to seli for at least $6 and
probably more (if I had printed 2500 [ could have sold them
for $1.50—and more, still lower). I didn’t have $10,000.
So I tried to borrow it on substantially a mortgage on
the book, from 25 successful business men, they to have the
additional satisfaction of helping advance knowledge. About
one quarter of them showed genuine interest; and I am
pretty sure that two or three would have advanced the money
if I had waited until the present low-speed panic (footnote
168h) is over. Those business men recognized at once that
J was honest and probably right (Index, ““Sizing up men’’).
But I decided that the book had waited long enough.

f. I spent three days reading about a dozen books on
printing—they were fascinatingly easy reading,—and then
about four more reading catalogs and looking at printing sup-
plies and talking to printers, and buying the cheapest second-
hand plant (new type), and supplies for an edition of 1000.
I have tried my hand a little at being a machinist, a plumb-
er, and six or eight other trades, as I had to handle men in
those—and at playing golf. And printing is the easiest—and
to me more entertaining and gentler exercise than golf. (Of
course, my effort was chiefly to print a passable bcok at the
lowest cost; e. g., there are two or three pages printed
poorly because | deliberately would not use time waiting for
the humidity to drop and hadn’t learned how to counteract
it satisfactorily; and there are too many typographical errors
left in, due to not spending an extra hour on each page.) It
took me a week to print the first page (p. 1), although I had
picked up a little printing as a boy; the second took three

SFf Preface

days. The last half of the book was printed about eight
pages a week, and once nine. I could have gone faster if I
had not taken plenty of time to revise the book—to think it
over and rewrite as ] set it up. That revision was the only
real work, except I would occasionally use my head a little
to overcome obstacles that printers assured me couldn’t be
overcome. Printing one’s own book is the best method of
revising it I have found; it gives more time to think over
each word, and a very gratifying and useful sense of respon-
sibility—there being no assumed-omniscient editor to rely on.
Anybody with sense enough to write a readable book can
learn to do passable printing in a week (of course, printing,
or any other trade, can be made a fine art, and a lifetime be
profitably spent on it; see §166f).

o. These are the costs per copy, estimated fairly close-
ly:- Plant and supplies (net, after selling them at the price
tentatively offered), 17 cents; paper, 28c; binding (by a
commercial binder), 25c; ink, 1}¢; engravings for pictures
(they are poor, 1 having made the mistake of getting them
from a high-price firm), 5c; transportation, 2ke; selling ex-
penses, insurance, etc. (circulars, postage, free copies for
publicity purposes), 4c. That makes a total of 83c. Then
my work costs:- author’s royalty at 5 per cent, 10c; pub-
lisher’s profit, 7¢; my labor, at $25 a week, $1.00—making
the total of what I get, $1.17, and the total cost of the book,
$2.00. I have charged labor at about half present
printer’s pay. Judged by present prices of farm products,
that is probably more than a printer is worth. But if a regu-
lar publisher had printed the book I would have had to use
fully half as much time on it [and five times as much nerve
wear and tear] as I did to do the whole work: and by that
criterion $25 a week is more than it sounds. And the plant
net cost figures out as a depreciation of 70 per cent a year.
A regular publisher of course would not have such an extreme
depreciation; so be could afford modern machinery, which is
supposed to be five or six times faster than the hand methods
J had to use. My ‘‘overhead’’ is itemized above, and con-
tains every legitimate item except rent, heat, and light—
which would have been Jess than 2c if I had included it. The
supervision and thinking for the job is included in the dollar
for labor; it was less than a millionth of the work of writing
the book, so I am getting overpaid at that. Books of about
the number of words of this nowadays retail around $10.

b. Asthat $2 is the lowest legitimate price, I had to an-
noy buyers by adding postage. Few know what zone post-
age will amount to, and the buyer is frequently consciously
irritated by any price which adds postage. But there is a
difference of as much as 600 per cent in the zone postage for
this book—which makes it scarcely fair to buyers to average
it, as the difference amounts to 16% per cent of the net cost.
I doubt if there is in fact any such wide divergence
as that 600 per cent in actual cost of postal transportation of
small packages; if not, then the present rate is unfair, as
well as being a nuisance.

i. I find that some readers want to buy their book at a
book store. It costs me no more to sell a book to the reader
direct than it does to a dealer, and | find it far more inter-

UNIVERSE x

esting and pleasant to deal direct. I first offered the book
*“by subscription’’ at $2 and postage, in that conventional
way announcing my intention not to sell at any less. If the
reader prefers to buy at a book store, ] am of course pleased
to have him suited; but naturally he should pay the dealer.
something for his trouble. J am told that usually the dealer
adds about 40 per cent of the cost of the book to him, as the
price of his services. So as a mere empty form 1 have
put the retail bookstore price at $3: J have no legal control
over the dealer’s price. At that price the dealer will per-
haps get about 40 per cent increase on the cost to him—and
incidentally he will get nearly as much for selling the book
as 1 do for labor in selling and making it. Perhaps his service
is worth that to the buyer: the buyer can judge that better
than I can. Of course, if the dealer were doing me
any appreciable service in selling this book I would sell it to
him lower than to others. But there are only 1000 copies,
and J do not want them sold to people who have to be urged
in any way to buy; and the slight publicity which dealers
could give the book would probably be undesirable. And
naturally, if the dealer thinks that what he does for the
buyer is worth the price, he will be as anxious to tell himthe
cost as ] am, and will be grateful to me for having largely
done it for him. And of course, if any dealer really wants
the buyer to get satisfactory value for his money, that dealer
will be glad to have the buyer accept my price if more satis-
factory. So if any dealer objects to anything in this arrange-
ment he thereby demonstrates that he is a profiteer, selfishly
trying to deceive and grab something for himself without
giving equal value in return—and | am glad to have gained
his ill will. J make these remarks because my stand in this
matter has already been attacked—that giving direct evidence
that they are needed. (For theory of middlemen, see §170o. )

SG. a. It is the opinion of those who are probably the
best judges that a book is an actual commercial success if it
is intrinsically interesting and so is recommended by one
person directly to another. I shall spend no money adver-
tising this book, and make but a negligible effort to give it
publicity. 1 think the book is a useful one and worth read-
ing—rather more so than the ordinary book. If the reader
concludes that it is worth reading, he would, if he is right,
usually be useful to his friends by recommending it to them.
And his doing so would be ample compensation to me; for
if the book zs useful, thus I shall in due time get paid for
the several years I have spent on it (principles of payment
are in 8168). If I have an opportunity I shall inclose one
or more circulars in the books I send out, for the convenience
of those who may want to use them.

b. I find by experience with various people that, because
there are so many stand-patters who consider a sound book
of this sort impossible, it takes unusual courage to recommend
it publicly. So judged by that evidenee the men who wrote
the introductions have displayed that fundamentally essentia]
trait in the degree that is leadership (§8170r, 167b).

5S. Ktrycer.

Winchester, Massachusetts,
September 17, 1921.

1 UNIVERSE

Introductory I §3b

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

CHAPTER I.

S1. a. This book is a brief description, and rigorous
proof of the truth of the description, of the universe and all
that appertains to it, both ‘“‘spiritual’’ and ‘“‘material.’’
Hence, the book is religion, science, and philosophy. If
those three names of the main ““branches’’ of knowledge are
taken in their customary senses, I am unable to determine
which name properly designates any given portion of the
book. The three are actually unified.

b. Butalthough all threebranches of knowledge are thus
included, one general method is rigidly and without excep-
tion adhered to:- all statements and conclusions are based
on experiment, so that the reader may also verify them by
his own experiments or experience. When such a method is
used, the product nowadays is usually called science; but in
that case “‘religion’’ and ““philosophy’’ become identical
synonyms of “‘science.’’ Personally, I have no preference
in that matter of names; simply for convenience the three
terms are hereafter used as applying respectively to the three
possible and conventional ways of expressing the same thing
(§39).

ce. Although everything is to be experimentally verifi-
able, the description is not therefore “‘materialistic.’’ In
all conventional fundamental senses this book is far more
definitely idealistic than are (say) the doctrines of Plato or
Berkeley or any orthodox theologian. The leadingscientists
of the present day, such as Richards, Jordan, Chamberlin,
Patten, Hale, reach conclusions the opposite of materialistic,
as we shall see (IX, X). It is at the same time quite true
that some of the men who claim to be scientists have been
materialistic, and have damaged the prestige of science with
intelligent people. Later we shall see explicitly how such
men as Ostwald, Clausius, and other Germans have been
materialistic, and hence wrong (see especially $147).

d. But the argument of this book, although idealistic in
the popular sense (§49,etc.), is not sentimental; it hasmore
than the conventional mathematical rigor. For conyentional
mathematics are defective (§44), and the argument is given
with the rigor of a properly corrected mathematics.

S2. a. We may first view the book as a whole by not-
ing how it compares with conventional *‘seience.’? The
brief statement of such a viewing is that we shall find present
science to be quite correct essentially, except that it is in-
complete—as is of course acknowledged by most scientists.
So it is completed, in a qualitative sense. In many cases we
shall find that science reaches what are customarily termed
religious conclusions. As strict science those conclusions are
wrong in the sense that they are mislabeled and misapplied.
Thus, the so-called law of conservation of energy is quite
true; but it is religion, and not science. Or, to give a more
directly concrete example :~ Newton’s law of gravity is cor-
rect as pure religion; but it is wrong, both in principle and
qualitatively, when applied to any two (‘scientific’) bodies
such as the earth and the sun (§§74, 73d, 83f).

b. But that statement of the scientific aspect of the book
is perhaps too broad to be comprehended at this point. So
we may take a more concrete view of science, and note just
how it is proposed to complete science.

c. Careful mensuration is considered to be the proper
basis of present science. Kelvin declares that “nearly all
the grandest discoveries’’ of a legitimate, valid science have
been ““‘the rewards of accurate measurement and patient,

Summary of contents and their character.

long-continued labor in the minute sifting of numerical re-
sults, I substantially quote this paragraph from
Richards (Faraday lecture, 1911; ‘“Science,’? N. S., 878).

d. The last paragraph asserts in effect that experiment
or experience is the correct method of getting science, and
then states the best method of experiment:- careful obser-
vation or “‘measuring.’’ (Later I prove that the assertion is
true; see especially §§$38-9; also 36-7, 57, 59, 60, 150.)
But the use of that method by no means exhausts what sci-
ence must do, and actually does do:- it is obvious that what-
ever is obtained by those experiments must be expressed,
stated, communicated, classified—and is, before it is even
known as science.

e. So we investigate the expression—the consistent ex-
pression, or classification—of experiments, basing that inves-
tigation itself and consequent conclusions upon experiments
or concrete evidence. (It is a “‘circular’? process.) That
investigation permits us to complete science. We promptly
find that the fairly well informed average man is already in
possession of enough ‘“experimental’’ data to complete sci-
ence, 2s soon as we derive a consciously definite and con-
sciously consistent method of expression. Hence, it follows
that the reader needs no wide acquaintance with “‘scientifie’?
or ‘‘technical’’ details in order to judge the general truth of
this book. However, some scientific detail is included for
the use of those who need it, and to show the general reader
the further implications of his present knowledge.

f. We shall find that there is a mere verbal trick which
enables us to complete and unify all knowledge; to solve,
verifiably and_ self-evidently, all qualitative problems—all
problems of why, how, what, or all principles. We shall find
that we already constantly use that verbal trick, but merely
have not definitely noticed it—that it is an absurdly simple
trick, the use of which is ordinarily named ‘‘commonsense’?
($491). The application of that easy trick to the thousands
of details of daily life sometimes requires the consideration of
such a number of things that it is dificult toremember them
all, and we say that such application is complex. That is the
only actual difficulty we have in ‘“anderstanding’’ anything.
A child can “‘understand’’ the “‘argument”’ or “‘reasoning’?
of this book. I have tried it on children of six and they did.
The reader already knows the argument (§49q).

g. Now, Kelvin himself elsewhere clearly implied that
the expression of science is defective. We have him com-
plaining:- “‘Quaternions came from Hamilton after his really
good work was done; and although beautifully ingenious,
have been an unmixed evil to those who have touched them
in any way, including Clerk Maxwell’’ (“‘Life of Lord Kel-
vin,’’ 1188; quoted from Shaw, ‘“Philosophy of Mathemat-
ics,’? 98). Maxwell used quaternions to express the theory
of electricity that is still substantially used. So it is clear
that there is more to science than measurement.

§3. a. The last section implies that mathematics is the
means of expression used by orthodox science.
view our book from a mathematical aspect.

b. We noticed Kelvin objecting to a certain sort of
mathematics that is explicitly used ina large part of science.
Somewhat contradicting Kelvin, it would be easy to quote a
number of scientific writers who substantially hold that those
without a knowledge of the so-called higher mathematics can
not understand many things that are true about the universe.
We shall see that those writers are wrong.

So we may

§8c I Intreductery

c. The fact is that mathematics is simply an abbreviated
method of expression—a formal shorthand langnage (§30).
It is based on precisely the same method or trick that ordi-
nary speech uses ($30). Orthodox mathematics itself contains
a fundamental inconsistency or selfcontradicticn. pe
mathematicians themselves admit that it does. ee
(Buer. Brits; oX¥ils 881) shows it, and says it 2277-8)
moved in a certain way; but Shaw (‘*Phil. of Mat ‘ Pee.
substantially disagrees that Russell removed ee ees,
Poincare, one of the most renowned of recent ma

So it
’ ,

irl ici ever agreel

as despairing of mathematicians ©™' a
is aoe that mathematical authorities themselves imply

i r than
orthodox mathematics serves to confuse science, rathe

j i intelligibility.
re it any fundamental in g . . 7
d As erthodcx mathematics are afflicted with such in

consistency, I shall as a general rule not use some pianos
of them. It will be shown in general how to correct—more
accurately :- complete—them. But this is not a book. on
mathematical detail, and extended revision of mathematies is
omitted. It will be shown how ordinary algebra, when used
in 2 consistent way, gives highly abbreviated expressions
which we can easily keep in mind: ashort formula will sum-
murize the whole verbal trick. So we use that formula,
derived in §§33-8.

§4. a. The consistent expression of experience is con-
ventionally named /ogic. The mathematicians call substan-
tially the same thing logistics or symbolic logic. The trick of
language, or the theory of language, will therefore be given
that conventional name logic.

b. That name hesa formidable sound. Orthodox logic is
formidable, as it is quite unintelligible if taken at just what
itsays. (That means the ordinary textbook logic; there are
several valid treatises—§490-q.) But valid logic is excess-
ively easy—precisely that:. so easy that such logic was
usually taken for granted and overlooked,so that we have had
such monstrous books as Kant’s ““Critique of Pure Reason.’’
The fact which we shall find (§49) is that the average man
has been using the valid logic right along, and that it is very
simple as scon as we are conscious of what it is. We
are not going to trouble ourselves with syllogisms, and other
such horrors of our school days. In fact, we are going to see
that in the conventional senses there are no such things as
‘“logic’’ and ‘‘reasoning.”’

c. We shall readily see that the well advertised “‘mys-
tery that shrouds the ultimate nature of the physical [also
spiritual] universe’’ is nothing more than our previous more
or less unconsciousness of that trick of verbal expression
which we continually use. The mystery and the “‘Veil’’—
all ‘‘Unknowns,”’ and especially **Unknowables’’—simply
turn out to be the things we really know best, as soon as we
see just how we have been talking. Valid logie itself hasthe
characteristics of a “‘machine’’ (VIII). So the puzzling

mechanical’’ aspect which the universe seems sonictimces to
take is an aspect of the verbal method used to describe it.
Sines eee and the last ely, assert that,
mathematics by Bie ae ae De an ve ay. ee
seen ae rs ae trick or method of expression
2 qualitative problems.
ae " neers a Ree have to solve guanti-
as we go through lifes ee I see Ee ee
i such problems be solved
ce by acneally living’’ them. The qualita-
ive solutions given in this book do not take away the need
of continually solving such problems of actual living, and it
it rigorously proved that never can such problems be other-
wise solved (§§25d, 40-1, 50, 167, 178; ef. §66¢). Sono
one need fear that this book or any other is ever going tore-

ng on it.

UNIVERSE

2

effort, by solving all qual-

move from man all need of mental but we shall se©

ei:
itative problems. It sounds paradoxica

aot tre simple (111):
that it is quite simp ere
85. a. From the point of vie See eee al]

:; is to pro
. e of this book is ae
es 2 Ean thus absolutely destroying agnosticism
quail atiyv

z for everyday living, the book
Bm Bees ae Fee i will be shown that
eee the only ‘“cin’’ or source of pain ($164c); and
6 eaith?’ and dogma, by their very definitions, acknowledge
some degree of ignorance, and are sins. However, it is to be
emphasized that the actual facts, the verifiable truth, dictate
that purpose of the book—not any arbitrary fancy of mine.
In no instance do I indulge myself in any “‘purposes’’ and
““aims,’’ in the vague conventional sense of inexplicable or
truly primary or uncaused desires—for all kinds of absolute
““purpose’’ or ‘First Cause’’ or teleology are proved to be
wrong (§$86d, 144h, ete.). In all cases the facts govern: I
personally, as the writer, merely record; and the reader ob-
serves and discovers for himself. J am not an ‘‘authority’’;
the universe as a whole is the realauthority. I donot preach.
I ‘‘uree’’ nothing on the reader, and do not so much as *‘in-
vite’? him te do anything. I do not dictate in any way.

b. In many places hereafter we see that the point of
view set forth in the last paragraph agrees with things as
they are. Here, I may show in rough physiological terms
that agnosticism is damaging:- If the nerves controiling the
beating of a man’s heart were to become ‘ignorant’ or agnos-
tic of just what they were doing or ‘wanted’ to do, then asa
truism they would be vacillating, uncertain, unreliable; and
if they were really agnostic or quite ignorant—and not just
partly or ‘formally’ ignorant,—they would as a truism stop
working, and the man would die. But even the minor vac-
illation would be ‘‘heart disease.’’ Obviously, if his “‘high-
er’’ nerves become really agnostic, they stop working, and
he is partly dead. He would, as a truism, die wholly if he
actually were agnostic about everyday living. We
shall see that no one is really agnostic: people are ignorant
only in a quantitative sense, and not in a qualitative sense
(S§25, 49). Also, agnosticism in practice is turning out to
be a favorite disguise of the dogmatist, obviously saying this
for him:- ‘‘See how very modest I am in admitting igror-
ance. You ought therefore both to praise me for being mcd-
est, and also unquestioningly to believe what | assert I know,
as that modesty proves my reliability. ”’ I shall im-
plicitly show in this book that an assertion of ignorance re-
quires as much proof as one of knowledge; that it therefore
by no means follows that such a dogmatic agnostic is either
modest or reliable.

c. But because the method of using language rigorously
has previously been somewhat unconscious, although the con-
clusions got from the method were consciously called —com-
monsense,’’ there actually are what we might call quantita-
tive agnosticisms—partial qualitative ignorances, sins, pais,
cr partly dead nerves. The removal of those defects will
truistically give “‘life more abundantly.’’ The reader him-
self, by his own efforts in observing things as they are, gains
for himself that more abundant life, as explicitly described
in Chapter XVIII on ethics.

§6. a. It is difficult to give briefiy at this point any
easily intelligible snmmary of the religious conclusions which
are to be established. That difficulty exists mostly because

of the fact that theology is customarily considered to be re-

ligion, whereas orthodox theology contradicts religion, so that
there is great confusion in customary terms for this subje

Another difficulty at this point is that it is not custom : a
consider religion as being a definite, verifiable matter eae eD

f actual life the idea or

3 UNIVERSE

b. Probably the clearest way of summarizing the relig-
ious conclusions that will be established is to state that the
average American in his everyday life or work, and as the sum
total of his thinking about it, has substantially achieved a
true religion (§166e). Or, the sum of Christ’s doctrines is
valid. On the contrary, the “‘reasonings’’ and exhortations
of professional theologians are usually not sound religion.

ec. Perhaps the only explicit remark on religion which
will be of much service at this point is that the theologians,
in so far as they are explicit and not evasive (848b), mostly
teach Paulineism and not what Christ taught. It will be
shown that Paulineism diametrically opposes the truth, where-
as the substance of what Christ probably taught is correct
(§8160-3, etc.). Considering them as men, |] think theolo-
gians vary as do other men. Some are objectionable to me,
while others are personally very fine. But taking them pro-
fessionally—and unless otherwise noted my remarks refer to
thein professionally,—they are substantially wrong, and Jam

opposed to them (§§169d, 177b).

87. a. The foregoing summary of the book from five
points of view may unintentionally lead the reader to believe
that what follows is perhaps almost exciting. But to most
readers it will not prove to be so. It is more likely toseem
at first to be rather dull and tedious. I have had some
years of experience in giving the proofs and expansion of
those summaries to various people—mostly to men with

highly trained minds,—and the argument seems usually to
depress them at first. However, occasionally it explicitly
collides with some pet superstition of a man, and he gets
quite excited. Ordinarily, though, this unification of know-
ledge is disappointing. It may be useful to the reader to have
me point out the general causes of that possible temporary
disappointment :-

b. (1) Many generations have been inventing pleasing
yarns concerning the delights of having absolute knowledge.
In the absence of having such knowledge, even now men
often assert the existence of it in some future heaven. But
apart from such rosy fairy tales, for generations even the re-
sponsible thinkers in their speculations have rather overrated
the benefits that would immediately accrue from the posses-
sion of absolute and complete qualitative knowledge. So
naturally the reader wil] be expecting too much. If he could
discount those expectations about 95 per cent right now—
which will probably be practically impossible,—he will not
be disappointed.

ce. (2) The next particular source of disappointment will
be that the reader already knows the essential conclusions
that are reached. As I have reiterated, I do nothing but use
a verbal trick consistently. The reader does nothing but
discover for himself that he already knows the essential] truth.
That will probably disappoint him at first, as it is not likely
to be what he expected. For he may have the age-old, re-
curring idea that some Messiah, with mighty intellect, and
an overpowering command of the disciples’ emotions, would
happen along and communicate undreamed-of, beautiful truths
and happiness. It will clearly appear that such can never
happen. The reader may resent the destruction of those ex-
pectations, the commonplaceness of the whole truth, and
probably the commonplaceness of me and my ways.

d. (3) Because the reader actually knows the substance
of our conclusions before he reads them, it follows that I am
writing the obvious for him. About the most difficult thing
to show is the obvious, as will appear. Peshaps it is even
more difficult to see the obvious consciously—to observe defin-
itely that we know it. ‘*Philosophy’’ is the simplest subject
there is. The difficulty with it is that it is too simple and

Introductory I §7j

obvious. ‘Those uuexpected things will perhaps exasperate
and further disappoint the reader at first.

e. (4) The German tyve of materialistic scientist has
taken Kelvin’s phrase, ‘‘minute sifting of numerical results,’’
as practically stating the sum total of any sort of valid know-
ledge. The German scientists of that sort so vociferously
praised that idea that some others confidingly acquired the
same delusion. If any such deluded person reads this book
he will be disappointed—except that it is shown that in
humanies (Part Three) there is probably not yet enough of
definite measuring. For in this book there is added what the
materialists omit, and what we have seen Kelvin himself sub-
stantially saying was needed (§2f). The book does consid-
erable ‘‘minute sifting’’; it is necessary, but it is only half
the truth (the whole of Part One proves that).

f. (5) Finally, the reader is liable to be disappointed
because I am too much lacking in skill in presenting the
matter to him in the way he requires.

g. I know of no way, available in any practical length of
time, of saving the reader from one or more of those possible
dissapointments, or ] would use it. If he has a youthful,
vigorous mind—a condition not closely dependent upon cal-
endar age,—it is nearly certain that in a few months, as the
discoveries he makes gradually permeate his mind and become
familiar, the disappointment will fade and he will find that
he is extremely pleased, and really approves of things’ being
as they are. If the reader is surprisingly vigorous in spirit
he may be at once pleased with the rigorous truth that the
book proves. Personally, I am conservative, as was stated ;
and it took me a year or two to see the beauty of the truth.

h. But to the possible reader who is so unfortunate as
to be rather firmly fixed or ossified in the habit of materialis-
tic ‘‘science,’’ and who requires—perhaps more or less un-
consciously to himself—a long list of dry-as-dust obfuscating
statistics, and nothing but such ‘‘facts,’’I can offer no pleas-
ing hope. Both he and his mental brother, the persistently
sentimental reader who prefers to believe much current theo-
logical and ethical dogma, will perhaps to their deaths mourn
or resent that their beloved formulas have here been so plaus-
ibly questioned, if they rashly read further.

i. However, to the general normal reader I may offer
another pleasant hope. It will be shown that the world or
universe is correctly made. I am not a reformer, nor a
grouchy pessimist—nor a Pollyanna glad-gamer. The tacts
do not permit me to be, as will be shown. On a basis of
definite fact, I judge the present age to be the best age in
history to live in, even though | consider people to be stil]
very stupid. I do not think that 1 am as stupid as some peo-
ple (I shall not ever bother the reader to praise me for hav-
ing ‘“modesty,’’ as I have a negligible amount); but I find
that J am enough like other people to prefer to associate with
them—wouldn’t feel at home among really intelligent peo-
ple. So I like the human race very much on the whole, and
shall not try to revise it. We are all on the way of acquir-
ing more truth and hence more religion or life, or whatever
the reader prefers to call the good we get. So the only
panacea is experience—or in scientific technicality :- experi-
ments. When we consciously get experience, we name it
education.

j. Although I am thus correctly optimistic about quali-
tative affairs (88149e, 161), in practical life I am able to see
existing quantitative abnormalities, or unbalances, or undue
departures from the average. I shall never bore the reader
with any nonsense to the effect that everything in ordinary
life is quantitatively good and lovely; for it is a fact that we
(in usual language) say we dislike abnormalities in ourselves
(usually calling them pains), and dislike to see them in

§7j I Introductory

others; and such abnormalities sometimes do exist. From a
wider point of view those painful things are good, and are
needed; but we can definitely attain that wider view only
by explicit recognition of that usual practical view of consid-
ering them painful ($177). From an immediate, direct point
of view it is unpleasant to contemplate an extremely skinny
man, and equally so to contemplate an extremely fat one;
both departures from the normal or balance or the immedi-
ately pleasing are obviously dangerous to life, or limit life.
The ‘‘upper ten’’ and the ‘‘submerged tenth’’ are abnormal,
and when we come across them I shall not deny that they
are. As we are getting a description of the universe, which
includes all things, as a detail it will have to be shown that
the I. W. W. and the domineering, profiteering employer
persistently try to depart—in opposite directions—from the
normal balance or the temperate life, from the democratic or
religious life; and are truistically offensive. So it is with
the materialistic scientist and his counterpart the dogmatic
theologian, the militaristic Prussian and the totally nonresist-
ant pacifist, the dualist and the technical mystic, the autocrat
and the socialist, the aristocrat and the tramp, the closet
philosopher and the “‘rough-neck,”’ the “‘pure’’ theoretical
man and the blatant “‘practical’? man. Inu brief, we shall
see (XVIII, XIX) that a democrat is a balanced, temperate,
religious man; and rigorous proof will be given that such a
man is the only sort who is happy and can possibly survive.
It is proved with mathematical rigor that our Constitution is
in agreement with that and with all natural law (XIX). So
the book will be pleasant from «a human point of view, pro-
vided the reader is none of those unbalanced sorts of persons.
In order really to prove anything about humans we
have to connect the proof consistently with ““natural’’ law.
So I connect it—or unify knowledge.

CHAPTER II.

§8. a. We have seen roughly the conclusions to be
reached. J shal] now state the order in which they are given,
as that shows briefly their general relationship.

b. The portion of the book following these introductory
remarks is divided into three parts. Part One gives a formal
or general unification of knowledge, by showing the language
trick. Part Two gives a unification in “‘concrete’’ terms of
**matter’’——or is physical science. Part Three gives the uni-
fication in “‘spiritual’’ or “‘mental’’ terms, and is the science
of human beings, or humanics.

c. Those three Parts are briefly outlined in the next
three sections. Here it may be emphasized that in substance
all three are identical. I.e.,each Part is essentially a repe-
tition of the other two: the same principles are merely re-
peated in terms of different things—the essentials of words
in Part One, of matter in Part Two, and of menin Part Three
being identical. Al! the different ““sciences’’—the expres-
sions of all aspects of the universe, of all modes of living, of
all jobs in life—are merely repetitions of the same essential
things. They are simply different points of view—quantita-
tively different expression—of the same thing, regardless of
how widcly different their names may at first secm to be.
Obviously, such repetition is a truistic result of unification:
for unification means the ultimate identity of all things.

§9. PART ONE. — Formal Unification. a. The first
form of unification gives the verbal trick. The statement of
that trick or method may with about equal accord with con-
ventions be named (1) the theery of Janguage, or (2) the
theory of mathematics or (3) principles of mathematics, or
(4) legic. And as I shal! make a concrete mode] of language

Order and relationship of contents.

UNIVERSE +

(VIII) which is a machine, the statement of that trick could
also properly be named (5) mechanics. But as Part One
does not explicitly discuss what are ordinarily called **con-
crete’’ things, that Part could also rather conventionally be
named (6) philosophy. And also, because the language trick
is found to be identical with what in theological technicality
is called the Trinity, Part One might with verbal conven-
tionality be ealled (7) religion. Unification itself means
‘‘consistency’’; and as consistency is simply “‘valid classifi-
eation,’’ which is conventionally “‘science,’’? Part One is
also (8) science.

b. Thus it appears how unessential mere names are. I
endeavor to use names in the way that is generally eustomary.
But as soon as we begin to get a real understanding of things,
names begin to coalesce—sometimes with such persistence
that even temporary verbal distinctions become hard to hold.

ce. Obviously, so far as formal completeness is coneerned,
I might end the book with Part One. For it essentially
unifies knowledge. But so far as that goes, knowledge is
also completely formally unified im the first few paragraphs
of Part One (§12). We need further repetitions of the uni-
fication as a proof that actual unification is possible (ef. §35),
and in order to get directly applicable conclusions. For
centuries there has existed a formal unification in the word
God, or in the word wniverse—and neither unification has
practically proved to be very applicable, or intelligible.

S10. PART TWO. Concrete Ungfication. a. Con-
sequently it is proved that mind and matter are identical
($$46, 150), and our unification of knowledge is explicitly
shown in Part Two to hold good with respect to ‘‘matter.’’

b. The doing of that constitutes physical science. We
shall see that such science is very useful for our purpose be-
cause its terms permit us to be definite. And its concepts
are simple, and hence easily grasped. So it is excellent as
an introduction to the difficult science of humanics—difficult
because of the numerousness or ‘‘complexity’’ of its details,
which are hard to hold clearly in memory. That physical
science is also directly useful of itself, as it is an intelligible
description of the ‘‘environment,’’ which we continually use.

S11. a. PART THREE. Spiritual Unification. a.
The last part is another repetion of consistent knowledge,
given in terms of humans. That final repetition is crucial
proof that matter is mind——it being the actual consideration
and use of matter as such in a way that obviously agrees with
the facts.

b. Part Three is, practically, the direct application of a
unified knowledge to our immediate interests. It is familiar,
and can be used by everybody—is used, in fact; for] merely
describe how people act. In Part Two we see that every
atom, our solar system, our galaxy-—every so-called material
thing—is a live personality with actually as many traits or
‘“properties’” as a man. But im physical science we ean not
see those traits so well; hence in each sort of “‘materia]’’
structure we explicitly consider only the few outstanding
properties. And that “‘simplicity,’’ which is really meager-
ness, permits us to work up gradually to a consistent grasp
of the numerous perceptible propertics of men. But at the
same time, much of Part Two is unfamiliar and ‘‘uninterest-
ing’’ to the genera] reader simply because those properties
of atoms have not been conventionally named like the same
properties in humans, and so atoms are not at once recognized
from the very names as being like himself. The general
reader will hence necessarily find Part Two to seem some-
what “‘abstract’’ at first. There is no need that he try to
remember Part Two. But at least a casual acquaintance with
physical science is needed for any actual understanding of
ourselves, as we shall see at some length.

5 UNIVERSE

ec. In writing Part Two I have tried to show that most
of it is of immediate interest to us, and to remove its verbal
abstraction. Butitis written with all the fundamental rigor
I could put in it, as is the rest of the book. Nothing has
been ‘‘prettified’’ or sugar-coated for a lazy mind. Through-
out I omit many details, the explicit statement of which
would serve more to complicate than it would to forward the
main thread of thought. Many such details ] know; but I
am quite aware that there are enormously more of which 1]

One Ill §14b

am not explicitly conscious—although the argument, as is
proved, implicitly includes them all. But everywhere the
book is written “‘up,’’ in an attempt to equal in worth the
work of the best experts in each particular subject, and to
interest them. However, the normal reader will find that he
is quite my equal in most subjects and superior in some, if he
will only take his ability for granted, and ignore the super-
stition that there is something esoteric and appallingly
recondite about ultimate knowledge.

PART ONE

FORMAL UNIFICATION;

CHAPTER III. Nature of the general problem and its conven-
tional name; or, what apparent failure in unification
requires reconcilement.

812. a. In this section we shall see in a brief, concrete
form the whole trick which definitely unlocks all truth. After
that I shall prove the need of such an unlocking, and then
begin in a more comprehensive and generally applicable fash-
ion to express and apply the trick.

b. Without stating the proof explicitly, it still will be
rather obvious that we may make atypical form of statement
or sentence, thus:- ‘Two things plus [or:- and} three things
are equal to five things.’ We may abbreviate it,
thus:- ‘two and three are five.’ Or we may abbreviate it
still more:- ‘2+3=5.’ The only other general form of
statement is what is called the truism, in which both sides are
explicitly identical, as:- 55, A is-A, A—=A. Later we
shall see that all true or-and intelligible statements can be
reduced to truisms (§§35-7); we can see at once that our
2-+3=5 is really the same in meaning as 55. Mostof the
sentences we use are obviously but slightly removed from be-
ing explicit truisms. E. g., John is a boy means that John
[cohom I know to be a boy] is a boy, or Boy=Boy. Or, we
could call “‘boy’’ a “‘elass,’’ and finally get the truism in the
general form, One unit [who is named John] is one unit [in a
collection or class named “‘boy’’|; or, 1==1. But we need not
go into that here. It was mentioned merely to make it
reasonably obvious at this point that, unless we make sen-
tences which are explicit truisins, the general form is 2+3
=5. And that sentence is itself only one step from a tru-
ism, as noticed:- for the first member, 2-3, is obviously 5,
and we have, 5=5.

c. So we start with merely the general form of state-
ment, in an abbreviated form:- 2+3=5. In the first
member of that, we have two parts, “2’ and “3’. I. e., the
first member implicitly asserts that there are two collections
of things, which collections are at least verbally separate. The
last member of it asserts that there is only one part, °5.’
I. e., the last member implicitly asserts that there are not two
collections of things, but that there is one collection not ver-
bally separate. In short, so far as form or language is con-
cerned, the last member formally contradicts the first. Hence,
in our typical sentence, we say a thing is so; and then
promptly, and as a part of the very same sentence, say it is

not so. Pe
d. Well; by all conventional views of logic or " reason’

our typical sentence is thus verbally or formally positively
and completely illogical and irrational, as it says one thing
and then at once says it is not true—as it flatly contradicts
itself. But by ordinary commonsense—by direct observation
we know that the typical sentence is correct

3

or experience

or THEORY OF LANGUAGE

or true. In fact,a proverbial symbol for obvious truth is the
statement 2+2-—-4; and I should have used that, except we
needed to distinguish one 2 from the other 2, and it is hence
rhetorically less awkward to use 2+3.

e. Therefore, we simply use observation or ““common-
sense,’’ and conclude that orthodox logic or reasoning is
wrong, because 2-+3—=5 is correct. Then we further con-
clude, as being the total essential of a valid logic, that in any
sentence—i. e., completely stated and tntelligible sentence—
which is not a truism of the form AA, we must have a
formal or verbal “‘contradiction,’’ in the respect that parts
are asserted both to be parts and alse to be combined into a
whole which is not parts. In fact, we may readily see that-to
make such a ‘‘contradiction’’ is the whole purpose and use
of language :- to combine parts into a whole: to make names
of parts coalesce into a formal unit that means the whole.
That states the essential of language and the whole
verbal trick. We apply that trick, and thus unify know-
ledge, by adhering to the simple rule:- make sure that the
valid—or “‘rational,’’ or “‘true’’—sentence does contain such
a formal contradiction; if it does not, and is not a truism,
it is really nonsense.

S13. a. That is the sum total of the essentials of valid
logic, and it implicitly contains the solutions of all qualita-
tive problems. The last three paragraphs express all the
real argument of this book, and there is nothing in all of
knowledge any more difficult to understand than those sim-
ple observations. The reader knows that logic already. He
uses it daily, as ‘““commonsense,’’ without even having to
*“‘think’’ about it. He is so expert at it that he would find
difficulty in saying how he does it, just as he would find
(perhaps much less) difficulty in stating precisely what mo-
tions he makes in putting on his clothing. Below in this
book I merely point out the details of that familiar logic, and
the reader verifies them by his own observation and discov-
ers that he knows all answers to questions of principle.

b. So I now begin to translate that simple argument into
the various aspects of it we have become accustomed to use.

S14. a. As we proceed we shall see in more and more
detail that the formal contradiction occurring in that simple
typical sentence is inherent in positively all knowledge or
expression. I shall state in this section some of the more
general aspects of the contradiction which have been recog-
nized, often for centuries (also cf. 5th and 6th paragraphs of
Dewey’s Introduction).

b. For each one of perhaps a thousand points of view
that contradiction already has a definite conventiona] name.
The “‘philosophers’’ long ago (they were the scientists of
those days) named the formal way of speaking of parts—e. g.,

$14b III One

of our ‘2’ and *3’—the Many; and the formal way of speak-
ing of the whole, the One. Or perhaps mostly, they called
the parts themselves, the Many; and the whole itself, the
One. Usually I shall not need to be explicit about such a
distinction between parts and expression of parts, etc. (cf. §36).
And when the philosophers had assigned those names, some
asserted that the Many was “‘real’’ or the “‘truth,’’ and the
One false or ““seeming’’ or ‘‘appearance’’; and others said it
was not so—that it was vice versa. And that dispute was
and is named the problem of the One and the Many.

ce. We shall see in detail that the problem is by no means
an academic one, without appreciable effect on actual life
(see Index, s. v. “One and Many’’). For identically the
same problem is involved in the theological Trinity, and
disputes over that plunged peoples into wars for centuries
and still produce clashing, expensive sects. Whether a dem-
ocracy is right, or an autocracy or other sort of aristocracy,
is the same problem (XIX). As the problem has not before
been rigorously and with explicit consistency settled, it fun-
damentally produced the world war, which was an attempt,
perhaps more automatic or instinctive than conscious, to find
out how much aristocracy could be imposed on people.

d. We have already implicitly seen in our concrete ex-
ample 2-+3=5, that the problem of the One (the whole)
and Many (parts) was not an actual problem at all, but sim-
ply a puzzle of form—of arbitrary use of language, of verbal
technique. Man invented a language; and he thereby cre-
ated a verbal puzzle which he fancied was a real, world-
shaking problem. And he finally got so befuddled that he
ealled it the riddle of the universe—or if theologically in-
clined, the mystery of God. The human race took words,
mere words, far too seriously—made idols of them. ‘The
race have been highbrows:- idolaters of words, the last spec-
ies of a long line of idolaters of more tangible things. How-
ever, we shall see that the normal man actually did not get
so befuddled: he merely made no explicit reply to the num-
erous varieties of aristocratic exploiters who kept misusing
language according to their own mistaken ideas of self-
interest until they came to believe their mendacities and
evasions. That befuddling, highbrow bunco game is now
mild in comparison with the past. But it may be observed
still—nearly surely in this morning’s paper, unless like the
Boston “‘Transcript’’ it has an editor especially well bal-
lasted with fair-play commonsense. This book explicitly
shows how the priesthood of that last, most subtle idolatry
work their game.

e. The sum of the matter is that there exists no riddle
of the universe, no mystery—that there exists no real prob-
Jem of any sort. The solution we shall get to that pseudo-
problem, which we have already seen broadly given by
everyday observation or commonsense in 812, is that the One
is true, and that the Many is also true in a formal way, even
though they are formally contradictory. We shall simply
investigate those formal contradictions, and see.how to keep
out of any real contradictions, and how to eliminate our vari-
ous verbal] puzzles.

S15. a. We may go somewhat more into detail! as to the
modern forms of the One and Many.

b. John Dewey, in the ““Introduction’’ of his ‘“Essays
in Experimental Logic,’’ definitely implies continually that
this Cne and Many underlies all philosophy or togic. Dewey
is accepted by the experts as a Jeading authority (see Riley,
** American Thought’; ““Eney. Brit.,’’ xvi, 918, footnote 8).
I think he is one of the best of ali plrilcsophers, logicians,
and psychologists—and J muy add that since he wrote the
Introduction for me J] naturally think sc more emphatically.
And William James, who was finally in his ‘“Radical Empiri-

UNIVERSE 6

cism’’ almost as sound as Dewey, says somewhere that he
has come to believe that the One and the Many finally un-
derlies all problems.

c. Russell, one of the leading mathematical authorities,
shows in a general way (‘‘Ency. Brit.,’’ xvii, 881) that the
One and Many is at the base of mathematics, and points out
the contradiction—which he says he obviates. We haveseen
($3c) how the mathematician Shaw disagrees that Russell
avoids the contradiction, and states that Poincare was doubt-
ful of ever reconciling mathematical differences of opinion
over infinity (infinity is one mathematical name for the One—
see §§30, 4.3).

d. Technical scientists rarely use the ‘‘philosophical’’
name, ‘One and Many.’’ But we may quickly find them
asserting the existence of the ‘‘problem’’ in the most ortho-
dox of treatises. E. g., Maxwell is quoted in Watson’s
‘*Physics’’ (p. 2):- ““The difference between one event and
another does not depend upon the mere differences of the
times or places at which they occur, but only in the differ-
ences in the nature, configuration, or motion of the bodies
eoncerned.’’ In that statement Maxwell is obviously trying
to say what really divides the whole or One of things into
parts or ‘‘events’’ of the Many (and as he didn’t know, his
statement is, as we shall see in time, confused and unintel-
ligible—although it is given children to learn). And three
times he uses a form of the term ‘‘difference,’’ which is itself
a technical philosophical term—the problem of Differences—
that is substantially a synonym of “‘One and Many.”’

e. That shows with great brevity that authorities agree
that the One and Many is fundamental, even though they
name it variously. As we proceed we shall incidentally see
all kinds of authorities naming the problem, and puzzling
over it. The general statement of the problem obviously is :-
we seem to see the universe in two opposite aspects, (1) split
into parts as the Many, and (2) connected into a whole as the
One, or universe: and the problem is, How reconcile that ap-
parent contradiction ?. We are now ready to sce, by
our own observation and without any of the explicit support
of convention and authority which I have been citing above,
that the problem is fundamental, even though we state it in
everyday “‘scientific’’ terms:-

f. First, we consider broadly the very bottom thing of
science, a ‘machine’’ (for details, see §S21, 8ef, 962).
When we say a machine works—and obviously it is not a
machine in a conventional] sense if it does not work ,—we con-
sider the machine as a unit—as a One. Equally obviously,
the machine is made up of parts, which are the Many.
Everything which we conventionally call a machine has
at least two perceptible parts:- e. g., a lever is the bar
(or “‘lever’’) and the fulerum; a screw is the thread (the
‘‘serew’’) and the nut; the inclined plane, as a machine, is
the plane and the load on it. In each case there is a jfric-
tional union of parts which may be “‘separated.’’ We may
make a typical sentence for, as, or ““describing’’ a ma-
chine:- One part plus |i. e., held on by some degree of’ friction
to| at least one more part is a machine. Or, we may abbrevi-

ate:- One part + One or more parts = The machine, or the
Whole. Or, The Many = The One. There, in z
‘*scientifie’’ ““inachine,’’ we obviously have parts equal to a

connected whole—which is formal/y contradictory. But cb-
viously, both are true (so far, we see by ordinary common-
sense that they are true; later it is erplicitly proved to be
truc—IV). So again we have our general *“solution’? :-
The Many=The One. And we see at once that the mistake
some people have been making as to “‘machines’’ was that
they emphasized the parts of the machine, and overlooked
the equally true fact that there was a machine only as it was

7 UNIVERSE

a connected, consistent, really inseparable whole—related
together as a structure, or organism (XI). When a baby
takes apart a watch it is no longer to him a watch—it is not
a watch except as it works together. When an infant phil-
osopher or scientist or theologian takes apart the universe—
‘‘analyzes’’ it, not into a ‘‘machine,’”’ but into machine parts,
—he can not put it together, and to him it no longer is the
universe or a whole; to him it is a pile of mental junk, vari-
ously named agnosticism, dualism, etc. But, the obvious
fact is, he never did actually take the universe apart; in his
egocentric, anthropocentric way (§$40f, 73h, 100, ete.) he
just fancied he did. The universe kept right on working,
and his “‘analyses’’ produced no real problem.

g. Newton’s first law of motion, which asserts inertia,
explicitly states that no body can move unless acted upon by
another body (§88). If we agree to say that bodies move (we
could construct a valid science, wherein nothing verbally
moves—§97), then at once we imply that in some way the
universe (the One) is as a whole made up of parts (the Many)
which are connected in some way that permits motion (by
orthodox logic no such motion can occur—Index, s. v. ‘“Ze-
no’’), And as we shall see ($88), the other two laws of
motion were Newton’s attempt to assert that there was no
logical contradiction in that assertion of inertia. In short,
his laws were an attempt, surprisingly successful for that age,
to solve the One and the Many.

h. The last two paragraphs give two of the thousands of
ways in which science names its forms of that so-called philo-
sophical problem of the One and Many. I may at this point
merely name some other ways that will probably be seen
obviously to involve the problem.

i. There is now much apparent conflict between ‘‘quan-
tum’’ theories, and ‘‘continuous’’ energy theories—such as
wave theories. Those quantum theories in effect assert that
fundamentally the universe is divided into parts (here, parts
of energy—the term energy being the more usual scientific
name for universe). The opposing theories assert that there
is no such division—that the universe in continuous (XIII).

j. That conflict of words begins far back in scientific
history, and comes up to the present day. Is heat small,
Many motions (and if so, a Many of what?); or is it continu-
ous phlogiston? Is electricity continuous energy (the One),
or discrete as electrons or corpuscles? Usually now it is taken
as discrete; but the question has already come up whether
electrons are continuous inside. Is light continuous as
waves, or discrete corpuscles—or in modern terms, discrete
magnetic disturbances? Or, in more generality, are there
exact or eternal or absolutely separate atoms (the Many); or
no exact, really separable atoms (the One)? The so-called
kinetic theory gives two answers to that which contradict
each other (§89, etc.). And the electron theory is in the
same contradictory condition:- Thomson and his school hold
that electrons have tubes of force, which substantially
amounts to continuity; and the other school have discrete
electrons in what is substantially the older kinetic theory.

816. a. I think that is enough evidence of the general
need of an investigation of the One and Many. It is prob-
ably already obvious to the reader that the investigation,
even if it does apply only to a verbal confusion, is of funda-
mental importance in reaching a conscious understanding of
things, regardless of whether we consider those thingsas be-
longing to science, philosophy, or religion. So we begin
the completely explicit solution.

§17. a. ‘“The Encyclopaedia Brittanica’’ (11th edition)
seems to me to be the most reliable generally available auth-
ority as to what are orthodox doctrines concerning most sub-

i

One Ill §17d

jects. As] am trying to use words in their customary
senses, so as to he easily intelligible, I shall frequently cite
that encyclopedia as giving such general agreements as to
words and facts. Hence, indeveloping the meaning of ““One
and Many’’ ] shall show some of the details of the orthodox
difficulties by quoting the important parts of that encyclo-
pedia’s articles on pluralism and monism:-

b. Art. ‘‘Pluralism’’:- ‘“‘Pluralism ***, a term used
** in philosophy for any theory which postulates more than
one absolutely distinct being or principle of being [postulates
the Many], opposed to monism. Pluralistic systems are
based on the difficulty of reconciling with the monistic prin-
ciple the principles of variety [or Difference] and freewill.
The chief difficulty which besets any such view [that there
is an absolute Many, or pluralism] is that if the elements are
absolutely independent, the cosmos [universe] disappears
and we are left with chaos: if, on the other hand, there is
an interrelation ***, the elements [the Many] are not ulti-
mate in any intelligible sense.’’ l. e., if the universe
is not chaos, then as a truism it is not possible to say (as a
concrete example), that there is any actual difference which
will permit us to distinguish between a man and a moon.
Clearly, if we take language forms as seriously as the writer
of that article, we are fundamentally forever barred from
knowing anything.

ce. Art. “‘Monism’’:- ““Monism, *** the philosophic
view of the world which holds that there is but one form of
reality, whether that be material or spiritual. The aim of
knowledge is explanation, and the dualism or pluralism which
acquiesces in recognizing two or more wholly disparate forms
of reality has in so far renounced explanation (see Dualism
(i. e., the Article quoted in the last paragraph]). To this
extent monism is justified [probably the writer means that
monism is justified in that it ‘explains’]; but it becomes
mischievous if it prompts us to ignore the important differ-
ences in facts as they present themselves to our intelligence.
All forms of monism from Plotinus downwards tend to ignore
personal individuality and volition, and merge all finite ex-
istence in the featureless unity of the Absolute; this, indeed,
is what inspires the passion of protestagainst monism. Turn-
ing to the historical forms of the theory *** [there follows a
short statement of philosophical technicalities not needed
here; and it may be added that there seems to be evidence
of Chinese monists centuries before Plotinus]. Those who
maintain that all these forms are hasty and superficial stand
by the conviction that the right philosophical attitude is to
accept provisionally the main distinctions [differences] of com-
monsense [but we saw, in the case of the machine, §15f,
that commonsense gave also a One, as well as that Many},
above all the distinction of personal and impersonal; but to
press forward to the underlying unity so far as experience
and reflection justify.’’

d. We may note that the writer of the second article
speaks of “‘a passion of protest.’’ In short, the reason peo-
ple have not agreed on the One and the Many is, from one
point of view, because they took mere words so seriously as
to become violently emotional over the problem. There is
current an odd fiction that philosophers are unemotional (for
the psychology or **human nature’’ of it, see §155); but we
have just seen the staid ‘“Brittanica’’ tacitly agreeing that
it is proper for emotions to keep professional philosophers
from agreeing. It is sometimes fancied that scientists do not
thus let emotions interfere with their consideration of the act-
ual facts. But some in real life become violently emotional
the minute this problem is mentioned; e. g., one professional
astronomer spat out “‘metaphysician’’ at me, as the vilest
epithet he could invent, because I incautiously used with him

Ce

§17d II] One

the name “‘One and Many.”’ Those remarks are
made to show that there is all the emotion there is, concealed
under the apparently harmless and abstract ‘‘philosophical’’
problem of the One and Many. We are going to go cau-
tiously with it, so as not to set off any premature emotional
explosions. (See Dewey’s recognition in his 8th paragraph
of one of my methods of doing that which I agree J have
overdone, but‘which I ‘don’t'dare modify.) | But when, we
have the solution thoroughly. controlled; it, is to, be. shown
that area] grasp of the problem is an ultimate religious ex-
perience, or “‘conversion,’’ or **rebirth”’ (S8153f, 162).

S18. a. The One is therefore a conventional and useful
technical term meaning that the universe with all its phe-
nomena is inherently continuous or joined together; or is an
absolutely inseparable or indivisible unit. We shall see the
proof that the universe is really thus; but at the same time
we shall see that it is absolutely impossible to make a pos-
tively intelligible statement or cxpression about such a uni-
verse. Consequently, to anticipate—perhaps somewhat
unintelligibly here,—-the universe will arbitrarily be talked
of as a pluralism—explicitly as an ‘infinite pluralism,’ which
is a formally self-contradictory name, not before used in
that sense so far as I know. |

b. The Many, as a conventional technical term, means
that the universe is made up of more than one part, each part
being, absolutely distinct, separable, and absolutely real in
itself; ““the Many’’ is the conventional name for the parts.
Obviously, such a ‘collective’ name is essentially sclf-contra-
dictory if it is supposed to have a real meaning, if the parts
are absolutely separate; for in that case they are truistically
absolutely not collectible, even verbally. Hence, in this book
we shall not have “‘the Many’’ used with that absolute con-
ventional meaning. I shall use it asa term, admittedly form-
ally self-contradictory and desirably so, which asserts or
implies that we have arbitrarily divided the universe into
parts, basing the division upon certain agreements among
' men (§100, ete.). For, to anticipate the proof agaim—and
‘again perhaps somewhat unintelligibly here,—when we are
positively intelligible in our language, we have to speak con-
‘eretely of the Many; an actual language is otherwise impos-
‘sible (IV). Also, we may validly hold that the infinite Many
is true, or is the One ($49).

S19. a. The only other technical philosophical word
which the reader need remember is dualism. Instead of
using the now unfashionable theological name devil, I say
dualist—and there are many professed dualists, although asa
matter of fact there can not possibly be a real dualist, as we
shall see. Kant, in so far as he was explicit, was a dualist;
the Germans took him seriously—and see what happened
to them.

b. By dualism I mean that nonsense which is dressed up
in the orthodox “‘logical’’ form—i. e., all explicit, formal
orthodox “‘reasoning’’ is dualistic and nonsensical. J shall
describe that conventional form by this quotation in substance
from Art. ““Dualism,’’ ““Eney. Brit.’’:- Dualism is a term
that is applied to all doctrines which try to explain facts
by classifying them all under two coexistent and separate cr
distinct forms or ‘“beings.’’ Dualism in technical philosophy
postulates—i.e., assumes and then undertakes to prove—~the
eternal coexistence of positively separate mind and matter;
it is thus opposed to an ‘‘idealistic monism’’ and a “‘materi-
alistic monism.’’ [The “‘Encyclopaedia’’ says there are
those two sorts of monism, thus obviously making ‘‘monism’’
also finally dualistic; as a fact, the German variety of “*mon-
ism’’ does in effect make so-called monism a dualism—§49. |
Similarly, there aré two forms la ‘dualism’ | of dualism.

One form is that ynind oe matter are absolutely heterogene-

i 3
¢." a ;

torical details.

UNIVERSE 8

ous {that is the form that has been substantially stated just
above]. The other holds that matter in its usual sense does
not exist, but that we have an “‘idea of matier,’’ and the
dualism then consists of the eternal absolute distinction be-
tween (1) the idea of matter, and (2) ideas themselves, or
“‘reason.”’ The reader need not worry if he fails to
understand all that: it is unintelligible when considered ex-
plicitly: I have been simply quoting—translating into my
erude, common words. Indirectly and implicitly, that formal

‘dualism contains the basis of truth, so that it will vaguely

mean something:- for we saw that dualism at onee formed a
dualism of dualistn: that regress actually implicitly goes on
indefinitely and gives the truth (SS23-4). But that remark
is not intelligible at this point.

c. Inthe Article ““Dualism’’ there are given numerous
historical facts about the forms of dualism. E. g., according
to the encyclopedia the ‘‘Christianity’’ which holds that
there is a God and a Devil is substantially dualistic, and the
morality that makes Good and Evil absolutely distinct is
positively so. In suitable places below I shall soive those
puzzles without burdening the reader with the explicit his-
But J may mention here, in anticipation of
the proof in §24c, that all orthodox pluralism is in final form
dualistic, because orthodox logic is explicitly dualistic. In
short, all positive expression in past history, previous to the
present solution of the verbal trick, was technically a plural-
ism which was a dualism, and hence was technically wrong,
if we hold it rigorously to a valid logical standard. Asa
matter of fact, very few people ever dreamed of interpreting
previous expression thus rigcrously: substantially, most past
expression was right, and sensible people actually definitely
disparaged the orthodox logic, and very great men like
Christ practically repudiated it (8162e). |

820. a. We see thus that orthodox philosophical terms
are quite self-contradictory. Orthodox scientifie terms are
as bad, as we saw in §15, and shall see in more detail from
time totime. Those contradictions are obviously the attempts
of various men to dodge the formal contradiction that is un-
dodgably inherent in the One and Many. So imevitably,
those attempts to escape the inescapable simply, for each at-
tempt, put the contradiction in a new place; and instead of
resulting in a “‘solution’’ where no solution was needed,
simply added one more verbal puzzle. (That is the whole
qualitative history of ““philosophy.’’) The attempt became
more puzzling when the contradiction was made movable with-
in a given “‘system,’’ so that it wasn’t ‘‘there’’ just when
we thought we “‘had’’ it:- such an elusive state of affairs
occurs in technical philosophical mysticism (analogous words
are mystify and mysterious), or in Bergson’s ‘“intuition’’ ; or
in modern science, relativity is really an example, which by
rigorously making the contradiction move infinitely becomes
technically sound, as will become intelligible in §66.

b. We may here, in further detailed proof of the exist-
ence of such contradictions, and ASG useful means of becoming
inoculated against taking any ““isms?? —‘‘ 5, ystems’’ —too seriously,
casually note some further substantial quotations from the

“Eney clopaedia. ’ TI use the Articles ““Realism,’’ ‘‘Ideal-
ism,’’ ““Mysticism’’ (and of course what I thus substantially
quote is, just of itself, mostly unintelligible—a deliberate
but factually correct parody on the human mind as it disports
itself in the “higher learning’’) :-

c. Realism is a ‘‘philosophical term used in two opposite
senses. (1) The oldest of these is the scholastic doctrine,
traceable back to neerates, that univer sals have a more ear’
existence than things.’’ A “‘universal’’ of a chair (say) is
not real ehairs, but the mental “‘ideal’’ chair. In its extreme
form of this first meaning, realism denies the reality of

9 UNIVERSE

anything but “‘universals,’’ and is opposed to what is called
‘‘nominalism’’ and “‘conceptualism.’’ [That denial is of
course logical nonsense; a ‘‘universal’’ is what we later call
a relationship word—see §§57, 49 for the solution of that
orthodox nonsense.| (2) The modern application of realism
is to the opposite doctrine that there is a reality apart from
such universals. There are several forms of that sort of doc-
trine:- e. g., ‘natural or naive,’’ ‘‘ideal,’? empirical,’’
“transcendental,” ete. {Obviously from those quo-
tations, the two opposite varieties of realism are tacitly both
dualisms. But when expression is so vague and conflicting
as those quoted definitions, no one can say positively what
such expression does mean. |

d. Mysticism requires about five of the encyclopedia
pages, the size of these, to explicate. The article says, to
begin with, that mysticism is a ‘‘phase of thought, or rather
perhaps of feeling, which from its very nature is hardly sus-
ceptible of exact definition’’—l[as a matter of fact, we have
no difficulty in this book in considering it under the name of
infinite regress, which in psychology is called by the very
common names emotions or feelings—see Index, “Infinite
regress,”’ ‘““Emotions’’]. “Most frequently it [mysticism]
appears historically *** as a reaction of the spirit against the
the letter.’’ In short, orthodox historical mysticism makes
an inconsolable contradiction between “‘spirit’’ and “‘letter’’
—and having no “‘letter’’ can not actually express itself.
The emotions of mystics are ‘“violent’’; they are said to
have ‘‘fervid Godward aspirations. ”’ [T may mention
that several notable mystics have been considered by some
to be on the border-line of insanity, if not over. Women
sufficiently hysterical to be on the verge of insanity, such as
St. Theresa, are often mystics in the orthodox sense. |

e. The ‘*Encyclopaedia’’ uses six pages to explicate
idealism. First, there are two rather opposed meanings :-
(1) The popular meaning is substantially :- “‘abstract perfec-
tion’’; i. e., ““ideals.’’ In that sense, idealism is a form of
monism. As commonly used by the average man, J do not
think that idealism is quite so exaggerated, but think that it
is merely his name for the valid logic we are to deduce ex-
plicitly (cf, 849, etc.). (2) The technical meaning of ideal-
ism is:- the doctrine that conceives knowledge or experience
as a process in which two factors, subject and object, stand
in entire independence of each other. That of course is ad-
mittedly dualism. It is distinguished from so-called
‘*commonsense dualism,’’ which regards mind and matter as
being in “‘more or less accidental relation’’ with each other,
in that it ‘“seeks to realize its own ideas’’—| by which hysteri-
cal phrase I suppose is meant that it strives to relate its ideas
into a One, and thus stultify itself, and flop over to the op-
posite first meaning |. The article states substantially
that there is no contradiction between technical, dualistic
idealism and James’s pragmatism. But as a fact that is
easily verifiable, James, in ‘‘Essays in Radical Empiricism,”’
did explicitly flop from dualism to a monism that was really
valid logic (§§49p, 156).

§21. a. Viewing that maze of nearly unintelligible con-
ventional contradictions, the reader has probably seen for
himself that orthodox philosophy is rather indeterminate. It
was fairly obvious that the contradiction, which was shifted
about from point to point by the various “‘ists’’ in their dif-
ferent “‘isms,’’ is the formal one between the One and the
Many. _ Of course I took the easy way and madea
parody—a slight exaggeration—of that ‘‘higher thought.’’
(Those past experimental efforts to get consistent thought
were of course needed, and have actually been my guide in
working out this book.) But a proper constructive summary
of the whole thought of the race is given by Dewey in his

One Ill §21d

Introduction. His summary is a masterpiece, and was far be-
yond my powers—in fact, the reader needs to know consider-
able about the history of thinking to be able to appreciate
the excellence of that summary.

b. And probably the reader has seen already, in antici-
pation of the explicit discussion in the next chapter, that the
whole aim of philosophy and religion, in the search of a con-
sistent way of stating truth, was to get ‘one part’ related to,
or joined in some way with, ‘at least one other part,’ in or-
der to have the united, or One, meaning. In fact, as was
indicated in considering mysticism (§20d), unless there are
at least two such verbally contrasted parts, there can be no
positively intelligible expression. So philosophy was always
thrown back upon a dualism; and just as inevitably, as we
saw under ‘‘idealism’’ (§20e), it then struggled from that
really merely verbal dualism—which however it took too
seriously, as being “‘real’’—back to a united or One mean-
ing. And obviously, dualism is nothing more than an equiva-
lent name for ‘“machine’’ (§815f, 86f), or for “‘analysis.’’
Scientists use “‘machines’’ and ‘‘analyses,’’ and most of
them, precisely as do philosophers, struggle to get away from
that dualism to a popular idealism, or an intelligible “‘rela-
tivity,’’ or a ‘“unification,’’ or “‘understanding’’—or really,
to an explicit religion. Those who are too weak to struggle
much tend first to be ““quitters’’ by asserting agnosticism;
when they are sufficiently calloused to that lack of unifica-
tion or understanding, they become materialistic—which
variety of hardened, indifferent ignorance is, in everyday
terms, named cynicism—the dogmatic ignorance of the quit-
ter that is temporarily forgivable in the young, who almost
invariably assume it fora while as a protection from becoming
too fatigued by the flood of impressions rolling in (8155).

c. Jt is possible to go on from this point and show that
philosophers, poets, and prophets have invented an idea they
called God to make that dualism or machine work. When
they asserted (as the result of short vision—cf. $47) that
there really was a distinct dualism, then they obviously had
to have something to make that apparantly totally disas-
sembled machine get its parts together, and work together,
in order that it be intelligible or do what we plainly see it
doing. And they used their ““God’’ to do that. Obviously,
if God actually stuck the pieces together, then as a truism,
there was not any longer a dualism, or dismantled scientific
machine. And, unless the prophet himself actually created
that God, then clearly the God existed previously, and there
was not the dualism the prophet or scientist began by assert-
ing existed. So we see, merely as a truism, that the
idealist-dualists who “seek to realize their own ideas,’ and
the realist-dualists who make their machine work somehow,
both have, like the mystics, ‘‘fervid Godward aspirations’
—which means, in commonsense terms, a desire to see
things as they are (§§153f, 162, 166).

d. But we shall not spend any more time directly upon
such vague orthodox philosophy or theology, even in order to
see the interesting historical facts concerning man’s intellect-
ual inventions of God in his (man’s) own image ($1 70jm).
We shall proceed to make first-hand, rigorous investigations
of facts for ourselves, and not rely upon picking out consis-
tencies from the maze of conflicting ‘‘authoritative’’ doctrine
~—although the reader may readily do that for himself, if he
likes. By having heard those authorities a little we have
found some useful conventional words; and the reader is
perhaps convinced that it won’t do to take some of such
authoritative “*knowledge’’ very seriously.

§29a IV One
CHAPTER IV. Statement and proof of principles of lang-

uage; or, Logic.

§22. a. We now begin definitely to observe facts, each
for himself. JI simply point out the things the reader may
look at, as a means of seeing the truth for himself. What I
write is a sort of gnide or sign-board; it is not the truth, but
merely a particular expression of the trnth——certain symbols
that point to the truth.

b. It is an evident truism that if the reader is to use
solely experimental evidence, and is not to make the reaily
impossible attempt to substitute this present symbolic guid-
ance jor the truth, then J can not permissibly make any as-
sumption as to a real truth or fact, from which I ean “‘start.’’
If I were to say that ‘In the beginning God created the
Heaven and the Earth,’ or “In the beginning was the Word,’
then I] have assumed the truth or reality of everything about
those extensive subjects I cared to assert, regardless of
whether or not the reader could see and verify it for himself;
and the assumption is obviously used as the answer, or abso-
lute explanation, of any problem that is proposed. Obviously
there always would remain the problems:- Why is the as-
sumption true? and What was before the assumption that
made it true? and Just what does the assumption mean any-
way? What actually is the ““beginning,’’ and the ““Word’’?

ce. Therefore, in this book positively no essential or quali-
tative assumption is made: everything is based directly on
the reader’s seeing for himself. However, it is not possible,
in my writing this symbolic expression (or guidance as to
which direction the reader may look), to avoid two general
arbitrary, quantitative, or formal assumptions. For if I am
to write and have the writing actually guide, ] must formally
assume:- (1) that both the reader and I can and will use a
certain sort of agreed upon symbols or language; (2) that
those symbols do point to something for the reader to look
at. In this section we examine those ‘assumptions’
in more detail, it being shown that they are arbitrary and
not real.

d. The first assumption is simply that the reader and |
both speak English. Obviously, it is not essential in any
absolute sense that we do. It simply is:- that 7f we wish
to communicate, then we both must speak English (or any
other mutual language; the book can be translated into
other langnages for other readers without greatly modifying
its present pointings). So obviously, that assumption is not
real, but is a mere temporary and mutual agreement.

e. But that arbitrary assumption contains one corollary
or implication that is important, and which we need to keep
in mind. “To speak English’ [or other language] means
finally that jf we say A is A, then we must not undertake to
say that simultaneously A is not A; for to do that obviously
destroys at once what we say—and we then are not speaking
any langauge. That implication of the assumption is still
obviously arbitrary; for it says that if we agree to use cer-
tain words for certain things, then we must keep the agree-
ment until we give notice that we shall change it. It is not
an assumption in any real sense; for it is an obvious and
commonly accepted fact that (1) many people do not speak
‘English’ li. e., any language] (infants, e. g.), and that
(2) some who do speak ‘English’ will consciously and delib-
erately fail to adhere to such an agreement (are liars, in
short), and further that (3) a number who try to keep the
agreement have such poor memories or nervous systems that
they fail to do so. The agreement is usually referred to bv
the phrase, ““having the same definitions.’? But we are go-
ing to see, as an immediate implication of the principles of
time and space, that two persons can not have quite the same
definitions (S§36, DY Ot polio, Ch. 66): and that even after

UNIVERSE 10

I carefully make a definition it is impossible that it be accu-
rate (Index, s. v. ‘‘Exact’’), so that it is absolutely impos-
sible for me to adhere strictly to my own definitions.
Our examination into the language trick in this chapter will
show those facts abont ‘“definitions’’; we have had here a
summary statement of why there has always been so much
difficulty over ‘‘definitions’’——the difficulty is a quantitative
matter. Therefore, I have put our arbitrary agreement as
to language into an explicitly quantitative form, and we
shall see repeatedly, in further detail, that it is not a real
or qualitative assumption, but merely the base of the in-
vented language trick.

f. (2) Our second assumption, when we talk together
in this book, is that I am talking ‘about something.’ In
short, the minute I begin to use these verbal symbols then I
have tacitly assumed that the universe exists. | Now, clearly,
that assumption is substantially the same, at least in form,
as saying that ‘God exists, and his existence explains every-
thing’. It requires a little keen observing to see that this
second assumption is also formal, and not real. We shall
see it in general in the remainder of this section, and more
explicitly in §§60, 93, 161 (also, see Dewey’s treatment of
it in his Introduction). The assumption may be called the
existence assumption; the philosophers discuss it under the
names ‘‘being’’ or ‘“Being’’ or “‘substance’’ or ““ontology.’’
In actual effect, this total book is required to show and does
show, that it is not a real assumption. ;

g. We obviously correctly write the existence assump-
tion thus:- ‘Jf we speak English, then at that time we tacitly
assume that something exists, goes on, acts, or happens.’
Well; we can see as a truism that if ] had made #
real assumption there, then it would follow that if I had not
written the book the universe would not exist; or, I really
saved the reader’s life by writing this book, as otherwise he
would not ““be.’? That conclusion is clearly absurd. So it
is obvious that I am merely formally assuming the existence
of the universe. What actually happens, stated in a
commonsense and ultimately rigorous way (as proved by this
whole book), is that I write, ard in writing I describe the
formally-assumed universe; and the reader looks at it—what-
ever it is,—and 7f he sees it there, for himself, then the uni-
verse is experimentally and verifiably demonstrated to him,
and my formal or arbitrary assumption for the purposes of
this book was merely a tentative—i. e., not generally essential
—way or method or trick used in guiding him to see.

h. But that commonsense way of showing that I have
made no real assumption does not explicitly satisfy various
sorts of agnostics and irrationalists (§32c). They often even
definitely ask:- ““What is this universe you take for granted
you are talking about? and where does it come from and who
made it? and how?’’; and assert that unless I answer those
questions intelligibly then I have made a real assumption
that there zs such a thing as the universe when I start talking
about it. Again, the same commonsense way of answering
is, that in this book I do give verifiable answers to those
questions, and that further I show experimental, verifiable
proof that those answers are complete, and that nothing more
or further—in a qualitative way——could exist as an answer.
Hence, the book as a whole again is proof that my assump-
tion is formal.

i. But those commonsense answers do not content the
technical objectors. As we shall discover (§35ed), act-
ually the only final way or real way to prove any thing what-
ever is to do it or make a or produce it (‘observe’ it or

experience it, all that being merely the ancient wisdom
that the proof of the pudding is the eating thereof)—and
that actual way is the one we use in this book for all fina] or

il UNIVERSE

rigorous proof. But those objectors want an explicit technieal
statement which rigorously expresses proof that our existence
assumption is not real. SoI give it in the next paragraph;
but they will have much difficulty in understanding it at this
point, as the understanding requires a grasp of the whole
book. The actual fact, which causes the difficulty, is that
the objectors’ questions do not ask any real question; the
questions are wholly meaningless, or self-contradictory. The
reader not interested in technieal word juggling might well
skip the paragraph, in which I answer those word jugglers.

j. I assert the formal assumption that ‘something exists,
or goes on, or acts, or happens, about which we speak when
we speak English.’ We can arbitrarily consistently use that
form, and rigorously and intelligibly describe and prove
everything, without really assuming it. Each of the readers
using that formal assumption will then get the same meaning
as to what the ‘something existing’ is or is not, regardless of
how he considers it for himself: i. e., he can say that ‘it’ is
everything or nothing, mind, matter, God, consciousness,
ideals, real, unreal, trutb, lies, dreams, life, death, Nirvana,
heaven, hell, static, dynamic, or any one of millions of pos-
sible mere names; and then he will still, obviously to all the
other readers who will adhere to AA, mean just the same
that each of them does, regardless of the fact that each may
actually have used a different name (or ‘‘Being’’). Inshort,
J assert that this book, by using that formal assumption, will
get for each reader the same meaning, regardless of what he
says ‘it? ““really’’ is. That is the explicit assertion of what
I formally (and at least, necessarily tacitly) assume by
the very act of writing this book (every book tacitly makes
the same assumption—and every speaker of a sentence).
Now, the explicit proof of it is:- It appears as a tru-
ism, from the very agreement as to the primary use of the
‘English’ [any] language, that the ‘existence assumption,’
whatever it is, is absolutely and rigorously wnxexpressible in
any positive or actual words, as xo provision for such expression
is made by the agreement. (As a further fact, whieh the reader
may verify by personal trial, or which is made to appear im-
plicitly by this whole book, no such provision for that ex-
pression—the expression in words or ‘English’ of a real
assumption which has any positive, actual, or intelligible
meaning—can possibly be made; see the remarks on the in-
effable, §56.) Consequently, as a truism (which truism was
asserted to begin with: and the fact that there zs this ob-
servable truism, or obvious ‘‘circle of reason,’’ is the absolute
verbal proof—ef. §35), in no expressible sense is that assump-
tion a real assumption; consequently, it must be merely a
forma] one, or an arbitrary, temporary one. And as a part
of the same truism, the agnostic questions quoted in par. h
also fail to express any real question; or, this is a formal,
technical solution of the problem of Being (put in a negative
form: as stated above, the whole book is needed to give the
positive, really useful form).

k. Well; if the reader did not skip, he probably finds
that he does not care for those verbal gymnastics. J] do not
care for them myself, because they are not very useful; for
such formal expression of proof is generally unintelligible
to the very objectors and word quibblers who demand it.
That proof is the only sucha one given in the book; J put
that one in because I have found that it is often demanded
by impatient persons who do not know just what they are
asking for. Such ““proofs’’? do not convince. That one is
rather obviously a sample of the customary uselessness of
mere verbal ‘‘argument.’’ It is really a very brilliant ““argu-
ment.’’ But there is no room for that sort of stuff in this

book.
]. It may be held that if the reader is to observe for

One IV §23d

himself, then I am tacitly making a real assumption that he
is able to observe—or, more generally, that man is conscious ;
or, © I think, therefore ] am.’’ But that assumption that
the reader can observe is obviously included as a part of the
formal assumption that the universe exists (the reader is part
of the universe), and hence like that existence assumption is
arbitrary. As a matter of actual practical fact, that formal
existence assumption includes any assertion which I wish to
call to the reader’s attention for his personal verification. Any
non-dogmatic book or sentence makes the same assumption,
and leaves the verification to the reader or hearer. In prae-
tice, I simply refrain from pontifically asserting that anything
is so: the book lets the reader assert that anything whatever
is so or not so, just as he likes to say; and if he will then
stick to that verbal agreement, that 4—=A can not simultane-
ously be A is not =A, the book proves that his further con-
clusions, verbally consistent with that assertion, give him
absolute knowledge, and knowledge that essentially coin-
cides with all other persons’ similar knowledge, regardless of
how differently they started verbally. It of course
sounds odd to ‘start’? without starting from something—
without “‘assuming’’ something. But the total book wil] be
concrete evidence that it not only can be done and is done,
but that ultimately no other sort of ‘‘start’’ is possible
(otherwise, how could any baby possibly start learning?).
Valid logic or language or expression is circular, and can not
have a real “‘start’’ (§58j)—any more than a circle can.

S23. a. In order to clear the field of traditional obstruc-
tions, so that the reader may look at things as they are and
make his own discoveries, ] begin here and destroy the tra-
ditional logic—the logic given in the usual texts, which for
convenience I frequently refer to as the classic logic. That
logic is essentially dualistic (§24c), and J hence also refer to
it as dualistic or pluralistic logic. And as doctrines conven-
tionally written in texts are ordinarily tacitly claimed to be
“‘Jogical,’’ and the logic is wrong, it obviously follows that
insofar as such books really are ““logica]’’ or “‘rational’’ they
too are wrong. Some books tacitly admit being ‘‘illogical’’
— Alice in Wonderland,’’ ete. And some few (perhaps less
than a dozen) rather clearly repudiate classic logic :- Christ’s
remarks, Dewey, Richard’s theory, Jordan, etc. ($49o0p,
etc.). But by the destruction of orthodox logic we clear the
field, formally at least, of most printed doctrines or theories.

b. I said that I shall destroy the classic logic. To
speak more accurately, J shall complete that logic. But as
the completion contains the conclusion that the beginning of
the classical logic—its foundation—was not cnly positively
wrong and precisely opposite to the real truth, but that the
logic was also useless for any directly practical purpose any-
way (and actually never has been so used), then perhaps it
is permissible to call it “destruction.” However, the reader
ought to name that process what he judges best; I shall
name it destruction or completion according to the context.

ce. We may trust ‘“The Encyclopaedia Brittanica’”’ (xvi,
879) to state orthodoxly the essentials of that classic iogic:-
as being ‘‘the science of the processes of inference,’’—‘‘in-
ference’ being ‘‘the mental operation which proceeds by
combining two premises so as to make a consequent con-
clusion.”’

d. ‘The obvious, commonsense replies to two common-
sense questions at once destroy—merely destroy—that logic :-
(1) If the truth of one or more premises can be observed
directly, why can not the truth of the conclusion be ob-
served directly? Clearly, if we take a classie example of
‘"reasoning”’ or “‘logic’’—-such as ‘“‘All men are mortal;
Socrates isa man; therefore, as a conclusion, Socrates is

§23d IV One

mortal’’—it is just as easy (actually more so) to observe that
Socrates is mortal as it is to observe that all men are mortal.
Hence, such “‘logic’’ clearly does nothing which can not be
otherwise done. So there is obviously no nced of adding a
useless thing like “‘logic’’ to our burdens. (That is an ulti-
mate or absolute view. The actual temporary usefulness of
orthodox logic was that it was a tentative trial which, though
it turned out a failure itself, was needed as showing how not
to do it—a bit of experience essential in practically all cases. )
(2) The second question is:- If the two premises are two
distinct or separate entities of some scrt, not connected in
any way (as is explicitly implied by the encyclopedia), then
how can they be combined? and if they are already com-
bined, then why say that they are to be combined? Obvi-
ously, the crthodox definition of logic substantially asserts
that the premises are absolutely separate—are dualistic or
pluralistic. In that case the assertion by that logic that it
then combines the premises is self-contradictory and self-
destructive:- it says A is A (premises are absolutely separ-
ate), and that 4 is not A (premises are combined). On the
other hand, if the Jogic means that the premises are not sep-
arate, then they do not need to be combined, and there tru-
istically exists no such thing as the logic which does “‘com-
bine’’ them. In point of fact, this second question,
which promptly shows the absurdity of any such thing as
““logic’’ or ‘‘reason’’ being said to exist at all, is vaguely
in the minds of most thinkers nowadays; and their answers
to the question are not the brutal showing of the orthodox
contradiction which ] have just given, but an assertion of
agnosticism.

e. This paragraph is a slight digression:- When the
contradiction is thus dodged by asserting agnosticism—by
asserting:- ‘“I donot know’’—the same contradiction merely
bobs up in the next step. (That is well known; but I may
briefly write it ont in this paragraph.) If the agnostic as-
serts that the truth of no premise can be observed or known
——that we can not wltimately know whether the universe ex-
ists (even though its existence assumption is formally rigor-
ously demonstrated for him in §22j),—then as an obvious
truism he has no consistent right to assert the first definite
premise or assumption of the classic logic:- that two prem-
ises can be combined—or even to imply thus that a premise
can exist. A man who does not know can not consistently
make any assertion: to do so is to contradict himself essen-
tially—to say A=A and A is not—=A. He can not even as-
sert that he does not know, for then he would be asserting
that he knew at least one thing; and it would then immedi-
ately become necessary, according to the classic logic, that
he prove from that one premise, by using another which he
asserts does not exist, that he has no other—knows no other
thing. And it is obviously impossible—i. e., essentially
self-contradictory—to do that. In short, the customary as-
sertion of agnosticism promptly destroys both itself and the
classic logic at the very first step. The agnostic by
asserting agnosticism thereby asserts that he knows one thing
to be true. That promptly makes him in effect agree that
he observes—and tacitly adinits the properness of the exist-
ence assumption of the last section. I complete the
explicit qualitative principles of agnosticism—or rather the
showing of the complete lack of any valid principles—by re-
ferring to its variation called irrationalism, the technical
synonym for cynicism, in §35. But throughout this book it
is shown that qualitative ignorance is impossible—the expres-
sion of qualitative knowledge and definite consciousness of it
is a different matter, which is being explicitly treated in this
chapter, and will be finally fully considered in 8150. And
any absolute or exact quantitative knowledge is also impossible
(Index, s. v. © Exact’’).

UNIVERSE

12

S24. a. The last section shows the fundamental self-
contradictions in the classic logic, thus merely destroying !t.
In this section we examine that logic more explicitly, and see
its completion into one form of a valid logic.

b. Ifthe two premises actnally be separate, then ob-
viously reasoning consists in combining them. I. e., reason-
ing consists in creating (out of nothing—as nothing is sup-
plied by the classic logic for the purpose, as can be seen by
referring to the conventional statement of what that logic is,
in §23c)—reasoning consists in absolutely creating a link be-
tween two premises, so that the two and the link all join to-
gether into one—that creation “‘causing’’ the “‘consequent
conclusion’’ or that joined-together one. I am unable to con-
ceive anything’s being created ont of nothing—even an idea
as being created out of nothing. The assumption of such a
creation is saying) Nothing— Nothing, and then at the same
time, Nothing—Something, or A=A and A is not—=A. Cer-
tainly I never observed any such process as creating some-
thing out of nothing, and no one has ever submitted any
verifiable evidence that he observed such. But let us verb-
ally and formally assume that an idea, or that connecting
link just mentioned, zs created by reason or the classic logic;
and then let us see what happens, in strict agreement with
the orthodox method of that logic:- By the conventional
description of that logic we have definitely that the link did
not exist before it was created. Hence, it is at once a mere
truism that the creation of the link must also create the con-
clusion, and that the conclusion did not exist as fact or truth
before that actual creation. Therefore, by classic logic, be-
fore formal science was ‘‘reasoned’’ out, the universe was
chaos and the sun didn’t rise—which is glaring nonsense.
What science does is merely to call men’s attention to cer-
tain things: they look, and a part of those things actually
becomes a perceptible part of their nervous systems or minds
(see Chapter XVII, on psychology),—or their minds or ner-
vous systems grow asa result of observing, and nothing is
created (S898p, 120h, 144, 146, 166). Therefore, we
observe that the classical logic will invariably produce anon-
sensical conclusion—as shown typically in that conclusion
about chaos. And we use that observation as one premise;
and following strictly the rules of classic logic, observe and
use as a second premise:- that the classic logic is claimed to
exist—or to be not self-destructive. Then from the two
premises—viz:- (1) the classic logic destroys its conclusions
(i. e., gives nonsense), and (2) the classic logic is not self-
destructive or does not destroy its conclusions—we deduce
(as a truism of our verbal agreement not to contradict our-
selves) that there is no such thing as the classic logic or rea-
soning. All that—necessarily long-winded in order
to be strictly ““‘logical’’—shows nothing more than the un-
escapable contradiction in the One and the Many. The
classic logic merely shuts its eyes to it. We may readily see
Just how it arises and how to dispose of it, by observing the
classic logic a bit more in detail :-

c. Obviously from the last paragraph, classical logic is
a dualism—there being always in its forms one thing (prem-
ise) separate and distinct—evactly and sharply apart—from a
second thing (premise). _4// doctrines based on that logic
(i. €., conventional science, philosophy, and religion) are
hence truistically dualisms: or, are technically finite plural-
isms——tor the possibility is tacitly indicated by the conven-
tional description of classic logic that there may be more than
two premises; but obviously by that description there must
be a fnite number because that logic requires explicit state-
ment of its premises and only a finite number can be ex plic-
itly stated—that being atruism (or, for full discussion see
Index, s. v. ‘‘Infinity’’). And as a further truism, a vp
pluralism may always be reduced to a dualism; and as A

13 UNIVERSE

matter of commonsense fact, the classic logic itself takes its
final dualisms—whatever they are in the hands of its differ-
ent teachers—and always unites the pairs intoa One: an
example was given in §20e. However, classical] logic does
not explicitly agree to that commonsense fact, but takes one
premise and another premise and relates them by what is
actually a third thing or entity—that third entity agreeing
definitely in character with Descartes’sand Aquinas’s and the
Catholics’ God, and less definitely with the God of all other
doctrines or philosophies that use the classical logic (i. e.,
those others are with more or less explicitness beginning to
break away from the use of the classic logic and agree with
Christ). Or, the third entity constitutes whatever it is that
dualistic systems (§§19, 20e) vaguely and_ surreptitiously
mention as “‘relating’’ the “opposite two principles.’’

We may note an incidental but somewhat important truism
in al} that. We can see already that strictly speaking, even
formally or verbally there is no such thing as dualism:- for
that third or relating entity is alway put in in some way, and
that makes three things at least—and not two. Therefore,
all so-called dualisms are actually some sort of attempted
finite pluralism which is at least a ‘trinity.’ But in verbal
agreement with conventions I shall continue to use ““dual-
ism,’’ merely noting here the careless way the classic phil-
osophers had of bandying words.

d. Obviously, the classical logic has, in its historical
*“systems,’” used such a third, connecting link, even if that
link was no more than a formal word, such as ‘‘relation-
ship.’’ And clearly, as a truism, if the premises are such
sharply distinguished, separate things, they cannot be joined
—or ‘‘related’’ together in some way—without some link;
for if the two things were directly joined together they would
lose their essential character of being sharply distinct. But
then we immediately see that this link or third entity itself,
by the classic logic, needs a link on each side ef it to join it
to the first two things. That fact has frequently been ob-
served in the past (it is another mere truism of the logic’s
original assertion of absolutely separate things); and its ob-
servation is definitely the cause of assertions that pluralisms
were truth instead of dualisms. But we sawin the last para-
graph that those pluralisms were formally finite; also, they
were exceedingly vague as to how many things they con-
tained— although classic logic demands sharp, distinct things.
However, for the pluralists to have been explicit about how
many would have destroyed the classical logic. For if we
really observe what we are doing, and become explicit about
it, we see that, just as the first link needed a link on each
side of it to connect it, so those two links in turn need a
link on each side, and so on ad infinitum or in absolutely in-
finite regress—making thus an infinite number or never-ending
number of entities.” Thus by rigorously using the classical
logic we derive an infinite pluralism—which is sound or valid
(the “‘truth’’), as we shall also see in simpler and more di-
rect ways. But ‘infinite pluralism’ means ‘unmeasurable
pluralism,’ or ‘unnumbered number-ism’—which phrases or
names are explicitly verbally self-contradictory. Clearly,
unnumberable or uncountable pluralism means a continuous
connection of things: for we kept on multiplying those links
in infinite regress until they necessarily became continuously
joined—for if we went to absolute infinity those links would
necessarily use up everything in the universe and the last ones
would become zero, which truistically means that there is a
continuous joining. So the classic logic’s rigorous conclu-
sion as to what is truth contradicts its base:- that there were
separate and distinct things. But this time its conclusion is
obviously a verbal or formal self-contradiction :- ‘unnumber-
able number-ism,’ or “infinite pluralism.’ That conclusion

One IV §25c

obviously means either a continuous universe, or else one ab-
solutely divisible into an infinite number of parts of zero
size—which at least are not “‘parts’’ of any distinct, finite,
perceptibly separable size. (That is an odd looking conelu-
sion, of course; but later we shall see that it can be readily
handled when put into commonsense terms which merely say
‘there is no exact science.’) So when it is actually used
rigorously, the classic logic gets the truth by destroying its
base. Below we observe that in simpler, sounder ways.

$25. a. We may at once see some important facts. The
classic logic’s premises are not absolutely separate, in the
ordinary sense of the words. Consequently, they are al-
ready together, and we can, as a truism, observe conclusions
in essentially the same manner that we observe premises.
Therefore, there is no such thing as logic or reasoning in the
conventional sense. In the end we shall see that reason is
simply what is called consciousness (XVII); and is, in more
explicit terms, mind or intellect as verbally distinguished from
emotions. But emotions are a part even of that sort of
actually-existing reason. Man is not at all a ““reasoning’’
animal in the conventional sense. A number of very useful
implications are contained in that general fact; we shall see
them in detail throughout the book.

b. As the classic logic will, and does, come out right if
it be definitely taken as far as it will go, it is an obvious tru-
ism that in the past the best philosophers and prophets and
seers and scientists have been implicitly right. If we see
what they meant, even though they did not say it with rig-
orously explicit verbal self-consistency, then we see that
they were essentially right. As a matter of fact (the de-
tailed proof of which will appear from time to time), if we
take into account all the causes of anyone’s saying anything,
we see that no one can ever make an error: man can not
make a real error: to know all is to forgive all. A short rig-
orous proof of that is:- to say that someone makes a real er-
ror is to say that the universe—of which he is a part,—or
natural law, or God, makes a mistake or is inconsistent—
which contradicts the tacit agreement that ‘“universe’’ means
oneness or consistency. But actually, in practice,
we restrict our vision and statements to just a part of the
universe (§28c); and in that restricted part of it, aman may
obviously get out of agreement, as a man, with his somewhat
immediate environment, however right he may be in a wider
sense. We can not actually see definitely all the universa]
details one by one, especially in the limited time of a human
life; and that fact is at least tacitly agreed upon when we
say that someone makes a mistake, or is wrong. Conse-
quently, when we use that practical or quantitative, re-
stricted way of looking at things, and observe the actual
historical context of the classic logic and the explicit expres-
sion of the doctrines that use it, then it must he said that
explicitly they are wrong.

ec. But that is only an intellectual or partial conclusion.
Implicitly they are correct, and the actual fact is that men
have usually correctly understood them in a general way.
Often hereafter ] sharply assert that some conclusion is
wrong. But IJ show that it is wrong from only a par-
tial point of view (usually the everyday one): my sharp
condemnation is only intellectual, and I ask always to be un-
derstood as meaning that I know that the total of the matter
is beautifully consistent and right. Even the classical] logic
is right ultimately. And even the late Kaiser’s paranoiac
exaltation of his rather trivial, short-sighted self exhibited
the strict consistency of natural law and his own right agree-
ment with it, provided we go hack centuries and view the
accumulating Prussian aristocracy that, so far ashe personally
was concerned or responsible in his relatively short life,

§25c IV One

merely happened to focus in him. But obviously, in daily
life if we say something about the former Kaiser we can not
stop and go through with all that lengthy prologue. Usually
we simply do not think in terms of centuries and of space
that includes galaxies.

d. The ultimate fact, anyway, as we shall see when we
examine the infinite regress we saw the link go into ($§40-2),
is that we can not make an erplictt, accurate statement.

$26. a. Having thus fundamentally destroyed all ortho-
dox teachings in so far as they pretend to be explicitly rational
expression, we can now look unprejudicedly at things as they
are, and as a child would. And we can discontinue the use
of that tiresome, scholastic classic logic. I used its own
weapon to destroy the classical ‘‘reason’’; but it is a poor,
overweighty, clumsy tool.

b. A child sees things joined together—sees them as be-
ing continuous. He does not at first understand how to
‘take’ things as being ‘‘apart’’ or separate, so that they may
be readily counted one by one. The reader can substantially
verify that by watching a child learning to count, noting that
at first he fails to distinguish the things he is counting as be-
ing “‘apart’’ from each other. I am now beginning
to formulate explicitly the verbal trick of language—the
trick of saying things,—which is to replace the defective
classical logic. That trick is the basis of the discovery of
what is positively the whole truth. It will appear that al-
though some of this may look like ““philosophy,’’s:it is act-
ually experimentally verifiable. In anticipatiod of the
detailed showing of that, I may state that I first began to
get at the valid language trick by carefully watching a
child learn to count, and trying to see what it was that made
it such a slow, difficult process for him. The process of
counting is the basic form or invention of mathematics; and
mathematics is merely generalized or simplified language.
We adults know how to count so well—are so skilled in the
use of the trick of mathematics—that we have to watch a
clumsy learner at it to see the method.

ce. If it is not convenient to watch a baby learning to
count, or if the reader prefers to observe actually in himself
that we naturally, “‘truly,’’ or with “‘commonsense’’ observe
things as continuous or joined together, then he may readily
do the latter, thus:- If he observes (say) Chinamen, at first
they look practically alike to him. After he gets accustomed
to looking at them he can distinguish them apart, and see
readily that they have as distinctive ‘“different’’ features—
‘‘separate parts’’—as we have. The essence of the experi-
ment is that the reader observe something unfamiliar to him:
he then sees without the prejudice of preconceived ideas, and
he sees better what it actually is, with the details of parts
merging continuously into each other.

d. And that fundamental observation which we make
is one way of noting the fundamental principle of science :-
continuity (or unification or relativity). | “‘Conservation of
energy’’ is a phrase that means that cnergy ezists continu-
ously. Or, scientific continuity means that there has been
observed a continuous, unbroken (unseparated) sequence of
events—whether that is named cause and effect, or by some
other pet phrase. We have actually had to learn to distin-
guish things “‘apart.’’ The way that distinguishing is done
by us humans is with convenient arbitrariness based on the
velocity of the light that perceptibly affects our eyes: wedo
not Aave to do it that way, for by using suitable tools we
could divide things differently (§877fg, 83, 100, 136; XIII).

e. Therefore, when we look at’the universe, at first it
seems joined together and not separated into parts.
Usually conventional science, as its last conclusion and its
formal end, gets the law of continuity. We are here going

UNIVERSE 14

in just the opposite direction, and beginning with that, sim-
ply as the first, ‘“commonsense’’ observation. _ It is merely
a fresh point of view. Valid logic is circular (§58}); hence,
we can start backwards and use our eyes then without inter-
ference from remembered dictums.

f. With practice we learn to separate the universe into
parts, as stated in par. d, and as we shall see in **concrete’’
detail in Part Two. Here we are observing words, and not-
ing how they are used to refer to or ‘‘express’’ those parts.
And we have seen that when we get practiced in separating
the universe into parts we forget how it at first was eontinu-
ous. We simply get out of the practice or custom of seeing
it as joined. So obviously this whole book is essentially re-
calling to the reader’s memory something he already knows.
He most likely has never put it into words of any sort; so
the words that have to be devised for this book may in some
places look a little odd at first, especially along here where
we are using words to diseuss an investigation of words.

g. Consequently, to our sophisticated eyes and un-
prompted memory the universe has rather a self-contradict-
ory appearanee:- sometimes it seems continuous and some-
times it seems separated into parts (the things we are very
familiar with seem so emphatically distinct as to be almost
‘‘sharp,”’ ‘‘exact,’’ discrete things). Obviously, the “‘prob-
lem’’ of the One and Many arises with the first observations
made by a baby. He does not *‘express’’ the problem and
its solution—the whole thing being obvious and simple to
him, whose mind has not been tinkered with by Aristotle,
the theologians, etc.

S27. a. And that seeming double aspect of the universe
as being the One and as being the Many can be at once ob-
served to be shown or reflected both in the meaning of single
words, and—more explicitly—in the meaning of sentences.
First we consider single words :- ;

b. A-single word standing alone is simply a symbol:
i. e., the word indicates or points out to us a meaning which
we have mutually previously agreed upon. The word, just
of itself, has not that meaning; itis itself obviously a visible
design or mark or collection of ink, ete.—or if a voeal word,
is a combination of condensations and rarefactions of air, ete.

ec. A single word does not, just of itself, have what we
might term a positive meaning. E. g., the printed word Oh
substantially has no meaning, because only by the tone of
that word when spoken can we determine any particular
meaning: and just the single word bay (no context) might
mean a color, or an arm of the sea, or a sound made by an
animal, or a part of a building, or the state of having to face
an opponent, or might have several more old-fashioned or
*‘obsolete’’? meanings and local or slang meanings. There-
fore, a single word has a positive meaning only when we tae-
itly or otherwise agree that it means a complete sentenee.
With the understanding, then, that single words are agreed
to imply some explicit sentence, we shall observe them.

d. We may note that there are three sorts of words, if
we consider them from the pcint of view of their meaning :-
(1) There are words which name parts, and henee imply
that the universe is separated, or is made up of parts, or is
the Many. (2) There are words which name combinations
or unifications of those parts (such as the words universe, all),
and which hence imply that the universe is continuous and
not split up, or is the One. (8) And there is a third class of
words which are used to assert in some way the joining or
that which relates the Many together, so as to form a One.
From the point of view of meaning there is another
sort of words, which are named interjections (such ag Oh).
Those words formally have no meaning, as noted. When
one is used, it obviously means nothing positively and is then

15 UNIVERSE

not a word in the usual sense; or else it must imply in its
particular given usage one of the three meanings mentioned.

e. Grammarians name other sorts of words; they dis-
tinguish sorts according to the structural usage of words in a
sentence, which usage is not directly dependent upon mean-
ing. There are any number of ways of sorting words:- into
lists depending on initial letters, which the dictionaries use;
into classes depending on the number of letters, or of syl-
lables, or by whom used, etc. Those ways, and our way
according to meaning, are merely convenient—i. e., arbitrary
and not essential. We shall see that no classification of any-
thing is in any way absolutely essential; i. e., we can classi-
fy or divide the universe or any part of it as we please,
depending on convenience (that statement is equivalent to
the one about the velocity of light in §26d, and includes the
theory of space and time, §§36, 57, etc.). In the
grammars one word is sometimes one ‘‘part of speech’’ and
sometimes another, and sometimes in a given usage is not
positively any certain part. Precisely similarly, we are go-
ing to find that when we divide words according to meaning
the same word may be used as any one of the three kinds
(§§52, 4.41) ; and sometimes in vague speech its sort is not
positively determinable. In brief, even after we
classify anything, it is, as we shall see, a general principle
that the classification is never exact or fixed. In no case do
I ever intend to mean that any classification which I make is
sharp, absolutely accurate, or fixed in any essentia] way.
Much of this paragraph is an anticipatory statement,
given here to let the reader know what to be on the lookout
for as we further observe words. In the next section we
take up the three classes in more detail.

f. Although explicitly I have been saying ‘words,’ ob-
viously we may include whole phrases or clauses in the same
classification into three sorts. E. g., if 1 say ‘this sheet of
paper,’ the phrase is clearly a single name for but one thing
in the universe. Therefore, it is tobe understood that when
I use ‘word’ with reference to the language trick, I mean a
symbol that may bea single word, a phrase, a clause, ora
sign such as A or L.

S28. a. The first class of words mentioned in §27d—
words which name parts—consists usually of nouns and pro-
nouns or their equivalents. Those words can name (1) just
one definite part of the universe, as ‘this sheet of paper’; or
they can name (2) a part or ‘‘class’’ which is usually consid-
ered to be made up of parts itself, as ‘men.’ But ‘this sheet
of paper’ may also be considered as being made up of parts
—of atoms, e. g. So there is no real distinction as to the
sorts of words in this first class which consists of names of
the Many. I shall refer to words in this class as
‘Many’ words, or ‘pluralistic’ words, or ‘scientific’ words.
They are scientific words because when scientific is given an
explicit meaning it refers to the formal treatment of the uni-
verse as made up of arbitrary parts (§85).

h. The second class of words—those which name com-
binations or wholes—is also usually made up of nouns or
pronouns (or equivalents). They name the One, and hence
are conventicnally known as “‘absolute’’ words; i. e., they
are considered to name all there zs to name, and _ truistically
they are absolute, as there remains nothing else to name.
Some words that are usually absolute or One words, are:-
the One, universe, all, complete, a-perfect-anything, an-
absolute -anything, everything, an- -aceurate-anything (mean-
ing really accurate or exact), infinity, zero, nothing, none
(the last three are negative in form, but are obviously abso-
lute). However, practically any one of the words that
are usually Many w rords may be formally used asa One word.
I. e., at any time we may formally and arbitrarily consider

One IV §28¢

that whatever it is we are talking about may be temporarily
taken as the whole universe for that conversation, or sentence.
Thus, in our equation 2--3==5, the ‘5? is for the time being
considered to be, and is, the absolute sum total of what we
are talking about, and it obviously is formally a One word.
In the past, that way of using what was ordinarily a part in
a One sense, without being clearly conscious they were do-
ing it, caused men to fancy that they did not know the whole
truth. In this book, I simply call attention to that formal
device whenever it is importantly used, and it becomes
glaringly obvious that there are no qualitative problems.

c. Whenever any explicit name is needed for a word
which is formally or logically used as a One word, but does
not in ordinary meaning refer to the whole universe, I shall
call that word a ‘standard universe,’ or state that we are talk-
ing about a ‘standard universe.’ It is called a standard uni-
verse simply because we are using a word in a One form, as
being for the time a formal universe, or a final verbal model
or scale for that conversation, or a criterion, or a measure—
and that is precisely what a ‘‘standard’’ is Of
course, I have not as yet shown the reader enough facts to
make it positively intelligible to him that it is very import-
ant, if we are to see and think correctly, that we notice the
use of One words, and especially the use of standard Ones or
universes. It simply is requested that the reader keep these
remarks casually in mind until their application is shown.

d. We see again that there is a formal contradiction be-
tween the One words and the Many words. That formal
contradiction is ingrained in language.

e. But the language itself promptly—and with a rigor-
ous, valid logic that we are now explicitly noticing— corrects’
or eliminates that formal contradiction of the first two sorts
of words by ‘making’ and using the third form, relationship
words. Those words, in meaning, assert that the Many are
really joined together, and as such zs the One. In short,
Many words assert a splitting; and relationship words at
once assert no-splitting, and thus really cancel any formal
contradiction. Language itself is thus really and explicitly
consistent, and there is a double contradiction in it which is
self-cancelling. We shall see that fact more definitely when
we consider sentences (§§31-4, 51).

f. There are several sorts of relationship words, and it
is often puzzling to decide just how much of the relationship
quality is possessed by a word in a given usage. As a rough
general rule, conjunctions, prepositions, and verbs are defin-
itely relationship words; they are obviously ““copulas,’’ or
joining-together words. Intransitive verbs, such as is, assert
explicitly the ultimate nature of a relationship:- identity, or
absolute unification (see par. h below). Other relationship
words merely explicitly imply identity. There is a
sort of relationship words, which words are always making
puzzles for us, because the implication of relationship is so
remote in them. Usually they are what are called abstract
nouns, such as fruth. It is obvious that **truth’’ is not what
is usually considered a part of the world; nor is it in its con-
ventional meaning the whole of it, the One. It can probably
be seen at once that ““truth’’ is simply the name of a rela-
tionship:- to get the word we name all the Many we like,
and explicitly connect them by a relationship which really
and obviously exists, and then we verbally ‘‘adstract’’ or take
away those concrete Many and give a name to that real re-
lationship which we used to connect them, and formally seem
to speak of it as either a One or a Many name:- truth. But
obviously, the actual content of meaning is still relationship.

g. Usually, such abstract or ‘relationship nouns’ have
considerable resemblance to One words. Love is a relation-
ship noun or name, and we say ‘All is love,’ or “God is love,’

16

§28e IV One UNIVERSE . Many words formally cop”
. 1 ri S. oh = tra~
: rds, and relationship wor ae weee ords in turn cont
where ‘is’ verbally asscrts an identity between a One word wo But relationship W ree aga One (with-

and a relationship word. But clearly, in such cases we wae
that all the parts of the Many are joined together by a reia

tionship named Jove, and as such is-are the Cne. e,
h A relationship 1s obviously a joining tugete Pie
r—really joined or connec e
t—or absolutely one,
d the table, if
book and

two things are joined together ae
——they arc, as a truism, a4

Saar rE. on if we say ‘the ae ce ie
‘and’ is a relationship word iat ie, pe positively ascer~
the table merge together without PU see in detail in
banat Coed mines aie ieee the case.) Con-
Part Two ee dopey ere gocurately. we are unable to
sequently, if we speak post Roepe Geening’ hence, if
say where the book ese h, we have to include

we mention the book accurately as such, )
sais le (and implicitly the rest of the universe).
with it the tab eee Aetie The

That is to say, the real relation is an identity ase
reader possibly does not see a]ll that for himself as yet; “ 1S
something that requires a large amount of evidence, and that
is given only gradually as we proceed. . But what is -esPce-
jally called to the reader’s attention at this point Is that there
is really—in the ultimate—no sort of relationship but that of
identity. And here is a formal statement of the truth of that
point, simply as definite truisms:- Very obviously, if two
relationships are named, the two can not be connected by a
relationship word, for there is no relationship (or mutual
action) between relationships. A relationship of a relation-
ship is nonsense: e. g., what is the brotherhood of mother-
hood?™* Relationship, by all our implicit definitions above,
is an indirect assertion of continuity; and if something is
continuous or the One, it obviously, as a truism, can not be
more One or less One. And that is exactly identical to say-
ing that all relationship is identical ultimately, and hence és
an assertion of identity. As we proceed, frequently
I shall point out more and more clearly and in detail, that

there is but one relationship—that of identity.

i. So, to summarize, there are One words, and Many

hThe reader is usually puzzled by such a question, and by this
whole subject of relationship, because he has been trained into the
habit of being puzzled. All his life he has heard various species of
intellectual] grafters using relationships trickily to befuddle him (us-
ually the grafters have long ago befuddled themselves, so that they
are probably no longer conscious of being such intellectual exploit-
ers). Many of us have given up in despair and Ict the befuddlement
procced, so that it is difficult now to come out of it. The fact is, as
we shall see under religious psychology (§$153f, 162, 166), the ob-
servation of a universal relationship is a profound emotional exper-
tence. If the reader rcally grasps ‘God is love,’ or ‘The Many: is
continuous,’ or any other of thousands of general statements, he is
much moved. All relationships are really identical and finally uni-
versal. Consequently, when some conscious or unconscious deceiver
wants to move the reader profoundly he begins to fire relationships
at him—abstract words, **high-sounding’’ words, **rhetoric,’’ ‘‘ora-
tory’’ which has little more sense than ‘the brotherhood of mother-
hood’ when coolly examined. Perhaps the mast exaggerated form of
that intellectual trickery is what in the present day is known a
futurist literature and imagism, although the same sort of exa er :
tions under other names is perennial. If the reader of that Ge ft
and flabby minded he is much moved; if he has a normal] it
mind, but has not studied out the way such chicanery with aie
accomplished, such forms more or less irritate him; if he k pha
ae Ps qe eiepene also pains him that some people Shee Be
estroy thelr own and their neiglibors’ minds. But all
normally tough mi i f. ‘ eae
sale ate : POR ONE oy struggle irritat-
withaeecnenice ae or ourselves by such fraud
_vonsequently, when I here have to take

tomary befuddled haze, and also to feel ir
towards me. However, the fact that I am sh

buneo man’s game is fairly good evide
k nce th
it; and we shortly shall ha ae

owing the intellectual

t I do not care to
ve old confusions cleared away. er

tradict One words.
dict Many words, an
out 4 relationship W

and hence identity W
formal

nie teoned logic ‘link’),
Therefore, ob-
or verbal or logical contradiction is in-
and unescapable. But there is, in
a second—and hitherto not very explic-
1 or verbal contradiction which elimi-

d assert their
ord’s being u
ith the One.

viously, the
herent in language
relationship words,
itly mentioned— ‘forma
nates all real contradiction.

j. Before proceeding to take up with regard to sen-

tences that same formal cancellation of verbal contradiction
(beginning in §31), we shall notice that precisely the same
thing is evident in theology ($29), and in mathematics ($30).
We may here observe, as another form of summary of this
section, that One words, especially standard Ones, are merely
what science calls classes, and attempts continually ina con-
scious way to make. In this book we shall see in detail just
what classification is: existent texts are vague on that sub-
ject (for implicit authoritative agreement with that assertion,
see ‘“Ency. Brit.,’’ xvi, 900-1).

S29. a. The race for many centuries has tacitly recog-
nized the facts stated in the last section, in the guise of the
theological Trinity. Because religion is the most important
aspect of life (XVIII), men naturally gave those facts a theo-
logical name. In my opinion the men who invented the
Trinity—it is a verbal form, or “‘invention,’’ as we shall
see—substantially solved all knowledge, and got the same
solution as this book. And as that was done centuries ago
(nobody knows just when), the reader will probably agree
that there is essentially nothing novel here. The chief dif-
ficulty connected with the Trinity seems to have been that
the priestly intellectual aristocrats promptly started confus-
ing it with various historical happenings affecting their spec-
ial privileges or graft, and the rest of the people stupidly
and weakly submitted.

b. At this point I merely mention the outline of the
Trinity :- (1) God the Father corresponds to the One. He
was consistently the summation of all things (apart from the
priestly exploiting, of course). (2) God the Son was a sort
of emphatic symbol] for Many words. As a truism, there
could be no absolutely unique God the Son; there were God
the Sons. But we have already noticed briefly the similar
difficulty that arises from standard universes (S28be). His-
torically it seems that Christ was first made by people rather
definitely simply into a standard One—and when that fact
was then afterwards overlooked, the Trinity obviously be-
came nonsensical. Christ himself seems to have intelligibly
and intelligently held that he was one son of God the Sons
—a unit of the Many (§§160-2). (3) And then, to unify
the God the Sons into or as God the Father, there was the
named universal relationship, God the Holy Ghost.

ce. We shall take up those Trinity names for the One
and Many form or language device as we neeg them. If
any reader thinks that these merely formal aspects of our
way of talking can be eliminated, he will find an easily read
attempt todo it in Wells’s “‘God the Invisible King.’’
Wells there tried to ‘‘abolish’’ the Trinity as being merely a
theological and useless term or name. And the observant
reader can readily note Wells’s own reconstruction of another
eee ’ aye while he was throwing away the con-
Christ is a ieee ie ee : ee Cee
contradictory ae es . - 'd ae al ecg eee us

as we shall further see ($849 iene ay 7 a eens
5 , ‘J; IS precise]

posed to what Christ probably taught; and is the 5 ae

. . = = 2
the aristocratic exploitation which the priests have Ae a
Iced

> and

LT UNIVERSE

for centuries (the same dualistic game under names other
than Christ’s was worked by priests and kings long before
Christ was born).

§30. a. It has been asserted (§28bgh) that the chief
puzzles men have had in the use of language were due to a
failure to notice definitely the various kinds of words—espec-
ially to a failure to observe the character of a standard One,
and the character of a certain sort of relationship words (ab-
stract nouns).

b. Mathematics is an abbreviated language in which
markedly different symbols are (usually) used for those three
different sorts of words. Consequently, because all that is
needed for consistency in using valid logic is (as we shall see
more definitely, §§43-5, 58) the proper recognition, or con-
sciousness, of the different sorts of words, it follows that
mathematics is an easy, useful, safety-first language because
that recognition in it is automatically provided for (usually).
In short, mathematics is simply a language that is much
easier to use consistently than ordinary words, because in
using mathematics it is far less necessary to keep our wits
about us. Orthodox mathematics has some defects
which make it very puzzling. In fact, it is impossible to
understand much of it (the calculus, e. g.) as it is orthodoxly
explicitly written: I have cited Poincare twice as asserting
something which means that (Index, “‘Poincare,’’ ““Calcu-
lus’’). So there is full justification for the customary horror
of mathematics. I had it myself so strongly that ] investi-
gated them” to see why I had it.

c. Mathematics was probably consciously first a science
of number. 1. e., all Many words were, in mathematics,
represented simply by numbers: instead of saying ““two
hoys’’ mathematics wrote 2. Afterwards, those formal sym-
bols were increased by writing various other brief symbols,
usually letters, such as x, y, a, 6, 9, etc. Obviously, it is
easy Just to glance at mathematical language and pick out
such Many words.

d. But orthodox mathematics may be said to be form-
ally defective in that it has devised no symbols for One
words that are readily and positively distinguishable from
the Many variety of symbol. As we go along we shall see
that the symbors for zero and infinity (0 and ©) are always
symbols for the One—although orthodox mathematics does
not definitely recognize that fact (§$43-4, 55-6). But there
are no other symbols in mathematics which are definitely
distinguishable as being One words (unless various forms of
integration signs be taken as indirect One words). Usually
mathematical One words are standard universes, as the ‘5’
in 2+3=5, A device is usually unconsciously or intuitively
employed by conventional mathematicians to distinguish such
One symbols:- putting the symbol all alone as one member

30bJ apologize to the grammatical purists for my inability tocon-
sider such words as mathematics, ethics, as being always singular.
Sometimes in my view I take them as being made up of various doc-
trines or branches, and hence grammatically plural. ln
principle, people with minds untrained in some appreciable degree
need rather elaborate verbal inflections—glaringly definite grammat-
ical signs of just where and how words fit in asentence,—as a means
(1) of forcing themselves to think definitely, and (2) of definitely
guiding the similarly untrained hearer’s otherwise unreliable com-
prehension. In so far as we are mentally keen we may drop such
slavish formalities of inflection, and thereby gain fullness of thought
coupled with economy in words (the characteristic of the largely
uninflected English language which probably helps its continual
spread). There must be a balance or compromise between no inflec-
tion and fulsome, barbaric inflection. Without further remarks on
the subject I shall take it that the reader of this book is mentally
not barbaric and hence likes to tolerate an occasional] disregard of
inflectional agreements which might be unpleasant tothe more plod-
ding purist who in effect considers it unsafe to give up asingle in-
flectional crutch.

One 1V_ §30f

of the equation—as that “5.” We shall consciously employ
that device in this book, in the few algebraic equations we
need for brevity. But it is obvious that it would be
a considerable advance in mathematics if mathematical books
would, in some practically effective manner, positively dis-
tinguish One words. It would be an advance perhaps as
useful as any since the invention of the calculus. We are
going to see that our recognition of the fact that 0 and @
are not “‘numbers’’ or Many words is the practical rule or
formal guidance we need in using valid logic (§43, ete.).
That last sentence states the exceedingly easy and simple
fact which all this detailed talk about words reduces to. The
details are all so obvious that we know them without being
clearly conscious of it, and I have to write at some length to
make them conscious.

e. But there is in mathematics a definite sort of symbol
Ge aie peer ee cca v4,
(An integration sign—that long s, meaning summation——is
a relationship noun.) Obviously, those symbols are so dis-
tinctive that they are ordinarily practically automatically
recognized, and hence are not—without almost an effort—
confused with Many words or with One words. If a mighty
orator with no real thoughts worth mentioning, or if some
similar intellectual bunco man, goes into a rhapsody over
truth, and dresses it up in shining armor, etc., soft-minded
people fancy he is saying something, and are impressed. But
if a mathematician were to do identically the same thing,
and go into a rhapsody over his ’s, and +’s, and +’s, and
dress them up in shining armor, he would be ridiculous even
to the soft minded. The mathematician has not been
wholly guiltless in the past of getting relationships confused
with Many or with One words: those who take a space of
anything but three dimensions very seriously are like that
orator (§§59-62)—and the relativitists, unless they are defi-
nite about the form of logic they are using, are practically
like that orator (§66). But obviously, mathematics has a
tremendous advantage over ordinary verbal language in that
it is not easy to confuse relationship words with other sorts,
usually. And there is another automatic advantage
of nearly equal importance:- All relationships, as we saw
in §28h, are-is ultimately and definitely a relationship of
identity; and in mathematics that relationship is the equali-
ty sign = (or some logical or formal equivalent of it—often
in practice given in a negative form, such as >, <, etc.).
And obviously, all mathematics is an effort to use that sign
explicitly. All other relationship symbols are evidently a
step by step process leading up to that final definite assertion
of identity. There is thus a very definite goal towards which
a mathematical discussion is headed: everything explicitly
goes towards getting some intelligible One on one side of
that equality sign. That gives a tremendous advantage over
ordinary verbal expression; for & discussion in words, be-
cause we are often so vague as to what ultimate relationship
is, frequently omits all clear statement of what mental goal is
desired, and naturally never arrives at any goal in particular
—not even at a statement of Just what good it is anyway to
have truth in uncomfortable shining armor.

f. But mathematics is slightly defective in this matter
of having distinctive relationship symbols, in that sometimes
it uses letter symbols for relationships, that are like its Many
symbols (also, figures and letters when used for indices or
exponents are relationship symbols). Thus, d is usually the
differential sign; f, the function—and there are other simi-
lar relationship nouns. It is a fact that mathematicians
rarely do confuse a relationship letter with a Many letter
symbol—except in the cases of LZ [length, or space] and 7
[time]; time and space are abstract or relationship nouns,

for relationship words :- etc.

§30f IV One

and in ordinary equational use are not Msny words, but are
continually erthodoxly taken to be such (IX). The
fact that there are such formal] samenesses is a rather positive
indication that even mathematicians did not recognize just
how mathematics had advantages over words. And incident-
ally, it may be noted that Newton, whe invented one sort of
calculus, seemed to know almost definitely the foregoing facts
about mathematics and hence used a dot or dots over differ-
entiated Many symbols instead of the confusing dan in-
sight which the German Leibnitz seems to have obscured
(““Ency. Brit.,’’ xiv, 540-2). (If the reader has forgotten
calculus, or never bothered to pretend to learn it, then he
has missed nothing appreciable by failing to understand
completely that technical remark about a defect of calculus
~—and he is reassured that there are very few such remarks,
needed by experts, hereafter. The remark just made is quite
simple and intelligible if translated out of that mathematical
jargon. But it isn’t of sufficient importance to any but the
mathematicians to warrant using the reader’s attention on
such asomewhat lengthy translation giving the full meaning. )

g. The disadvantage all mathematics have, compared
with ordinary speech, is that they are not nearly so flexible
in giving adefinite meaning. ‘That can at once be seen by not-
ing that mathematics have but a few symbols for expressing
relationship——probably less than a hundred ,—whereas verbal
language has thousands of such words—so many that the
very profusion is a perplexity sometimes, a]though it always
serves to secure an immense brevity iz putting across an ex-
plicit meaning (because those thousands of relationship words
replace verbal inflections—those inflections being language’s
original ‘mathematical’ way of automatically indicating re-
lationship, as shown in footnote 30b: in short, mathematics
is merely a primitively differentiated form of words). But,
mathematics nevertheless achieves greater brevity with re-
spect to the amount of space occupied or number of symbols
actually used. However, that results because of the paucity
of relationship symbols, and each such symbol] therefore
means so much that we take it rather mechanically and fail
to get the real emotional content of a mathematical equa-
tion. The meaning is formally put over; but not with much
emotional fullness or convincingness—in short, mathematics
is not so flexible, as was stated at first. As we shall implic-
itly seein the chapter on psychology (XVII), if a statement
fails to arouse some perceptible emotion it is pretty nearly a
failure as a statement-—as expression. And mathematical
equations—i. e., mathematical sentences—have hitherto
failed to arouse very much perceptible emotion even among
first class mathematicians—who hence are “‘dry as dust,”’
etc. Some of them go so far wrong as to assert that such
absence of emotion is an advantage to mathematics. (Of
course, if a man is so soft minded as to get excited, and fly
off the handle, and run amuck like an untrained Malay, ora
prima donna, because he has an emotion or so, then he had
best avoid them; but the more of controlled or balanced emo-
tions the better—§$149, 159). But perhaps the
most convincing proof that equations are not so flexible as
ordinary language is the fact that mathematicians use words
to say just what their equations do mean.

h. There remains but little more to add to the descrip-
tion of methematics, and that will be incidently done,
chiefly in §§43-4, 55. The reader has seen in this section
the whole of the nature of mathematics, except that possibly
there is not yet enough direct evidence of the fact that 0 and
2 are One terms or symbols. Obviously, there is nothing
recondite or esoteric in valid mathematics that need frighten
us. They are dull and dry and hence unpleasant if their
nature is not understood. But ordinary verbal language is a

UNIVERSE

great deal more difficult and complicated than mathematics:
it is much harder to avoid incorrect and confused statement
in formulating ordinary verbal language, or to understand it
correctly and clearly when it is expressed to us. But the
mathematics in the textbocks—especially the so-called
higher mathematics—contains much confusion of One words
with Many words, and in that degree properly is frighten-

. . ef . OF . ° .
ing, just as all ‘‘sin’’ or ignorance is repulsive.

§31. a. We have briefly seen the general] nature of the
valid logic by examining the equation or typical sentence,
g+3=5 (§12). We then saw some more of the details of
precisely the same thing by observing the meaning of words
themselves. In doing that with words, we actually were
considering each word to have a meaning that implicitly was
a ‘‘sentence,’’ whereas the intended meaning of a word
standing alone is frequently indeterminate. We are now go-
ing to consider sentences explicitly, and not merely implicitly.

b. When we definitely consider sentences we are going
to see more precisely the same principles we have already
seen several times. There is only one principle:- the uni-
verse hangs together, or works together. But there are an
indefinite number of ways of stating that principle, and we
are now coming to another way. In this new way we are
going to bring in “‘time’’ and ‘‘space’’ explicitly—they be-
ing only implicit above. And simply because the things we
are going to observe are things we all know, and know so
well that we apply them all the time, the observations have
never in our history so far as | can find been put very defin-
itely into words. Hence, some of that description of the
obvious looks a bit odd at first. But I do nothing more than
show what logic the “‘man in the street’’ uses, and show
that it is correct, and that ] use it. Everybody who has
ever correctly stated a valid observation has used it.

§32. a. A sentence is a collection of words which states
a fact, an opinion—which states a meaning. That is the con-
ventional meaning of sentence. Obviously, the words them-
selves are, as a truism of that definition, a Many which are-is
actually joined together into a One called a meaning. We
obviously have there our problem of the One and the Many,
and an apparent contradiction—at the very beginning of
speech or language. As we saw, if we have simply a list or
assortment of words not thus collected into a sentence, the
words themselves do not explicitly give any meaning or One.
Usually the meaning of a sentence isastandard One.

b. Some technical philosophers, ordinarily named irra-
tionalists, substantially refuse to agree that there is a “‘mean-
ing’’ in any sentence or any of the universe; sometimes they
merely say they do not know (are agnostic), but in effect
they deny that a sentence can be made. Fundamen-
tally, the non-technical person who asks ‘‘What’s the use?’’,
with the implication that there is none, is an irrationalist or
cynic—as will implicitly appear from time to time, as J
show what’s the use (see Index, ‘‘Good’’), There-
fore the irrationalists assert:- ‘“No actual sentence can be
made. For us commonsense mortals it is sufficient to point
out that their basic assertion or ““principle’’ is a sentence,
even if it is negative in form; and that therefore, truistically,
those irrationalists destroy themselves as such by making a
sentence to deny sentences. In the same commonsense way
the sufficient answer to the person who asks Jhat’s the use?
is to say that if he really believed there was no use of some
sort, he would kill himself or at least refrain from his efforts
to keep alive, and spare us the question. Hence
those irrationalists simply prefer to talk negatively; and it
is obvious that, if we wished, we could add the symbol not to
every sentence in this book and the meaning of the book

19 UNIVERSE

would remain identical, even if formally the meaning was
““reversed’’; the symbol not would merely change its present
arbitrary meaning. As a historical fact, Zoroaster substan-
tially reversed language that way (by giving his devil the
name of his neighbors’ God), with no change in real mean-
ing. There is a contemporary example of language’s revers-
ing in meaning in the slang statement, “I should worry,”’
which I am credibly informed means “‘I should not worry.”’
In general, as we shall see from tine to time, it is
possible validly to reverse the way of saying or expressing
any theory; the theory, in its reversed condition will con-
tinue to mean precisely what it did to start with (cf. Index,
s. v. ‘‘Direction,’’ ‘“Ether’’). |The fundamental principle
is that language is arbitrary: we can twist it around to say
anything whatever verbally, and then if we keep on consist-
ently or non-contradictorily expanding what we verbally
stated, we shall end with precisely the same meaning that
all others get, even though they may have started with
a statement verbally the opposite. The general proof of
that is quite simple and obvious:- the things themselves
(the universe itself) to which the words or symbols point give
the meaning to the words: the mere words just of them-
selves have no meaning; e. g., what does the word slgkebjf
mean? We may say that ‘irrationalists’ of all sorts are the
people who take the dictionary too seriously. It is always
painful to take any part of the universe too seriously, as only
the One deserves complete attention (8163b).

ec. The reader who has dipped a little into general
science, or into philosophy or the different orthodox theolo-
gies, is aware of the historical fact that practically every
sort of principle imaginable has been asserted and denied.
I do not think I could formulate even the simplest, most
harmless looking sentence on any appreciable subject without
its being possible to find somebody, at some time or other,
asserting in effect that he could observe that the opposite of
my sentence was true. Those contradictory assertions are
not confined to closet philosophers, and scientists. Just as
soon as we make any kind of statement, some average man
is likely to bear vehement witness that it is not so. A large
number of average persons assert that there is no such thing
as whatever it is the dictionaries designate as evil and pain
and disease. Therefore, in the last paragraph, at the very
beginning of the description of the valid logic, I considered
what would be the result if we verbally agreed with the man
who denied that there could be any such thing as a sentence
—thus in effect denying, according to the ordinary usage of
words, the possibility of any language or logic. We immedi-
ately saw that we would get precisely the same essential final
meaning regardless of whether we started by saying ‘‘a sen-
tence is’’ (sentences exist), or ‘‘a sentence is not.”’

d. The general conclusion of that discussion in par. b
is that we can take any sort of statement which anyone cares
to make, and get the same meaning for it by expanding it
fully as I am getting from my present conventional way of
expanding things. All I am doing is to take the most con-
ventional way of verbally naming things. If somebody
wishes me to start a complete and valid description of the
universe with his own primary verbal assertion that the moon
is made of green cheese, then I am quite able to do it—and
get it right, intelligible, consistent. But the result on lang-
uage itself would be that what we now customarily name
‘‘sreen cheese’’ would be green cheese of a considerably
different history from that which verbally constituted the
moon. In brief, it is a scientific fact that any substance is
equal to any other substance, 7/ the other substance be given
a different age or time factor (including space factor, the two
being ‘“‘history’’; see §§36, 57, 59, 60, 165). That is

One IV §33d

substantially a repetition of what was shown in par. b; the
importance of the principle perhaps warrants the restatement
in different words. So we have here, with formal rig-
or, onee for all taken eare of those who wish to say things
in different words from ours. (We shall note the practical
effects of such actual variations from time to time as we pro-
ceed.) There is no essential objection to their using such
different words. It would result merely in changing the
present ordinary meaning of words—would result finally in
changing time and space implications of words into some-
thing different from present ones. The only objection to
their making such changes is the inconvenience of them.
Most words have a customary, fairly definitely agreed-upon
meaning; and insefar as the meanings are self-consistent it is
mostly a waste of time to change them—it is a trivial occu-
pation pursued by the trivial, of scarcely more value than
making an index for the dictionary. There is no essential
reason why an apple should not now be named balloon; it
merely is a historical fact, dependent upon many now imper-
ceptible causes, that it has not in the past been so named.
If an appreciable advantage could be shown to accrue from
naming an apple balloon, we would, as a physical truism, so
name it (proof in §98m). A simpleton could easily devise
a new language by merely assigning each word in the dic-
tionary to the definition of some other word—and people re-
sembling that simpleton often write lengthy books.

e. Whenever words are taken so seriously as to be con-
sidered essential, then they have become idols—a part (a
word) is mistaken for the whole; a unit of the Many for the
One. We considered that generally in §14d. Because
idolatry of words, directly considered, is so trivial, it is cor-
respondingly hard to detect (is ““subtle’’), and hence rather
prevalent still—as we shall frequently have to notice, be-
cause of the momentous indirect results of that idolatry.

§33. a. Hence, we have established the possibility of a
sentence, which consists of Many words combined into a One
meaning.

b. If we were to name any really isolated fact or thing
by the word or symbol THIS, that word—which I am going
to use frequently as a ‘single’ algebraic symbol—would ob-
viously be absolutely unintelligible. The reader can observe
the truth of that by various trials; e. g., if all colors were
the same, we could and would name no color; for when we
say red we mean or imply that something else is not red.
Consequently, we must have a put-together or collected
Many of words before we can talk and mean anything—for
just one word will] not (without at least implying others) say
anything. Hence, the THIS (whatever it is to which we
refer, or which we name, by that word) must be compared
with something else, which I shall name THAT. (Clearly,
whenever we say THIS, if it means anything, we have at
least implied a THAT with which it is compared.)

ec. That last paragraph simply gives explicitly the ob-
vious details of the fact that we have several Many words in
a typical or explicit sentence—at least two:- formally THIS
and THAT. That is precisely the same fact which we saw
relative to a machine (8815f, 21b):- there has to be more
than one part to a machine. In a real machine the parts
actually join znto each other by friction—just as was men-
tioned concerning the book and the table (§28h). A mach-
ine, with strict explicitness, is what is usually called an
“‘organism’”’ or an “organic whole.’’ Similarly, as we see
in detail as we proceed, language itself is a machine—is
identical with a machine,—and the words themselves insep-
arably merge in meaning with each other.

d. When we say THIS we mean (at least implicitly)
that there are a number of other things with which it may be

§33d IV One

compared. If we say that THIJS is number one of a scries or
assemblage of things, we imply the rest ef an unending
series of numbers or names of things with which it may be
compared. And that introduces and describes the primary
sert of mathematical words, numbers. Number is simply tne
most generalized naming, or the most general sort of Many
words. Consequently, when we talk intelligibly we
by some means indicate that the 7’HJS is compared (which
is to say:- related) toa THAT. That means or method of
talking intelligibly may be by gestures, by interjections or
sounds such as are made by the “‘lower’’ animals, by impli-
cation of some sort, or by explicit words. The means must
truistically be explicit words when we propose to express
something by means of language and with rigor.

e. We have seen that the Many words in the mathe-
matical variety of speech have that comparison or relationship
(with each other—which we saw in the last paragraph was
needed in a sentence) expressed by means of symbols such
as +, X, = (§30e). We have seen that in a completely
expressed sentence Many words are mutually related, giving
a combined or One meaning that is the sentence (§32a).
That statement of what we have observed is simply a de-
tailed description of a complete sentence. And we may
roughly express that typical sentence in mathematical sym-
bols, thus:- THAT xX THIS=MEANING. Obviously, that
“‘equation’’ or mathematical sentence is the same in form as
Q9+3=5. I have used the X sign instead of the + sign,
because it happens that later on ordinary science usually uses
it; > is simply a sort of abbreviation for a number of -+’s.
All relationships are ultimately identical (§28h); hence,
formally or logically it makes no difference whether we use
a X ora, if we consistently keep to the one started with.

f. That equation THAT THIS= MEANING is only
roughly expressed. J. e., it——and its equivalent sentence in
ordinary words—contains numbers of implications which are
not yet made explicit. We are now ready to begin making
those implications explicit—writing them all explicitly into
that as yet considerably abbreviated equation.

g. It may be stated here, in anticipation (and the read-
er can not understand it fully at this stage), that the omitted
implications are in general two:- (1) the THAT obviously
implies a series of other things, and so does the THIS; and
henece—with all the explicitness we usually need, but not
with complete explicitness—we can write them THAT...
and THIS...; (2) and the complete implications of those
things obviously are that they are explicitly named-—or meas-
ured, as it is called by ‘‘science’’—by the conventional or
Euclidian ézme and space. Hence if we write only THAT...
THIS..., thus omitting that complete explicitness, we may
include such explicit time and space in another, or measur-
ing, member of the equation; obviously, that additional
member is directly a repnetilion in different words, or a truism,
of the first member. Hence, we have the general] equation :-
THAT... THIS...=A whole Onelor a standard One| measured
by the conventional time and space—MEANING, or =Energy
(as Energy is the *“scientific’’ One, corresponding to our
‘logical’? or verbal One:- MEANING). That equation
(which is logically equivalent to 2+3—=5, but more explicit)
is the sum total of the argument of this book. All that a
unification of knowledge is, is such a formal expression of a
complete sentence. }t is obvious that we may then substitute
in it any terms, and have a complete statement of the mean-
ing of those terms; or, the **solution’’ of any problem is
merely the translation of such a complete statement into the
ternis naming the point of view (the time and space) of that
problem. The further details of that complete statement or
equation consist in noting just how we customarily use time

UNIVERSE

20

and space to measure or name things, or concretely to re-
place the THAT and THIS. We drop that gen-
eral anticipation now, and go back and observe step by step.

S34. a. Inthe equation 7HATX THIS=MEANING
it may be easily observed that the real meaning——which is
whatever we have observed and understood when we compare
‘this’ and ‘that’—is obviously not given by the word orsym-
bol MEANING: it is given explicitly or positively by the
THIS and THAT, and that observed meaning is simply
named MEANING (and that name is set down in what is ob-
viously a tautological or repetitional manner, for the Many
names of ‘that’ and ‘this’ already gave that meaning once).
Or, it can be directly observed that MEANING does not of
itself positively mean anything at all. I. e., the last mem-
ber of the equation, ef itselfhas no meaning, any more than
Oh has, or is not explicit, or is not actualor positive language:
for it itself is not verbally separated into parts that can be
observably or verifiably compared—and only the naming of
such parts tz conjunction can give a verbal expression of a
meaning. The fact that a One word does not of it-
self positively express an idea is a fact not usually noticed,
so thoroughly have we get into the habit of speaking nearly
automatically. (The One is, directly considered, absolutely
ineffable—856, etc.) The One word merely names and thus
formally or logically but not really repeats the idea positively
expressed by the Many words (as joined together by the re-
lationship words—by X in our equation). In short, we in
practice say everything twice—expressing it by Many words,
and then tautologically echoing it by a One name. Itisa
curious fact—when first noticed. So accustomed are we to
that deliberate saying of everything twice (once ‘“‘scientific-
ally,’’ and then again “‘religiously’’ or “‘ineffably’’ or mys-
tically) that it is a bit difficult to describe it intelligibly. If
the reader is still puzzled, in spite of my having stated the
proposition in several different ways in the first of this para-
graph, he may note that if we use language that is largely
composed of One words it is called mysticism—and mysti-
cism is of itself unintelligible (820d).

b. As the substance of the last paragraph may stil] seem
odd, I shall expand it in more detail:- If THIS and THAT
be considered positive or explicit language (and, in agreement
with custom we do so consider it—it being the opposite of
mysticism), then AYEANING is xot language in any positive
sense——but simply a convenient ejaculation, which is a sort
of signal that we have “‘caught’’ the meaning already given.
(It is like the last member of many formal] equations :- ‘“==0.’?
Zero is a One word, and means nothing explicitly.)
As we see under ethics ($162), MEANING is the milder,
verbal or enunciated equivalent to the laugh which is given
when we more energetically’ catch the vivid—i. €., very
clear—meaning of something. And a laugh is commonly
agreed to be not explicitly language. A laugh, and the less
energetic cjaculation MEANING, may be intelligibly con-
ceived as a finished or whole or One nervous reaction Gaeid:
ing emotions axd intellect or meaning), or summing-up echo
to something already expressed. Hence, it is glaringly a
tiesto: that to accuse a person of having “‘no sense of hum-
or is substantially to accuse him of being so stupid that he
can not sum up meanings as wholes or asa One. It is the
same in principle as telling him he has not enough intelli-
ie edema haere ear ba ties Apr tiapnsate cn
Ree ac at all of us have a limit
Neyond which we can not readily (and hence with a laugh,
oe

of humor ($149), States-~
men ae Supposed to be grave and solemn because they are
handling matters weighty to the limit of human endurance

24 UNIVERSE

—a variety of poppycock (XIX) not indulged in by Lincoln.

c. We have seen repeatedly that our typical sentence,
now in the rough form That < This—Meaning, contains a con-
tradiction between the One and the Many which has hither-
to in history been considered an actual self-contradiction.
We see now with ultimate obviousness that the contradiction
is merely logical or forma] :- for we have seen that the mean-
ing is not really given by Meaning “* —that being a mere
ejaculation (and itself a meaningless word—by either the
classic logic or the valid logic). Also, it is obvious that that
formal “‘contradiction,’’ improperly called a real one by the
classic logic, must inhere, or must appear, in any equation, or
in any conclusion or sentence, which sums into a One the
Many that is detailed in positive words. Truistically, if we
do not use words or symbols, that ‘must’? does not apply:
there is no such thing as what is conventionally meant by
‘logical necessity.’’ That ‘must’ is simply the brief way of
indicating the implied truism that ‘if we use language, we
use language’ —of indicating that we will stick to our agree-
ment that if A—A, then we ‘must’ not say that simultane-
ously A ts nof—=A (§22). See §35 for further consideration
of ‘‘logical necessity.”’

d. This section shows rigorously in perhaps the most
obvious way that there is no real contradiction between the
One and the Many. It will be shown in other ways as we
need them (Index, ““One and Many’’).

§35. a. The complete meaning of valid “‘proof,’’ and
implicitly of valid “‘logic,’’ and of a rational or actual “‘logi-
cal necessity’’ is given in this section. That meaning is
needed to enable us to make further steps in expressing our
general equation explicitly.

b. Jf we say or assert the formal truism A—=A, then (if
we honestly and intelligently adhere to that ‘if’ clause) we
‘must? not say that at the same time A is not—=A, unless we
agree to change from that original A—A form of speaking
with which we started. We can make that change in agree-
ment if we like, and explicity say that we now agree that

=something that we shall No LONGER name A.

ce. It appears generally from the last paragraph—and I
proceed to show it in further detail,—that to reduce any-
thing to such truisms is the only valid ‘“*proof’’ which can be
expressed in language. Such a meaning of valid ‘‘proof’’ ap-
plies only to verbal expression of what we observe; and *“logi-
cal necessity’’ is merely the “must? which we follow if we
wish to be verbally honest and moderately intelligent. (It
is a historical fact that ‘‘logical necessity’’ was not in the
least considered a necessity, or even a requirement of good
breeding or moderate intelligence, by some people who con-
sidered themselves quite logical; e. g., the well known
remark about a ‘‘scrap of paper.’’) All the ‘valid proof’
which I can print or express here in this book is that verbal

34¢] have abandoned the printing of That and This and Mean-
ing in capitals. I find that all-capitals is too glaringly conspicuous
on the printed page; the reader does not need so much emphasis on
the fact that he is dealing with a symbol—that all words are sym-
bols. Also, all-capitals uses up too much space. 1 could of
conrse reprint the last two pages, and conceal my bad judgment or
taste in starting with capitals—which, althongh they look well and
are needed on the written and typewritten page, are out of place on
the printed page. I have little patience with amateurs who insist on
plundering publicly. Bnt 1 am an amateur printer—or rather a
printer perforce. Hence, it may be well not to try to conceal it.
lt is an excellent thing, I think, to give the reader a concrete ex-
ample of the fact that | am not infallible—that he must verify my
doings and sayings for himself. Also, my leaving the pages as
printed shows that my mind it still flexible enough to conform to
changed circumstances. Also, the undue typographical emphasis of
the two pages may be of advantage to readers. Also, it would cost
me two days of work and $2 for paper, to reprint them.

One IV §35e

proof:- reducing or reduction to truisms. All real or abso-
lute proof is actual observation or experience or experiment—
seeing for ourselves. I can not sce for the reader; hence,
he has to get all the actual proof for himself, and make his
own discoveries. If there is for him any discovery in this
book, ke makes it—not I. Hence, logic, which is the formal
technique or trick of consistent expression, can not give any
real proof. Logic gives expressional proof only, and such
proof is reduction of expression to truisms.

d. It is not usually recognized that the only valid ex-
pression of proof is to reduce the expression to truisms.
Classical logic substantially says that proof is something else
—a step by step process from premise to premise. I. e.,
classic logic says (in its syllogism) that something to this ef-
fect constitutes the process:- A—=Something—Something else
=Something else still. That logic then considers that the last
step is inferred from the premises (let us assume that the
inferring it done in accordance with that logic’s rules), and
that hence the last step is ““proved.’’ As a matter of glar-
ingly obvious fact, it is not in the least proved, even in ex-
plicit expression; the actual proof (when that step happens
to be true) is obtained by the reader for himself by observing
whatever it is the expression vaguely implicitly points to,
and the classic logic does not give even au explicit expression
of proof, as that requires statement of truisms. (On the
contrary, classic logic asserts that such expression of truisms
is circular reasoning, and that such reasoning is invalid; see
par. f.) Ignoring that parenthesis here, we see that classic
logic thus begs the whole question, wholly omitting actual
consideration of ‘“‘What is the expression of proof?’’, which
is the relevant question. The classic legic in all that, tacitly
concerns itself with a much different question:- ‘‘Does the
universe exist?’’ But as soon as we begin to talk we verb-
ally assume the existence of something about which we are
talking—as was seen in §22, where we saw the rigorous
formal proof that there was something. The actual saying of
all which can be said, and then the observing that it does ap-
ply to that ‘something’ is the real proof of the issue which
classic logic always irrelevantly raises. | By declining to be
thus irrelevant ourselves, we see that logical proof (i. e., ex-
pression of proof) is the expressing of a truism. Obviously,
if we show that 4 is a number of things, and then fail to
assert that those things are A, there is no explicitly com-
pleted expression of proof—no logical proof. It sounds
silly, doesn’t it? That is because it is so excessively simple.
And hbecanse it was so simple, classical logic substituted an
irrelevant question for it (thus fundamentally contradicting
itself as to what it was about—see Dewey’s Introduction for
an explicit technical and historical statement of it), and the
result was agnosticism, and finally the recent war. If we
can dodge another such war by becoming inteiligent enough
to start with things that are so simple and easy as to seem
silly, then such things are important.

e. If the point of the too-obvious remarks in the last
paragraph is not yet quite clear, let us take a concrete illus-
tration:- Suppose that a man thought his name was Smith.
How would he go about validly expressing the proof of what
happened to be the fact that his name was Smith?
Thus:- He asserts to begin with:- “If all men having
cognizance of me agree that I am named Smith, then Smith
is my name.’ Then he produces a number of persons, all
of whom say:- ““His name is Smith.’’ Therefore, Q.E. D.,
his name is Smith. Obviously, it is alla truism:- if he is
named Smith, then his name is Smith: he is named Smith by
those who do name him, therefore he is named Smith.
Now, the classic logic becomes irrelevant right at the start ;
it asks What ts his name?, and then promptly goes off on a

§35e IV One

tangent trying to discover what a name is, anyway. The
problem of What is a name? isa different problem, which
requires observationa]l proof: it involves the existence as-
sumption (§22), and ean be ‘‘solved’’ only by giving a com-
plete unified description of the universe and having the reader
verify it for himself. (And similar remarks apply to the
analogous directly irrelevant questions of number and credi-
bility of the witnesses, of the judges, ete.)

f. Hence all /ogical proof of a verbal statement consists
in reducing that statement to an obvious truism. As we saw
with respect to our equation (§§$34a, 33g), we begin with
actual tautology in language: J am now showing that we
end with such tautology. Consequently, asa truism of the
ordinary definition of “‘circular reasoning,’’ all valid logic is
circnlar reasoning (see the proof of Smith’s name). That
looks heretical, but we may readily see that it is not really
so:- (We have to anticipate conclusions rigorously derived
later on; for final summing up of proof that valid logic is
circular, see §58j.) If we ‘‘reason’’ from the One—i. e.,
analyze it into the Many,—we derive the Many; and _ to
‘‘orove’’ the reasoning we synthesize that Many back into
the One. And that is circular reasoning. Obviously, as we
can not get out of the universe, we have to reason ‘around’
in it: that is a truism. Usually, we reason in standard
universes. In such cases our conclusions neglect the remain-
der of the real universe; and because they do, always in such
cases they are quantitatively inaccurate. Classical logic ob-
serves that truistic fact about our customary standard uni-
verses; and the practical trouble with that orthodox logic is
that it then promptly jumps to tbe erroneous whole One, or
qualitative, conclusion that a// circular reasoning is wrong,
whereas the fact is merely that standard Ones are quantita-
tively inaccurate. But the circular reasoning in standard uni-
verses is qualitatively or in principle, or essentially, correct;
and all reasoning or consistent expression is, so far as total
explicitness is concerned, quantitatively inaccurate.

g. This section, which anticipates somewhat, has
served to introduce the following facts, the detailed proof of
which can be observed as we proceed:- We have explicitly
begun with a tautology or truism:- That < This Meaning.
So we must end by showing that it is a truism, or is tauto-
logical. Hence, whenever our expression or language de-
parts from being an explicit truism—departs from saying
Meaning—Meaning, to saying That This=Meaning,—we
truistically must have a formal contradiction. That ‘One
and Many’ contradiction is hence essentially inherent in any
positive language. Therefore, the whole of a valid logic (just
the logic formally considered of itself, and not considering
its use in expressing knowledge) is to show or make obvious
the existence of such a forme] contradiction, in summing any
set of details into a whole or One conclusion. Only the ex-
istence of such a formal contradiction allows reduction to a
truism; and such reduction is the only proof in a logical

sense.
$36. a. When we say This and That, we have implied
that we move or travel from one to another in some way—even
if only ‘‘in thought’’ (for more precise statement of “‘mo-
tion,’’ see 897). That ‘travel’ ‘definitely brings in the ideas
of space and time—which are at least implied whenever a
Many word is used, and never when a One word is used. As
we shali see, space and time, in their fundamental usage are
relationship words. For, when we split the One into
the Many for verbal purposes (that Many being an inherent
neccessity in making a positive language—§$35a), we use
space and time as a verbal form by which we consider it log-
ically done, or name its doing; then, when we want to un-
derstand (re-collect) what we have done, we use (express)

UNIVERSE 22

that space and time as a relationship (‘travel,’ I arbitrarily
called it above), to get the parts verbally together again into
an intelligible One. A separated Many is not intelligible—
chaos is its conventional name. Most scientists say that a
separated Many, or ‘‘action at a distance,’’ is inconceivable.

b. In that last paragraph we have a complete summary
of the ultimate character and use of tame and space. It prob-
ably is too condensed to be obviously true; so we shall have
various details as they arise (8857, 59-62, 64, 66, 97, 150,
161, 165, etc.; also, Index, s. v. ‘Light, velocity of’’).
There are a number of words that practically mean time and
space. But usually al) the scientists and philosophers and
theologians agree to condense the verbal puzzles of them into
the two words time and space. The reader can probably see
from the last paragraph that those puzzles evaporate very
simply by noting the obvious. It took me five or six years
of steady work to learn to write that last paragraph: so it
may take the reader five or six minutes to graspit. The
difficulty with the paragraph is that it is too obvicus. It is
so obvious that Herbert Spencer wrote a system of philoso-
phy or science and suhstantialiy forgot to consider time and
space: it (or they) bobbed up however in the guise of his
*“Unknown’’—and a considerable addition to the world’s
load of deadening agnosticism resulted.

‘ec. We shall consider that travel between This and That.
If That be my pencil, and This an egg possessed by you”,
if you want to understand (really prove) a statement about
the two (get its meaning), you have to go from one to the
other and see for yourself; ultimately, you could not take
my word for it, and if you had not before experienced (ob-
served) a pencil, you would have no idea what unit of the
Many that word pencil pointed out, even though you wanted
to take my word for it. (I might verbally ‘construct’ a pen-
cil—describe it intelligibly—in terms of other units of the
Many previously observed, or now readily observable, by
you; but the ultimate proof or understanding of my expres-
sion is that you see for yourself; you may be ocularly blind,
but you still have to use me as a more or less remote tool,
and use your own senses and brain for the direct ‘‘seeing.’’)
That obvious fact, that in some way you have to go from one
thing to the other and look at them—‘‘experiment’’ with
them,—explicitly introduces space and time, both being thus
at least zmplied when we speak of That and This.

d. Hence, if we become more explicit in our language,
we must definitely name the space (which we may abbreviate
to L, for ““length’’) and time (or T), when we name This
and That. We go from This to That, passing over a space
L; therefore we shall definitely say so, thus:- (That
This)L. (The parenthesis marks, ( ), as thus used in mathe-
matics are equivalent to a <—are merely a different way of
symbolizing a relationship.) But we require time 7’ to pass
over that space: the more space we pass over the directly
proportionally less time we need to pass over all the inter-
ae oe a

, thus:- (That
This) L| TY. But when we get to That we are traveling only
on a geometrical] line—on the line or one dimension repre-
sented by L or length (and completely represented by Li T).
To see all of That we have to travel out into the other two

a trust that l may be forgiven for addressing the reader di-
recily in the second person in this somewhat formal book. At this
point the number of facts we must attend to is so large that it helps
considerably in achieving rhetorical clearness to use the readily dis-
tinguishable and readable second person pronouns. The reader may
perhaps consider that the saving of his effort in reading is sufficient
warrant for the use of that rhetorical device. 1 noted that in
occasional places further along in the book it became rather absurd}
stilted to revert to ‘the reader,’ and I did not do so. :

23 UNIVERSE

dimensions (if my pencil were several miles long you could
not see it all from the line L; even with an ordinary pencil
you do not confine your vision to one geometrical line L).
So we put in that fact explicitly also (although we still shall
not have a completely explicit statement), and have (That <
This) L?/T*.

e. A logical or expressed proof that there are three di-
mensions is required. It is given in §59. We usually say
that we observe directly that there are three dimensions.
We do not directly observe that: directly we observe that all
things are joined together, and from different points of view
we give various names to that one identical relationship, one
name being space (see §150 for the simultaneous inclusion of
a cancelling time). We can observe directly, from the last
two paragraphs, that in order to get a That and This from,
or out of, a connected universe, we tacitly put in what we
called space to ‘“distinguish’’ them apart, or arbitrarily sep-
arate them, or make them have a ‘‘Difference.’’ Then, when
we came to talk explicitly about That and This we promptly
used that same space as a verbal link to connect them. Ob-
viously, we thus really used space in two directly opposite
ways, and thus absolutely cancelled it out, as being a mere
form to begin with. You may thus see in detail (see also
par. j), from this present point of view, the truth or consis-
tency of the general summary of the nature of space in par. a.
There are other points of view which we see from time to
time—altogether an infinite number of points of view, all of
which show that space and time is-are formal and cancels
out, are possible.

f. But that much explicit expression—( That X This) L?/T°
—= Meaning—does not give us the whole explicit expression :-
for the This may have changed while we were going to the
That. This was (as an example) your egg; and it might
have hatched and the chicken might then have walked off
and got lost while we were going over L to That. And in
that case our expression (That < This) L?| T°® about the two
things would not be quite exact or true, because there was
not the explicit This egg with which we began, but now a
lost chicken This. You may readily observe a baby lose his
‘egg’ thus in counting (in mathematical naming or talking);
he then does just what we are going to do—goes back and
finds it, or ‘verifies’? it again,—only we are going to be
very explicit and formal in erpressing what we see and do.
This learning the truth of all things—which from our point
of view in Part One is the verbal trick of expression, or the
logical or mathematical or philosophical game—is nothing
more than being a little child with a good memory. The
words Iam writing here are nothing more than an aid to
your memory—they help you concentrate on, or collect to-
gether, what you already know. Being myself too sophisti-
cated about counting, I got that aid for my memory by
watching a child count—as was mentioned.

g. So we have to go back to the egg This, to see it
again and be sure that our expression That X This is verbally
or formally positively correct and accurate before we ““re-
lease’’ that expression for publication, and then become
chagrined to find that This is a lost chicken instead of the
asserted egg. So we go back to the This, But my pencil
That might have had something appreciable happen to it
while we were going to the egg. So we go back to That,
and verify it. And in the same way we obviously must do
that ad infinitum, or in infinite regress, if our language is to
be perfectly explicit or positive, or is to be accurate. (In
this book, when I say accurate or exact or perfect, I mean ab-
solutely accurate or exact or perfect—which is merely the
conventional meaning. When I mean fairly or roughly ac-
curate or exact I say definite, or something that more explic-

One IV §36i

itly indicates au approximation.) -—-—- We must make that
infinite regress if our language is to assert exactly the de-
tails which do exist when we speak, and which details are
observable by us if we proceed to see them all. We have
proposed, as does conventional science and mathematics, to
make a completely explicit statement, and it is simple honesty,
or intelligent adherence to our agreement to keep on saying
A=A, that we do make that explicit statement or else pro-
ceed to state just where we fall short of such exactness.
Therefore, we write that infinite regress directly, thus:-
(That X This)L® | T”?=Meaning. That equation does
not yet express explicitly the fact which we observed, that
This and That changed: the L*/T” indirectly asserts it of
course, but asserts directly and explicitly only the ad infinitum
travel. I put in that omitted explicitness in par. 1.

h. And in deriving that equation we tacitly assumed
that This was some part of the universe, just as when we say
‘2’ we actually mean ‘2 things.’ Just ‘°2,’’ the absolutely
abstract ““number’’ 2, without any implication, is utterly
meaningless. The most ‘‘abstract’’ way in which we can
conceive ‘‘2’” just alone, and not have it utterly meaning-
less, is to consider it a relationship word implying that it
means, or is the verbal link, joining one thing and another
thing into a whole; in such a case any ‘‘number’’ is cor-
rectly and validly equal to any other ‘‘number,’’ as they are
then all simply equal to links, or relationships, and the only
relationship is identity (that way, in which any number is
equal to any other number, is explicitly proved by orthodox
algebra in $44; it is also one view of “‘number’’ taken by
Einstein’s relativity, $66). In orthodox science or in
a formal equation the This and That are often given by just
the ‘‘abstract’’ number (as by “‘2’’), and then the ‘things’
that also belongs in the expression is frequently .forgotten—
with disastrous consequences to the logic, resulting in a final
agnosticism (also in the orthodox mathematical nonsense
typically shown in §44). Consequently, we are safer if we
put the term ‘things’ into our equation, in some form, so that
in the equation there will be an explicit assertion that we
are talking about “parts’—about actualities, and not about
mere words or symbols. The customary scientific symbol for
‘thing,’ when such a symbol is explicitly asserted, is M, the
initial of mass—a thing, or in general a part of the universe.
So we may stick that AZ into the equation, without meaning
that some new ‘‘number’’ is multiplied into Thai and This,
but that they explicitly mean the Many. The MM we put in is
to be a unit of mass—to be a standard,—-which thus merely
names the sort of measurement, and hence will positively pro-
vide for the equation’s being used as a standard universe jf
we so wish. So, in an algebraic sense, the M zs multiplied ;
but so long as That and This are also explicitly retained in
the equation, AJ is unity—or, is simply ‘thing’: onze thing.
The fact obviously is, that when we have a completely
explicit equation (i. e., when the space and time are
really taken as infinite), That and This become the total uni-
verse, and in that case M is the unit which 7s the universe
(as we shall see further iu par. 1).

i. An additional fact about the M is that we are forced
to be explicit as to a unit of measurement, if we are to ob-
serve our agreement 4—=A. Orthodox science sometimes is
not, and gets into fearful logical confusions (cf. theory of
relativity, 866). For, if That and This are, as we took it, a
pencil and an egg, we can not intelligibly multiply them to-
gether. Cows Xhorses is nonsense. The M explicitly as-
serts that a common unit of measurement is taken and ap-
plied (ultimately it means that the egg and pencil are joined
and then measured simply as occupying space, as we shall
see). Hence, the explicit presence of the M keeps us from

836i IV One

starting talking such nonsense as Pencil < Egg, by asserting
that a common measure (finally it is ZL and T) is applied to
those: names. Therefore, we have the mere explicit equa-
tion:- (That This) ML” /T°=Meaning.

j. Also, we truistically conclude—as another aspect of
the arbitrariness and unreality of space and time,—from our
way of naming L and T, that whatever they are, or however
we name them, they vary directly proportionally: in fact,
that is what I said when they were explicitly introduced into
the equation (4th sentence, par. d), and the statement was
made to agree with obvious facts which we can verify at any
time by watching a baby count (for explicit statement of it
from the point of view of T, see §$150-1).. Hence, L and
T, so far as either the meaning of our Many expression, or
of Meaning, is concerned, actually cancel each other. I.e.,
space and time, so far as this language we are constructing is
concerned, is-are absolutely arbitrary. They are mere ver-
bal counters. We saw directly in par. e that space was un-

eal and simply a verbal form. Obviously, in precisely the

same way as there used for space, we can see that time is
unreal—it is implicitly done in §150. And in this paragraph
we see further, and asa formally separate observation, that
when we consider time and space together, they themselves
formally cance! or contradict the reality of each other.
In sbort, our language machine is a very close-knit affair.
In whatever way we regard it, we may see at once that there
is always the formal contradiction (here we observe it be-
tween Land T), but that always the very description of the
language structure truistically declares the contradiction to
be unreal because it at once cancels. These somewhat mi-
nute examinations of the language machine—e. g., the one
in this paragraph—need not be remembered. They are ex-
ceedingly tiresome if yeu try to remembér them; I never
remember them, but work them out by direct observation
when I need them. But if there is any point of the exten-
sive, important conclusions we are shortly to reach which you
wish to see for yourself in ultimate detail, then these minute
details are here to refer to.

k. Perhaps some readers have formerly been puzzled by
the idea that time and space are ‘“‘real’’ in the sense of con-
crete or objective (although leading scientists objected to
the idea on the ground that £ and 7' could not be manipu-
lated in a test tube as ceuld HzO); or by the dualists’
messes of time and space, and by views as to ‘‘transcending’’
them, apparently in our Many personality; or by the mathe-
maticians’ n-fold space which they themselves blandly admit
is sensibly inconceivable (§62). For those readers, as a
gcneral means of clearing up those puzzles, I add this para-
graph of direct observations as to the nature of space and
time. (From time to time additional concrete details, more
easily seen than this paragraph, are added.) It is
cleer that we have above used space and time, or Land T,
simply as verbal copulas. They are a paired name (i. e.,
L/T) for God the Holy Ghost, which we wnplicitly intro-
duce when we first consider This and That as separate (intro-
ducing it in order to make them separate), and then have to
put in a second time (cancelling the original contradiction)
in order to get Zhis and That back together again into the
One. Hence, £/T' is simply tautological with the xX.
Therefore, in the expression (That This)L/T, the contra-
dictions ‘<<’ and ‘Z£/7” mutually cancel—which is another
way of showing how close-knit is our language machine.
Perhaps the simplest way of seeing the nature of time
and space is to try for yourself to see which of the three
kinds of words (as in the Trinity) they correspond with when
used in the senses above. Of course, space is sometimes
used as meaning that which is a part of the universe and

UNIVERSE 24

really meaning the matter that fills it, as a cubte foot—which
insofar as it is a Many term obviously indicates the human
foot. And sometimes it is used to mean the total universe,
as all spuce; then it is obviously a One word. And t2me may
similarly be used as each of the three sorts of words; but it
is not so usual for time to be anything but a relationship word.
l. If we had actually done all that traveling which was
or is necessary in order to get the absolutely accurate (al-
though not yet fully explicit) statement, (That X
This) ML” | T *=Meaning, we obviously would have traveled,
naming or counting, all over the universe. And obviously,
the That ann This would then have finally coincided as being
absolutely identical with the universe, or as forming the
universe (see last sentence, par. h). Hence we can drop
the verbal counters This and That if we like (as they have
merged into identity; also because it is often customary in
everyday language to do so; and also because we shall still
have in the MM an explicit name for concrete things), and we
have left the 31L°/7'", which is still the universe, ora One
or meaning. Or, we have M [meaning the whole universe]
= Meaning= Universe,—which is obviously the truism The
One=The One. And we have noted or observed only one
fact in the whole process of writing an explicit and accurate
sentence or equation—the other observations were merely of
word forms or agreements: were arbitrary inventions. That
fact is that the This (which merged with the That and hence
implied it: and also implied the M and is the M if we drop
explicit mention of This), varied in some way while we were
engaged in traveling over Zin 7. (The concrete fact was
that the egg hatched, or at least changed in some way. The
object of cold storage is to prevent as much as possible eggs’
changing—and it is well known that even there they still do
change. Part Two shows in detail that all things always are
changing. ) Also, the fact that there was change is
truistically expressed by the verbal logic or form:- that the
That and This changed so as absolutely to merge into each
other and hence become identical with the universe (mutu-
ally inclusive). But that truism has not been fully verbally
expressed in our equation—especially it has not been defin-
itely asserted that M, which explicitly names This, does thus
vary. Therefore, we will explicitly say what we observed,
thus:- M(vurying with) L” | T° =Meaning, or Unwerse. That
equation is then simply our truism, The One=The One. But
the truism, in that explicit AZ form, asserts that the parts of
the universe move or change in some way. And that motion
or change is nothing more than a verbal or formal agreement
(so far as expression is concerned) with our formal assumption
that we go from This to That (or, finally, so far as expres-
sion is concerned, motion or ““energy’’ or “‘life’’ is nothing
more than that the universe is formally divided—‘ changed’
—into parts, or into This and That: cf. 8850, 97);
Therefore, in expression, we have simply a more explicit tru-
ism. And if we take it as an observable or existing fact that
the parts change, then we accept motion as a fact, as change
is motion. But, as we shall see (especially in 897), we do
not need to assert that ““motion’’ is a fact, or ‘exists.’ We
can assert absolute rest’’ or “eternally static’’ (some peo-
ple do do s0) and we would finally get the same meaning.
So it errs whether we say ‘rest’ or ‘motion.’
Motion” is more conventional, so I take that word.
PP gab eapten app iirla bard
’ completely explicit and ac-
curate—logically or verbally. (We as finite individuals can
not of course practically use any such expression; we come to
that point in §38.) When we say ‘John is a boy,’ we imply
that complete equation.
ae in ieee en of ere anes Boa
rst member of that

95 UNIVERSE
equation, depending on the degree of explicitness we wish
to achieve, as follows:- That This; (That This)L/T;
(That X This)L°/T”; (That This)ML°/T"; = Mvarying

with)L”/T”; and M [meaning a whole One]. In the next
section we begin to note important conclusions and applica-
tions. Here, we shall obtain one more variation in the
method of writing it that is of considerable use.

n. We have seen that in order to write That and This
accurately, we are forced into an infinite regress of compar-
ing them more and more carefully, because they change.
The changing was a mere truism of introducing space and
time at the beginning as a means of getting This and That.
Above, I have explicitly expressed that regress by L”/T™.
There is another more conventional way of expressing it
which we shall find more useful:- We may write it That...
* This...3; or, we may express the same thing with a single
word or symbol, as That..., or M..., or This.... The dots

. are the usual typographical sign indicating a continuing
series, or regress, or verbal step-by-step process, when ex-
plicit naming of all the members of the series is not gone
through with. Or, the dots mean simply ‘‘ete.,’’ or
mean that the completion of our ad infinitum process is
omitted. (In English the dots ty pographically spread out,
thus:- .. .3 but for obvious reasons it is preferable to use
the compact French fashion in this book.) We may
conceive the meaning of the dots in a much simpler (i. e.,
more familiar) way than to consider that they replace the
M”/T™:- When we say This we imply that there are other
This’s and That’s. Hence, we may say that the dots ...
mean that in order to state This completely or accurately we
have to go on and name an infinity of Zhis’s in comparison.
Therefore, explicit typographical expression of any This—of any
part of the universe, or of any unit of the Many—is This... .

837. a. By explicitly formally expressing any statement,
using general words or symbols to do it, we have derived an
equation or sentence which we can put into various forms,
depending on how explicit we wish to be. And we have
seen that each form reduces to an explicit truism. Thus,
the general explicit form was M(varying with)L” | T ”=Mean-
ing, or Universe: we may write that, M...—Universe, and
obviously (as a truism of our agreement as to what symbols
mean) M... is the universe, and we have Universe= Universe.

b. But clearly such explicit truisms are not useful in
ordinary ‘speech. Also, in ordinary language we can not
actually express that infinite regress which is implied when-
ever we use a Many word. Therefore, we need (1) to get
those various forms into directly useful shape, and (2) then
to note, and express very carefully in conventional terms,
just what our practical] typical equations or sentences mean.
Actually, we are going to see that all the general laws of
science, philosophy, and religion are definitely implied—even
expresscd—in those type sentences. It will take the
whole book to show that. But it is obvious that if truth is
consistent or unified, then it is a truism that all of it may be
reduced to explicit expression by one typical sentence.

ec. The form which is usually implicitly used in every-
day speech is That... This...—=Meaning. That equation
simply explicitly asserts a comparison of things—a verifica-
tion. And it is obvious that when we talk we compare
things—describe the less well known in terms of mutually
familiar things. Or, all language is metaphor or simile. It
is better to know explicitly that trick of talking. Then we
are less liable to depart from it, and try to talk of things as
being absolutely separate (which of course implies that they
are absolutely without comparison); such talk is nonsensical.

d. As immediate rough evidence of the fact that that

‘ 6é ree 3 6é 3
everyday equation explains’ things, or solves problems,

One IV §37e

or gives intelligible talk, we may in the remainder of this
section observe some examples of its use. (These samples
are here quite roughly stated: the more definite statements
—which would not be very intelligible at this point—are in
the last chapters. ) Our Constitution makes a broad
comparison of (1) That and (2) This by the method or terms
of comparing or joining (1) the various state governments and
(2) the federal government. The (1) state governments may
run into as many explicit dots (State Governments...) as we
can write, by naming governors, legislators, etc., on to the
individual citizens—and on to the parts of their component
atoms. And (2) Federal Government... may have as many
dots as we care to name, such as president, congressmen,
messenger boys, on to the details ‘federal citizens,’ and on
to pins owned by them, etc. The Constitution broadly
makes the Federal Government... react as a verba] Many, or
as a part of a machine, with State Governments..., thus:-
State Governments... < Federal Government...—=Country, or Na-
tion. That is a standard universe (unless we consider it in
the light of §47, which we need not, here). But we
can divide our Nation into reacting pairs in an indefinite num-
ber of ways by making a division in those infinite details or
dots from other points of view. Thus, we have People... <
Officials... (a form of equation which is recognized or indicated
by the first ten amendments to the Constitution—the so-
called bill of rights). Or, we may have Congress... >< Presi-
dent.... In that pair, the dois in President... obviously wil]
finally include the people who elect a particular man as presi-
dent (which means, for one thing, in ordinary language, that
the people are perceptibly a part of the president as such, in
that they can have him impeached, etc.). But Congress...
also includes with more or less definiteness the same people.
So there is an obvious example of That... and This... becom-
ing identical when carried out a little in detail. The
Constitution explicitly asserts a democracy—a reacting, or
interacting, or formally and explicitly (as well as actually)
related That... < This..., or machine. And the Constitution
in effect states that regardless of how the standard One or
Country be considered as thus arbitrarily or ‘logically’
divided into parts, they are compared, or balanced, or are of
equal logical or formal importance, but explicitly are not of
equal quantitative importance or “‘value.”’

e. Butin an attempted aristocracy or autocracy (there can
not possibly bea real or actual one; §174) anattempt is made
to depart from the valid equation That... X This... —=Meaning.
The people in an aristocracy are mostly called subjects or
vassals, meaning that they are expected to be essentially or
in principle subordinate, and xot a complementary or re-
acting part of the whole. In short, with respect to the gov-
ernment (to the autocratic officials) the people are said to be
officially or logically nothing or zero, so that we bave the
attempted equation Oficials—Nation, or One. 1. e., it is in
verbal effect denied that there is any reacting part, or other
unit of the Many such as That...; and it is also denied that
there can be any dots, which can, by a division from a dif-
ferent point of view, give reacting or comparable parts.
Obviously that aristocratic or dualistic point of view is arrant
nonsense. As soon as we see how we must talk about the
Many if we are to talk at all in positive or concrete terms,
we see that there must be reacting parts, or a machine.
When the autocrat says that he is the state, he asserts:- An
individual of the Many==The One—which is obviously equiva-
lent to the claim of divine right, or ex officio infallibility,
because in conventional terms the One is God. Such logical
absurdity is admired and praised by some; by others it is
variously named autocracy, aristocracy, egotism, paranoia,
megalomania, hysteria, or excessive selfishness. All

§87e 1V One

of that states a logical or gialitative proposition. | have
made no assertion or implication that onc part of the essen-
tial machine is quantitatively equal to another part. Asa fact,
no two parts can ever be quantitatively equal during a finite
time (S$162i, 164, 167-8). The quantitative sizes of That
and This become a matter for measurement, by means of L
and T, and we are to investigate that matter; but clearly,
that difference in size does not affect the principle that there
must erplicitly be at least two reacting parts.

f. Thus we see that essentially there are no ‘‘superiors’’
or “‘inferiors’? among the parts of the One. On the other
hand, quantitatively, or from the arbitrary L and T point of
view, the parts of the One are always of different sizes.
That double aspect of the application of our equation—
(1) the essential or qualitative aspect is the One; (2) the
quantitative aspect is the Many—runs throngh every act of
our lives. Thus:- no “‘line’’ organization can, as such, pos-
sibly work, as it is se]f-contradictory nonsense (§8$174c, 175,
167). Aline organizationis the so-called military one,
wherein there are asserted to be essential superiors and in-
feriors (so that by virtue of rank an order is correct, ete.—
Just as the pope, in the Catholic line organization or ecclesi-
astic hierarchy, is nonsensically held officialiy infallible).

g. Those conclusions are anticipated here to show that
what superficially seems to be arather trivial investigation of
words clears up everyday matters that confuse and puzzle
many. Continually we are going to be using that form
That... X This...—=Meaning. And usually we find that
merely to express a point of view in that form throws such
an iJluminating light that further explanation is rather need-
less. Also, as we all must be able to estimate the different
quantitative sizes of men (KXVII1, X1X), we further need to
know about the measuring form of that equation—we need
to know very definitely about Z and 7, and see how those
apparently ‘‘abstract’’ relationships are applied to simple
‘“material’’ parts of the universe—as a means of learning to
apply that form to the complicated parts named men.

CHAPTER V. General statement and proof of how to apply
language.
S38. a. Wemay write onr explicit statement thus:-

That... X This... = (That This)ML”/T” = Mvarying
with) L” /T ”=Universe, or Energy. In practice, an infinite
regress or the L”/T'™ is not positively stateable. | Conse-
quently, in order to get rid of it explicity, we assume (this is
an actual assumption, in that it is not an exact fact, and will
always in practice make cur equation inaccurate quantitatively ;
but in §42d we get rid of the assumption formally or logic-
ally or qualitatively by cancelling it out—doing that by the
simple method of asserting the real truth:- that the equa-
tion is inexact) ——-we ussume that This does not change
enough to make any particular or important inaccuracy in the
truth of what we say, during the time we go to That, if we
do not return and re-view and re-state This. Or, we assume
that we can guess at what change there will be in This, and
hence state wiat the parts This and That are simultaneously,
without going back to Tis to see that change—and thereby
losing the exact change in That, and having to return, and
so on ad infinitum. We therefore, (1) drop explicit stating
of the dots before they become absolutely infinity (we as fin-
ite individuals have to discontinue naming them at some
time); and (2) we also drop the infinite Z’s and 7’s that
symbolically gave the impractical positive naming, and have :-
That... X This... = (ThatXThis)ML3?/T? =

M(varying
with) L?/T?—=Energy. The dots...

of That..., ete., now

tional in form as it is validly possible to make it.

UNIVERSE 26

mean in practice that we can not positively go on and name
each onc to infinity. They also, in practice, explicitly mean
that they replace the ML®/T? in the more explicit form,
(That X This) ML®/T?; i. e., That... X This... is really an
abbreviation which implies always that a definite measure-
ment by Z°/7? must be made if we are quite practically ex-
plicit. Usually in this book J do not print that full form
(That X This) ML? / T°. Hence, always hereafter, unless
definitely stated or indicated otherwise (e. g., as in the cases
where I am showing what pluralism or the classic logic verb-
ally asserts), Tat and This, or any of the numerous analo-
gous symbols or synonyms into which they are translated,
are to be understood as having dots; i. e., logicaliy every
Many term implies the infinite regress (the classic logic verb-
ally tries to deny that regress). For various reasons, on a
few occasions ] omit printing the dets.*™

b. And conventional science, for reasons of convenience
(SS68d, 72-3), changes the L°/T° into L°/T7. We may
therefore drop out an L/T in the second member, remem-
bering that it is implied (see $72), and we have what I shall
call our general equation, or general sentence or statement:-

That... < This...=Mvarying with) L* T-?=Energy.

c. That equation expresses, formally and in a fairly
conventional scientific way, all knowledge. It is as conven-
Orthodox
science usualiy (in the older textbooks) asserts the equation
ML? T-?=Energy,** —making totally illogical and somewhat
inaccurate assumptions ($72, etc. ). Our genera] equation
closeiy resembles that orthodox one in form; and the fact
is that our ‘(varying with)’ is a number or ‘‘coefficient’’ that
in ordinary circumstances quantitatively is equal to approxi-
mately 1 (§$72-3, ete.). But in principle, the orthodox equa-
tion asserts that the part M is isolated (has no dots); that
there is no other body with which that explicitly named Af
reacts, but that it just has energy of itself, whatever that
mystic statement may mean (of course, all commonsense
people, and Newton’s first law in effect, hold that there is
energy displayed only when that named M reacts with some
other body or M; Iam merely showing what the orthodox
equation really asserts, and how it is interpreted). In short, the
orthodox equation asserts that M=The One—which we saw
in §37ef is nonsense. Our ‘(varying with)’ is ultimately
merely an explicit assertion that there are dots—that the
part is really M..., ¢mplying an indefinite regress of other M’s
with which it reacts or reatiy ultimately joins.

§39. a. We begin now to note the rather numerous

as we shall see, the above practical nse of L3/T? for L°/7'™ is
merely arbitrary, and not essential. When we make that practical
assumption, besides (A) making the statement or equation inacen-
rate, we also (B) have selected our ordinary everyday Janguage as
the language we shall speaix. We did not have to select that par-
ticlar language. We could (1) have selected £"/7, and thus obv-
iously got any one of the indefinite number of arbitrary languages of
a ‘‘space’’ of other than 3 dimensions. Also, we could (2) have
taken it that L was not Euclidian or ‘‘flat?’ space, and got any one
of an indefinite number of languages—which one we got depending
ou the quantitative degree of ‘‘curvature’’ of the s pace which we ar-
bitrarily selected. Or, we could (3) have assumed that Land Tdid
not vary proportionally—were not mutually steady—and got any one
of an indefinite number of languages known collectively as the ‘‘rela-
tivity theory’’—which one, depending on the particular quantitative
degree of disproportionate variation (of ‘‘jelly-fish’’ shaking of space
described in §66) we selected for any given case or statement. We
consider those different sorts of languages in VITI.

%8¢Usually science writes that equation 4mv*== Knergy, where m
is our M; and v is velocity, or L/T, so that v°=JAT-2; and 4 is the
numerical result of differentiating or averaging the change of velocity
(on the erroneous assumption that there is not our ‘varying with’ —as
we shall see). AL T-? is the so-called dimensional form of w%my2
which drops such ‘‘abstract’’? nnmbers (§68). :

27 UNIVERSE

conclusions that are directly observable in that general form
of a complete sentence. It may first be observed that the
reason for using the ‘‘mathematical’’ form is that we have
noticed such a considerable number of implications contained
in language that we see we need the formality of mathemat-
ics to make them explicit in a statement brief enough to be
easily remembered—one that is an- aid to memory rather
than a burden. If we like, we can put that form which we
mostly use into ‘‘words’’:- ‘Thut and this is something.’ But
even compared with that form, the ““mathematical’’ way,
That... X This...==Meaning, seems to be terser, and more
illuminating to the eye. The equation is merely a mne-
monic device—-all equations are, and in a sense language is.

b. I may repeat somewhat, in summary:- ‘The three
members of the general equation are three different forms in
which identically the same thing is asserted; i. e., the three
are the truism A—=A=—A. The first member, That... X
This..., expresses the Many in everyday terms, asserting
that the Many is really the One. The second member,
M(varying with)L?T-*, expresses the Many explicitly in
measuring or quantitative terms (explicitly in terms of time
and space)—again asserting that the Many is really con-
nected continuously into the One. The third member,
Energy (or The One, or Universe, or Meaning), expresses the
One as a tautological echo, without being itself positive
language.

c. We may now see that in so far as it is consistently
possible to distinguish apart philosophy, science, and relig-
ion, the three members of the equation respectively do it.
The meaning or content of philosophy, science, and religion
is obviously identical (assuming that each fas a valid mean-
ing, as is the case if the names are honestly applied or if we
stick to A=A, and if this book proves that knowledge is
unified). Hence (unless the book fails to unify knowledge
—to show that The Many= The Onc), no valid essential differ-
ence can exist between religion, science, and philosophy;
they are an inseparable unit, mutually including each other,
just as That... ultimately merges identically into This... .
Hence, the difference in form (an arbitrary, L and T, or
quantitative difference) implied by the general equation is
the only valid distinction between the three.

d. The That... X This... member is substantially the
form in which knowledge or experience has been discussed
by philosophy for centuries. And the same form, which
speaks of observations in customary terms such as ‘‘this”’
and “‘that,’? and compares such Many terms with each
other, is obviously the form used by the average man, in
which to express everyday matters. Practically all of hu-
manics is expressed in that form: it is used throughout Part
Three. Theoretically or technically, it is ““philosophy’’ ;
practically, it is the brief commonsense way of expressing
what we ordinarily see or think of. ssentially, the foregoing
discussion of language (which some critics would nearly
surely condemn by their curse-word ‘‘philosophy’’ if they
are not hereby discouraged) is obviously equally science, re-
ligion, and philosophy——briefly, is commonsense.

e. The second member, M(varying with)L*T~", is sub-
stantially the scientific member, and its obviously distin-
guishing characteristic is that it considers the Many
explicitly in terms of Land T. In brief, science definitely
and carefully uses space and time, and gets what it calls
measurements—so that fundamentally and specifically science
is the explicit form of Many expression (summing of course
to a One or religion). That agrees with Kelvin and other
authoritative scientists (§2c). | But science customarily by
no means confines itself to the use of that explicit form.
Conventionally it spreads to the other forms, just as This...

One V_ §39h

merges identically with Thal.... E. g., conservation of en-
ergy (i. e., the absoluteness of the One—or briefly, The
One=The One) is religion—-even technically mysticism, al-
though quite intelligible, —and not formally explicitly science.
And science is continually using the first member, the philo-
sophical form; as in Force X Length=Energy; Quantity of
electricity X Voltage; Volume X Pressure, etc. Further, every
one of science’s.‘mathanica] theories’’ is definitely a philo-
sophical form ($§88-90, 96, ete.).

f. On the other hand, orthodox philosophers and the
average man are both frequently engaged in talking of time
and space—in explicitly using those words to express meas-
ures definitely. In doing so, they are obviously technically
scientific. As a matter of commonsense fact (i. e., taking a
view of all knowledge, regardless of its forms), there can be
no sharp distinction between science, philosophy, and relig-
ion, even in the matter of technique or form (for rigorous
implicit proof, see §$41, 40, 50). The distinction which |
more or less observe in this book is to consider that science
treats primarily of the Many—and by implication, is explicit
about L and T where need be,—whereas religion is explicit
about the One. When I use ‘philosophy’ I am inclined to
follow customary usages of the average man, and imply a
doctrine of some sort that is rather vaguely stated. I may
say in defense of that rather untechnical conduct that to use
That... X This... ig more vague than to use M(varying with)
L°T-"*, and that with the exception of the few first class
philosophers the professional philosopher, or particularly the
amateur sort, is pretty vague. So the word philosophy is an
uncertain, tricky sort of word to use. | When the scientist
means what is strictly technically philosophy—i. e., a
That... X This.... sammed into a One,—Ae usually calls it
“‘commonsense.’’ And that is just as tricky a word: it ob-
viously has been saying ‘‘philosophy’’ for the scientist at the
very time he claimed he was abjuring philosophy. Moses
and the theologians, when they want to indicate what we see
is technical philosophy, thunder ‘“Thus sayeth the Lord’’—
which is even more dangerous and uncertain—now so glar-
ingly so that the day of noisy dogmatism is rapidly passing.

g. Thethird andlastmember, Energy, is the tautological
One word, and is the technically religious part of the equa-
tion. As a matter of fact, all erpressed religion—when it is
not mysticism and of itself unintelligible, ond hence not ex-
pression in a positive sense—is necessarily expressed in Many
terms that are then summed into the One that is technically
religion. So, the erpression of religion is thus truistically a
science—or it may be technical philosophy:- a mechanical
theory. The science which directly expresses religion is us-
ually called ethics (§160). Orthodox theology is funda-
mentally dualism, and hence is nonsense when explicitly
considered, and actually in practice is neither sciénce, nor
philosephy, nor religion (as we shall see in verifiable detail).
Theology is practically a spoiled word—so spoiled that in
this book I make no perhaps hopeless effort to rehabilitate
it, but use it in its customary meanings to indicate a certain
dogmatic species of dualism, aristocracy, ete.

h. Ishall use the word religion to mean that the pri-
mary emphasis of a certain state of consciousness or life or of
a certain collection of words is on the validly formal and also
intelligible—and hence considerably emotional—sunmmation of the
Many into a One. And 1 shall use the term with one special
implication:- the summation must be a complete or whole
One, and not merely a standard universe. (Words for sum-
mations that perhaps usually refer to standard Ones, and
hence in such cases are not religion, are education, art, cult-
ure, and such; but those words can, and often actually do,
indicate whole One meanings and are real religion, as shown

§389h V One

in S166.) Religion itself as being even more explicitly a
conscious meaning, can not be positively expressed: the One
words which indicate religion are not positive expression. So
when I say religion, I refer to the fact that the definitely
used Many words give a meaning of a complete One, and that
One is religion—remembering that it or its really grasped
meaning gives an appreciable emotional effect. That such
a meaning is the One which for centuries has been striven
for by orthodox religions, is obvious from the fact that all of
them undertake to express definitely a description of the
universe which might be summed into a complete God or
One. That expression has mostly been dualistic and hence
invalid theology; the orthodox reJigion itself, as understood
or inarticulately held by vast numbers of past and present
people, is obviously real; and the erpression of the great re-
ligious teachers themselves (of Christ, Buddha, Confucius,
ete.) was usually intelligibly or practically valid, although
technically slightly vague at times (Christ, e. ¢., himself
repeatedly asserted that he was aware of such technical
vagueness in his remarks, by stating that a saying was for
those with understanding, or for those who could receive it).
When we come to observe the details of religion
(SS153f, 162, ete.), we shall find that the more convention-
ally recognized characteristic of religion is that the meaning
of the complete One must be sufficiently vividly perceived to
make it what is called ““emotional.’’

$40. a. Probably the most important conclusion asserted
by our general equation is that there is not, and never can
be, any exact science. All through the book I sliall be show-
ing just what that means, and proof of it. A brief intelli-
gible statement of its meaning is that if momentarily we
succeeded, by one chance in infinity, in getting the exact
dimensions of (say) this sheet of paper, then at the next in-
stant those dimensions would be inaccurate. Or, stated in
amore technica] way, there is not a single pliysieal or
‘“seientifie’’ ““constant,’’ and can not be. There is no such
thing as a constant or eternal atom, cr 2 constant or fixed
atomie weight, or ‘‘conservation’’ of a certain mass, ora fixed
or eternal ““person’’ or personality—short of the total universe.

b. An important, intelligible way of considering the
fact that there is no exact science is to state it from the
point of view of quantity—of “how much.’ Te put it briefly,
it is not possible to express accurately the quantitative solu-
tion of any actual problem. That is the same as saying that
we can not express all the really ad infinitum dots of actual

That...’s and This...’s.

ce. Quantity implies that the time and space relationships
of a part of the universe are meant: i. €., quantity means
measurement. In the first place, measurement implies a
standard unit——of time and space. It may be readily ob-
served that scientists have never been actually able to desig-
nate any such units accurately. The length of a day—which
gives the standard time unit:- one second—is observed to
have varied in past centuries; and it varies slowly now (XII).
There are carefully preserved metal bars representing the
standard L (yard and meter): and they have been repeat-
edly measured and compared, and always with some slight
variation. There simply does not exist any exact standard
unit of any sort-—and it is impossible for one to exist, short
of the total universe (Part Two).

d. However, we are acting—as distinguished from verb-
ally expressing—all the time in exact quantitative measure.
To turn this page you must exert an exact amount of force.
When you turn the page you do exert that foree. If you
had turned it a second earlier or a second later, slightly dift
ferent amounts would have been needed (e. g,, the sun
would have been in relatively different places with reference

28

UNIVERSE

to the finite size of the leaf, so that the gravity pulls, or
weights, of the leaf would have been slightly changed).
This page is a This..., with an infinite regress which must be
stated completely in order to achieve verbal quantitative ac-
curacy; and it can not be so stated. No man can state ex-
actly how much force it needs to turn the page; of course,
we can, for practical purposes, readily measure it with fair
accuracy. But we are trying now to speak precisely, and
by so doing avoid al] the agnosticism and errors due to the
vague and indefinite speech of past ages.

e. Consequently, we can accurately solve quantitative
problems only by doing them—living them. We can, by
learning the principles of measurement (principles of L and
T), predict pretty accurately the measures. Thus, without
an almanac, I can guess to within say ten minutes when the
sun will rise tomorrow, and that is elose enough for my pur-
poses. The astronomer can anticipate to within about a
hundredth of a second what the average of actual measures
would be, and the navigator to about a second or so what
his measures would be.

f. That may be expressed in a different way:- At first
mien expressed astronomy geocentrically—i. e., in terms of
the earth as a stable or exact base, or scientific ““constant’’
or standard. Then Copernicus found it more eonvenient—
i. e., much more accurate and brief, if we use our customary
language consistently——to express astronomy heliocentrically
—i. e., with the sun as a base or eonstant. At present,
with better observing, astronomers find the sun also ‘“mov-
ing’’—not exact—(so that it is unfitted to be a ‘‘eenter’’):
they tacitly more or less assume a fixed base somewhere, but
do not know where or why. This book shows that no such
center is possible; there simply is not any (so far I have
shown it by an investigation of mere words; but later I give
similar proof in terms of all other things). We advance
from Copernican astronomy to an astronomy without a cen-
tér—without an exact center. Similarly, conventional hu-
manics usually takes a man as « base or constant; al] onr
everyday talk is anthropecentrie—man creates God in man’s
own image. We are going to change from that standard,
and see that man is a sample of the universe—is the uni-
verse, if we speak absolutely aecurately (§47). That makes
the whole universe the center, which is logically and really
the same as saying no center (ef. §§43-4), It is actually
making a One God the standard or base: most of us have
been claiming for many centuries that we are monotheistie,
or believe in one God; now we are actually going to be, or
do so. It will sound odd at first, although it is merely do-
ing what the race has for centuries been claiming it does—
and really has been doing in actual living. Ihavea profound
respect for the wisdom of what, in the long run, people do
—but not much for what they say about it.

g. To say that we can not solve quantitative problems
accurately, meaning that we can not express oy in any way
anticipate the solution of them accurately, is obviously equiv-
alent to saying that uever can man anticipate his life exactly
and thus be able to quit making an effort to live a better or
more successful one, or stop being interested

este in actually
working it out.

It is an obvious truism that if science ever
did succeed in doing what some over-enthusiastic second rate
scientists fancy is possible—accurately predict some quanti-
tative measures,—then in the degree in which. those meas-
ures were important it would make a man’s life a bore, take
away his incentive to live, and in the same degree kill his
nervous system. (Qualitative agnosticism and quantitative ex-
act gnosticism both kill—ultimately are death.) To
restate that about quantitative exactness in more familiar
terins:- Suppose that a fancied-exact science had predicted

29 UNIVERSE

accurately the important things that would happen to us to-
morrow: obviously, there would be no use living to verify
them, as we already absolutely experience them ?f the pre-
diction is accurate: so we would simply die, as a truism. It
is a fact, perhaps not obvious in detail until the chapters on
psychology and ethics (XVII, XVIII), that such accuracy
would bore us to death. However, sucha quest for accuracy
is obviously a quest for the impossible, It is a waste of tine
or life to go after something which in the nature of things
does not and can not exist (but we have to be careful that
there is rigorous proof of such a condition: they told me
that this book was impossible; and then when it was written
that I couldn’t find you, to read it; and again that it was
impossible for me to print it—not to mention printing it at
a reasonable price). Hence, we are, by clear seeing, finding
just what knowledge we are after.

h. A qualitative problem is one which asks why or how
or what. It asks an explanation. And an erplanation con-
sists of stating the relationships of things until we find some
thing in the series with which we are familiar—fundament-
ally, a thing which is directly related to ourselves as a part;
is a part of us (cf. Index, s. v. ““Rebirth’’). If an average
child asks us to ““explain’’ a cow he is generally satisfied at
first if we say it gives milk—is related to milk in the capacity
of producer. Not having disturbed himself with the verbal]
puzzles of the philosophers, he knows milk, and the cow is
explained. Later, he wants himself and milk ‘‘explained.”’
We are doing that in this book by relating all of the Many
to each other, in a generally recognizable way. Explana-
tion, then, means relating things, and direct observing of
the related things as being so related, by the person to whom
the explanation explains. That is circular, valid logic.

i. Already, in various ways we have observed that the
Many parts of the universe are all mutually related. We
saw that that principle was the underlying basis of our lang-
uage. Consequently, all qualitative ‘“‘problems’’ are ex-
plained. We know them al]: it is the fundamental fact or
principle upon which we started when we started to talk.
Sometimes we may not see immediately the expression of the
aspect of desired relationship between (say) cabbages and
kings. J] show the general relationship between cabbages
and kings and everything else in 847; also, in detail in Part
Two: to get the expression of other aspects of any relation-
ship is mere verbal] skill easily acquired—and to get fairly
accurate measures of those relationships is the whole business
of life. But the essential point is that we know absolutely
that there is a universal relationship. We know it from
merely our investigation, so far, of the typical sentence
That... X This...=Meaning. The solution of all qualitative
problems is represented or implied by any assertion of the
One we may make—and we are continually asserting some
One. So, speaking accurately, there are no qualitative problems.

j. Consequently,as qualitative so-called ‘“‘problems’’ are
the essential ones—the “‘riddle of the universe,’’—we need
never worry over any **anknowns.’’ All the theological
Veiled Beings, unseen Gods, “‘mysteries,’’ “‘faith,’’ ete.,
are like the exploiting patent medicine advertisements which
in effect fool the dupe into believing he has a disease, and
then into paying for an imaginary cure. Before we
start doing anything, we can know positively and absolutely
that the relationships— ‘causes and effects’’—are going to
hold, and that the affair is going to work itself out with
quantitative perfection. The Joy of living is to see just how
closely we can anticipate and then realize those measures—
utilizing them towards what we call our ‘‘wishes’’ or ‘‘will’’

or *“purpose’’ ($§165-8). But we know before we start
that there can be no perfect anticipatory guessing.

One V_ §4lc

That is a very rough anticipation of the solution of the
problem of Good and Evil. We are here simply getting a
general idea of all things, directly from observing language.

k. And we may note that the Oneand Many is directly
exhibited or implied by ““qualitative’’ and “quantitative.”
Quantitative is the Many, and is not accurately or absolutely
expressible or ““soluble,’’ but is positively expressible with
as great accuracy as we have time to achieve. Qualitative is
the One, and is absolutely known and “‘soluble’’—in con-
ventional terms, is so absolutely known that it is not even a
‘‘problem,’’—but is ineffable, and can be expressed only in-
directly in terms of the Many. Hence, qualitative and quan-
titative are mutually contradictory. But the contradiction
is formal, and not real; for it is obvious that there is a sort
of double contradiction which cancels. Quantitative
problems are often called problems of expediency, and their
reasonably aceurate solutions truistically change daily with
the change in Many circumstances. And qualitative prob-
lems are problems of principle, the valid solutions of which
are fixed and unchangeable, and which give the general way
of solving the changing quantitative problems. An‘ ‘oppor-
tunist’’ is a man who more or less ignores problems of prin-
eciple—which obviously must complement and serve as the
base of tolerably correct expediency. A theoretical man—
one with a “‘single track mind’’—is unbalanced in the op-
posite direction, and in actual practice is more dangerous
than the opportunist, because he attaches One names—holy
names—to his bad Many guesses.

S41. a. The phrase ‘no exact science’ is a negative
form of statement. It is more easily intelligible in that
form. At first a negative statement of anything is always
more intelligible. |For there are an indefinite number of
things which something is not; and as we are familiar with
many of the things which it is not, we can understandingly
compare it negatively with those. But there is only one
thing which a thing directly is; hence, we have to observe
it closely and carefully, and more or less grow some new
nerve structures to provide for directly understanding it
(XVII). It is hard work to grow a little of new mind; oft-
en it is painful. © Hence some people protest against going
from the negative form of statement (which though easy to
understand, is correspondingly hard to apply), to the definite
positive form,

b. The first member, That... This..., obviously is an
explicitly implicit assestion of no exact science. The second
member, M(varying with)L?T~, is an explicitly implicit as-
sertion of the positive form of expression of no exact science.
That form is:- mass varies with velocity; or, in everyday lang-
uage, a thing changes as its speed (‘acis,’ ‘living’) changes.
That is the “‘fundamental law’’ of science; i. e., it ex-
presses a form of truism to which any scientific statement may
be rather readily reduced—which is what is meant by *‘fun-
damental law.’’ We shall from time to time—e. g.,
throughout Part Two—see concrete evidence of its truth.

ec. When we say that a body varies with its speed, we
definitely mean that what is usually called its weight varies.
The best quick, concrete proof of that perhaps is to observe
that if a body moves fast it perceptibly rubs off (by friction)
some of its substance, and hence has a continuously lesser
weight (that technically is a static view; in moving through
ether, the dynamic or ‘gravity’ results, in the opposite di-
rection, are greater for ordinary bodies at a speed less than
that of light—a complicated remark about measures that
will require a thorough grasp of Part Two to understand—
and only professional scientists have any use for it; the av-
erage reader will get the same thing in familiar subjects we
discuss). At this point it might be asked how the weight

§41e V One

could thus change in an absolute vacuum: it will be shown
that there is no such thing as an absolute vacuum (§§43-4,
100i, XI, XJI). Scientists are now generally agreed, as the
result of direct experimentation, that mass varies with veloc-
ity (specifically, that within certain limits clectrons get per-
ceptibly heavier as they travel faster; neve Bites
xxiv, 401; Millikan, ““The Electron,’’ 185, 251). Weare
seeing here, and shall latcr seein more detail, what it means.

d. The conventional law of conservation of energy is
obviously a statement that energy passes from one part (or
MM, or unit of the Many), to another part, without changing
the sum total of energy—i. e., without being destroyed and
without growing. As we saw (§39e), that is a religious
statement; it is the truism Zhe One—The One. The law
that mass varies with velocity is the Many statement of that
religious truism, and asserts in effect that the parts are en-
ergy (i. e., are parts of Energy, or of the whole), and hence
merely as a verbal truism, do change or vary when energy
changes or ““passes’’ from one part to another—all of which
will be proved in detail (XI, ete.).

842, a. The most definite proof of ‘no exact science,’
is the concrete or direct proof which we can get by direct
observation of the fact that every unit of the Many changes.
It is obviously the same proof as the carefully or ‘‘scientific-
ally observed fact that mass varies with velocity (S41c). A
more extensive statement of such experimenta! proof of no
exact science—no ‘‘constant”’ units of the Many,—in mod-
ern scientific terms, is this:- All phenomena are observed
to result in (or be) some flow of electrons from atom to atom
(conventional science does not know about gravity in that
respect, but see Index, ‘‘Gravity’’). All parts of the uni-
verse are exhibiting some phenomena continuously—if noth-
ing more than a transfer of heat. Electrons have weight.
Hence, all things, even atoms, change continucusly—or, are
not constant.

b. Such observations were made by good observers cen-
turies ago. Heraclitus asserted, as fudamental, that all
things flow or change. He was called “‘the Obseure.’’ It
is a little puzzling at first to talk of things that explicitly are
changing (although obviously that is only an infinitely smal]
fraction as puzzling as talking of fixed things when it isn’t
so); but we are going to derive some very simple and un-
derstandable ways of being clear and intelligible in express-
ing our observations of that fact. We can’t change the fact.
And the modern scientific theory of relativity is the same
sort of thing that Heraclitus noticed, and the relativitists
have become perhaps more obscure than “‘the Obseure’’;
what they substantially do is to say that they will keep a
constant M or formally fixed things, and then, in order to
agree with obvious facts, will let Land JT vary (866). In
our everyday language, as represented by the general equa-
tion, L and J are really relationship words, so that thus to
vary them is nonsense from an everyday point of view, as we
can not really have a relationship of a relationship. How-
ever, as we shall see, the relativitists make a new sort of
language that in theory is valid; but in it each person has
his definitely exclusive language; in it a second of time to
you is not one to me, ete. Therefore, in noting that
there is no exact science we are not discovering anything
new. But we are arranging to keep verbally consistent
about our observations, and to avoid both obscurity and un-
intelligibility, and also the untruthful assertion that some
things are exact, constant’’ standards which do not change.

ec. The expression of the proof that there is no exact
science has already been made by formulating our general
equation. To say that there is no exact science is a mere
truism of our way of writing that equation; and hence, so

UNIVERSE

30

far as logic or form is concerned ($35d), we have, in agree-
ing to use such language, absolutely demonstrated the valid-
ity of the law. I need not repeat the details again. Briefly,
we used the formal or verbal links L and T' to get the arbi-
trary That and This together again—after it (they) was arbi-
trarily split by using IL and 7;—and we had to go into an
infinite regress of such formal links (just as the classic logic
was forced to use an infinite regress of its presumably real
links). And that regress is obviously truistic with ‘no exact
science.’ Hence, logically I have absolutely proved ‘no
exact science.’

d. We therefore see further, that in the equation the
This... (or the That... X This...) is by verbal agreement a
generalized naming of M, which M is an arbitrary part of
the universe (so that, as being the truism which we just saw
in the last paragraph, the expression of any such part or en-
tity at once demands the infinite regress if accuracy of state-
ment is required). And we assumed (38a) that M or This
stated the same This pretty well if we stopped the regress
with L°7'-3 (or L?T~) instead of going on to L®7”,
Therefore, our general equation is not exact. Hence, if we
definitely assert that it is not exact—and I do, and we are
to understand that it is not exact,—then we formally cancel
our previous assumption, and the equation is absolutely rigorous
in form, or logically, but quantitatively inaccurate factually.
We do not need to know anything about the degree of
inaccuracy until we actually begin to measure—begin to try
to apply the equation to particular circumstances, either in
*“science’’ or in daily life. Insuch cases we are then forced
to guess, literally. We can never exactly know what degree,
but in every practical problem there is, must jinally rely
upon our skill in guessing fairly closely before we act. It
is thus absolutely proved that nothing can ever relieve us (or
an atom, or a solar system, etc.) of the necessity of having
that “‘personal skill’’ (for implications, see Index, ““Teleolo-
gy,’’ “*Personality’’). That guessing is conventionally
called by the polite name judgment, or by the even more
dignified names purpose and teleology. The mildly offensive
name guess is sometimes a safer one to use, and I often use
ae (Quite probably I over-do the avoidance of all shams
and pretentious euphemisms; I have been various sorts of
snob and aristocrat in my time, and am probably nowa snob
at being no snob. lor the general principles of such over-
doing see $155.) It is obvious that this paragraph is
a deliberate repetition of the substance of this and the last
two sections. Yct a distinctly different logical point was
stated in this paragraph—lI explicitly asserted the end (or
joining) of the logical circle, which is what makes this para-
graph sound a bit too vague. You can at any rate see by
the concrete example furnished by the paragraph that all
this book is going to be a continual repetition of the solution
of the One and Many. But I am going to bother you with
these fine logical points only a very little—just enough to
indicate that the word-quibblers can split hairs as much as
they like, without being able to escape the rigorousness of
our argument.

S43. a. We may now observe in more detail than in
§30¢ the nature of number, and then at once observe that our
equation explicitly implies the one single rule for keeping
expression or logic consistent and valid—an important prac-
tical conclusion.

b. Number is directly observable to be the name of the
oaeet general way of ae, the units of the Many—of nam-
ing the Dhis s and Lhat s. An ordinal number (e. g., 21st)
is the specific naine of the last thing or entity considered in
ae of Many things containing as many as are named by
the cardinal number (21). An ordinal number hence clearly

Sl UNIVERSE

explicitly involves relationship: it sometimes isa relationship
noun. But we shal] not consider those distinctions in this
elementary book; we take simply the broad generality that
numbers are general Many names, used instead of boy, tree,
Jjield; we do not go into details as to classes, etc., and the
standard universe number, which is 1.

ec. It is obvious that if we begin to name the Many,
using numbers as names, then the so-called number, 0 or
zero, does not namea Many, but essentially denies that
there are any Many entities. | Consequently, it is obvi-
ous that 0 is not a number in the usual meaning of number.
It is formally or logically a One word. Also, the name for
the “‘very last number’’ is © or infinity. But obviously,
the concept of number as a general naming does not imply
any such end to naming. Therefore, © is is not a number,
in the usual sense of number. Infinity or © is the collective
name for all numbers, and hence is a One word. Orthodox
mathematics asserts (““Ency. Brit.,’’ Art. ““Mathematies’’)
that O and © are numbers. They are not.

d. Or, we may see in what is formally another way,
that 0 and © are not numbers. As a lower limit, outside any
actual number or name for a unit of the Many, there is 0.
And as an upper limit, autside any actual number or name
for a Many, there is ©. Therefore, obviously 0 and © are
not numbers, but are /imits of numbers, which logically is an
entirely different thing.

e. Or, we may see in another way that 0 and @© are
not numbers. Obviously, ©, in any intelligible and erplicit
sense, means all the Many, and hence means continuous or
joined or unified. In that respect, it is clearly a One word.
And 0 is a statement of a no-Many, and hence, logically at
least, is a One word; with glaring obviousness it is nat a
positive Many word in form. In agreement with that and
also par. c, we might conventionally say that 0 is a null
Many word. Also, 0 does not name the One, in the usual
sense of name; hence, it might with perhaps equal agree-
ment with conventions be called a null One word. Hence,
when I conelude that although zero is a null Many word and
also a null One word, it is explicitly a One word, we need to
see the definite ‘reason’ or truism for that:- It is said that
0 is a One word because we are taking it that Many words
are positive—are explicitly language. (Zero does not actually
say anything; it is ineffable—and for that reason a One
word.) Consequently, when we have a null word, it posi-
tively is not positive language, and hence zs a One word.
The mathematicians (““Ency. Brit.,’’ ‘“Mathemat-
ics’’) failed to see that distinction, and consequently called
0 a number, and introduced an error that technically vitiates
all of orthodox mathematics, as we shall explicitly see in
this and the next section. We may see again, in a
curious way, that this paragraph is consistent. The custom-
ary Occidental conception of Nirvana is that it is a universal
nullity, or negation. It isa One, anditis zero. We of
the West do not, in holding that, hold precisely the Bud-
dha’s view (‘‘Ency. Brit.,’’ iv, 744). But weare practically
right in our idea of Nirvana, because Buddhism is a sort of
negative language; and if language be reversed (as it may
validly be, and as validly is substantially done in Buddhism),
then 0 is positively the One (is Nirvana), and © is the null
word for the One. And obviously that reversal—which is
merely formal—does not at all make 0 a Many word, ora
number. Hence, the orthodox mathematical views as to
‘“‘null’’ classes (J. ¢.) are inconsistent.

f. Hence, we say that 0 and © are One words, and are
logically identical. That means formally identical, of course.
0 and © are ‘opposite’’ ways of speaking of the One, and
although at first it may seem odd to speak of them as being

One V_ §43i

formally identical, such nevertheless they are, as we shal]
see clearly in the mechanical model of language given in
8853-8. Also, that fact is the general or ultimate principle
of ‘“direction’’ (Index, ‘‘Direction’’). Further, as the One is
really ineffable, there obviously is not any really “‘opposite’’
ways of speaking of it, and hence we may use © and 0 in-
discriminately for it. But, the Many requires definite, posi-
tive words; and if we were to use 0 and © in connection with
the Many, even if they correctly meant that the Many was
thus summed into a whole, they would mean that the sum-
ming was done in opposite directions; and that gives us two
languages, logically identical, but in one of which “‘up’’ is
named up, and in the other is named down.

g. Orthodox mathematics has two other concepts which
it is continually confusing as being identical respectively
with 0 and ©:- (1) a very small number (an infinitesimal),
and (2) a very large number. It is glaringly obvious that a
very small number is not 0, and that a very large number is
not ©, “A very small number’’ and 0 are qualitatively or
in principle absolutely contradictory—and similarly with
‘large number’ and ©. In this book, which as has been
stated is much more rigorous than conventional mathematics,
when ] mean a large number or a small number J shall say
so—generally saying ‘indefinitely’ large or small—except in
a few negligible cases where it seems best for merely rhe-
torical purposes to follow conventional phraseology.

h. Itis already obvious that in practice the only rule
that we need follow in being strictly validly logical—i. e.,
rigorously consistent in expression—is to avoid naming any
Many thing 0 or ®, or by any of their numerous synonyms
such as no, none, nothing, separate, distinct, all, whole, ab-
solute, continuous, total, everything, perfect, God—and,
on the contrary, to name a// One summations by such words.
Or, from another point of view:- we shall be validly logical
simply by being truly scientific and always speaking of the
Many as being measurable and the One as unmeasurable—
what the measures are numerically being not a matter of log-
ic, or general scientific law, but of practical life, experience,
skill and good judgment or good guessing. That is
the only rule, if it is taken for granted that no one is going
to perpetrate the absurdity of making a relationship word—
God the Holy Ghost—into a One word or intoa Many word.
Even the mathematicians sometimes do that (as shown in the
next section). So perhaps we should always be more pre-
cise, and say that the only rule to be followed to achieve ab-
solute consistency or rationality in expression is to avoid
confusing the three sorts of words. Or, we may state that
complete rule in terms of our equation:- (1) have no zeros
or infinities in the first and second members (Many mem-
bers), and always include one or the other in the third or
One member; and (2) never confuse the relationship symbols
witb the One or with the Many names—never confuse a
‘“process’’ with an “‘entity.”’ Incidentally, the L
and T in the equation are relationship symbols. As we saw
in §30f, it would have been typographically more consistent
to have made them similar to the symbols <, =, ete.
When we write JM... for M(varying with) L? T —2 we do become
thus typographiecally consistent. And obviously, That...
and This..., and especially That... < This..., are thus typo-
graphically consistent, the Land T being indicated by the
dots, and not explicitly named by the same sort of symbol
used for an entity.

i. That last paragraph completely states all the rules we
need in order to be always consistent. The practical, every-
day rule is the one about 0 and ©, Most people (except
when they try to talk of something of which they are largely
ignorant, or when they try to be oratorical or appear

§4i3i V One
Wise and important and weighty) by natural commonsense
avoid making the confusion of relationship words. Only
when they begin to dress up truth, or get off some ponder-
ous piffle about the glory of SCIENCE do they become such
asses. But when [ put that practical rule in that
formal] and rigorous ‘zerc-infinity’ guise it looks strange and
hard to apply. So we may note its use and meaning in a
little of familiar detail:- | Suppose you are looking at what
is actually a chair, and see it. Then, in order to he logical,
you will refrain, first, from saying that it is not a chair—
i. e., that it is a zero chair. Further, you will refrain from
saying that it is a pig—i. e., that it is a zero chair, and that
the resulting Ois then multiplied by © to make it something,
and that that something, produced by putting in the ™, is
a ‘‘pig.’’ And last, you will refrain from saying that the
chair is everything, or perfect, or the universe—i. e., vou
will refrain from multiplying the actual chair by ©, or call-
ingit © or perfect: you can validly say that the chair itself is
inseparably related to the total universe, and hence in that
sense 7s or becomes the One; _ but that statement uses chair
in a One sense different from its common, Many, actual use
we started with, and in ordinary honesty that One sense
ought to be explicitly distinguished when thus used.

j. Obviously, the practical application of the logical
rule is simple enough when we have to deal witha chair. It
reduces to the rule:- say that a chair isa chair. It is only
when we deal with numerous things that we begin to get
confused, and to need the explicitly formulated rigorous
rule. Obviously, it is essentially no more difficult to speak of
numerous things than it is to speak of a chair. But the
nuiierousness confuses us because it burdens the memory,
and we need the guidance of an explicit rule. We see in
the next section how even the mathematicians get confused
because of not being conscious of that rule. But asa
matter of fact, a large part of the logical errors of the world
comes, not from any intellectual difficulty in being logical, but
from the lack of courage and honesty to face facts as they
are—and those are usually called emotional qualities (§155,
ete. ). It takes a strong man to be steadily logical—not
necessarily a mathematician.

k. The practical rule of logic is so well known and
‘“‘common’”’ that it has, in another form, been taught to
children for centuries; every well-bred person is supposed
to conform to that rule. The rule is:- do not exaggerate
[or if you do formally exaggerate, make it obvious to your
hearer that the exaggeration is not really meant—and then,
within certain limits, it gives a more vivid understanding,
and is one sort of humor]. Exaggeration obviously is simply
the making of things too small or too large, with a tendency
to multiply them by 0 or ®. One of the Ten Command-
ments is simply a partial statement of that everyday form of
the logical rule (or is that rule, expressed in ethical terms) :-
do not take the name of God in vain. That Commandment
clearly is:- do notusea One word asa Many word, or in such
a context as to confuse it with Many words. The common-
sense view of the matter is that if we have a language, it can
be usefully employed as a good tool, and there is no sense
in persistently misusing it. However, the human race have
indulged in so much confusion of terms—really, in so much
‘“swearing,’’—that it is sometimes said that language is to
eonceal thought. E. g., the ““gay and sparkling and _ bril-
liant’’ conversation at (say) tea parties, with its tinklings of
‘“wonderful,’’ and “‘perfectly sweet,’’ and “perfectly in-
triguing,’’ is swearing, just as much as are the casual
‘“damn’s,’’ etc., of longshoremen. So we can reduce our
practical rule to the homely one:- do not swear (except on
the occasions you really mean it, and except as humor—and

UNIVERSE

32

unless one’s hearer appreciates the humor, it is not humor
also humor always ceases to be humor when it be-

to him;
You see, there is

comes too automatic; 8162).
nothing esoteric about logic.
$44. a. We shall hereafter see numbers of instances of

conventional failures to be validly logical—failures to follow
the single rule that the three kinds of words must not be
confused. The worst source of such logical confusions is the
fact that practically every name in our language may be used
as each of the three sorts of words. The name God is a
conspicuous example. And conventional logical error con-
sists in formally confusing the three sorts—just as the con-
ventional Trinity has been confused and befogged until the
average man feels almost a repulsion towards the very men-
tion of it. As was stated, conventional mathematics does
not follow the principle that the three sorts must not be con-
fused; in fact, it sometimes asserts practically the contrary ;
so I am going to follow strictly the conventionally stated
principles of mathematics, and “‘prove mathematically’’ in
several ways the absurd result that any number is equal to
any other number. That will show again that 0 and © are
not numbers and that we must not confuse relationship
words with either One words or Many words. And it will
prove the correctness of our logical] rule, and also show that
orthodox mathematics needs it.

b. Let ¢ and d be any two different numbers, with differ-
ence e, so that c——d=e (A)
Multiplying (A) through by e—d, we have

c’— 2¢ed-+-d?=ce—de (B)
Rearranging (B), c*—cd—ce—cd—d>—de (C)
or, c(e—d—e)=d(c—d—e) (D)
Dividing (D) through by (e—d—e); or multiplying (D)
through by 1/(e—d—e), we have c=d; or, any
number equals any other different number, Q. E. D.,—which
obviously, or truistically by our agreement 4=A, is non-
sense. The mathematicians sometimes, without giving any
reasons, say that it is a fallacy to do as I did above, and di-
vide (D) through by zero—by (c—d—e), which is equal to 0,
—or multiply it through by infinity—by 1/(e—d—e), which
is equal to ©. However, J am not able to find an assertion
in any of the severa] varieties of mathematical books I hap-
pen to have at hand, that such a process is a fallacy; the
closest to such an assertion 1] can find is the discussion of
“‘indeterminate or illusory forms,’’ such as 0x0, 0X,
o-oo, ete., wherein it is merely dogmatically asserted
that those forms are, as such, indeterminate—thus implying
that logically or mathematically they are permissible.
On the other hand, mathematical texts all assert in effect,
and usually explicitly if they take up the subject, that 0 and
oo are numbers, and hence at least imply that it is just as
valid to divide or multiply (D) by 0 or © as by (say) 5—
and such a process with 5 gives no absurdity. ““The Eney-
clopaedia Brittanica’’ (xi, 303, referring to xiv, 545) clearly
implies that there are actual numbers, as values, which are 0
and So tcugh. usually *” means a large number which
fee 2 become | = lorthodox mathematics thus clearly
Me Wate ee
y asserts that 0 and © are
ae ee
ieee ee eny it, and in effect, although a
: s ordinary mathematics just as we are
doing here. But all the explicit authoritative assertions
eee one of eee are thus shown to be that
there is no aeunt that a ie quae ivi Eye een
by any number ot} : : ne Pee ere an Eanouah
ier than those so-called numbers 0 and
and as orthodox mathematics makes no distinction in kind

33 UNIVERSE

between Oand ©, and those other ‘‘numbers,”’ it truistically
follows that it is rigorously following orthodox principles to
divide through by 0 or ™, e—d—e is a null com-
plete One—as is asserted implicitly hy (A)—and the valid
mathematical principle is that any sort of complete One is
not positive language and (according to our primary agree-
ment that dA) can not be used as positive language, or as
Many words; and when that One is related in any way (as
by multiplication) with the Many member, that is equiva-
lent to denying that it is a Many, or makes it a One (as all
relationship is that of identity). Perhaps the briefest and
clearest way to say that is to say that 0 and © arenot num-

bers. The absurd conclusion given above is substantially
the same as those which are named the paradoxes of Zeno
(““Ency. Brit.,’’ ‘“Zeno’’). Only the explicit solution of
the One and Many—which is what the rule concerning 0 and
© substantially is—will solve those paradoxes. And with

that solution, the solution of those centuries-old puzzles is

so simple that there is no need to give it explicitly here.

ce. A series is orthodoxly (“‘Ency. Brit.,’’ xxiv, 668)

‘a set of quantities *** arranged in order so that each quan-

tity is definitely and uniquely determined by its position’’;

and it may be infinite—i. e., ‘“the number of [those quanti-

ties or] terms may be *** unlimited.’’ | We shall use such

series, again to prove that any number is equal to any other :-

By algebra, 1/(1-+a)=1—a +-a®—a?+... (A)

Let a=1, and we have $=1—1 +1 —1 +... (B)

By algebra, (i-a)/(itata)=1—a ta—a 1... (C)
Let a=1, and we have =1—1 +1 —1-++... (D)

And (1+ate2)/(1 poo eg re ne +... (E)

Let a1, and we have =1—1 +1 —1 +... (F)
Similarly we may get jy eee Pp eG)
ete... etc.etc.

The second member of (B), of (D), (F), ete., is a series;
and orthodoxly it may be written out to an absolutely unlim-
ited number of terms—may have ail the terms there are, as
a truism of the orthodox defmition. Consequently, as those
various series are, by orthodox mathematics, term for term
identical unlimitedly, then obviously they are identical or
equal, by our agreement AA. Therefore, as the second
members of the equations are equal, the first members are
equal (by the same agreement AA: mathematics says
that they are equal by the ‘‘axiom’’ that things equal to the
same thing are equal to each other), and we have:-
1/2=2/3=3/4—4/5=... (N)
By manipulating (N), and similar equations obtained by like
methods, by simple algebra, we have:- 1—2—3=—...,
or, any number equals any other number. Well; I did
not explicitly, or technically by orthodox mathematics, intro-
duce any 0 or © into that “‘proof’’—certainly not in the
sense of ‘‘multiplying’’ or “‘dividing’’ by one or the other,
which is sometimes superficially held by orthodox mathe-
matics to be fallacious. But with orthodox mathematical
rigorousness I managed to get an absurdity. In a sense (in
the commonsense view taken by valid logic), there was an
in the “‘proof’’:- the series had orthodoxly absolutely un-
limited terms. By commonsense, the fallacy is of course that
if the terms are unlimited or infinite in number, then the
terms are not ‘‘definitely determined’’ as was asserted by
the orthodox definition which I simply took atits word. The
simple fact is that there is no such thing as a positively stat-
able infinite series (there is no exact science). The _ series
above, if they are made definite and expressed definitely,
always have a fractional quotient as a Jast term, and evaluate
definitely as 44, a4, etc., which are simple identities of
standard universes—not of standard universes and absolutely
infinite universes, as is orthodoxly asserted.

One V §44f

d. There are an indefinite number of ways of getting
that absurd result by orthodox mathematics, all depending
on confusing the One and the Many—in effect, on taking 0
and © to be numbers, or confusing qualitative with quanti-
tative. We shall now proceed to “‘prove’’ with orthodox
mathematical rigor the same absurdity by confusing relation-
ship words with the other two sorts. In this way we donot
use 0 or © in any ordinary sence:-

By conventional algebra, [—3+-47 (3) B=1 (A)

Also, by conventional algebra, 12=1 (B)
As the right members are identical, then

(—4+47/(—3)P=18 9 (C)

(D)

Extracting cube-root of both sides of (C), we have

ae V8) )
Hence, 41 (—3)=3/2; or, V(—3)=3; or, —3=9 (E)
Adding 4 to both sides of that last, 1=138.
And proceeding similarly by conventional algebra, any number
equals any other number.

e. The trouble with those last orthodoxly valid equa-
tions is that I used relationship terms (the ““cube,’’ and the
‘‘square-root,’’ and the ‘“—’’ in (—8)) substantially as
Many terms (doing it an odd or uncancelled number of
times; see next paragraph). It is obvious that there is no
explicit principle in orthodox mathematics which says that
that is wrong; but it nevertheless produces an absurdity.
There are other well known ways of proving our ab-
surd proposition by manipulating the ‘“‘second power’’
(which involves a relationship), without introducing the —.
The same absurdity is shown in another way (using geome-
try) in §50b; and in a general way in §66. We may note
briefly that the symbol // is a relationship term, just as defi-
nitely as is —. And of course it is as much nonsense to say
and mean explicitly ““the square-root of a minus,”’ as it is to
say ‘the brotherhood of motherhood.’ Orthodox mathemat-
ics itself agrees that it is meaningless to speak explicitly of
the square-root of a minus—calling the ‘‘quantity’’ V (—1)
“‘imaginary.’’ Asa fact, we can not even imagine that
‘‘quantity’’; it is absolutely inconceivable if taken explicitly.
ae same thing applies to manipulations of second ‘‘pow-
ers,’ third “‘powers,’’ and all other relationships. A rela-
tionship can not be used as a One word or a Many word, or
to ‘duplicate’ another relationship.

f. But orthodox mathematics does get correct results as
a usual thing when it uses /(—1) (and other ‘relationships
of a relationship’). The way in which that is done is by
more or less unconsciously introducing another similar con-
tradiction which cancels the first (and, with a little common-
sense, rejecting the absurdity that results when it happens
that that is not done—a procedure which glaringly shows
that conventional mathematics is not rigorous). So long as
there is a balance, an even number, of such contradictions in
an argument the result will obviously be logically consist-
ent: and the verbal or symbolic expression of such dupli-
cated relationships may be considered, not as giving or in
any way having any explicit meaning, but as merely a mne-
monic device for keeping account of the relating process.
In the same way poker chips have no special meaning or
value of themselves, but are used as mnemonic devices to
indicate the relationship of the players to the stakes. To
puzzle over (—1) is equivalent to puzzling over the ‘why-
ness’ of a poker chip: there is no real whyness, but merely
a convenient agreement. In identically the same way the
2's, —’s, etc., in our L?7'~*’s, etc., do not mean two absolute
verbal links or relationships, or any relationships of a rela-
tionship, but mean simply the verbal way in which space and
time—the single relationship—is used in the language ma-
chine (see the total discussion of space and time in this book),

$44f V One

But as this is not a treatise on mathematical detail, I must
here omit the volume or so of ways of balancing and other-
wise handling such self-contradictory but formal duplication
of relationship counters. Those mathematical details will
be implied in the investigation made of our general equation.

g. The tacit, actual rule of conventional mathematics is
that if its rules—which as we have just seen, are not com-
plete—obviously do not work, then throw the result away,
and with the same blindness try again. The savage says
that if the lever at hand fails him, throw it away and try
another. Actually, it is the only ultimate way to learn; it
is still an excellent method; but it is good only in the ab-
sence of knowledge, for it is uneconomical of time and effort.
Some professional mathematicians and scientists of a medi-
ocre sort tend to believe that mathematics is perfect—the
‘“queen’’ of the sciences, etc.,—and that if anything is ex-
pressed mathematically we must in submissive awe ‘‘believe”’
it, or at least pretend to understand it. Well; the reader
has now seen that orthodox mathematics is no more certain
to produce an intelligent result than is orthodox language.
That ““queen’’ stuff is obvions nonsense—the protective
cloak of the egotistical dogmatist.

h. The important thing which we have seen is that we
get absurd results in expression whenever one sort of word
is asserted to be another sort. We have seen that orthodox
mathematics needs a more precise restatement to make it
self-consistent. We could at this point go ahead and trans-
late the above simply expressed results into the technical
terms used by Jlogisttcs—which is mathematical logic, or
what might be called the science of mathematical founda-
tions. But I omit that; for ] assnme that most of us have
more need for ordinary language than for technical mathe-
matics. It takes more skill to say some given thing in
words than it does to express it mathematically.

a

CHAPTER VI. Names for logic, and chief application ef
valid logic to men.

S45. a. We have seen a way of expressing a complete
or unifying sentence or equation. And we have seen some
important conclusions which were obvious from that complete
sentence—finally seeing the simple rule by which consistency
of expression can be achieved:- the three parts of the Trinity
must not be confused. That rule was, for clearness and
vividness, exemplified by showing the absurdities resulting
from its non-observance by orthodox mathematics, which is
presumably the most precisely rigorous sort of expression.

b. Inthe remainder of this Part One we consider the
same things from different aspects, and in addition notice
more or less interesting details. I shall hegin this chapter
by giving the most important general application in everyday
life of our precise unification. After that we shall try to
find a conventional name that fits the unification. To antici-
pate the results of that search fora name:- We definitely
find by observing the meanings of various conventional
names, the important fact that our valid logic and concrete
truth is the same as the logic and truth of the average man
—that the race for centuries has somewhat unconsciously
been using valid logic and obtaining truth, naming it com-
monsense.

ce. Then, I give in the next chapter (VII) a new
sort of proof of our whole argument in a way which shows
the indefinite flexibility and possibilities of language. Next
I show (in VIII) amechanical model of language, as concrete
proof of the argument, and for more definite guidance in the
use of language. Then (in the last chapter in Part One, IX),

UNIVERSE 34

as an actual example of the fact that merely our investigation
of language will enable us to unify knowledge rigorously, I
apply what we have learned to elementary physical science,
and we see its formal completion.

$46. a. Man is chiefly interested in man, because man
is man and hence most directly and steadily perceptible and
familiar to himself; it is merely a truism. Consequently,
the most important application of the solution of the One and
Many is its application directly to man. This whole book is
with more or less directness engaged with that particular
application. But now that we have the solution, we here at
onee apply it to man with explicit directness, in broad out-
lines. We see further details throughout the book.

b. Itis held by the dualists that man is of two-fold
nature:- soul and body. The soul isnow usually considered
to be the same as mind, or spirit, or consciousness, or the
‘vital spark.’? There have been many ideas as to soul (see
‘“Ency. Brit.,’? Index, s. v. ““Soul’’). So many people
have considered it some separate entity or thing which in
some way dwelled in the body, that “‘sou!s’’ have rather
gone ont of fashion because it was so glaringly self-contra-
dictory to consider the soul absolutely separate and also not
separate, but more or less attached to the body; also, be-
cause no one ever succeeded in putting his finger on such a
“‘soul,’’ although many attempts were made. ‘The modern
fashionable name for soul is personality. Soul, or any
of its several synonyms, is simply the unified or joined sum
of parts of an individual, considered chiefly from a ‘‘mental’’
or ‘‘spiritual’’ or nervous-system aspect—as will be proved.

ec. Some dualists further hold that there is a dualism—
an unbridgable, unesecapable, essential difference in kind or
quality—between the ““body’’ of man, and “‘matter.’’ I. e.,
they hold that ‘‘body”’ is “‘alive,’’ and “‘matter’’ “‘dead.”’
We take that up in detail in the chapter on biology (XVI,
especially $144; and it may be remarked that the matter of
the old Clerk Maxwellstyle of scientist was viciously ‘‘dead”’

verbally—but erroneously; see Index, ‘“Dynamic,’’ ‘‘Max-
well’’). Here, we simply note that that dualism—‘‘vital-
ism’’ is the name of that variety,—and all others, will

disappear in the same way as that between mind and matter
is shown to disappear in par. f and following. We may an-
ticipate here, that all the universe is “‘alive’’ in any real or
One sense (or “‘dead,’” if itis preferred to talk lugubriously).
Whether or not a given thing is, in everyday and Many
language, to be considered alive ornot, isa quantitative prob-
lem, the solution of which depends upon what perceptible
degree of organization or structure or personality—what in-
tensity of internal and external reactions—we arbitrarily agree
to require of the thing that is to be called alive.

d. The orthodox way of “‘logically’’ bridging the dual-
isms alive-dead, and mind-matter—the way of Descartes,
Aquinas, the Catholic church, and most other pluralists—is
to use ‘“God’’ as an entity, a concrete or Many link, or ter-
tium quid to join the two. (In that sense, God validly should
be a formal relationship word, God the Holy Ghost—in
which case there is no dualism.) Other dualists do not like
the name God and use some synonym. Some materi-
alistic scientists substantially deny that there is any such
thing as mind, or a real relationship or organization or per-
sonality or soul. In effect, they deny that there is (say)
friction in a machine. We consider their views in detail
later (Index, ““Materialism’’); in general it has already
been shown that the classical logie which those materialists
fancy they are using asserts some sort of relationship,

e. Obviously from the last paragraph, the dualists (ex-
cluding that queer variety:- materialists) do get mind and
matter absolutely together. So essentially, all that their

35 UNIVERSE

talk amounts to, is that they assert that the two were abso-
lutely apart until they (the dualists) themselves with super-
Godlike power created a God to put them together. Hence,
a commonsense question that obviously disposes of their talk
is:- Why do the dualists keep on chattering about mind
and matter being separate if they have been so good as to
get them together for us? do they want us to keep on being
grateful to them for having remoulded the universe nearer
to their hearts’ desire, and keep on appreciating their skill
and miraculous power in making a God?

f. The obvious principle is that mind and matter are
unified or related, and hence ultimately identical. The
dualists by inventing their poor sort of God did not change
the universe, and produce the relationship which they tacitly
admit now exists. The shortest proof of the identity of
mind and matter is that we attach some meaning—regardless
of what it is—to the phrase ““mind and matter’’: and a
meaning is continuity or unity. If we didn’t, obviously it
would be nonsense to use the phrase.

g. In Part Two, where we observe matter in detail, we
see that it is identical in all respects with mind, life, per-
sonality —except in quantitative respects, which are unessen-
tial. The formal proof in the last paragraph is of course
rigorous; any dualism may be destroyed in the same way.
But it is destructive proof. For actual, intelligible proof of
‘no dualism’ we describe things as they are.

847. a. If we consider a man, superficially he seems to
be a separated part of the universe; and it seems at first
that we can not actually perceive that he is inseparably
joined on to the remainder. __ But if we look closer (if need
be, using microscopes, etc., as tools to intensify our percep-
tions), we can see that the man is not sharply cut off or
bounded from the rest of the universe. His breath extends
indefinitely inward into his blood and indefinitely outward
into the atmosphere. His skin does not bound him; for his
sweat extends indefinitely in, and vaporizes indefinitely out
into the atmospliere. There isobviously no definite place at
which his food and drink become a part of ““him,’’ or ccase
to be a part. Obviously, it is not possible to say where the
man begins or ends. Like our circular logic, which starts
from truisms and ends in them and stays always inside such
a verbal One, the man ultimately, or in eract language, has
no positive beginning or end, or sharp boundary. A man
himself is precisely like our valid logic.

b. We can at this point be somewhat more definite
about his mind and body (see XVI and XVII for remainder).
It is observable that if we remove part of his nervous system
we remove part of his mind. So obviously, in that rough
way it is shown that there is no essential difference between
mind and body. Also, it is not possible to observe any exact
or positive boundary between the nervous system and the
organs in which it “‘terminates’’ (§152). Any tool which
we take in our hand (say), isobviously a perceptible extension
of our body or nervous system or mind; for nosharp bound-
ary may be distinguished anywhere; and very evidently we
can—with the ordinary tool—feel or observe perceptibly
with the outer end (8165).

ce. Except for rough statement that he isa This, the
man is really continuous with the universe—inseparable
from it. He is actually This...; any unit of the Many is
actually This..., as we have seen in “‘theory’’ and are now
broadly seeing ‘“‘coneretely.”’ If we try to assert that the
man is at least bounded by the surface of the earth or by
the atmospheric boundary, a closer look will convince us that
the assertion will not hold. For obviously the air and the
water on the surface of the earth (and some of his vaporized
sweat, etc.) extend into the earth with all degrees of percept-

One VI §47¢

ible connection. And the air does not stop at any outer
boundary. There is an outer zone of attenuated air from
which parts (molecules) bounce up, and mingle with similarly
bouncing gas from the sun, and so on. We see that continu-
ation of the atmosphere in zodiacal light ($121). And in
turn, it is observable that parts of the solar system mingle
with other such systems, then on to other galaxies, and so
on indefinitely or in infinite regress (ED);

d. Therefore, the so-called individual man is an arbr-
trary part; for no exact boundary can be fixed for him in any
way, short of the total universe. And even if we were to fix
a formal boundary for him as a definite ‘‘individual,’’ with
glaring obviousness that boundary would constantly change.
Every time he breathed there would bea continuous cycle of
change; his heart beat usually moves parts of him percept-
ibly in and out; the ingestion of substances constantly pro-
duces changes. Obviously, even such a formal boundary
is not definitely or positively fixable.

e. Therefore, from every point of view the man is sim-
ply arbitrarily a unit of the Many. In termsof the Trinity,
he is, considered roughly and inexactly,a God the Son. The
only accurate boundary we can give him is to say that he is
ultimately, without any real break in continuity, the whole
universe, or God the Father. Explicitly, each man, when
accurately described, absolutely includes in himself all other
men and things as parts of him, and is God. That is the
most intelligible description of God (particularly God the
Father) that can be given. The description is thus far very
thinly intellectual—i. e., mostly formal and abstract ;—this
whole book adds details, and under ethics (XVIII) we get
some small measure of its actual infinite emotional content.

f. The conventional ““belief’’ of the dualists is that God
is something outside the “‘universe,’’ separate from it, and
absolutely apart. Obviously, as a truism, if God or anything
else is outside the universe and apart from it, our very asser-
tion of the existence of that extraneous thing implies an as-
sertion:- ‘the universe avd it.’ And that assertion, by the
‘and’, explicitly asserts a connection so that ‘it’ is actually
implicitly a part of the universe and included zm it (or else
the phrase is utter nonsense and unintelligible). In short, it is
absolutely self-contradictory to assert that we are even aware
of the possibility of anything extraneous to the universe or
separate from it; we can write such a form or assortment of
words, but the form is self-contradictory and pure nonsense
—or else it implies some new and novel meaning of the words
used. I might add a volume of the same sort of ob-
vious proof, But the foregoing part of this paragraph is
rigorous, and is sufficient for the intelligent reader, in spite
of the wide currency of the yarn that God is outside the
universe. God is the universe.

g. To take another point of view of the last paragraph :-
There is no ‘‘something’’ exterior to the universe with or by
which to describe the universe’s boundaries. JI. e., the uni-
verse is not a This, which we can speak of positively and ex-
plicitly (as we can of the color red) by comparing it with a
That “‘outside’’ or even formally different or separate. The
universe is the complete “‘finish’’ of all different That’s and
This’s, and has nothing by which to fix its boundaries (except
that they include the sum of everything inside):
day language, the universe is not ‘‘bounded.’’ It is not
quantitative. Consequently, when we achieve complete accur-
acy by describing a man as ultimately the universe or God,
there is no way of expressing any boundaries or size, in pos-
itive words (see Index, ‘‘Difference surface’). We are
really truthful, ‘essential,’ qualitative, and accurate then ;
but we are indefinite, and not verbally positive. The universe
or God or any ultimate thing is ineffable or mystical, or is

in every-

§47g VI One

quantitatively absolutely indeterminate, or is really infinite.

h. Thus far we have seen rigorously—in formal, thin
intellectual expression at least——that a man is arbitrarily an
individual or unit of the Many, and in ultimate reality is the
universe or God the Father, or the One. It is now similarly
obvious that ““man’’ as a class is a word which implies the
relationship of al] individual Many men. In that sense, man
is God the Holy Ghost, or a relationship word. That use of
man is rather common; the more explicit names for the same
relationship, which also include an implication of a Many
meaning, are mankind, brotherhood of man, and society. ‘The
science of sociology emphasizes that point of view of man as
God the Holy Ghost. All governments and other human
organizations obviously take the point of view that man,
from one aspect, exhibits relationships—is God the Holy
Ghost. So the solution of the vexed problem in sociology of
What is sovereignty? is obviously :- sovereignty is the name
of that relationship (is a relationship word); and various
‘‘sorts’’ of sovereignty are nothing more than such a rela-
tionship of ““natural’’ continuity or ultimate identity, ob-
served in various perceptible quantitative degrees of extension
and intensity in various historical circumstances.
When it is said ““God is love,’’ fundamentally it is meant
that man as God the Holy Ghost is a linkage or unbreakable
organization or organism called love. The same ‘‘connec-
tion’’ in ‘‘science’’ is called “‘cause and effect’’; or cohe-
sion; or, negatively, pressure (§86). In philosophy and
theology the relationship aspect is called reason, and mind,
and the ‘‘moral sense,’’ and “‘spirit,’’ and teleology. The
chief dificulty in orthodox doctrines is that there is such an
everwhelming profusion of names for that same thing. For
centuries theologians, scientists, philosophers—prophets—
have come forward with ‘‘systems’’ or “‘truths’’—special or
particular ways of unifying knowledge,—each thinking that
he had some bright new idea, to which he often gave a new
nae and said it was the most “‘important’’ thing in the
world. All of them were talking about the same simple
thing :- God the Holy Ghost—or copulas in language; or the
relationship of the One and the Many. And all of them ob-
viously were fundamentally right, even if they were a bit
narrow minded and over-proud of their new little names.

i. When in everyday terms we speak of a manas having
personality, we obviously mean that he is strongly consist-
ent; i. e., all of him hangs together or works together so
energetically that it all “adds together’’ instead of there
being appreciable mutually conflicting and hence neutraliz-
ing parts; and hence he is on the whole vividly perceptible.
He then is not futilely vacillating, or noisily contradicting
himself, or awkwardly ““falling all over himself.”’ Hence,
even in conventional meaning personality substantially is
perceptible relationship—a definite continuity inside a given
man as a standard universe. Obviously, when we consider
man as a complete universe, personality is still God the Holy
Ghost. Or in that relationship sense, and also in the sense
that a man is accurately and ultimately the One, God is a
person. That is not using person in quite a conventional
sense, which Jatter sense usually makes a person a standard
One (vision being too short conventionally to see a whole
One), and hence in practice makes God a sort of senile gray-
bearded Oriental or Prussian kaiser seated on a sort of un-
supported gold throne nowhere in particular. But obviously,
our conclusion that God is a person uses person in its essen-
tial conventional sense of continuous, or organized, or con-
nected; we agree completely that a standard universe may
have such a personality, and note that in it the personality,
to our rather restricted vision, may be perceptibly much
more vivid than is the personality of the whole universe (al-

UNIVERSE 36

most stupendously so in the case of Christ, e. g.): but it is
quite evident that the facts show that the whole universe is
also a person. ] may make the technical philosophi-
cal remark, that in that sense the present sort of deism tru-
istically is practically opposite to the customary historical
pantheism. That pantheism usually was substantially
nothing but what we now cal] materialism (§49h), with a
silly, cloying sugar coating.

j. It is to be kept in mind that consistently with pres-
ent conventional language, God is a person. I. e., the uni-
verse is organized, connected, organic— ‘something more’’
than a mere “‘heap’’ of parts or Many. The universe is a
real machine—one held together by friction (or love, if we
prefer the ethical term; or cohesion or force, to use scientific
terms), and is not a heap of disparate parts. The machine
works. It is a person (88144, 153). An ordinary locomotive
has a personality quite perceptible to me: in principle it
ought to have slight personality, as we shall see by the whole
of Part Two. Many people have asserted that they can per-
ceive the personality of a locomotive or similar machine—as
witness the affectionate name ‘‘tin Lizzie’’ for a Ford car.

§48. a. Wehave seen that nearly any name can be used
for each of the three sorts of words (§§28h, 29, 30, 43-4).
We have seen it vividly in the case of man ($47). And we
saw by the absurd matheinatical conclusions that the confu-
sion of the three produced nonsense ($44). ft is therefore
evident that to be consistent or rational——to see things as
they are,—we distinguish in which of the three meanings
we are using some given word, so that mere names shall not
confuse and blind us while we are ostensibly using them to
avoid that:- to aid our memories. Any normal child can
readily judge which of the three meanings of a given name
is intended, or else see that in a certain case he can not and
hence that the word or sentence is unintelligible to him.
There is no intrinsic difficulty about being logical, and see-
ing the truth: the difficulty is that we are in the habit of
confusing the words.

b. It is further evident that by considering any name
ultimately and accurately as designating God the Father (as
may be validly done), we therein have a formal religion that
is really correct, as it means or indicates the whole related
universe. Obviously, as a further truism of that, any person
who considers and observes that the results of his activities
are an inseparable part of the whole universe, and are needed
as that part to round out the whole, they being absolutely
indispensible because inseparable—any person who can thus
regard his activities or his life has a real, everyday, working
religion even if he is no more than an unskilled laborer (for
further details and proof, see §§166-7). Theology does not
necessarily express a valid religion. If you will refer to an
authoritative orthodox theologian’s statement of what theo-
logians think is the Trinity (‘“Ency. Brit.,’’ vi, 284-5, in
Art. “Christianity’’), you can readily see, in the light of
what we have now observed about the Trinity, that no so-
called Christian theologian, aceording to that statement, has
yet consistently expressed any valid religion. Ifit is not
obvious from that short citation, then the remaining pages of
the article cited make it more obvious. “©

Many theologians

bThat article (p. 289) explicitly states in effect that the theolo-
giams are evasive—i. e., that they will not agree to say that 4=A
and stick to it, nor yet will they refuse to do so (ef. §22). E. g.,
the writer states that officially both the Protestant and the Catholic
churches assert certain doctrines which many scholars in the church
find ‘‘no difficulty’’ in rejecting and “remaining Christian.’’ He
says that they produce a large literature ‘‘reconciling science and
theology by softening and compromising and adapting’’; that men
are not ‘‘prepared to carry principles to their logical conclusions. By

37 UNIVERSE

of course have a valid religion, and have had. I have merely
pointed out that by their own statement their expression of
such religion is grossly inconsistent. Yet that theological
dogma, worthless when strictly interpreted, implicitly points

a fortunate power of mind they are able to believe as truths mutually
inconsistent propositions.’’ The writer goes on further, actually ap-
proving that extraordinary refusal of theologians to abide by any
verbal agreement they may make. Obvionsly, he asserts in effect
that a theologian will agree that .1—A, and will then at any time he
likes, and without notice, assert that A is not=A. That
writer is an authoritative Protestant (whose name in simple kindness
] omit), and perhaps the Catholics may hold that he bas no right to
speak for them. So we shall let the Catholics exhibit fundamental
evasiveness for themselves:- If you will refer to the Art. ‘‘Philoso-
phy,’’ inthe authoritative ‘‘Catholic Encyclopedia’’ (xii, 37-8), passed
by their censor, you will find that its official Catholic writer (in an
extremely confusing manner which may have confused even himself
—and which on the other hand may have been sophisticated guile to
prevent anybody’s pinning him down, which is the acmeof evasive-
ness) dodges definite statement of what the Catholics fundamentally
believe as expressed in philosophical terms, and finally makes this
‘‘shifty’’ statement as to official authoritative imposition:- ‘The
Church has never imposed any philosophical system, though she has
anathematized many doctrines.’’ [That of course is equivalent to
asserting that the church has negatively imposed philosophical sys-
tems-—but let that pass.] Bnt another writer in the same official
work (“‘Cath. Ency.,’’ v, 170) substantially flatly contradicts that
first writer by stating:- ‘‘From the thirteenth century, through the
influence of Albertus Magnus and still more of St. Thomas Aquinas,
the philosophy of Aristotle, though subjected to some important
modifications, became the accredited philosopby of the Church’’;
and, ‘‘The distinction between the bumaao soul and the body it ani-
mates was made clearer and their separability emphasized; but the
ultra-dualism of Plato was avoided.’’ An authoritative Catholic
theologian, Ryan, in a more or less casual book not officially recog-
nized by the Church so far as I can discover, asserts as asort of mat-
ter of course and as actual practice, that the Catholics are dualists
(‘‘Socialism: Promise or Menace,’’ 261-2); and he goes on to make
the nonsensical dualistic statement (which in actual practice Catho-
lics claim to hold), that ‘‘science and religion as such *** deal with
entirely different spheres of reality,’’—which remark of course im-
plies as a verbal truism no need of consistency between science and
religion. Also, J. J. Walsh, in ‘‘The Popes and Science,”’ officially
censored by Catholic authorities, states (p. 327):- ‘‘At the end of
the nineteenth century Leo XII]. crowned the tributes which many
popes had conferred on Thomas [Aquinas] by selecting him as the
teacher to whom Catholic schools should ever turn by formulating
the authoritative Papal opioion—the nearer to Thomas the nearer to
Catholic truth.’’ And see also Walsh’s ‘‘The Thirteenth, Greatest
of Centuries,’’ pp. 81, 276-81. lt seems to me that those quo-
tations prove both sorts of theologians to be officially evasive, irre-
sponsible and unreliable in their assertions—or else to have minds of
such weakness of perception and hence unreliability as perhaps oc-
casionally to border on pathological insanity. The Germans repudi-
ated a ‘‘scrap of paper,’’ and the rest of the world would not tolerate
it—it is becoming bad taste, and sometimes dangerously unhealthy,
for even statesmen and diplomats—a ‘‘government’’—to lie in these
days, although Henry Adams says in effect that they feel quite free
to lie. We here see the theologians acting even more reprehensibly
than that defunct German government—for that government was at
least honest in giving notice that it did not propose to keep its word
unless convenient, and those theologians in those quotations evade
even that much of explicit statement of how far we canrely on them.
As a matter of fact, if the Catholic theologians are ever forced to
notice these remarks, quite probably they can ‘‘prove’’ by technical
canonical law that I prove nothing officially by such quotations—a
characteristic Catholic procedure (e. g., see Walsh’s ‘“The Popes and
Science’’) which if followed proves my point. There is actually a
history extending over centuries, of theological lies and evasions:
see ‘Pious Frauds’’ in Lecky’s history of the ‘‘Rise of Rationalism in
Europe.’’ And the Protestant theologian quoted gocs so far as to
assert that none of mankind will live up to their principles: the
truth is that most theologians even have excellent principles and live
up to them quite honestly as a usual thing. So far as I can
find, all other classes of men try to be verbally honest. Even the
first Catholic writer quoted above makes a sort of verbal claim to
the intended honesty of Catholics in dealing with science. But in
view of those quotations, ] have no choice but to state that in no case
in this book do I place any particular reliance upon what a theologian

professionally or officially says.

One VI §48d

out the complete truth. So obviously, theology need not be
taken more seriously than any otherscience. And orthodox
theology is explicitly wrong when it pretends to any *‘auth-
ority’’ (such pretension being substantially the invalid claim
that expression is rea] proof; see §35). Also, theology is,
in making such a claim, an aristocracy, autocracy, or kaiser-
ism. The Catholic church explicitly pretends to such auth-
ority (ibid., Art. ““Christianity,’’? 289); hence, the Catholic
church is absolutely wrong by its explicit words in that re-
spect (which is an important practical one), and is in prin-
ciple intolerable (§169).

ec. In the old days the Trinity was a governmental
problem. It is now the verbal custom to consider that in
some countries there is no religion in government. Obvious-
lv, in a complete sense, we can not possibly keep religion
out of government: man himself is clearly the Trinity, and
man is society. But what is meantis that we keep theology
out of government (allowing free speech in the matter—as
theology, with its claim to ““authority,’’ will not willingly
do)—which is quite right and practically necessary until such
time as theology becomes a valid science (when it itself will
accord such free speech; §169f). As a matter of clearly
obvious historical fact, the reason this country removed the-
ology from politics is that theology is essentially aristocratic
or autocratic in its substantial claims and inits practical ten-
dencies—a so-called ““spiritual’’ dualistic doctrine of kaiser-
ism that can not possibly be reconciled with democracy in
principle, it being the flat contradiction of democracy—as
we shall see proved in detai) in XVIJ-XIX.

d. The historical fact, with an obviousness that is pain-
fully glaring to me, is that most churches, and especially
the Catholic church, have opposed any verifiable, objective
proof that certain of their dogmas failed to agree with things
as they are. Theologians have tried to force men to accept
their “‘authority’’ even to the irrelevant point of torturing
them bodily. For historical proof see the Catholic Walsh’s
officially censored ‘Popes and Science,’’ where the facts
glare through his formal denials and ““explanations’’; or,
for explicitly stated proof see White’s ‘‘Warfare of Science
with Theology’’ (note that White advisedly says theology),
or Buckle’s history. The reason for that insistence
of theologians upon their ‘‘authority’’ is of course the same
as the reason for the maintenance of any kaiserism:- it was
a more or less selfish, personal effort to get and keep them-
selves in a position of power and privilege and ‘‘emolu-
ments’’ (i. e., graft)—and of course their doing so did con-
fer some very temporary benefits on the laymen (e. g., it
saved them the pain and effort of doing a lite thinking for
themselves, giving them the lazy comfort of saying that those
subjects are of course outside our line and we will leave them
to the specialists—just as some presumably intelligent people
have talked to me about this book); and those temporary
comforts were paid for later by mental and moral deteriora-
tion, as is all kinds of paternalism or parasitism (cf. Part
Three). It is much easier to claim to be right (especially
after one’s brain is so debauched—i. e., partly killed—by
the evasiveness described in the footnote, that it no longer
rebels against such dishonesty), than it is to dig into things
by hard effort and find out what zs right. Consequently, so
long as there are men so weak and stupid as to tolerate being
duped (and even actually to invite it, as has come to my
notice repeatedly in working up this book), there are going
to be dogmatic theologians, as well as other sorts of dogmat-
ists, who are mentally sufficiently depraved to dupe them.
The dogmatist pays for the ‘“privileges’’ and graft he gets
by suffering that brain destruction——a very expensive
payment, although he in turn is too stupid to know what is

§48d VI One

hurting him, and fills the air with complaints about the
““unbelief’’ of the people. This book will show unescapably
that we pay for everything we get, and get everything we
pay for. In the aristocratic kaiser-theologian-dupe game
the payment is merely a trifle slow——and that fools boobs.

e. The extent and intensity with which we perceive the
ultimate unity or organic personality of the universe determ-
ines its mental effect upon us (including emotional effect),
and hence its worth ($168). The remainder of this book is
a series of evidences that there is such ultimate unity or con-
nection or love or cohesion. Jn that sense the book expands
and intensifies the reader’s religion or enjoyment of life if
he sees and verifies that evidence for himself.

f. The argument of the book is now complete. It was
complete when we had examined the sentence 2-+3=—=5 in
812; but now all implications of that form have been stated
and shown in a broad way. Hereafter I simply repeat the
argument in terms of different sorts of details, as a means of
making it applicable and more thoroughly intelligible. Hav-
ing now achieved that genera] completeness, it may at this
point be of interest to see what the conventional] name of
the argument is:-

849. a. There may be said to be three general histori-
cal ways of viewing—interpreting—the Trinity (‘‘Ency.
Brit.,’? Art. ““Christianity’’). “* | Each of those historical
interpretations consists of emphasizing one sort of our three
sorts of words, at the expense of the two remaining kinds.
Sometimes the emphasis is so violent that the other two
members of the Trinity are claimed to be non-existent.
Thus, the atheist or the materialistic scientist emphasizes
the Many so much that there is to him nothing else—no
unity, no God, but only “‘a fortuitous concourse of atoms’’
(an obviously self-contradictory phrase that thus implicitly
re-establishes the Trinity). Or, the technical mystic will
so violently emphasize the One (or may be it is relationship
or God the Holy Ghost: no one ever knows just what the
technical mystic is saying), that he substantially denies the
existence of the Many. And there are other varieties of
doctrines that wholly deny one or more parts of the Trinity.
Sometimes people become exasperated with the theological
dogmas, as Wells apparently did, and deny the Trinity in
toto—and then more or less unconsciously construct another,
with new names. But as we have seen the formal need in
language of each of the three sorts of words, it is obvious
that the truth is not any of those doctrines which deny one
or more parts, either very largely in a quantitative way,
or wholly—in really a qualitatively impossible way. So
technically, we are neither Christian Scientists nor theoso-
phists (two species of mystics), nor atheists, nor materialistic
scientists (who are almost German ‘‘monists’’)—not yet ag-
nostics, who say they know little or nothing of the matter.

b. Nor are we dualists, who undertake to make some
real split in the Trinity, so that any two parts are “‘perfectly
equal’’ to each other. The parts are not real or essential
or distinct, but merely arbitrary or verbal, and actually
merge into each other even in the nsing of such logical
formal distinctions.

ec. It is not profitable to examine at length the names
of the doctrines that in one way or another gave greater

‘The writer mentions four more technical ways as being
‘“‘Christian,’’ but I shall ignore such technical dogma as being too
trivial for intelligent readers. EE. g., the Catholic Trinity is briefly
this:- ‘‘In this one God there are three distinct Persons,—the
Father, the Son [i. e., Christ], and the Holy Ghost, who are per-
fectly equal to each other’’ (Cardinal Gibbons, ‘‘The Faith of Our
Fathers,’’ Chap. I1)—and | take it that the reader of this book is too
intelligent to desire a discussion of such balderdash, that is so glar-
ingly self-contradictory and meaningless if explicitly considered.

UNIVERSE 38

emphasis to one or two parts of the Trinity than to the re-
mainder. There are already bundreds of tiresome books on
the subject. We shall look at a few important doctrines.

d. The Buddhists seem to me to make relationship
words—explicitly time and its numerous substantial synonyms
—the most emphatic of the Trinity. I. e., they make re-
lationships or God the Holy Ghost “‘real.’’ (For rhetorical
purposes I tacitly take it for granted that I am _ historically
correct in my interpretations. I am not able to make out
with much definiteness what the Buddha did mean, and I
doubt whether he knew very clearly himself—there are
places in this book [they are labeled] where I do not know
clearly what I mean; e. g., the full extension of the theory
of harmonic periodicity: and I know considerably more
about things than the Buddha did. All my historical state-
ments are similarly liable to error. Such statements are
quantitative, and I can do no more than give reasonable
guesses, some of which are most likely to be very inaccu-
rate.) To make relationships real or truth, is, truist-
ically, valid, provided that there is at least formal] recognition
of the logical existence of the other two forms. I. e., we
validly can emphasize relationships very much—say they are
‘‘real’’—and at the same time say that the other two forms
logically exist, but will verbally be called not ‘‘real,’’ but
“‘arbitrary”’ (real and arbitrary in that usage merely take on
quantitative meaning). The Buddhistic way of making time
real (doing so in practical effect by emphasizing the long
temporal duration of training or education, or what they
call the “‘way,’’ to ultimate perfection—to grasp of the One)
obviously makes the One a form—it makes the One what we
may cal] a ‘negative reality,’ or Nirvana. Buddhisin
is hence obviously quite right; it does not deny the formal
or logical need of those three forms, and their ultimate unity.
But we Occidentals do not talk that reversed language (it is
in practice an Oriental, more ‘selfish’ [ef. §151), introspect-
ive language; whereas we prefer an objective or ° ‘scientifie’’
language). So Buddhism is inconvenient for us—and also
possesses inherent tendencies towards selfishness which are
inadvisable (e. g., the conduct of the Buddha himself in
coolly deserting his family would get him a jail sentence in
some of our states), and are technically and historically
primitive. In speaking of Buddhism I refer to the
original Buddhism, which was essentially sound, and an ex-
traordinary advance. The Buddhistic theologians seem to
have perverted Buddha’s teachings as ours have Christ’s.

e. Those who emphasize the Meaning or One or God
the Father member of the Trinity are now perhaps most oft-
en called monists. The chief objection to that name as a
proper name for our valid logic is that its German users, in
their exaggeration of detail (of the Many, of ‘‘material’’),
have rather spoiled it. They usually call their doctrine

scientific monism,”’ and fail to recognize that the phrase
implies a dualism of “‘matter’’ and ‘‘spirit’’ that instantly
stultifies it. Some theologians in a somewhat similar way
try to appropriate the name monism as being more up-to-date
than the ancient equivalent theological term monotheism, —
and then make a dualism out of their *“monism.”’ Or, the
Germans are sometimes equally shallow in asserting what
they call a monism, that in effect denies relationships (so
that they can formally use the elassieal logic with it); such
monism again implies dualism. Before the war I
used to devote considerable space to showing that Ostwald
and Nietzsche, who seemed to be the Germans’ actually ae-
cepted leading “‘thinkers,’’? were exceedingly unsound
fundamentally. (I am aware that Nietzsche attacked Prus-
sians—in a way which was really complimentary in their
view—and that Germans verbally often repudiated him. I

39 UNIVERSE

think however that in view of the psychological principle
shown in §155, it is reasonably correct to say that Nietzsche
expressed German general views:- they being chaotic and
selfish. I also recognize that Nietzsche was tremendously
in earnest, and was actually likeable in many ways on that
account; and that he was a victim of his time, and hence
deserving of much approving pity by really intelligent per-
sons. As we saw in the case of the Kaiser (§25c), if we take
an ultimate One view of Nietzsche, he was completely con-
sistent and beautiful. I am however restricting my remarks
about Nietzsche to what he actually wrote; and that was a
violently emphatic dualism and hence perceptibly insanely
incoherent. ) But now that the war has occurred, I judge
that any extended proof of German unsoundness in principles,
due to too much emphasis on detail or the Many, is no long-
er needed—just those very general remarks about German
monism being all that is needed to call attention to the
facts. ‘Those remarks show, what will probably be accepted
as the historical fact, that the Germans did not asa rule
grasp any real meaning of the One, or couldn’t generalize
well (and hence talked loudly and sentimentally of being
monists because essentially they were so far from being such;
for the psychology of that see §155); although they were
very industrious and prolific with details of all kinds. That
detail work they did well, and it is of great value. From
the point of view of theirown best interest, they did that
detail work too well, becoming unbalanced in it (cf. §149).

f. Consequently, although monism is thus a somewhat
spoiled word, and gives conventional misleading indications,
it may, if stripped of those conventional accretions, serve as
a poor name for what we have observed to be the truth—
subject to another defect to be mentioned in par. i. For it
is an observable fact that Occidentals have acquired the ten-
dency to consider the One, or a unified God, to be the “‘re-
ality’’ or ‘‘truth’’ whenever there arises any definite question
as to what is ‘‘real.’” That seems to be the result of several
centuries of a religion that in usual practice tended to be
rather monotheistic (or without a ‘‘center,’’ or formally not
anthropocentric) if it were explicitly pinned down to definite
statement (and Occidentals formulated such a religion be-
cause they appreciably had greater mental or general vigor
than the Orientals, and that in turn had many causes,
climate being the verbally final one—Index, ‘‘Climate’’).
E. g., the ignorant Catholic layman substantially has five
coordinate Gods (Christ, God the Father, Holy Ghost, Vir-
gin Mary, and a null-God, the Devil), and the Protestant
Trinitarian usually substantially has four Gods. (As people
lose in mental vigor the number of their Gods increases, that
being merely truistic with inability to see the relationships
that give unity; hence it is another truism that the numerous
Catholic Gods appeal to the ignorant who can’t or won’t
think for themselves.) But if either layman is pinned down
to an explicit statement he will verbally assert one God, in
spite of the glaring fact that the assertion contradicts his
ritualistic practices. But in spite of those practical vagaries
—they are emotional or ritualistic (§167d) survivals of that
ancient day when men were too weak mentally to see and
express considerable unifications,—whenever a question of
formal speech or explicit logic comes up, the Occidental] has
become accustomed to asserting a unified universe or God,
and as a result our whole language is formally permeated (cf.
par. j for actual practice) by the implication that the One is
*‘real’’ or ‘‘true,’’ or that monism orits theological synonym
monotheism is the truth. And to repeat, that mono-
theistic ‘‘religion’’ did not absolutely ““cause’’ Occidentals
to progress ahead of Orientals; the Occidental progressed
because he was able (for reasons we implicitly see in numer-

One VI §49h

ous places below) to get a wider grasp of the connections of
the Many. He stated that grasp as monotheism, and that
religions expression in turn reacted as a‘ ‘cause’’ that widened
the grasp, and so on in infinite regress.

g. There remain those people who emphasize the Many
part of the Trinity—substantially saying that the Many is
most important, or is ‘‘real.”’?. The more usual name for
them is pluralists, meaning finite pluralists. A name nearly
as common is realists. Probably most people who are said to
have “‘scientific’’ tendencies are what are popularly called
commonsense realists; i. e., without much investigation
they take as being “‘real’’ what the theologians call the
things of this world. We have seen that the Many zs form-
ally or logically true; hence, those names for truth may
serve as poor ones except that we have to be explicitly
infinite pluralists (a verbal self-contradiction of course—
needed on account of the fact that the Occidental names
things as stated in the last paragraph; see also §24d). How-
ever, we see better names in par. i. There is one
special objection to calling the Many real, and the One ar-
bitrary. We are in the habit of calling the One real, and
to call the Many always real turns our customary language
topsy-turvy (and fundamentally is perhaps the most import-
ant, theoretically superficial but intensely practical, cause of
the warfare between science and theology—which is hence
seen to be mostly verbal and unessential; and science was
under an obligation to show that an advantage accrued in
the long run from such verbal innovation, and science neither
recognized nor met the obligation, although there zs an ad-
vantage, as indicated in footnote 100c). -That turning of
language topsy-turvy can be validly done (§51, ete.); but
it is rather confusing. We shall see ($891, 84, 93, etc.) how
Reynolds in his scientific theory correctly called the Many
real; he got ““matter’’ as being holes in the ether, the holes
traveling when ‘‘matter moved,’’ and other weird verbal
results, in an elaborately upside-down language. The Many,
or an infinite pluralism, zs real or true; but if we steadily
verbally consider it so, we have to construct an upside-down
language in which to state it.

h. There is one variety of person (other than the ag-
nostic), unwatrrantedly usually called a scientist, who is a
pseudo-species of realist or pluralist that logically departs
wholly from the truth. He is the materialist. He starts
with what he considers an exact, sharp This, and he keeps
on saying desperately This, Thisg Thiss Thiss Thiss
but holds in effect that no One is achievable. Usually he
does not explicitly assert that no One is ever synthesized;
in practice he tends to be vociferous that there is no
‘“PROOF’’ that we can ever sum up his “‘scientifie’’ string
of This: 23 45 6 ete. into any meaning. He excitedly
overlooks the fact (and it is an example of the principle that
man can not make a real error) that his very vociferousness
is a violent dogmatic assertion that This: 2 3 ete. = Nudl-
Meaning, which logically is precisely what he has been deny-
ing. However, in practice we shall take the materi-
alist at his word, and say that in brief, instead of making an
intelligent equation he makes a sort of formally disconnected
single member of it, This: 2 3 ete. , and denies that there
ts any actual equation even while he is striving desperately
to run down all the This’s:- Thiss 1 3 ete. —and pile them
up as mountains of statistics—an attempt to put salt on the
tail of the universe, so to speak. Obviously, his acts and
his implicit logic contradict the folly of his outward protes-
tations—although he vociferates so much that it sounds noisy
just to talk about him. He views his mountains of statis-
tics, which he erroneously calls science, in despair, and em-
phatically denies that any complete grasp of knowledge,

§49h VI One

such as we are seeing in this book is in actual fact fairly easy,
is possible. He says this book is ‘‘impossible.’? In charac-
ter, he is a pessimistic, talkative weakling.

i. The defect of the three ways of calling one or another
member of the Trinity the important one—'‘reality’’ or the
*“truth’’—is that those who undertake to do it are usually
opposed by other schools with doctrines giving a different
emphasis. Then the opponents get excited, increase their
emphasis, and tend to finish with each school substantially
asserting that its emphatic part is its only part, and that the
opposing schools are wholly wrong. Such fanatics are very
entertaining, even if distressing. History, including yes-
terday’s newspaper, is full of their vagaries. When not
ameliorated in some way, thcir excess tends to cumulate
until it reaches the borderland of insanity as some form of
megalomania, paranoia, or Nietzscheism. E. g., materialism is
obviously the result of becoming so emphatic about the reali-
ty or ‘practical importance’’ of the Many that the other two
parts are either wholly or practically denied.

j. The essential characteristic of those three ways of
considering some one of the three parts of the Trinity the
important one, and naming it “‘real,’’ is that such emphasis
is considered a fixed emphasis (i. e., it nominally does not
change, and fall on some other part); so we may call such
forms static logic. We can note that the average man (who
is paying slight attention to ‘‘logic’’—and that includes even
professional theologians and mathematicians for the most
part of their lives, and perhaps for the greater part of their
professional writings) does not use any such static logic.
The average man, whenever he uses any one of those three
sorts of words, regards that word at the time it is used as
pointing to or meaning the truth or reality. It is a dynamic
logic:- the emphasis (“‘reality’’) is laid on that particular sort
of word which is at the moment being used, and then changes
or moves to the other kinds as they are used. And obvious-
ly, the emphasis is thus in principle distributed in evractly
proper proportions. Consequently, that sort of logic is the
strictly valid sort (and the same sort of principle of validity
is extended to the end in footnote 100c). Hence, our gen-
eral equation is valid in that sense; for we have not consid-
ered that one member or one symbol of it is any more ‘‘real’’
or important than another. And whatever word wil] name
that sort of logic is an appropriate name. Those given
above are not quite appropriate, as we may now see; they
are usually somewhat quantitatively inaccurate for us.

k. But the reader can now see definitely (cf. §§25, 13)
that our observation of things as they are, especially of lang-
nage as it is, has showed us that all of the historical doc-
trines of the truth which have had any special vitality are
qualitatively substantially right. All the great religions
have been substantially right when considered apart from
the theological perversions. All those valid doctrines were
obviously conscious ~or ‘‘intellectual’’ attempts to state a
unity already dimly perceived by people (§170}), and the
inevitable result was an over-emphasis somewhere in them
($155). Poor emphasis does not make a statement “‘wrong’’
qualitatively; but it does make it quite liable to be misin-
terpreted (even by the author of it—which is why we may
often properly assert that we do not think that some writer
knew what he said or meant), as it is more or less quantita-
tively inaccurate. (And then science came along and at-
tempted, usefully and properly, to correct such doctrines
quantitatively by measuring. Some scientists in turn so vio-
lently emphasized their correction as to become materialists
—thus making a religion, but one of the null sort.)
So it is glaringly obvious that the simple solution of the
riddle of the universe is that the man in the street uses valid

UNIVERSE 40

logic, and there never was any riddle about it. There is
nothing strange abont the fact that the average man has
always been qualitatively right (even if somewhat inarticu-
tately so): as arapid proof that he has been, we may note
the truism that if that average man had not been right the
race would have died out long ago. And cows and
birds use valid logic so far as they need it for their environ-
ment—which is far enough to use One ejaculations. The
overtalkative people— philosophers, scientists, priests, poets,
and other varieties of persons who, being more or less biologi-
cal sports and unbalanced ($159), write books—became verb-
ally self-conscions and hence rattled, and manufactured
*“riddles’’ and ““mysteries’’—even for themselves—where
there were none. But somebody had to do it thus more or
less wrong, by that ultimate method of trial and error, in
order to develop the highly useful and sure language tool
we now have.

]. Consequently, as the valid Jogic is such a ‘“common-
place’’ affair, there are a number of common and familiar
names which conventionally apply to it. **Valid’’ is one;
*“dynamic’’ another. We have seen that ultimately all things
join together as identical; and we have seen that the em-
phasis on the three parts of the Trinity is identical in valid
logic; hence, we may call it the logie of identity. (Classic
logic is obviously logic of non-identity, as each premise is
nominally distinct and different.) And since our valid logic
is used by the average man it may conventionally be called
commonsense logic, or simply commonsense—or common logic,
or everyday logic, or intelligible logic.

m. And the reader, finally, may like to know when and
where this logic made its appearance in literature. Of
course, as a truism, it has zmplicitly been used in all intelli-
gible writings that came to correct conclusions which were
stated with fairly balanced emphasis. J have not invented
it. Jt is simply the ‘“commonsense’’ that people so often
mention. |] am merely pointing it out and describing it.
The prehistoric men who invented language invented it, ap-
parently half-consciously and without formulating specifica-
tions. The whole universe acted on them to cause them to
invent it—in ways we implicitly see in Part Three.

n. The valid logic has explicitly been used by a number
of men in forms that were pretty definite. Christ was very
obviously somewhat consciously using valid logic (§162e).
So far as I can judge, his reported utterances in the Bible
have been somewhat falsified (perhaps both unintentionally
and intentionally); but they still show that Christ recog-
nized valid logic and was deliberately using it. That was a
stupendous feat in his day, and indicated his remarkable
balance or great character (XVIII, §167b). Any fairly in-
telligent and honest person ought to be able to do it now.

o. For his age, Christ was reasonably definite in his use
and indication of the valid logic. So far as I am aware, the
next man to become more definite was Buckle, in his essay,

Mill on Liberty.’”’ Buckle attributed the ideas to Mill,
but in my opinion Mill is largely innocent of them. The
next person I know of is Dewey; his “*Psychology,”’ writ-
ten over thirty years ago, was more definite than Buckle,
and his later works are steadily more so. Dewey has often
been accused”’ by classic logicians of using circular logic,
which was precisely what he was doing, and doing validly,
and with rather good technique. Dewey, as far as I can
Judge, was the founder of the present and valid, school of
psychology, named behavoristic psychology. That name ob-
viously means dynamic—and such psychology is of course in
general agreement with valid dynamic logic. I use that
psychology in this book (XVII), rewriting it in simpler form
and eliminating its overstock of technical names. And it

41 UNIVERSE

is shown repeatedly below, that all other valid knowledge,
like valid psychology, is “‘dynamic.’”’

p. James gave the name pragmatism to substantially
the same logic—but bestowed the name before he worked
out the technical details very well. There are technical
defects in the expression of pragmatism—which do not, how-
ever, warrant explicit consideration in this condensed book.
The leading American philosophers, headed by Dewey, have
corrected the substantial ones; and some of those philosoph-
ers have repudiated the name pragmatist along with the re-
pudiation of James’s errors, and call themselves neo-realists.
(So far as I can find, living philosophers outside America
are searcely out of the amateur class. ) And David
Starr Jordan independently, and before James and the neo-
realists did so, worked out the valid logic in ““The Stability
of Truth.’’ = Alfred Sidgwick has, with somewhat less defi-
niteness, the same valid logic in his book, ““The Use of
Words in Reasoning.’’ Stallo rather definitely implied it in
his ‘“Theories and Concepts of Modern Physics,’’ which was
explicitly perhaps too destructive. And Karl Pearson, in
‘“Grammar of Science,’’ nearly thirty years ago explicitly
and emphatically made for science the distinction between
Many words and One words under the respective names per-
ceptions and conceptions, and went so far as to deduce from
that distinction the principle that mass varies with velocity:
that ““deduction,’’ as Pearson showed, was simply a correct
interpretation of Newton’s laws (§88). | Pearson’s book is
now scientifically accepted almost as commonplace; _ but it
was novel when published, and I think was, in spite of its
grave defect, one of the five or six first-class books on physi-
cal science of the last century. It contains a bad defect
which has marred Pearson’s later work:- it omits explicit
naming and consideration of relationship words, and that
perhaps technically comes close to making Pearsona materi-
alist. What seems to have been the actnal difficulty is that
Pearson tends to be a mathematician; and as mathematic-
ians write relationship words as symbols +. =, &, different
from ordinary words, therefore he more or less unconsciously
took it for granted that no ordinary words were needed for or
about relationships: so he omitted them. As a truistic con-
sequence, his book was not intelligible to non-mathematicians
(it is readily intelligible when the omission is supplied);
also, the person trained in orthodox mathematics could more
or less understand the book, but as he himself did not ex-
plicitly know the language trick with reference to the rela-
tionship symbols, he could not clearly express what he had
understood. This paragraph of course simply states
my judgments. There is no space to show the historical
evidence for such quantitative matters, and my guesses will
probably be disagreed with by some. And nearly surely
there are other historical instances of fairly definite use of
valid logic which have not come to my attention. There are
not likely to be any very substantial uses of it which I have
overlooked; for such use would have been by a person of
such unusually strong cbaracter that he would not be the
sort that is overlooked. For further remarks on the charac-
ter of men who could use the valid logic, see §167b.

q. Probably it is safer never to use for very long any
particular name for the valid way of expressing the truth.
The way itself hasan indefinite number of possible variations
(S63, etc.). If we adopt a fairly fixed name for valid logic,
some soft minded person might take it to refer to a fixed
system—and thus be a word idolater. But there is
the graver danger that the intellectual exploiters will prompt-
ly grab any definite name for it, and capitalize it for their
benefit. The exploiting capitalization of the word ** Christi-
anity’’ is so pernicious and generally prevalent that many

One VI §&49t

people are becoming doubtful whether they wish to be
named Christians. Democrat will probably be the next word
exploited on a large scale; the demagogs have already been
watering the stock of that word generously, and as this book
is likely to make it definitely no longer respectable to be an
aristocrat, probably all the intellectual bunco men and their
soft minded followers will scramble even more to steal the
now better trademark democrat.

r. The common, untechnical, everyday name of the
truth set forth by valid logic—other than democracy, which
applies particularly to people—is idealism. Hopkins, in his
Dartmouth inaugural address, names the common views of
that truth (he expressing them implicitly in valid logic) :-
“constructive idealism.’’? That name gives as much descript-
ive information as to what is truth as any I can think of. It
is somewhat obviously a verbally self-contradictory name,
meaning an idealism or unified One or religion, definitely
expressed mechanically (so that it will be applied).

s. In the process of giving a large choice of names fairly
suitable for the valid logic, so that the very number discour-
ages exploitation of the name, I have tried to make clear
the complete meaning of the valid logic, and to attach it so
strongly to all the historical knowledge and well established
emotions possessed by the reader that that essential part will
be easily remembered. I of course would not have used the
space discussing the choice of merely a name: one line
would have sufficed fora name and nothing else.
There has further appeared implicitly the answer to ‘“What’s
in a name?”’ The answer is:- history—meaning mental
connections or associations, or unification, and emotions, so
that appropriate action readily results where there is much
history—or ‘‘advertising’’—and hence habit attached. So
it obviously is an advantage to have a familiar, common
name, even if the exploiters do capitalize it, stealing its
trademark value. We have to balance—compromise—be-
tween having a name that automatically arouses emotion,
and having one that is not so very automatic as to make it
worth the exploiters’ efforts to steal. But that answer to
‘“What’s in a name?’’ includes what the name points to;
the mere name is a little ink, or sound.

t. We have now seen in a little intelligible detail that
everyone with ‘‘commonsense’’ has previously understood
the essentials of this book. For I am simply writing ont
the explicit details of what for centuries has been recognized
as such commonsense. We have seen that the general argn-
ment of the book has been rather definitely stated numbers
of times in the past. Hence, because such knowledge is so
old, itis rather obvious in theory, even without observing the
actual facts, that a normal five or six year old child can un-
derstand the book—and even more so that an intelligent adult
can: that the adult is quite competent to grasp all essen-
tials of the book. But there is another side to all
that, which other aspect shows some important conclusions :-
The reader may occasionally find himself struggling to grasp
something which is written in the book; and so wonld nat-
urally feel resentful if it were held that a six-year-old could
understand what he himself finds so diffienlt. But those
difficult details are the Many, and of course probably would
not be grasped by the child—and are not essential. The es-
sential parts are the One conclusions—the seeing that ulti-
mately things are related, and work together. Iam forced
to state those Many details from my point of view; and all
readers ocenpy other points of view, so that those details are
more or less unfamiliar to them, and hence “‘hard.’’ Of
course the reader finds it hard at times to ““grasp’’ things
from my point of view. Also, as those details are in infinite
regress, very shortly I find it extremely difficult for me

§49t VI One

myself to grasp the series far out. The better the reader is
as an observer and thinker (a “‘thinker’’ is an observer of the
relationships of his ‘‘observations’’), the more emphatically
will he be conscious that he is not grasping all the Many de-
tails as I see them—is not getting the detailed significance of
what I say. But, to repeat, those details are not
essential; they are the Many and are ultimately arbitrary.
The reader who is a good observer will substitute his own
details for mine. If the circumstances were reversed, and
the six-year-old were the writer and I the reader, the same
principle would hold:- I would be forced to see (if 1 were a
reasonably good observer) that the child expressed details
that ran on to infinity, and that I couldn’t “‘grasp’’ them or
understand them as well as he did. Considered from that
aspect (of details) the child would be ““mystic’’ to me, and
hence deserving of the highest wonder and awe from me.
Or, speaking rigorously and more definitely, I could learn
from the child. Yet at the same time | could readily grasp
the One conclusions of the child, just as the child can grasp
any of the essential conclusions of this book if I state them
in words he knows (it is possible to do that for the average
child). So obviously, all of that is proof of two im-
portant practical points:- (1) The definitely observable facts
about so “‘abstract’’ a thing as “‘logic’’ or words show that
other people are really deserving of our wonder and respect
for their capacities and ultimate dignity (or even ‘‘divinity’’)
and lovableness; or those facts show rigorously that we can
learn from anyone, but need not be essentially troubled or
‘“‘lowered’”’ if somebody knows more details about a certain
thing than we do—for in nearly every subject that state of
affairs does exist. (2) Those facts further rigorously show
the error of the frequently encountered erudite person who
prides himself upon the possession of some special knowledge
or intricately complex knowledge of some sort of details.
Any ‘‘knowledge’’ which is so complex that it can’t be ex-
plained to a child well enough for him to get the essential
meaning of it, is either unfinished and in that degree unin-
telligible to its erudite possessor, or else is wrong in some de-
gree and not knowledge—simply isn’t so. When such
knowledge is also concealed from the average person, as in
‘“secret diplomacy,”’ it has the same defective character,
and in addition the concealment is undemocratic and immoral
(8167-9), and its possessors deserving of contempt and
scorn—instead of envy and an idle curiosity, as was the case
in the crude and aristocratic childhood of the race.
We shall from time to time see more familiar proof and ex-
pression of this paragraph. ] have here simply given the
general outline from both the One point of view and the
Many point of view, of what the reader can ‘“understand,”’
or has need to; and of what that implies.

CHAPTER VII. Statement and proof of valid logic from
additional points of view.

§50. a. In this section valid logic is briefly but rigor-
ously demonstrated by using the principle of incommensura-
bility (or commensurability). Two “‘quantities’’ or ‘‘num-
bers’’ or units of the Many, or two things, are said to be
commensurable when there is some third quantity of the same
kind (another thing), called the common measure, which is
exactly contained a definite or whole number of times in each.
Two quantities are orthodoxly said to be incommensurable
when they have no common measure. _ E. g., the diameter
of acircle is incommensurable with the circumference; i. e.,
if the diameter is 1 unit long, the circumference is 3.1415...
units long-~meaning that no number will exactly express the

UNIVERSE 42

circumference. (Obviously, that orthodox definition agrees
with the argument of this book, and does not consider 0 and
co ‘‘numbers.’’?) The “‘number’’ 3.1415... or 7 is said to
be an incommensurable number—meaning that it is not act-
ually a number, as it ultimately can not be positively ex-
pressed.

b. I shall make some digressive comment in this para-
graph, anticipating the conelusion we are to derive, but
anticipating it in a not very intelligible form. If the
diameter of a circle is a line having a definite length, then it
can be conceived, or considered to “‘exist’’ (i. e., to assert
that there zs a diameter is not a self-contradiction A—A and
A is not=—A; specifically, is not Line—Definite length or
Line, and Line is not—Definite length or Line), and its repre-
sentation can be “‘drawn’’ as a “‘line’’ on paper. There-
fore, if there is a diameter, then it is glaringly obvious that
there is not any such thing as a circle or circumference ac-
cording to orthodox mathematics—for the circumference is
not definite and hence not a line—or can’t exist as anything.
A circle is thus conventionally inconceivable, for if we have a
circle it can not have a diameter, and vice versa. Similarly,
by orthodox mathematics it is absolutely inconceivable that
a square have a diagonal, an equilateral triangle an altitude,
etc. Orthodox mathematics itself asserts in effect that it is
irrational—i. e., nonsensical—to say thata circle may exist,
when it says 7 is irrational. Hence, by following the same
argument we demolish all orthodox geometry and related
mathematical doctrines. In brief, classic logic, as used in
geometry, definitely gives nonsense. The immediate
conclusion from that reductio ad absurdum (it is somewhat
difficult to see clearly to the conclusion here, as the reductio
is naturally negative in form), is that there is no exact
science. If we do start with the absurd assumption that a
line is ever in any Many sense something absolutely exact,
then we get into those orthodox difficulties :- briefly summed,
that there is no geometry possible. Or, more remotely, we
see that the Many members of our equation, That... X
This..., and M(varying with)L?T~?, necessarily assert the
infinite regress even in geometry. And it can also be seen
further that a consistent geometry is dependent upon the ex-
plicit solution of the One and Many, and that another way
of viewing the orthodox difficulty above is to note that ““line’’
(and similarly point, surface, solid, etc.) is a name containing
considerable relationship meaning—is often practically a re-
lationship noun, or is “‘abstract’’’—which must in any valid
logic be distinguished from Many words. To separate out
such relationship terms is equivalent to rewriting geometry
and its allied subjects, and the several volumes of that is
omitted from this book at this point. Orthodox geometry is
Substantially valid; it is merely vague and inaccurate and
verbally inconsistent (cf. §$60-3). The reader need not
fee] that I have destroyed anything substantial; but in just
one paragraph he has seen that he is warranted in being
somewhat unimpressed when a mathematician thus rhapso-
dizes:- ‘“‘Coterminous with space and coeval with time is
the kingdom of mathematics; within this range her dominion
is supreme; otherwise than according to her order nothing
can exist.’? So-called hard-headed scientists used to listen
to that sort of thing soberly. Now it is more kindly to omit
the name of the man I just quoted, as he is still alive.

c. We may generalize the fact that the diameter is in-
commensurable with the circumference into this proposition :-
any perimeter is incommensurable with its average diameter.
I have not been able to find any published proof of that
proposition. It is obviously to me true, simply as a truism
involving the solution of the One and Many. If it is not
thus obviously true to the reader, or obviously true as being

43 UNIVERSE

a perfect analogy (§94g) to the conventional special case of
the circle, then this whole book furnishes the proof, and the
further proposition which ] show in this section works back-
wards to establish the foregoing genera] proposition.

d. It therefore follows as a truism, that 7f there were
any fixed or exact or constant parts of the universe, it would
be absolutely impossible for them to join with the other
parts and form a body or a universe that had a_ perimeter.
And that truism holds vice versa:- that if there is any real,
connected, mutually-working-together universe, then it is
absolutely impossible that it should be composed of exact,
definite, constant parts ef any given finite size or sizes (for
such would give impossible definitely-measurable diameters).

e. That last paragraph is the verbal expression of validly
rigorous mathematical proof of the truth of this whole book
or argument, with respect to its general consistency. Or ex-
plicitly, it is rigorous proof of the consistency or formal
truth of our general equation, and hence a proof of the
erroneousness of all equatious of whatever sort which fail to
conform in principle with that general one. And that proof
is perfectly reversible; i. e., it itself works vice versa as was
seen; also, if the proposition in par. c is accepted, par. d
proves the book; and if not now accepted, the book proves
the proposition. And obviously, that is a general example
of the principle that valid logic is circular; a formal proof
of that principle is this:- all expression of proof if valid is re-
ducible to the truism A=A, and it is immaterial which 4 of
the two A’s comes first, as formally or logically they are
identical (§§35, 58}). Hence, if there is any “‘rule’’ that
will not work both ways, the “‘rule’’ is not a rule or prin-
ciple that is subject to any proof, but is simply a quantitative
guess, subject only to temporary inexact verification by meas-
urement. Therefore, obviously, as a general principle, no
quantitative fact—no proposition which includes in itself any
particular time and space (as contrasted with our general L
and J, that are relationship words that may be applied to
any particular units of the Many)—is susceptible to any such
thing as expression of proof; it is subject only to direct obser-
vation, or what I called “‘real’’ proof (§35). Or, we can
put it at once into scientific terms:- no so-called cyclic pro-
cess, short of a cycle including the total universe (in which
Land T are not particular measures) is perfectly reversible
(Index, ‘“‘Cycle’’). Or, more specifically, xo machine which
exists or can be made, short of the total universe, is perfectly
reversible. I. e., any well-designed machine will (1) per-
form pretty nearly the same operation or cycle after making
one ‘‘revolution’’ (such as the earth’s rotating daily in nearly
the same time); and may (2) run backwards in revolutions
or cycles that more or less approximate the cycles in the
ahead direction (in some ordinary machines the approxima-
tion is so remote that we briefly say that they ‘‘won’t’’ run
backwards, in the same way we say the Kaiser was wrong;
§25). But in no case, short of the total universe, will that
repetition of a ‘‘cycle’’ ever be an exact repetition (and ingen-
eral, repetition includes reversal; see Index, *"Direction’’).
Part Two proves that general] principle in useful detail.

f. We could go on from that point of view and consist-
ently completely describe the universe. The orthodox point
of view of the science called heat would be the next step.
Or we conld at once shift that principle of cycles to ethics
and show that a workable or moral life was ultimately or as a
One a perfectly balanced cycle (i. e., reversible cycle, in
which the ‘‘other fellow’ had a fair deal or reaction) of vari-
ous acts, which cyclic balance is commonly named temperance.
In a really unified knowledge, obviously, as a truism, we
can start from any point of view and consistently describe

the universe; I mention those two large extensions of the

One VII §50h

present point of view as an example of thet principle. The
practical need of having an end to this particular book ob-
viously precludes my ever going on toall the implied details
—of ever continuing explicitly to name thedots of That... X
This...—or even of pointing out that possibility often.

g. In this paragraph I summarize the general proof of
the argument of the hook, by the use of incommensurables.
It is so brief as to be hard to follow. The fact that
Many units can not be bounded by a definite or exactly com-
mensurate perimeter or One obviously shows that the One
and the Many are absolutely irreconcilable in their formal
contradictoriness. If we say that there is really and truly a
One, then it is, by our everyday language agreements, formally
or logically impossible to say that there is simultaneously a
real Many. And we can see at once that in general there
are two immediately applicable ways of reconciling that con-
tradiction:- (1) We can say that the Many is absolutely
infinite, and as such is absolutely true at the same time that
the One is absolutely true (dué that changes our everyday
language agreements, as we shall see). That is what we do
say, in our valid logic, in the formal way of reconciling the
contradiction (i. e., we formally say L*®7~”). For then
obviously we can, in the absolutely infinitely small units of
that infinite Many, which are really absolute zero, find a
common measure that will serve as a complete measure for
the otherwise incommensurable One. Logically, that way is
consistent, and gives us our zero-infinity logical rule. But
our everyday language is constructed ona formal implication
that the One is “‘real,’’ and that the “‘infinite Many”’ is not
“‘real,’? and hence is a verbal contradiction (cf. footnote
100c). By such verbal agreements, infinite “‘really’’ means
continuous, and not a ‘‘measure.”’ (2) But we can use
that formal reconcilement, and at the same time use the
practical reconcilement of stating and showing that there is
no exact science—that we can not be exact oraccurate about
the Many,—that when we do make a ‘‘real’’ or definite
perimeter or One, then the Many or that perimeter’s diame-
ter actually is not exactly commensurate in any measure that
we are verbally able to set down in full. In short, we drop
the L°7'—” and use L?7'~, and say that practically there is
an infinite regress, which we formally merely imply by writ-
ing + as 3.1415..., or as This.... And that practical way
of handling the difficulty clearly agrees with the obvious fact
that we can and do conceive geometrical circles, and have
no difficulty in representing them approximately.

h. That rigorous and concise proof of the argument is
so brief that it is scarcely susceptible of being more than
superficially comprehended at first. Probably a million cor-
olNaries—implications—cou!d be dug outof it with but casual
vision. Hence, in theory, and also according to my actual
experience in using it on some of the ahlest thinkers, it
slightly dazes the reader at first. You can use it to gauge
your own mental capacity:- If on first reading it you get a
vague glimmer of what I am talking about, your mental pow-
er is as great as anybody’s in the matter of soundness, integ-
rity, or keenness (although that will not perceptibly be a
measure of the endurance of that strength—the ability to
keep on using such a strong mind until you get, and not
merely aspire to, whatever you are after). If you want to
compare your mental! strength with mine, you are informed
that I had to dig at that proposition for about two years be-
fore I got what might honestly be called a definite glimmer
—-you probably have a keener mind than mine, but I have
considerable endurance. Incidentally, if anybody is
fond of brevity, and thinks that anything which is true can
be said very briefly, then here, in 29 words, is not only a
statement of this whole book, but also a rigorous proof of the

§50h VII One

truth of it and of a unification of all knowledge:- Any
perimeter is incommensurable with its average diameter.
Hence, if there are exact finite parts it is impossible for that
Many to combine into a One; and vice versa. With
further reference to brevity, the title of the book, UNrverss,
is a condensation of the book into one word. The defect of
brevity is that it is not positive and intelligible. When we
say ‘“Brevity is the soul of wit,’’ it is really meant that the
essential of language is given by Meaning—that brevity, in
the ultimate, is the One word; and that it, like humor,
gives us a mild rebirth (§8162a, 34b)—that the equation is,
Humor...= Brevity, or Wit, or the One. In that One sense
obviously brevity positively expresses nothing, but is relig-
ion. We must have a temperate amount of That... * This...
(of details) before we can expect to be understood.

$51. a. I shall now briefly summarize and prove all
the theory of language, using a somewhat different point of
view that gives some additional fine points, and also shows
that language itself is so flexible or changing or incapable of
being put into any absolutely rigid form or logic that it is
practically imperative that each person who is going to un-
derstand and use a valid Jogic achieve that understanding
and skill by experience of his own—getting in the end a valid
logic (a style) which although thus valid is formally a_ little
different from that used by any other person. Even the expres-
sion of the most rigorous mathematics can not validly be put
into an absolutely fixed mould or form: always judgment ts
needed. Hence, we need to look at some of the fine
points of language; and truistically the argument must be-
come complicated, and will for that reason require attention
if it is to be understood. This section is very hard reading.
If the reader is not an expert at mathematics, science, or
logic, or desirous of being one, he can perhaps most satisfac-
torily and usefully to himself merely scan the pages of it,
taking only what strikes his interest.

b. We made an agreement as to what words do, and
the formal agreement that we shall not say A—=A and simul-
taneously A ts not—=A. We then observed, as a formal] basis
of all language—or language mechanics,—that there are
three more or less distinct forms of words, which are analo-
gous to the three parts of the Trinity. The fundamental
truism concerning those three forms omits the use of one
form (the One), and is this:- if we are going to talk about
parts of the whole (as we tacitly agree to do when we use
language of any sort), then we must have (Z) the names of
those parts (God the Sons), which must, as the truism, then
be joined into the whole [which One need not be explicitly
named] by (2) symbols or names which do join them togeth-
er (relationship words, or God the Holy Ghost). So far as
logical necessities of language go, we could verbally stop
there, with just those two forms of words—(Z) and (2),—
and understand the unified meaning, but not say Meaning.
And we could consider that formally there were two reacting
parts (i. e., the Many words with the relationship words)—
a verbal dualism fundamental to all speech that is positive,
all doctrines, all machines. The reader may note
that I have shifted view point, and instead of taking a con-
crete view of the actual Many, with zts parts reacting among
themselves, I am looking at language directly, and consider-
ing what I call the reaction on each other of its two sorts of
words that have been mentioned. I therefore truistically
consider that there is a verbal dualism (1) (2), in place of
the That... < This... heretofore expressed (for explicit con-
sideration of that new form, see footnote h). That shift of
point of view of itself shows how very flexible our language
is, and how, if we formally omit some part, other words will

UNIVERSE 44

imply it (I have omitted mentioning any but one formal] unit
of the Many:- naming only (2) ).

ce. So we have (2) verbally reacting with (1). But, to
obtain the previously mentioned convenience in jogging our
memories and attention (and probably as a vestige of prim-
eval Janguage, in which there existed only One words, while
and before men were inventing the other parts of the lang-
uage machine), we all actually do go on toa tautological
process, and deliberately repeat what the primary necessity
in formal speech would and does do of itself; i. e., we use
(3) words or symbols which again assert—which now explic-
itly name—the whole or One which the other two forms have
already said or positively expressed,—these third, tautologi-
cal words being God the Father. It is that pure tautology
of (in a way) deliberately saying twice everything we have to
say, that has been the final ‘“‘mystery’’ that for ages puzzled
the seers. We knew so well what that mystery was that we
exuberantly said it twice—which was most illogical by the
classical logic, which frowns so on exuberance that it has
almost killed our quite proper and correct commonsense in-
stinct to use two or a dozen negatives when we are sure we
mean zo, and has produced the monstrosity, “May I not?’’

d. We may summarize what we have:- The form (7)
is parts of the verbally-split universe; the form (2) joins
those verbal splittings together again into the whole; the
form (3) tautologically names and thus repeats the whole.
Or, (2) used in connection with (2) is the whole or meaning,
and is also tautologically verbally equivalent to (3). We may
write that (7) x(2)=(8).

e. Obviously, (7) and (3) are logically or Jormally self-
contradictory. Also, (Z) asserts a splitting, and (2) asserts
a rejoining, and those two ideas are in reality or meaning ab-
solutely self-contradictory; or (1) and (2) produce or assert
nullity or zero in the sense that the things asserted by (Z)
are not really split off or separated. Again it can be
noted that I am taking a different point of view, by explic-
itly considering as a form itself the contradiction introduced
by (3), and considering contradictions in both form and
meaning. As a matter of fact, we have started on an infinite
regress of logic itself (see par. h). It should also be definitely
noted that when I said ‘the things asserted by (Z) are not
really split off or separated,’ we are using real merely as a
tacit verbal agreement:- for we could just as well have said
that the One (3) was not really connected. And it can
again (see §49¢, etc.) be seen directly that by thus reversing
the agreement we produce no real changes in the conclusions
which we are going to derive, but merely reverse language
or the dictionary.

f. It is also obvious that (7) and (2) are Jormally totally
different or contradictory, being the two sorts of words which
are formally needed together to make an explicit or positively
expressed whole. Hence, when we use them together, as
(1) X(2), we have the fundamental lingual requirement of
the truism in par. b:- that we split the universe and then
join it. So that formal contradiction must inhere to make
the logic valid, as it balances and cancels the formal contra-
diction we started with. That finishes, from the present
point of view, with formal agreements (but see par. h for
extension of the point of view).

g. We then have the disagreements in meanings—(Z) X
(2) being made up of parts, and (3) being really a whole.
But (1) x(2) is only formally made up of parts, because the
explicit meaning contradiction inheres only in (2), and is re-
moved or really contradicted by the (2). Consequently,
though there is a contradiction in meaning of the words we
use, the contradiction is destroyed as stated, and is not real
in language as a whole. Consequently, the whole equation

45 UNIVERSE

(1) X(2)=(8) is absolutely true, and must contain the double
contradiction—one of form and one of meaning. That
double contradiction also justifies, or formally necessitates,
from this point of view, the existing tautology.

h. But, language as a whole thus being without any act-
ual self-contradiction, it follows at once that we have now
really failed to use our requisite mechanical truism that was
started with in par. b:- that language must have reacting or
contradictory parts. "" Hence, we start all over again with
our equation, and consider the total single symbol ‘(1)X
(2)=(3)’ as being a standard whole that is now a Many, or
a new (1), which we may write ((7)); and then we construct
a new (2) and new (3), and put them together into an equa-
tion in order to get a positive assertion that is not ineffable.
In short, we now have to begin to duplicate ‘language’ or
‘logic’ itself, in order to get the intelligible expression or
equation that applies the truism. And obviously, it is an
infinite regress. | When we do it infinitely (use up ail time
and space—or, do what is practical, take time and space as
unreal), we achieve a logical and also a verbally complete lang-
uage, or an eract language. I know it sounds queer,
and is hard to understand. Well; there are always some
men with minutely seeing minds (who as a compensating
characteristic usually fail to see wholes or commonsense very
well). They would find considerable fault with our original
general equation as first derived, because the equation was
substantially said to be finished or absolute. To say that, is
equivalent to our conclusion in par. g, that the form of equa-
tion there was absolutely true. It is true; but only when it
is seen that the infinite regress stated in this paragraph is
also implicitly contained in it, and considered formally com-
pleted in it. But the men who have trouble in seeing a
whole—usually the materialists—demand the details. So 1
have explicated the infinite regress for them. They can now
follow it out in detail as far as they care to go (keep on
drawing in the actual smaller and smaller picture of the ad-
vertisement), and keep on until they are by actual experience
convinced that it will give an absolute whole. Obviously,
they can not honestly assert that it does not give a whole un-
til they have actually kept on infinitely on the regress, if it
does not sooner convince them that they fave seen a whole.
So if they can’t see, they are rigorously tied up to an experi-
mental occupation that will keep them occupied and quiet
forevermore, or allow them only obviously inconsistent talk.

§52. a. The last section, in making the flexibility of
language obvious, implied some definite facts which are set
down in this section somewhat at random.

b. We have seen more vividly that the same word may
be used in each of the three forms. Often, many meanings
that have been attached to some given word in the past may
be now nearly dead, but still slightly remain as implications

5lbThe reason J succeeded in making an intelligible or positively
expressed equation, instead of winding up with an equation or lang-
uage which, as just asserted, was without reacting parts or ‘contra-
dictions,’ and which hence was ineffable and unintelligible, is this:-
without saying anything definitely abont it in par. b and d (where it
would have been confusing), I introduced into the equation the re-
lationship symbols X and =, which was equivalent to implicitly re-
duplicating the three forms in infinite regress, or toimplicit assertion
of this footnote. A simple description of that literally infinitely in-
volyed statement is this:- inan advertisement which contains a
picture of a man holding a periodical on which pictured-periodical
again appears the same advertisement, it is obvions that to be
consistent the second picture must contain another picture of the
man holding the periodical on which again appears in still smaller
picture the same advertisement, and so on ad infinitum. That eqna-
tion (2)<(2)=(8) was the original ‘advertisement,’ and it, sO far as]
at first explicitly stated ought to have been (2) (2) ()—an ineffable,
unintelligible language without contradiction, etc. See the
text for the further unwinding of that infinite involution.

One VII §$52e

—or implication-ghosts, so to speak. Words, like science,
can’t be accurate or exact, and it is now quite obvious that
our formal separation of words into classes is itself just a con-
venient, arbitrary form which is inexact, and is subject, like
all Many things, to infinite regress.

c. We thus again see that we can not validly make any
sharp separations in the universe—not even of words into
classes, although words are obviously as arbitrary as any-
thing. And that fact will often serve as a useful
measure of the ability of men. If we observe a man insist-
ing on “‘sharp distinctions’? between any classes of actual
things, or insisting that kis way of making classes (of judging
any Many proposition—or that in human affairs he knows
just how to separate the sheep and the goats) is essentially
right, we may at once safely decide that he is more or less
incompetent, and knows little of his subject. In this day,
that test is perhaps the most easily applied test of mental
competence. But of course the incompetent who is cock-
sure about quantitative problems will quickly discover what
yardstick we are using on him, and superficially avoid being
so obviously foolish.

d. Or we may express it, that a word used in a context
has ““fields’’ or implication-auras that stretch out and bind
the word continuously in meaning to the context, even if the
word does appear superficially to be ““printed separate.’’
Hence, words in use have the characteristic of other Many
things; just as there is no sharp This, but always Tits...,
so no word is sharply Word, but always Word.... Modern
physical theories have atoms with such “‘fields’’ (§89, XI).

e. And we may observe that words are perhaps the
most highly specialized tool, or machine, or means of trans-
mitting force, that we have—meaning that it is possible to
control the extensiveness and intensity of the force, and
hence its resulis, more completely when we use the language
machine than when we use any other machine (e. g., than
when we use the skeletal levers and muscles behind a fist;
or apply them to shoot a gun). Words actually ‘“‘exert
force,’” just as explicitly and definitely as do molar bodies—
as do machine guns, a heaved brick, or an engine. The
words printed here (even if primarily considered as only so
much ink) consist of very energetic atoms that *“foreibly”’
make very perceptible changes in your eyes and nervous
system. Considered more indirectly as directing your atten-
tion to certain things (and that is also what a 16-inch gun is
‘for’’), they act as a trigger—a slight starting or initiating
force—that may result in enormous force transmittal. The
advantage of words is that they can be devised to transmit
very accurately the kind and quantity of force (the modern
technical word of course is energy, but we may here continue
to use the ambiguous but more forcible popular *“foree’’),
which it is desired to transmit in order to effect a given pur-
pose. Truistically, the effectiveness of words depends, like
that of all other tools, upon the skill] and strength and endur-
ance of the user (actua]ly upon his whole personality; cf.
§140e), and also upon the personality of the receiver. Every-
body except infants and marked defectives uses words—and
the infant really uses the primitive words (One ejaculations,
or cries), and makes up by emphasis some of what his words
lack in positiveness. | The business man carries on much of
his business with words—often all of it, ina direct sense.
Bullets and clubs are obviously very crude tools for the ex-
ercise of force, as they are under very poor contro] and give
very uncertain results. The truth of that is rather well
recognized, as is proved by the fact that people who wish to
seem intelligent or even barely civilized invariably try to
show that the other side started the use of ““brute’’ force—
i. e., poorly directed force. Of course, if militaristic persons

§52e VIl One

of such inferior mentality start using ‘‘brute’’ force they
thereby definitely indicate that they are incapable of very
well understanding or using more efficient forces, and intelli-
gent people have to give them a sufficient dose of the
sort of force they do understand (§114c). A person who
is militaristic in ““private’’ life—in affairs between individ-
uals rather than between societies and governments—is con-
ventionally called a blackguard or bully. Militarism is
merely wholesale blackguardism or bullying—and still exists
simply because it is a little harder to see the nature of a
reaction between many scattered people than it is to see the
nature of the same reaction between a few close together
**private’’ people, so that some persons of a low grade of
intelligence fail to see its blackguard character.

f. But ultimately words are a tool—a means ;—funda-
mentally a relationship, just as ““force’’ is ultimately a rela-
tionship (888, etc.). Because they are so useful, we are
prone to mistake words for the actualities to which they
point us or join us. That is word idolatry—a mistaking of
formulas, ““systems,’’ creeds, dogmas, books, for the One,
which is as silly as bowing down to and being afraid of a
golden calf as such—and a good deal more prevalent.

g. And finally, we may note that if we begin to state
our observations of words in detail, we have the collection of
conclusions that is called rhetoric. I give a minor example :-
Adjectives and adverbs are observably not very definitely
anv one of the three kinds of words; they are rather vaguely
Many words which supply some of the dots after This....
Hence, because of that vagueness, when they are used they
subtract from the forcefulness or clear simplicity of what is
meant. Therefore, where force and rough-clarity is desired
adjectives and adverbs should be at a minimum. But where
explicitness and considerable accuracy is desirable—where
we have to be definite about some of the dots: display a
keener judgment,—adjectives and adverbs (and parenthetical
phrases somewhat equivalent) have to be used to some extent.

h. Rhetoric is commonly called an art, or an empirical
science—meaning that no definite relationships or unity be-
tween the observed facts of it was easily perceptible. We
now see that the statement of the details of a valid logic be-
comes a connected, rational science that includes rhetoric.
Hence, the argument unifies logic and rhetoric; and the
facts of rhetoric serve as observations that verify the forego-
ing description of logic. A definitely scientific treatise on
rhetoric is omitted at this point. It is a historical
fact that centuries ago the name for general or unified know-
ledge was rhetoric or grammar. Apparently, men rather
consciously recognized then that in the mechanics of lang-
uage lay the solution of their puzzles. But the rhetoricians
failed to clarify the puzzles, started exploiting and became
idolaters of words, and fell into such disrepute that conven-
tional “‘rhetoric’’ is still tainted with it, and their more hon-
est successors were known by a new name:-_ philosophers.

OC

CHAPTER VIII.

§53. a. In this chapteris discussed a mechanical model
of the forms of language. This model is a so-called single
surface ring, including its infinitely numerous variations from
what we may consider its regular form. This model is
capable of being directly used as the model, or mechanical]
representation, of everything (S63i, Part Two). In_ this
chapter we confine ourselves to such few simple facts as are
needed to givea brief but rigorous description of the different
possible sorts of language and-or space (and time; cf. 8150).

b. Iam unable to find any full mathematical treatment

Mechanical model of language.

46

UNIVERSE

of our single surface ring, although | remember seeing &
statement that there was such a treatment. I have not gone
very far into the investigation of the figure—just far enough
to see the possibilities of unlimited application of the model,
which has been a geometrical curiosity for years, and is nee
mentioned in the usual text, or ‘Encyclopaedia Brittanica.
A good popular description of single surface rings is given by
Hering in ‘‘Scientific American,’’ Feb. 21, 1914. He also
gives a preliminary mathematical investigation of those rings
and some additional interesting facts in another article ( Se.
Am. Supplement,’’ Dec. 21, 1918, reprinted from Jour.
Franklin Inst.,’’ Aug., Nov., 1918).

S54. a. The best way to comprehend this single surface
model is to make a rough one—which can be done in a min-
ute. It is such a surprising figure on first acquaintance that
only the actual model is likely to be easily intelligible. Take
a strip of paper (say) nearly a foot long and about an inch
wide. Lay flat. The strip has two surfaces (neglecting now
its thickness, and the conse-
quent very narrow surfaces
of the two side edges and
two end edges), which we
may term surface A and sur-
face B. Hold one end of the strip flat, and lift the other
end and turn it—twist it-—over (around 180°), so that sur-
face A is up at one end and B upat the other, with the strip
twisted a half turn, as shown roughly in Fig. 54a. Then,
without further twisting the ends relatively to each other,
bring the two ends together to form a ring, and fasten the
ends together (preferably with glue; or with a pin). It is
then a rough single surface ring (unsymmetrical or warped
in some respects, as we shall see). A picture of a symmet-
rical ring (with appreciable thickness) is shown in Fig. 63c.

b. If you place a finger on any part of the surface, and
move it all around the surface, touching the surface, it will
then be on the surface that was originally opposed to the
surface you started on, although your finger never left the
continuous surface. I. e., if you started on surface A, after
your finger moves all around the ring it will be on surface B,
which is now a surface continuous with A, and not. structur-
ally opposite. The reason for that is of course that the 180°
twist gradually turns the finger onto the ‘‘other side,’’ and
the twist also permits the surfaces to be continuous when
fastened into a ring and the thickness neglected.

c. We may note some preliminary properties:- If with
a knife or scissors the ring be split in two in the direction of
its length (i. e., the original strip, if it had been flat, as in
Fig. 54c, and not in a ring, would be cut along the dotted
line), then there results
a single ring; but this
new ring has a 360°
twist in it (a double
twist), and has two sur-
faces, and has twice the

| | _ length around. Then,
if that ring be similarly split, two rings result, interlinked or

beknotted with each other, and each with the same double
twist and length around as the double-twisted ring. All
subsequent splittings result in adding one more interlinked
ring of the same length and the same double twist. But, if
the single surface ring has an edge cut off (not ‘splitting’ the
ring so that the ends of the dotted line in Fig. 54c would
come together if the strip had been in a ring), and we kee

on cutting around (twice) until we come to the place a
started from, a narrower single surface ring than the original
is left, interlinked with a double surface ring of See th

length, which is the edge that is cut off. :

Fig. 54a,

ZG.

Fig. 54c,

47 UNIVERSE

d. Let us now tentatively agree that a single surface
ring is a symbol of language, and hence a symbol of the uni-
verse. Or, we may call a symbol a model. Let us agree
that one surface of the original strip, say surface A, repre-
sents the One; and that surface B represents the Many.
And let us consider that the thickness of the ring is negligible
(for the time being), and that the ring joins together at or
in or as a geometrical line, instead of our having to lap
the ends over each other in order to glue or pin them con-
veniently. I. e., let one end of the original untwisted strip
as shown in Fig. 54c be ZI, and the other end I’Z’; then,
when we make the ring, Z joins to Z, and I to 1’, and we
have the single line ZI for a joint—it coinciding with ZT’.
Finally, let us agree that the 180° twist represents relation-
ship. It then at once follows as truistic that neither surface
is, or ‘‘defines,’’ the ring, nor is the 180° twist the ring. But
the three together—Many surface, One surface, relationship
twist——completely define or express the ring.

e. In this paragraph I digress slightly from the direct
argument and show the nature of the infinite regress, and
also of a “‘symbol.’’ I said that the three parts completely
define or express the ring. Yet the three together are ob-
viously not really the ring. The ring itself is the actual
thing between the surface A and surface B, which thing is
twisted and is not the twist, and which we are taking now to
be of negligible thickness. | We might say that the ring is
what or that which is between the two defined surfaces: the
geometrical surfaces are merely the limits of the ring, and
‘describe’ or de-fine it. In the same way, the universe is
what is described by our words. But if we are asked to state
verbally what that ‘what’ is, then all we can do is to begin
to divide the ring up and define it as the collection of parts
which are then given by surfaces which are closer and closer
to coinciding, and to being pure geometrical surfaces of zero
thickness. But sero thickness is not positive language, as
we agreed before; it is mysticism (also, that attempt to say
‘what,’ may be observed to be truistically circular language
or logic). Hence, we can not, with positive language in our
finite lives, go absolutely to zero language and name all the
zero parts of the ring. We keep going closer and closer, in
infinite regress, towards that zero thickness, or really exact
quantitative intelligible meaning. And the symbols are those
Many steps, which use time and _ space. And obviously,
although all attempts to use language wil] clearly be of that
eternally formally self-contradictory nature (as a truism; be-
cause the language formally and finitely is xot the thing it
describes), the use of our concrete model gives us at once
the conclusion that we know what we mean, even with that
verbal regress which we can not actually finish. We know
about the ring by looking at it, observing it: we experience
its ‘existence’ (cf. §22); or really prove it (cf. §35) by see-
ing it. Ina few words here I describe the ring—symbolize
it, or point to it intedligibly, and you know the ring—and I do
that without giving the infinite words of the regress. [n-
stead of using an ‘‘infinite number’’ of words I have actually
used about 800—and you not only ‘‘know’’ the ring in gen-
eral, but you have already seen a number of related things.

§55. a. When we take the surface B of the ring as
representing the Many, then we have arbitrarily agreed that
we shall divide it into parts, or the Many, and that each
part may be given a name—and must have a definite and
positive name when referred to. We may agree that instead
of naming the parts as various This’s and That’s, we can
give them the general sort of naming called numbering.
Suppose we divide surface B into parts by lines across it,
parallel to ZI (Fig. 54c). Then obviously each number may
be, conventionally, one of two things:- (1) it may be the

One VIII §é56c

name of one of those lines; or (2) it may be the name
of the part of surface B between one really geometrical or
zero line and the next.

b. Usually, the mathematicians and logicians seem to
mean that a number (and by implication, azy name-—but
they probably would not acknowledge the implication) refers
simply to one of those zero dividing lines—to a dividing
(which is actually zero; and *‘abstract’’), and not to what is
considered divided), In that case it is obvious that regard-
less of how many actual or positive numbers we used innam-
ing all the parts of the Many (of B), always there would be
the spaces left between those imaginary geometrical or inef-
fable zero lines or numbers, which spaces were the actual
things to be indicated. Inshort, by that rather conventional
practice, we have to name or number to a read infinity in or-
der to get that surface B actually verbally named; and a real
infinity here obviously contradicts the nature of that conven-
tional numbering or Many—for real infinity means continu-
ous. Also, it is further obvious that this more conventional
way of naming or numbering the Many results in what is
practically an infinite regress (see §58d for the details, etc.).

c. If we take the second view—that the name or num-
ber refers to the space between one line and the next (e. g.,
that 2 means the part of B between say Z,]; and Zel2),—it is
again obvious that there is nothing whatever which determines
or fixes how long (kow much) that space is, or should be; nor
how long the surface B (i. e., the whole of the Many) is.
I. e., if the model ring is the universe, there is positively
nothing outside it, which serves as a standard or as a meas-
ure to determine the length of surface B (or its width, pro-
vided we divided B in other ways than by those parallel
lines). Consequently, it is glaringly obvious that there is
absolutely nothing which determines fundamentally what—
how much—a unit of the Many is. We take such a unit ar-
bitrarily, making it convenient. Also, it is equally obviously
a truism that there is absolutely no way of verbally stating
positively how much the universe is—of giving it positive
““boundaries’’ (we see the nature of its ‘‘boundaries’’ in Part
Two; Index, ““Difference surface’’). | For time and space
obviously do not apply to the whole universe or to the whole
model of it. Time and space are simply the arbitrary con-
ventions we use in dividing upthe surface B:- for obviously,
we determined Z]), Zele...Znln..., by saying ‘the space or
length between,’ and tacitly took it that we required time
to go over the space (or to take the parts in a one by one
order, if we look at it that way). It therefore again follows
by this second point of view that we may name a part of the
ring anything we please (call it any measure); and that there
is an infinite regress of naming. There can be no exact
science for the simple reason that ultimately there is nothing
which serves as a fixed standard or “‘center’’ by which we
may judge any exactness. As soon as we have this concrete
model before our eyes it is fairly easy to see directly that
those things are true.

§56. a. When we take the surface Aas the One—as
God the Father, or monistically,—it is obvious that we con-
sider it undivided, or as being a whole, and thus take it into
our perceptions or consciousness at once—at one time. Itis
one surface; a child can conceive or perceive that—he does,
in fact, and does it before he is able to divide it into the
Many, as we saw when observing a child count (§26),

b. This One surface as a model of the universe or One
is characterized chiefly by its simplicity (i. e., familiarity),
obviousness, and total lack of definiteness, “positiveness,’ and
properties. It simply is continuous, or One, or the whole.

c. Possibly the most important point of view to be taken
of the observable fact that the One surface as a model has

§56c VIII One

absolutely no properties in any positive or definite sense, is
that the One is not determined or bounded in any way.
That is obviously a truism, and it clearly implies that time
and space does-do not apply to the One. There are no paris
of the One, considered apart (spacially **separated’’) from
the other parts, and hence comparable with them, the com-
parison being fundamentally a ‘‘property.’’

857. a. Relationship words are represented by the 180°
twist. Obviously it is the existence of such a continuous
twist that maintains the ring as a continuous surface. We
have seen (§28h) that the chief characteristic of relationship
is that all relationship is that of identity. That may be
clearly seen from our model:- Suppose we hang the ring
over (say) the left forefinger held horizontally, placing the
left thumb on the ‘upper’ surface of the ring; and then
pull the ring so that it slips around between the finger and
thumb. ‘Both’ surfaces finally rub on the thumb, without
the thumb’s changing its space location: the 180° twist or
relationship simply travels in the down-hanging part of the
ring. The thumb obviously always bears identically the same
relationship to the total form of the ring, although it rubs
all of it in turn. (I. e., it does, assuming that the ring
represents the universe with nothing outside, which is the
same as assuming that the actual model ring is perfectly
homogeneous and flexible and acted upon by steady forces,
thus making it always hang in a constant loop—none of
which is true of the actual paper ring. )

b. It is to be emphasized that the last paragraph tacitly
assumed that the ring was ‘‘symmetrical’’—which means
ultimately that space and time, as used to name its Many
aspect was unchanging (or agreed with the “‘space’’ of or-
dinary geometry, called Euclidian). © When that space and
time is not considered Euclidian, we have other aspects of
relationship (§§$60-1, 66). We may observe here that ‘sym-
metrical,’ if applied to the One, or to the ring considered as
a One and without reference to the arbitrary Many naming
of surface B, meaus just the same as ‘unsymmetrical.’ That
is obviously true, from this truism:- if the ring, as a total
universe or whole, hangs from the forefinger, then except for
its own arbitrary Many parts, there is nothing whatever by
which to determine or to state whether it is ‘““symmetrica]’’
or not (whether its ‘“space’’—which in that One aspect is not
‘‘ased’’ at all-—is ‘‘straight”’ [i. e., Euclidian], or variously
“‘curved’’ or “‘warped’’ [i. e., non-Euclidian]; cf. §38);
hence, the twist then is always merely the whole 180° twist
(regardless of whether it be named 180° or not), and hence
is always as such absolutely identical as the same relationship
regardless of any sliding of the ring on the finger. We shall
see (beginning at $60) that those very simple considerations
(they are merely truisms, which are easily seen by observing
the model—as a mnemonic device), are fundamentally the
complete solutions of the modern verbal puzzles about non-
Euclidian space, whether parallels meet at infinity, 4-dimen-
sion or n-dimension space, and the theory of relativity. So
this paragraph, obvious and trivial as it is just of itself, is
important. For some authoritative thinkers get their minds
into a soft foggy daze contemplating those puzzles—and all
the “‘evils’’ of the world result from such states of mind.

858. a. Taking the ring as a whole, and as represent-
ing the three sorts of words, wesee first that our three forms
of words actually are completely symbolized. The One and
the Many are formally contradictory in that the first is not
formally separated into parts and the second is. But the
ring shows that the two are really the samc, and inseparably
continuous—that continuity being achieved by the identical
relationship or twist.

b. The next important thing is to note that it would be

UNIVERSE 48

impossible positively to express or symbolize a meaning (any
whole) unless we use some sort of arbitrary contrast (or a
self-contradiction—such as is given by considering B split
into Many parts) and subsequent identification of the con-
trast by a **relationship.’’ The very nature of the matter
is a truism, as we have seen before in several ways, and now
have before our eyes in a concrete model. So a verbal repe-
tition is unnecessary. Many similar models and
many valid languages can be made, as is shown in detai] in
this chapter. The foregoing is merely a statement of the
essential characteristic of all those models and languages.
And to repeat emphatically, the foregoing about contradic-
tion and subsequent identification refers to a posztive lang-
uage. Itis not essential that we use posztzve language: cows
do not, having merely a few One vocal ejaculations, and
cows therefore do not have our verbal puzzles. But cows
pay for that advantageous immunity by failing to have a very
useful, or ““controllable,’’ language tool.

ec. And the final rather important thing we can see at
once from the whole model is a concrete illustration of the
sole logical rule that it is always self-contradictory nonsense
to confuse one sort of word with another sort (that confusion
being always equivalent to saying A=A and A is not=A).
We see the explicit details of that general rule, in terms of
our model, in the remainder of this section. A further ex-
tension of the rule, in details from other points of view, is
given in subsequent sections (§§59-66) about space and time
—that extension amounting to the general principles of
measurement or judgment that are in practice used by all
people in all their activity or living, regardless of whether
they are conscious of it or not.

d. If we make aring of the strip in Fig. 54c we may
consider that ZI is the geometrical line from which we begin
to name or number the universe, and Z’l’ the line limiting
the other end. By usual conventions, ZI is therefore 0, and
ZT’ is ©. Obviously, if we follow more or less conventional
mathematics and say that the line at the end of a space (or
part) is the “‘number’’ (§55b), then ZI is not a number, but
is the beginning or limit of the first number, 1, of which
Zil, (and not ZI) would be the name or number. __In brief,
ZI is a line not in the universe (the model universe), in the
same sense that Zh, etc., are zn it. Consequently, even if
we are going to agree to name an abstraction such as a zero
line a number (it can be validly done; but usually itis inad-
visable; doing so gcts us into other puzzles mentioned in
par. f), it is impossible to say that ZI or 0 is a number (or
that its coincident line ZI’ or © isa number) in the same
sense that Zi],, Zala, are numbers.

e. The simplest way to consider ZI is to take it posi-
tively that a number or name actually applies tothe part that
is in the space between the lines. That actual part is ab-
stracted in the mathematicians’ idea that a number names
just the line. The truth of the matter obviously is that if I
say just ‘2--38—=5,’ the sentence of itself is explicitly utterly
meaningless; and hence nobody can have the remotest idea
of whether it is true or untrue. In practice, we consider
that 2 and 3 and 5 imply “‘things.’’ Therefore, if we act-
ually supply what mathematics abstracts (ef. next para-
graph) then each actual number must apply to a part of the
ring, and it is glaringly obvious that 0 (or ZJ) is not a num-
ber, there being no part or space on the ring to which it
applies. In precisely the same way, regardless of any other
consideration as to “‘numbers,’’ Z'I’ or © is also nota num-
ber, but the upper limit of numbers. The actual unit space
or part that just ‘precedes’ Z’J’ obviously has a name that is
indefinitely large, but which, if we are rigorously explicit in
speech can not be © or any fixed ‘“last number.’’

49 UNIVERSE

f. As the mathematicians actually imply the space be-
tween lines as being what it is the numbers name, regardless
of whether they say abstractly that a line—a zero part—is a
number, we need not use time and attention showing and
seeing in mathematically abstract language that © or ZI’ is
also, by such language, truistically not a number. Ttis
broadly obvious that it could readily be done, by considering
that there is positively nothing which may be used as a
standard showing how many numbers there are in the uni-
verse, or in our model of it (also, see par. d).

g. When we explicitly consider that the strip in Fig.
54c¢ is made into a ring, then obviously ZI and Z’I’ are co-
incident as ZI, the line-joint—butt-joint—of the ring; or 0
and © are coincident, and the joint may be called the gero-
infinity line. Clearly, therefore, it makes no difference in
which direction we name or number when we sum up and be-
gin dealing with the One; or, in an absolute sense ‘‘down’’
and “‘up,’’ etc., are identical. (That matter of direction
repeatedly comes up hereafter; see especially 899b. The
essential point of it is that time and space are ‘direction,’
and are arbitrary and simply disappear from the One or real
meaning, just as that line which is the ‘beginning’ and the
‘end’ of time and space or direction has really disappeared
in our model as a zero geometrical abstraction. ) Also,
Oand © are obviously logically identical—their ‘‘lines’’ co-
incide. Jf we are on the Many surface of the ring, and pass
over that zero-infinity line, going in either direction, we are
then on the One surface; and vice versa. I. e., if at any
time in language we introduce a O or an %®, or any of their
equivalents, we have by so doing shifted from the Many to
the One, or vice versa.

h. This paragraph is of slight practical importance, and
hence is condensed so much as to be hard to see:
The relationship words are obviously as asum total reducible
to Land T; i. e., the 180° twist is itself actually a change
in direction (i. e., in space during a time). That is nothing
but an implication of our second member, M(varying with)
L*T~?;- for that member says that M or the Many changes
as we pass over space during time. Consequently, it is ob-
vious that if we speak of that time or space as being a Many
part of the whole One (if we make a relationship word into
a Many word or into a One word), that change implies that
we have tacitly assumed the whole of the twist before we thus
change the form, and hence have formally passed over the
zero-infinity line by assumption. In short, it introduces a 0
oran ©, andif that is not provided for by the context, 4
logical contradiction results. Hence, we may validly say
that we need only one rule in order to be absolutely consist-
ent logically :- do not introducea Ooran © without balanc-
ing the formal contradiction introduced (ef. §43).

i. The nature of the error of confusing relationship
words with others may be observed directly from our ring:-
Suppose that it be held, hanging down, with the One or A
surface up. Then the upper loop of the ring may be delib-
erately turned over on the finger (through 180°) so that loc-
ally at the top the Many or B surface-is now up. We may
call that process:- ‘going over the edge of the ring.’
Sometimes that additional twist put in the top loop of the act-
ual paper ring will simply ‘run’ itself out through the bottom
loop—ttaveling down through each side of the ring and
‘mutually cancelling’ itself at the bottom. But unless the
paper is rather elastic, that local turn-over at the top puts
in a twist of 180° on one side of the upper loop of the ring,
and a twist of 180° in the opposite sense on the other side—a
total additional twist for the whole ring of 360° (‘‘arithmeti-
cally’? it is 360°). And it is directly observable that the
whole effect, relative to getting onto the opposite surface

One Vill §59a

(getting from the One to the Many), is equivalent to sliding
the whole ring around once (as in 857a), bringing in the
original 180° relationship; for sliding the whole ring around
is 360° (or corresponds to the universe or ©—or to 0 and
0°). Now, going over the edge of the ring, to get from one
sort of words to another, is obviously equivalent to using a
relationship word as a Many word, or as a One word (or, to
put it negatively:- going over the edge ignores relationship).
And doing so, as we have seen, is equivalent logically to
introducing the whole relationship or 180° twist—or to pass-
ing once over the zero-infinity line. Hence, it is directly
obvious that all relationship is identical—is that ‘twist.’

j. It is further obvious from our ring that all valid logie
is circular logie—meaning specifically that it is continuous
logic, or expression that in the end comes back and closes
with itself—‘‘checks up,’’ verifies with itself, concludes
with the truisms from which it formally started. We may
see directly from the model that the reason for all that is
that all valid reasoning must have a complete statement of
relationship, or a relationship which goes all around the ring
in order to go continuously from the One to the Many, or
vice versa. Only such a complete relationship is explicitly
a relationship of identity (as we saw, from a somewhat dif-
ferent point of view, in §57b). If we go over the edge of
the ring we clearly have not explicitly put in a complete rela-
tionship—-which was in the last paragraph emphasized by
the concrete fact that a two-sided contradictory twist was
thus put into the ring. If we go over the edge, we say
A=A (that A is, say, a Many unit), and then simultaneously
(on the other surface) we say A is not—=A (that A isthe One);
obviously, A is’ ultimately the One, but the way to get it ex-
pressed as the One is not to talk fast and loose that way,
but to follow our agreements and go through all time and
space, identifying it with ad/ others of the Many—that being
equivalent to sliding the ring around. Get-rich-quick schemes
won’t really work, even with mere words.

k. All that of course is rather confusing at first. The
model helps to make it conciete, and gradually clears up the
confusion. The actual difficulty lies in the fact that although
time and space are primarily used to express relationship,
we often use them as the other two sorts without noticing
the differences. I merely show how the change from one
form to another must be explicitly made. We can acquire
such conscious skill in the use of words only gradually: for
familiar affairs we instinctively have that skill, but we get
corfused in less familiar affairs—to the extent of agnosticism.

l. The model, besides serving to help us consciously
avoid the customary confusions of the three sorts of words,
gives a clear insight into the solution of What is real? or
What is truth? Taking it in terms of the Trinity, we see at
once that neither (1) the God the Father or One surface A,
nor (2) God the Sons or Many surface B, nor yet (3) the
God the Holy Ghost or relationship twist, is itself (regarded
separately) the ring or ‘‘reality.’’ | Nor is any combination
of any two of those the ring or ‘“truth,’’ or the universe.
Obviously, only the three together are real or true. Conse-
quently, the valid or dynamic logic (S49j1) which takes it
that each part, as it comes up, is real, simply means that one
part, if it is intelligible, implies the other two. Hence, the
dynamic or everyday logic is shown to be ultimately true.

859. a. We may now see, by this model, just why there
are three dimensions of space, and not some other number
of dimensions. Our final conclusion is going to be this
simple one:- we have devised (invented; agreed upon—per-
haps mostly unconsciously in the past) for everyday use the
language with the fewest possible forms or dimensions that

§59a VIII One

could still be positive or explicit; three-dimension space
contains the fewest number of dimensions out of the infinite
regress L®7'~@” that oould explicitly be so. In get-
ting that conclusion we shall see that an unlimited series of
other sorts of languages is possible (cf. §38a; and as indi-
cated before, English, French, etc., are ‘ different’’ lang-
uages merely in having somewbat different vocabularies;
formally or logically they are the same). This investigation
of the number of dimensions of space is obviously a quantita-
tive one. ‘There is no absolute necessity about using three
dimensions: there is no absolute necessity that we use lang-
uage, Or any space. Three dimensions are ‘‘necessary”’
only jf we are to talk in the easiest, shortest, or ‘‘simplest’’
way. It is a fundamental law that we do act in the path of
least resistance (with ultimate accuracy :- in the path of zo
resistance; §$§98m, 104). Consequently, acting according
to that law with more or less consciousness or explicitness,
everybody takes it for granted that we are going to use the
simplest language. So the reader need not fear that I] am
going to inflict any new dimensions of space and-or time on
him. [am going to show that those who try to do it, and
those who try to assert the “‘reality’’ of other kinds of space
[or time] (such as the ‘“two’’ non-Euclidian spaces, and the
variable space of the relativitists), are implying different
languages—and are usually failing to completely formulate
and use those other languages, but merely indicate implicitly
their possibility. So of course, as a truism, their different
sorts of space and time are not intelligible when expressed
in ordinary terms of everyday language: such spaces logic-
ally contradict that everyday language (assert that they be-
long in other, different languages). In order really
to understand our language, and use it without making verb-
al puzzles for ourselves, we need to understand how to make
those other, different languages. At the same time we thus
protect ourselves from ever taking seriously, or being puz-
zled by, the introduction into or language of such contra-
dictions of it, when taken as belonging in our language, as
4-dimension space, ete., which by no means whatever ex-
press any idea in our language. We are not familiar with
those other languages, of course; so my description of them
will truistically be a bit novel and strange—even to the
mathematicians whose familiarity extends mostly to views
that aren’t so. Unless the reader is a professional scientist,
philosopher, or mathematician, or intends to become one, he
does not need to grasp especially well the details of the rest
of this chapter. If he merely reads it casually he can get
all that interests him.

b. The model ring is, as a model, considered to be a
standard universe; i. e., we use it as a universe, neglecting
the remainder of the universe; it is, so to speak, abstracted
from everything else, and is, in that abstract condition, for
the moment, the whole universe logically. Consequently,
every standard universe is obviously an abstraction. When
we are talking, and using the valid dynamie logic, consider-
ing each sort of word temporarily real, that reality is an
abstraction—for the whole reality comes only of actually sup-
plying the other two forms. Hence, we see that any use of
language, or of any sort of symbol or model, involves a tacit
temporary abstraction. That is equivalent merely to the
quite obvious fact that we can not say everything at once. Con-
sequently, we shall carry the idea abstraction, with reference
to our model, to the end, and see what we get. After that,
we add everything to it, and get surprising conclusions.

ce. We have been considering the ring to be of negligible
thickness. If it has zero thickness obviously the two
surfaces are coincident (as well as being continuous). If the
surfaces are thus absolutely coincident, it is obviously verbally

50

UNIVERSE

contradictory (or nonsense) to say that there are two sides.
But the fact is that it is nonsense to say that there is any
such thing as a geometrical surface; for such a surface 15
what is left of (say) a cube when the cube is wholly removed ;
obviously, nothing is left. Consequently, it is obviously sen-
sible (as the cancellation of two nonsenses) to say that there
is an upper surface A and a lower surface B of the ring when
it is an abstract geometrical surface. Please keep
those apparent trivialities slightly in mind for a moment.

d. This model ring has been tacitly taken to have some
breadth. The one we made was casually said to be about an
inch wide (§54a). It is obvious that the 180° twist (the es-
sential relationship that establishes ultimate continuity of
the two surfaces) requires that the tacitly accepted breadth
be warped some. Now suppose that we make the ring still
more abstract than the mere geometrical surface, and thus
take it to be a dine, without that breadth. We may consider
that line to have the surfaces A and B, and to have the 180°
twist (and the line in taking that twist would obviously have
no warp). It clearly is formally explicit and cancelling of
zeros, to have that line with two surfaces, and hence be thus
“twistable’: see last paragraph. |

e. Therefore, we now have it, in considerable abstrac-
tion, that the universe may be completely represented, in a
positive way, by a point, of no dimensions, (1) moving in a
line, and (2) turning or revolving so as to form a closed ring,
and at the same time while describing its closed path, (3) ro-
tating or twisting 180°, so that its original side A joins tn
JSormal continuity the originally opposite side B. In that
somewhat abstract model, obviously we need make no real
demands, or have any real necessities, as to time and space:-
for the length or space of the point is zero, non-existent, or
not real; the /ength or space of the closed path may be taken
as zero, and the ¢éme of that revolution hence zero; and then
obviously as a further truism the rotation will require zero
space and time. In short, making the closed path of no length,
the ring has become a completely abstract, or zero, point—
although still formally or logically a ring, and hence repre-
senting formally the three parts of the Trinity. The model
contains no *‘actual quantity’’ of space and time; but it does
contain the forms of space and time, as we see in the next
paragraph. It is obvious that our model, and with it the
formal requirements of language, is here reduced to the very
“lowest terms.”’ Any further reduction in the form will
destroy formal language and give some incomplete language
described in §62c. (We have already subtracted the total
substance, or Many actuality—and also the One reality, in
our everyday usage of considering the One ‘infinite’, al-
though in a Buddhistic sense of zero reality, and also obvi-
ously in strict logical technicality, One reality remains. )

f. (1) It is obvious that as the point moves in the zero line
path it formally does one thing (i. e., that doing or moving in
a line constitutes one dimension’? of ‘“space’’—really con-
stitutes one dimension’’ or ‘one formal part’ of the One,
or of whole reality or the complete ring {see $581], or of be-
ing, or existence). (2) When it revolves so as to close on its
path and make the path continuous or the One it formally
does the second thing (and that revolving
more dimension’’ of ‘

constitutes one
nore space,’’ giving now ‘‘two dimen-
sions.”’ (3) And when it rotates or twists so as to relate those
first two contradictory forms, it does the third, and obviously
last, formally necessary thing (and that is one more “*dimen-
sion,’’ making finally ‘‘three dimensions’ ’), Obvi-
ously, no fewer forms will serve. Equally clearly, if any
other is added we have taken at least one step on the infinite
regress of possible languages (§51h), and we then have not
our everyday language, but have a language that is at least

51 UNIVERSE

‘duplicate,’ and hence formally different from ours. Those
three forms are the “‘three dimensions of space’’ (for obvi-
ously each form was a needed sort of ““motion’’ in a hence
formally different aspect of ‘“space’’—i. e., motion and space
are formally or logically synonyms). Clearly those three
constitute the lowest practical and still positive reduction of
the infinite regress ML°7T~°, where M is the “‘thing’’ or
that point. The whole of Part Two may be considered (al-
though explicitly it is nothing of the sort) to be a description
of a point moving in a closed path in that way (§§98m, 104).

g. In no casein the last two paragraphs need the formal
model occupy actual “‘space,’’ in onr everyday usage of
space. We have actually been using the Buddhistic ‘nega-
tive’ form of zero-space: for a primitive or original state-
ment, such a form is easier to grasp—and for that same
general reason or trnism, Buddhism historically preceded
Christianity, its equivalent in “‘infinite’’ or ‘positive’ terms,
by five centuries, it taking the race that long to grow the
few needed nerve connections. So we may now consider
the ring (which is still our zero point) to ‘depart’ from that
condition, and acquire some ‘room’? or space for the M (now
also become “‘actual’’) to move in. The only logical way
to get those zeros or abstractions into ‘positiveness,’ or into
the other aspect of the One (the infinity aspect) is to multi-
ply them by infinity. We then have a “‘solid’’ ring, still
indeterminate (i. e., ©) as to the measure of all the space,
but containing ““space’’ and time in usnal meaning—though
they are obviously merely the same verbal forms as before.
Or, the ring now has “‘real’’ length and breadth (and real
but negligible thickness—see §$63f for explicit consideration
of thickness), and we have the nsna] conventional but arbi-
trary space:- for obvionsly, in onr usnal convention of an
infinite One, we now have in our model that represents the
universe a ‘ length’’ (ete.) that is ‘‘infinite’’ (i. e., continv-
ous), and the three forms occnr jnst as before, in, or as,
3-dimension space—a _ trnism. That is the total
‘‘mystery’’ of the three dimensions of space. We are so in
the habit of using those briefest, simplest means of talking
tbat all parts of our language imply those three dimensions
or forms. So when we speak our language, it is a contra-
diction—utter verbal nonsense—to say that there is any
other number of dimensions: for such an assertion says that
“now another language will be talked while we still talk our
ordinary one.’’ It can be noted that as soon as I explicitly
made the ring of no thickness (of two dimensions) in par. c,
I abandoned onr ordinary language, and was talking nonsense
with reference to our langnage and said so (even though the
language I was using is the language of ‘‘plane’’ geometry,
and quite conventional). And when I reduced to zero di-
mensions I was very nonsensical. So 1 had to balance or
pair off those contradictions to our everyday language, and
do it explicitly to be intelligible; and that obviously consisted
of really stating our forms (which are the real ‘three dimen-
sions’’), and thus actually talking of three forms of zero
space—or, I reversed language into Buddhism, that being
the reverse of the truism mentioned above. Hence,
with those evident truisms, the foregoing proof of the exist-
ence and meaning of three dimensions is quite rigorous.
That proof is, 1 think, the hardest thing to state and under-
stand, in this book. That is becanse it is so obvions. Or-
dinarily, we simply say that we ‘‘see’’ that we have to use
three dimensions to talk abont things definitely. | And that
is substantially all I have said above—only | stated it in de-
tail from a different point of view, so that it was possible to
see definitely that the matter of dimensions was simply get-
ting the fewest parts in a language machine, just as there are
three parts in the ‘‘simplest’’ machine, the lever:- load,

One VILL §60c

power, fulcrum. Also, the foregoing argument is munch
easier to see in §62c, where concrete examples are given of
languages having other than three dimensions.

S60. a. When we start to describe the universe, we
take it that there is something (whatever it is) to talk about
(§22). When we similarly ‘assume’ (i. e., agree to invent)
our ring model, obviously we in the same way, all in a lump
take the three sorts of words as being definitely bound to-
gether. I introduced no complications, but took the barest
agreements:- a contradictory One and Many reconciled by
a single or ‘identical’ relationship or invariable twist. | We
saw in §57b that in absolute or One meaning (taking the ring
as a whole, as we must do to get any final intelligible mean-
ing) that relationship between the One and the Many conld
be only of one sort, regardless of whether the ring was sym-
metrical or asymmetrical. (That is merely a special case of
the principle that the One is ineffable.) We also agreed (in
§57) that we would consider the actual ring to be perfectly
symmetrical, as the means of getting our ordinary language.
In this section we see the formal changes in language if we
regard the model as being unsymmetrical in various ways.
There are an indefinite number of quantitative ways in which
it can be asymmetrical, each of which gives a different formal
language, although every such langnage means the same as
a whole. Those changes in form are conventionally said to
be different sorts of ““space’’—‘“‘eurved’’ or non-Euclidian.

b. We considered the ring to be symmetrical because
that gave the simplest, average sort of language; i. e.,if we
take any part of the ring, or unit of the Many, such as
Zi];-Zel2, we may nameit 2,andthen—7f the ring stays sym-
metrical,—regardless of the relative position of 2 (regardless
of how we slip the ring around when hanging over the finger
and thus changing the place of 2—regardless of where 2 is
in the universe) that 2 remains formally or lingually the same;
its relationships or L and T, with respect to the whole ring
stay steady, or are average all the time formally; or the de-
gree of twist and warp does not change. But if the ring is not
considered symmetrical that part is obviously not warped in
an average way (so that it does not take a proportionally av-
erage share of the whole 180° twist); consequently, if we
write for 2 its full general name M(varying with)L?T ~, the
Land T of its name are always varying or varied Just in mere
form. The reader possibly can not yet grasp that condensed
statement—can not see Just what happens to language when
the form of the language, or what we have called relation-
ships or L and JT measures of units of the Many, (1) varies
all the time, or (2) departs or is varied from the average in
Euclidian space, and hence, fora given non-Euclidian space,
has a ‘steady curvature.’’ The relativitists make L and
T always vary—technically over all quantitative degrees of
non-Euclidian and the average Euclidian spaces (866). And
as neither the relativitists nor non-Euclidians grasp the ulti-
mate meaning of what they do to Zand T there is in exist-
ence considerable strange, weird, esoteric doctrine which
tends to have the same hypnotically benumbing effect npon
the brains of the authors and some of their hearers that the
logically precisely analogous weirdly nonsensical incantations
of ancient medicine men or priests had on themselves and
most of their hearers. Both tend to superstition—fear of
the fancied unknown. Such hypnotic deadening or fear in
some degree precludes seeing things as they are, and hence
prevents men from being as alive as possible. Soit is of value
to investigate those possible variations in language, espec-
ially as doing so further shows possibilities which may be of
some use. For those languages are not “‘wrong.”’

ec. Some mathematicians substantially claim that there
is no proof’’ that our ring can ever be symmetrical in any

§60c VIII One

portion; so that if we use Many words the same words (or
forms) because of such lack of proof, by the theory of proba-
bilities constantly mean something else, and that therefore
if we use relationship words there is no continuous identity
of relationship anywhere (i. e., in any finite space and time
——meaning that those mathematicians assert ignorance as to
the sum total of relationship). | Again such a general con-
densation is possibly not quite clear to the reader. The
statement is equivalent to the orthodox claim that there is
no ‘‘proof’’ of one of Euclid’s “‘axioms’’ or postulates (but
ought to be, if it is used):- Euclid defines parallel] lines as
straight lines which, being in the same plane and produced
indefinitely in both directions, do not meet. And the postu-
late, in common form, is:- through a given point not on a
straight line, one straight line, and but one, can be drawn
which is parallel to the given line [I give the proof of that
postulate in par. i]. The mathematicians say that in the ab-
sence of ‘‘proof’’ of that postulate, there are two general
sorts of possibilities:- (1) It can be assumed that every
straight line through the point [and in the same plane, of
course] will cut the other line. That gives Riemannian or
‘elliptic’? space-——Riemannian ““geometry”’ {or really a new
space language]. It is equivalent to saying that our bound-
aries Z,]:-Zele of 2’ vary in such a way as regards their
distance apart that the L (and T) between Z]; and Zel2 at
some point becomes absolutely zero—or any such word or
possibility of such word as 2 disappears: we shal] not exam-
ine the details of the new language that results; in general,
the Many word ‘2,’ or M in M(varying with)L?T ~, would
vary in a way not conceived in our average language. (2) Or,
it can be considered that two lines (including some angle
between themselves which can contain an infinite number of
other lines) can be drawn which are both ‘‘parallel’’ to the
given line, in that they do not meet it, so that those
two lines form the limits of the infinite number of other
lines lying between them that also do not cut’ the
given line. That is Lobatchevskian or “‘hyperbolic’’ space
and geometry. It says that in our ‘2’ or M represented by
Zy1\-Zele, Zelg may be two intersecting lines which do not
ever cut Z];, so that there are really an infinite number of
parts or Af’s all of which are named 2. Well; we can make
a language of that sort if we like; again I shall not go into
the details, but below we see the general implications as to
such new languages. The Euclidian or ordinary
geometry considers space as ‘‘flat’’ or “‘straight’’ or average
(i. e., there is one set of two parallel ZI’s which formally
fix the 2 with a steady or fixed or “‘straight’?’—i. e., undevi-
ating—space, or really form); the other two sorts have
‘‘curved’’ space—i. e., are two languages where the forms
or ways of naming depart or deviate from the average: one
on either side of the average. For a somewhat technical
orthodox account of such spaces see ““Ency. Brit.,’’ xi, 724
to 735 (in Art. “‘Geometry); or for a good popular account,
see ‘Science History of the Universe’? (New York, 1909),
viii, 143-52 (in the same volume is a more technical account
—pp. 230-36—by Keyser, aleading mathematician). Those
accounts are not really intelligible unless something be
added to them (as we shall see). Consequently the reader
need not worry if he has failed to understand the condensa-
tions of them which I made in the first part of this paragraph.
We shall now begin with the fundamental orthodox assertions
abont those curved spaces, and get at their real meaning.

d. The same Art. “‘Geometry’’ (pp. 730, 733) states
that there is an unreconciled controversy about space, it be-
ing shown substantially (on p. 730) that space is considered
(1) as the One, (2) as the Many (i. e., in the paragraph
‘*Axioms’’:- a space ““known only from experience’’—as

UNIVERSE 52

contrasted with ‘‘a priori’? or One space-—is obviously a
Many word), and (3) as relationship. [Tt therefore follows
that orthodox geometry would tend to mix the three forms of
space—not meeting the fundamental logical necessity of
distinguishing apart the three: it does rather mix them
in the article I am quoting from.] Then it is shown that a
valid geometry [or what we have been calling a valid logic
or language machine] is merely one that is self-consistent,
regardless of what arbitrary agreements are made. And two
general sorts of valid geometry are distinguished :- (1) ‘In
projective geometry any two straight lines in a plane inter-
sect, and the straight lines are closed series which return
into themselves, like the circumference of a circle’’ ligvecpca
*“straight’’ line is a string or series of points that have a
closed path: that is Riemannian or elliptic geometry ].
(2) “In descriptive geometry two straight lines in a plane
do not necessarily intersect, and a straight line is an
open series without beginning or end. Ordinary Euclid-
ian geometry is a descriptive geometry: it becomes a pro-
jective geometry when the so-called ‘points-at-infinity’ are
added.’’ [That is Lobatchevskian or hyperbolic geometry;
and it is more rigorous to say instead of that, that Euclidian
geometry is the average geometry that is the limit of (1) and
(2)—the geometry that lies just between the two. ]

e. We now come to the illuminating facts regarding
those orthodox sorts of geometries~—stil] quoting from the
same place:- Projective geometry is developed from “‘two
undefined fundamental ideas, namely, that of a ‘point’ and
that of a ‘straight line.’’’ | Descriptive geometry is devel-
oped from two undefined ““fundamental ideas, namely, of
points and segments.’’ <A ‘‘segment’’ is a part of astraight
line, the development of which into an [unlimited] straight
line can be provided for.

f. Itis obvious from an examination of those two orthodox
beginnings of formal language or ‘‘geometry,’’ that those
geometries start by taking (1) a typical One (i. e., taking a
line, which is considered and more or less described as a
continuous “‘idea’’ or whole), and (2) a typical Many (i. és;
a point). It is then obvious that the two are formally con-
tradictory; and that they are also two abstractions that
imply essentially (2) zero (a point is 0), and (1) infinity (a
line, as an indefinite series of points, is ©). Hence, rela-
tionship terms obviously (as a truism) must be explicitly
introduced in order to reconcile that forma] orthodox contra-
diction—which the orthodox theory does then vaguely intro-
duce, as space-passed-over-during-time. But then it is
obvious further, even to the orthodox theory, that in those
Oand © ‘‘fundamental ideas’’ there és nothing whatever posi-
tive (or explicitly agreed upon) by which we may say whether
space (during, or and, time) is a ‘steady’ term—an ‘identi-
eal’ term. So very clearly, consistently with itself, that
space is itself forced to take upon itself in addition to its rela-
tionship capacity, the further capacity of an explicit or positive
Many word (for obviously the formal or “‘fundamental’’
Many word " point’? was not positively a Many word, but
merely an ineffable word zero). Therefore, in such orthodox
geometry space (and time—time is always implied by space—
§150,—as I shall take for granted will be understood by the
reader) takes a double meaning, and when used in our average
language in one of those meanings (the Many meaning) must
take on variability (for bodies or units of the Many do vary),
while in the other meaning (the relationship meaning) it
would be steady, or ‘identical’ as a form in language. The
mathematicians perhaps see that in the actual, observable
world “‘space’’ as an M or a Many body does vary (1 do not
venture to say positively what, in their confusion, they do
see), At any rate, as there is orthodoxly no agreement (nor

53 UNIVERSE

really any essential necessity) to make space in its second
capacity as a relationship formally or verbally steady (except
that the sum total or One is always identical, so that steady
space is simpler: cf. §38a), the mathematicians let their space
(including both formal meanings, so far as I can judge from
what they say) vary, and as a result we have the two sorts
of non-Euclidian space (in addition to the average Euclidian
space lying as a limit between the two), in one of which the
unit of Lin a sense varies in one direction from the aver-
age, and in the other sort in the ‘opposite’ direction.
That of course would get them into difficulties with actual
M’s, which are cyclic, or vary about a mean in both direc-
tions: but the mathematicians do not goonand finish formu-
lating their languages, so apparently do not notice such
practical difficulties, Neither do IJ finish those new lang-
uages, as we have no present use for them; but I indicate
the general results of using them——some valuable.

g. There is obviously no logical reason why those two
different geometries or ‘‘space’’ should not be used if de-
sired. They are self-consistent—even with space implying
that duplex-meaning, one of which orthodox mathematics
fails to express definitely, so that it has an unreconciled con-
troversy. But there still remains one omission in the fore-
going statement of those orthodox geometries (I think that
orthodox mathematics vaguely supplies this one just as I do
below; but that duplex-meaning of its space confuses its
statements so much that it is not safe to make any definite
assertion as to what it does say):- that variation of L as yet
has nothing to fix its measure in any given language or geome-
try: i. e., L can be continually variable, as in relativity; or
its ‘“curvature’’ can be definite and steady for a given language.
The only possible way to “‘catch’’ those varying
languages and pin any one of them down so that we can use
it positively whenever we wish to talk among ourselves and
hence know that we are using at least approximately the
same sort of language (are all referring to the same sort of
space, that hence has approximately the same ““measure of
curvature’’), is to revert to our ordinary average Euclidian
space for a basis or standard or ‘center’ or “verbal potential’
of such measure. In that Euclidian language we arbitrarily
say that we will take (say) ourselves (we could take anything
else, but usually do not) as a standard universe, or a unit of
measure or quantity, as a sort of average, in spite of the fact
that we are not all in or at the same L (which introduces
minor quantitative error or inexact science). In
short, the non-Euclidian space, strictly as such, has no pos-
sible means of mutually indicating a quantity. And the logi-
cal truisms or reasons why we must revert to Euclidian space
in order actually to talk together, are these:- Euclidian space,
in terms of those infinite possible formal spaces that are
quantitatively different as to degree of curvature, is the space
whose radius is infinity, and whose curvature is hence zero;
consequently, we have a formal 0 and © to balance with
and cancel the 0 point and © line with which those spaces
formally orthodoxly started (par. e): the two nonsensical
abstractions are cancelled into sense by two opposite non-
senses, and we have ordinary space which omits including
in itself the Many sense, and requires that some definite
Many or quantity standard be used, there being no longer
any formal possibility of using the slidingscale. Therefore,
it follows that although an indefinite number of languages
are validly possible in terms of, or as, non-Euclidian space,
each of those languages, in order to become positive hive.
in order to have, say, any valid right to use our average lang-
vage word ‘‘curved,’’ as they all do, although the word then
in those languages has no such meaning as *“curved’’—that
being a truism), or in order to be anything other than a form-

One VIII 860i

ally valid mysticism absolutely incapable of explicit communi-
cation, must be translated into Euclidian space (ef. 866).

h. Because our standard quantities in Euclidian space
are arbitrary, it of course follows that in an absolute sense
they are not verbally communicable from one person to
another. That is « mere truism. But as Euclidian space is
the average of all possible actual or factual quantitative varia-
tions, by using it we theoretically achieve an average quanti-
tative error in understanding each other that in the long ruu
cancels into zero. Also, by using that average space, and
asserting what is the fact about it (that there can be no
quantitative accuracy—no exact science), we obviously
achieve absolute qualitative consistency. In short, the in-
telligible complete translation of what the mathematicians
mean by non-Euclidian space is this:- there is no exact science.

i. It therefore follows as a truism that the reason
Euclid’s postulate about parallels can not be “‘absolutely
proved’’ in the classical] logic sense (which is irrelevant any-
way: cf. §35), is because it is a tacit arbitrary agreement
that we shall select some part of the Many as a standard
quantity. It is not a postulate, proposition, or real assump-
tion at all, but our agreement (§22) to say formally that
A=A, and to keep on asserting that formally A remains A or
A=A, even while recognizing that any actual A, such as a
metal bar, keeps on perceptibly changing: obviously only if
we have that ‘fixed’ form A is it intelligible to say that the
actual A changes. It happens that Euclid’s way of
saying that the formal quantity is agreed not to change in-
volves the term infinity. I. e., he in effect said:- parallels
are the same quantity (or part of the Many) distant from each
other here (at 0 distance) and everywhere else cven at infinity
(at © distance); or, A—=A_ every-where, which is the same
as saying in §22 that A=A_ every-time (§§150-1). As the
mathematicians rather habitually use that term ™ in two
different senses, naturally a direct confusion arose, and it
was irrelevantly held that the agreement was unprovable.”’
But Euclid’s postulate is however obviously validly provable
(i. e., can be shown to be a truism: §35) as soon as we stop
using the same word confusedly in two _ senses. It is an
agreement (an arbitrary verbal truistic invention), and hence
not absolutely provable in the sense of §35. But it is prov-
able in the same sense that any of geometry is:- I. e., the
postulate is precisely the same sort of proposition as the the-
orem that from a point not in a straight line a perpendicular
to that line can be drawn, and but one. For in that theorem
the perpendicular is the distance or Many quantity from the
point to the line. Because the perpendicular is here (at pre-
sumably a formally 0 distance from us), it is held to be always
of the same length. But obviously, in fact, it is uot at ex-
actly the same distance from each of us, nor at zero distance
from us in any given case (for we do not in any Many sense
coincide with a “perpendicular’’); we are the differently
located observers of the case. Consequently, if that perpen-
dicular distance varies any when changing its distance from
absolutely here (0 distance) to any distance away (and Euclid
includes all such distances in his postulate by saying © dist-
ance), then in no case can the proposition about the perpen-
diculars be considered to be ““proved’’ (or for that matter, even
to be true) to anyone except the person impossibly coinci-
dent with the perpendicular. Hence, if the theorem about
the perpendicular is considered by the orthodox mathematic-
ians to be proved, in exactly the same way Euclid’s postulate
is proved. That is condensed, and hence roughly
stated from a mathematician’s point of view. But it proves
with rigorous truisms either that Euclid’s “‘axiom’’ about
parallels is proved, or else that al) kinds of geometry (inelud-
ing non-Euclidian) are not only unprovable, but are in the

§60i VIIl One

same sense disproved, or proved to be erroneous. The act-
ual fact is that we have merely rigorously established the
preliminary formal agreement of language or geometry—
Euclid’s postulate being that agreement in one form.

$61. a. That leads us specifically to what I believe is
generally considered to be the unsolved problem of whether
space (and time) is really Euclidian or not. The solution of
it—already implied above, of course—is that there is not
any such problem; it is merely an implicit self-contradiction
and confusion to propose such a ‘“problem.’’? We may prof-
itably explicitly consider it, as it shows the ultimate details
with regard to confusing the three sorts of words.
(1) If space is a relationship word or God the Holy Ghost, as
we explicitly consider it to be in our general equation, then
obviously there is no such Many or ‘‘objective’’ thing as
space, and no possibility of its having anything but merely a
whole identity with itself (§857, 60a). The problem of
**Euclidian space’” is obviously meaningless or non-existent
from such a point of view: space in this first sense is solely
an absolute assertion of connection, or identity——and identity
is identity, it being nonsense to consider in curved or flat.
(2) If space is the universe, the One, then it is Euclidian or
non-Kuclidian just as we please. Neither mystic statement
has any definite meaning as such, and both are “‘true.”’
(3) It space is used as an actual unit of the Many (as mean-
ing, say, that which is named by cubic yard), then ubviously
we can say that that space is formally a fixed quantity or
standard One, in which case (2) again applies. But if we
observe that “that which’ at first was in the space changes
with reference to other parts of the Many, and say that it no
longer fills the ““space,’’ then we use that last term “‘space’’
(a) vaguely in a Many sense, and also (b) in a relationship
sense that is covered by (1), but which is explicitly, asa
standard One or measure, a Euclidian space. Or, instead
of saying as in (h) that sucha space measure did not change,
we may with the mathematicians say (c) that the space
measure also changed with the change in ‘that which’ or
Many part init. Then that assertion of change, as a verbal
truisra, implies that we have assumed another ‘‘form,’’ or a
second “‘space,’’ which tacitly assumed form is the relation-
ship word, but which second space is then, by orthodox
mathematics, inserted into (i. e., verbally identified as, or
duplicated into) the original name space. (The original space
would then have to change again, and be fixed as a form;
and so on ad infinitum. It is, from this point of view, the
infinite regress of language: or more definitely, that simul-
taneously duplex ““spacc’’ is the mathematicians’ unrecog-
nized way of asserting the infinite regress; or more concretely,
that duplexing of ““space’’ is the ancient infinite regress of
ethers; cf. §51.) In that case, where we get flung on an
infinite regress of spaces (which is another way of stating the
last section), each space that changed in some given degree
is a distinct language, of non-Euclidian space. And clearly,
to interpret that language, we simply have to revert to the
formal or fixed space, which obviously is the average or Eu-
clidian space. Or, briefly and obviously, there is no such
thing, or unit of the Many, as_ space. To say “‘Euclidian
space’ is, strictly, the same thing as saying *‘motherhood of
brotherhood’’—logical nonsense. Hence, there exists no
such problem as whether space is Euclidian. ‘‘Space’’ is a
verbal invented agreement as to the expression of universal
identity, and the Euclidian agreement is the average, intelli-
gible one, and no other is mutually quantitatively intelligible.

b. It may now be seen why we have gone to so much
trouble and effort with what is superficially the rather foolish
business of investigating non-Euclidian space. Two import-
ant advantages appear at once:- (1) We have very definitely

UNIVERSE

54

seen just how a word is orthodoxly confused in the three
meanings (and bow excessively confused that confusion may
be), and just how to dig the word out and unsnarl it. The
non-Enclidian space serves as the type: no other mixing
can go further in confusion: yet, at the same time, if we
have nothing better to do than juggle words, it is possible to
make valid expression ot anything in terms of non-Euclidian
space (but to be quantitatitively intelligible expression it then
has to be translated into Euclidian). (2) And we have seen
how very flexible our language is. If we do not explicitly
pin it down to Euclidian space, any noun in it can be given
not only aay meaning as a One (which is validly possibie in
our everyday language—we must simply point out that we are
doing it); but can also be taken as any quantity as a Many
(S66); and can further, from one point of view, be consid-
ered (a) steady, or (b) in any way warped as a relationship,
in which case it implies an infinite regress of different formal
languages—all of which then have to be explicitly stated
in order to be intelligible (and the way to ‘state’ all of them
logically, is to state the average, or zero, or Euclidian one).
Consequently, it behooves us to understand our logical rule
about 0 and ©, and use it, if we donot wish to find ourselves
adrift in non-Euclidian unintelligibility, or the dupes of the
men who are.

§62. a. Thescientific physical theory of relativity ($66)
is a variation from ordinary language of the same character
as are the non-Euclidian varieties. That theory uses ‘‘time’’
as if it were a fourth dimension of space (§66z). Non-
Euclidian geometries often do the same thing (‘‘Ency.
Brit.,’’ xi, 735). In both cases the usage is merely a form,
and implies no actual ‘‘fourth dimension.’”’ In this section
we consider the actual meaning of all asserted and verbal
departures from three dimensions.

b. We have seen (S§58ab, 59) that our everyday lang-
uage was reduced to the most parsimonious terms possible in
an explicit language, and hence had three dimensions of
space. We saw that they were forms; hence, it is already
implicit that, as a form, there might be any number of “‘di-
mensions.’’ But we proceed to examine the details.
The Euclidian everyday language and each of the non-
Euclidian possibilities may be varied into an infinite number
of valid languages which depart from that simplest form.
So far as I can determine from the vague statements of ortho-
dox mathematics that possibility is not definitely recognized
by it. But orthodox mathematics in an indefinite way be-
gins the construction of such different languages:- e. g.,
various branches of mathematics treat of ““space’’ (1) of no
dimensions (points) ; (2) of one dimension; (3) of two dimen-
sions, etc. As we shall see, the three varieties of ‘space’? -
just mentioned explicitly, actually imply the use of lang-
uages that are logically different from our ordinary language.
But it is not conventionally so considered.
that we can ““conceive’’ a ‘‘space’’

It is considered

' of say two dimensions.
The fact is (the absolute truism is) that we can not conceive

any such space in any way really different from conceiving
a space of a million dimensions (and we can not properly
talk of either the 2-dimension or million-dimension space in
our ordinary 3-dimension language—as we shall see). The
usual conventional assertion is that it is impossible even to
imagine“ a physical’’ space [i, e., a Many unit as usually
named | of a million dimensions. Of course it is, as that is
an essential contradiction of terms; in precisely te same
everyday sense it is equally impossible to imagine a space of
two dimensions, or three dimensions, as we shall see.
c. What we are going to see now is that there are Os-
sible an indefinite number of valid languages, each of ee
has a different formal base (or, in some eases, lack of forma]

55 UNIVERSE

base, or negative one—which is logically the same). The
language which we actually use (§58) is based on the Trini-
ty, and is the simplest positive language. It has three forms
of words, conventionally necessitating the three dimensions
of space (§59). Following is a description of the
formal base of four different languages:- (1) The most primi-
tive ‘language’—I doubt if it may properly be called a lang-
uage—is one merely of ejaculatory sounds, such as a hen
usually uses to her chickens. It is rigorously ‘‘mysticism,”’
and implies only the One, or meaning. Actually, it has no
‘“words,’’ as any of its ‘words’ may, just as a One word
may, be used to designate any complete meaning. That
‘language’ does not use space at all—has no form,—and is
hence of zero dimensions. (It is also obviously of infinite di-
mensions, as it implicitly includes all possible forms.) Con-
ventionally, that is not a ““language.”’ (2) A hen
can and does use another and “‘higher’’ form of language.
When she finds food she sometimes adds to her previous
language a gesture of ‘pointing’ or pecking at it (and perhaps
a vocal sound equivalent to that gesture), indicating a point,
or a no-dimension location in space (and time—always under-
stood). A small child is “‘verbally’’ a little more explicit
in such a language. He puts his finger on or towards the
‘‘point”’ and says ‘‘This’’ or ““That,’’ or some word corres-
ponding formally to the mathematicians’ “‘point.’??’ That
also is a language which is uot positive—and conventionally
perhaps is not recognized as a language. That 0-dimension
Jorm of word is the primitive Many word, and such a word
is indefinite as to whether (a) it is a unit of the Many that
is a formal part of the One, or (b) is a mere formal recogni-
tion that the One may be arbitrarily divided, but is not such
a part. It has been seen (e. g., in 858d) that orthodox
mathematics is still, like the child in that language, ambigu-
ous as to its general Many words:- number. Hence, it is
obvious that when mathematics speaks of ‘“points,’’ or tech-
nically of ‘“‘number,’’ it probably is attempting to use this
no-dimension ‘language,’ without recognizing that it is nota
positive language. This ‘language’ formally and implicitly
asserts space or form, but explicitly asserts no space. But
there is no trace in it of the relationship form—note the
indefiniteness under (a) and (b) above. Obviously, as this
language uses space, and denies dimensions, it may be said
to have no logic, or be negative logically; yet it is fairly
intelligible in practice, and is often eloquent—for it raises
no verbal problems and needs no formal answers. This zero-
form or zero-logical language may be held to include the
absolute mysticism described under (1). (3) The next
‘language’ is the one in which the motion of a point is form-
ally recognized—the continuity or relationship that is explic-
itly a one-dimension line formally explicitly asserting the
Many, but obviously not fully separating the units of the
Many. Hence, relationship is explicitly used, but formally
it is denied or omitted. This 1-dimension language is stil]
not a positive, controllable language, as it obviously still
lacks a definite logic. (4) The next language is one
of 2-dimension surfaces, in which the One is obviously ex-
plicitly separated formally into the Many. Relationship is
obviously implicitly used, but it is not explicitly named as a
form—it is, when it comes into explicit notice, pseudo-
invented as a thing, or another unit of the Many, ora tertium
quid, or God. This is actually the language the dualists use.
It is not a positive language—not our Trinity language. It
is, compared to our positive language that has the minimum of
logic or form needed for controllability, a nonsensical lang-
uage—practically more nonsensical than the languages of
the hen and the infant; for those make no pretensions.
Dualists are not ‘‘wrong’’; this language is not ‘‘wrong,””

Onc VIII §62g

as it is fairly intelligible, and is actually the language of
most of conventional mathematics. It merely is not complete
and itis not our everyday dynamic language. Strictly speak-
speaking, it is a barbaric lJanguage—half-formed; static.

d. Obviously, just as soon as we say above in the lang-
uage (2) that there exists one way of asserting and denying

‘space’”’ (or the formal distinction between the One and the
Many), it immediately follows that there can be twe ways of
doing it—and two were shown in language (3),—and then
on and on in a balancing of such forms, in infinite regress.
We saw (§59) that the first way in which the whole set of
contradictions is explicitly or positively handled is our Trini-
ty language. Hence, that Trinity language is what is ordi-
narily known to us as “‘language.”’ But obviously, the
other forms pointed out in the last paragraph are languages
—even though they differ quantitatively in the number of
explicit forms or ‘logic.? So those are concrete and conven-
tional examples showing the possibility of an infinite regress
of languages with different forms which are valid (although
not equally useful in quantitative Many affairs) so long as they
make no claims to be other than they are (the real objection
to dualism and other languages with queer numbers of forms
is that they make false claims for themselves).

e. The mathematicians call each such assertion-denial
( formal assertion of a splitting: denial of it) a “‘dimension”’
of “‘space,’’ and get thus 4-dimension, ...7-dimension...
space. Obviously, what they can mean is correct; the
names they have adopted for it are not enlightening and us-
ually puzzle even themselves. For obviously, in no case
have they got a ‘‘space’’ that is a bit different from the one
the child has when he merely ‘points’ and has 0-dimension
*“space’’—i. e., has no form in language, no technique, no
trick of talking. The actual difficulty the mathematicians
have is due to the fact that ordinarily we consider the forms
of language explicitly in terms of time (with space always im-
plied; cf. 8150); but (as in 860i) Euclid shifted those forms
explicitly to space—making a ““veometry’’ instead of a tacit
‘“psychology,’’—and instead of talking of every-time talked
of every-where. Because of the nonrecognition of the existence
of those two aspects of precisely the same essential principle
of form, the mathematicians thought they had something
really different in the way of language variation.

f. It therefore follows as a truism that when a man un-
dertakes to talk about a space of (say) four *“dimensions’’ as
being one in which (say) we could go in and out of a room
which was ° closed,’’ then he is, in his mental confusion, at-
tempting to talk two different languages simultaneously :-
our Trinity language of the “‘closed’’ room, and the 4-dimen-
sion language in which he describes the path “‘out.’? The
result truistically is nonsense—saying A—A and simultane-
ously A is not=—=A. Competent mathematicians do not talk
such nonsense: at least I am unable to find any such ab-
surdities in the “‘Encyclopaedia Brittanica.’’ In one modern
mathematical book I find the author rather undecided as to
whether he shall talk such 4-dimension nonsense; but in
spite of the fact that he is a reputable mathematician he
concludes that such “‘hypergeametry’’ resulted when the mind
of man “‘finally burst into flowers of its own’’—a rather
vague statement for 2 mathematician. But in sober moments
competent mathematicians consider space to be the same as
it is in our general equation—primarily a relationship word
(Whitehead, in ““Ency. Brit.,’’ xi, 730). However, White-
head frankly admits that mathematicians are undecided about
it, just as his competent associate Russell admits in general
that they are undecided about the One and Many (“‘Ency.
Brit.,’’ xvii, 881), which is really the problem under space.

a It is obvious that because we tacitly call our Trinity

§62g VIII One

language ““sense’’ or commonsense, in order to be consistent
we must cal] any other language nonsense. And I did. But
to repeat, that means compared with Trinity language.

h. Obviously, in each of those infinite forms of language
with respect to the number of ‘dimensions’? we may now
have another infinite regress insorts of space—Euclidian and
non-Euclidian. That makes the total of mathematics or of
language to consist of explicit statement of an infinite re-
gress of languages of different extent of form, each of which
languages in turn consists of an infinite regress of languages
of different ‘intensity’ of form—which may be expressed :-
Extensity of forms... Intensity of forms..., exactly equivalent
to That... X This.... There consequently can be no actual
end to the mind’s “bursting into flowers.’ I omit those
‘“flowers’’ here, and with rigid parsimony use everyday
Trinity Janguage of Euclidian space. But we can see that
the mathematicians can have an extensive flower garden.

S68. a. In the last section it was not stated just how
we are going to represent those different kinds of spaces with
our ring model. In this section I shal] represent them by
showing briefly some of the possible variations of the ring.
To show those variations in detai) would constitute a com-
plete new mathematics—volumes of which are here omitted.

b. A symmetrical ring consisting of a geometrical single
surface is generated when a straight line, the generatrix, is
moved so that the same point of it lies always in the circeum-
ference of a directrix circle and its whole remains always in
planes passing through the center of the circle and perpen-
dicular to it, while at the same time the line rotates around
the circumference as an axis at half the angular rate of its
revolution about the center. In order to represent the un-
limited possibilities of making non-Euclidian languages, that
symmetrical ring can be varied from that symmetry indefin-
itely. Instead of a directrix circle we conld use any closed
path. And the ‘warp’ (the proportionality of its rotation
about the directrix) may be varied locally in any degree, so
long as the generatrix finishes a complete revolution with an
algebraic sum total of 180°, or 180° plus any multiple of
360°. If the sum total of the twist is different from that,
and the generatrix is of finite length, truistically the surface
will not close as a single surface, with one revolution, and
we have no ‘language,’ as there is no summed identical] re-
lationship. The language would be a dualism; and, any
of the languages described in §62¢ would be represented by
a ring in which the length of the directrix was zero, and
the twist unstated. If the twist were stated, then other de-
tails too trivial and extensive for mention here are obvious.

ce. An actual paper ring made of a straight strip will

Cl

Oe

Fig. 63c.

not take that symmetrical form, because to permit its doing
so its edges would have to stretch and contract considerably.
Also, when the generatrix explicitly has a length of line

UNIVERSE 56

extending away from the directrix greater than the diameter
of the directrix the single surface will intersect itself (and a
ring made of a paper strip physically would not ““intersect,”’
but would ‘‘interfere’’). | That fact may be observed to be
true by observing Fig. 638c, and considering what would
happen if the ring were wider. (Fig. 63c is a perspective of
a symmetrical one surface ring of appreciable thickness: it
is shown cut square across by four arbitrary planes, so as to
make it easier to see its shape.) If we had a paper ring of
negligible thickness its width could be made as great as we
like, without interference, by folding the strip first diagon-
ally along its length, and again in other ways as may be
necessary to keep the Z] and ZY’ edges (Fig. 54) along the
meeting edges of the finally be-folded triangle. The paper
‘strip’ then, when bent around to make a ‘ring,’ actually
makes a cone. (It would require pages to express that con-
struction with verbal explicitiness, and then it would not be
easily intelligible. The reader, if interested, can readily
understand the construction by actually making such a ring.)
In whatever way the folds be made, there will be one or
more thicknesses of paper between some portion of the *join-
ing’ ZI and Z'l’ edges, and the joint will take various odd be-
folded conditions. Clearly, as the meeting edges have the
paper (or if that is considered of negligible thickness, then
at least a “‘surface’’) between some portion of them, then in
ordinary language they do not meet. But, by multiplying or
duplicating means of stating relationships, an 2#-dimension
language can be devised which will describe the be-folded
‘ring’ as a ‘‘ring’’—i. e., as if the edges met: and hence
as if the surface was continuous and “‘related.”’

dande. Clearly, that sort of complicated language is
not perceptibly needed in our ordinary life. The mathema-
ticians may find uses for it, and quite likely in a century or
so, after we get skilled in our Trinity language, the last para-
graph may possibly be written in a consistent 4-dimension
language and be easily intelligible in half its present length,
instead of its being practically unintelligible as it stands in
8-dimension language unless such a strip be actually made.
However, it is clear that there is not contained or involved
in that 4-dimension model a ‘‘space’’ any different ina Many
sense from 3-dimension, 2-dimension, etc. As an
interesting fact, it may be observed that the model ‘ring’
which is now a cone contains all the relationships included in
conic sections, and other branches of geometry—and those
are thus here directly connected with the theory of logic. The
volumes expressing that unified geometry are here omitted.

f. Instead of making the ring of a flat strip and neglect-
ing its thickness, we may make a ring explicitly solid—say

Fig. 63f.

of square cross-section, as in Fig. 63f. In this case, instead

of a twist of 180°, we give a twist of 90° (of 360° divided
€¢

by the number of ‘surfaces’’ or sides the solid is considered

57 UNIVERSE

to have). Then there is but one continuous surface, and one
continuous edge; but we pass our finger four times around
the directrix circle in completely following that surface. If
we cut off a corner having a right triangular cross-section
with legs of the same length and equal to half the ring’s
side, there results a ring of triangular cross-section four
times the original length, with three surfaces and three
edges, interlinked with a ring of the same sort as the origi-
nal, but half the cross-section. Similar corners may theo-
retically be cut off the ring indefinitely, there remaining
always a square core like the original. _It is obvious that a
direct description of the more complicated systems of rela-
tionship, Many surfaces, etc., of a symmetrical ring of this
sort would require a Euclidian language of more than three
*‘dimensions,’’ or sets of reconciled contradictions.

g. <A different language would be required forthe direct
description of a single surface ring made of triangular cross-
section with twist of 120°. That is obviously so, if we con-
sider the complications resulting if we considered the three
sides extended indefinitely. Similarly, a special formal lang-
uage is required if it is to be directly applicable to a ring of
any regular polygon of z sides, with a twist of 360°/n.

h. The /mit of that regular n-sided polygon would be a
circle of an ‘infinite number’’ of sides, giving a tore or anchor
ring—or a smooth doughnut. Ifa “‘corner’’ be cut off that,
it would be a line. And we would keep cutting it off,
around and around an “‘infinite number’’ of times until the
whole ring—or universe—was used up, and there was just
one closed line to represent it. All the mutual contradictions
possible (an infinite ““number’’) would be used up and recon-
ciled. The resulting line would be the Many, or the One,
or (when considered as a twist) all of relationship. As a
matter of rather obvious fact, the total expression in words
would become infinitely formally self-contradictory—as is
directly evident in this paragraph. Yet, because all those
contradictions, and this Jine’s implied “‘infinite dimensions’’
of “‘space’’ mean nothing more than continuous, we under-
stand the description of that tore—the meaning of this para-
graph—without difficulty. However, more or less concretely
speaking, this paragraph is language gone mad. When we
describe a common doughnut in this romantic way, we have
passed beyond the power of the best mathematicians and
used ‘‘ ©—dimension space,’’ and in that extraordinary lang-
uage have in reality reverted to the language of the hen
(§62c)—a concrete proof that infinity is logically equal to
zero. There is not any difficulty about comprehending a
doughnut. The universe is essentially as easy to understand.

i. One last point concerning this variable model of lang-
uage remains to be added to make its infinite variety or vari-
ability obvious :- I have been calling language a machine.
This ring also serves as a model of all mechanics, as we may
briefly see:- If any of the rings (theoretically the ‘cone
ring’ also; but we for brevity omit that) be revolved about
its main axis (i. e., the line through the center of the direc-
trix circle perpendicular to the plane of the circle: the di-
rectrix circle itself 1 name the filiar axis), then it acts as—is
—a pump, or rotating fan, or propeller, of (and in) whatever
medium surrounds it. (Hence, some useful machines might
be made of the ring; J] have not investigated those possibili-
ties, but such an investigation may be worth while, espec-
ially when it is remembered that all ‘‘engines’’ are reversed
pumps of various sorts, so that these rings will make a new
sort of rotary engine.) Also, when the rings thus
revolve, they appear to be rotating also in cross-section around
their filiar axis or directrix circle; virtually or dynamically
they are. Conseqently, they mechanically are vortex whirls,
or “smoke rings.”’ And in Part Two I use such whirls as

One VIII §65b

being usually the most simple and convenient machine by
which to describe the universe. A whirl is shown to be
equivalent to a lever, or to any other machine (8100m). The
universe, or any atom, or any natural machine (any “arti-
ficial’ machine p/us man is shown to be a natural machine;
$140), may by its use very conveniently and intelligibly be
considered to be a sort of self-inclosed pump, or engine.
Therefore, rigorously, language is as definitely a machine as
is any other, and is as explicitly subject to *‘scientific’’ ex-
periment and verification.

§64. a. Two general considerations remain to be added
to our description of the concrete model of language:- In
this section we take one:- that ZL and J always mutually
imply each other. In the next section we consider the other :-
the general method of splitting the ring into the Many.

b. We can observe in our model (as we have several
times seen: §§36-7, 60i, etc.), that every time the idea or
form space is introduced, it at least explicitly implies a can-
celling time. I. e., space and time, as mutually contradict-
ory words, constitute the relationship, or twist, in the model.
To put it another way, the total universe can be described
as the motion of the general (‘universal’) body M. We can
not possibly have any thing which is not fully implied by “M
varying with V or L!77!,’—or with complete explicitness,
by ‘M varying with L®7'~-°,’ We see directly from our
model that in all cases of explicit expression, the exponents
of L and T are equal and cancelling: in general are nand —n.

ec. Physics, somewhat vaguely, terms those exponents
*“dimensions’’ (868). But orthodox physics is not quite so
definite about the matter as we are seeing is justified by the
facts, and hence there exists no familiar way of stating the
conclusion which is now obvious (also, cf. footnote 165b, on
Bergson). That conclusion is, that, as L and T always imply
each other, then if L is ‘“‘eurved,’’ T also must be compen-
satingly ‘“‘curved’’; and if L is ““steady’’ or “‘average’’ in
ordinary average ‘‘space,’’ then TJ also is average.
Mathematicians and physicists are confused over the matter,
although they substantially agree with that conclusion.
Their esoteric way of agreeing is to use a form which is
equivalent to making 7T'a fourth dimension of L; obviously
that makes 7’ identical in form with L. They are not at all
certain what it means (““Ency. Brit.,’’ xi, 735). We come
to the same thing in the theory of relativity (§66).

d. That last paragraph is not very clear—especially is
it extremely confusing to follow the orthodox usage of T' as
a “‘fourth dimension.’” The last paragraph is one just for
the technical objector. The simple facts we need to get out
of it are (1) that L and 7, whenever validly used explicitly,
are paired; and (2) that all conventional technical languages
are somewhat vague on this point (IX, $66), and conse-
quently get into verbal confusions that are unintelligible if
taken literally. E. g., Newton’s law of gravity is such a
confusion; strictly interpreted it is totally illogical, and pre-
eludes gravity’s having any mechanics (Index, ““Gravity’’).

$65. a. We have let our model represent the Many
by having its Many surface divided crosswise (Fig. 54c).
That has been convenient for the points of view we have
taken. But if we had actually cut the ring into Many parts
on those lines, the ring would have “‘come apart,’’ and no
longer have been a ‘‘ring’’ (unless we had considered it a
One, in which ‘“‘coming apart’’ has no particular meaning).

b. But we saw tbat the rings could have an edge or
corner cut off, giving a lengthened ring of more than one
surface (and edge), interlinked with a remaining single sur-
face ring like the original, but with a diminished cross-section.
Those split-off rings constitute units of the Many more defin-
itely than do the ‘crossways’ units, for a number of obvious

§65b VIII One

reasons. In splitting off parts to get units of the Many, the
relationship glaringly remains (as the interlinking); if a
crossways unit of the Many had been cut out, we should
have to consider that because the ring was the tota] universe
then that cut-out unit of the Many could not have been re-
moved ‘‘elsewhere’’—so it in effect would stay in place and
*‘breserve’” the ring. It may also be observed that
the split-off unit of the Many no longer has the characteris-
tic of a continuous One and Many; the “‘logic’’ or language
description of such a definite, formally separated but still
interlinked unit essentially changes.

ce. All those points have perhaps become so obvious that
I shall write no more than those rough suggestions. A very
extended discussion of them is readily apparent.

S66. a. In this section we consider the theory of relativity.
We do sou chiefly as a means of summarizing our ideas about
language. For the theory of relativity is essentially a lang-
uage or logic different from our ordinary Euclidian language,
and a study of it will show how we may change from ours to
a different sort. That theory of relativity, which is actually
a new scientific logie, has been developed recently, begin-
ning with a short article by Albert Einstein in 1905 which
extended Lorentz’s hypothesis of the Michelson-Morley ex-
periment—~an experiment which showed that there was no
perceptible mution or “‘drift’’ of the ether relative to the
earth, as indicated by the travel of light (see §127 for de-
tails), although the old dualistic theory of frictionless ether
held that the earth could not drag that surrounding friction-
less ether with it, so that there would be such drift (§127ij,
X11). For an authoritative statement of relativity I
shall use Einstein’s ““Relativity’’ (Eng. trans., New York,
1920), referring in citations below to pages of that book.

b. Einstein used his theory a few years ago to predict
the bending of the path of a ray of light ina °‘gravity field”’
(that bending is actually a special case of a general phenom-
enon of light known for centuries; §127). His prediction
was reported verified at a meeting of the Royal Society in
1919 (ibid., 153-5). On that occasion J. J. Thomson, as
its president, is reported to have stated in effect that those
observations perhaps caused a revolution in science—the
greatest in centuries, etc. And that rather strong language
brought Ejinstein’s theory into general prominence. How-
ever, Thomson is reported to have also stated that he could
not understand the theory. (Obviously it is pertinent to
inquire:- if he couldn’t understand it, how could he guess
it was a revolution?) But we shall see that the theory does
not revolutionize science except in the sense that it expresses
our commonsense science in a somewhat new and in an arbi-
trary language, which does not at all destroy or contradict or
change our everyday language. Also, we shall see that
there is no difficulty in understanding the essentials of the
theory; and it is in strict principle impossible to derive, in a
finite time, any definite quantitative result or statement from
the theory. However, in practical use, guessing somewhat
at quantities, the theory is sound and has great value, as we
shall see. Einstein has done work that makes him the peer
of Newton.

ce. The specific essential of relativity is correctly and
clearly stated by Einstein (ibid., 135):- ‘* According to the
general theory of relativity, the geometrical properties of
space [and time: the rest of his book proves that space is
logically inseparable from time; see par. g of this section |
are not independent, but they are determined by matter.”’
Hence, as he uses matter explicitly as ‘‘quantity,’’ and as he
shows that matter is always varying or changing quantita-
tively (that mass varies with velocity), therefore M, L, and
T are always varying—or, Einstein has no formally steady

UNIVERSE 58

language. Or, instead of having our Many member, M(vary-
ing with)L2T*, in which L and T are arbitrarily and form-
ally or Jogically fixed and steady as in our everyday language,
and in which member there is a ‘(varying with),’ or assertion
of no possibility of a quantitatively exact science (see our next
chapter, IX, for details), Finstein’s theory of relativity would
have a member in which there is no ‘(varying with)’, but an
exact quantitative science, although then formally Land T
are not constant and steady or formally exact and unvarying.
In other words, Ejinstein’s theory is obviously logically pre-
cisely the reverse of our everyday language; in respect to
concrete facts, or to assertions about matter, our language and
his language obviously undertake to mean identically the
same. As a truistic result of the fact that formally
his Land 7 are not steady, Einstein’s general relativity has
a space (and time) which is not Euelidian. His space and
time is a verbal ‘‘reference jelly-fish’’—i. e., an unfixed,
shaky, uncertain method of talking (his translator says
*‘eference-mollusk,’’ p. 117, ete.; but “‘teference jelly-
fish’? better expresses what was or should have been Ein-
stein’s idea). And that relativity space has no fixed curvature
or definite variation from Euclidian space. (Truistically it
can’t have; for otherwise L and T would be unvarying, al-
though with [Gaussian] numerical coefficients different from
unity; see par. e.) Consequently, it is in strict principle
truistically impossible to get any definite quantitative result
or statement from the theory. Einstein (p. 136)
concludes that our universe is a more or less (i. e., numeri-
cally unspecifiably) spherical or elliptical non-Euclidian space
—thus showing that in his own hands in the end the theory
can give no definite quantities. And incidentally, as we saw
(§62), that more or Jess bounded or shaped relativity space
means precisely the same thing as our ordinary language’s in-
finite or unbounded space of the universe; for obviously there
is nothing but an unessential verbal difference between a uni-
verse which is unboundable and an “‘infinite’’ one.

d. Or, we can express the last paragraph, showing the
essential characteristic of the theory of relativity, in a more
intelligible and more general way:- Einstein in actual effect
says that he will express everything in a quantitative form—
will express everything in exact measures—will have all state-
ments in the form of exact quantitative science. (In short,
he in effect asserts that there will be, for his theory, no dif-
ference between qualitative and quantitative; he can be noted
asserting that in his first complete paragraph on p. 23, and
the second on p. 15. And in agreement with my assertion
that he verbally makes the two equivalent, on his p. 98 he
in effect consistently and properly rejects the problem of the
One and Many as being non-existent—or the One is directly
the Many—“in the next to the last sentence in the first para-
graph.) Such expression of everything is in principle an
absolute quantitative unification of all knowledge. And we
have seen (§40, ete.) that such a quantitative unification is
impossible. But Einstein consistently and validly makes
merely a formal unification of that sort except that he does not
finish (strietly, a unification of that sort would have to run to
infinity). I. e., in actual effect, as we have already seen
and will see more explicitly in the next paragraph, he getsa
jelly-fish or variable frame of numerical translation or ex pres-
sion or reference,’’ so that although formally he has a
quantitative unification, actually he has to guess at quantities
Just as we do in ordinary language—which is merely another
way of saying that he does not finish. Consequently, Ein-
stein has a language which is formally the opposite of ours $
but as stated, it means the same as ours, and there is no real
conflict. We take it that our standards of measurement are
formally steady, but that in the nature of things we can’t

59 UNIVERSE

accurately measure always varying matter; Ejinstein takes
it that his standards measure matter accurately, but that the
standards themselves always vary, and vary in an unmeasur-
able degree.

e. Or, we can express the general relativity theory in
specific mathematical terms, thus repeating the last two
paragraphs in another form:- _—_ Einstein does it excellently
(p.115):- “‘The following statement corresponds to the
fundamental idea of the general principle of relativity: ‘Adl
Gaussian co-ordinate systems [of which the Euclidian ‘‘sys-
tem’’ is a special, or more precisely, a limiting, case] are
essentially equivalent for the formulation of the general laws of
nature.’’’ 1, e., all events or phenomena may be quantita-
tively expressed by eract symbols in a certain kind of always
practically non-Euclidian space and time. Einstein proves
that. Then, the mathematical formula for expressing one
phenomenon in terms of any other is worked out (p. 105) to
be:- ds’*—=gydx;?+-2gidmdz2... tgudxz, where ds is the
quantitative difference of the two phenomena, the 2’s are
really our ordinary Euclidian time and dimensions of space,
and the g’s are numerical coefficients for the given particular
ease, which fix jor that case the variations of the time and
space from the Euclidian reference or limit. In brief, that
expression is simply in effect equivalent to our formula
Mvarying with)L?T’=The One (but is not precise as to what
is the One and what the Many expression; see par. h).
But, it immediately follows (ibid., 106), from the way that
Kinstein derived that formula, that the magnitudes or coeffic-
ients g have values which vary with each event. Conse-
quently, in actual effect, that Gaussian or non-Euclidian
formula is not mutually translatable from one event to
another; itis only formally or unintelligibly-orthodoxly-
mathemathically translatable—the monstrous word fits the
ease. Or, as before, the relativity or unification derived by
Einstein is merely formal—is actually qualitative, just as the
one we are deriving in ordinary language is.

f. Jt therefore is truistic with those three ways of view-
ing relationships (in the last three paragraphs):- (1) that
Einstein’s general theory is right (he has worked out an ex-
tended formal truism, mostly in terms of the orthodox
mathematics of space and time); and (2) that his form of
using words is the reverse of our ordinary way (and is hence
rather novel and sometimes puzzling—especially to him).
Our ordinary language is a language which, although explic-
itly inexact as to quantity or measures of sizes of things, is
qualitatively or essentially the same language for all of us,
and for all time (except for the arbitrary practical fact that
from time to time we mutually agree to change the applica-
tion of certain words, or invent new ones). The backwards
language of the relativitists is theoretically exact as to quan-
tity, but essentially is, or requires, a different language for
each person (as each person is a different phenomenon or
event—is differently located: two persons can not occupy
the same space), and also must be varied by each person
from moment to moment into a new language (as we saw,
especially in considering the Gaussian formula in the last par-
agraph). A simple example of that would be:- If we use
the theory of relativity consistently, with reference (say) to
what we in our ordinary language call ““a doy’’ (all of us ad-
mitting that ““a boy’’ does not mean exactly quantitatively
the same to each of us), then only at one instant in eternal
time and then for one observer only, at one zero or point
spot in infinite space (and actually, no observer can occupy a
point), would the name ‘‘a boy’’ properly apply, and hence
be a permissible relativity term. All other observers, and
this single point-observer at all other times, in order to use
relativity consistently, must invent and use a new name (a

One VI111 §66¢

different ‘‘quantity’’); he could still use the exact numeri-
ca] form “‘a ’? (the ““a’’ meaning exactly 1), but must
fill in the blank with some new word to or with which the
quantitatively exact a or 1 will fit—-which new word would
itself be good only instantaneously. Obviously, rela-
tivitists can’t practically consistently talk any such language.
What Einstein actually does in practice, even in his formal
book, is ¢acitly to use our ordinary Euclidian language as a
means of translating. EE. g., in the last paragraph we saw
that his unifying formula was itself actually expressed in
Euclidian language.

g. It will be useful to notice two particular points about
Einstein’s theory in this long paragraph. (1) He
states it as two theories, a special theory of relativity, and a
general theory (his special theory really deals with what we
eall the One, and the general with the Many, as we see
shortly). In the special theory he works out the verbal
method for expressing phenomena in mutual terms of two
bodies which are moving relatively to each other ina straight
line, with constant motion. He uses the velocity of light as
a standard of comparison (i. e., a verbally constant velocity
in “‘free’’ space), thus tacitly using Euclidian space and
time as the form of talk to measure that velocity (which is
what we call a qualitative base). But Einstein sees, as we
we shall see, that motion in a straight line at constant
velocity is a special limit, and experimentally can’t happen
in the real universe (§§838, 88, etc.). | Therefore, he had
to develop what he calls the general theory of relativity,
which will apply to actual variable motion (for all the details
of such motion see Part Two). But as soon as motion de-
parts from a straight line, the standard of measurement (the
speed of light) is truistically relatively ““curved’’ (the paths
of both bodies considered are relatively curved), and hence
variable in quantity—i. e., merely as a verbal truism of such
language agreements, and without any reference to what
actual light does do, light can no longer in such language,
verbally travel in straight lines at constant speed. Hence,
as can beseen, a// possibility of comparative measures of two
mutually variably moving bodies (and all actual bodies are
such) has departed from Einstein’s logic; or, that logic or
language necessarily or truistically reverts to the jelly-fish
system of reference for both space and time, as before seen.
Einstein seems to think he shows that change from special to
general theory by experimental facts—talking about “‘ gravity
field’’ at some length,—but as a matter of fact, his gravity
field is created (and ‘described’) by an extra-universe, incon-
ceivable God and is pifflle, and Einstein is actually merely
formulating verbal agreements—and doing a good job at
that. The only actual experience he is using is the observa-
tion that, expressed in ordinary language, mass varies with
velocity. He is unconsciously making his forms fit that Eu-
elidian fact. In short, it thus appears that the relativity
theory essentially is logic or ‘“philosophy,’’ and not concrete
or experimental science: compare it with Part Two of this
book which is directly experimental science. With
constant light velocity in one theory, and variable light
velocity in the other theory, it superficially looks as if he
were dealing loosely with facts. But he is not; in making
the step from the special to the general theory he is merely
shifting from Euclidian to non-Euclidian space, and reverses
language (shifts from monism or monotheism as “‘reality’’ to
infinite pluralism as “‘reality’’). | As a matter of strict fact,
he could be said to have already done that with mathemati-
cal orthodoxy in the special theory (i. e., to have asserted
both theories simultaneously according to the forms of ortho-
dox mathematics). For in deriving the equations for talking
mutually of two bodies (ibid., 139-45: those are the

§66g VIII One

equations Lorentz used in considering the Michelson-Morley
experiment; for comment on them in actual physical terms,
instead of terms of logic which are being given here to ac-
cord with Einstein’s discussion, see §127j), in equations (3)
and (4)—not quoted here, as they are not needed, —he mul-
tiplied zero by two ““constants,’’ and in effect said that the
two could be any numbers. That is equivalent to saying
that any number is equal to any other number, and accepts
or uses the total orthodox forms of mathematics (§44). Con-
seqently, by that theory his “‘constant’’ speed of light in
the special theory is already in general any speed—i. e., by
such orthodox mathematics is variable. In short, his theory
merely amounts to using a formal mathematics in which any
number can equal any other number, as we saw was the case
with ordinary orthodox mathematics. (Or, as we can see
now, his special theory is what I call the One, and his general
theory is the Many; his special theory is the dzmzt, or the
use of Euclidian space, or a dealing with O and ~; his
mathematical formula includes both the special and general,
just as does orthodox mathematics, by considering 0 and ©
to be numbers, and not limits.) That can be validly and
logically done, merely by formally arbitrarily agreeing to do
it, provided it is not otherwise contradicted, although as
shown before in several other ways no definite quantitative
statement which is mutually intelligible can then be made—
there will be merely mathematical, symbolical, formal exact-
ness or quantitative definiteness (and because by agreement
no mathematical Many symbol need be definite anyway—
i. e., 2 boys are not actually a definite number, although
is mathematically or symbolically definite,—therefore ob-
viously it is possible to put that indefinite, not mutually un-
derstandable theory into mathematics and make it thus
indefinitely understandable: that is the logical trick that can
be done with mathematics, and it is highly useful provided
the mathematician is not so soft headed as to fancy that just
such formal, actually unintelligible statement is the end of
the matter). Then Einstein, instead of saying bluntly and
clearly that in his theory no number is steady, says what
amounts to precisely the same thing:- that space (and time)
is variable (an uncertain, shaking jelly-fish); and in practice
he uses abstract mathematics, in which indefinite letters (such
as g in par. e) are used for numbers, so that he talks mathe-
matically about his theory without being actually troubled
by that numerical indefiniteness. (2) The second
point is that when he insists, following the mathematician
Minkowski, that time is a fourth ““dimension’’ of his jelly-
fish ““world,’’ he means merely the same commonplace thing
which we have been seeing:- that space and time must, in
any valid logic, always be used together (and we see the
psychology of that in §150e, etc.). | Orthodox physics and
mathematics drop time or Z' whenever they think it conven-
ient or ‘‘simpler’?; and that separation gives a dualism
or materialism, as we have seen. And Einstein is
merely destroying such self-contradictory materialism when
he says time is a ““fourth dimension’’—as is quite plain in
his book. He is not using ““dimension’’ in the same sense
that we speak of a ‘‘dimension’’ of space; in that sense the
word is quantitative, as we have seen. When Einstien says
time is a fourth ““dimension’’ he simply means that it is a
_relationship word and ought not to be dropped, which is
quite true: and he uses a very emphatic mathematical de-
vice to stop the dropping of time by mathematicians.

h. It thus appears that the relativitists have worked out
a formal logic or ““philosophy’”’ in terms of scientific “exact
quantities’ or ““matter.’? The ‘‘quantities’’ really evapo-
rate, so to speak, or turn into unstatable jelly-fish measures;
so the logic is actually the same in meaning and also in its

UNIVERSE =

ultimate form as ours. The theory of relativity is generally a
revival of Heraclitus the Obscure’s philosophy, as before
noted—and is superficially obscure because it claims to be
using (quantitative) terms which in practical effect it isn’t
using. Or, as was seen, formally relativity deliberately re-
fuses to distinguish between quantitative and qualtiative; nat-
urally, as we commonly explicitly distinguish between the
two, it is verbally confusing to us at first to use such a run-
together language, where any number is openly and consist-
ently asserted to be any other number or to be no numberat
all (i. e., to be 0 or ©). Relativity really means
unification. And Einstein’s theory—or actually logic—is in
principle incomplete in that he omits showing explicitly that
all relativity or relationship is ultimately that of identity or
unity (S28h). Also, his verbalisms are so confusing that
many obvious conclusions and experiences are hidden from
him; those are given in this book, in ordinary terms, with
an oceasional indication of how they would be expressed in
relativity logic.

i. The theory of relativity is important, and has at-
tracted much attention, because it is a unification of know-
ledge and is valid. Einstein makes a number of minor
logical errors in his book. But he drops those slight errors
and pulls through triumphantly with a formally valid logic—
valid so long as he keeps his infinite regresses and actual
numerical indefiniteness summed into that jelly-fish space,
which miraculously quivers infinitely (but merely verbally).
About the only theoretical objection to his work worth men-
tioning is that he seems to think that his non-Euclidian re-
marks may be “‘real’’ and different in actual meaning from
our ordinary way of talking. But because their phraseology is
so novel, the relativitists are not bothered with any of the supersti-
trons of the old dualistic science, and hence go along unhindered
and discover many new principles and facts hidden by and to that
materialism. Hence, the very novelty and quantitative verbal
unintelligibility of its verbalisms which repel and puzzle,
are the characteristics of relativity which make it valuable
now to the scientist by making him forget the materialistic
superstitions of the old so-called science. As evidence of
that, already it is reported that the German materialists are
attacking Einstein, but doing it on other alleged grounds.
The reader who does not intend to become an expert scient-
ist need not bother with relativity: if the relativitists dis-
cover any new ~ fact’’ that is actually a fact they can state
it, even for themselves, much more clearly than in relativity
terms, in ordinary terms intelligible to the average reader.

CHAPTER IX. Theory of language in terms ef Physical

. ’ . €¢ .
Science; or, general unification of “‘science.’’

S67. a. In this chapter will be shown the general uuifi-
cation of knowledge in terms of conventional physical ‘‘meas-
urements,’’ or experiments. _I shall state more definitely
what that means:- _—All our positive language is based upon
explicit, or tacitly accepted, measures—is expressed in posi-
tive Many terms by means of using relationships, which are
the “‘measures.’? Thus, we speak constantly of a foot, acre,
quart, pound, meter, much, little, now, yesterday. Even
in the so-called ““spiritual’’ business of (say) getting a wife
(or husband) we tacitly use measures:- e. g., we ordinarily
would not accept a spouse who was two feet or ten feet tall,
who weighed a ton, or who in mental measures was ‘‘unbal-
anced.’’ In short, our definite thought and talk is explicitly
in Many terms—involving either directly or with but slight
indirectness L and 7, or some of the numerous practical
synonyms of those relationship terms. We talk and think,

6} UNIVERSE

in so far as we do it positively and with perceptible useful-
ness (cf. SS 166, 168), in terms or ““measures’’ of the first
two members of our equation, That... X This... and M(vary-
ing with)L*T~?, and have a meaning that is the One or religion
tautologically named by the third member. In a general
way, physics (or “‘natural science’’) is the broad outline
statement of such terms or measures made with respect to
what we .call “‘objective’’ or ‘‘material’’ things (for more
specific description of physics and science, see §§85-6). Those
terms are the easiest to use: when we learn to use them,
then we are more or less competent to use ‘‘subjective’’ or
“‘spiritual’’ terms in Part Three. Hence, physics is simply
the actual use of our logic or consistent language, in connec-
tion with the simplest or least complicated Many parts (those
that are superficially that way, to be quite accurate: all
Many parts ultimately are identical in complication).
We may have a very fine, theoretically valid language; but
if we do not wse it, apply it considerably to ourselves and our
environment, it is doing us no particular good. Physics uses
our logic mostly on the “‘environment’’—that being easier
to see definitely than ourselves. The general physics of this
chapter is therefore a rough, broad application of what we
have observed in this Part One. And it is a self-conscious,
broadly complete application, so that we may see how it is
done, and thus be able to understand our language and use
it ourselves for facts of direct interest to us. Physics them-
selves are ordinarily of slight direct interest to us: just
““pure’’ physical statistics bore me dreadfully. But as
**clues’’ that enable us to derive the complete detective story
of the universe, physics are quite entertaining. As we are
going to find out what ““measures’’ are, mostly this chapter
is the explicit general application of M(varying with) L?T~2.

b. Hence, all of us who use language have some practi-
cal need for this chapter. However, init I am going to unify
all things, in general explicitness, so that there may be no
question as to the rigorousness and applicability of our logic,
even in the minds of experts. Probably no reader, not even
the physical expert, happens to be familiar with and directly
interested in all the things which J happen to have looked up
and to have mentioned in this chapter. Consequently, parts
of it will be decidedly hard reading—rather dull and dry.
There is no practical way of avoiding that: everything that
is worth having costs some effort. However, the reader can
merely casually scan such parts, verifying for himself only
the passages that interest him and seem to be of use to him,
and (unless he is a professional scientist) he will miss a neg-
ligible amonnt. This is much the ‘“‘hardest’’ and dullest
chapter in the book.

868. a. Orthodox scientists in effect undertake to make
a consistent theory of language or logic, naming the result
the theory of dimensions. For details of it, see any fairly full
physics; for the few details we need here I use *“Eney.
Brit.,’’ Art. “‘Units, Dimensions of’’ ; Watson’s ““Physics’’
(see Appendix A), pp. 6-9; Daniell’s ‘“Physics,’’ pp. 15-16,
746, 748. That conventional theory of dimensions, or logic
in terms of physics, is correct in principle so far as it goes:
it merely is incomplete, and hence gets into confusion with
some details.

b. Watson’s ‘‘Physics’’ explicitly states that a *“dimen-
sion’’ is a relationship, thus:- “The relation by means of
which we derive the magnitude of the unit of any quantity,
in terms of the fundamental units, is indicated by what is
called the dimensions of the unit in question.’’ The funda-
mental units are M, L, and 7. To give an example of that
rather vague conventional definition of dimensions:- If we
write [V]=[M°Z!7—1], it means that a unit of velocity [Vv]
is equal to an agreed-upon unit length, divided by an agreed-

One VIII §68c

upon unit time (i. e., multiplied by [Z~!]), with the agreed-
upon unit of mass equally applicable to all (©) cases, or from
the 0 point of view, not explicitly involved (i. e., M°=
M/M=M!-!=1). And that equation [V]=[M°L/L~] is a
dimensional equation. |The dimensions of V are said to be
0, I, and —I; or more fully, soas tobe completely explicit,
the dimensions of V are |[M°L!T]. 18 is formally truistic
therefore that if a velocity is ever mentioned by physics the
explicit or full expression of it must involve just those dimen-
sions and none other. And orthodox texts correctly gener-
alize that into the principle that in any physical equation
which is valid or consistent the dimensions of each member
are the same (Watson’s ‘‘Physics,’’ 790; ““Ency. Brit.,’’
xxvii, 737). Obviously, that actually is equivalent to our
principle that the logical proof of anything consists of reduc-
ing it to truisms ($35); so fundamentally, orthodox physics
is obviously directly our ‘language’ or ‘logic.’

ec. <A paragraph of arbitrary detail is required here. Or-
dinarily physics (as opposed to the theory of relativity) re-
gards the [M], etc., as being an agreed-upon unit, fixed and
constant, just as are the verbal forms of this book. Then,
when (1) various parts of the universe are expressed in terms
of that unit, or when (2) a given actual part of the universe
varies in different circumstances, the same arbitrary unit is
used for measuring (i. e., xaming), and a numerical coefficient
added, which indicates (1) those different parts, and (2) those
changes. When ordinary physics is explicit, it usually uses
a small letter for that “‘numerical coefficient’’ or number or
*“*‘measure’’:- thus ml[M] means (say) 3M, or 3 grams. Pre-
cisely the same agreements are used in everyday language.
Thus, as we have seen (§§60hi, 66fg), if we say ‘boy,’ the
expression is equivalent to [M]; and we say ‘John, a boy,’
‘big boy,’ ‘five year old boy,’ etc., in which the added words
or phrases are equivalent to a number, or general name or
measure, or numerical coefficient m—and ‘boy’ stays ‘‘steady”’
or ‘‘constant,’’ or an agreed-upon verbal unit of the Many
like the form [MI]. In this book our fundamental
principle that we shall keep the three sorts of words uncon-
fused is itself eqnivalent to saying that our fundamental
equation That... X This.. .=M varying with) L? T~2= Universe
or Energy is a dimensional equation in which (1) the dots .
and the “(varying with)’ are symbols which are precisely
equivalent to those numerical coefficients (as we shall see
throughout the chapter;—and it is to be noted that in our
equation we always not only express the existence of those
coefficients, but also indicate their variable character); and
in which (2) our M, L, and TJ are the dimensional units con-
ventionally printed with the brackets around them; and in
which lastly (3) the That and This (without the dots) are
equivalent to such conventional dimensional quantities as [V]
(i. e., That and This, and al] names in physics such as V,
are not complete and explicit expressions, but are irrational as
more fully defined in §71g). Therefore, because the
method of speech we are using is already explicitly what
physics calls dimensional, we do not need to distinguish such
equations by putting the quantities in brackets. Also, as we
see throughout this chapter (cf. also 8§134, 136; 138, etce.),
orthodox physics uses terms (such as K and U; Index, ‘‘K’’
and ‘‘U’’) which are not dimensional although orthodoxly
more or less taken to be so, but are nnmerical coefficients.
So if we were to use such brackets in this book, it would not
be possible to use them ina conventional way, because of
that orthodox confusion, and also because of the fact that M
is not the same sort of formal word that LZ and 7 are, and
the brackets conventionally used would tend to imply that it
is, Obviously, the brackets used by physics indicate a vague
and perhaps even conscious yearning to have relationship

§68c IX One

terms always distinguished formally from Many names (cf.
SSe6e2f, 44). Hence, I omit those brackets hereafter, and
will gradually clear up that double confusion that exists in
conventional physics, as it becomes intelligible to do so.

d. Now, from our investigation of language we have in
effect seen:- (1) that all complete sentences are dimensional
equations; (2) that snch valid sentences have the same di-
mensions in each member; (3) that finally such dimensions
really sum to zero (or ©); (4) and hence all valid sentences
are ultimately truisms of the form 4A; and (5) therefore
all verbal “‘proofs’’ reduce to that truistic form as being the
progf. That is the summary of Part One in terms of physics
or physical equations. In detail] it obviously means this:-
The first member of the general] equation is That... X This...,
which, fully expressed, is (That This)ML*®T~°—and that
form permits the tantological (That < This) to be dropped if
we like, so that we have the Many unit M, with actual “‘di-
mensions’’ or relationships that are ©— ©, or 0 (and the M
itself, taking it directly, is all things, or from that point of
view has © dimensions). The second member, M(varying
with)L?T 2, is similarly one in which the actual dimensions
are always 2—2, or ©—©®, etc., or zero—leaving again the
Many name M. The third member, Universe or Meaning or
Energy, obviously contains no real dimensions (or © dimen-
sions from the other view), or has zero “‘dimensions,’’ and
simply implies that it may be arbitrarily divided into M’s if
we like. So we really have the truism, in physical terms,
M=M=™M: or, more explicitly, as one M implies others :-
All M’s=All M’s=All M’s, and all M’s are unified or con-
nected. In that equation M is not a ‘‘dimension’’ or relation-
ship term (but from the other point of view it explicitly
implies infinite relationship; the relationship terms can not
properly be dropped from positive language; the definite
equation obviously should be M...—=M...—=M..., where ...
indicate the dimensions, thus hecome symbolically infinite).

e. Now, the orthodox theory of dimensions does not
precisely assert the last paragraph. But I think it is obvious
that the conventional theory of dimensions has been striving
to say just that paragraph—and very clearly means it.
Therefore, in brief, our investigation of language is nothing
more than a series of observations of commonplaces, which
gives us the same speech or “‘logic’’ that physical science
uses and formally names “‘theory of dimensions.’’ By go-
ing at that theory in terms of everyday life, we saw defin-
itely its completion, and meaning.

f. We need to look at the physics method of speech
from one more aspect:- I must again anticipate the proof
(S888, 83, 100, etc.), aud assert that we observe different
things (split the universe into M’s) by noting their
““surfaces’’ or bounding zones, which are at about the con-
ventional ‘‘velocity of light.”’ (J. e., we in practice divide
or split a chair from the rest of the universe because various
outside layers of what we call the chair send “‘light’’ to our
eyes, or quantitatively similarly affect other nerves; if we
*“set fire to the chair’’ those velocities change enough to
modify our splittings considerably.) The completest theory
in orthodox physics is electricity (XIV). That theory uses
two names, K and U (which, with respect to electricity,
mean respectively the same that visibility and transparence,
and somewhat synonymous words, mean with respect to
light). K and U are used to give the measures of electrical
M’s. Orthodoxly, they are nominally dimensions, although
it is frankly asserted by competent physicists that their nat-
ure is unknown (Watson’s ““Physics,’’ 789). But by ordi-
nary experiments physicists find that K and U together
directly assert the velocity of light. That is to say, all elec-
trical M’s or parts of the Many are also distinguished or split

UNIVERSE 62

from the rest of the universe (or ‘‘measured’’—distinguished
and observed and separated into parts and considered different,
and all such terms, are simply synonyms of the formal tech-
nical term measured)—all electrical M’s are also, like a chair,
distinguished by what is ultimately the average velocity of
light in their neighborhood. And there are names or “meas-
ures’ exactly analogous to K and U in all phenomena. So it
perhaps is now generally obvious to the reader that Kand U,
and the other similar terms, are identical in meaning (but
explicit in what we might call quantity of meaning) with our
‘(varying with).’ 1. e., they are numerical coefficients which
merely designate which actual M it is we are naming by
means of the fixed standard jorm, M—regardless of what
‘‘sort’’ of ““‘phenomenon’’ we are talking about. They in-
dicate that we mean the ‘boy K’ or the “boy John’ or even
‘the boy matter that has now grown into the man light’
when we name a ‘boy’ in certain circumstances—i. e., in
certain ‘‘phenomena.’’

gs. Well; that is the total theory or “*inwardness’’ of
physical science, and the explicit statement of the solution of
the only general unsolved “‘problem’’ in orthodox science.
It is no problem; to repeat, competent physicists know that
its non-solution is a verbal confusion, and hence is merely an
incompleteness. The theory of physics is hence very simple;
anybody not mentally defective can understand that all it is,
is a very carefully explicit naming of all its “boys’—of all its
M’s regardless of what clothes or even *“disguises’’ they
wear, of what changes in appearances (dignifiedly called
““transformations’’) they pass through. The method or way
of doing that naming is precisely the way we use daily in
talking about different ‘boys’; the physicists cal] it by the
large name ‘‘theory of dimensions,’’ but there is no reason
to fear a cow even if it be referred to as a bos taurus.

h. Consequently, physics merely applies the theory of
language we have seen, (1) using four or five sets of ““tech-
nical terms’’ instead of the set That... < This... (there is a
set for electricity, one for heat, etc.), and (2) getting defin-
ite numbers, measures, or names for the general ‘(varying
with)’ in the second member. We saw in the last chapter
that we can make models of language and thus make lang-
uage more intelligible to us. In the same way we can make
models or “‘machines’’ or mechanical theories of the particn-
lar expressions of physics, and make physics more _ intelli-
gible. Part Two is for that: in’ this chapter we take just
the general] language of physics.

i. And we see again (cf. §867b) that this chapter will
not be quite familiar, and hence will be hard reading in
places. We now see definitely that part of that results be-
cause of the confusion which is in orthodox science. The
fact is that I personally derived the theory of language by
definitely starting with orthodox physical equations and
eliminating their inconsistencies. But by actual experience
J have found that that directly “‘scientific’’ way of unifying
science is so deadly dull, especially to professional scientists,
that people would rarely read it, and could not keep their
minds on it long enough to comprehend it when they did
read it. They can’t see at first just what it is **good for.”
It actually is highly useful, and some parts of it are likely to
be of interest to the general reader. _It is useful because it
shows explicitly the general way of making all positive state-
ments (that being the base of science, engineering, etc. )—
and is brief enough to be grasped in a lump, especially as ]
have so violently condensed the chapter. But there is no
particular reason why the reader who is not directly inter-
ested in the special facts to be noticed should make an effort
to remember them.

$69. a. In this book I shall use for the most part the

63 UNIVERSE

conventional physical symbols, as given in “‘Ency. Brit.,”’
xxvii, 736-45, and Watson’s ““Physics,’’ 7f, 343f, 789f,
adding subscripts ;, e, or dots ..., or coefficients to them
when necessary to distinguish explicitly the three parts of
the Trinity, and substituting English for two Greek letters
—there being objections to lugging in Greek if English will
serve. The orthodox fundamental equations are of course
supposed to be simply a shorthand way of stating the results
of different sorts of systematic measurements—of explicit
naming. I take it for granted that the reader is roughly
aware of how those experiments or measures are made. In
the end, of course, all measurements, all observations, consist
in observing space (and time) coincidences (or negatively,
lack of coincidences); e. g., noting that the top of one
boy’s head will reach to the same mark as that of another
boy’s—all that being a mere truism of what we have already
seen about language. But if it happens that in any case
where I omit statement of details the reader is not roughly
familiar with the orthodox experiments he can find descrip-
tions of them in any fairly full physics or encyclopedia.

b. And in this book, unless otherwise specified by the
context, we shall use the ordinary scientific units:- M is
the unit representing the mass or quantity (§§70-4) of a por-
tion of matter which weighs a gram at a given place, under
given conditions (including date, or 7). L is the unit of
space, a centimeter, which is the 1/100 part of the distance
under certain conditions (including date) between certain
marks on a metal bar—kept in Paris, I believe. T is the
unit of time, a second, which is the 1/86,400 part of an av-
erage solar day of the present. The average solar day varies,
so we do not know exactly how long a second is, any more
than we know exactly the unit M and unit L.

$70. a. Conventionally, W=—Mg; or weight W of a
a body M is equal to the mass M of the body multiplied by
the number g, which number names or measures the accel-
eration given the body by the force of gravity acting at a
certain place under certain conditions, as observed by experi-
ments. (Incidentally, under average conditions in temper-
ate latitudes at sea level on earth, g is approximately
981cem/sec”, or 32ft/sec?.) That equation is a numerical or
non-dimensional one. W is (conventionally: all this is
orthodox, as stated) the force of gravity at a given place
and time. Acceleration is the change in velocity during a
unit time, or is equal to V¥/T; WV=LT—, and hence Accel-
eration=LT1/T=LT 2. Hence, the dimensional form of
the equation for W is F(of gravity) =MLT™*. —_Convention-
ally, any unit F is equal to, or measured by, the fact that
it results in giving unit mass a unit acceleration; i. e., if we
push with a certain ““force’’ on a ball, the ball will roll
faster and faster if “‘free’’ to move, under average conditions.
Or, as the brief way of saying that:- F—MLT~. And
orthodoxly, energy is force-acting-through-space (the amount
of the results of force); or Energy=FXL=MLT?X L=
ML?T-2, Now, orthodoxly, Newton’s law of gravity (usually
I shall refer to it simply as ‘Newton’s law’) asserts that
every body M in the universe attracts every other body M (
with a force F that varies in each case directly as the two
attracting masses and inversely as the square of the distance
L between them. lf we take all three as being units, we
may condense Newton’s law to the dimensional equation,
F(of gravity)=M?L~.

b. Therefore, we have by orthodox physics two equa-
tions for F when it is a certain kind of force (the force of
gravity):- F(of gravity) —=MLT-, and F(of gravity)=
M?T-*, Consequently, if we stick to our fundamental
agreement A=A, or to the conventional axiom that things
equal to the same thing are equal to each other, then ortho-

One 1X §7Ib

doxly the two F’s are equal, and we have MLT?=M2?L %.
From that, by algebra, 7~2—=ML™; or (1) T?7=M" ZI; or
(2) M=I3T-?. or (3) E=MT*. Obviously, any of those
three formulas, explicitly interpreted, is sheer nonsense.
The first asserts that a time, squared, is equal to a solid
space divided by a body; the second, that a body is a solid
space divided by a time, squared; the third, that a solid
space is a body multiplied by a time, squared—al]] mutually
contradictory nonsense, and all violating the orthodox prin-
ciple that the dimensions on the two sides should be the same
(S68b). Orthodox science has for years recognized that such
a nonsensical self-contradiction existed at its very base or
beginning.

c. It immediately follows, that (1) the orthodox defini-
tion of F is wrong; or (2) the orthodox law of gravity is
wrong; or (3) both are wrong. We find that both are wrong
($74d). That is to say, in defining or writing both of them,
conventional science simply failed to note and express ex-
plicitly all that was actually observed. The difficulty with
both is that too much is left to implication—i. e., orthodox
science in them gives no indication as to which of the
three sorts of words is being used, and mixes them. Science
now actually knows the facts quite well; but there is so
much of the expression of those facts omitted in the equations
for F, W, and F(ef gravity) that as soon as the equations are
compared (to see if science keeps on sticking to A4—4A), ex-
plicit nonsense results. Hence, what we have to do now is
to observe just what is meant, and say it explicitly.

d. The truth of the matter is that F and W in the equa-
tions are not the same, and ought not to have been equated.
F is a general way of considering a part of the expression for
Energy (and only the total expression of it is intelligible and
verbally consistent, anyway; §71g); and W is another sort
of part of that expression for Energy. But there is nothing
in orthodox physics which explicitly asserts that about those
equations, or which in any way explicitly holds that what I
did in par. b is not permissible (J merely did with orthodox
physics what 1 did in §44 with orthodox mathematics)—ex-
cept of course it is recognized that such nonsense would re-
sult, and so conventional physics usually stops before it
writes those queer equations—keeps its skeletons decorously
in the closet.

871. a. In the first place we can observe that physics
undertakes to use F or force itself simultaneously as a Many
word and as a relationship word——and then later on uses it
as a standard One. Thus in Newton’s law, F=MM /L?, F
expresses a relationship between two bodies M and M’, and
is identical in real meaning with cohesion or love (§8s), or
God the Holy Ghost. But in the orthodox equation F X L=
MI? T*=Energy, F is actually an M, a part of the universe,
or a Many word (just as in That... X This..., That... implies
an M, or is a Many word; §36l). And in the orthodox
equation F—=MLT™, F is substantially a One word, as it is
absolutely alone. (As a matter of fact [cf. par. g], all of
these orthodox equations are logically mystic—i. e., all
their symbols are more or less One words. The assignment
just made of orthodox F’s as various sorts of words is based
on the point of view developed by this book.)

b. The simplest way in which we can use the conven-
tional F, and other symbols, and at the same time keep our
thought clear and definite (i. e., avoid the classic-logic or
dualistic mysticism just mentioned), and thus arrive at valid
conclusions by following the logical rule (§§43-4), is to dis-
tinguish its three uses in the Trinity by three explicit modifi-
cations. For such three uses, I shall use two subscripts,
r and ¢, and the dots ... ov a numerical coefficient (C, G, K,
U, H, J, ete.) that is equivalent to the dots. The subscript

§7lb IX One

r means that the symbol it is used with is a relationship
word—equivalent to X, +, =, etc. The subscript e means
a zero (or infinity) or One word—usually a standard unit or
One. (The, is the initia) letter of relationship; I couldn’t
buy the type for a letter more suitable tban e except ata
silly price, so I use e, which can be remembered by the fact
that it looks somewhat like a little zero.) Our symbol M
standing just alone (and also, formally, all the M’s used in
orthodox science) is a standard unit or One; i. e., at a certain
time and place it is taken as a jfized standard, and it is then
logically or formally considered to remain so as a word, and
always to refer back to those formally absolute conditions
(cf. $68c). Consequently, as an M, or other symbol, stand-
ing alone formally (i. e., without any dots, or coefficient, or
subscript ;) is thus formally indicated to be such a standard,
there actually is no positive need to distinguish it by the
subscript ¢; but often hereafter, as a means of typographic-
ally emphasizing its standard nature, I use the subscript.
Then, a symbol followed by the dots, or by a ‘coefficient’
($72), or by its general equivalent ‘(varying with),’ is a
That..., a Many word; examples:- M..., MC, F....
Further, as there are different “‘sorts’’ of force (i. e., con-
ventionally, but not at all necessarily, a force is named with
various names to indicate ‘‘different’’ phenomena), etc.,
when it is convenient and clearer thus to name them, I! add
either the subscript «, meaning a * ‘static’? phenomenon, or
m, Meaning a \dynamic’’ one, and at times further add, in
parentheses, the name of the phenomenon.

c. Now, if we wish to name at least two M’s, in order
that later on we may say samething about them, clearly we
must assert that there are such two parts of the universe,
with a relationship F;. That is positively all that F; isa
pure verbal assumption or agreement, serving as a verbal basis
of then making an intelligible statement. hen, if we assert
that the M’s related by the F, do move relatively to each
other, there has been a That... or M... or F... (i. e., an M
asserted related) which is compared with the This... which
is-are the other M’s (any motion of one M, except in the
case of an abstract unit or standard, which only exists as a
verbal form, changes it to M...); and that comparison, or
That... X This..., or standard One or Energy, is « complete
meaning. So we begin to state the implications of our “‘scien-
tific’? equations, just as was done with This’s and That’s in
§$33-7, as a means of finding out how to make any valid
scientific equation or statement. It is a repetition, in
‘‘seientifie’’ terms—and so I shall condense considerably.
The reader already knows the principles—he will see merely
the rigorous, definite application of them, which of course
serves as final proof of those principles of language.

d. The orthodox expression F XL (which equals Energy
or MI?T~2 [§70a], Fe being equal to M-L 7) is obviously
an implication that a standard Me might move over a space Le
relative to the implied AZ. at that location—i. e., the L, is
the implied space between the two implied M’s, and hence is
the ‘‘potential’’ (i. e., ‘implied’ or “‘possible’’ motion) of
the two. Consequently, the conventional FX L is actually
Fe Le when it is erplicitly written and is a pure mysticism
equivalent to the similarly pure mysticism MZ?T7~ or its
explicit equivalent M-L?T*—i. e., it does not assert, but only
implies motion. But clearly, those implications of naming or
“‘measuring,’’ just as we saw in the discussion of That... X
This... ($36), explicitly imply the form (M...XM...)L°7-”.
That form, depending on how we modify its symbolic ex-

pression, clearly is identical with either the first or the sec-
ond member of our general equation—to either That...
This... or to M(varying with) I? T~. As we wish to retain
conventional symbols (I am forced to, if I translate them), we

UNIVERSE

64

may therefore write that form as F... xX... (and further as
(M...)L?2T or (MC)I?T-2; see S72d). F... and L... are
actual Many words—not the standard units or M’s taken as
the One that are used in the orthodox absolutely mystic
formula Fe Le or FX L.

e. As we shall see in more and more detail, any scien-
tific equation may have a member of that That... DOTS. x
form. In that F... XL... form the F... (or the orthodox F
or F.) or analogous term, is conventionally named the ezten-
sive factor; and L... (or L or L.) or any analogous term is
the intensive factor. Obviously, *‘extensive factor’ agrees
with the usual meaning of That:- something away from this;
a completing part or factor, extending the This out. And
‘“‘ntensive’’ is This—something intensely right here.

f. In this book I always print as the jirst in the pair
That... < This..., the factor which seems to be usually re-
garded as the exlensive one. ‘That’ obviously by usual con-
vention has a meaning more ‘‘extensive’’ than ° This’—but
not necessarily so; it depends solely upon the point of view.
g. Also, those two factors, F... and L... and all analo-
gous ones, are beth irrational factors. _I. e., each is utterly
meaningless when used alone: factor itself means a part, and
clearly a part truistically is not a whole or meaning, but ex-
plicitly implies incompleteness, and lack of positiveness.
That simply means that any Many word implies all the other
parts of the Many—that it is sheer, irrational nonsense to
say that a Many word, which formally names a part, simul-
taneously is not formally a part, but is formally an absolute
Whole. Also, the expression F'.< Le (or its more con-
ventional form FX L) from the point of view of positiveness is
obviously utterly irrational—as Fe. and JL are by verbal
agreement fixed or formal standard units or Ones that as such
logically or truistically contradict being related with the re-
sulting variableness. Only as we let FX L imply other ex-
pression which is variable and actual and hence positive
can it have any actual meaning; otherwise it is really (as
well as formally—and in order to handle the One and Many
with valid logic it must be formally or verbally) dualism or
the old classic logic, and fundamentally also really nonsenusi-
eal. E. g., some militaristic Germans tried to consider the
This which was their State as being alone worth considering,
and a being a real One—and many of the historical results
clearly showed the stupidity and ridiculousness of their view.

h. So it is already generally evident that the difficulty
with orthodox physics is that it is not sufficiently explicit. It
unwittingly tried to ‘‘simplify’’ too much and fell into relig-
ious or mystic expression. ‘“Simplification’’ actually con-
sists of translation into familiar (““common’’) terms; it does
not mean the ignoring of many things that actually exist, in
order to get mere superficial verbal brevity.

i. In using such pairs of factors physics obviously uses
precisely the same sort of Many names, in precisely the
the same sort of way, that ordinary language does. Hence,
the factors may be called zaming factors; the more explicit
second member of the equation is the measuring member.
E. g., in the orthodox physics of gases the names are pressure
and volume (p Xv; and clearly p and v indicates names more
definitely that they do measures, although both are the same
in the end); in heat, they are entropy and temperature (Ent X
Temp); in electricity, quantity of electricity, and potential
or intensity or pressure of electricity (QP); ete. In
Richards’s explicitly complete extension of Van der Waals’s
gas equation or kinetic theory, orthodox physics definitely
requires or uses the dots, or infinite regress, after those
Many names or factors (§§82, 92-3). So I am agreeing with
orthodox physics, and not really doing anything new.

J. That covers broadly the theory of the first member of

65 UNIVERSE

our general equation, as it is used by “‘science.’’ We go on
to the broad consideration of the second or measuring mem-
ber, and then take up details.

§72. a. Explicitly speaking in ‘‘scientific’’ terms (and
that explicitness makes this paragraph unfamiliar and queer
in form), a specified amount of energy (i. e., a standard or
whole universe or One, Energy) is equal to the movement of a
specified quantity of matter (which quantity or Many part is
hence truistically, or formally necessarily, named relatively
to at least one other specified quantity); and that meaning of
energy truistically implies that the movement must ‘verbally
take place’ ox be expressed. 1. e., Energy is motion (expressed
of course as the ““measure’’ of it); but further, the verbal
assumption of such motion (which is of course necessarily
made when we try to express energy) requires a verbal asser-
tion of motion—a formal truism which orthodox science over-
looks, so that its Energy or M.L?T-2 jis not positive
language: it should be M.L°T7~°, as we shall see. I
have not there assumed ‘‘motion.’? Just as in §22, it was
verbally taken that there existed something which we talk
about; if so. then the talk of relative parts is ‘‘motion.”’
Clearly, if a person does not care to say, with everyday peo-
ple, that there is ‘‘motion,’’ then he can take an absolutely
static reality or Nirvana, in which nothing changes or varies,
but which he describes by arbitrary variation in mere form or
relationship of words—a “‘really’’ non-existent change, and
hence a verbal proof or truism, of absolutely no motion.

b. I shall now express in symbols that explicit Energy.
The ‘specified quantity of matter’ is expressed in standard un-
its by M (or M.). The ‘movement’ is, in verbally the most
parsimonious way, expressed by L7™! (i. e., not with ulti-
mate accuracy as a One by L*7~%). Then, still quoting
from the last paragraph, the ‘truistic naming of M relative to
at least one other M’ requires at least one more verbal rela-
tionship form LZ 1. Next, in order to get the movement
verbally to ‘take place,’ and complete the most parsimonious
set of truisms, we must have at least one more relationship
form LT (all that being the “‘scientific’’ point of view of
859). And letting the at least one more M (an M’) be im-
plied (or letting it be considered to have really joined with
the standard M or M.), and collecting together the three
LT™-1’s that were used, we have:- Energy—MIL?T™, as a
preliminary most frugal sort of expression of energy ;—the
expression is really mystic unless we include as being a part
of it, its context that the M implies at least one more M;
but our chief present interest is the L°7~%, instead of the
I?T-? in the conventional ML?7T™?. We can see at once
that instead of L°7~%, complete expression would bave been
L*T-*—)but we need not go again into the fact that Eps
is a practical replacement of that infinite regress and makes
the equation inaccurate (§38). Further, orthodox equations
omit and thus imply one LZ! both in defining Energy and
in making the actual measurements. I. e., in making the
measurements those orthodox equations tacitly assume that
the observer moves at zero velocity in order to measure (ite. :
that he sees both M’s simultaneously), or at an infinite veloc-
ity (i. e., asserts a space between the M’s, but ignores its
existence or passes over it in zero time)—all of which
amounts to asserting Enxergy—=ML?T~*, which expression
hence actually asserts that there is absolutely zero potential
(or zero L) between the two M’s, so that they really could
not exhibit any energy. _It therefore results that ML?T 2
is absolutely zot, of itself, the positive expression of anything,
even if the M is considered as expressing at least two M’s:
it is absolutely ineffable. But, it furnishes a standard One,
and it together with the context we are to supply is to be used
as a scientific expression for Energy just as it is now used.

One IX §72d

ec. We noted in the last paragraph that in measuring the
unified bodies M. in M.I?T~*, we tacitly assumed that the
observer (in going from ‘egg’ to ‘pencil’ as in §36) took his
speed of measuring or observing to be either zero or infinity
—i.e., to be absolutely constant, and hence as not needing to be
expressed. If the speed is not such, then (as a verbal truism
shown in §36]—or as a truism of the fact in par. a that the
M’s are ‘“‘moving’’) every M, for each person at each
instant, is necessarily designated by a different name, or else
there is a quantitative inaccuracy (as a matter of fact, our
speed in that measuring or observing is, to use ordinary
language, the velocity of light; so the inaccuracy is slight
with respect to things in our everyday practical environment;
but it is indispensable that we notice the logic definitely if
we are to claim to talk consistently and carefully, and are to
have a valid or even a really intelligible physics). Orthodox
science takes cognizance of those facts in relativity (§66);
we are now going to do so without having to abandon our
mutual language and then have a formally private language
for each person. Obviously, the only possible way to make
our equation for Energy formally correct is to put in, or ex-
press explicitly, that it is quantitatively inaccurate (which
inaccuracy of course resulted when we dropped the explicit
L°T-), and also of itself has a logical omission.

d. Now, the ordinary standard unit M. which we use is
a gram-mass, which is the ““matter’’ or substance or part of
the universe that is the 1/1000 part of a lump of platinum
kept in Paris (Daniell’s ‘“Physics,’’? 13). We distinguish it
—only can observe or measure it—because its outer atoms or
molecules have zones of ether that move at about the velocity
of light in our neighborhood (XIJI)—actually a varying ve-
locity itself (8127). We ourselves as a molar M are more or
less at rest (static) compared with that high velocity—not
absolutely so, however. Therefore, we assume that we take
an average M, and that we may formally for verbal purposes
take it to be absolutely fixed and constant always and every-
where—i. e., is explicitly an Me. Then, because we observe
that any actual body or M... varies, we must add to that
formal Mor M. the dots..., or a numerical coefficient (a
*“number,’’ such as 1. 0002...: it can never be accurately a
commensurate or ‘‘rational’’ or exact number), which we
shall call C (that C indicating that we are referring to ‘‘ordi-
nary’’ or molar bodies, as arbitrarily distinguished from elec-
tricity, atoms, light, ete.). Or, MC is merely another way
of writing M... or M(varying with) (§71b); we use that way
because conventional science in a number of cases in effect
has such letter symbols in its equations. In writing its
equation Energy—ML?T~ orthodox science omits explicitly
including any equivalent of C—thus (1) taking it quantita-
tively for granted that C is equal to 1; and (2) taking it
logically or qualitatively for granted that Cis always steady
or a constant, which is absolutely wrong. Asa matter of
fact, in most practical affairs with molar bodies, C substan-
tially is equal to 1, and is approximately, but never qualita-
tively, a constant. But in heat, electricity, light, chemistry,
all molecular physics, most gas phenomena, gravity, biology,
psychology, etc., Cis so far from being a constant, and has
changed so much from its quantitative value in molar phys-
ics, that in most of those cases orthodox science explicitly
gives °C’ a name, experimentally finds it to have that changed
value (sometimes an enormous change), and hence usually
gives the °C’ different names, and also names those ‘cases’ or
‘‘pbhenomena’’ or “‘branches’’ of science differently, taking
the ‘C’ of each to be unity for that branch—thus splitting
‘‘science’’ into ‘‘parts’’ or formally disconnected branches,
whereas nothing changes between any two branches but
velocities, or the measures of velocities—both being arbitrary

§72d IX One

anyway. ‘The real confusion in science is caused by the fact
that in effect in each branch the original formal or quali-
tative error is repeated:- that of asserting that the new Be
with its different value, is a constant—thus in effect asserting
flatly, with no experimental proof of it, that a unification of
science is impossible, and making a verbal impass that has
produced the queer relativity theory as an exaggerated re-
action. Therefore, from the point of view of the
measuring member M(varying with)L?T~™, our unification of
science will consist of replacing the ‘(varying with)’ with the
symbols already mostly found by science, and showing that
not only by our already observed verbal] truisms, but also by
*“scientific experiments’ those symbols are all identical in
character and in measured quantity vary continuously so that
there can be nothing but an arbitrary quantitative line be-
tween ‘different’? phenomena. That is obviously identi-
cally the same in principle as unifying science with respect
to the first member by always explicitly adding the dots as in
F...XL... (§71e-i); here, M(varying with)I?T~ is equiva-
lent to (M...)I?T~, and we are to be explicit about the dots.

e. We may now see very briefly some general direct ex-
perimental proof that every actual body varies:- (1) The
quickest statement of that proof is:- observe that every act-
ual body changes—very perceptibly so if we watch it for a
long enough time. (2) The general technical experimental
proof is that it is observed that mass varies with velocity.
(3) Particular proof is, that it can be noted that every so-
called physical constant unit has to be described carefully as
to date and place—numerous conditions given—before it is
considered to be even approximate; and then it is agreed
that no two observers of it are likely to coincide exactly in
their measures. The variation is orthodoxly called ““personal
error,’ etc., but no proof exists that man is subject to varia-
tion or “‘errors’’ while other bodies are miraculously im-
mune. That is a direct implication of the infinite regress—
of the symbolic need of dots in M..., or of the C in MC.
(4) Further, modern physics, in mechanical theories (in the
naming member That... X This...), substantially reduces all
phenomena to a passage or flow of electrons (which have
mass and weight) between the various bodies involved in the
phenomena; so truistically, the bodies or M’s vary. (E. g.,
if we were merely to look at the standard 1000-gram body
in Paris, it actually changes as a result, due to the passage
of electrons in the light phenomena that are involved [X1V].
It is quite true that the change is of practically no quantita-
tive importance—it would probably be too small to measure
by any direct means now available. But it is equally true
that it is absolutely wrong to assert, by conventionally using
MI?T~2, that there is zo change. ) We see other ex-
perimental proofs throughout the rest of the book.

f. Consequently, we have in physics, for the funda-
mental positive equation for molar bodies (subject to an
additional implied L7~!):-

F...XL...=MCL*T *= Energy(molar).

873. a. We shall at once plunge into the meaning, im-
plications, and expansion of that somewhat odd looking equa-
tion. What we are going to see now is shown in §§875-81 to
be nearly explicitly what conventional science asserts in elec-
tricity and substantially in heat. So there is essentially
nothing novel about our equation.

b. We have seen that each of the first two members
implies at least two M’s. The L... in F... XL... is implic-
itly an assertion of a molar body, which we can consider to
be M’. Now, we wish to assert the relationship of F... and
L... more explicitly than that abbreviated F...*L... does
it. I] shall condense the statement of that relationship in
this paragraph; but not until all the meaning of the equation,

UNIVERSE 66

including the explicit mathematical values of F... and L...
(par. g), is seen, can this paragraph seem very intelligible.
We take it that a relationship (the ) exists across
a space between two molar bodies M and M’, and we wish
to express that relationship with formal completeness (when
we do that 1 usually name the X more explicitly :- i),
The surfaces of the bodies are their sole property, as molar
bodies—a truism, as property simply ultimately means ‘an ez-
pression of, or a concrete, separation into parts,’ as we shal] see
more and more clearly in this chapter. I. e., a body isa
molar body when we consider that it has a surface zone of
motion—the insides of the body being static or motionless so
far as formal expression explicitly goes (of course, such a
condition is never true of any actual body, and hence such
formal molar equations are never accurate—and_ unless
understood to imply the present context, by the agreement
that C is variable infinitely, conventional molar or static equa-
tions are illogical). Furthermore, because of the formally
omitted LT 1, the space between M and M” is also consid-
ered to be logically negligible, or constant, or static, or
traveled over in the process of naming in absolutely zero
time (§72b), so that that space is simply and solely the divi-
sion (a relationship) of the One into at least two parts.
(J. e., the ZL... tends to take on the form L,, and finally
changes in the L. which is the ‘“L’’ in the orthodox FXL;
—the three forms of the Trinity are so intimately mixed in
that ““‘Z’’ that to reform the confusion science humanly used
the unnecessarily violent method of revolting to relativity,
in which the L., or the Lin MCL?T~?, is entirely thrown
away or repudiated verbally—although still tacitly used.)
Hence, that space Ly (actually the X in F... XL...) is form-
ally or logically a symbol or a “surface’—what IJ shall call a
difference surface, meaning not a geometrical surface, but a
bounding zone. Incidentally, the “‘F’’ in the ortho-
dox F XL, when that F XL is implicitly taken to have a
meaning, like our L... implies other forms of the Trinity;
but technically the orthodox F XL is a rigid and hence mys-
tic Fe Le, as we shall see further.

c. We have then a formal relationship F; from M’ ex-
tending across a logically or formally dead or static space
which we may call d (distance: it is a conventional symbol,
equivalent to L), to another body M. I. e., the two bodies
are actually united, but we verbally take them to be separ-
ated by the formal relationship space d, and then assert the
relationship force F; as uniting them—that being the usual
formal cancellation of the verbal contradiction in the One
and Many. I shall call that F; across an absolutely formal
relationship space:- ‘¥F;(molar)’—in agreement with the
conventions stated in the last paragraph. As we are
speaking ordinary 3-dimension language, therefore, as a tru-
ism (cf. 8836de, 59), as we move formally (as a relationship
LT") from M’ to M, the cancelling relationship or force F;
(which here takes the place of the usual “‘time’’—or is an
Py eee Ch Pens ‘és ‘ eae.

objective“ synonym of the ‘subjective’ T'; ef. 88150-1)
must also spread out into the other two dimensions; for, the
relationship is inclusive of all M’s, as a truism of its original
introduction into the discussion; or, M itself (by $59) has
by our parsimonious explicit language, three dimensions.
Putting that observation of verbal truisms into ordinary sym-
bols, we have:- F;(molar)=M(LT™)M’/d?. (That LT}
indicates that those M’s are actual M...’s and not M.’s.)

d. That equation resembles Newton’s law of gravity—
would be it explicitly if we hadn’t taken the trouble to be
explicit about the LT. —_ But it is not any law of gravity.
It is, so far, simply an explicit statement of a relationship
named F; which is true anywhere in the universe across any
portion of formal relating space between molar bodies—and

67 UNIVERSE

as such is a symbolic, brief expression of simple truisms of
the naming or arbifrary recognition of such bodies as formal
parts of the One which they constitute. It is nothing more;
it is a verbal preparation or agreement or form for measuring,
or for expressing observations, and is not the actual measur-
ing or expression of actual measuring or experiments. Or,
it is what is conventionally called the mathematical limit; it
is the ultimate abstraction and applies to no actual phenome-
non (§83f, etc.). And it is important to observe that that
so-called inverse square law which appears in that equation
(the /d? or +d? or d~*), and which appears so often in
science, is nothing more than a verbal truism based on the
agreement to use 3-dimension space. The inverse square
law is purely logical—an agreement of speech. That law ez-
plicitly is :- (M...)(M’...)/d?. As we shall see, the measured
or observed so-called force between any two distinguished-
apart actual bodies is mever accurately stated by the form
MM: |d?; that form (more conventionally written MM‘/d?
or M?L~) assumes the existence of a constant relationship F;
which is never actually, or in a Many sense, the case, as M’s
always change (§72). A good physicist could readily
finish writing the valid physical equations from just that
crucial logical point. But to save him work I shall develop
some of them; and we shall see more intelligible details of
those very broad conclusions as we proceed (§§77, 83, 98.
Index, ““Static and dynamic’’).

e. We may write that equation:- F,—(M...)(M’...)d~?
or F,=(MC)(MC)/d? or F-=M2C?L-2. That simply puts it
in conventional form—one which is analogous to electrical
equations, and is in superficial form like Newton’s law. We
could have used any other symbol beside C, and given that
symbol any numerical exponent besides that 2. Asa stand-
ard of measuring, the inverse square law or formula of course
becomes M.*L~2, where the C is the average 1.

f. As wesaw, F... in F... XL... explicitly implies an
M.... We may arbitrarily take it that F... is one of those
M...’s in M?C2L-?: or, F...=M...=MC. (That does not
mean that F...=the MC in MCL?T-? of §72f, any more than
that one of the six dots here printed in F..: XL... is equal
to one of the three dots in M...L°T-?. If we wished, we
could interpret F... as the MC in MCI?T~; it would merely
result in making a different distribution of names, and would
make MC in M*C?L~* have some other name. Also, see
next paragraph.) When we thus talk of F... as being an
actual body M..., we are doing precisely what conventional
science does in talking of FX L—except for the secondary
fact that science means by ‘‘F’’:- F., or an ultimately av-
erage or standard or abstract “‘M.’’ Orthodox science says
that that F. is a force that “‘resides’’ on or in the body,
which by moving through L displays the M-L?T~ or Energy.
Now, if one entity “‘F’’ “‘resides’’ on another named wove?
then that ‘residence’ is simply an implication of a relation-
ship not explicitly expressed. Hence, without repeating all
the trnisms as to the identity of relationships (§2s8h), itis a
truism that the F... (or the orthodox “*F’’) is identical with
the M... (or with the orthodox “*M”? in which it “‘re-
sides’’): a sufficient practical explicitly expressed proof of
that for this place is that **M’’ is tacitly taken to occupy
all the space it occupies, and as the **F”’? is held to be in the
same space, then by science’s ‘‘axiom’’ (4=A agreement)
that two things can not occupy the same space simultane-
ously, the “‘F’’ must be the ““M.’’ So we are quite in
agreement with conventions in taking F... to be an M...—
although verbally we are more explicit. That truism
that a ‘‘force residing’”’ is the body itself in which it resides
is an important one, although here condensed into a few
lines, as an incident to another subject. There are numer-

One IX §73h

ous attempted absolute dualisms in conventional science be-
tween ‘‘F’’ and ‘‘M’’ because the ‘‘F’’ “‘resides’’: that
truism eliminates them all.

g. Therefore, instde the narrow special limits in which we
take our average or standard units /., L, T, we have F(mo-
lar) on an average (i. e., in mutual language or names) giv-
ing a unit acceleration to a unit mass; or, as a mutual,
standard statement of unit quantities, F(molar)=M.LT~?.
Therefore, we have the explicit, definite, actual translation
of actual M...’s into mutual, average, standard language:-
M.LT?=(M?°C?)L-*. (Incidentally, that equation shows
explicitly why F... is zot the MC in MCL?T~; cf. §70b.)
Then, for the F.,. in F... XL... we obviously have:- F... or
F...(matter) or F...(molar matter) or F...(static)=MC=
V(M0C%)=/Y((MLT ALI UM ZA4E14T 1. That is explic-
itly F’... (which we were after), when or if we are making
molar measurements or experiments under standard condi-
tions. Hence, L...(static) =MCV?T?/M “114 TA=
M4cLn*T. And F (static)\=F.../C=M“4C1LI47T1,
And L.(static) = M.1?T-?/M2C1D47T1 = M4CL4T",
Therefore, as a truism of course, fox L=M.L?T, which
is the same as the orthodox equation FX L—=ML?T°=En-
ergy. So it is obvious that we have not at all found any real
error in orthodox physics—we have merely been explicit as
as to what the conventional equations mean.

h. We may get a preliminary general understanding of
those equations by considering that orthodox science, in
those it asserts, is absolutely anthropocentric—takes the ob-
server, or the asserter of the equations, as being a standard
One, who then talks absolute mysticism. For the conven-
tional F’, (in ““F=MLT~?’’) obviously consistently refers
only to what the observer considers actually coincident with
himself at a 0 (or ©) point in space and time, which condi-
tions are taken arbitrarily as a unit or standard, or as an ab-
solute point of reference for subsequent comparison. Then,
he asserts, in calm and complete disregard of all the actual
facts and of all verbal consistency, that that absolute One
moves a distance L (in F XL) and gives Energy—MI?T-?,
Clearly, (1) motion is then an absolute assumption of some-
thing which truistically is then unexplainable and indefinable
(the observer as that anthropocentric One is an immovable
body, and it can’t move, according to our usual verbal agree-
ments); (2) that distance ZL also becomes some change re-
ferring to the same absolute One, and is precisely analogous
to the motion; and finally (3) there is absolutely nothing
whatever stated as to why that absolute One should move or
exhibit energy ;—there is expressed or given vo potential—
no ‘possibility’ of travel through L, whatever that ‘‘travel’’
or ‘motion’? might be—nothing to make that One move.
Those difficulties have now been shown to be purely
verbal, and we have obviated all of them but one, by
being verbally explicit and showing the logical truisms,
thus:- We do begin by anthropocentrically adopting a One
standard, f,—=MLT~?; and we end by translating back into
an anthropocentric One, f.<XL—M-.L?T*. But in doing
all that we have included expression of all changes and have
thus succeeded in making our One standard average (instead
of uniquely and rigidly individual or anthropocentric), and
hence mutually intelligible, and universally applicable. The
defect in the explicitness (the lack of completeness in logical
truisms) in the equations in the last paragraph is that no po-
tential is expressed in them or by them. I. e., I omitted
explicit assertion that in order to make F’. become F.., the
space between M and MM’ (par. b, and §72b) can not be
static or dead or verbally negligible. I. e., an LT“ was
omitted— the inclusion of which would have given us the ex-
plicit expression for energy. As a truistic consequence of that,

§73h IX One

as we saw in the last paragraph LZ... and Le have identically
the same value, M“CL“T™!. L. is the formal verbal agree-
ment that there may be a potential, which our J... then (as
a consequence of omitting that 77!) merely names without
asserting (just as the anthropocentric FXL=MI?T™ fails
to state what it is that is going to cause—to ‘assert’ —mo-
tion). Therefore, our equations in the last paragraph merely
name Energy, and do not state that it is in existence—i. e., do
not finish stating that we did divide the One as per agree-
ment and then put it together again. That is quite in har-
mony with the commonsense, valid conclusion of orthodox
science aboutits Exergy:- that energy which zs actual energy
—which does move— is ‘‘power,’’ or ML? T-3. Therefore it
is obvious that we may use a form of MI?T-? for Energy,
instead of MIE°7~*; but we always have to remember that
it names energy only, omitting an L7~!. Perhaps it may
be preferable in the future to be quite explicit about Energy
and put in that L7~!—it is a matter of expediency; of what
is verbally convenient. But in this book I am forced to use
hoth the old verbalisms and their new and more explicit
forms, and neither my own brain nor the usual reader’s can
support the strain of completely changing here.

874. a. We can now see just what Newton’s lawis, and
how he got the logic wrong. Numerically, Newton’s law is
written F(of gravity)=MM'G/d?, in which G is orthodoxly
taken to be a real constant number, determined by measur-
ing. Newton and those who believe Newton’s law to be
logical (Newton himself seemed to be doubtful as to whether
his “‘law’’ was self-consistent) assert that G is constant—is
everywhere and at every-time the same, regardless of the
relative circumstances of M and M’. As an actual fact,
Newton guessed that G was a constant, and found that his
guess was fuirly accurate with respect to the large bodies,
considerably separated, inside the solar system. Newton
didn’t know much about the principles of gravity, and
he knew that he didn’t, as I implied in the last sentence
(see Brewster’s life of Newton). However, it is now known
that G is not accurately constant even for such measures in-
side the solar system (Eddington, lecture Royal Inst., re-
printed from ‘‘Nature’’ in ‘‘Sc. Am. Supp.,’’ July 6, 13,
1918; Tunzelmann, ‘‘A Treatise on Electrical Theory and
the Problem of the Universe,’’ 418). Also, two more or
less adjacent molecules of a body obviously may be consid-
ered two M’s, and it is glaringly evident to physicists that
Newton’s law fails to apply accurately between them—that
there G is not a constant, and not even near the value of the
orthodox G. Hence, quantitatively, Newton’s law is ex-
perimentally known to be inaccurate. Logically, it is wholly
wrong, if it is supposed to apply to any actual bodies, as we
see in the next paragraph.

b. In speaking of gravity it is taken for granted that it
is some sort of force’ W (explicitly it is W... in actuality,
or W. as an average unit) “‘residing’’ on or in all the parts of
a body—including the insides of the body. That is shown
to be the case by the fact that we speak of the pull of gravi-
ty traveling, apparently unchanged (cf. $83f), through bod-
ies and into all their parts. It therefore follows that in
naming the force of gravity [F(gravity)—which of course at
once implies F...{gravity) | we consider the whole insides of
the two M’s in the orthodox expression MM’G/d? as being
split up in parts—i. e., Mand M’ are _ structural, or intern-
ally moving relatively, or dynamic. Hence, as the M and

™4bHence, it is at once a glaring trnism that Newton’s law, by
making G@ constant, in effect asserts that the M’s are fixed, con-
stant, and unchangeable, and hence noé structural. Therefore, the
very form of Newton’s law asserts that the mechanics or the de-
scription of gravity is non-existent—is qualitatively or absolutely

UNIVERSE

68

M’ are moving inside, Newton’s law ought to be simply a
dynamic statement of moving bodies, of which F...(static) in
the last section is the static form. Therefore, as the bodies
which explicitly assert gravity {the bodies which have a resi-
dent’ F;(gravity) | , or have W..., are dynamic (are really,
ultimately, divided into relatively moving parts in infinite re-
gress), we simply explicitly and consistently say so, as a
verbal agreement of naming—i. e., we state an if,—thus:-
FAgravity or dynamic matter, or dynamic **molar’’ matter )=
(M...)(LT™)(moving M...)/I?. 1. e., as in the last section,
we have to name M and M” relatively to each other, with F,
spreading out in the other two dimensions, and we hence
first have M(LT"!)M/L*; but then, we said that each M
was itself internally split, so we have to make those M’s
into M...’s; and then as there was to be relative motion (not
is, but merely potentially, or if: an if of mere ‘existence’ or
preliminary verbal form), one of those M...’s is a ‘moving
M.’ Now, as in the special circumstances in which New-
ton’s law MM’G/d? is true the M’s would have to be abso-
lutely static, it follows that if we have dynamic M...’s we
would have to write for those M’s or for MG” of Newton’s
law the expression MG~”. — And for the ‘moving’ we write
LE Hence, we have the equation:- F,(gravity)=
(MG-*)\(MG-“LT)(LT)/L?=M’GT-, Therefore,
if as standard units F;(molar) is =M.LT™, then, as a uni-
versul law true everywhere at every time, F;(gravity)=
M?’G-1T-2, in which G is a variable number with relation-
ships to be indicated below. That is the actual quantitative
law of gravity, consistently expressed in everyday ‘Trinity
language: it is identical with Ampere’s law in electricity,
and can be understood better by comparing it with that law
(§$76-7). Newton’s law is a static statement of a special
case, and is not logical even for that. For the mechanics of
gravity, which are very simple, see §$103, 134. The valid
‘law of gravity’ is, of course, not intelligible at all, as such
or of itself, for the most excellent reason that it is merely a
statement of an 7f:- 7~f so and so is verbally agreed-upon as a
manner of speech, then we may measure or speak in a certain
way, and will later on use such preliminary measures (or ‘ir-
rational’ or of-itself-unintelligible factor; §71g) in the ex-
pression of such and such a One or standard One;—but the
law does not in the least make that intelligible statement of
energy, or pretend to. And that jf is easy to understand as
a partial statement, and is completely ‘‘explained,’’ it
amounting to this:- jf we agree to name a boy John, then we
are prepared to say that John did soand so.

c. We hence have, precisely as in 873¢ (and as we see
again in electricity, 876d) I- F,(dynamic)=M .LT~, as unit,
average naming agreements. And, as a translation of actual
M...(dynamic or gravitational):- M,.LT-? = M¢G272.
Hence, F...(dynamic or gravitational) = W... = Mq-*=
VM LT) T?|=M.4%L4*, We shall use A... (chemical
Affinity; see par. e for description of it) as the intensive
factor corresponding to the extensive factor W..., so that
W...XA...=Enuergy. Then, 4...—MG4%VT2/M,4L%=
M“G4E47T 2, And W.=W.../|G-%"=M4G4L%, And
A=M PT] M4G4L4=M4%G- 447-2. And as a tru-
ism, WeXAe=M.L?T, which is an equation missing in
orthodox science, that in strictly conventional terms would
be WX A=MI?T?=Energy. Because Newton’s law form-
ally is erroneously stated (as was shown in the last paragraph)
that equation in orthodox science uses instead of A the

impossible. The orthodox law of gravity is Static, and gravity itself
is dynamic. An eternally dead or absolutely static One has no
“‘mechanics,’’ as a mere truism—unless we shift to a different lang-
uage from the one Newton was talking, which is our ordinary one

Thus it is seen that a ‘‘mechanics’’ of Newton’s gravity is impossible.

69 UNIVERSE

orthodox static potential symbol L, and writes the equa-
tion WX L=ML?T-*=Energy—which is obviously a very
confused, and exceptin narrow conditions, wrong expression.

d. It therefore follows at once that the comparison of
F...(ordinary molar bodies, or static), and F...(dynamic bodies)
or W...,instead of being the nonsense orthodoxly derived in
870b, is:- F.../W...=M.2014T1/M.“4L4=LT“",—or, is
a velocity. Obviously, in order to get the expression of dy-
namic matter from the expression of static matter we truis-
tically deliberately inserted a velocity, L7~!, in par. b. So
as a cancelling truism, it comes out again when we compare
static matter (F...) with dynamic matter (W...). The ex-
plicit velocity which we put in is the velocity of light—which
we use as a distinguishing criterion in naming. Explicitly,
F.../W... = MC/MG-“=CG“=LT"|=average velocity of
light here and now (see par. f). Hence, purely by verbal
agreements, LZ! is the velocity of light, just as we see it
is in electricity (§77), and in all the other “‘branches’’ of
physies or knowledge ($§83, 100, 136, ete.). The fact that
in electricity, etc., the same verbal LT! is also experiment-
ally observed to be the velocity of light is nothing more than
the observational verification that in that branch the same
criterion was put in as a verbal form and then orthodoxly kept
unconfused. The reader is not likely to grasp that
general unifying point in its entirety until he has finished
the book. It is merely a rigorous expression in terms of
physical measurement of the fact that the total universe is
inseparably related. If you do not happen to be interested
in remembering or seeing how the technical language or
slang of physics expresses it, you lose nothing essential in
passing over this casually; for the same facts are later on
expressed in familiar terms of everyday life.

e. We noted in par. c that orthodoxly WXL and FXL
are considered logically identical; but we saw (§73g, and in
par. c) that they were not so: in a rough quantitative way
in fairly steady molar circumstances here and now they may
of course be used alike. We need the special symbol 4 for
the “ZL” in “WX L.”’ We saw in §7le-g that F...
(and implicitly /V...) is an incomplete expression—a factor,
irrational when used alone. WW... itself (par. b) simply
names matter considered divided internally in parts. ‘Sup-
pose we name those parts atoms (we could give them any
**structural’’ name: atoms happens to be a familiar one, and
later we see that atoms are the conventional small parts
whicb have an outlining zone of motion at about the-velocity
of light). Then it is obvious that W... simply implies a
verbal agreement to speak of atoms—implies that there are
This’s, compared with which W... is That’s. A W (without
dots)—a ‘‘weight’’ just in itself, asserting or implying
unrelated That’s—yreally asserts chaos: has absolutely no
meaning. Clearly that is true; for weight means something
only when we consider whatever it is that has weight as be-
ing (so to speak) stuck to the earth, or combined with or
compared with the earth (or sun, etc.), | And obviously, in
our explicit scientific language, we want a word to go with W
which will be an anything to which the M implied by the W
is stuck: we do not, in describing the universe, wish to ex-
press everything directly and immediately in terms of our
little earth—it wonld be provincial, to say the kindest thing
about it; sometimes the earth is too small, and other times
it is too large, to be a useful comparison. The nsual name
for whatever it is that makes things thus stick together—
especially atoms—is chemical affinity. We may give it the
abbreviated name A. Incidentally, that A is not the 4
(which represents any symbol, word, thing) in our formal
truism AA; but the two are always readily distinguishable
So we have (as already seen in par. c) the

by the context.

One IX §7éa

dynamic or gravitational equation for matter in general (as
distinguished from the matter that is electricity, light, ete.) :-
W...XA...=MG“L?T-*= Energy(dynamic or gravitational).

f. J shall be more explicit as to the comparison of static
matter and dynamic matter—which comparison gave (par. d)
the average velocity of light in our neighborhood (which
velocity I shall abbreviate to V1). We had F.../W...=
MC/MG~-“=CG“=LT'!=P;,. That equation: assumes that
we talk of the same actual M from two points of view:- the
static and the dynamic. So the CG” obviously merely states
that one point of view is in or from a static velocity, and the
other point of view is to consider ourselves as observers in a
dynamic body with a velocity of CG” units (which is V1),
looking at a static body. We may get that numerical ratio
more explicitly :- F.] We = M“C1 L471 /M“*G“4L2 =
LT“1/CG“%; hence, if the bodies on which the standard
units Fe. and W. reside are the same, then F./V.=1, and
LT1=CG“%. Consequently, as our equations for matter are
constructed with perfect generality, they may be transformed
as desired, and converted into any other physical equations,
especially the orthodox ones of modern electrical theory (see
8877, 83, 100, 136, ete.). Also, as we are taking C and G
as being numerical factors of an explicitly variable (which
however is approximately the same for all ef us on earth at any
given time), with the unit or standard M, L, and T formally
fixed, it is obvious that those fundamental equations at once
furnish a mutually intelligible base upon which to establish
with rigorous identity all physical naming (although no quan-
titative accuracy is possible, for the simple reason that V; is
never exactly the same for two persons). We may
also note a simple fact showing that we have rigorously uni-
fied all possible naming:- The ‘“density’’ of a body obvi-
ously implies that it is considered as a molar or formally
not-internally-moving body; its dimensional equation is
evidence of that:- Density—=ML™3 (Daniell’s ‘‘Physics,’’
224). The ‘‘elasticity’’ of a body, as given by its resistance
to direct compression, stretching, or shear, obviously re-
fers to it as made up of mutually movable parts, which in
general is the dynamic way in which gravity refers toa body.
The dimensions of such direct elasticity are, Elasticity=
ML !T~2 (Daniell’s “*Physics,’” 263). Therefore, we have
Density] Elasticity=ML=?/ML1T?=1/V?. — Hence, if the
same units are used, Density] Elasticity=1/V?=1/C?G =
1/K-1U-! (see §§80i, 95b; also, Tunzelmann, ‘‘Electrical
Theory,’’ 32). That again obviously unifies all of science,
and directly connects this elementary theory to all valid
physics, especially the usual Maxwell theory of electricity
and its extensions. I. e., it is obvious if the reader is famil-
iar with the physics I have cited: if he is not a physicist
there is no special need that he verify the point, as the same
thing is proved in familiar ways repeatedly below.

§75. a. We now take up fundamental electricity. We
shall conclude that orthodox science handles it in rough gen-
erality quite consistently, and in precisely the way we have
just found was necessary to express ordinary matter. We
find that conventional science is, however, if we interpret it
explicitly, wholly wrong logically about electricity, in that
(precisely like Newton with his G) it considers K (which
actually is analogous with our variable C) and U (which act-
ually is analogous with onr variable G) as constant. The
experimental facts are, that those values are fairly steady in
ordinary circumstances (i. e., vary almost ‘constantly’? with
the thickness r or L of the various “*spaces’’—actually the
substances—throngh which the electrical “‘forces’’ act);
nevertheless, measured values of them vary quite percept-
ibly from constancy (see ‘“Ency. Brit.,”’ ix, 245-6, and Art.

§75a IX One

**Magnetism’’). It could be claimed of course that those
perceptible variations were variations in space itself; that
gives the relativity theory (§66). But I am taking it for
granted that we propose to talk our everyday Trinity lang-
uage, and I am tinkering it into workable condition, after
all the abuse it has received. Also, it will be shown
that Ohm’s law is empirical ($136); and that fact is shown
to be directly equivalent to the principle that there is a vari-
able K and U—that there is no exact science, or no constant
in the universe; or mass varies with velocity.

b. Briefly, the ‘““specific inductive capacity,’’ or *“di-
electric constant,’’ or ‘“‘permittivity,’’ or K of a substance is
the numerical ratio of the electric force which it ‘‘permits’’
to pass, to the force which is passed by air taken as a
unit standard (or its ratio to that passed by a ‘‘vacuum,’’
according to some physicists: a vacuum acts practically as
air does); i. e., Kofairis 1. Thus, two bodies of static
electricity exert mutual electric force on each other across a
‘dead’ or static ‘difference surface’ or space (specifically now
in electricity, even orthodoxly, through an actual substance
or ‘‘dielectric’’), precisely as we saw molar force F;,(molar)
doing in §73cd. Hence, in precisely the same way, F,(static
electricity) =(Q;.K~“)(Q.K~“)/d*, in which Q,K~” is a unit
body of static electricity (Q;...), analogous in al] respects to
a molar body, with this explicit distinction (see XIV _ for
details):- ifan actual Mand an actual M’ be touched to-
gether and then separated, some of one of the bodies wil]
always stick to the other; after the separation, if the amount
of one which is stuck to the other is not ‘molarly’ or grossly
perceptible, we still call the bodies the same molar bodies M
and M’ (which obviously is not accurate or even rational,
just of itself), and then proceed to correct that assertion by
calling the amount stuck on one:- Qs..., or a quantity of
(static) electricity. Therefore, obviously, so long as that Qs...
does not go moving around on the body perceptibly (it always
does move some), and hence so Jong as we do not formally
consider it split up internally, it is formally a lump or ‘molar’
body of an attenuated sort, definitely named _ static electricity.
So we treat it as static. The orthodox equation is F=
Q,*/Kd*, in which K is supposed to be a constant of a nature
otherwise unknown; I have merely changed that interpreta-
tion to agree with the quantitative experimental] facts; and in
order to make it logical, I am attaching the K (in place of
the dots in Q:...) to the “‘Q:,’’ thus:- Q,K~%. (lt happens
that A was orthodoxly put into the denominator of that frac-
tion; hence, in accordance with that arbitrary and logically
unessential agreement, the exponent ~” of K is different in
sion from that of our G.)

c. Briefly, the “‘permeability,’’ or ‘“‘magnetic permea-
bility,’’ or “‘coefficient of magnetic induction,’’ ete., or U
(which most texts symbolize by #), is the ratio (a numerical
coefficient again) of the electric force or relationship in any
given case which is “‘induced,’’ or which ‘‘permeates’’ a body
as gravity does, with respect to the inducing magnetic force.
I. e., two bodies of dynamic or magnetic electricity (which
we shall see, especially in XIV, is static clectricity ‘‘split
up,’’ or with insides relatively moving with /)), are consid-
ered to exert electric force throughout (inside) themselves,
precisely as we saw gravity doing (i. e., are considered to
be completely related to each other, in all splittings, or in
infinite regress—although practically we call the velocity of
light average, tacitly using our eyes as a quantitative stand-
ard, and do not go to that infinity, but are content with the
resulting inaccuracy). Therefore, following precisely the
same truisms of expressions as were followed there (§74b),
we may define a static magnet m as:- F,(magnetic)=
(mU-“)(mU-“)/d?. = Now, just as in §74b, if we take one

UNIVERSE

70

magnet m as a unil, or ‘static’ beginning, or potential, and
consider the other moving with reference to it and also in-
ternally, we at once, as our ‘ordinary language agreement,
have the naming equation (an if equation) :- F (dynamic or
magnetic electricity) =(m...) (moving m... (LT7})/r?, in which
r is an L (see next section for the mnemonic reason itis con-
venicnt to name it r). Substituting the coefficient U and
the LT! for the dots, on precisely the same truisms or ver-
bal agreements as before, we have F, (dynamic electricity )}=
(mU“%)\(mU“LT3)(LT)/rP?—=m2UT. In agreement with
conventions (see next section), we may name a magnet that
is actually taken to be dynamic or m..., and is not a static
standard unit thatis really a zero me:- Qm...;—which stands
for Quantity of magnetic or dynamic electricity; or, Qu...
mU~”%, Hence, precisely analogous to the case of molar and
gravitational] matter (see next section for explicit details),
we have Qee/Qme = LT™/K-*%U-*; or, LTI=Y, =
K-“*U-*%, We take K and U as being variable coefficients.
Hence, that last equation, precisely analogous to ordinary
matter in §74, unifies all of electricity. In the next section
we see the logical details, which (§22) consist merely of uni-
versally applicable truisms-—a rigorous explanation dry and
hard to see just of itself. |The “‘mechanics’’ of electricity
—the easy description of how these rigorous explanations are
true, and what they mean in everyday terms—is in XIV.
876. a. The orthodox fundamental] electrical equations
which we shall need here are:- F=Q,*K7?L7, F=
mU-1[-2, where m is a unit magnet pole—really a static, or
One, or zero me. F=mel/r?=mcL/L*?,—that being Ampere’s
law, which asserts that a unit current of electricity c flowing
in a uniform conductor of Jength 7 (or L) that is arranged as
a segment of the circumference of a circle of a radius r (or
L), will exert unit force F on the unit magnet pole m at the
center. '°? OT where GO: is a quantity of magnetic
electricity ; or truistically is the amount of electricity that is
the sum of unit current c flowing for the unit time 7.
Q. >< Ps=Energy, where P; is electrostatic potential. And

7aln brief, Ampere’s taw is, as we shall see in more detail, the
description of a method of using molar or static Af’s as a fixed zero
point of reference or zero of potential or absolute ‘‘center,’’ and on
that formally, or agreed-upon, or fixed base dynamic ‘‘electrical]’’
matter (which is precisely similar to gravitational matter) moves—
actually does move (in everyday language). Obviously, we have, in
Ampere’s description, a jived base on (or by or from) which to meas-
ure or observe the motion. (Clearly, identically the same thing
happened-in static clectricity, as implied in §75b:- a very little of
the effective surface of one molar body with formally dead insides
stuck to another body,and then those molar bodies served as a fixed
point of reference.) | However, it is obvious that in considering dy-
namic gravitational matter it is not so simple to get that convenient
zero point of reference or potential; actually in considering gravita-
tional matter the only fixed point of reference is the total universe
(hence, Newton’s law is a form of static equation; he did not go on
to the dynamic equation that was really needed, as apparently he
was not able to logically get hold of a formal base on which to erect
it—he needed to grasp the total universe as a base, and that seems
to have been a bit too strenuous mentally for him and men of his
time, although it is a commonplace performance of men nowadays).
We are using the total universe here as a point of reference; form-
ally itis nowadays still somewhat unfamiliar, and hence somewhat
hard to follow here; but in human terms it is used in practice all the
time, and the same thing will be quite easy to follow in Parts Two
and Three. Hencc, becanse electricity has an easily observed, and
actually quantitatively rather stable zero reference, or arbitrary
zero of potential (§80m), the orthodox theory of electricity is broadly
valid, and quite simple (the orthodox error lies in assuming that the
molar masses are absolutely static, although obviously they are not;
finally we have to refer the electric point of reference to the whole
universe as a standard). This general anticipation of the principles
of this formal or logical unification of science is all that the general
reader needs to comprehend; the physicist of course needs to wade

ahead through the dry technical details of the licit :
that follow in the text. explicit equations

71 UNIVERSE

Qm X Pu—=Energy, where Pm is magnetic electric potential—
or more commonly is called electromotive force (E.M.F., or
voltage). All those orthodox equations are supposed
to be based directly upon measurements, experiments.

b. Those equations conventionally take it for granted
that K and U are constant, or « dimensions, like M, L, and
T. I shall show first that if that is so, then the equations
will promptly give absurd, and flatly self-contradictory re-

sults. (I. e., the orthodox equations mix the three sorts of
words: analogous nonsensica) results were shown in §44.)
Orthodoxly, F=MLT?*=(Q2)K1L-2 (A)

(I print Q. in parentheses to indicate that orthodoxly it may
be separated from the K.)
Then, by algebra, (Q,)=M* D147 1K% (B)
Orthodoxly, we may write the molar equation, including
Newton’s law, exactly analogously to (A), thus:-
F=MLT?=ML~ (C)
Hence, M=M?*.-372 (D)
which is nonsensica] of course, but no more nonsensical than
the precisely analogous equation (B). Then, substituting the
value of M given by (D) in (B), we have
(Q.)=(M2L 37?) 4(11471K4)=MK* (E)
or, QA Ne se ERD)
We have orthodoxly, Energy—=ML’T"=Q, <P, (G)
Substituting for Q. its value from (B), we have
P.=ML?T ?/ M4114 7 -1K4=M“*L“ T1K-% (H)
Then, in Energy=Q.XP., we substitute P, from (H), and
Q, from (E) and have,
Energy=MK*? X M*“L“TUK-4=MI4L4%7-1 |, (I)
And that result, obtained by strictly following orthodox logic
and equations, is nonsensical, and is also flatly and explicitly
contradicted by (G). We hence see that an actual Q,
is Q..., and that K is a numerical] coefficient replacing the
dots. In standard One conditions Q, is Qse, and K isthen 1.
ec. In this paragraph I shall make a verbally consistent
explicit fundamental statement of static electricity, analogous
to the fundamental molar or static matter equations in §73fg.
We have F;(stat. elec. )\=Q:(LT“Q. /U?=Q.27K1/1L?. And,
as a unit standard:- F;—=M.LT-? = Q/K 102, Or,
Q....(stat. elec. \=V (Q2K)=Q.K-*= Y [(MLT~) L?] =

M.“014T"1, And P,...(statie electricity) =MK~“I2T?+
M.“0147T-1 = M*K-“L“T"1, And O.0 — Q,.../K-% —
M*K“0@7T1; and Pre = MUTOM*4K4*DY4 TI =

M*K-“L“*T—1; so that truistically the orthodox Q.X Ps, or
explicitly QseX Pee, =—M-L?T *=Energy. It may be
noted that the standard potential P:, or explicitly Pse, and
the actual potential P,..., are identical (cf. §74h); and that
again means that these equations are merely formal or naming
or ‘jf’ equations that omit an LT !; i. e., there being act-
ually zero potential, they assert no actual motion or energy.

d. In this paragraph I shal] make a verbally consistent
explicit fundamental statement of dynamic or electromag-
netic electricity, analogous to the fundamental dynamic or
gravitational matter equations in S74be (repeating a little of
875c). We have as a standard or static or One unit naming,
F,<(dyn. elec. =(mU-“)(mU—*)/@=m2U1L; and F;(dyn.
elec. =meed/r?; and Qme=cT. And for actual, dynamic
electrical matter or m...’s, we have F;,(dynamic electricity) =
(m...)(moving m... (LT) /r*=(m... (LT... (LT OL? =
(mU*)\(mU“LTOA)(LT OL ?=mUT. Also, orthodoxly
we have F—mcelr—2; and Qn==cT,—so that c=QnT!; and
substituting, F = mQmT Ur or explicitly, F,=
(m...)(Qm...)LT 1r-*; hence, as Qm is an explicitly moving
m... (see next paragraph), we orthodoxly also explicitly have
the same “‘experimental’’ equation as the equation already
derived purely verbally (i. e., by experiments or observations

on words) :- F,=(mU“)\(mU4LTO)LT AL, I. e., our

One IX 876d

verbal truisms are now in definite agreement with orthodox
‘‘observational’’ equations—taking it that by correct obser-
vation K and U are noi quantitatively constant. Then, as
before, we have the general One static reference or Zero
point, Fre-=M.LT-2. Therefore, Qm...(dyn. elec. )=mU“=
V (ML LT-*) T7)=M AL, And Qme, or the orthodor Qn, =
Qn... /U4=M~% U-“L”“%, And the orthodox E.M.F., or
Pme, =MIPT-2/M4U-*L4, Qn... X Pu... =MU-41°T .
And Pm...=M“U-“L1“T°2, — And we see from those val-
ues that Q..../Qm...==LT-!; or orthodoxly, Q./Qm or ex-
plicitly Qe] Qme—LT1/K-4U-4, And the same
remarks about potential (cf. par. ¢) still apply—an LT7!
has been omitted, so that now the difference between Pie
and Pm... is that Pm... is multiplied by (U~”)? to give Pine;
i. e., the ‘moving m’ has the purely verbal inverse square law
applied to it, and has not yet actually become a real differ-
ence in potential. Or, to put briefly what we see in more
detail in the next section, the purely naming inverse square
law (which is hence absolutely ““explained’’ as being a ver-
bal truism of naming an arbitrary splitting of the One) is
applied once in order to name the static m’s; then, the same
purely naming inverse square truism is applied a second time
internally in the moving-m or Qm, in order to name the parts
or the dynamic changes or internal motion of Qm or one of
those m’s previously statically or ‘molarly’ named. That
absolutely explains the +” (rather than the ~%) exponent of
the U’sin the actual F,=(mU”)(mU“)(LT-1)°L. itis what
I shal) call the second inclusion or use or application of the
inverse square law—a purely verbal way of making the es-
sential cancelling of L’s and 7’s, so that we may rigidly and
honestly adhere to our agreement that A=dA. But that
second inverse square obviously still does not assert that the
zero or unit or static or ‘point’ m actually gives or exhibits
any potential. In practice, we verbally insert another LT~!
in the equation, and get “‘power’’ (§73h). And in order to
have our really mystic point m become actual, and consist-
ently apply to parts of the universe, and not be restricted to
mere geometrical abstractions, we assert that U is not con-
stant—a truism naturally in agreement with observed facts,
because we started these truisms on the natural fact that
bodies change. That gives ‘no exact science,’ and in effect
logically includes an infinite regress of the inverse square law
itself. That is to say, actually or observably all m’s
have structures— ‘internal motions.’’ So when we apply the
inverse square naming tothe One, we would in practical actu-
ality take some finite smaller structure as a static or ‘molar’
body of reference; Out, theoretically and also practically in
the degree in which our perception and use of the universe
increases, that structure or smaller or unit static m in turn
must be split, in order to be more accurate and definite—and
so on ad infinitum. So we parsimoniously chop that theo-
retical ad infinitum Jogic (not our practical efforts to use
smaller and smaller structures: ef. Part Two) sharp off by
ealling U variable—which obviously will logically take care
of all splittings. In practice, we can and do take two
points of view:- (1) we consider ourselves on a static body
(i. e., take ourselves in effect static), and observe (i) static
bodies, and (ii) moving bodies and compare them; (2) we
take our point of view as dynamic or as moving, and observe
the same two sorts of bodies. Consequently, it is obvious
that we need, and do use, the inverse square naming device
twice; we get started on that infinite regress of points of view
(i. e., we ourselves in turn are partly static and partly dy-
namic, etc., etc.); but having thus essentially experienced
how we go from parts to the larger standard whole they make
or vice versa—from a structure of one order (as molecules) to
one of a different order (as a molar body )—we then chop off

§76d IX One

the remainder of the naming devices. It is a trifle puzzling
at first, when stated explicitly: in implicit practice it is so
simple that three-year-olds understand it so well as to use it
fluently. I shall give a few details in the next section of
just how Ampere did it in practice (see also §83). In this
sharp, explicit form here that is needed by experts, the prop-
Osition is hard to see because it is stated in technical terms
not very familiar except to physicists. But in every-
day, rough terms al] this is exceedingly simple:- If we
want to get the energy from coal we burn the coal: i. e.,
actual energy consists of the coal’s changing its inner struct-
ure, and ceasing to be coat. If we ourselves work—do some-
thing,—we partly destroy ourselves—-partly die (usually we
eat some food and grow back again). Hence, when we be-
gin to express or name energy, the body which actually gives
the energy ceases to be, and then of course there is not any
such body to name: obviously, the actuality or the reality
is ineffable. So, what we actually do is formally to name
the body as exploding or flying into pieces (soto speak), and
we name those pieces as flying out in L”, while we ourselves
nominally or with tacit formality take tbe line of the third
dimension to the other body which receives the energy. That
body grows (explodes or changes itself into something else,
in what we might call the opposite direction; see Index,
‘*Growth’’), or verbally receives the energy into itself by the
inverse square relationship. So we end, not with the two
bodies we first named, but with two bodies that in strict
verbal truth are new, and would have to have two new names
unless we used that inverse square device twice, as a general
way of implicit double naming. There is no need
to try to grasp all that here, in that condensed form. All
that needs to be noted is that the instant we start to use
language it will slip out of our positive grasp unless we de-
vise that infinite regress of inverse square naming to hold it.
e. It has been observed experimentally that a moving
static charge or Qs and a moving magnet m both create what
is called a magnetic field (““Ency. Brit.,’’ ix, 216; and Art.
‘“Magnetism’’); and hence both cause a current (or, truis-
tically with our equations, are a current, when **matter’’ is
consistently defined; i. e., Qs..., Qm...., m..., and c... are
all simply different names for matter). Ampere went zndi-
rectly about measuring a current (Watson’s ‘‘Physics,’’ 688),
and instead of getting the immediate complete statement of
those observations just mentioned (I have put them in a form
reversed from the usual point of view), he made an uf state-
ment, a complex verbal naming:- F,(dyn. elec.)=mel]r*.
He tacitly assumed as a context of that statement:- F,(dyn.
elec. )=n®U1TL™, and c=QnmnsT, and F,=MLT™, and QseX
Ps=ML?T-2. What I did in the last paragraph was to
combine all of Ampere’s if’s and tacit verbal agreements
into a complete single statement. I did not put that com-
plete statement into the equation for Energy; that equation
lacked an LT™!: the complete statement is in the context—
and, as we saw, more or less had to be in the context, be-
cause the Qn or other matter, if it did produce Energy,
‘“died,’’ and did not any longer exist as Qn to be talked
about. So in the next section we see some of the details of
Ampere’s law—of the double use of the inverse square law
in mentioning any actual energy.

§77. a. The orthodox equation F,=mel/r*, when it
talks of multiplying m and c together, actually explicitly as-
serts that it will multiply mules by cows—which of course is
pure nonsense unless a definite proof is given that the ulti-
mate meaning is merely that m and ¢ are related as identities
—that “mules cows’ merely means that both are (say) ani-
mals—that m and ¢ are the same sort of matter. Actually,
in that equational statement of Ampere’s law, m is a static

UNIVERSE Me

unit me that implicitly implies an unstated inverse square
law, and c is dynamic zero matter ce that is nominally dis-
tributed over the line /, and is named by the asserted inverse
square law e/r?. We are to look at that in a little more
detail and from a point of view a little different from before,
but essentially what we see will be a repetition of §76de.

b. Ampere explicitly asserted his law (Watson’s **Phys-
ics,’’ 688) in this form:- F=cXdsXsina/r*, where ds is
the length L of the infinitesimal element of the path of the
current c, and a the angle made by that short part of the
path with the line joining its center to a point (the center of
a circle in the experiments) at a distance 7, at which point
the F (relationship) is measured. Now, unless that element
ds is actually zero or a One (a geometrical point, or the total
infinite universe), as a truism that verbal inverse square law
does not hold. (If Ampere’s experiments “‘show’’ that it does
hold, then the experimentally nonsensical conclusions of §76b
obviously must also be true; and as those conclusions are
extremely easy to disprove experimentally and as Ampere’s
experiments on ds are truistically practically impossible to
get accurate, forcing him to guess, we conclude that Ain-
pere’s experiments do not accurately prove what his law
nevertheless formally asserts—and as Ampere is a first class
man, he probably said so himself.) If ds is zero, a is inde-
terminate; i. e., by using a zero we promptly go into ineff-
able religion, where no measures are positive. But as we are
dealing with unit measures we may call a 90°, in which case
sina—1, and drop further considerations of its numerous im-
plications—as it then has its average effect that is implicit in
F=mel/r?. | Thus we have the explicit verbal truistic apree-
ments:- F,=cX0/r2. That is rigorously logical (a truistic
statement of the naming principle Ampere started with, as
was just indicated); but we positively have said nothing ex-
cept that we are going to say something in that way or form
about a c which we have not yet actually asserted or indi-
cated, which exerts F; on, or is related to or identified with,
the body 0,—the c itself thus as yet being positively or in a
Many sense a 0, like the other body (see next paragraph).
The c has not yet been asserted to move. Hence, c is abso-
lutely static electricity, or absolutely Qse (there isno such act-
ual thing; it is a verbal unit form). And if we have an
actual] Qs..., we have already seen (and itis agreed by ortho-
dox science) that we must allow for its environment by Kt,
and write F;=cKt? x 0/r. (I still write it c, as we have
yet to give it a velocity.) Now, that is in direct
agreement with well known experiments on static charges,
Q,...’s.. Thomson and Heaviside have shown (““Eney.
Brit.,’’ ix, 216) that F=cVsina]r?, where ¢ is a moving static
charge. That equation is obviously the same as Ampere’s
law F=cXdsXsina/r?, except that as c is named a ‘‘charge’’
the V is explicitly stated.”’ So that Heaviside ex periment

“Incidentally, that Heaviside equation also omits—at least in
the place cited—all definite statement of evironing conditions, thns
implying a constant A; hence, its inclusion of a definite V is self-
contradictory. For it is obvious that if there were no variation in K
—no effect of the environment on c,—then simply as a truism, 7,
which is logically a part of the environment (or asserts that some
thing is ‘at the distance r,’ so that we mean, by using 7, that thing),
conld have no effect—could not have been related to r by F.
As a perhaps important digression, that mere verbal truism of the
One and Many is the solution of the controversy as to whether ‘‘action
at a distance’ is possible. The answer depends, as a mere truism,
upon what language agreements are made—‘‘on definitions.’ In
our everyday language, asatrnism action ata distance (i. e., between
two things absolutely separate) is not logically possible, as we have
just seen. But, if we talk an infinite pturatism, then no sort of ac-
tion but action at a distance is possible (i. e., no two parts are ever
absolutely in contact, or unseparated, as that would mean merging
or ultimate identity, contradict the agreements of infinite pluralism
and revert to our everyday One langnage; also, ef. §97).

73 UNIVERSE

agrees with our language truisms to the effect that we must
put an actual c (i. e., c...) in Ampere’s law if we are to talk
positively—thus:- F,=cKt X0/r?.

c. Wemay now explicitly assert that the cK” does
have a velocity, as in Ampere’s experiments, by simply writ-
ing itin:- F,—(cK*)XVX0/r?. Next, we note that the
0 implies a standard unit body at a distance r from cK”.
Obviously, if we are to speak a positive language of finite
Many terms, we now have to express explicitly an actual
body instead of that formal 0 (zero). The cK” is asserted
to be moving, the K” providing for any changes the envir-
onment may cause in the fixed unit standard c (c.,—an M.).
Consequently, we truistically have to assert that c is related
to—identical with—a part of the universe that is also moving;
otherwise, we would undertake to identify cows with mules
as such, That part can not of course be actually condensed
to the geometrical point 0 at the distance r. Also, the part
or body at distance r obviously must have its motion internal;
for if the body at distance r moved bodily or ‘molarly’ as
does c in its circular path, it would move away from the
distance r, and we would have to devise a more complicated
way of expressing and observing which would somewhat hide
these fundamental elements of expression without dispensing
with them. The sort of electricity which is that kind of
matter in internal motion is a magnet m... (as we saw in
rigorous theory in the last section, and as we shall see con-
cretely and intelligibly in §135). Hence, we have to name
an actual m... internally, by the usual inverse square law
(this is the second application of that verbal law); we may
indicate or imply that, as with the cK”, by writing mU%.
Obviously, the environment of the internal parts of an actual
m... is not the environment between c... and m... which the
K*% took care of; so we had to have another coefficient, U”.

d. Wenow have formally, F;=(mU”%)(cK%)LT/L?.
But that equation is by no means explicit. It merely names
two dynamic bodies (i. e., both are formally ‘mules’):-
(cK*% XLT) and (mU%); but it fails to assert explicitly
that there is relative motion between them—fails to be ex-
plicit about another LT~!. Also, as m... is now explicitly in
internal motion (and as of course in finite language both c...
and m... must be of finite size), an infinite regress of addi-
tional numerical, coeffictents, each implying the same inverse
square truism of naming, is, for absolute explicitness and accu-
racy, required. But clearly we can not write that infinite
regress. | So we chop short the logical procedure by letting
just K and U stand for that infinite regress and then by as-
serting the absolutely accurate truth:- that we can not write

K and U accurately—which is the same as saying that in |

absolute truth they vary. We also note that we omitted one
LT™, and that the fname F, is hence still an Fs-—formal.

e. The equation F,=(mU“)(cK“)LT!/ L? is not directly
comparable with the equations in S76be. The difference of
point of view used is obviously that here I] have used a ce (a
unit point of zero charge) to start with, as that showed the
elementary verbal laws we needed to see. In 876 we used
m’s; and is obviously only one of the internal parts of an
m (see XIV). Consequently, our equation here is merely an
outline of the verbal foundation of Fx=m?U!L~. The last
paragraph explicitly asserts and describes that primitive con-
dition of our present equation. I have formulated this primi-
tive equation because it serves to show fairly clearly a number
of verbal relationships that are too much concealed in the
more explicitly complete equations in S76. The present
equation is merely tentative. An indefinite number of other
ways of writing the equation to show those relationships are
possible. I am not satisfied with the way I use; the physi-
cal mathematician ought to have a considerable volume of

One IX §77%h

more careful and explicit discussion of these forms and appli-
cation of this matter which I must condense into the present
section. Such a treatise would show that I am forced into
vaguenesses and unprecise statements in order to get brevity.

f. It is obvious that the second verbal introduction of
the inverse square law into our equation means that a change
from cows to mules was made; one standard One (a formal
universe of things named ‘cows’ or c—things moving bodily
or molarly) was translated or changed into another standard
One (into a universe’ named “mules’ or m—things moving in-
ternally; i. e., which were verbally split up some more; or,
what is the same, were split differently with respect to the
total universe). In short, mand c are typical of any two
bodies expressed each by a property different from the other;
and that equation is the explicit type of physical equation that
permits and asserts their measurable (i. e., definite, explicit,
‘“scientific’’) comparison. Clearly, the explicit method of
splitting things differently, or giving them different ‘‘proper-
ties,’” is named motion, and is otherwise expressed by or as
time and space (i. e., is the LZ !)—method, motion, prop-
erty, time, space being obviously ““abstractions,’’ or what
we more precisely call relationships, all of which are ulti-
mately identical. And the explicit numerical or
**measured’’ or “‘scientific’?? connection or unification thus
given to all knowledge is at once obvious from the equation,
thus:- The unit or standard m and ¢ were mere monistic or
mystic zames to be expressed inversely as the distance L?, in
infinite regress. Those names then were simply the verbal
*“framework’’ or logic of a possible explicit expression or as-
sertion about two actual bodies of different properties, thus :-
me/L?—=a unit force or relating-into-a-One of any value (i. e., a
numerically indeterminate quantity). Then, when we wished
to make that abstract formal unit actually a unit or 1 in
agreement with our average positive speech of finite parts
like yards and pounds, J inserted a more explicit expression
of the infinite regress:- U*%K*%XLT!. (The two parts of
that expression are themselves implicitly cancelling—as we
have seen repeatedly. Jl. e., it isa truism, equivalent to
our A=A of §22—which is the ultimate proof and explana-
tion of the equation.) Hence, in average conditions, or in
our inaccurate mutual positive finite Trinity language, we
have U*K“2LT!=1; or U-“K-“=LT“1.

g. The theory of translation—the fact that all science
is unified—is thus complete, rigorous (as being merely tru-
isms), and ultimately final (i. e., the universe itself is the
standard, and no changing part such as man, or our compara-
tively little earth). To get, in any case, the actual meas-
ures of the things we thus unify, we simply go and measure.

h. I have been calling our bodies ‘static’ and ‘dynam-
ic,’ depending respectively on whether a given one was con-
sidered as a ‘whole,’ “‘rigid,’’ or “‘molar’’ body, or as a
body that explicitly was internally in motion. But a static
body has in general effect, and also formally, a surface zone
of substance at /¥;; and adynamic body consists of parts,
each of which has such a zone, with a tacitly static interior
to that part like the interior of a molar body (for explicit
proof see Part Two). Consequently, a ‘static’ body is not
perfectly static (i. e., the moving zone extends into the in-
sides some); neither is a ‘dynamic’ body perfectly dynamic
(for the insides of tts parts are tacitly static). The fact that
the coefficients represent an infinite regress of variable mo-
tion obviously provides truistically for those actual variations
from perfection or formally statable exactness. Furthermore,
it is obvious that a part of the dynamic body has substan-
tially the same zone velocity (V;) as the difference zone or
surface of the static one; consequently that part (witha
negligible static insides; cf. S98pw) can unite with the

?

§i7h IX One

moving zone of the static body, changing the velocity of the
whole molar body, while the dynamic body partly passes out
of existence as such. Hence, our formal expression is ulti-
mately consistent. As an incidental point, our use of *stat-
ic’ is obviously equivalent to the conventional ‘potential
energy,’’ and ‘dynamic’ to “‘kinetie energy.’ Clearly,
therefore, ““potential energy’’ does not assert any absolute
non-existence of motion; consistently, it merely means that
the body is verbally static. I shall not go further here into
those obvious details of formal speech.

i. That formally completes the theory of electricity,
unifying it with respect to itself, and unifying it (according
to the whole of this chapter) with other branches of science.
In XIV we revert explicitly to electricity, using Ohm’s law
as a conerete method of unifying the actual mechanics of
electricity with this general statement of the valid mathe-
matical or verbal theory of the expression or measurement of
electricity. We ought to know definitely what measurement
itself is before we go basing science on ‘‘measurement.’’
There is no more merit in the shibboleth “‘measurement”’
than in the Scholastic ones ‘“‘Essence,’’ “‘Substance.’’ We
have seen that Newton and Ampere fancied they were meas-
uring; however, asa matter of fact, they mostly merely
matched their skill with some verbal truisms.

878. a. The orthodox summed statements (i. e., the
orthodox fundamental equations) of the ways of naming or
measuring heat consist in assertions of agnosticisms and then
assertions of gnosticism. E.. g., Watson’s °"Physics’’ says
in effect (p. 344) that J and H (which are our heat names or
quantities that are really analogous respectively to the pairs
of coefficients C and G, and K and U;—I use H instead of
the usual Greek 6, the final straw deciding the change being
that I couldn’t buy the Greek type in Boston except by
having it made with a delay of a month) have unknown ““di-
mensions.” But Watson then explicitly makes a guess at
those dimensions; also, he and other orthodox physicists,
even in the state of admitted or tacitly admitted ignorance
go right ahead and use J and H in explicit equations—the
very doing of which of course truistically implies definite
knowledge of them.

b. Consequently, it truistically follows that I am unable
to say positively just what the orthodox theory of heat does
assert—ultimately, to say what any orthodox theory asserts:
for al] actual Many units at least tacitly involve heat condi-

tions. We simply have to sum it up that orthodox science
asserts its incompleteness. So we are seeing how to com-
plete it. And it is an unessential quantitative problem as

to just where conventional science stops.

879. a. Joule and others found that a certain amount
of molar motion is equivalent to a certain amount of heat un-
der certain conditions; e. g.,he found that in his latitude
in about average weather the energy that would lift about
772 pounds one foot would raise the temperature of one
pound of presumably pure water from 59°F. to GO°F. That
equivalence or transformability of heat and molar motion or
‘“energy’’ is called the first law of heat, or of thermodynam-
ics. The law is expressed (Watson’s ‘*Physics,’’ 342-5) in
the equation Energy—@,J, where Qn is unit quantity of heat
(explicitly, in our abbreviations, it would be Que), and J is
orthodoxly the ‘‘mechanical equivalent of heat’’ and a con-
stant (but validly, it is a variable numerical coefficient applic-
able to ‘molar’ or ‘static’ bodies of heat). The thermal unit
Qn by orthodox definition depends upon the mass M of water
heated, and upon the “‘unit’’ (involving H) of temperature
taken; or, Qa—=MH. Hence, J truistically depends upon
the temperature scale, whose dimensions are implied or

UNIVERSE

74

indicated by the H (because fundamentally Energy=QnJ and
also =MI?T-2); and H is said to be of unknown dimen-
sions so that validly J orthodoxly must logically be unknown
and unusable. Watson says that perhaps H=ML’T? (i.e.,
probably is Energy itself). Lamor, an authoritative mathe-
matical physicist, states positively and, so far as I can de-
termine, without reservation (‘“‘Ency. Brit.,’’ xxii, 806) :-
‘‘The temperature of a gas is measured by the mean energy
of translation of its molecules.’’ Expressing that in orthodox
equational form, we have Temp=tmV2 X a constant; or H=
MI?T-2= Energy. However, regardless of what H
orthodoxly is dimensionally, orthodoxly Qua—MH.

b. From the two orthodox equations, Energy =
ML?>T-?=Q,J and Q,—=MH, we have directly, by ordinary
algebra, Energy=QnJ =MHJ=ML? T~*, If in that we sub-
stitute the orthodox presumptive dimensional value of J, J=
ML?T~, wehave (MJ)MI?T?=ML?T 2—which (if explic-
itly interpreted) is obviously self-contradictory nonsense.

ce. If we take that equation, Energy—Q,J —MHJ =
MI?T~, as it stands and consider that it actually means or
implies something (and it certainly is self-consistent in its
usual interpretation, so far as that interpretation concerns
approximate measurements or experiments—which are apart
from conventional scientific theorizing as to what tempera-
ture and entropy are, which is atrociously irrational and
puerile), then it obviously must assert one of two general
statements:- (1) The equation may assert that J and H are
numerical coefficients, each implying an LT, so that HeJe=
(LT~1)?, and MHJ=ML*T *,—which makes the equation
a trnism (identically as in 877), and gives us H“#%J?%=
LT1=PV. In that case J“H” corresponds identically with
CG” and K-“U-“; and we see at once that these heat
equations imply the same facts as all other valid equations,
but orthodoxly have merely omitted explicit statement of the
verbal processes of naming. (A quick proof of that,
which of itself rigorously proves our total argument, is this :-
The inverse square naming law orthodoxly is omitted twice,
amounting to the fourth power of any single coefficient.
Hence, radiant heat, which implies a dynamic heat, should
vary approximately—since the coefficient is variable—as the
fourth power of such a coefficient. And that actually is ex-
perimentally what is known as Stefan’s law [“‘Ency. Brit.,”’
xiii, 155]. In the experiments that variability is very per-
ceptible.) (2) Or we can take the equation in an
orthodox interpretation:- that H and J are some sort of con-
stant values. In that case JH=L*T; and asa truism, J
and H must be fundamentally identical with L and T—a
conclusion which in effect asserts that all of orthodox heat is
religions or mystic language, and that a positive finite or
scientific language is impossible; or else it drives us to the
theory of relativity. As a matter of fact, this second inter-
pretation asserts that relativity theory. In that sense, our
equation is an explicit assertion of the infinite regress (to
speak everyday language) that applies to any Many part; or
is an explicit assertion of no exact science. So again,
by the only other interpretations of the equation that were
possible, we have a rigorous general proof of the validity of
the unification made by this book.

d. Therefore, (1) we are forced to drop any orthodox
view that J and H are physical “‘constants’’ (unless we re-
vert to relativity), and to take it that they are variable coef-
ficients like K and U, ete. And (2) if the actual direct
measures that have been made of H and J be noted (those
for Stefan’s law are indirectly such, e. g.), it is obvious
enough that they vary. Those two points therefore
complete the essentials of the measuring theory of heat—
show how to write M(varying with)L?T~™ in heat terms. The

75 UNIVERSE

H and J really belong together, as was shown in §77 to be the
case with K~“%U-%. The reader who is interested may
readily see for himself the details of how MJ” expresses
static (““convective’’) heat matter, and MH” expresses dy-
namic (“‘radiant’’) heat matter, and get the consistent di-
mensions of them. He will see too that orthodox equations
really assert that Q,J, MH, and M are all ““matter,’’ and
that the inconsistency and agnosticism of orthodox equations
lies in their omission of statement as to just what kind of
matter each isi. e., omission of the naming inverse square.
Consequently, as we see in the next section, when heat theo-
ry or naming undertakes to translate from the measuring
member M(varying with)I?T~ into the One member Exergy,
or into the everyday naming member That... This..., it
gets confused. The actual fact is (cf. (2) in par. ec) that
orthodox heat is mostly engaged simply in writing what are
substantially truisms of the religious member:- Energy=En-
ergy. E. g., Energy=QhpJ immediately implies such a tru-
ism, in so far as it explicitly has any rational meaning; and
so does Q:—=MH; and so does the vague, aspiringly tenta-
tive equation H=MI?T~2. Aspirations are for children and
second class poets: adults, and especially real scientists,
achieve.

§80. a. It therefore is obvious that conventional heat is
substantially not science at all, but religion. The first law
of heat, Energy=Q,J, is mostly an observational statement
of the religious law of conservation of energy; the poets
back in the mist of antiquity said the same thing with more
extensiveness, but less intensity and direct verifiability, when
they said that all things unite into the One.

b. But for the past fifty years there has been an effort
to make heat scientific—express it in pluralistic terms, or
definitely in terms of Land 7. The difficulty was, as we
shall see, that heat from our usual point of view consists of
unsystematic splittings of bodies—which unsystematic parts
were readily perceptible. In short, in heat so many varia-
tions were perceived that it was difficult to make short, con-
sistently mechanical or logical statements of them, and there
was a tendency to bunch them religiously. When the so-
called science of heat tried to make a pluralistic statement
of itself, it intuitively followed everyday usages at first, and
attempted to split heat into That... This.... If it had
been done fairly correctly, the resulting pair of factors would
obviously have been similar to the Q... XP... in electricity,
or F... XL..., etc., and the last section (which formulated
the measuring member for heat) would have amply covered
the theory for the purposes of this book. It however unfor-
tunately happened that a German, materialistically inclined
and hence with no actual grasp of the principles involved (a
physical science highbrow, in brief), Clausius, undertook to
make heat a science (‘‘Ency. Brit.,’’ Art. ‘“Clausius***’’),
And Clausius messed up heat about as thoroughly as it could
have been done (the mess passes from the ridiculous to the
sublime), and concluded with a nonsensical second and last
“law of thermodynamics’’—which is usually put into the
form of a strange generality called the “increase of entropy,’’
which temporarily had as blighting an effect upon science
as its sociological analogous nonsensical generality, aristoc-
racy (or the “‘increase’’ to infinity of a part of mankind)
temporarily had on society. We have to examine Clausius’s
rather confusing mess here from the present point of view of
mere scientific naming of observed M...’s. | We obtain the
same valid principles, in familiar and more intelligible terms,
in §§100, 140, 153, ete.

ce. Thething which Clausius substantially did (stripping
it of all its confused technical verbiage which poor little
schoolboys are supposed to be able to understand), is this:-

One 1X §80d

He combined the two approximate, observed equations En-
ergy=Q,J and Q:=MH into the equation (which is still
monistic), Energy=MJH. Then, instead of seeing what
that actually meant, he substantially said that H is a quan-
tity that is temperature, and Energy/H, or MJ, is a quantity
that is entropy—so that Ent Temp—Energy. However,
he could not assert any such quantitative equations as M/=
Ent, or H=Temp, as the perceptible variableness of what
are actually mere numerical coefficients would keep those
equations from being quantitatively reasonably accurate ex-
cept at standard zero conditions, and therefore such asser-
tions would lead to obvious self-contradictions when H and J
were orthodoxly taken as constant. So he named tempera-
ture not H, but Temp, and said Energy/Temp—=Ent. But
the verbal forms of expression he used or assumed in thus
attempting to get a That and This (namely, Ent and Temp—
instead of an actual That... and This..., or Ent... and
Temp...), may obviously be considered to be these two:-
(1) He misinterpreted the first law of heat, Energy—QhJ, to
the pure dualistic effect that the total Energy which corres-
ponds to the Q, is absolutely independent of the temperature
of the body containing the heat: i. e., J is constant, or the
equation Energy—QpJ is taken to be completely explicit, and
because it fails to mention Temp explicitly, therefore it is
true of any temperature. (2) He then held that the equa-
tion Qu==MH was also completely explicit, and that it, on
the other hand, asserted that when we have to consider the
actual conversion of that heat Q, into Energy, then the temp-
erature of the body containing Q, (which body is the ‘resi-
dence’ of Q,) is asserted by H, and hence that temperature
has to be taken into account. That second view is one way
of stating the second law of heat: the equation Qu=MH is
tacitly supposed to represent the law. Of course you
can’t undestand those dualisms if you interpret them strictly.
I am implying that they are nonsensical, and from that point
of view they are more intelligible than Lamor’s dualistic re-
mark (§79a) or the orthodox mathematics (“‘Ency. Brit.,’’
xviii, 658), that are openly dualistic.

d. Those two interpretations of the That and This (no
dots) which he got for heat under the names Ent and Temp
are clearly self-contradictory ;—for obviously Clausius says
(as the first law) that heat-quantity or ‘weight of heat’ or
entropy resides as a second entity on a given entity or molar
M and is independent of the temperature or Temp or poten-
tial of the body (which isa materialistic assertion of dualism);
and then he asserts (asthe second law) that temperature
does have some effect. The first law of heat, in that
orthodox form, is clearly merely an incomplete attempt to
pass from a monistic truism Energy—Q)J, to positive or
pluralistic language by making a formal agreement to divide
the universe into static parts or M’s of heat. If properly
(i. e., completely) expressed, such a verbal agreement or law
is necessary for science, as we have repeatedly seen. But
Clausius’s way of solving that One and the Many in its heat
guise is merely the customary German professor’s invalid
dualistic, materialistic way:- he logically or formally keeps
on having absolutely independent universes, or That That
That etc., explicitly as Ent Ent Ent etc., which never
combine into a meaning or a real universe—although he ob-
viously just the minute previously had started from a real
One. Therefore, apparently being intuitively suspicious of
his first law as he stated it (as was quite natural, it being
nonsensical; and also because it was difficult to have such a
short memory and forget so extremely quickly that One or
Energy which he started with), he proceeded flatly to deny
the first law in the second, with the natural result that it
also is nonsensical, as we now proceed to see.

§80e 1X One

e. The difficulty he directly had with the second law
resulted from the fact that he tried to use Temp or tempera-
ture surreptitiously (even with respect to himself) as being
all three forms of the Trinity, in order to compensate for
the shortcomings of the first law in dealing with the One and
Many. Perhaps chiefly he used Temp as a relationship word
(as Temp,, corresponding to L,) to assert L (and 7) as bind-
ing his Ent Ent Ent etc., into a universe; consequently,
as a formal] truism of valid logic, we have Temp, disappear-
ing or becoming zero in the sense that it is mot a Many part;
and as Ent Ent Ent etc., is all that is left as Many parts
when temperature thus disappears, then Ent Ent ete.,
‘‘increases’’ until it is the universe or “‘infinity.’’ But the
second law also says in effect that Temp is Thise—a standard
unit or One, on which as a formally fixed base the whole
science of heat starts (for details, see next paragraph). And
still further, the second law asserts that Temp is This...;
obviously, in al] applications of heat equations to actual cir-
cumstances Temp is a changing This.... Therefore, Claus-
ius, in his confused way, took Temp as actually Temp..., and
asserted that all 7his’s became zero and the universe became
all That’s—entropy increased to infinity,—which is some
more obvious and glaring nonsense. That error was
clearly due primarily to fancying that MJ’s could be distinct
or absolutely separate, while at the same time a One Energy
was asserted—that A=A and A does not—A. Therefore,
that ““increase of entropy’’ is the typical technical error of
all forma] dualism, classic logic, or scientific materialism.
The materialists chase the ‘series’ of That That That etc.
until they become mentally desperate, and finally assert that
those That’s are the universe pecause there are so many of
them. It is the same infantile way of talking, and narrow
vision, that causes a child, when he sees (say) twenty cows
in a field and is not able to count to twenty, to say that he
sees ‘‘a whole world of cows.’? As a monistic or admittedly
poetical way of talking it is quite permissible and intelligible,
being logically the way in which a hen with more or less
successful results talks to her chickens. The materialists
should not, however, claim that that way—or as they prefer
to put it, ‘‘the increase of entropy to infinity’’—is definite,
or positive, or “‘cold fact,’”’ or *“scientific,’’ as it glaringly is
not, according to usua] meanings of words. An ample logi-
cal refutation of such dualism or materialism is that if entro-
py increases, then there are no facts or agreements which
limit the past age of the universe; hence itis logically sound,
especially by the classic logic, to assert that already there
has been infinite time, and entropy has zow increased to in-
finity, and a]] temperature or temperature differences have
disappeared or become zero—which obviously is not so.

f. Clausius tried to make Temp a One (in the same
sense that orthodoxly it is guessed that H=ML?7T-2=Eu-
ergy)—that being his vague way of asserting dynamic heat,
instead of using the valid way of inserting the inverse square
law a second time. When we say a body has a temperature
we mean, in an explicitly measurable sense, that the whole
inside of the body is considered to be divided into parts in
some way, and that that ‘motion’ or division inside the body
causes the whole to expand or contract or otherwise (as a
truism) change “‘properties’’ or splitting, in some percep-
tible measure. (‘Temperature’ in a man is indicated by
calling him energetic, active, strenuous; entropy, by calling
him enduring, persevering, hard-working, reliable. | Obvi-
ously, some of each of the two factors must be had by a man
even to exist——to say that his endurance or entropy increases
to infinity, while at the same time his activity or potential] or
actual use of that endurance becomes zero is to say that the
man ceases to exist: is *“nonsense,”’ if we say the man has

UNIVERSE 76

such possibilities. ) So when temperature is asserted
we are dealing with a ‘dynamic’ body, precisely like a mag-
net in principle. And to say that H=ML*T~, or that
Temp ts that body is valid as a religious or mystic truism,
but is logically wrong if we are professing to talk scientific
language: for ““temperature’’ then should be the second im-
plication of inverse square that is the way of saying that the
body is a particular sort of M (or, is wrong because Temp
and Ent are irrational factors [$71g]: each is utterly mean-
ingless unless supplemented by the other, just as it would be
nonsense to talk of a man highly strenuous but whose strenu-
ous activity would not endure for an instant). However,
Clausius decided that because Temp was sometimes used to
imply a body or an entity (was what I name Temp...: when
we talk of strenuosity we imply a man, etc.), then (as a con-
clusion; and this is also one conventional way of stating the
second law):- heat can not pass from a cold body to ahotter
one (because, by tacit orthodox truisms, the cold body rela-
tively to the hot one has zero of the entity Temp..., and can
not give what it, relatively speaking, does not have). Obvi-
ously, those tacit orthodox truisms are quite irrelevant (as
they also tacitly assume the erroneous view that Temp... can
be used intelligibly entirely independent of its completing
irrational factor Ent...). As a matter of actual fact, if the
reader wil] strike a match he will see that pseudo second law
violated; for heat then passes from relatively cold bodies—
the original match tip and the air about it—to the things in
the neighborhood of the then ignited match. Actually,
what that second law will validly assert is the abstract truism
(which completely applies to no actual body in the universe)
that from a low potential a higher one can not be obtained:
it is logically equally true that from a high potential a lower
one can not be obtained, as potential with reference to actual
bodies is a relationship word, and is not subject to compari-
son. The materialists erroneously assume, as the practical
fact, that a dynamic body has a perfectly homogeneous po-
tential—that all of it has, at least approximately, a steady
constant motion or temperature (Maxwell’s demon is a theo-
retical speculation to the contrary). We have seen here in
general that the error is due to their omission of the verbal
inverse square laws: we shall see repeatedly in Two and
Three that no body has any such constant potential, but that
all actual bodies in principle have internal potentials that
vary from 0 to ©. As an equivalent statement of that, we
may put the foregoing materialistic pseudo-scientifie confu-
sion of One words and relationship words that is usually
called the second law of heat into familiar everyday terms:-
(1) a baby can not be born, as his potential or ability to
move about for a longer time is greater as an average than
the biological potential of his failing parents; (2) or, ‘‘To
you from failing hands the torch we throw’’ is, according to
that second law, a nonsensical expression, whereas all intel-
ligent people can observe directly, without all this present
talk, that it is not nonsensical; (3) or, those materialists as-
sert that growth, and birth, and radioactivity, and electron
formation are impossibilities, as in such cases the potential or
temperature ‘increases,’’ at least locally. We shall see just
how matter is made, and what growth and birth are (Index,
Growth, Secondary whirls,’’ etc.). Then these formal-
ities will become easily intelligible. These facts and this
argument are important to you:- all the engines which sup-
ply you with many needs are applications of them, and
require clear thinking about them; and even safe experi-
menting with the “‘strenuous life’’ requires such clear think-
ing. Also, I have just performed a major surgical operation
on the materialistic mind; it may not recover; but at least
it can no longer infect the rest of the world.

V7 UNIVERSE

g. It therefore obviously follows that the way in which
temperature should have been measured or defined is pre-
cisely the way in which electric potential was. | Hence we
may write the combined static-dynamic heat equation:-

Ent... X Temp... =MJ “H“1?T?=Energy(general heat) .

Or, if we wish to consider that we handle heat in quantities

such as molar bodies, in agreement with the monistic truism —

Energy=Q,J, thus permitting all the standard One which is
included by the equation to become formally the same tem-
perature, we have the ‘static’ heat general equation:-

Ents... X Temps... =MJ “1?T-?= Energy(static heat).
And the corresponding general ‘dynamic’ heat equation is :-

Entm... X Tempm...=MH“ L? T-2= Energy(dynamic heat).

h. Those equations (provided we write them as unit
standards, Ente... X Tempe...—MI’T 2, etc.) are the valid
forms of the well known equations for the pressure p and
volume v of a gas. The orthodox form of the static equation
is pu=a constant,—which **constant”’ is obviously a standard
One or Energy, so that logically or dimensionally (but not
numerically when usual conventions of measuring are used)
the equation is pu=—FEnergy. That is called the isothermal
equation, and is represented by an equilateral hyperbola.
The orthodox form of the dynamic equation (the last being
static) is the ““adiabatic’’ equation pv“/“=a constant (Dan-
iell’s ““Physies,’’ 394f; ‘‘Ency. Brit.,’’ xxvi, 809f). We
take up those gas forms of scientific equations in §§82-3.

i. We may now explicitly observe (it is something of a
repetition) that the fundamental difficulty in those orthodox
heat confusions was as to the way to use the same language
to go from statements about static bodies to statements about
dynamic bodies. The equation Energy=Q,J implies ‘molar’
or static heat, and Energy—MJH implies dynamic heat.
The theory of the transition, which is a matter of verbal
form, is identically the same as already seen with respect to
electricity, etc. 1 must at this point omit the volumes of
details which would be needed to give a reasonably full ap-
plication to heat. But as an introduction to the pu form of
the same verbal puzzle (which we need to consider), I shall
restate a general solution in the remainder of this section,
from the useful point of view of what is called the “‘absolute
zero’ of temperature.

j. In the equation for static heat, Energy=Q,J, tem-
perature (in the sense of internal division of a heat-mass, or
Tempr) is not mentioned; and the same thing applies to
Ents... < Temps...=MJ “I?T~ —i. e., that explicit static
equation actually has zero potential, and hence no actual
Tempr is explicitly asserted to exist; it of course has the
symbol Temps..., but that symbol is identical with ZL... in
the general F... XZ..., and as such means merely that in an
actual thermometer the thermometric or lheat-containing
substance stands at that height ““L’’ or Tempr. In that
sense, the explicit static heat equation makes a statement
which is true at a formal absolute zero of temperature (and
if there were no variation in J, would be true at any tem-
perature—but there is a variation). That is to say, so far as
the statement goes, there is vo motion or zero internal mo-
tion in the MJ” (or in the QuJ). And that formal agree-
ment as to how the universe is to be divided—the MJ” ob-
viously implies an inverse square,—is the total meaning of
such phrases as ‘absolute zero,’’ whether the phrase refers
to a potential called temperature, or to any other sort of po-
tential. In Many terms—in actual, everyday nature as we
commonly speak of it,—there is no such thing as a zero of
temperature, any more than there is an infinity of tempera-
ture: it is an absolute truism that it is impossible to have
either, in a Many sense. The total universe is at zero tem-
perature or at infinite temperature, just as we prefer to say.

One |X §80l

But no part of the universe either is, or can be. As a curi-
ous fact (which again shows the consistency of these truistic
statements), the theory of relativity, having completely cap-
sized our language, asserts that there can be no velocity
greater than the velocity of light in our neighborhood (but
ef. XIII, XIV). That relativity conclusion, if expressed in
heat terms, asserts that at the velocity of light there is an
absolute infinity of temperature—an absolute maximum. So
if a flame gives light, some portion of the flame is, by that
theory, at infinite temperature. And that, truistically, is
valid. The complete facts are (as we shall see repeatedly in
Part Two) that at some place in it, every natural structure
or body is always growing or else breaking down; at that
place, where respectively either the part’s neighboring parts
are ceasing to be, or else the part itself is ceasing to be (as
or in its ‘original’ structure, of course), the temperature or
potential is obviously either zero or infinity, depending on
the point of view of naming it:- if a structure is viewed as
going out of existence, its “‘temperature’’ is “‘zero’’; but
at the same (really geometrical point or zcro) place and time
its neighboring structure is coming into existence, and tts
“‘temperature’’ there is “‘infinite.’? But, as the structure
does not exist when it has thus broken down, or is not ‘com-
ing into existence’ when it does exist, clearly it is a verbal
self-contradiction to say that any Many part can have either
a zero or an infinite temperature. ‘That is obviously merely
the problem, in terms of ““measuring’’ or of heat or of any
potential, of Whatis a number? (see discussion of the zero-
infinity line of Fig. 54c, which is analogous to these Jimits).

k. Ina way precisely analogous, the dynamic heat equa-
tion formally asserts temperature—whereas previously zero
temperature was asserted (last paragraph). Therefore,
speaking precisely, zf we assert that either the static or the
dynamic equation is absolute or is absolutely expressed, then
the dynamic equation asserts an infinite temperature, for
the simple reason that the only way to make a zero tempera-
ture become some other temperature is to multiply it by in-
finity (and that really amounts to saying that the One named
zero is the One named infinity—and we actually get no defi-
nite potential that way). The mechanical or concrete
facts that explain that verbal One and Many difficulty which
orthodox science fails to get out of, are those given at the
end of the last paragraph.

1. That verbal One and Many contradiction which in-
fects all conventional discussions of potential from their very
start with the obviously self-contradictory idea ““potential
energy,’’ is completely obviated by noting that neither the
static equation nor the dynamic equation is completely ex-
pressed (or valid) if considered to be absolutely separate from
the other (which is equivalent to the fact in §§$73h, 77d
that there is actually zero potential in our ‘static’ and in
our ‘dynamic’ equations). Actual or Many expression of
finite temperatures is obviously implied in the orthodox One
truism, Energy=—M.JH; and is explicitly given in Many
terms in MJ ”“H“L?T-?=Energy(heat):- for in such a com-
bination we have neither the 0 of the static nor the © of the
dynamic. The practical way of avoiding those formal] zeros
and infinities is of course to consider that (say) MJ” always
has a numerical value of J” which agrees with the actual re-
lations of MJ” with the omitted but necessarily implied H”
(and that is a mathematical proposition the fairly good state-
ment of which would require volumes of differential equa-
tions, omitted from this book; I call it the theory of
harmonic proportions or of harmonic periodicity, as it is the
principle or quantative relationship of ratios, or explicit writ-
ing of the definite expansion of That... X This..., on which
the periodic table of elements is based; see Index). Until

§801 IX One

we came to heat we tacitly considered that the static and the
dynamic equations always belonged together: that view
was the total unification of science in the form K~“U-4=/.
But because Clausius in heat explicitly made science in act-
ual effect chaos—disintegrated und disrupted it logically with
German thoroughness (not out of ‘“bad’’ motives, but merely
through coarseness or dullness of comprehension of principles
resulting from having a mind overburdened with unassimi-
lated details or ““material facts’’—most of which in such
cases aren’t ‘‘so’’ anyway, being too inaccurate),—by split-
ting H and J apart and asserting that they were absolutely
independent, even to the preposterous extent of ““increase of
entropy,’ it became needful to be explicit about their unity.

m. It hence follows that a zero or an infinite tempera-
ture (or any other potential:- chemical, surface-energy,
space-molar-location, etc.) simply implies the ‘surface’ or
zone between two parts into which a One is split—asserts
the existence of a ‘difference surface,’ across which smaller
parts of one body pass as it changes or ‘moves’ into being
another, the first body diminishing or dying and the second
(which is the first transformed) growing or being born, with
““energy’’ being ““evolved’’ as the process. The potential
of any actual finite body can not therefore be that formal
limiting potential, but is measured from that limit in either
direction—one direction being called growth or increase, and
the other dying or decrease. Death is the biological term
for zero temperature, and birth for infinite temperature; ob-
viously there can be no such entities or Many parts, nor can
any actual finite Many part attain such an absolute condition
or relationship; birth and death are, with reference to any
part of the universe, merely quantitative, or matters of de-
gree, and not absolute. We shall see the concrete details of
this subject from time to time (Index, ““Birth,’’ “‘Death,’’
*“Growth,’’ ‘“Potential,’’ “‘Difference surface’’). Incident-
ally, the same principles of potential apply to the problems
of good and evil, the structure of the solar system and atoms
and man, personal immortality, etc. I have here merely
stated the rigidly formal solution of those problems, in con-
ventional physical terms.

881. a. We have thus seen how Clausius became con-
fused in trying to make science of heat. Substantially his
was the everyday or technically philosophical way of splitting
Energy or Universe into That... This..... The more spe-
cifically “‘scientific’? way would have been to write heat en-
ergy in terms of the measuring member, as indicated in §79.

b. Hence, it has appeared that in conventional heat the
everyday commonsense form or philosophical form That... X
This... is ordinarily used. As that everyday form is used to
a considerable extent in other branches of science, we need
to complete this formal unification of science by a more ex-
plicit consideration of that naming or philosophical member.

c. Weare going to find that Richards, by completing
the theory started by Van der Waals, has explicitly and with
complete generality stated a unified science in the everyday
or philosophical form That... x This..... | And as all other
branches of science are already expressed in terms of Exten-
sive factor... < Intensive factor..., and as it is commonly under-
stood that Jntensive factor... or intensity or potential is
included in complete orthodox statements of Energy (and
that it rather consciously implies Z and 7), it follows that
because orthodox science accepts Van der Waals’s and Rich-
ards’s conclusions, it in effect already accepts the unification
of this chapter—provided I show that those conclusions agree
with the chapter, as is easily done.

$82. a. The conclusion which Clausius gets, and which
is in agreement with the dualism of the classic logic, is that
in Ent X Temp, Ent is an entity of some sort which is abso-

UNIVERSE

78

lutely separate and distinct from another entity of some
sort, Temp—and vice versa. And in agreement with that,
the orthodox ‘static’ form of Ent Temp—Energy is py=—kn-
ergy. Orthodoxly, pu is equal to a **constant,’’ but the
constant is obviously a standard One. Explicitly, the con-
stant is RTemp, where Ff is a constant number, and Temp is,
like H, orthodoxly confusedly given the (dimensional) mean-
ing Temp=ML?T (but I do not need to repeat our heat
discussion to show that RTemp is actually Energy). And
the customary “dynamic’ form of Ent Temp—=Energy is
pv'/"=RTemp=Energy. (The same remarks as to RTemp
again apply. Also, & and c are orthodoxly taken as constant
numbers derived from experimental measures, so that R=
k—c, etc.; see Daniell’s ““Physies,’’ 370.)

b. Thus, in the gy Xv expression, the p and v have to be
absolutely distinct in order to agree with Clausius’s theory
of heat. I. e., in conventional formality, the p and v are
explicitly without the dots—are a dualism which older ortho-
dox theory holds willsharply and accurately make up at least
a standard universe: concretely, will accurately describe any
given quantity of gas. But at just that point the total equa-
tion of pseudo, dualistic laws falls down completely and fails
to agree with observed facts. For a sharp p Xv agrees with
what is called a perfect gas—one in which truistically the
volume and the pressure vary with perfectly steady mutual
proportionality. A perfect gas of course is merely an asser-
tion of a real One: we saw Clausius starting with it ($80ed).
So here it inevitably bobs up again—and fails glaringly to
agree with observed facts about any perts of the universe.
Quite naturally it would: we have seen repeatedly that as a
truism there are no perfect parts (Index, ““Exact’’). |The ob-
served fact that there is no actual perfect gas is clearly a
verifiable proof of the general argument of this book.

c. In short, the orthodox, ““constant’’ form pv is neither
in quantitative agreement with observed facts, nor formally
consistent. Or, what is truistic with that:- all factors, such
as F XL, WXA, EntXTemp, are mutually interrelated;
they are explicitly That... This..., p...Xv..., ete., and
each factor (such as That..., v...) is absolutely unintelligible
or irrational if considered alone—and so on, for all the other
conclusions we have already seen: they reject materialistic,
perfect-gas science, and assert the fundamental law that
mass varies with velocity, or assert no exact science.

e d. Now, Van der Waals (in remarks written by himself,

Ency. Brit.,’’ vi, 846) finds that instead of the orthodox
sharply separated p and v, written as pv, we must write
(p-ta/v*)(v—b)=RTemp [or, =Energy}|, in which a and }
are usually taken as constant numbers, but not necessarily
so. If constant, then Van der Waals’s equation is obviously
equivalent to p... Xv; i. e., p... varies or is an actual Many
part, but v (without the dots) is ‘perfect?’ [which latter is
nonsense]. If a and 0} are not constant, then the equation is
rational and valid, being explicitly the form Der Olek: On
the page cited Van der Waals states that ““we are still per-
fectly in the dark’’ as to the principles on which his equation
is based. Substantially, the equation is a fundamental modi-
fication of the o/d kinetic theory, as we shall see (S§s9, 93-4,
ete.), and as he himself clearly implies on the same page.
But he fails to be definite about it, so far as I ean find.

e. But Richards, basing his conclusion on a long series
of unusually careful and skillful measurements of substances
(Faraday lecture, 1911, printed in ‘‘Jour. Chem. Soc.,’’ v.
99, and “‘Science,’’ Oct. 27, 1911), finds definitely that all
volumes v, even including explicitly atomic volumes, are
vara and hence that it is irrational ever to speak of a

perfect’ ” v—one whose value is in any way ‘‘independent.’”’
By actual, direct measurements he finds Clausius’s theory or

79 UNIVERSE

the perfect-gas theory (par. a) finally untenable so far as is
now perceptibly measurable. Then Richards explicitly takes
the step at which Van der Waals hesitates, and definitely
asserts that the old kinetic theory, which is the “‘concrete’’
or mechanical, guessed-at base of the orthodox theory of
heat, is untenable. And that amounts to Richards’s saying
and to proving directly even with respect to atoms, that the
valid physical equation is p... Xv...=Energy. In order to
be completely explicit and logical, we add to that equation
the measuring member, MJ “H“L?T-?, — That completely
and rigorously unifies physical science.

§83. a. It finally remains, to complete our chapter on
the explicit formal unification, to make a brief statement (in
this section) of that complete theory or expression in familiar
terms that will give us a more thorough grasp of the details
noted; and then (in the next section) to indicate the pussible
extension of the general equation.

b. We have been seeing that physical equations, or in
general any valid statements, were simply statements assert-
ing some variously named splitting of the universe into parts,
which splitting was a ““property’’ (i. e., an equation asserts,
describes, names a property). Now, the usual name for the
product of that splitting is ““things’’; 1 also use ‘thing’ as a
name for the One. Some of the scientific technical names
for things, beginning with “‘large’’ things, are:- Energy,
universe, One, galaxies (I designate the galaxy or particular
structure of stars in which our solar system is situated, as
‘ours’), star clusters, solar systems, stars, planets, moons,
comets, meteors, earth, Jupiter, molar bodies (such as solids,
liquids, gases), molecules, atoms, electrons or corpuscles,
and finally ““waves’’ or “‘vibrations’’ of different sorts. We
therefore need to note explicitly whether or not the same
method of expression, of naming, that applies to (say) atoms
in dynamic heat also consistently applies to galaxies. The
observed fact is that it does—that a galaxy is identically the
same sort of a structure that an atom is, differing only inthe
unessential numerical name of the L and 7’ measure. The
general truth of that is rigorously formally proved in the
foregoing part of this chapter. In this section I state the
formal proof somewhat explicitly. Parts Two and Three
give the proof in concrete terms.

ec. As we saw, Richards’s effectual conclusion that the
valid expression of phenomena is explicitly p... Xv... is
equivalent to asserting that we must say That... X This...,
whatever part That or This may be. Therefore, it follows
that if the universe is split into (say) just two bodies—a
That which we may name sun (or it could be a galaxy, an
atom, etc.), and a This which we may name earth (or another
galaxy, etc.),—then those ““two’’ bodies can not be sharp
and exact and constant; even just those two would be con-
tinually changing, and must still be written That... X
This.... Or, to make that explicit and more conventional,
suppose that there was-were just the sun and earth (with all
other ‘‘bodies’’ wiped out, except that the sun and earth are
not taken to be perfectly rigid or absolutely static—and tru-
istically they can not be if the One is formally divided into
that Many, the truism being the reverse statement of the
first part of this paragraph). Then, orthodoxly, the earth
and sun are taken as being in effect a perfect gas, and it is
then assumed that the problem of their relative motions, the
problem of two bodies, is rigorously exactly soluble (for solu-
tion, see ‘‘Ency. Brit.,’’ ii, 803-4). But obviously no such
solution is possible (see next paragraph). The problem of
two actual bodies is not exactly soluble, any more than is
the problem of three bodies. | Hence, in brief, there is no
exact science; we can not explicitly say or use pv about any
two actual bodies; always the explicit expression is p...X

One IX §83f

v..., with the dots indicating an infinite regress which may
be formally stated but never exactly evaluated. New-
comb shows in the place just cited why the problem of three
bodies or more bodies is insoluble; it amounts to showing
that there is an infinite regress. A mathematical ““solution’’
of the problem has recently been made by Sundman. Judg-
ing from the descriptions of the solution I have seen, he
simply has a formal one, which explicitly involves infinite re-
gresses or series which can never be exactly evaluated; and
hence, athough it is a formal solution it is not an actual one.

d. The briefest proof that the problem of two bodies is
not accurately soluble when actual bodies are considered is
that because mass varies with velocity, then the average
point center of gravity of the two bodies is never steady
relative to the geometrical parts, and hence the problem is
identical with the problem of an infinite number of bodies and
truistically is quantitatively insoluble. That proof is
of course identical with, and inclusive of, all the proofs of
the same thing (clearly it is the infinite regress) given from
various points of view. I shall indicate some of those proofs
in the next paragraph. Here it may be noted that that gen-
eral proof is identical with saying that every actual body in
the universe is asymmetrical with the universe or with any
other body (obviously, that is also immediately a truism from
the theory of incommensurables, §50). And that
general proof is merely a verbal way of expressing the equa-
tion F...X<L...=MCL*T?*=Energy. For obviously that
equation asserts ever-varying M’s, so that no two given MM]’s
would remain the same for any finite length of time; hence,
no two could have a verbally fixed or determinate orbit.

e. Neither one of any two actual bodies is absolutely
rigid (all of Part Two is implicit proof of that). Hence,
unless the departure from rigidity is absolutely identical in
each body (which is not the case, as is obvious by using uni-
versal circular reasoning and coucluding that there is no such
symmetry; or, by so-called direct reasoning, there is only
one chance in infinity of identical] departure from absolute
rigidity in each, and therefore not such a departure), then
the bodies would have different amounts of tide, which would
move the point center of gravity and make the orbits insol-
uble, in any numerical] or verbal exactness. In the
same way, any two actual bodies are electrified in some de-
gree. Any relative motion of them changes the relative
electrification ($134); hence, the orbits truistically vary in-
finitely. And any phenomenon between the two
bodies will similarly give that same result of variable orbits.
Hence, not even the ““heavenly’’ bodies constitute a perfect
gas, and there is no absolutely “‘free’’ space, or ‘‘empty’’
space (except of course those terms may be applied to the
One if it suits the speaker’s taste and agrees with his other
phraseology). | Whenever ‘“free’’ is applied to any part—to
any unit of the Many—it obviously truistically is a quantita-
tive term implying some degree of freedom, and not absolute,
as we see repeatedly in fainiliar terms in Two and Three.

f. A point of much interest is that in the orthodox
pseudo-exact solution of the gravitational orbits of two bod-
ies, the ‘‘velocity’’ of the travel of gravity-force is taken as
infinite. The absolute solution of why gravity has that speed
is simply:- gravity pull is asserted to exist before we ever
begin to talk about it: consequently, if we say it is there,
then inevitably, as a purely verbal truism, it zs there; or, in
conventional mathematical terms, in order to be there, it has
an ‘‘infinite velocity.’’ E. g., in our general dynamic molar
equation W...XA...=MG“L?T *=Energy, I have asserted
that gravity does exist between all M’s, and that is the same
as saying that it travels at infinite speed. But, that asser-
tion means precisely the same thing as was meant in Ssok

§83f IX One

when it was shown that the dynamic heat equation asserted
infinite temperature. I.e., as was shown, it is not completely
explicit to use just the dynamic molar or gravity equation
alone. The complete truth is the combination of the molar
static and molar dynamic thus:- Extent of internal splitting
into M’s...< This moving pair of M’s directly considered...=
MCG“ 1?2T?=Energy. Then, the relative velocities of nam-
ing the M’s (i. e., naming them internally and externally)
are implicitly expressed by the equation CG*=The criterion
velocity af naming—which velocity is in general actually
roughly V; for us, but not necessarily so. But the separate
velocities (i. e., the ‘“velocity’’ of naming the V..., and the
‘‘velocity’’ of naming the 4...) can be anything; i. e., they
are absolutely indeterminate, because to separate them is to
speak of bodies being absolutely static or absolutely dynamic
—~which would be ineffable One talk. Consequently, when
we customarily consider that gravity merely is there, or is
formally G., its corresponding ¢ velocity is®; and we then
relatively consider that the time of our travel between the
static body and the dynamic body is 0 (i. e., the two bodies
have the queer standard or « name used above:- This mov-
ing pair of M’s pirecriy considered). As soon as we observe
that we are co-relating that 0 with ©-speed gravity, the
**reason’’ for that speed of gravity becomes obvious:- it is a
mere truism of the formal naming of gravity—the verbal
trick of the One and Many. Therefore, as a further truism
and rigorous and absolute explanation, if we wish to be com-
pletely explicit about the law of gravity, then the valid equa-
tion must explicitly contain a ‘second’ expression of inverse
square, precisely as in 877 we saw was in a complete Am-
pere’s law (cf. §§100, 128, 134). If thus completely ex-
plicit, we could with verbal consistency say that the velocity
of gravity was the same as an electric current (roughly V; in
ordinary circumstances), and work out all molar mechanics
just as electricity is stated. But, then gravity phenomena
obviously become—are—what we usually call electric phe-
nomena. Consequently, as the summing up truism, we may
say that gravity travels at any speed we wish to assign, and
on that speed work out a complete, rigorous, unified science;
but in every case where we say gravity has some speed other
than the almost One or - “‘infinite’’ speed, we are using
gravity as being a phenomenon other than the one we con-
ventionally consider it; e. g., if we give it the speed of light
we bave what is usually called electricity, as before men-
tioned; and as ‘electricity’? from a conventional view is
sometimes light, then gravity would also be light. Or, in
other words, as we saw in §73d, Newton’s law assumes that
gravity travels at an absolute infinite speed. But that is the
mathematical limit, and does not apply to any actual body.
Such gravity just verbally zs, exists as a logically pure rela-
tionship, or is God the Holy Ghost. Obviously, zo mechan-
ics of such gravity is possible—for such an infinite gravity is
not scientific but religious in form. We see details of that
point of view of Newton’s law from time to time.
And in general therefore, we can have an “‘infinite number’?
af sorts of ‘‘phenomena,’’ the difference between any two sorts
being that the ‘speed of naming’ is different; and nothing else
but such a quantitative distinction does differentiate phe-
nomena. But as we have already seen in the case where
‘‘eravity’’ became ‘‘light,’’ all those different phenomena
are really identical—that being a truism of course, because
““speed”’ is merely LT or the ultimate identical relation-
ship. Therefore, in this paragraph we directly see
the complete solution of ‘‘Why does gravity (or any phe-
nomenon) have a certain speed; and what is that speed?’’;
but we also see the truistic result that in a unified science
al] phenomena become identical except as we arbitrarily dis-

UNIVERSE 80

tinguish them. And the only arbitrary way of differentiating
is to assign each sort a particular speed or LE

g. We may now look at the general meaning of intro-
ducing the inverse square law a second time. It involves
some repetition; but this subject of armonic periodicity is
the summed principles of final quantitative expression of
knowledge, and is of sufficient complexity to make some
repetition perhaps acceptable. | When in usual language we
name a standard or a whole One, we imply the possibility of
splitting it verbally—which implication is the infinite regress.
And in nearly every sort of statement, we use a standard
molar body Mz, that to begin with is logically a One. That
M. is formally absolutely static—is internally not split.
Then, as an if-agreement in language, we change that Me
into MC, and write Energy=MCL*T: but that is merely
the verbal form of agreeing on preliminary naming of what
is going to be actual energy (§§73, 77). Then in any case of
actual transfer or exhibition of energy, some or all of one
such molar body must pass from itself to another such molar
body and be incorporated in that second one. And truistic-
ally, that can not occur if the second (also the first, in point
of fact: cf. the nature of the infinite regress of C... at the
end of this paragraph) is actually internally static as just as-
serted. Hence, the second must, as what we might call an
MC. (note the .), be itself split into parts, or be made “dy-
namic,’ by the second use of that naming law—and we get
the expression MCG”. We have seen all that before: now
we come to a little clearer way of expressing it:- Obviously,
in every case when actual energy is exhibited, we must torm-
ally pass (or concretely:- have matter pass) from a body
made up of parts (say molecules), toa molar or formal --body
—and we may generally consider that as passing from one
sort of arbitrary physical structure (i. e., one split in a cer-
tain way) to another structure of a different order. (Those
orders may be conceived thus:- electrons combine into a
‘“‘higher’’ order, atoms; atoms into “‘higher’’ molecules;
molecules into molar bodies, or into biologic cells; cells into
persons; molar bodies into solar systems, which are atoms
or cells of a galaxy, etc.—as we shall see in detail.) Every
time we make such a ‘‘step’’ (either ““up’’ or ‘“down’’) we
need to introduce into the measuring member a new coefficient
implying one additional use of the inverse square law (ortho-
dox science does not clearly recognize that need; also there
are no such essential ““steps’? anyway, they being merely ar-
bitrary quantitative conveniences which merge continuously
into each other, as was proved generally in the last para-
graph, and will be shown in intelligible detail throughvut
Two). Every time we take such a step to a different order
in the zaming member we ought to name a new This and That
(and orthodox science usually does that). Then, as there is
no logical limit to the number of different orders of struct-
ures (as just seen, they ultimately merge together continu-
ously; or as a concrete example, stellar galaxies exist inside
atoms, differing from our galaxy only in unessential size,
$105), we may explicitly have the numerical coefficients in infin-
ite regress, each order or period being obviously related to all
the others (hence the name ‘harmonic periodicity’) and all
therefore necessarily being formally based on whatever arbi-
trary unit measure we start with (which, agreeing with the
structure of our nervous systems, happens to be Vj). I. e.,
if we wish to write ‘(varying with)’ explicitly and also in
agreement with our previous symbolic way of doing it, we
have C... (in MC...), and not just C. And that MC... L277?
is the measuring member in complete symbolic explicitness; but
as we saw in §76d, we can’t practically be so infinitely ex-
plicit, so we chop off the logic by indicating its nature by
different names that use the inverse square in a “step”? of an

81 UNIVERSE

. ‘ < F 6s °
appreciable size. The universe runs in such ‘ rhythmic’’

appreciable steps for reasons we shall see. The periodic
table of “‘chemical elements’’ is an example of perceptible
rhythmic steps that are some of the dots in (say) C...—the
total change not being considered quantitatively enough to
add an inverse square naming (it may be in the future).

§84. a. Thus it is obvious that there is possible an un-
limited extension of the various measuring expressions of
science. 1 have above reduced those expressions to their
simplest forms, and omitted substantially all manipulation of
them—omitted ““mathematics.’” That extension of science
is here called harmonic periodicity—a poor name. That is
in distinction from the use of the naming or That... This...
member, which use is called “‘mechanies,’’? ‘‘mechanical
theories,’’ or “‘scientific theories,’’ but which technically is
philosophy (§39d); and when the names in that member are
familiar its use is called ““common knowledge,”’ or ‘‘infor-
mation.’’ “Harmonic periodicity’ is not definitely recog-
nized as being an existing general aspect of science: it is a
sort of general name that includes all of what is tacitly in-
cluded in “‘measuring’’ and “‘measurement.’’ Its definite
expansion requires primarily a rewriting of calculus in a way
that agrees with the basic logical rule, and then an applica-
tion of such mathematics; most of the volumes needed for
that is omitted from this book.

b. Recently there has been a vast amount of measuring
or ‘‘experimenting’’ in science, and an inadequate proportion
of consistent expression of results. In so far as this book
consists of ““science,’’ its chief purpose from such a technical
point of view is to supply a consistent basis for such neces-
sary expression of results already obtained. This chapter,
from that technical point of view, is mostly concerned with
the principles of the measuring member—science technically
is chiefly that member (39f). For centuries men will have
to try various applications of those principles before there
wil] be excellent judgment as to which forms are most useful
in our practical, verbally split universe. I have shown that
I have given nothing essentially new in this chapter: the
work of Richards was shown to be a generally accepted basis
of those principles, his facts about p... Xv... being directly
translatable into the chemical measuring member, of which
Van der Waals recognizes the need (“‘Ency. Brit.,’’ vi, 846).

ce. I shall mention other excellent work that may furnish
useful hints for the explicit extension of science (see Index,
under the men’s names, for further details):- Reeve’s ““En-
ergy’’ is highly suggestive. It is not explicit in the unifi-

PART

CONCRETE UNIFICATION;

CHAPTER X. General principles, and general mechanical
theories, of science.

§85. a. The everyday way of naming things is briefly
symbolized by the naming member That... This..., or by
some of the variations of it, a number of which we have seen.
The use of that form of expression gives what is commonly
called description. I. e., we name things in a related series
until the hearer gets a name which he knows, from his pre-
vious observation or experience. The remainder of the
names then become intelligible to him (fundamentally, be-
cause he is at least intuitively or vaguely aware that all rela-
tionship is identity, §28h: hence, he merely identifies,
finally, the name that he knows with the other names that

Two X §85b

cation of all science, nor in using the measuring member.
But it takes a point of view of treating p... Xv... which has
its special advantages (§92). And Reynolds, in **Sub-
Mechanics of the Universe,’’ and in the popular “"On an In-
version of Ideas as to the Structure of the Universe,’’ gives
some curious mathematics that are applicable. Marshall, in
‘*Principles of Economics,’’ is continually treating the varia-
tion of our naming factors. He uses conventional mathe-
matical forms for summarizing his work with such variables
and those mathematics will furnisb some guidance for ex-
panding our measuring member. Marshall almost explicitly
uses valid logic in that work; practically he always does, so
far as I have observed in reading the first half. Erwin in
“The Universe and the Atom”’ is particularly good in point-
ing out the regress of the different orders of structures (§§83,
94). He orthodoxly uses classical logic, introducing 0 and
© without regard for our rule; but he uses good common-
sense in keeping them practically balanced. Patten has
unified the biologic history of man by his “‘Evolution of the
Vertebrates and their Kin,’’ and has since been using a valid
and strongly dynamic logic in extension of the unification to
some of the most difficult forms of That... This... in ““The
Grand Strategy of Evolution.’’ Ritter has used the naming
member excellently in several biological books, unifying
general biology in a way that would be a useful guide to
physicists. And Jordan has done that in numerous books in
all the biologic sciences. | Eugene Miller in ““The Secret of
the Universe’’ gives what is actually a good monistic account
of gravity, and by implication of any sort of MG.%, ete.—
not of the actual MG”..., ete. Possibly Miller does not
recognize it for just that; but a reading of his book will help
the intelligent physicist to learn to distinguish between pure
formality (which of course is religion in our strict sense of
§39, asareall ‘pure’ or perfect things, even ““pure science’’),
and Many science. Finally, Bjerknes in ‘“‘Fields of
Force’’ keeps pretty logical even when using vector analy-
sis—a species of mathematics worse than that in §44 or than
Einstein’s in §66. I have profited much from those men,
and have used their ideas.

d. We are now ready to take up in Part Two the usual
sort of description, or mechanical theories, of the universe,
as given by the naming member, That... This.... That
sort of description, because That... X This... is truistic with
Mvarying with)L*T~*, will obviously serve to repeat, in
more intelligible form, the argument of this chapter, and the
general investigation of this Part One.

TWO

or PHYSICAL SCIENCE

were related to it). |The description is therefore obviously
also a real explanation (Index, **Explanation’’).

b. Hence, if we are to describe the universe we keep
on naming This’s and That’s until the bearer grasps the iden-
tity of relationship of everything he ever saw or rationally
imagined. (For the implications of the psychological half
of that assertion see the chapter on psychology, XVII.) So
as a truism the only valid description of the universe is also
a unification. Such a unification—specifically, the actual
grasp or comprehension of the whole (Index, **Rebirth’’ )—is
as a sum what is usually called religion. And for centuries
men have tacitly accepted these genera] statements I am
making here in a form which already is obviously true, or

§85b X Two

will be made so in due time. That men did accept these
statements is historically shown by the fact that every re-
ligion that received much acceptance undertook to give just
such a description (which is now usually considered **scien-
tific’’) as its base. | Hence, as we are in this Part going to
have such an everyday description of the *“material’’ universe
it is well to recognize and keep in mind that final religious
aspect of the description—an aspect that shows the import-
ance of the description.

ce. The somewhat expanded descriptions of the universe
are, as such, nowadays termed science, it being tacitly as-
sumed that valid, consistent descriptions are meant. The
chief reason for formally detaching those descriptions from
“‘religion’’ and giving them a new name ‘science’ was that
the “‘religious’’ authorities became egotistical with their
power (‘power-mad,’ like the former Kaiser; $173) and
tried to use the descriptions to exploit others (§49b). I. e.,
such aristocratic authorities substantially claimed (1) that
they were better able to find out the consistent descriptions
than ordinary people, and hence because they were thus
*‘superior’’ to laymen their dogmatic descriptions for that
**reason’’ must be accepted.”” Because their descriptions
were always liable to be somewhat inconsistent, the “‘relig-
ious’’ authorities, in order to hide their errors (they hide them
from even themselves in.the end, becoming dupes of them-
selves; §155), naturally lost sight of the possibility of appli-
cation or use of the descriptions, and claimed (2) that there
was some sort of magic perfection about the descriptions;
e. g., some people still claim that there is some sort of magic
or supernatural verbal infallibility about the Bible. That
infallibility of course tacitly is taken to shed its privileged
aristocratic glamor over the persons who assert its existence
and can manage to get such a claim accepted; for they too
thus become more or less perfect Gods or mouthpieces of
such, and thus presumably superior to the layman who does
not ‘“know’’ so much and honestly takes on himself the re-
sponsibility of proving the truth of what he says, even when
he quotes an assertion from the Bible. As a direct
consequence of such ecclesiastic mental evasion those “‘relig-
ious’’ descriptions became an end in themselves:-_ the ‘‘let-
ter,’’ the mere phraseology, made the Bible a golden calf,
and finally served as a mental dope that drugged the dupe’s
mind so that be became unseeing to much of actnality.
Therefore, descriptions of the universe tended continually to
stop being useful. For, as soon as the layman began to try
to apply those descriptions to his own seeing and further liy-
ing, he actually was making a first-hand investigation of
them, and he then readily found some of the mistakes of the
authorities—that the pope or other sort of religious autocrat
was not actually infallible, and that even the honest original
prophets made mistakes. The argument also applies,
with merely verbal changes, to any ‘‘authority’’: ecclesiast-
ics and their power-mad brothers, the demagogs, are merely
the most marked types. Often there are “‘scientists’’ who
undertake to be popes in science; but the percentage of
such men in science is small: I have encountered only two

%eThose ‘‘religious’’ authorities usually do formally claim that
their descriptions are those which are ‘‘divinely revealed’’ to various
men other than themselves (and they generally select men safely
dead, who can’t question the accuracy of the authorities’ quotation).
But as the authorities themselves judge who is thus inspired, those
‘‘revealed’’ descriptions are in reality asserted by the authorities on
their own responsibitity, and 1 shall not belittle the intelligence of the
general reader of this book by discussing in detail that childishly
transparent evasion of the theologians. When / pick out some
former good observer and say that a doctrine of his is right, I as-
sume the responsibility of proving that doctrine—a responsibility
that any fairly reliable and intelligent modern man always assumes
in such circumstances.

UNIVERSE

82

or three who have much reputuation and were so weak as to
let it ““swell’’ their heads. Consequently, the “‘spir-
itual’’ aristocrats substantially denied that those descriptions
were useful in the sense of being applicable to this ““wieked”’
world. They practically were forced into that denial in or-
der to protect their own aristocratic power, privileges, etc.,
in that same ‘‘wicked’’ world—although of course they were
not so brutally clear about the reasons for that denial, or
even about the denial, as J have just been.

d. Incidentally, it is obvious that to ‘“apply’’ our de-
scriptions means finally to use them to foretell or prophesy
the future. The full meaning of that is implied in the chap-
ter on ethics; but it is sufficient to consider here its rough,
everyday meaning. When we © describe,’’ we use the re-
lationship of identity, and as a truism can go on and by ob-
serving the relationship state things not yet directly observed
—i. e., describe the “‘future.’’ That is clearly in agree-
ment with the fact that ZL and T are not real: of course, if
T were absolutely real it would not be possible to predict
the fnture (see §150d for rigorous proof of that). And it
also obviously is a truism, that because whenever we use L
and T' we are inaccurate, we can not ever predict the future
with accuracy (the degree of accuracy we can achieve is a
quantitative matter that is a part of the theory of measuring
or harmonic periodicity). But we can not tell with accuracy
what happened yesterday—e. g., witnesses and history are
notoriously unreliable in accuracy. Formerly it was tacitly
recognized by theologians that such prophesying application
was finally required of any truth, and there were such pre-
dictors, or ‘prophets.’ But nowadays, the dogmatic theo-
logians, consistently with what has been said about their
professional exploiting and evading tendencies, substantially
refuse to accept the possibility of prediction—to accept the
possibility of there being any more bonafide ““prophets.”’
They thus obviously completely stultify themselves. But
they do claim to predict a future world—concerning which
they erroneously fancy there is no direct experimental evi-
dence to check them up and confute them. We shall see
that there too they have been wrong (SS144, 152).

e. Hence, it was rather convenient to give the new
name ‘ ‘science’’ to those same continuing-attempts at descrip-
tions of the universe, so that under that new and _ unsullied
name, which at first had no trademark value to the aristo-
crats, these two essential things could be emphatically re-
quired of the descriptions:- (1) that those who ex pressed
such descriptions should get them by repeatable observations,
for the correctness of which they were explicitly personally
responsible, and not get them by rather irresponsible tradi-
tion, rumor, and hearsay; and hence would give descriptions
which the hearer was able to verify by observations—tests—
of his own ; (2) that the descriptions would hence always be
applicable and therefore useful. The name science is
now rather old, and has acquired considerable trademark
value for exploiters: so some weak “‘scientists’’ tend to ig-
nore the fact that all valid science or description must, as its
actual test, be applicable and usefu]—i. e., simply must be
relatable to anything, regardless of the arbitrary L and T\.
And in the same way, unbalanced or aristocratic persons in
other professions tend to exaggerate ‘‘classics’’ (not having
strength of their own to produce work that will stand in-
spection), conveniently forgetting, in order to save their own
egos (which then being without restraint often swell enor-
mously ), that if anything is true—i, e., universally self-
consistent or related—it is, merely as a verbal troism, always
applicable and useful. A thing which has no perceptible ap-
plication, nse, or immediate human worth (to the perceiver) by
common consent as to the meaning of words is ugly,

evil,

83 UNIVERSE

worthless (XVIII). And all things, whether ‘‘classic’’ or
not, are ultimately, in a One sense, truistically beautiful,
good, and applicable (§25b).

f. This section therefore sums up:- (1) That a valid
description of the universe is really religion when compre-
hended as a whole. (2) That such a description is now com-
monly called science. (8) That the advantage of the name
science over © religion’’ in the perverted ecclesiastical sense is
that it serves to emphasize that, as a verba] truism, such a
description is (i) verifiable by anyone who wishes to make
the responsible effort of observing for himself; (ii) useful,
applicable, beautiful, good, etc. Therefore, as the
summed conclusion of that general survey of science, I shall
try to give to this Part Two, which is explicitly such descrip-
tions, those chief characteristics of verifiability and applica-
bility. Part Three, humanics, is the further direct extension
of this Part to humans and must have the same charactistics.

§86. a. As the purpose is to describe the universe with
direct verifiability, it next becomes necessary to determine
how to do it—the method ;—to answer the question, What
is the best way? (If the description is universally verifiable
it truistically equally is applicable.) The general answer to
that question is obviously given by, or is, Part One. The
specific answer is that we need to use the most familiar form
of everyday speech or naming, and that that is the use of
the form which we write generally, That... This.... We
therefore shall observe in the remainder of this chapter the
general ways in which that formula is customarily named and
used. After that J] shall proceed to use it in such ways.

b. Possibly the most general naming of the meaning of
that formula is to say that it expresses continuity. | Conven-
tionally, continuity is said to be the basis of science. The
word obviously means ‘identical relationship,’ and hence is
in complete accord with the truisms that formula expresses
(IV), and especially with the general characteristics of our
description as stated in the last section.

ec. In modern days continuity is usually said to be ex-
hibited and expressed by, or as, a ‘sequence of events.”’
J. e., phenomena are held to be in a continuous, unbreakable
‘“‘chain’’ or series. The old name for the same thing is
‘cause and effect’’—for any observed phenomenon or “ef-
fect’’ there is always a preceding unique and completely
efficient ‘‘cause,’’ or thing which produced or made the ef-
fect. The phrase “‘cause and effect’? has become somewhat
unfashionable, substantially for two reasons :- (1) to say that
acause produced or made an effect is formally equivalent, in
the parlance of classic logic, to an assertion that the cause is
an absolute creator, and hence to imply a dualism that as a
finite pluralism definitely goes back to, and implies, a *First
Cause’’; (2) and to assert a cause as a sufficient and unique
producer is, by classic logic, formally to imply that the uni-
verse is sharply cut up into absolutely separate parts—and it
is also, in a way, getting ‘relationship’ mixed with ‘thing’ or
Many; i. e., the word cause in this second aspect is likely
to mean a combination of a thing and a relationship. Clear-
ly, both conventional objections to *‘cause and effect’’ are
correct (IV-VIIJ); the very existence of those objections
obviously indicates that in practice science substantially re-
pudiates the classic logic. But if we write for our formula,
Cause... X Effect...—=Meaning, then to interpret the two fact-
ors just as we interpret That... and This... clearly obviates
the two conventoinal objections to the phrase (and also uses
valid logic, and not classical). And it is at once obvious
that science in making those objections to *‘cause and effect’’
substantially asserted precisely the same argument as ours
in formulating That... X This.... So it is apparent that we
are in agreement with the base of orthodox science.

Two X §86f

-

d. Because all such words as This and That—i. e., all
Many names—are actually subject to precisely the same ob-
jections as are ‘‘cause’’ and “‘effect,’’ if strictly interpreted
by classic logic as being without dots or infinite regresses
(even implied ones), it would be practically inconsistent to
bar just those two names (Cause... and Hffect...) and make
them unfashionable. | Hence, J shal] use the two, in the
meaning indicated in the formula given. Any cause there-
fore implies an actual infinite regress of contributing or re-
lated causes, which finally sum together asa closed universe,
or as a ‘ circle’’ (in which all of the causes are really identi-
eal with the effects), and which summing precludes any such
nonsense as the classic logic “First Cause.’’ And any effect
similarly implies an infinite regress of effects, all of those too
being finally related as identities with the causes in a closed
universe or ‘‘circle,’’? which hence precludes any such non-
sense as the classic logic ““End,”’ or “‘final end,”’ or *‘Final
Purpose,’’ or “‘Purpose.’’ The reader who is familiar with
philosophical slang will note that teleolegical systems thus
simply vanish—nor are we to get in lieu thereof any of the
often objected-to ““chance collections’’ or “‘fortuitous con-
course’ of atoms as being the universe (it has already been
pointed out that the universe is an organism; see $144, and
Index, s. v. ‘‘Teleology,’’ “‘Personality,’’ ‘‘Organism’’ for
additional proof). Further, as a part of the same truism, to
use everyday theological terms, there is no such thing as
Final Judgment, or Judgment Day. There glaringly can no
more be any such sharp, definite, separate coming of a
‘judgment of the quick and the dead,’’ than there can be an
absolute splitting of the universe into unrelated parts. ‘The
universe as a whole keeps, so to speak, a set of ledgers (cf.
§158c) which are always instantaneously balanced in full to
date. We see those thing more definitely later: I anticipate
them here merely to show that there are no separate ‘‘water-
tight compartments’’ in which we can keep “‘science’’ and
‘religion’? apart—to show that religion and science do not
““deal with entirely different spheres of reality’’ as the
Catholics claim (§48b). Just a slight clear and honest con-
sideration of words people use almost daily, cause and effect,
instantly exposes the error of such theology.

e. So science, and commonsense people, have obviously
used the valid formula Cause... X Effect.... In that use we
have made the extremely commonplace observation that one
phenomenon or part of the universe acts to produce another
or cause another. And that effect then obviously reacts on
the cause, or ‘stops’ all or a due amount of it. (It is obvi-
ously precisely the same as saying that energy is the transfer
of part or all of one body to another; §83g, etc.) So,as an
equivalent statement, we may translate Cause... Effect...
into Action... X Reaction.... (Perhaps the usual point of view
would make Reaction... the extensive factor, so that the
formula would be Reaction... X Action....) That formula is
so obviously the same observation, and the same general way
of naming things intelligibly that we usually take it for
granted without explicit expression. Action... X Reaction...
is verbally equivalent to F... XZ... of the last chapter. And
Action... X Reaction... is the naming form of expression that
is named *‘mechanical theory.”’

f. We have seen (§§15, 21) that a machine essentially
consists of at least one unit of the Many acting with at least
one more such unit in really inseparable connection—i. e.,
in ultimately identical relationship. | And another word we
use for machine is structure. A structure consisting of usually
numerous perceptible parts, thus verbally inseparable, is an
organism or a person (and in our practical language, the parts
or splittings are based on V1}; see XVI, XVII). We now
see from the last paragraph that the general form of everyday

§s6f X Two

description of things consists essentially of verbally putting
them together as such ‘‘machines’’ and having them **work’”’
—observing them work, or transfer energy, or die or be born
with more or less completeness. If the things verbally as-
serted to be consistent—to go together—fail to ““work’’ or
react or act in a perceptible way, then obviously there is no
perceptible consistency or intelligibility or explanation.
When there is perceptible reaction, then asa truism the
‘*mechanical theory’’ is correct expression of verifiable de-
scription. And further, when we start using such mechani-
cal theory, names are given to actual parts of the Many, and
as such expression, are directly verifiable. Hence, it is a
truism that “‘mechanical theory’’ is merely a solution of the
One and Many, in which solution we emphasize the names
of the parts or the arbitrary Many, as a means of providing
for continuons verification and positive intelligibility—two
actually identical things. We positively grasp the One by
such a method or trick. Of course, if we mistake the method
or ‘‘letter’’ for the reality (fall into verbal idolatry), we have
materialism if we use Many words, and mysticism or totally
unintelligible talk or dogma if we goto the opposite by using
One words (§§20d, 49h, etc.). So 1 shall avoid such verbal
idolatry—shall state and prove mechanical theory, apply it
to different machines, and then use those machines or organ-
isms or persons as models of the universe.

g. We have already seen in Part One that an ‘ ‘infinite
number’’ of valid languages may be formulated; it truistic-
ally follows that a corresponding number of valid mechanical
theories can be formulated. In fact, we saw that each lang-
uage was a machine (VIII), and this present formal repeti-
tion of the same idea need not be expanded. It also follows
that an indefinite number of machines can be validly used as
models, each of which represents all the various T'hat’s and
This’s. In fact, we saw that the single surface ring was
(especially when in motion) a machine model which would
give an indefinite number of forms—and all of that furnishes
rigorous proof that any one of an indefinite number of me-
chanical models will validly represent the universe.

h. And that is the total of the principles of all know-
ledge or science. It implicitly includes the measuring mem-
ber also (§84b). | Those principles are extremely simple,
obvious and familiar; probably most people will agree that
any fairly intelligent person can understand this chapter so
far—and we have already seen the essentials.

$87. a. The brief statement of mechanical theory is
correctly given in a general way in terms of our ordinary Trin-
ity language by Newton’s three laws of motion, which I usu-
ally call ‘Newton’s laws,’ or ‘laws of motion.’ By examin-
ing them briefly below, I shall show that they are rather
vague; are negatively expressed; and omit too much that
perhaps ought to be expressed explicitly. But they are sub-
stantially valid; and are in effect a correct solution of the
One and Many, which we just saw is essential in any valid
mechanical theory.

b. Nowadays numbers of non-Euclidian mechanics are
being promulgated (e. g., the Einstein relativity theory, $66,
has come into prominence since this was first written), and
their announcers seem to assert that the Newtonian mechan-
ics are wrong. Newton’s mechanics do have grave defects,
as we shall see. But they are shown to be probably quite
good enough to justify the high esteem in which Newton is
usually held. His law of gravity was a mere incident to the
formulation and use of those three laws, and he got that law
rather thoroughly irrational. I think myself that Newton
knew there was no “‘sense’’ in his law of gravity. But all
those objectors to the essential soundness of the Newtonian

UNIVERSE 84

mechanics could formulate different and valid mechanics in
any of the indefinite number of languages using non-Euclidian
space, or using n-dimension space. The method is indicated
in VIII. Butit would be a tedious job, and the result would
have to be translated back into our language; so I omit such
mechanics from this book, except for the outline in §66 of
Einstein’s, which shows that it is merely another form of the
solution of the One and Many. The reader may need
to know, the better to understand later discussion, that in
my opinion Newton was a thinker of the first order. He en-
joyed the advantage of having four or five contemporaries
about as good—and | think that in all-’round greatness Hal-
ley was much superior to Newton. About a century later
Ampere was about as good as Newton—Ampere had greater
opportunities, and possibly did not use them quite so well as
Newton used his. He had six or seven contemporaries about
as good as himself, followed a bit belatedly by Faraday, who
seems to me to be a little better than Newton. Then,
bringing us to our times, Darwin and Buckle were the first
of eight or ten thinkers who I think are somewhat better than
Newton—took hetter advantage of their opportunities.
Dewey, Jordan, and Reynolds undoubtedly to me have a
wider, surer grasp on things than Newton did, which grasp
they mostly had to work out for themselves. But
always there are backward-looking people who hold that the
Golden Age was in the past, and that all the best men are
dead. Roughly, there are two general facts about the men-
tality or intelligence of such people:- (1) they are not intel-
ligent enough to recognize a first class man when they see
him (and in general all success consists in picking a winner,
whether a thing, an idea, or an individual—the individual
being hardest to recognize, as shown in Three); so those
backward-lookers can’t recognize the size of their contem-
poraries, but because of such poor vision have to wait two or
three generations until a general chorus of opinion has time
to start, and then automatically join in without knowing
particularly what they are talking about; (2) they are
so blind to things in general and hence especially to their
own limitations that they have a deep-seated conviction that
they, having imbibed [at least the superficialities of] the
knowledge given by the great thinkers of the past, have
reached the limit to which human knowledge’can go; hence
they automatically deny that any of their contemporaries can
go further and exhibit first class ability. Well; personally
I would rather deal with those safety-first, back ward-looking
people than with the even weaker minded lion-hunter who
thinks be has found a Messiah in every unbalanced and often
unwashed eccentric or radical he sees. So picking a winner
has dangers on either hand; and many people in effect
openly acknowledge that they are failures in some ways by
stating that they will let the ““future’’ give a “‘verdict.’’
S88. a. Newton’s first law is this (for the three laws I
use Daniell’s ‘“Physies,’’ 5-6):- ““Every body tends to per-
severe in its state of Rest or of Uniform Motion in a Straight
Line unless in so far as it is acted on by impressed Force.”’
That is conventionally tersely expressed :- matter has inertia.
It asserts that if there is an absolutely separate universe or
One (a body or One absolutely distinct from any other),
nothing can be imagined which would affect it. Only when
there are | ouly other bodies related to it (so that the rela-
tionship " force’’ can explicitly exist) is there any change in
state. So it is obvious that the terse assertion of inertia is
simply a negative statement of the existence of the One.
Newton’s actual expression asserts or names a One, and im-
plies a possibility of its later being divided; and hence the
total assertion is that matter (or that the One) has inertia.
That is a ‘negative universal property’ of matter;

if we say

85 UNIVERSE

that a perfectly black closed room is not light, then ‘light’
is obviously a “‘property’’ of the contents of the room in pre-
cisely the same way that “‘inertia’’ is a ‘“property’’ of mat-
ter (there are verbal contradictions in such statements, of
course; a real One—a body really “‘in a state of Rest’’—is
ineffable, and to say that it has a “‘property’’ is logically to
split it into a Many, so that it is no longer such a One).
Newton expressed this law otherwise by saying that action at
a distance—across an absolute separation—is inconceivable.

b, Clearly, his first law is substantially equivalent to
what we started with in formulating language:- the verbal
naming of a One which we may arbitrarily divide. So it is
merely a preliminary statement of agreement as to language
mechanics, equivalent to the ‘existence assumption’ in §22,
It is equivalent in detail to:- “all matter (the One), as such,
has the “‘property’’ of not changing.’ And that is no ‘‘prop-
erty’’ at all, but an assertion that ‘all matter’ is not-divided
—which is a verbal truism at the beginning of monotheistic
speech. Therefore, the first law is “‘proved’’ simply in that
itis a truism. In the classic logic sense the first law is not
provable—a fact which is recognized by leading physicists,
who thus again agree that classical logic is invalid.

ce. That negative One form of Newton’s obviously im-
plies the reverse, or the positive Many form:- mass varies
with velocity. And of course, that ‘mass’ implies a
portion of the universe; for only a portion can havea positive
or statable velocity. Motion in a “‘straight line’’ for a finite
distance is not positively statable; i.e., itis infinitely improb-
able, or contradicts the theory of commensurability (§50) or
the infinite regress (IV), and no actual body in the universe
moves so——as we shall see in more detail from time to time.
And “‘rest’’ is zero motion. So it is also obvious that New-
ton, in postulating the One, rather explicitly showed that
both 0 and © expressed it—because we might consistently
call motion in a straight line ‘infinite motion.’ For we have
seen in the problem of two bodies (§83) that any actual body
is always changing direction relative to any other body. So
only the universe, an absolute One, could move in a straight
line. Then the name “‘infinity’’ applies to such unrelatable
motion—meaning simply that any name is equally applicable
and mystic. Any really tangential motion of a body (i. e.,
motion which formally is not affected by a second given body
and truistically deviated from that straight tangent) obvi-
ously logically holds the first body to be a One; hence that
motion or its energy is absolutely indeterminate and mystic
—and really can not occur, except to the total universe.

d. Because, as was seen, there are an indefinite number
of valid forms of negative expression—of statements of what
a thing is not,—and only one general valid statement in a
given sort of language of what it 7s, Newton naturally fol-
lowed the easiest course of making his first law negative in
form. And as a further result, orthodox science consists
very largely of negative statements—expressions of what is
not so, rather than of definite statements of whatis so. When
it says that inertia is a fundamental “‘property’’ of matter,
then all M’s are logically multiplied by zero or **no’”’ to be-
gin with. Hence, the only change needed in the first law
is to formulate it positively instead of negatively——-which we
have done in the general discussion of how to split the One
and get That... This.... This book in genera] makes
science direct instead of negative: positive instead of agnostic.

e. Newton’s second law is:- ‘‘Change of Motion [Mo-
tion here, as used by Newton, is equal to M(LT™!), which is
now called momentum] is proportional to the impressed
Force, and takes place in the direction of the Straight Line
in which the force acts.”” Hence, change of Motion would
be the variation of M(L7~—!) during a 7; therefore, the law

Two X §88}j

says:- F=MLT™. Obviously, Newton condenses too much
there, and gets a confused result. By saying that a change
takes place in a straight line, he rather inclines to the impli-
cation that his ML7™? is an absolute universe, and in agree-
ment with that to say that his F is a standard unit &- which
moreover is itself a sort of standard universe or One instead
of being even there an irrational factor; whereas, his F act-
ually is F, (see 1X).

f. Hence, it is rather apparent that Newton in this law
in a too brief way tried to assert:- there trnistically exists a
relationship between the parts into which the One could be arbi-
trarily split—that making the split-up-One (i. e., the Many)
still the One. He rather clearly implied That... X This...,
in which formula X is the relationship, force. So this sec-
ond law is also purely verbal agreements of truisms—as is
conventionally recognized by the assertions that the law is
not verifiable by ‘‘physical experiments’’ (i. e., the law, like
the first law, is merely ““expression,’’ and hence is subject
only to formal or logical proof; §35). This second law, in
its orthodox or Newtonian form is rather a confused jumble
of assertion of (1) the One and (2) relationship—is amateur-
ish logic or philosophy.

g. It may he reasonably held that his first law is an as-
sertion of or agreement to use God the Father or One words.
The second law then is a statement of God the Holy Ghost,
or ‘“foree.’? | And we shall see that the third is explicit
statement of God the Sons. Although the first two laws are
logically confused and omit most of explicitness, perhaps the
only practical defect of much importance at first was that the
first one was negative in form. However, J think the reader
will readily see that Newton made a remarkably good solu-
tion and expression of the One and Many—and especially so,
compared with the great confusion of views prevalent in his
time (““Ency. Brit.,’’ Art. ““Motion; Laws of’). But what
was fine in Newton is amateurish for us now.

h. His third law is:- ““To every Action there is always
an equal and contrary Reaction; or the Mutual Actions of
any two bodies are always equal and oppositely directed.’’
That is obviously a definite scientific or Many statement, be-
cause arbitrary portions of matter are considered as joined in
a seqnence of phenomena. It is directly equivalent te Ac-
tion... < Reaction... (§86e), and as such is ““mechanical.’’
It may be held by some that Newton did not imply
the dots, but meant a sharp dualistic statement of absolutely
separate factors:- Action < Reaction. Well; it is a historical
problem of some antiquarian interest; if Newton did not
mean to imply the dots, then he was wrong—and we should
not imitate such mistakes even if he did make them. But
we have seen in the last chapter, and see further and in con-
siderable detail in this one, that conventional science now is
almost explicit in asserting the dots.

i. This third law, being explicitly pluralistic and explic-
itly stating that there are at leasttwo mutually acting bodies
or M’s, is hence a general description gf God the Sons. It
seems to me that the first two laws, by establishing the verb-
al agreements as to expressing the One and Many, now defi-
nitely combine with the third law and clearly imply the
inseparability of the “‘three’’ laws, and also clearly imply
the dots in Action... X Reaction... imply the infinite regress.
At any rate, the reader can see that Newton’s laws, if they
have any consistent meaning, are the solution of the One and
Many in terms that are conventionally “‘mechanical.’’

j. The third law, being expressed directly in terms of
the Many, is ‘“‘experimentally’’ verifiable—meaning ‘‘con-
cretely’’ provable (§35). Of course, the complete verification
considers the other two parts of the Trinity just as “‘real’’ as
the Many is ‘‘real.’” We saw that such was true, when we

§88) X Two

saw in §49j-] that our everyday valid logic considers each
part of the Trinity equally real or verifiable; so we need not
go into that again (but ef. 8§150-1). We may simply note
here that the reason for speaking of the Many as being ex-
perimentally, or concretely, or actually verifiable or provable
is that we tacitly take it for granted without statement of it
that the relationship of continuity or ultimate identity is
always existing as “‘truth,’’ and that the consequent summa-
tion of that Many all the time into a real One is also truth.
In short, we take all of real religion for granted (we take for
granted God the Father and God the Holy Ghost) as being
already proved, and then have left only the arbitrary Many,
and need to be shown its consistency directly as being proof.
Obviously, as progf in fact or in deed—as ultimately conclud-
ing proof,—we do need such Many, or concrete, proof; but
as expression of proof, we need the completion of the whole
Trinity—and I simply give it, and do use as a part of that
the Many precisely as is required in everyday life, or by
‘science.’ Obviously, the “‘proving’’ of anything
by using an absolutely disconnected, dualistic Many, and ig-
noring that real religion (of which our valid logic is the ex-
pression) is wrong; is materialism; and given time enough
will inevitably wind up in an exploiting aristocracy, autoc-
racy, ecclesiasticism, and socialism (which are the names
given to the chief *‘practices’’ of such ignorance), with cor-
responding stupidity, idolatry, and weaknesses in the ex-
ploited. (I am aware that ecclesiastics—and demagogs—
violently contend that they are ‘‘spiritual’’; they are some-
thing like the late Kaiser with his Gott; see 8155 for the
reasons for such contentions that flatly oppose fact.) But
because the Many has thus been misused by being vastly
overrated by those grafters (and their dupes), that is all the
more reason why we should use the Many, and use it prop-
erly, in its due place and with its due value. Conseqently,
although I explicitly and definitely use Many or concrete
proof in this Part, it is properly supplemented by the state-
ment of logic in Part One—by explicit expression of the re-
ligion the average commonsense man tacitly takes for granted
as the basis of ““proof.”’

k. This third or Many law may be easily verified. I
once saw a two year old child discover and state the law by his
own observation. His statement was substantially this:-
‘‘When I push on something it pushes me right back.’’
The two M’s were “‘I’’ and ““something,’’ and obviously Z
and T were inseparably included explicitly. Clearly, there
was a push “‘out’’ from “‘1’’; and science usually calls that
point of view or ‘direction’ or ‘form’ of considering the rela-
tionship:- “‘force.’’ But equally, there was a push in
towards ‘‘]’’ in the “‘opposite direction’’; and science usu-
ally calls that form of naming the relationship:- ““pressure.”’
But when the relationship itself is rather emphatically in
mind rather than the arbitrary circumstances or direction of
its naming, science usually combines the names “‘force’’ and
ae 9 : oc 8 : 9 i

pressure and calls the relationship cohesion,’” which ob-
viously means the same as the ethical name ‘‘love.’? And
because there is in the universe as a One no absolute direction
(for, as verbal truisms, there is not another One outside,
with which to compare or relate and thus ‘‘fix’’ any direc-
tion; §§58¢, 99), there is obviously no real difference in any
of those relationship terms—which in general is equivalent
to saying that all relationship is that of identity.
. 1. Itis also obvious that because the “‘push’’ and the

push back’’ are equal, then the sum total of the ‘*force,”’
and hence of the energy, in the universe is zero. That cb-
viously gives an absolute Nirvana, in which as a whole there
is no energy. But we could validly take another view, and
say that the push and the push back was each a certain

86

UNIVERSE

and that as there was ulti-
we would add them all
(it has to be kept
else that manner

amount of force, giving energy,
mately no real *‘direction’’ anyway, We
arithmetically as a formal way of speaking
in mind that there is no rea] separation, OF

hat
of speaking will run into an erroneous pantheism). hee
point of view, the sum total of the energy of the ote s i.
infinity. And that is the view we usually take. t merely

amounts to reversing forms: zero 1s logically identical with
infinity. The total energy of the universe is merely abso-
lutely indeterminate or ineffable—there truistically being no
other universe to serve asa standard of positive measurement.
Hence, any force or energy or part is again directly seen to
be unexpressible or unfixable from an absolute point of view.
We merely arbitrarily assign to a part a certain intensity or
potential—and that fixes, logically but still unexpressibly in
exact terms (§50), the measures of all other parts as parts.
There can be no absolute center or standard—no exact science.

m. So it is cbvious again, from the child’s discovery of
Newton’s third law, that an easily intelligible description of
the universe is one in which we name those ‘“something’s’”’
and ‘‘I’s’’ in familiar ways, and state the relationship which

&é >?
exists—usually as what we prefer to name force. And
that is called a mechanical description—or mechanics. For
any two bodies working together is called a machine. And
Newton’s laws state the trick of giving such a description.

n. So we are ready to look generally at the various con-
ventional machines which have been used by science to
describe or represent the universe. We note their character-
istics, and select a machine we think is easiest to hand]e—to
observe or see. Then we proceed to use it.

S89. a. There are several naming or mechanical descrip-
tions of the universe in general use. The everyday descrip-
tion consists of various forms of the Trinity, as we have
seen. That sort of commonsense, valid description actually
ignores any real distinction between mind and matter, and
speaks of things as being joined together as the ““parts’’ of
various ‘larger’? things—-making no real distinction between
periods of time and ‘periods’ or extent of space (ef. §150).
That is precisely what this book as a whole does. However
I do it with explicit logical formality so as either obviously
to include all conventional ways of describing the universe,
or else to show that some of the ways have some slight spots
that are inconsistent.

b. “‘Science’’ is also merely that more or less formal use
of everyday ways of describing. Perhaps the most usual such
**mechanical theory’’ is called the molecular or atomic theo-
ry, or the kinetic theory. (There is a technica] distinction
between the molecular theory and the atomic theory; but as
it is one merely of order or relative sizes of structures [ pro-
vided the fact is recognized that atoms are splittable] it is
not essential, and J shall not notice it very explicitly; §100.)
In the kinetic theory, ““matter’’ in general, or the One, is
divided into parts, related by force. The assumed ultimate
parts are named atoms in the older, explicit kinetic theories.
(In actual fact, not conventionally always recognized,
nearly always the kinetic or atomistic or ‘Many’ theories are
accompanied by and explicitly mtxed with logically different
theories:- fluid or ‘continuous,’ or ‘One’ theories—just as
orthodox theology is a hodgepodge of pagan polytheism,
Pauline dualism, and a trifle of Christianity. Rigorously
consistent—although never absolutely quantitatively accurate
—kinetic theories are possible, in which the parts for con-
venience and greater accuracy are smaller than atoms or
electrons; examples are Reynolds’s in §91, and Reeves’s in
S92. I shall omit further explicit mention of such contra-
dictory fluid theories included secondarily in kinetie theories
until $93.) In the kinetic theory the atoms are in relative

87 UNIVERSE

motion—as by the truism of ‘dividing’ they must be (§80).
The other general conventional mechanical theory is
the electron theory. It was observed that we could perceive
or measure a more minute splitting of matter than that form-
erly described by atoms. So the atoms were said to be made
up of smaller parts, now usually called elections.
That obviously implies the logical] possibility of further split-
ting of electrons—an infinite regress of structures and of
“‘theories.”’ Asa matter of fact, we shall see that light
(say) is electrons split up (XIII). That is a matter of nam-
ing. We may note at once the formal or logical truism that
all the various controversies as to whether atoms are “‘real’’
or not, are rather irrelevant. Atoms are obviously Many
entities (or names of them), and by everyday valid logic
(§49j-1) are “‘real’’—that ‘‘reality’’ being itself based on
verbal agreements. But atoms are not “‘constant’’ or fixed
or eternal; e. g., both by verbal truisms and by actual
weighings of some sorts of atoms, atomic weights are variable.
And of course, as being merely the remainder of the same
verbal truism, all properties of atoms vary just as weight
varies, but not in any fixed proportionality; or, there are no
absolute ““elements,’’ with eternally absolute, fixed proper-
ties; atomic weight is merely the property of atoms formerly
used to distinguish ‘“different’’ atoms apart. Obviously, the
controversies as to the reality of atoms were actually contro-
versies concerning the verbal trick of the One and Many.

c. Therefore, conventiona] atomic or molecular theories
are as varied as conventional theories of the Trinity or “‘sys-
tems’’ of philosophy—and for precisely the same reasons.
For some details showing that, and showing that Maxwell
substantially understood that the One and the Many was in-
volved, see ““Ency. Brit.,’’ Art. ‘““Molecule.’’ Asa rough
sort of statement, it may be held that there are three general
sorts of conventional kinetic theories (described in this and
the next two paragraphs):- (1) The oldest one, definitely
compiled by Democritus over two thousand years ago, was that
matter was absolutely divided into small parts named atoms,
and that each atom had the absolute character of a One or
universe. The God which related those atoms was usually
named force—but was not explicitly recognized as an zdenti-
Jying relationship. That God force was obviously “‘there,”’
but was more or less denied by Democritus’s classical logic.
That old form of the kinetic theory is held and stated by
Maxwell (in a notorious address; Glazebrook, ‘“James Clerk
Maxwell and Modern Physies,’’ 82):- ‘“They [{molecules;
or atoms, as we would now technically say] continue this day
as they were created—perfect in number and measure and
weight; and from the ineffaceable characters impressed on
them we may learn that those aspirations after accuracy in
measurement, and justice in action, which we reckon among
our noblest attributes as men, are ours because they are es-
sential constituents of the image of Him who in the begin-
ning created, not only the heaven and the earth, but the
materials of which heaven and earth consist.”’ The reader
who has followed the solution of the One and Many will
recognize that as being dualism and materialism, and also
the conventional theological myth. It would be difficult to
cram more nonsense into a passage of equal length. It is as
bad from an ethical standpoint (XVIII)—as is directly evi-
denced by its term “‘aspirations,’’ which means weakly and
futilely merely having good intentions, instead of going and do-
ing it, whatever it is. But logically it is possible to construct
a valid theory of an absolute Many which is infinite (§§91-2).

d. (2) The next form of the kinetic theory is that
vaguely put into form by Van der Waals (§82). In it the
atoms were no longer actually sharp and fixed and eternal.
They had ‘“‘fields of force’’ (possibly first formulated by

Two X §89f

Faraday) which vaguely were variable, and which were more
or less formally actually unified with each other, under the
assertion that they produced, or were, pressure. There was
a rough guess that beyond a small fraction of an inch from
an atom (whatever that may mean) gravity attraction took
place; closer to the ‘‘atom’’ than that, vaguely there was
an opposite force of repulsion. Nothing was very definitely
said as to how atoms were pulled together in (say) a solid.

e. (8) The most modern form of the kinetic theory is
Richards’s (§82). He correctly asserts that his theory con-
tradicts the logic of the two just mentioned. He has atoms
which are also explicitly variable in volume, so that we have
the explicit form p... Xv..., or That... X This.... It would
consistently follow (although so far as I know, Richards does
not assert it), that his atoms would or could include, as be-
ing parts of themselves, the vague fields of the Van der
Waals form. If so, then atoms would truistically or logically
be continuously touching each other, and not be on an aver-
age at relatively considerable distances apart as they move
about colliding; in any case they truistically could not have
a constant boundary or absolutely fixed ‘skin’ of some unde-
scribed sort, as in the other two theories. And that contin-
uity obviously wipes out the Maxwell sort of “‘reality’’ of
atoms, and the One and Many again definitely bobs up for
solution. In short, the kinetic theory in its modern
form works around to a destruction of the ““explanatory”’
names it started with centuries ago. As a well known fact
(Art. ‘‘Molecules’’), the kinetic theory is explicitly called
the kinetic theory of gases, because only in gases where the
““fields’’ of the atoms are relatively very weak are there any
even approximate measures indicating any apparent separa-
tion of the atoms. _iI. e., any rigorous kinetic theory—any
actual dualism such as Maxwell strives for—requires that
every thing in the universe be a perfect gas, and no perfect
gas has yet been found anywhere, or ever will be (except
that the One is a perfect gas, if we care to say so). Hence
Richards finishes the complete swing around the logical cir-
cle, and by using a kinetic theory denies any dualism. So
it is obvious that to give explicit names to the details of
Richards’s theory, some unconventional novelties will be re-
quired. It happens that Reynolds and Reeve and others
formulate such novel theories, as we shall see.

f. The reader will note that orthodox science has thus,
under the single name of kinetic theories, shifted all around
the Trinity, just as we saw theology and philosophy doing
(VI), and for the same reasons. And. then, about twenty
years ago it was observed that atoms themselves were form-
ally splittable—explicitly, that certain phenomena which
appeared definitely with our improved seeing were consist-
ently describable in everyday language only in terms of parts
of atoms. The necessary repetition of the verbal inverse
square law for such splittings had been made only in elec-
tricity (IX). So that splitting of atoms into ‘“‘corpuscles’’
was expressed in terms of electricity, and the quantity of
electricity in or on one such part was said to be a natural
unit of electricity and was named an electron. The term
electron was afterwards usually applied also to the parts
themselves—which of course logically implies that electricity
and ‘‘matter’’ are identical, and that an ““electrical force’’
residing in or on a particle is such a ‘‘material’’ particle—
in short, that the only relationship is identity. However,
orthodox science perhaps tends to assert that electrons are
‘‘constant’’ or fixed like Maxwell’s atoms, and are all of the
same size: such a view would clearly be logically incorrect
(for details see next paragraph, and for concrete proof of the
incorrectness see 8137). Consequently, as the atom
was now split, the kinetic theories had to be split. There

§s9f X Two

obviously were none of Maxwell’s perfect, eternal atoms. So
all the various kinetic theories of the day were shifted to in-
clude parts of atoms. That was mostly done in general by
writing electron instead of atom.

g. The atoms by older kinetic theories were not all of
the same mass or weight (e. g., C weighed about 12 times
as much as H), although by Avogadro’s law they were of
approximately the same volume when in a gaseous condition
(or at least molecules were); whereas electrons at first were
all supposed to be of the same mass, with nothing definite
asserted about their volume. Therefore, in order to write
electron for atom, so that in terms of mass Atom/«==Electron,
a different 2 had to be used for each element, on the assump-
tion that an element atom had a constant weight (which it
had not); « for H was variously observed to have values
from 1000 to 2000, but it was orthodoxly tacitly assumed
that it was some ‘constant’? value. However, some physi-
cists in effect claimed that for x to have a different but *con-
stant’’ value for each element made no difference in the
logic, and that the same kinetic dualistie logie still held. It
would still hold, as a truism, 7f the kinetic logic had exrperi-
mentally held with reference to (say) solids; but the kinetic
logic admittedly had not held there. That of course con-
fused the whole matter; for there was no knowledge as to
whether electrons formed a ““gas,’’ or “‘solid,’’ ete.
And there arose another complication in the electron theo-
ries, which corresponded to the (1) attractions and (2) repul-
sions in the later kinetic theories:- there were orthodoxly
two ‘‘kinds’’ of electricity; an electron was “‘negative’’
electricity, and no one was able to find a ““positive’’ electron
for a while, and then it was finally decided that an “‘electri-
fied’’ atom would serve. So the logic was more confused.

h. However, J. J. Thomson rather substantially cleared
the puzzles of that shift from atoms to electrons by asserting
Faraday’s tubes of force as existing, and extending from
negative electrons to positive electrons (and vice versa, of
course; “‘cireularly,’’ or asa One). Those tubes (which
fundamentally were merely a convenient verbal trick) are
obviously equivalent to a relationship, and at the same time
assert that electricity is structural, or is matter in a Many or
mechanical sense. As the original kinetic theory is not
structural (i. e., only an asserted metaphysical capricious God
holds its eternally perfect atoms together), Thomson’s form
of electron theory is obviously identical in principle with
Richards’s modern or valid kinetic theory. Possibly most of
the leading physicists now hold Thompson’s form. But some
do not like calling a relationship a tube or an ether string,
and refuse to do so. But they follow substantially the same
consistent logic or mechanics, leaving it largely tacit and
unexpressed. It would be difficult to say just how many
sorts of electron theories there are now—they are more num-
erous than philosophical] idealisms, and as mutually contra-
dictory. Some physicists seem to hold that an electron can
not be further split. Others seem to hold that an electron
absorbs and gives off by “‘radiation’’ (whatever that may be)
a fixed or definite ‘‘quantum’’ of energy; that amount, or
very small M, would obviously, as a truism, imply a struct-
ural splitting of the electron, but it is not clear whether they
mean in infinite regress. (For further details, see Millikan,
*‘The Electron Theory,’’ X; also XIV this book.)

i. Obviously, the formal kinetic and electron theories
logically consider parts of the universe to be what is usu-
ally meant by the name, “‘rigid molar bodies.”’ Thus, the
non-Thomson electron is formally a rigid body or M, which
moves as a whole; anda *‘quantum”’ of energy seems to be
held to be a whole rigid M even smaller. And so truistically
there must be some absolutely “‘free’’ space about those bod-

UNIVERSE

88

ies, as otherwise they would be ‘“blocked in’’ solidly like
the bricks in a wall, and so could not be “kinetic.’’ That
absolutely ““free’’ space also serves as a formal means of sep-
arating or distinguishing the parts. But then, such orthodox
dualism having ““separated’’ the parts absolutely, it promptly
wants them together again, or related—and proceeds form-
ally to abolish that ““free’’ space (except for some now dis-
credited theories which have an infinite ‘“‘sink’’ for energy,
and a similar infinite ‘‘source,’’ as a One at the ““Begin-
ning’? and the “‘End’’ corresponding to the theologians’
God—which theories we need not consider explicitly). And
at the same time, more careful observation shows that those
*‘constant’’ M’s are not experimentally constant or ‘‘rigid,”’
but that continually a regress of smaller splittings is being
perceived. Clearly, science must definitely use the solution
of the One and Many to escape those contradictions.
We may further note that invariably the first class scientists
who see things as they.are pretty well, show that the various
Many M’s are really continuous or universally related—that
an effect must have a cause; that no miracles occur; that
God is love, or that rea/ religion or continuity is true. E. g.,
the essential of Darwin’s work, the fundamental principle
which eaused so much disturhance, was that he proved that
man was not sharply and dualistically and aristocratically cut
off from the rest of the universe, but was directly related to
all the living things we know (the theologians would have it

‘that man was a specially privileged aristocrat essentially

superior to ““animals,’’ who thus could and did get something
for nothing, etc.); Newton’s gravity (although formally
crammed so with the logical dualism of his time as to be
technically wrong) according to the practical, actual under-
standing of it asserted the absolute universal relationship of
all things (again contradicting the dualistic theologians, who
insisted that the earth was a specially privileged place—that
nature faking being intuitively felt to justify their grabbed
privileges). Christ substantially asserted the real relation-
ship or continuity of all things—taught a valid religion
(XVIII). And Paul and the ecclesiastics stole the name
Christianity, but shifted back to dualism. Always heretofore
in history, the mediocre, short-sighted men who are unable
to see things clearly, fail to observe the connection of things,
assert that the Many is sharply split up (and hence miracu-
lous, and not subject to cause and effect), and slump back
into dualism. So in practice those fools fancy they can get
something for nething, and start grabbing or profiteering—
are selfish, to use the antique term,—end resent even the
verbal interference of the clearer-seeing men.

J. It thus becomes obvions that there has heretofore
been a struggle in science over the One and Many, as to
whether the smallest arbitrary parts of matter (e. g., atoms)
were continuous with each other and hence severally variable
or were absolutely hard, fixed, constant, eternal. If those
parts were constant—if there were any constant thing in nat-
ure—then they were obviously truistically essentially intern-
ally without motion, or absolutely ““dead’’—as witness the
old idea of ‘“dead matter,’’ or Maxwell’s. And that started
a dualism between mind and matter (cf. §150). And invari-
ably, the scientists who were instinctively recognized, even
by the dualists, as being the best, in order to agree with
what they saw and speak everyday language had to make
those parts of matter variable or continuous or “‘alive’’;
Maxwell himself did it in electricity, in which he was gnided
by a sae class observations of Faraday and Cavendish.

owever 9
i bie cae
second class ee rather than enter = on Re tera She
achieve greater Secures and obtain ae eect

ge of more and

89 UNIVERSE

more details—finer and finer splittings,—would begin to drop
any continuous, variable atoms and thus dodge the need to
consider or “‘measure’’ cause and effect very far (and of
course they simultaneously filled the air with the talk we
hear so much of, about science being “‘accurate’’ measure-
ments, ete.; for the psychological reasons for that surplus of
such talk see 8155). Obviously, all the ups‘’and downs of
science are simply exhibitions of ordinary human nature, as
will implicitly appear in Part Three. The problem of what
is ‘‘really’’ inside an ‘‘atom’’ is largely a problem of what is
inside the men who talk of atoms. The dualist is the lazy,
mediocre (compared with present day standards), “‘empty”’
man who would put knowledge up in neat little finished,
constant, stand-pat parcels like Maxwell’s “‘eternal’’ atoms
that were dead or ““empty”’ inside like himself except in
electricity. Such dualists have the sort of brains that cause
business men to say that “brains are cheap.’’ The dualists
fail to see deeply enough into things to see that principles—
the complete and consistent truisms of the One and Many—
are the eternal things, and that parts of the Many are merely
arbitrary and changing. All shallow, superficial observers
will continue to prefer to be dualists—to have fixed atoms.
In society they also want delusions as to fixed things; so
they assert fixed classes and are aristocrats themselves:- i.e.,
they consider themselves the “‘best,’’ and fixedly so by a
‘“Divine Providence’’ or a miracle, without special effort on
their part, whether that ““best’’ be the too-rich, or slum or
near-slum dwellers—there are many more aristocrats among
incompetent or grabbing workmen than among dwellers in
mansions. Always they fancy that they can get some privi-
lege—a sinecure, light work, a “‘soft snap,’’ something for
nothing,—beat the game in some way by refusing to see
cause and effect, or the universal relationship of identity (for
proof in details, and the showing of how dualists do pay—
‘“out of their skins’’—see the last two chapters).

S90. a. The solution of the One and Many at once gives
us the solution of the centuries-old puzzle of how to name
atoms and their smaller parts. Whatever parts of the One
which we do name are logically, as such names, positively
definite as units of the Many. I. e., any Mis, as such M,
positive and definite, which means verbally “‘hard, rigid, and
fixed’’; it does not mean actually or really constant or that
the M is itself absolutely dead or motionless inside. _iI. e.,
the mere names of the parts of the Many are not the actual
parts, |Cousequently, as a completely general solution, we
divide the whole universe into verbal parts which are small
enough to permit statement of all the actual variations we can per-
ceive. If we divide electrons into very smal] parts, say parts
small enough to give some millions of them in each electron,
then for the present day they are going to be about accu-
rate enough to state all that we can perceive. As we learn to
use our senses better, aiding them with better tools, our per-
ceptions will become more delicate—‘‘improve,’’—and we
shall have.to use smaller parts. The same thing applies to
any aspect of society: given a steady climate we continually
need more delicate legal] laws CX IIE):

b. Then, those smaller parts will formally be constant—
M.’s. But by the very nature of language, if we assert that
they are absolutely constant, then they wil] truistically give
absolutely no motion. EE. g., Maxwell’s hard atoms were
supposed to be perfectly elastic, so that they would bounce
off each other perfectly to give a perfect gas; but obviously,
if they were perfectly elastic then there was absolutely fric-
tionless mutual motion of an infinite number of zero-size
parts of such atoms; and hence, instead of their being fixed
and hard they really were ineffable Ones which equally truly
had absolutely no rigidity or hardness. So just as we saw in

Two X §9la

the problem of the One and Many (IV), there is necessarily
always a formal contradiction at the base of science.

ec. And orthodox science, as we have seen, nowadays
tacitly and validly uses positively that verbally smallest part
in two ways:- (1) Richards’ atoms are compressible, so that
by the usual kinetic theory the parts of those atoms have
fields, or a variable boundary; (2) Thomson’s electrons have
tubes of force which also are truistically variable, and that is
obviously equivalent to Richards’s atoms, with possibly even
more explictness as to the existence of internal structure.

d. Clearly those two widely accepted modern theories
are valid—being ways of expressing That... X This.... But
because conventional science does not explicitly state the
logic of the two, they are unfinished in that respect and con-
tain various minor errors. But there is one grave practical
objection to them:- They are exceedingly vague as to what
a ‘‘field’’ or a ‘“‘tube’’ is: those two things are not described
in detail—their ““mechanics’’ are not given. All the ex-
plicit phenomena of the universe are explicit motions of or in
those fields or tubes, and those motions are not described.
In that sense orthodox science is as ‘‘spiritual’’ and “‘ideal-
istic’’ or half-baked as can be fancied. It is a defect that
those fields and tubes are far too mystic and intangible—are
a sort of soft fog of ““thought.’’ _—_It is quite true that ulti-
mately all so-called matter in the conventional ‘“dead’’ sense
does disappear as being a mistake, when things are closely
observed. But when orthodox science permits ‘“matter’’ to
disappear as those intangible fields or tubes before they are
ever arbitrarily described as machines, then science itself is
becoming a bit too precipitate in shifting to One mysticism
or poetry or religion. | We must shift or sum to that in the
end: but if we use language at all we are by agreement con-
strained to be definite and intelligible (i. e., positive and
pluralistic) on the road to mysticism, so that when we get
there we shall actually understand it, and not be at the
mercy of the various intellectual exploiters—or, if we are bio-
logically vigorous, will not ourselves become such exploiters.

e. So although the modern theories are correct in prin-
ciple, and although I] shall therefore continually use them in
this Part, we need to get a mechanical model which is rather
more definite about those fields—-about the formal and vari-
able boundary or difference surface of the positive verbal
parts of the Many. I shall use vortex whirls—which are
easy to use as soon as we experimentally note their funda-
mental or characteristic reaction, which seems to have pre-
viously been overlooked (S98). But various other
men have tacitly recognized just what we have explicitly seen
above was needed in physical descriptions and “‘theories,’’
and have therefore validly devised in more or less complete-
ness various mechanical] models of the universe. We briefly
consider such descriptions in the rest of this chapter.

S91. a. Reynolds (in the books cited, §84c) devises a
mechanical theory which he claims is the only possible one.
He does use the only correct principle (see par. d), and in
that essential sense justifies his claim. But he does it in a
way which turns ordinary language upside down, and gives a
weird description. He takes, as a verbal unit of the Many,
very small, perfectly smooth spheres, perfectly hard, and in
themselves perfectly inelastic. | Those spheres or ‘‘grains’’
are all piled together like a heap of marbles, to make the
universe. Consequently the total universe holds them to-
gether, as a verbal truism (there is nothing inside to push one
out of the universe, or outside to pull one out, as will become
obvious). That relationship of holding-together he verbally
names from the point of view of the ““outside,’’ and hence
calls pressure. We usually name the relationship that holds
things together as a force which pulls them together (towards

§9la X Two

us, as a center or standard inside), and not one which like
Reynolds’s pushes them together. Thus, Reynolds, by not
imagining himself as the center of things, verbally largely
got rid of the evils of anthropocentricism or “‘constants.”’
But by not being a center he got his names usually backwards,
or in the opposite direction from ordinary conventions.

b. It is also immediately obvious that Reynolds’s grains
or the units of his Many, are thus verbally taken as absolute
and not variable. His total universe or One would be vari-
ble, as will be seen. Hence, Reynolds has what is explicitly
an infinite pluralism, and it isin general valid, and essentially
equivalent to our everyday principles, but with the verbal
agreements reversed. It is to be noted that his grains
are not atoms, or any other things actually observable di-
rectly with our eyes or tools: in his infinite pluralism those
observable things are still variable and his grains have to be
much smaller to provide for such variation. He calls his
spheres ““anything or nothing’’—i. e., 0 or © (‘‘Sub-
Mech.,’’ 88). Only such a series of trnisms is consistently
possible even in an infinite pluralism (cf. §90). And
becanse Reynolds’s are thus the reverse of our usual agree-
ments, he therefore gets some odd namings, which are so
strange and unfamiliar that the burden of them on his mem-
ory finally trips even himself in logic (par. d).

ce. If spheres be piled together as closely as they will
go, they fit together as roughly shown in one plane in Fig.
91¢e1, which is called nor-
mal piling by Reynolds.
(Specifically, in normal
piling, each grain touches
12 other grains.) If the
grains he slipped up
(‘‘dislocated’’) out of the
hollows between them-
selves, as in Fig. 91ce,
they obviously take up ad-
ditional space, and are said
to “‘dilate,’’ and the piling
is ‘‘abnormal,’’ and the
‘‘surface’’ between them is
a difference surface or zone
which Reynolds names ‘‘a
singular surface of misfit.’’
In Fig. 91c2 the unoccupied
space between the grains is shown as the greatest possible
(i. e., the grains would be tangent to the plane shown by the
dotted line), and the grains have maximum “‘dilatancy.’’
Now, obviously, if in the total universe of grains any misfit
oecurs (and by the theory of incommensurables, 850, there
must be a misfit;—so far as | can judge Reynolds does not
explicitly make just this point, but obviously by it his uni-
verse, as a mere verbal truism, must logically ‘‘work’’), then
by the truism of symmetry (which is the same as the theory
of incommensurables) the misfit moves through the otherwise
more or less stationary grains. Such misfit ““surfaces’’ are
the “‘surfaces’’ of atoms, and the motion of those surfaces
(involving changes in the degree of misfit) obviously will
cause the atoms to move as a whole and to vary and split in
various ways (or join in various ways), and thus produce all
phenomena. So it is clearly truistic that in Rey-
nolds’s grain theory atoms are “‘anything or nothing’’
bounded by misfits which consist of larger absolute vacuums
than occur elsewhere: i. e., the misfit ‘‘surface’’ in Fig.
9lc2 is merely more of empty space than is between the
grains in the close or normal piling in Fig. 91c:. The ‘‘work-
ing’’ or essential part of “‘matter’’ hence is absolute vacu-
ums, and those vacuums are the only “‘things’’ that move

Fig. 91ee.

UNIVERSE

90

molarly. Such a theory, although odd, is obviously
quite consistent. It is concretely illustrated by Reynolds :-
If you step on wet sand the water is not squeezed out from
under your foot, making the sand around your shoe appear
wetter than that underneath at the moment of removing your
foot. On the contrary, the surrounding sand is pulled into
abnormal pilittg, and more water is needed to fill its larger
chinks, and that surrounding sand thus seems to dry out be-
cause surface water is pulled into those chinks.

d. In the grain theory the actual smallest part is the
(ultimately arbitrarily) fixed grain plus its proportional share
of the variable absolute vacuum or ~* field’’ about it (hence, a
grain explicitly has both the absolute rigidity and the abso-
lute elasticity that are actually required by Maxwell’s atoms
if they were consistently infinitely pluralistic; $90b). Thus,
the formal agreement that the rigid grains ““touch,’’ throws
the variability off his absolute Many onto the variable One—
as Reynolds seems to recognize (the touching of the grains
obviously serves to make the variable fields definite, thus cor-
recting the practical weak point in kinetic theories; 890d).
The actual result is that although he corrected the old kinetic
theory, he himself, thus headed right, got confused by that
variable One, which is obviously verbally the reverse of our
ordinary verbal fixed, steady, ‘‘perfect’? One, and asserted
what seems to be the ordinary nonsensical increase of en-
tropy. However, he stopped there, apparently recognizing
that something had gone wrong, and did not mix such an
error with the rest of his work.

e. His brief non-mathematica] statement of his theory
in the ‘‘On an Inversion of Ideas, etc.’’ is more easily intel-
ligible than my mere hints here. His statement in ““Sub-
Mechanics’’ is an extended mathematical analysis which 1
can not surely follow—nor was it worth while trying very
hard, as technical calenlus in general has to be revised to be-
come logical. But any good mathematical physicist ought
to be able now to translate it into intelligible, sure-footed
equations. One immense advantage of his queer theory, in
which ‘‘matter’’ is substantially holes in the ether aes) in
the collection of grains) is that its user is not disturbed by
preconceived notions; for he would not quite recognize the
conclusions until he translated them into ordinary terms.

f. Reynolds found that Newton’s law of gravity was
wrong. He corrected it, and apparently got a result equiva-
lent to the law as given in this book, although as just im-
plied, I have not translated it. He gave one correct
mechanical description of how gravity works. So far as ]
find, he was the first to devise such a correct description with
fair definiteness. Five or six men have since independently
devised correct mechanics, all finally equivalent (§134),

S92. a. Reeve in ““Energy’’ devises a working or prac-
tical ‘smallest part’ which consists of at least two bodies
which are in effect simply two masses or M’s that are con-
densed to geometrical points and have a formal “field of
force’ which (by the forms of our ordinary language) is an
attraction or relationship that varies as the inverse square—
is simply ‘pure space’ or an absolute vacuum. Therefore,
his logical or verbal smallest part is the solid, rigid absolute
point, plus the variable field regulated in measurements by
assigned mass’’ of its point-body; that smallest unit part
thus is logically equivalent to Reynolds’s grain plus its field
($914), with the modification that Reeve’s parts can be as-
signed various differing values so that his One is fixed as in
ordinary language (and then, to take care of the mechanics
of such phenomena as gravity, light, ete., Reeve would have
to have, what he omits:- an infinite regress of different or-
ders of structures in each part or structure—a remark intelli-
gible when this Part is grasped). Clearly, Reeve has the

91 UNIVERSE

formal contradiction of the One and Many tacitly contained
completely in that mechanical model, with © in elasticity
of field and 0 in the absolutely rigid point-masses as verbal
agreements. As the logic was valid in that it was balanced,
he got generally valid conclusions so far as he went with his
theory, which definitely included only heat.

b. The objection to Reeve’s theory, other than its in-
completeness, is that a ‘part of the universe’ that is substan-
tially a point and a “‘pure field’’ is not very concrete or
subject to direct experiment. But Reeve’s book is a formal
valid statement in everyday language of the kinetic theory
(it rejects the old one explicitly), and was written several
years before Richards independently by direct experiments
on atoms found the compressible atoms which Reeve showed
must exist by consistently using everyday language in de-
scribing other observed facts. With that comparison in mind
the reader can readily complete Reeve’s book to any desired
extent. In fact, I first began explicitly and deliberately to
write this book in 1910 by expanding Reeve’s. It took
me about three months to work out the mechanics of gravity
with that start; and I got the whole argument of this book
in a rough way from Reeve, being assisted by other valid
theories which I found from year to year later on.

S93. a. It has been seen that kinetic theories are usu-
ally accompanied by mutually contradictory fluid or continu-
ous One theories. I. e., there were observed to be what
science called waves of light, and afterwards electrical waves,
heat waves, etc.; and when the theories had their ‘smallest
part’ equivalent to an atom (or even to an electron) such
parts failed to be small enough to serve as parts of such so-
called waves. Therefore, science assumed (ultimately, it was
a mere verbal ‘existence assumption’: §22) that there is a
continuous fluid (conveniently named ether), actually unsplit-
table just as the formal One is, which served to transmit, or
be, ‘‘waves.”’ That One or ether of course with rather
glaring obviousness contradicted the Many atoms or electrons
and scientists have made efforts for centuries to get some
consistency between that One (or ether), and the Many (or
electrons, atems, quantums, etc.). Clearly, tbat One ether
when strictly considered as perfectly continuous or homogene-
ous is not “‘mechanical’’ at all, as it is not possible to make
a machine out of one part. (E. g., Reynolds’s and Reeve’s
“‘fields’’ of their rigid masses is-are really logically that or-
dinary continuous ether.) Yet in order to “‘describe’’ waves
the ether had to be split into at-least-formal parts. So the
physicists vaguely admitted that necessity of language itself
by saying that the ether is ‘‘elastic,’’ and more or less ig-
nored the fact that elasticity implies parts. | And then that
One ether, in the logical manner of the One, also cansed the
physicists trouble by sometimes insisting on approaching zero
(as when it directly gives excessively slight resistance to the
earth’s movement), and at the same time on approaching an
infinitely dense solid (which is the only thing that will trans-
mit a light wave as orthodoxly described ; XIIT).

b. The last paragraph shows the general total difficulty
science had with “‘ether,’’ and its source. Ether is nothing
more than a name for ‘‘substance,”’ or ““matter,’’ or what-
ever it is we talk about. In philosophical technicality the
name ether is the name Being, and the ‘“‘philosophical’’
science of ether, or Being, or of the question Does the uni-
verse ‘Be’ or exist?, is called ontology (§§22, 60, 142, 161).
When science was naming or considering the Many *‘matter’’
(or atoms, electrons, etc.), and ether a continuity or a One,
there was obviously an irreconcilable forma] contradiction
between ether and matter, and ontology or Being or ether
became also a formidable ‘‘scientific’’ problem totally insolv-
able until explicit statement of lingual agreements was made

Two X §93¢g

—as the problem obviously is that of just such agreements.

ce. Also, conventionally ether often became substantially
the name for a universal relationship (such as L is used for
in this book). Thus, Newton in a vague sort of way recog-
nized that force essentially asserted a relationship between
the various M’s, and that the only possible relationship was
that of continuity or absolute “‘touching,”’ or really identity
in the end. He indicated that recognition by insisting on
what is ultimately merely a truism (of everyday language;
§77a), that action at a distance is inconceivable—or that
force can not travel over absolutely blank space. So ether
was often used merely as Being, in the ““pure’’ sense of re-
lationship to fill ““empty’’ space so that force could exist or
Be (Being in conventional philosophy is also similarly thus
confused between the three parts of the Trinity; apart from
that verbal carelessness, ‘“Being’’ is no problem at all). So
obviously ether is a verbal or logical problem. Science has
talked almost as much about ether as philosophy has talked
about Being—and as futilely so long as the One and Many
was unsolved. ‘‘Ether’’ is said to be, or belong to,
““science’’; but obviously that does not make it actually any
different from ““Being’’ merely because “‘being”’ is called
philosophy, or from ‘‘God’’ because God is called religion.

d. The immediate solution of the actual (i. e., verbal)
problem of the ether is obviously therefore to say tbat ether
also will be given mechanical structure—i. e., will be verb-
ally split into parts, so that it will as a whole or when consid-
ered as a One be the universe or God or Energy and really
absolutely continuous; but that when we talk positively of it,
it will be split into parts (also, it can be used asa relation-
ship name, when properly so designated). Ether is there-
fore matter. In this Part Two I usually use both terms as
Many words, with the infinite regress.

e. Reynolds named all the universe or Being ether, and
arbitrarily split it into parts that were always touching,
which parts or grains were small enough to be used as verbal
counters that would “‘outline,’’ or ‘construct,’ or constitute
a ‘“structure’’ or form or ‘‘mechanics,’’ for any phenomenon.
Those grains were finite, and did not explicitly take care of
the infinite regress. Therefore, that regress or ultimate for-
mal accuracy, and the explicit logic, was included in the
field of the grain (which formally was a ‘second’ ether, im-
plying an infinite regress of ethers or splittable Being). And
obviously Reeve implied substantially the same thing (§92a).

f. It is therefore definitely obvious that when scientists
use any sort of elastic ether, or other elastic Substance such
as Richards’s ““compressible atoms’’ (whatever those may be
verbally ‘‘made of’’), they are tacitly making the ‘existence
assumption’ of ‘“Being’’ or substance or matter or the One,
and are further tacitly asserting that it is split into arbitrary
parts in infinite regress. For elasticity can not possibly be verb-
ally asserted without truistically implying a relative motion or
verbal separability qf internal parts. In orthodox science such
elasticity is usually taken as ‘‘perfect’’—i. e., is given values
of 0 or ® as happens to be convenient to keep names from
obviously reversing. Such elasticity is of course pure One,
or mysticism. It is quite true religiously or ultimately, but
violates the agreements that science as such will talk a posi-
tive language of finite bodies which hence is directly verifiable
experimentally.

g. It also follows that all of ““science’’ which treats of
any sort of wave motion in any sort of “‘perfect’’ medium is
not specifically science, but is religion. I. e., orthodox light
and analogous subjects are monistic, and contradictory to
atoms or electrons. Also, that orthodox light is invariably
quantitatively inaccurate (XIII)—just as Newton’s law is,
and for precisely the same reasons.

§93b X Two

h. Asa result of such confusions in the One and Many
in previous science, it naturally is difficult to say just what is
the general character of sciences which treat of fluids—of
light, hydromechanics, ether mechanics, etc. The descrip-
tions frequently use zeros and infinities, just as if they were
talking of the One; but they also consider a fluid as made
up of relatively moving finite parts. Obviously, there is no
explicit consistency in such ether mechanics; they solve the
One and Many by tacitly using the everyday valid logic—and
no clearly nonsensical conclusion is written down, although
as we shall see, some conclusions are written that are obvious
nonsense in the light of explicit logic.

S94. a. We may now consider two excellent fluid theo-
ries of the universe. ‘The first one, Marion Erwin’s ‘“The
Universe and the Atom’’ (1916), claims to be a general
description of the universe. The second one, V. F. K.
Bjerknes’s “‘Fields of Force,’’ with considerable parade of
‘modesty’ avoids claiming to do anything in partienlar.
Bjerknes gives a fine fluid theory, universally applicable (and
T suspect that he is intelligent enough to know it—in con-
tradiction to that ““modesty’’). In another book he gives a
mechanics of gravity; I have not seen that gravity descrip-
tion, but as it would be but a trifling and obvious step be-
yond ° Fields of Force,’’ I judge it is substantially valid.

b. Erwin says in effect (ibid., pp. 14, 20) that he holds
to both dualism and continuity, and throughout his theory he
formally has that logical hodgepodge (the existence of the
similar one in conventional science has been noticed in §93h;
Bjerknes formally, but not explicitly, has the same mixture).
However, Erwin tacitly uses our valid logic in spite of the
contradictions and vaguenesses he writes down, and gets his
theory without much important error—working out a valid
mechanics of ether which gives a structure of matter and a
mechanics of gravity, light, and electricity.

c. Erwin starts his theory by assuming (as a verbal
name of Being) an ether. He then takes it (p. 16) that his
ether is (1) “‘structureless’’ and “‘non-elastic,’’ and is also
(2) ‘capable of indefinite subdivision’’—which is of course
logically self-contradictory. He actually does use ether ‘“par-
ticles’? as his ‘smallest part,’ which particles (p. 6) are to be
considered as not solid, but actually as a sort of elastic eddy
or center of gyration; such infinite and zero elasticity follows
because (p. 16) the parts move over each other frictionlessly.
That is obviously a Jogical mess when |] thus merci-
lessly set it down in parallel columns. But it is logically
precisely the ether used in textbook physics: and as I said
before, Erwin by a powerful and intelligent use of valid ev-
eryday logic, or commonsense, steers a fairly safe course
tbrough the confusion—that confusion being merely his sup-
erficial use of dualistic logic. Perhaps the only mistake of
consequence which he makes is that he asserts that different
sorts of light travel at the same speed in “‘free’’ space; he
seems to have copied that out of the textbooks without
investigating it much himself (see 8127).

d. He then begins his intelligible, detailed description
of the universe by showing (p. 18) that beeause his ether is
continuous, the particles are like bricks in a wall, and cer-
tain given ones can move only if other particles take their
places—so that finally all motion in the ether is effectually
in closed paths (‘circular,’ like valid logic), or is rotation.
That is simple enough, although it usually is not ob-
served or stated. Reynolds of course always in direct effect
uses that proposition. Also, it necessitates that either there
be somewhere some absolute vacuum serving logically as an
elastic field (as in Reynolds’s theory), or else that the par-
ticles themselves be elastic (i. e., formally divisible in infinite
regress); for otherwise there can not be motion (cf. Index,

UNIVERSE 92

*“Zeno’s paradoxes’’), Also all of those considerations ob-
viously introduce the formal verbal contradiction of the One
and Many—and valid logic requires that they should. Also,
if we apply that fact that the ether ‘‘rotates’’ to the trick of
using words, it directly gives us the analogous conclusion or
truism that all valid logic is ‘rotational’ or circular.

e. Therefore, Erwin builds up atoms by making the
ether particles rotate. They explicitly rotate in all three
dimensions of space, and that explicitness keeps him consistent
with facts usually. Each rotating particle or ‘‘wheel’’ is
obviously truistically elastic. Also, a *“wheel’’ in turn can
and does act as a particle itself by revolving along the cir-
cumference of a circle which passes always through the cen-
ter of that wheel at right angles (that is a formal, perfect
One statement, given as Erwin gives it, which contains inac-
curacies). And that larger wheel is a ‘part’ of a ‘“higher’’
order structure—which means in the terms I have been using
that the large wheel is, relatively speaking, static, and the
lower order wheel moving along its circumference is dy-
namic (as, besides rotating about its own center, it explicitly
moves as a whole). And that large wheel can in turn also
revolve as a particle in a wheel ofa still higher order—and
so on. In that way Erwin automatically or mechanically
introduces the essential verbal inverse square form. Conse-
quently, he can go from one phenomenon to any other me-
chanically, so that he tacitly does unify them in spite of his
dualistic logic. Or, what amounts to the same thing, he by
that mechanical] device introduces the infinite regress into all
structures. He himself explicitly asserts the equivalent of
that infinite regress on p. 78, and often elsewhere less posi-
tively. Hence, his perfect circular paths are mere verbal
forms; in actuality that infinite regress makes al]l his circles
or wheels vary from such perfection, or from such zero-infinity
talk, and he definitely has That... This..., and he himself
occasionally says so in effect.

f. The reader may thus see in general how Erwin gets
a valid mechanica] model which in the end is formally con-
sistent. Although it is nominally a fluid or ether theory, it
actually is kinetic in that to the very ultimate the universe
is divided into parts. In that ultimate, or with such infinite
regress, ‘fluid’ and ‘kinetic’ are obviously identical.

g. Now, Bjerknes in his ‘“Fields of Force’’ does not say
anything very definite about atoms or ether: he asserts
*‘analogies.’’ An analogy is of course in customary meaning
a similarity of relationships among at least two sets of things
or circumstances. Obviously, if there zs a similarity, as the
word analogy asserts, then there can be only one sort ef simi-
larity, and that is flatly an ultimate identity (§28h, etc.).
So a valid analogy is, by valid logic, that valid logic itself.
Therefore, if Bjerknes’s claimed “‘analogies’’ are valid (and
they cbviously are), then he actually has unified the various
phenomena he describes by means of them. Also, as he
deals with electrical ““fields’’ of force, he essentially is deal-
ing with atoms (XIV), whether he says so or not. “@

*42] am quite aware that it is customary for people who do not
wish to be held responsible for their logic to say that they state an
analogy. I have merely pointed out that by any valid logic an act-
ual analogy is valid logic. Probably the most sensible way to be re-
lieved of responsibility for one’s logic is explicitly to disclaim such
responsibility—in which case it is obvious that usually the ethical
wisest course is to keep silent, that sort of silence having lone
been praised as “‘golden.’’ Bjerknes has the “‘modest’’ habit of
“‘registering’’ what perhaps he thinks is proper scientific caution by
verbally dodging saying anything in particular (if he were not really
a first class thinker, with a highly valuable theory that is sound
apart from that “‘modest,’’ ‘‘cautious’’ ducking, this book would ig-
nore him). By using a little valid logic I have rigorously pinned
him down to saying something explicit, asa necessary preliminary to
considering his theory; to dothat is always easily possible with such

93 UNIVERSE

h. Bjerknes uses vibrating, pulsating, or oscillating bod-
ies—i. e:, he uses bodies that tacitly are fluid, and which
change shape continuously, or are elastic. Vibration, oscil-
lation, and pulsation are merely names for what finally is
rotating motion: Bjerknes takes the whole of our par. d for
granted. He then proceeds by using a pulsator as a body
inside a fluid, and deduces the “‘fields’’ in the whole. fluid,
as far as he can take the mathematics before they become
too complicated (he uses vector analysis, which is pretty com-
plicated to begin with, and has buried deep in it the ortho-
dox confusions as to the One and Many). The pulsator plus
its field is obviously experimentally identical with one of Rich-
ards’s compressible atoms, or one electron and its tubes, or
with any elastic ‘‘kinetic’”’ part. And in proof of that fact
(which fact he only implies), Bjerknes shows that actual pul-
sators, vibrators, etc., act just as do ‘‘natural’’ phenomena;
and that the mathematical statement of them is equivalent
to the usual mathematical statement of electricity.

i. Bjerknes explicitly has a serious difficulty (ibid., p.
122). He can make his mathematics for vibrators agree
with experiments and correspond either to static electricity
or to magnetic (dynamic) electricity. But he can not mathe-
matically consistently pass from one to another. And he
obviously would get into that difficulty, because his phe-
nomena are all of the same order. I. e., he keeps his
vibrators al] either static or dynamic; _ or, there is no ex-
plicit mutual motion of the wbrators as wholes which is of the
same order as the motions of the fields. If he had given
such very rapid motion to some vibrators as wholes, as we
saw Erwin in effect doing in par. e, the verbal inverse square
law would have been introduced, and he could have com-
pletely unified phenomena—including explicitly the infinite
regress in his expression of the unification.

§95. a. There are many other historical physical theo-
ries—descriptions of the universe in the mechanica) or mutu-
ally named form of That... X This.... Our everyday talk is
in that form; e. g., we ‘classify’? or relate certain things
and name them paper, and use that with another factor, (say)
cloth; or again, we similarly assert some meaning about
Plants... Animals.... But as soon as we observe a number
of things we see that sometimes paper conventionally is cloth,

‘‘modest’’ people, but it is rather obviously objectionable in that it
wastes your time, my time, and good paper and ink. The
only sort of scientific or other caution that is actually logically or
rationally or morally permissible to a normal, responsible adult is a
statement that we are uncertain as to quantitative measures: ifa
given measure is of great importance (for the theory of ‘‘value’’ see
§168) we should be unusually careful about using it, as it is certain
to be inaccurate in some degree. To be ‘‘cautious’’ about a principle
or about logie or about a theory, or about any real explanation, or
about any general policy or executive policy, is logically absurd; for
directly by the solution of the One and Many, we either know or do
not know what itis; if we do not know, then we can readily find
out and decide by attending to the matter. The completing
practical remark about that very simple theory is that the greater
part of our human personality is noé iatellect or ‘“‘logic,’’ but emo-
tions (XVII); practically, it takes much training to make the emo-
tions stand up firmly on two feet to any such definite principles
(Index, ‘‘Courage’’). Generally speaking, the person who is in
practice very sharply, definitely decisive—is a ‘‘fine executive’’—is
often merely a callous, thick-witted brute (e.g., Napoleon, a num-
ber of Germans). Only unusually developed men of the executive
type, such as Lincoln, F. W. Taylor, Jordan, James H. Foster,
Carnegie, have enough emotional strength to be definitely decisive
and at the same time be intellectually sensitive and poised and bal-
anced and right. However, the man who publishes a book is respon-
sible for having enough emotional training to make him first definite,
and then consistent, about principles; that is not too much to de-
mand of any man who writes a book, for obviously the writer has
plenty of time to think and then brace up his emotions, get his cour-
age to the sticking point—zwhereas the good executive has but little
time to decide, and hence has to have much greater strength.

Two X §95c

and vice versa; and animals and plants are seen to merge
indistinguishably together. Hence, we obviously need nam-
ing factors that will be more specific than those names which
are actually so vague that they fail quickly in use to stay
““definite’’ and “‘distinguishable,’’ as we just saw. And
what is of more importance, we need to know also the unifi-
cation of (say) those four factors—to know, e. g., Plants...
Cloth... (the cotton fabric industry is largely summarized in
that formula, for instance). Therefore all the more urgently
do we need more specific naming factors, that will not lose
their definiteness and usefulness in ordinary phenomena at
least (e. g., suppose we burn the cloth; then, as cloth, it is
gone, and we would have to skirmish around for some new
words before we had got fairly started on a discussion of
cloth). ‘“Scientific’’ descriptions are merely those which use
those more minute and hence more generally applicable fac-
tors, or splittings.

b. But the theories mentioned above suffice to make it
obvious that all theories are finally identical. Superficially,
the most thoroughly different conventional theories are the
atomistic ones and the “‘continuous’’ fluid ones. But we
have seen definitely that finally in practice they become
identical in meaning—and that their inventors, by using ev-
eryday logic, usually made them formally almost obviously
identical. And similarly, we have just seen, in terms of
That... X This..., precisely the same ultimate unification of
the verbal contrast of “‘rigidity’’ and “‘elasticity,’’ “‘static’’
and ‘‘dynamic,’’ that we saw in terms of M(varying with)-
L?T~? in §874¢, 80i.

ec. Those fluid theories may all be said to rest on what
is called Bernoulli’s principle or theorem (“‘Ency..Brit.,’’
xiv, 42-3). That theorem is the law of conservation of en-
ergy in terms of fluids, and can be expressed and experi-
mentally exhibited in many forms. We may state it in this
form :- parts of a moving fluid which have a relatively higher
velocity have a relatively lower pressure; and vice versa.
(If the fluid is supposed to be “‘frictionless’’ that statement
is directly positive as a sort of standard unit or One; no fluid

Fig. 95c.

is such, and hence interna] rotations of all parts, resulting
from friction, have actually to be considered in infinite re-
gress as being part of the true ““velocity.”? A vortex whirl
is the most uncomplicated of such actual fluid flows.)
Bernoulli’s principle may be illustrated hy the reactions of
water flowing through a pipe containing a contraction, as
shown in cross-section in Fig. 95c. Obviously, if a certain
volume of water flows through the pipe, filling it continually,
the velocity through the contraction is greater. If two small
vertical pressure columns be attached as shown, the water
will rise higher in the one attached to the part which has the
larger cross-sectional area, in which the velocity is slower.

§95c X Two

A pipe with such a contraction is usually called a Venturi
meter. The observed differences in pressure will imply the
various velocities, and hence the amount of water flowing.

d. The easiest way to see the ultimately truistic nature
of Bernoulli’s theorem—to prove it absolutely—is to express,
formally at least, the infinite regress in it:- If the contrac-
tion approaches a cross-section of zero area, the velocity
must continually become greater in order that all the fluid
may go through. If the contraction becomes zero, the ve-
locity must be infinite; in such case there is obviously no
cross-section of fluid which can exert pressure, and hence the
pressure is zero. And by expanding the large part of the
pipe to infinity, the velocity becomes zero and the pressure
becomes indefinite, and sums to infinity (precisely as does
the unlimited sum of pressure Reynolds has available to run
his universe). That is the monistic form of the tru-
ism and it is self-evident. |The final pluralistic proof is to
make a venturi meter and observe it ($35). The mathemati-
cal or complete expression of it may be deduced from the
last paragraph; for the conventional expression of it, see
*““Ency. Brit.,’’? xiv, 43, 121; or Bjerknes’s mechanics,
which are the same as Maxwell’s electrical mechanics.

e. It is obvious that Bernoulli’s theorem is what we
might call the fluid-naming or -aspect of the One and Many.
It considers a “*continuous’’ [One] substance in motion [split
or the Many]. Obviously, arbitrary parts are conceived as
having relative motion, or as being split out of that One; and
that verbal] contradiction is promptly verbally contradicted
by naming a relationship in the ‘reverse’ way, in the “direc-
tion’ of ““pressure,’’ so that there is no real contradiction.
Or, Bernoulli’s theorem is identical with our fundamental
scientific law that mass varies with velocity. Bernoulli’s
form of that law, about two centuries old, is a capsized state-
ment, that pressure decreases with relative velocity, or pres-
sure (and hence density, and hence mass) varies inversely with
velocity. It always happens that we get a reverse point of
view and make language ‘go backwards’ (become a different
form; §104), when we talk of pressure: e. g., grain theory.
And it is further obvious that all physical theories ul-
timately use an indefinitely splittable universe, or Being, or
One, or ether. And it is again obvious that all of science is
rigorously and explicitly unified.

f. But it is obvious that if we try to see all those ortho-
dox theories at once, noting their consistent description or
unification in detail for each phenomenon, we are likely to
overburden our memories and become confused. The reader
who happens not to be familiar with the names in physies is
possibly a little confused by the foregoing too numerous
points of view, even though they are handled generally.
There is no need to try to remember them; if you see only
in a rough way that a rigorous unification zs possible, then
you have understood all that is essential, and there will be
no difficulty in grasping all that follows. For in the next
chapter we use a single, comprehensive machine, a whirl,
that can be concretely followed, and that automatically takes
in al] those conventional points of view. The next chapter
is itself dry-as-dust mechanics, with perhaps an occasional
bright spot. But we have got to get a language laboriously
that way which will stand the strain of giving concrete names
to cloth, paper, etc., in all circumstances.

CHAPTER XI.

S96. a. Possibly the most important source of confusion
or unintelligibility with respect to the various conventional
mechanical theories in the last chapter is that people are

General whirl mechanics.

UNIVERSE

94

prone to take them too seriously. They are merely tacit
verbal agreements. We are not compelled to use just those
agreements, nor to use those of the simpler whirl theory
which I am going to outline—although of course if we are to
be honest and fit for intercourse with the large majority of
our fellow men, and wish to preserve a normal and useful
nervous system, we have to adhere to some selected verbal
agreement. But some people are inclined to exaggerate one
point of view to infinity, and other points of view the oppo-
site way to zero, and thus assert that those other ways are’
absolutely wrong. Principles or the One are absolute; but
ways of splitting the One can not be.

b. And the men who invent scientific theories, just as
the men who invent philosophical systems, are often so seri-
ous about them that their fanatic insistence upon the sole
correctness of their way or verbal trick is liable to mislead
others. Consequently, there is in many people’s minds a
vague belief that there has to be a hard and fast way of de-
scribing things. So it becomes desirable that if possible we
adopt some easily intelligible way of describing, in which
orthodox apparently mutually contradictory theories are all
combined into a single directly observable machine which
shows that they are not contradictory.

ce. Second, although the fact was ignored in the last
section, conventional descriptions have a bad habit of using a
so-called machine that explicitly occupies only one or two
dimensions of space; e. g., the motion of an electron is us-
ually described in two dimensions (because the mathematics
for three dimensions are “too hard,’’ as if that would alter
facts). There is actually no machine in any but three dimen-
sions, if we are using everyday language (VIII). So a really
intelligible machine, in addition to possessing the reconciling
characteristics and obvious consistency required by the last
paragraph, and the familiarity and other characteristics re-
quired by the last chapter, must explicitly be a 3-dimension
one. Then we shall avoid the verbal troubles of trying to
talk two languages simultaneously.

d. Third, and perhaps the most important of all, we
want a model machine which will reproduce itself in higher
or lower orders—which will in effect concretely and experi-
mentally display the infinite regress. | Bjerknes’s models
would not do it, and he could not finish a unification (§94i).
Erwin’s wheels, as he describes them, are not, as such, ex-
hibited in any actual] machine; he could have rigged a series
of gyroscopes which would in general effect have exhibited
them. Kelvin some years ago suggested that the universe
could be represented by gyroscopes; and Erwin’s is substan-
tially that theory, although expressed nominally in a quite
different form. In short, in order to show concretely
the way to describe static and dynamic, or fundamentally to
show directly any “‘trausfer of energy’’ or *‘change of poten-
tial,’? we need a machine which will visibly give birth to
smaller or ‘“lower’’ order duplicates of itself; or which, in
collections, will give birth’ to a single duplicate of itself of
a larger or “‘higher’’ order.

e. The machine which will concretely meetall those re-
quirements fairly well is a vortex whirl. It has already been
stated (§63i) that when our language model is revolved it
gives a whirl; hence, all of the theory of language is directly
identified with such a machine. These vortex whirls are
readily made experimentally with some soap and water and
the experimenter’s hands (§101); and they can be observed
to give birth to different orders, which is something that
some machines do not automatically perceptibly do, in the
usual senses of those words (““biological’’ ‘machines’ do it,
of course; XVI). And a whirl obviously has three dimen-
sions; it would take much ingenuity to drop’’ one of those

95 UNIVERSE

dimensions and talk in a different language about whirls.
But the actual proof that vortex whirls have those advantages
when used as a mechanical model of the universe is given by
the using of that model below.

f. Kelvin also suggested some years ago that whirls
would make a good model of the universe. Descartes over
two centuries ago tried to use vortices as such a model—
which is substantially the same as trying to use whirls. But
Kelvin was troubled with the perfect gases and perfect atoms
of classic logic, and made his whirls mutually frictionless,
and eternal. Naturally they would not ““work,’’ as there
is not any frictionless part of the universe, unless we agree
to reverse Janguage forms. Any actual whirl, as we shall
see experimentally, is modified by friction—and thus in the
only way possible exhibits the relationship, force, verbally
required by any mechanics in our usual language.

g. Inthe rest of this chapter I give the elementary
mechanics or description of whirls themselves, with conven-
ient experimental] verification. In subsequent chapters I use
those whirls, as being simple and intelligible models of all
phenomena, to describe those phenomena. The remainder
of this chapter, because it gives details which at first are not
obviously useful, will be somewhat tiresome. That can not
be practicably avoided. The reader needs to see the general
mechanics or relations of the universe summed up succinctly
in the model; that is what the model is for. | But he may
merely casually observe how the summing up is accomplished
and not try to remember the details, and thus get through
the chapter without painful effort. The intelligent
reader is aware that it is dificult, by using classic ideas, to
determine or express just what are the relationships and re-
actions, especially the “‘valuable’’ ones, between (say) son
and father, or a man and his neighbor; or precisely what is
democracy, concerning which there are so many conflicting
opinions. Our model, by itself splitting or giving birth to
sons, and by combining with others like itself to form collec-
tions like mankind (or like the solar system—it is all the
same except that mankind is much more perceptibly quantita-
tively complicated), exhibits concretely and in the simplest
form the complete answers to such problems. | doubt that
the solutions of such problems can really be comprehended
without the use of such concrete models—which serve to
support and connect our memory, that otherwise would fail
and leave us in confusion (XVIJ). In fact, the general so-
lutions of those problems have already in Part One been
given verbally, mathematically rigorously, and in terms of L
and T. If you completely comprehend the solutions from
that form of expression of them, then you waste your time in
reading the remainder of the book, which in a concrete and
more comprehensible way repeats the solutions.

S97. a. We begin with no assumptions, but with an un-
derstanding of the nature of verbal agreements ($22), and a
willingness (and ability) to make some and stick to them.
Let us say that the universe (or whatever it is that we are
talking about: select your own name) is something continu-
ous, which we will arbitrarily split as much as we like, but
which universe in that verbally split condition is still, verbally-
contradictorily, related together. That is the verbal trick
or solution of the One and Many. If you do not like
those agreements, then you may with equal validity (but
with a considerably harder strain on your memory) take
Reynolds’s or Reeve’s opposite ones: occasionally below I
point out how you are progressing, if you have chosen thus
oppositely. | Also, we have tacitly chosen everyday Trinity
language; if you do not like that language, then you have
an infinite choice of others out of VIII. Regardless of the
way in which you choose to talk, it will appear that ultimately

Two XI §97d

your meaning is identical with the one expressed in the ordi-
nary way used here.

b. Weshall name that continuous something or universe
ether. We do that merely because it is conventional; if you
do not like the name, then call it consciousness, or spirit, or
mind, or relationship, or loyalty, or love, or anything else
you like; orturn ordinary language upside down, if you like,
and say that the continuous substance is non-Being, or non-
God, or nothingness, or hate, or non-motion, or Nirvana. It
would be precisely as if we agreed to call an apple a balloon,
and vice versa:- it merely verbally happens that a balloon
would be what we now usually cal] an apple. If any
reader is unable to see that this paragraph is true—that it is
actually merely astatement of verbal truisms,—then the only
way which remains that can convince him is for him actually
to try such substitutions, and see directly what he gets. |
have observed that most people idolize words so much that
they will not at first believe this paragraph—certainly they
can not very readily make their emotions content with such
verbal changes for a long while, although intellectually they
have no objection (Index, °‘Ritual’’). For my own benefit
I have spent considerable time actually making some of the
various substitutions suggested: it was profitable to me.
Like most other people, | am quite fond of ritual and stereo-
typed verba] phrases and names—when they are “my own.”’

ec. We shall now consider the ether to be verbally split
into parts in order that we may have a positive or Many
language. The parts are then really held together or re-
lated bya relationship which we may call anything we please.
Suppose we conventionally name it force: and as the parts
are ‘held together’ let us give it also the more explicit con-
ventional name cohesion. (Again, we could say the opposite :-
that the parts were zot held together. That would be iden-
tical verbally with Reynolds’s “‘pressure,’’ which is the
reverse-direction relationship. But obviously the final mean-
ing is identical.) Such split-up ether that is held
together by cohesion is obviously, as a truism, viscous—or is
not the mathematicians’ frictionless, perfect fluid. The parts
of our ether, as a verba] agreement, rub together with some
friction. That characteristic of course, in terms of ordinary
language, agrees completely with a// the actual parts of the
universe that have ever been observed: nobody ever saw any
actually frictionless parts, so it is rather a waste of words to
talk about such. The fact of the matter is that Reynolds,
e. g., gives his grains mass, and hence actually a resistance
to their motion (a substantial friction, regardless of what it
is called or where mechanically “located’), which he nomi-
nally overcomes by the *“foree’’ of pressure. His pressure
is then actually a relationship; he merely has not stated ex-
plicitly the truisms. The truth is again obvious:- that the
‘“force’’ which “‘runs’’ the universe is trnistically merely our
name for the relationship of continuity.

d. Suppose we name those parts of the ether ether cells,
or merely cells. As it is an arbitrary procedure to assert
parts, obviously we can keep on dividing ad infinitum. Fin-
ally, an ether cell would be absolutely a geometrical] point, of
no space and time, that formally corresponds perfectly with
the One from which we started—and would be Reeve’s
theory, and substantially Reynolds’s. But, we are going to
use positive, finite, Many or scientific language, and introduce
quantitative inaccuracy. So we say that the cell is of some
small finite size (thus definitely introducing L and T—but 1
shall not go into that again as it would be only a repetition
of Chapter ITI). That cell itself is, truistically with
the last two sentences or because of the actual infinite re-
gress, further divisible; hence it formally has parts which can
move relatively to each other, or is elastic in a vague and

§97d XI Two

unexpressed quantitative degree. Regardless of how small we
make the cell, there inevitably remains that vagueness as to
the measure of its elasticity. The real measure is 0 and @:
it is absolutely a One:—but language disappears if we use
that. Hence, the elasticity (or a cell’s actual splitting) is
pluralistically or scientifically indeterminate; in other words,
it is absolutely impossible in any finite time to get any abso-
lute accuracy in any scientific or actual measurement. That
vagueness as regards that cell will never disappear, as it is a
verbal truism.

e. All other valid mechanical theories or verbal descrip-
tions will have the same inaccuracy or its equivalent. (If
we use an infinite pluralism, thus starting with fixed cells of
exact size, we get a variable, inaccurate One, which obvi-
ously amounts to the same inaccuracy.) Both Reynolds and
Erwin fail to state that logical point very definitely: they
calculate the ““size’’ of their standard small parts, which in
our machine are called cells; but both of those calculations
finally take for granted that V is fixed and constant (and it
is not; §127), which amounts to making the One constant;
hence their sizes are merely relative approximations—M.’s,
applying to our average environment, and really unfixable
with respect to a general environment that is a One truistic-
ally variable. Also, if later on we say that light is waves,
then one size of ether cells would fit average measures——be
fairly accurate. But if we say, as is equally correct, that
light is corpuscular as Newton had it (i. e., is not formally
continuous, butis verbally made of small “‘structures’’), then
a different sized, smaller cell would be needed for the same
degree of quantitative accuracy. In short, any “‘size’’ of
cell which we determined on would give a certain degree of
accuracy—whether close enough to be acceptable or not de-
pending entirely on the fineness of our perceptions, measure-
ments, experiments, standard units. The mathematicians
can readily calculate those sizes (they are the ultimate arbi-
trary quantitative bases of harmonic periodicity) from the
mathematical theory of unification in IX, and by following
Erwin’s and Reynolds’s methods if they need such guidance.
But we do not need such figures in this book, for we can get
a better concept of what an ether cell is, and its practically-
varying sizes, in this way:- Suppose that our stellar galaxy
(i. e., the nebula in which we are, of which the Milky Way
is the base; XII) is an atom in some world like this earth,
but larger. Then our solar system—which is obviously a
variable, elastic affair, —which would be an atom of our gal-
axy, would be an electron of that larger world. And then,
what to us is a pin head would in size serve an inhabitant of
that larger world as a pretty accurate ether cell. Similarly,
what to us could be a fairly accurate ether cell is a percep-
tibly variable molar body to an inhabitant of a world inside
one of our electrons, and he would have to split it (our cell)
up quite a lot, quantitatively, to get a ““fundamental’’ de-
scription of it. And so on forever;—that is what an infinite
regress actually means. From that can be seen the
consistency of asserting that there is no such exact thing as
an ether cell. It is just an arbitrary very small part—small
to us: we are enormously big to some things and enormously
little to others.

f. We may also note again that when we say we split
the ether into parts, then in ordinary language (because of
having introduced L and 7) we imply simply as a verbal tru-
ism that there is relative “‘motion’’ of those cells. (Or, we
could use an inverse language such as Reynolds’s, in whose
theory the grain plus its vacuum does not necessarily as a
whole move; i. e., we could assert a static universe——static
relative to any given part. But that would, as an obvious tru-
ism, and as actually seen in practice in Reynolds’s theory,

UNIVERSE 96

produce the same final meaning as our everyday way of nam-
ing ““motion.’’) And that is the last verbal agree-
ment needed, and the last time the reader could consistently
require a general change in the everyday verbalisms which I
have been stating as the ones I am explicitly to use. J have
given the reader who does not like everyday commonsense
language an ‘‘infinite number’ of other expressions to select
from, and shown explicitly the translation of each into our
language, and demonstrated in general that all those lang-
uages give the same meaning as the meaning now to be ex-
pressed in our commonplace language.

g. Ifthe cells were absolutely distinct, then the relative
motion of any two of them (say we take two tangent cells)
would obviously require or exhibit either 0 or © force—i. e.,
relationship. | Reynolds’s grains are thus distinct, and he
fundamentally had to use mathematical trigonometric fictions
to get any Many measures (e. g., the tangent of 0° isO; and
of 90°, ©; with ‘‘actual’’ values between). That fiction is
the orthodox mathematical error that 0 and © are numbers
($44); I shall not use the direct mathematical avoidance of
that fiction here, but express the consistent avoidance or so-
lution directly in terms of parts of the ether. Strictly speak-
ing, with such absolutely separate cells (i. e., in explictly
infinite pluralism), the size of them (or of grains, or Reeve’s
masses, or Erwin’s particles) would have to be absolutely 0
before we could have a really positive language in which
there was a canceling number of formal contradictions (in
short, for explicit verbal consistency we must assert explicitly
an infinite regress). That is a repetition of pars. d aud e
from a reverse point of view.

h. Then, when J assert that the cells are not distinct or
of accurately fixed size, it is obvious that it means that that
way of asserting the infinite regress formally requires that
the cell be finally divisible into relatively moving zero points.
Then, any motion of any point is zero-infinity, or indetermi-
nate, or mystic. Therefore, when we arbitrarily proceed
from that One to the agreed-upon Many, we truistically take
a time and space assemblage of those points and arbitrarily
assign a positively named or numbered L and T to it (i. e.,
assign a finite size—verbally contradictory to the One): we
number or name that L and T, or Energy, or force, anything
we please. And the inaccuracy of such “‘measure’’ is merely
fundamentally a truism of the fact that there really is no such
thing as an actual measure, or that the One is ineffable.
That is of course another repetition of the solution of the One
and Many. It sounds odd in that ““concrete’’ form. But
it is the explicit general expression of this very simple fact:-
If we slide a finger over this paper, there is friction. Parts of
the paper enter into depressions in the skin, and vice versa
—there being transfer, or “‘wear,’’ of the paper into the
skin, and vice versa. Ultimately, the “‘friction’’ is the re-
lationship of absolute continuity. If that is not so, then the
motion of the finger over the sheet involves absolute tangen-
tial motion, and zero energy is exhibited—or no phenomenon
occurs,— which glaringly is not so. Hence, with rigorous
logic (this is of course another repetition of the One and the
Many), the fact is that the finger and paper absolutely
merge; or part of the so-called paper is in the so-called skin,
and vice versa. Now, from that fact, which is so ob-
vious that we customarily take it for granted without ex-
Pressing it, we get this very simple and intelligible relation-
ship for our ether cells:- the outsides of neighboring ones
are together, or stick together, or merge together (or nega-
tively expressed, simply have never absolutely split apart),
and exhibit friction when there is any relative motion of the
two. (Precisely the same thing happens with respect to the
parts inside a cell, ad infinitum.) That statement is the

97 UNIVERSE

formal expression of any ‘‘motion.’’ By explicit classic logic
obviously it is impossible that there be any motion; Zeno’s
paradoxes showed that centuries ago, as we saw (“‘Ency.
Brit.,’’ “‘Zeno’’). This paragraph is hence a detailed, con-
crete, consistent expression in everyday language of motion.

i. Therefore, with such moving cells, and with an inner
infinite regress of motion in each cell, when we inaccurately
speak of a finite relative motion of any two cells another
verbal puzzle arises. We may consider the cells each to be
like a toy rubber balloon, with the surface covered with
sticky glue. The problem is whether the relative motion of
two cells consists (1) of stretching the surfaces of the bal-
loons inwards and outwards from their origina] spherical
shapes, while their centers do not move in translation, and
the place of the sticking together of the two surfaces does not
change; or whether the relative motion consists (2) of the
same stretching motion, with the sticking-together places
slipping more or less on each other so that the motion is a
rotation of the cells as a whole; or whether the motion con-
sists (3) of a translation of the whole original centers of the
cells, accompanied by some degree of stretch of the surfaces
with (A) fixed sticking, or (B) slipping sticking, or (C) rup-
ture of the sticking. That problem is obviously a verbal
quantitative one of some complication. None of those things
can happen if the Many cell or part is exact; but we need
not go again into the solution of the One and Many with re-
spect to each phase of the complication. (The same compli-
cation is tacitly buried for Reynolds’s grains in the ‘vacuum’
that surrounds each; for Reeve’s points, in the ‘distances’
between them; for Richards’s compressible atoms, either in
the ““fields’’ of kinetic theory atoms, or else in the omission

of saying how anything can be ‘“‘compressible’’: and it is
tacitly buried in other theories. Obviously, it truistically is
inevitable. So I am being definite about it here.) We

merely observe, now that we know how the One and Many
works, that the verbal problem of such motion itself takes an
infinite regress; the three heads under which I with arbitrary
formality stated the ‘“‘problem’’ indicate that regress—and
that it is a quantitative problem of where and how much. So
the problem above is itself absolutely insoluble accurately,
and has no essential meaning (i. e., there is no such real
problem). Formally, and with rigorons logic, we instantly
solve it arbitrarily by saying that we shall roughly have it
that the cells have some of each kind of motion:- that spe-
cifically with reference to two originally touching cells there
is some surface sliding, and then rupture of surface contact;
some internal stretch or elasticity, largely stopping when
the contact ruptures and translation as a whole (revolution)
takes place. To illustrate that:- if we had a roomful of the
sticky rubber balloons, with a string tied to one near the cen-
ter of the room, and pulled hard enough on the string, there
would obviously be some perceptible degree of each sort of
motion in some balloon or another, and some motion in each
balloon. The quantitative theory of those motions is an ar-
bitrary matter, and has no end; __ it simply is truistically im-
possible to work it out in complete detail. But, we can
readily enough get sufficiently close answers by experiment
or experience in a particular case and predict such answers.

j. The sum of the last paragraph amounts to saying that
there is absolutely no accurate decision possible as to whether
the motion of the universe in any given place is (1) a vibration
(where the cells stick together, as is substantially the case in
Reynolds’s theory or in orthodox wave theories), or (2) a
translation (where the stickiness of two cells ruptures, and
the two move apart [finally in closed orbits], or revolve [as is
substantially the case in Reeve’s theory or in ordinary kinetic
theories] ). | The obvious truth of the matter is that nether

Two XI §98b

sort of theory—(1) wave, or fluid, or formally “‘static,’’ or
(2) kinetic, or formally ““dynamic’’—is accurate. So it is a
mere matter of convenience as to which one we shall use in
a given case (of how definite or accurate we want to be or
need to be in expression), the ultimate truth obviously being
that in a finite Many language, some degree of one sort of
motion implies some of the other. This fact that any
phenomenon may be expressed validly, but inaccurately, as
either a ““vibration,’’ or as a molar ““‘movement,’’ is rather
hard to see when expressed in the above general form. It is
easy to see when we come to use it in detail.

k. This section completes the general explicit descrip-
tion of an ether cell. That cell exhibits, for each of an in-
definite number of points of view, the inherent infinite regress
of any actual That or This. |The reason this section seems
complicated is that I have condensed all of Part One into it,
in being explicit as to the solution of all those infinite re-
gresses. Possibly it will be a year or so before the reader
can feel comfortable and at ease in the conscious explicit
presence of one of those regresses. But now that we have
summed all those solutions into the ether cell, we shall no
longer be troubled by the explicit or obtrusive presence of a
regress. So we are ready to get the summed motions of two
or more cells. In short, having split the universe down to
the limit, we now start putting those parts together again,
and in so doing we describe everything. And immediately
on considering a number of cells in motion together we get,
truistically and also experimentally, a whirl, which is an
easily observed unit structure, that turns out to be mechani-
cally identical] with tbe reactions of a cell itself, and that
also serves as the automatic model of everything.

S98. a. The universe is therefore inaccurately agreed to
be a number of cells. By the theory of commensurability
($50), any certain number of constant cells would fail to
make a universe or anything (which statement summarizes
the regresses stated in detail in the Jast section). Therefore,
as a truism all cells must continually be in motion as an at-
tempt, to speak “‘logically,’’ to bridge that verbal gap or
incommensurability or contradiction. Also, and what is
equivalent, no cell of a positive size (and all are agreed to be
positive—to have a definite L and 7) can ever possibly be in
a position [perfectly] symmetrical with any certain cell or
cells. Therefore, no two adjacent cells may ever have ex-
actly the same amount of motion or energy. As we have
agreed that the size of cells is variable (i. e., they are split-
table), we must therefore, in order to have any positive lang-
uage agree that each cell will always be verbally the same
body. To say that is not saying that an ether cell is always
the same mass. A cell is always varying in mass (ef. par. h).
Buta cell is always the same That or This—is Thate or Thise.
It is a fixed verbal counter or symbol. It is a positive, “verb-
ally surviving’ unit of the Many, but in every actual way is
varying, inaccurately measurable, and zrrational alone.

b. Consequently, we must state the relative motions of
at least two adjacent cells in order to be rational, The
adjacent cells may first be
considered as joining their
sticky skins along a part of
the circumference, as shown
in cross-section in Fig. 98b.
Then, because they cohere
and are in different rates of
motion, they will (1) rotate
in the same direction, as is
shown by the arrows; and

Fig. 98b.

(2) one cell will to some degree revolve about the center of

the other. (In expressing these mechanics I make the usual

§98b XI Two

distinction that a body rotates when it turns [approximately ]
around its own center, as in the daily rotation of the earth;
and revolves when it turns around some other approximate
center, as the revolution of the earth about the sun.)

c. We first consider that rotation in the same direction
(Fig. 98b). If there is any actual reaction between the cells
A and B, then obviously they must rotate in the same sense,
so that the joining portions move oppositely, as shown.
That is contrary to Maxwell’s vague guess at a mechanical
ether. But the essential point is that so far as we have yet
gone, tbose two cells (virtually 3-dimension wheels in this
reaction) are formally the total universe; from that point of
view their rotation in the same direction is readily proved
experimentally:- Suppose A and B were two spur or cog
wheels (as partly indicated in Fig. 98b), and that we sup-
ported them by their axles (not shown) so that the cog teeth
meshed (those pictured are engineering monstrosities, of
course). Then, the only general way in which we could
make the two react would be to pull A quickly down (say)
for some distance (and B upwards, if we liked); the teeth
would of course shortly unmesh, and the wheels would rotate
in the same sense, in the direction shown in Fig. 98b. = If
instead of the ‘sticky’ cells, we had cells that had very flex-
ible rubber cog teeth, and meshed them loosely together, we
would get the same reaction somewhat more clearly, the
teeth reacting, and bending out of mesh. Clearly,
if the two wheels rotate in the opposite directions with teeth
in mesh, no reaction of just the two wheels (i. e., of the two
considered as a standard or whole One) occurs, except in so
far as tbe teeth themselves have friction (which isa lower order
reaction). If that friction be free to exhibit itself in a reaction
involving perceptible motion of the whole wheels it obviously
will push the wheels apart—so that the two, at the point of
contact move in opposite directions, which obviously amounts
to identically the same reaction already described for rotation
(note the small arrows at point of contact in the figure).

d. Before we explicitly take up the revolntion of (say)
B about the center of A, we need to consider in general the
motion of a collection of cells in the total universe of cells.
Obviously, as already seen in S944, if a collection of cells
moves, its place has to be taken by another collection.” In
order to avoid infinities and zeros (to avoid lapsing into One
language), that replacement would obviously require some
short time and be accompanied by some slight stretching of
cells (in infinite regress as indicated in footnote). (That is
obviously what happens, as also shown by direct experiment;
e. g., if a puff of smoke be blown into the air, time is re-
quired for the reactions.) But obviously that motion finally
is in a closed path. The part that first moves takes the place
of some other part; and that, of another part; and so on
until the last part that moves takes the place of the first part
that moved. (Obviously, because there is some elasticity or
vibration, in actuality that motion involves in some degree every
bit of the universe; that is the infinite regress, or it is the
way the One and Many absolutely reconciles itself in this de-
scription. We simply quantitatively ignore the vibrations that

%’d]f the cells are elastic enough, the cells that ‘move’ may
merely ‘*condense,’’ and adjacent cells ‘‘dilate,’’ so that there is no
change in the relative order or arrangement of cetls. That, relative
to the cells mentioned, would be a formally absolute ‘‘vibration.”’
But obviously, the size of the ‘‘elastic’’ yield made it result that
there were merely ‘‘vibrations,’’ and the ‘motion’ I am describing in
the text would then take place relative to ‘parts of cells, instead of
relative to whole cells. Hence, the text which I give is always ap-
plicable if we take parts small enough. Compare also §97j. Neither
‘‘vibration,’’ nor the ‘motion’ I describe, is perfect; to avoid lapsing
into One langnage, when those cells move some ‘‘elasticity’’ must be
exhibited in order to make the motion use a finite time interval.

UNIVERSE 98

are extremely slight: we can’t yet in any way perceive such
vibrations that are much beyond X-rays in smallness—unless
the yet unmeasured reactions in telepathy, **personal mag-
netism,’’ etc., are such). Hence, all motion in the
universe is finally revolution. 1f we speak of *“translation’’
(or ‘‘vibration,’’ meaning strictly back and forth translation),
then that is but a partial statement of the total motion which
finally takes place.

e. Therefore, because the motion of A and B is neces-
sarily asymmetrical, one cell must necessarily finally revolve
about the other. For the reaction of the sticking surfaces
(or of the elastic cogs) accounts for or provides for only equal
or symmetrical motion in each wheel. It is therefore again
seen (and again it is directly truistic with language agree-
ments), that there can be no accurate solution of the motion
of two bodies (§83). For there is no possible way of de-
termining just how much asymmetrical the motion is; that
is finally dependent upon relative sizes, etc., as given in
897i. So it does not in the least “‘simplify’’ anything to use
a machine of only two cells. Hence we shall at once con-
sider more cells and get explicit whirl mechanics. The fore-
going is the rough, general logic or mechanics of whirls.

f. For the foregoing, in addition to omitting the other
cells that actually existed, also has been tacitly dropping a
dimension of space. If we consider that A and B in Fig.
98b are actually 3-dimension approximate spheres, then
the actual reaction, instead of taking place in a plane, as the
figure tacitly indicates, takes place in the 3-dimension space
in which the ‘surfaces’ stick together, or the flexible cogs
intermesh (the ‘cogs’ on such spheres could be small radial
pins). And in that actual case, obviously there is nothing to
determine positively the direction in 83-dimension space in
which they rotate. In terms of technical physics they have
six degrees of freedom (i. e., three dimensions in two direc-
tions each); that substantially makes six specific vague-
nesses. And in our actual model (i. e., the whirl we are
going to use) we are going to eliminate all such vaguenesses.
They will still be there of course in reference to measurings,
or when using the measuring member. But we are not using
that member now, but are using That... X This... which is to
have concrete, direct experimental positiveness.

g. Consequently, we observe that actually A. and B are
surrounded by other touching cells, and that in each case of
two mutually reacting cells the motion is asymmetrical or
unbalanced. The motion or reactions for two cells was-were
seen to be as a whole balanced when we were considering it
in a 2-dimension plane, by all the ‘closed’ or universal mo-
tion there is—namely, a rotation and a complete revolution.
We may note that that leaves an unbalance in the third di-
mension; i. €., on each side of A and B in the direction per-
pendicular to the plane of the paper there is an unbalance.
That unbalance has to be totally or ultimately compensated
precisely as we ultimately balanced A and B in just the plane
of Fig. 98b. I. e., there can not be either perfect rotation
or perfect translatory revolution of A and B in the third di-
mension: there must be, for finite Many or pluralistic lang-
uage, an infinite regress, which gives a combination (in some
quantative degree) of such rotation and revolution and of
elastic internal “‘reaction’’ (i. e. inner rotation and revolu-
tion), of adjacent cells (ef. par. d and §97)).

h. And therefore, if we begin by considering that
there are numerous cells in the plane of the paper (Fig.
98b), the reaction of rotation and revolution of all the cells
will sum up as being of precisely the same nature as for the
two, keeping in mind that there is some elastic change in the
size of the cells. That is a verbal truism with ‘mass varies
with velocity.” For obviously, that elastic change is a change

99 UNIVERSE

in mass, and the rotation and revolution (considered apart
from the inner change or elasticity) is velocity. It is simi-
larly obviously truistic with Bernoulli’s theorem.

i. Then, to complete or finally balance that reaction in
the plane of the paper (Fig. 98b), the sideways unbalance
will have to be taken up in precisely the same way by cells
on the sides (i. e., by cells up and down from the plane of
the paper). By Bernoulli’s principle the greater the local
unbalances or the higher the pressure, the slower the veloci-
ties. | Consequently, by that, just in the immediate vicinity of
the plane of the paper there forms a tube—’*eddy’’—of ro-
tating and revolving cells, with any cross-section of it that is
approximately parallel to the plane of the paper equivalent in
motion to the motion in the plane as described in the last
paragraph. And that now partially described balancing of
motion, or definite statement of equal action and reaction, in
three dimensions is identica] with the “‘tubes of force’’ used
by Faraday, Maxwell, and finally with practically complet-
ing additions by Thomson. Also, it is substantially identical
with what Erwin calls “‘ether flow’’ from the center of his
wheels. In various formulations of physics that tube (just a
short portion of which I have so far described) is called fluxes,
stresses, strains, magnetic lines, displacements (electric and
otherwise), currents, distortions (of various sorts), centers of
gyration, etc. Consequently, the concrete reactions I am
stating here may be compared with those conventional mathe-
matical ways. The difficulty with the conventional ways is
that they usually tacitly consider that tube as being exactly
perpendicular to the plane of the paper, and hence as extend-
ing indefinitely up and down (I have asserted or shown no
such tube: see next paragraph); consequently, conventional
ways usually get “‘lost’’ right there, in that 0 and ©—as
those “‘unending’’ tubes are obviously unintelligible, and
agree with no machine or finite thing, being really a One.

j. As we have here carefully carried along a verbal bal-
ance between the Zero-infinity One and the arbitrary finite
Many, we may now at once see precisely how to complete
that tube and make it actually practically balance, and at
the same time show the explicit completion of all conventional
ideas of tubes of force, etc. We have already seen repeatedly
that the only possible way—the truistic way—of completely
and wholly balancing those unbalances is to make a closed
path. Ultimately, the only way of obtaining that closed
path with one tube is to consider it bent around into a ring
(i. e., it was only approximately perpendicular to the paper
in the last paragraph, in order that the cells in the plane of
the paper should balance), closing on itself, thus forming
roughly an anchor ring or tore or doughnut, or a vortex whirl
or whirl (§68hi)—or a somewhat fully formed and enduring
eddy, of which a whirlpool is one not very obvious example.
Actual finite parts of the universe then, in such a structure,
are in rough equilibrium (i. e., absolutely complete balancing
is obtained only by considering some elastic motion of every
part of the universe in infinite regress—as we have already
seen repeatedly; e. g., in §86). That whirl is our unit
structure, or symbolic machine, or Thise. Verbally, its
formation is the expression of truisms; for a concrete tube
has to end somewhere; otherwise we abandon scientific lang-
uage and revert to the One—which, although quite correct if
acknowledged, is no longer the science we agreed to make.
Faraday substantially made his tubes close on themselves;
but Maxwell lost the idea. | Thomson makes his tubes end
in ““pusitive’’ electrons; but positive electrons are nothing
more that standard Ones (i. e., they are mere logical verbal
unifications of. electrons); hence Thomson implies that ulti-
mately all whirls are themselves united, which means that no
whirl is a perfectly closed or balanced structure. It

Two XI §9sl

will be noted that 1 have said above that our closed whirl was
in rough equilibrium. This whole Part Two is required to
show that (i. e., the whirl, not being in complete equilibrium,
changes itself in various ways into other structures, and thus
transfers energy, or displays all phenomena). But this much
of this chapter shows the genera] completion of the electron
theory. We see the details as we proceed.

k. Instead of having the tube ‘close on itself’ (as in the
last paragraph, thus forming a whirl) in order to obtain a fair
dynamic equilibrium for a given collection of cells, it
would have been possible (as the only other verbal alterna-
tive) to have the cells all take up mutual motions more or
less immediately or directly closing on themselves (in the
sense that a rotation may be said to bea self-closed revolution),
thus forming a more or less spherical or spheroidal body or
collection of cells. But we note at once that if the ‘tube’
were of sufficient diameter, so that when it closed on itself
no “ hole’’ was left in the ring, then the so-called ‘ring’ or
whirl itself would quantitatively be more or less a sphere.
(I. e., suppose we made a doughnut out of a tube or roll of
dough—instead of cutting out a hole asis more usual in hand
making. If we made the rolls relatively short, then when
we bent the two ends around to join them together, no hole
would be left, and the dough would squeeze into more or less
a sphere.) Consequently, that spherical form of dynamic
equilibrium is merely a special case of a whirl (a quantitative
case, in which case conditions are pretty steady, or potentials
are comparatively low). We shall see, e. g., that the earth
is a whirl (XJJ). On the other hand, the closed tube—the
filament of the whirl—could have any degree of tennity com-
pared with the size of the hole. If the tenuity went into
the limit of becoming a line closed in more or less of a circle,
with a hole therefore of a size ““infinitely’’ greater than that
line’s ‘diameter’ or size, then our language would obviously
reverse—the One and the Many formally exchanging places,
giving explicitly an infinite pluralism. In the precisely anal-
ogous case of where the hole or radius becomes zero (jf we
were to consider it explicitly) our language also reverses.
Therefore, as we shall see (XII), the spherical form of whirl
is a ‘reversal’ of the ring form. In practice we do not let the
logic or language itself change, but our point @f view—or
statement of L,—in lieu of such logical change, changes from
in to out, or ‘reverses’; or, from the same point of view the
language ‘goes backwards’ mechanically. Or, what is prac-
tically important, the sphere is (to use customary terms)
static (e. g., we say the ‘‘solid,’’ ‘‘steady’’ earth); and the
whirl which is not a sphere is dynamic (e. g., the magnetic
*“field’’ of the earth; or the winds that blow over the earth).

l. Itis hence obviously a truism that when we consid-
ered our rather spherical ether cells as being variable, or
elastic, we thus considered them as being whirls also—very
small whirls, the definite motions of translation of whose inner
parts were so short that we quantitatively neglect them.
In brief, our valid logic appears perfectly circular—and valid
because it consistently includes the universe. ‘Therefore, as
some more obvious truisms, any actual body whatever in the
universe may be considered a whirl; or any part of any
body or of the whole universe is a whirl; or the universe it-
self is a whirl. 1 shall explicitly show all] that in direct,
concretely verifiable detail as we proceed. So ina whirl we
have a machine model, immediately applicable to anything.
In §101 J shall describe some experimental whirls which you
ean make for yourself in a minute or so; then you can sub-
stitute that visible affair as being the directly usable summa-
tion of these verbal truisms which constitute the mechanics of
a whirl—for these truisms are rather tiresome and hard to
remember in their verbal form.

$98m XI Two

m. As we saw, because no cell can, by the theory of in-
commensurables, possibly be quantitatively accurate, there-
fore no finite collection can be accurate or symmetrical, or in
absolute equilibrium. Hence, a finite or actual whirl] is never
in absolute equilibrium with its environment—or what
amounts to the same thing, the whirl is not perfectly closed,
does not have a definite surface, ete. In brief, the whirl, as
our actual structure, is not a perfect or an exact structure.
Therefore, if we conceive a geometrical line in the whirl
which always passes from one cell to another at a point
where the pressure in its constant change is instantaneously
zero or balanced, then that line obviously would be continu-
ous; the point mentioned would always be the instantaneous
point of rupture; the line would always be changing its loca-
tion; it would be the conventional path of least action (ex-
plicitly the path of zero action, which is the limit of least) ;
it finally at some point would leave the given whirl to join
similarly continuously with the rest of the universe, and
would reenter the given whirlat the point where it was begin-
ning to join another (the cell-pressure being there infinity,
which, as we shall implicitly see in the rest of this chapter,
is the same as the zero-pressure from the opposite point of
view), after having passed through al] the points of all the
otber cells in the universe simultaneously (as strictly by the
infinite regress, each point is always rupturing from one point
and joining another). Hence that line, which is analogous
to the conventional stream line, would be infinitely long, and
formally would outline the total structure of the universe.
The line would in every respect be zero and infinity, so that
a geometrical point (zero mass or zero “ material’’) moving
in it at infinite speed would obviously truistically be the
universe. In brief, all ‘“‘materiality’’ absolutely disap-
pears from the universe whenever we give explicit and rigor-
ous description (and the description just given is quite ortho-
dox, being the ordinary principle of least action stated in an
obviously truistic form). We see that the so-called whirl or
*“‘matter’’ I am talking abont is a mere form, a verbal trick,
which outlines the absolutely inexpressible finally real uni-
verse, which universe or God is the line of least or absolutely
zero action. We land in Nirvana, here and now, by that
particular view point (we could shift to infinite God by em-
phasizing that the line reentered each cell or point at the
point it was joining another); and we did it by being per-
sistently and really concrete—by really sticking to Newton’s
third law, which the materialists fancy they accept. Only
by heing metaphysical and vague and inconsistent like con-
ventional theologians and materialists is it possible to be ma-
terialistic and ““worldly.’”’ The reader need not take
this paragraph too seriously. It is ultimate truth; but as
we see in ethics (§§166, 162), ultimate truth is a dangerous
thing to dwell upon explicitly without previous training:
just a touch too much of it for an unprepared man, and he
goes insane, as, e. g., did Newton temporarily and Sweden-
borg rather persistently. So if you do not grasp this para-
graph for a month or two it is merely nature automatically
and properly protecting your brain from too sudden a load.
I abruptly described the total] universe or God in sharply
precise physical terms. If] had at the same time definitely
shown that the sum was also a person, if nature had not
sufficiently protected you, you would have become ‘“God-
intoxicated,’’ or in undue measure have had what the theo-
logians usually cal] a rebirth or salvation (cf. $153).

n. Without being so ultimate as in the last paragraph,
we may observe that because the whirl is not exactly in equi-
librium, there are truistically variations from a perfect geo-
metrical tore, which we may note from three important
points of view:- (1) The ‘surface’ of the ring is not a sharp

UNIVERSE

100

: . 6é ”?
geometrical surface, but is a variable, 3-dimension zone

of high velocity and relatively low pressure, which ““shades
off’? with lower velocities in both directions away from that
‘surface’ (in the direction of the perpendicular or normal on
both sides of the ‘surface’). I. e., there is rotational and
revolving motion ‘‘outside’’ the ring or closed tube, as well
as inside it. The ether cells outside with that shading-off
velocity constitute what I shall call the field. In Fig. 98n
two views of a whirl are shown—in cross-section above, and

c “ ~ \ t ” ™~ \

Fig. 98n.

in plan below. The closed dotted lines about the tube
(which tube is shown in cross-section at ABD and A’B'D’)
show the field. (The field is not drawn in the plan view—
only the ring.) I shall call the ring or tube the filament of
the whirl. The filament is shown in full lines in the figure
—the plan or doughnut shape being below. The approximate
or instantaneous center about which the cells of the filament
revolve is shown in the cross-section part of the figure by the
centers F and F’ of the filament, and in plan by the closed
line F)F, F,’. I shall call it the jiliar axis. The line ap-
proximately perpendicular to the plane of the filiar axis, and
through its approximate center (shown at CC’ in elevation,
and at C2 in plan) will be called the whirl axis or main azis,
or simply azis. The field and the filament is the whirl. The
3-dimension surface or zone (ABD, A’B’D’, AiDi, A; Dy)
between the filament and the field I shall call the difference
surface, or briefly surface (when I mean ‘“‘geometrical sur-
face’ in this hook, I use that explicit phrase, unless the
context clearly implies it). There is also, in the same way,
an indefinite 3-dimension boundary of surface on the outside
of the field—‘between’ the field of one whirl and the field of
the adjacent one. I shall call that the field difference surface,
or briefly the field surface. We see more such details below.

9. The second important view to be taken of the result
of the asymmetry of the filament is that the cells truistically
do not revolve (and rotate) in a plane that is normal] to the
filiar axis; i. e., there is no definite, sharp, exact revolution
of the cross-sections ABD, etc., about F, etc., in the plane
of the paper as shown by the little arrows. For the ‘side-
ways pressure is not steady. Hence, there is truistically a
sideways (i. e., in the direction of the filiar axis) component
of motion, so that as a general sum for the whole filament
the filament effectually rotates about the main axis, anda cel]

101 UNIVERSE

in the difference surface thus travels in a spiral (as at S, S)—
in a line which when projected on the filiar axis in any whirl
always makes with it an angle different from 0° and 90°.
(Possibly a more correct technical name for that path is heli-
cal, or screw thread. However, it is not perfectly helical
and not perfectly spiral, but a variable path between the two
as limits.) | Obviously, that spiral motion, relative to any-
thing outside the filament (to its field, e. g.), may as extreme
limiting views be either (1) called a rotation of the filament
about the main axis, or (2) called a relatively fixed filament
with a spiraling surface (like a helical spring). | And those
two points of view, when taken to the extreme One limit (to
0, or ©), are analogous to the dynamic and static views in
par. h or in §97). So we again avoid both verbal mysticisms
by asserting that the motion never becomes perfectly rota-
tional (for in that case no connection could be had with any-
thing outside the filament, which is a self-contradiction; or
it is Kelvin’s frictionless whirl), and never becomes perfectly
spiral (for the same truism). We say that the motion is some
of each, and the cells then are consistently of finite size.
Therefore, now that we have preserved actual finite
sizes, without running off into 0-*% mysticism, we get an
important mechanical reaction—the completing or ultimate
reaction—or the concrete truistic expression of what transfer
of energy is, of what a phenomenon is:- For obviously, with
cells of a jinite size, whenever the angle of the spirals ap-
proaches close to 0° or 90° (how close depends upon the size
of the cells), then at that surface locality where it happens,
obviously a cell or cells would truistically leave, or enter, the
filament, and the filament thus would partly “‘wear out’’ or
decrease, or “ grow.”’ As orthodox science so often omits
that point it is desirable to consider it in detail for a few
paragraphs. In the next one I emphasize the point by sub-
stantially repeating it in a different form.

p.- What we must say, as a truism of the positive plural-
istic language we are by agreement using (and which is also
definitely proved by concrete, verifiable experimental fact in
§8101-2), is that if the spirals S,S in Fig. 98n make an
angle of 0° (or 180°) with the filiar axis F,F; F)’ (become
parallel to it), so that the motion is pure rotation of the fila-
ment about the main axis, then obviously there is no reaction,
or there is zero force, holding the cell in the filament. Be-
cause the cell is of some finite size, therefore it truistically
leaves the filament and joins the field before that absolute 0°
or 180° could occur. Similarly, if the spirals at any spot on
the surface approach 90° (or 270°) the local pull on the cells
outside approaches infinity, and as they are of finite size, be-
fore any actual 90° is reached, one or more cells are pulled
into the filament. Or, by taking the opposite point
of view, the expression of all that can be reversed, giv-
ing identically the same result. The simple verbal fact
is that such 0 and © functions are indeterminate, and are not
applicable to finite bodies and can not occur with respect to
them. Orthodox science frequently uses such 0-% forms.
When it does it obviously is religion—and is wrong if it pro-
fesses to be science. As a matter of fact, orthodox science
tacitly uses valid logic or commonsense, and asserts the act-
ual or correct answer; for it sees the answer also in the form
of experiments, similar to those I shall give. But I am being
explicitly consistent here—putting commonsense into words,
—and as an immediate consequence we have seen already
the total explanation of what ‘“growth’’ is, and it turns out
to be identical with any actual ““transfer’’ of energy, or any
phenomenon. A few rabidly agnostic scientists and theolog-
ians hold that the explanation of growth is “*impossible.”’
Truistically it would be if pseudo-science kept on dualistically
splitting the universe into absolute parts: for such parts then

Two XI §98q

obviously can’t formally get together or grow. But we now
see that growth, in expression is merely ultimately an inevit-
able truism of our primary agreement arbitrarily to split
things into parts. In short, religiously, or from the point of
view of the total universe, everything is conserved (that is
the explicit statement of the general religious law of the con-
servation of energy); taking the verbally opposite point of
view of the universe as being arbitrarily split into parts, then
the identical law (expressed pluralistically in formally oppo-
site terms) is that always each part changes—either grows or
decreases (which it does, depends wholly upon our point of
view; i. e., there is no absolute evolution or progress up or
down—for up and down are purely relative or Many; Index,
‘‘Direction’’). That law of “‘growth’’ is hence obviously
simply the law, mass varies with velocity. For obviously,
here we have concretely given a mass or body (given a cell)
a velocity, and we find the resulting structure explicitly
growing—and doing it truistically: we have not even made
any experimental whirls yet to see it happen. We shal] also
see (§146) that the same double aspect of the growth of the
filament (i. e., ““increase’’ and ‘“‘decrease’’) is also funda-
mentally what we call sex. All of this is just as explicitly
biology and sociology as it is physics and chemistry. Asa
matter of fact, as soon as we get these elementary mechanics
summed up into whirls, ] am going to use those whirls di-
rectly and in some detail to state astronomy (XII), as that
subject exhibits perhaps better and more simply than others
the familiar principles of biology, ethics, chemistry, ete.

q. Another point of view or way of stating the last two
paragraphs is quite useful in giving an understanding of
things in general:- When the asymmetry of the filament is
considered as truistically giving a spiral surface-motion, it
obviously is a part of the same truism that the spiral motion
exists in order to balance the filament with the field outside;
and that therefore a complete understanding of the truism
requires explicit expression of the motion of the cells in the
field. | Because that spiral exists as a means of balancing
sideways asymmetries, it truistically follows that the reaction
of the field cells is a rotation and revolution (as_ before,
neither perfect or 0° or 90°) of them sideways—on one side
or the other depending on whether the unbalance is due to a
growing filament or a decreasing one. That is precisely the
same sort of reaction we have already seen in pars. h and i.
Therefore, the cells in the jeld move in a spiral, the projec-
tions of which on the spirals of the filament cross at some
angle between 0° and 90°, but never at 0° or 90°. When the
angles between various field spirals and filament spirals get
rather close to those One limiting angles, then, as before and
depending on the size we are taking the cells to be, the geo-

metrical paths of a spiraling
cell in the field and a spir-

Cc aling cell in the filament
Cc ee ;

absolutely joiz, making a

rounding turn of about 90°—

e not exactly so, nor a per-

A fectly sharp turn,—and the

cell in that path leaves, or
joins, the filament. J.e.,
if we look perpendicularly
down on the path of a cell C, then it has a path represented
by one of the two arrows in Fig. 98q, with a rounding turn
of about 90°. The elbow in the arrow is in the difference
surface—the locus of all such elbows zs the difference surface.
That filament surface is identical in kind with the
surface of the possible spherical form of a whirl. That of
course directly follows from this paragraph, by noting that
the motion of the field difference surface, relative to the field

Fig. 98q.

§98q XI Two

of an adjacent whirl, is mechanically identically the same as
the filament surface. And it further follows that if the fila-
ment is growing, the cell moves into it on one path (say A
in the figure); and when the filament is decreasing, the cell
moves on a relatively opposite or reversed path B.

r. Itis obvious from the last paragraph that again we
have the distinction between static and dynamic. Every-
thing in the universe, by our verbal agreements, is moving.
Hence, if we are in the field say of a large whirl, moving
along with it, we can arbitrarily consider it static, just as a
fish in a muddy stream would not readily notice its **steady’’
motion (the fish is of finite size; hence in principle he could
always detect the motion of the stream by reference to his
nervous system, as no finite portion of the stream can have
mutually steady velocities of its parts—but in practice, the
fish would need some delicate tools to improve his nerves).
Then if we undertake to refer to the filament (or to act with
it in any way), the surface motion of it tends to approach to-
wards taking a path at 90° to our ‘static’ motion. So we
speak of the filament as ‘dynamic,’ or as exhibiting energy,
and formally we must introduce the other two dimensions of
space (the verbal inverse square law) in order to assert that
motion in a plane at about 90°. That is now con-
cretely obvious; for in our “‘static’’ environment we tacitly
assume equilibrium, or that we are in a ‘center of refer-
ence,’’ and hence we must for formal consistency assert the
two balancing L’s in going into a different structure. Also,
it is obvious (or possibly not readily so just yet), that we
could recognize or perceive a filament only when it was grow-
ing [or decreasing] a little, relative to the filaments in the
biologica}] structures of our sense organs. That criterion oc-
curs at VY; (X11I). All this is ““concretely’’ precisely what
we saw “‘theoretically’’ in §80.

s. It also appears that because there is universal] asym-
metry, or universal growth-or-decrease (i. e., change), all
filaments and fields as a truism are changing. I. e., even if
we assert that we are in a ‘‘static’’ environment, the actual
pluralistic fact is that by measurements which are accurate
to within the size of cells, there is measurable motion. So
there is no positive static environment—or in a similar sense
no accurate wholly dynamic one. A perfect “‘static,’’ or
*“dynamic,’’ one is monistic. Or, in the terms we are now
using, all That’s and This’s are explicitly That...’s and

This...’s. | Also, this truism is identical with what we saw
in §83¢:- that all naming coefficients are infinitely regress-
ive. And so on—in repeated proof of no exact science.

t. 1] have been speaking above as if there were a number
of paths of cells in and out of filaments (and implicitly, of
fields of adjacent whirls). | Obviously, at any given instant
the chance that there is more than one path at exactly the
same phase would be one to infinity. Consequently, and
also in extension of the same truism, there is one con-
tinuous geometrical line in which a// the cells must move.
That is simply a definite verbal proof of par. m. Beyond the
fact that it shows absolute unification, I do not use it.

u. (3) We may now lookatthe asymmetry of any whirl
from the third point of view mentioned in par. n. This
point of viewis what might be called a structural or concrete
summing of the second point of view (beginning in par. o):-

v. In a fairly steady whirl there is, as a truism, but
slight change at the difference surface. | But when there is
considerable asymmetry (“disturbed conditions,’’ consider-
able difference in “‘potential,’’ etc.), obviously as another
truism, there is a tendency for a number of cells to pass into
(or out of) the filament more or less together (never two ac-
curately together, or simultaneously, of course). | We shall
say that a number of cells come owt ofa filament more or less

UNIVERSE

102

together, observing concretely and generally what happens :-

w. In Fig. 98wthe large rough circle represents a cross-
section of a fairly balanced filament. If it is much out of
balance dynamically, as we now shall consider it to become,
we shall have a number of cells bulging out into the part

Fig. 98w.

shown dotted. By Bernoulli’s principle, the part of the
bulge farthest out will have the greatest velocity. There-
fore the farthest cell will leave the filament, and others
around it will in turn leave until equilibrium is practically
restored. They all come in contact with slower cells in the
field, and hence curl over and around as shown by the arrows
just in and outside the bulge, and thus form a new, small
whirl, in somewhat the relative size and position shown at A
(the variations from that size, etc., are great, depending on
conditions; §§101-2). The new whirl moves off (see next
paragraph) to the right, and its environment being asymmet-
rical with respect to it (usually markedly so, for reasons that
appear from time to time), it tums up or down (depending
for the direction in which it turns upon relative values of ve-
locities) and thus tends to take up a revolution about the filiar
axis F of the large whir] (subject to taking up also the spiral
motion of the main field, as we shall see). The new whirl
is shown moving around down, through the position B.

x. <A whirl as a whole will partly havea motion of trans-
lation (more precisely:- of variable revolution about some
relatively distant point), and partly of rotation about its own
main axis (more precisely :- of spiral or varying rotation).
That is obvicusly a truism with Bernoulli’s principle. Or,
the spirals on the outside of the fields can be considered as effect-
ually a screw thread, and the whirl will screw itself through
its environment, which then acts as a more or less fixed nut.
Or, its motion is due to precisely the same principles as were
set forth in par. b, relative to two cells, A and B. In short,
a whirl moves by the same principles as a cell—another cir-
cular checking up of the consistency of our argument or me-
chanics. Also, we have before seen that a cell will go in or
out of a filament (and also, in or out of a field, across the
field surface). Here, we definitely have a whirl acting as a
cell acts. So we see again, as we saw in par. 1, that except
for unessential ZL and 7, a whirl is identical with a cell.

y. This smal] whirl, to which the filament gave birth,
is obviously a ‘dynamic’ body, in that it moves off while the
filament as a whole is a “‘center’’ or is static. As we saw,
orthodox physics does not explicitly recognize any bodies as
giving hirth to smaller ones (or vice versa)—although all
men, €. g., are born. Such physics usually calls those things
which are given off ‘‘vibrations’’ or ‘“waves’’: yet, as we
shall see, electrons (and radioactivity) are tacitly by orthodox
physics the birth of such small whirls. And so far as that is
concerned, precisely the same idea is definitely contained even

103

in the old Maxwell physics:- in such physics God gave birth
to the smaller things—‘‘created’’ them, in Maxwell’s own
technical speech. So I am not proposing any novelty; I am
here merely being a little more definite as to the immediate
parents, while also agreeing that as a sum total God or the
universe gave birth to all things—and vice versa.

§99. a. The last section gives the general total of all
mechanics, and is as such the concrete summary of all plur-
alistic statement. It is much condensed. But I find that it
is much more intelligible that way. | Those who have the
need or the interest to expand it in detail will have no par-
ticular difficulty (except in remembering the details when
they become numerous) in expanding it to volumes. I have
myself on occasions expanded it to a volume or so. The
worst difficulty about those mechanics is to condense them
into sufficiently brief expression to be comprehended as a
whole readily (so that the trees will not hide the forest),
which at the same time permits useful detail to be visible.
The last section is a reduction to about 6000 words of a pict-
ure or description of the universe in all its infinite variety—
undertaking to make the completely unified beauty of the
universe intelligibly explicit, and at the same time to make
the infinite details and extent of that beanty also explicit
enough to be intelligible or perceptible. It is thus an effort
to accomplish in explicit completeness what all literature
undertakes to accomplish in more or less completeness. I. e.,
any writing or verbal communication is formally an explicit
(or implied—as in “‘nonsense’’ books like “‘Alice in Wonder-
land’’) statement of the solution of the One and Many—an
analysis into parts, which are then synthesized into a com-
plete meaning {and most writers do not take the whole One,
but imply it by using a standard One). FE. g., the usual
modern love story names force Jove, and proceeds to make
one couple of people, or several couples, One, or vice versa
—with positive mention of such This’s and That’s as the
writer thinks will best make explicitly comprebensible to
the reader the One and the Many. The Bible undertakes
to do that with respect to the universe. But the author of
the love story and the compilers of the Bible failed usually to
be very vividly conscious of what they were about. I was
quite conscious of what I was trying to do. To those people
for whom the last section is comfortably and applicably intel-
ligible, it is ““literature’’; to those for whom it its not thus
successful, it is not literature (success of course includes per-
ceptible stirring of the emotions—‘moving’ the reader to do
something right, indicated by my phrase ‘applicably intellig-
ible’; cf. XVII). If the last section is successful to a
majority of readers, then by conventional measures it is lit-
erature (8171k). Then, as it is explicitly completely exten-
sive, ‘ greater’” literature than that section would in general
possess (1) more meaningfulness and forcefulness (i. e.,
more comfortable and more applicable or emotion-stirring in-
telligibility) in an equal number of words (with the subject
remaining equally complete); or (2) equal meaning in fewer
words; or (8) both. But, as the estimate of the relative
measures of literature obviously thus depends upon the per-
ceptions of the readers, such estimates will change as the
readers change, and a direct comparison of literature requires
a preliminary comparison of the readers who estimate it,
That digression as to the measures of literature will,
by introducing an odd point of view, probably permit the
reader to see just what the last section really means. The
reader might try for himself to condense the Bible, Shakes-
peare, and all the novels and science he has read, to 6000
words intelligible to others, and see how he comes out. As
a matter of fact, I did not expect to be successful at it, so I
have added the rest of the book to it. A volume on

UNIVERSE

Two XI §99¢

the theory of literary construction (i. e., on ‘“making’’ lit-
erature, or synthesis) and criticism (i. e., analysis) is defin-
itely implied by this paragraph.

b. Judged by ordinary standards, the chief omission in
the last section is that I have failed to indicate in which di-
rection any given motion took place. KE. g., I said that the
whirl or cell would move, but usually I did not show or assert
in which direction it would move—whether up or down, left
or right, ete. Obviously, the actual direction of such motion
wil] always depend upon the relative values of the asymme-
tries—which is a truism. Clearly, the motion can always be
in either direction; i. e., this machine we have arbitrarily
invented is reversible. (It is not perfectly reversible, as tru-
istically the asymmetries or measures will always be different
if it runs in the opposite direction; but it is always logically
or qualitatively perfectly reversible, and hence the universe
as a whole is perfectly reversible in measure as well as form
——which is the same as saying that ZL and T do not apply to
the One.) As an explicit example of my omission of direc-
tions, when I said (§98x) a whirl would move, or screw itself
along, between adjacent whirls, I omitted all remarks about
those others whirls even having directions of motion. Ob-
viously, the others too would have motions, so that the whirl
mentioned, in its somewhat corkscrew motion in the general
direction of its main axis (cf. path of solar system, Fig. 107e)
has a direction that depends on those other motions. _I pro-
pose usually to omit naming such environmental directions;
for if I did name them, I obviously somewhat obligate myself
to the ad infinitum task of naming the relative directions of
all motions in the universe. I could not, while trying to set
forth the principles, maintain such a grasp of details: no
reader would stand being bored by such detail. even if a
publisher would print it [and since 1 wrote that about 18
publishers have in effect assured me that readers are not in-
terested in even the essentials of the universe or al] things;
but I think they overestimate the prevalence of the provin-
cia] or New York weakness known variously as pep, punch,
brevity and speed in the actual sense of shallowness, that
is shown in get-rich-quick and living-your-own-life-and-to-
hell-with-others delusions]. | And worst of all, there is no
general agreement as to how directions shall be named from
any given place, so that I would also be involved in a com-
plete revision and unification of all scientific standards (as all
of them finally depend upon L or “direction’—T being im-
plied), which is rather another story. Or to put it in terms
of the last chapter (also, ef. §§58g, 101i, 134d, 135c, 149,
etc.), if I] name directions, thus somewhat obligating myself
to state environmental quantitative relationships in infinite
regress, | must also explicitly locate, relative to ourselves
or our usual tacit standards, the arbitrary ‘‘zero’’ potential.
And I can not locate such a “‘beginning point’? of measures
except for myself alone; it requires general agreement of
people (§171k); you might agree with my zero potential,
but by the theory of chance you probably wouldn’t, and then
I would be involved in an “‘argument’’ or controversy with
you as to (say) how many pounds is a ‘heavy’? load—which
is not the purpose of this book. _I[ propose to give here the
principles or theory of all measures or descriptions; my
guesses at those actual measures are my guesses, and you
verify the book by using your guesses or opinions. So my
avoidance of entering into any extended statement of direc-
tion is simply my generalized avoidance of imposing my
opinions or standards on anyone. You really want to form
your own standards and need to at first—though in this gen-
eralized form the need is yet obscure. 1 shal] give some ex-
amples in the next paragraph.

ec. The conventional technical example is an electrical

§99c XI Two

current. It is now generally admitted that there is a flow
lof what is actually matter] not as the ‘‘positive’’ current,
but in the direction which is called “‘negative.’’ So the
guess made over a century ago as to the “‘direction’’ of elec-
tricity is verbally contradictory to ordinary standards of zero
‘molar potential.’ We may take a wider case. When
a filament gives birth to a secondary or smaller whirl, that
filament at the time decreases—or we would conventionally
usually say it degenerates or runs down or loses. But verb-
ally contrary to that, when people give birth to a second
generation, we commonly say the race is evoluting, or pro-
sressing—implying a growth or increase. The trick in the
naming of such “‘directions’’ is of course as to where we take
the “‘zero’’ and begin to count from. In the absolute, there
is no such ‘‘start’’ or zero mark on a scale (§80). In the
birth of people, our “‘start’’ is the race, and we ignore the
individuals who, as such, decrease and finally die. In the
birth of a secondary whirl I took the filament before the
birth as standard; of course, the filament itself previous to
that pregnant condition had to grow before it could decrease.

d. So it is obvious that I may not properly state direc-
tions in this book in any extensive connections. If I say the
race is progressing, I have to state that it is my opinion or
quantitative observation or guess that it is moving in that
direction; and I have to go further, in order to show that
the opinion is based on consistent statement of observation,
and show that the climate, by being fairly steady for prob-
ably two or three hundred centuries, accounts for it, and
further state that quite possible changes in climate may at
times in the past have caused the opposite fora while (Index,
**Climate’’). —_‘_It therefore follows that anybody, by taking
a different point of view of the directions which I do happen
to state in much brevity, may show that they should be re-
versed, in his point of view. I agree that he is right. But
even more confusing than that, by the theory of chances it is
going to he found that some of the few directions I do state
(when it seems more economical of space, I name a direction,
or guess) are going to be found to be mutually inconsistent
whenever they are followed out considerably further, with
careful measures taken all along. Those inconsistencies are
quantitative errors, and are due to the fact that I do not
know the measures, they often not having been made by any-
body; those errors are also due to the fact that I can not
carry very many facts in my memory at once, and hence get
confused sometimes with measures that are available. How-
ever, those inconsistent guesses which | occasionally make at
relative measures do not vitiate the principles or logic, as is
explicitly proved by the whole of Part One. They merely
prove that I am incompetent to give the reader any quite re-
liable practical (i. e., pluralistic or Many) advice or informa-
tion. In short, there is no exact science, and I personally
am unable to make science as exact as available information
would permit.

8100. a. We may sum up what has been “made obvious
about whirls in general. The summary is a concrete or
““tangible’’ restatement of the whole argument of the book.

b. (1) Any part of the universe may be considered
mechanically as being a whirl. If we take a part as a whirl,
then we have thereby explicitly implied a certain filament
difference surface, which has (truistically) a fairly definite
velocity; and that in turn, by the truism of continuity, es-
tablishes or implies every other whirl in the universe, because
the same relationships that hold in the first whirl must be
consistently identical] in all the others. The relationships
in the first or standard whirl thus established are definite
(i. e., there is a difference surface velocity that is definite)
within the degree of accuracy that is (A) possible to our

UNIVERSE

104

perceptions (if we have actually-measured velocities), or
(B) which we care to assume formally if we do not wish act-
ually to measure. That degree of definiteness establishes
the size of the cell—which is a smaller whirl we consider a
yague, internally unmeasured unit. Only by regarding that
cell as a geometrical point could we obtain accuracy; and in
that case we would require an impractical] infinity of words.
Therefore, we take or verbally agree on the practical quan-
titatively vague cell (or small whirl); and that, from two
points of view, allows—and verbally necessitates as a truism
—all other whirls to vary widely (i. e., to exhibit al] phe-
nomena) even though they are, as has been shown, formally
fixed by the first :- (1) Certain limits of variation are possible
to the cell to begin with; when, e. g., those variations are
multiplied by millions (by the inverse square law) in travel-
ing out to a distant whirl, there obviously can consistently
be considerable variability in the whirl (that is the funda-
mental reason for harmonic periodicity, or the periodic table
of elements—stated in a new way). (2) We have no practi-
cal means of actually verbally keeping the /imits of the cell
measurably steady (getting rid of the infinite regress); so in
practice those limits themselves vary, which adds to the other
variations; but formally in this book, and also implicitly in
practical life, we consider that variation to be zero; and be-
cause it is not, assert that we are always inaccurate, or that
there is no exact science. Those two verbal “‘reas-
ons’’ or truisms or explanations of why there are phenomena
or changes, are obviously identical.

ec. We hence see further, from the last paragraph, that
in practice our description of the universe begins anthropo-
centrically. Each of us takes himself (his body and-or mind)
as being a whirl—a Thise. That primarily ““fixes’’ all molar
bodies. Then by observing more closely (requiring some
millions of years of nervous ‘‘evolution’’), we name parts of
ourselves (with temporary undue self-consciousness:- ““they
knew that they were naked’’; Gen. 3, 7) and hence of molar
bodies, until we now have carried the splitting down to elec-
trons as being definite whirls or molar bodies of a ‘‘lower’’
order. Then, we can observe even more minutely; but at
that next step in splitting we consider no longer that there
are definitely lower order whirls (we validly could: ef. cor-
puscular light in XIII), but consider. the whirl ‘‘continuous’’
cells, as has been seen in this, and the last chapter. Obvi-
ously in that process we use the difference surface of our
skin as a criterion—we adopt the effective velocities of its
structures as the particular one(s) by which to gauge and
describe the universe (e. g., the Adam and Eve myth intui-
tively mentioned correctly that skin standard, by ““naked’’ ;
except for that, and other substantial implied truths in the
myth—for instance, the fact that the race for ages have been
tackling the job of formulating this book, particularly Part
One,—the story would not have survived long). So when
we get things split down. to vibrations, we find—because we
originally put it in—a continuous and obvious velocity rela-
tionship, 7; (IX). And then the total universe becomes
established for us as being whirls (or any other formal struct-
ure or splitting’) on the criterion of the velocity of our light
V\. Therefore, jf orthodoxly we hold that V; is an absolute
constant, obviously we make the universe consist of parts ab-
solutely different to (for) each one of us, and each part differs
(to each one of us) at each instant from itself at other in-
stants, and we then have an absolutely anthropocentric
universe (which is in principle the relativity theory; §66).
That anthropocentric universe obviously has the difficulty of
requiring a separate language for each person, ete. (S66).
But we see again that such a universe is logically valid, or is
consistent and ‘true’’—just as Ptolemaic astronomy, which

105 UNIVERSE

is geocentric, can be expressed consistently. But that as-
tronomy is grossly impractical; it would verbally give some of
the stars terrific velocities, and thus (e. g., in order to have
verbal consistency with such velocities) require complete re-
vision of the expression of the properties and _ structures of
atoms—in short would force us to revise our ordinary way of
naming things. Also, unless that anthropocentricism, geo-
centricism, etc., or azy-centricism, go to the ultimate limit
(formally at least) of splitting things down to geometrical
points it will become illogical (because a man, etc., is him-
self variable—and (2) in the last paragraph applies). No
sort of orthodox “centricism’ does that ultimate splitting in
practice; so all are both illogical and inaccurate, except Ejin-
stein’s in pure formality ($66). I. e., such a theory which as-
serts any physical ““constant,’’ uses something finite (a part
of the Many’) as an absolute center (or as an absolute stand-
ard of measure—which is logically the same thing), and
hence is illogical and inaccurate. (As we saw, theories like
Thomson’s electrons, Reynolds’s, Richards’s, Reeve’s, and
Einstein’s agree with that either by explicitly implying that
there are no such constants, or by formally going to the nec-
essary infinile splitting; Ejinstein’s book, $66, seems to be
inclined to overdo the thing by doing both, which, if he so
intends, would be wrong, and a new variety of meaningless-
ness. ) Therefore, this book explicitly uses that prac-
tical anthropocentric start, formally asserts that man varies,
or is approximate and not absolute, and thus logically uses
an absolute no-center; i. e., the universe or the One is the
only center or constant.” Man is so accustomed

100e Jt probably is better to be more explicit on that point:-
Throughout this book I take the everyday general or summed-up
language agreement that the One is ‘‘real’’ (§49g); and that is
eqivalent to no-center, in the sense that the One is everywhere, and
hence my center or standard is everywhere at once—which nsually
is expressed aS no center. Now, that agreement which I use
makes the logic or form of the book easier to follow. It however is
not essential. We can, as just shown again, use an infinite pluralism
as ‘‘real,’’ and in that case the correct thing to do would be to have
each thing that was mentioned be temporariiy the absolute center
and standard of the universe—to have finally an infinity of centers—
or, so to speak, to use anthropocentricism absolutely but witha new
or changed man every time. Further, it was seen (§49) that
valid logic is a dynamic logic that shifts the ‘‘reality’’ of each part
of the Trinity to apply to the part being used momentarily. So it
follows that after a time, when men have learned to use language
with much skill (implying great brain development), a valid descrip-
tion of some length will shift its ‘‘reality’’ from (1) no-centricism, to
(2) infinite-centricism or absolute-anthropocentricism, to (3) an at
present unnamed and practically unrecognized ignoring of centers by
making relationships ‘‘real,’’ or by speaking temporarily in terms of
‘“‘abstractions’’ as if they were the reality. Such a valid description
will shift its ‘centers,’ etc., as the viewpoint shifts—using (say) one
center for a chapter, and then changing:- Thus science would as the
most direct way of talking use infinite-centricism; religion, the
third way mentioned above; philosophy, and religion as we now ordi-
narily use it consistently would nse the no-centricism or first way,
which as stated is the everyday ‘‘reality’’ nowadays, and hence the
most familiar, and so the one this book uses (cf. §39). In short, this
book nses what in time will be found not to bethe best way: in time
the dynamic logic with its varying ‘‘reality’’ of the three Trinity
forms will be ‘expanded’ explicitly to what we might call “dynamic-
thinking’ with a corresponding varying reality of the three forms or
ways of conceiving truth (cf. §39; the idea is as old as our history
but has no definite explicit names:- by proper dynamic-thinking the
subject-matter of religion, science, and philosophy is identical, but
for convenience and full intelligibility of expression the three ways
will be used as just stated). My way in this book of emphasizing
the reality of monotheism or Many-continuity or Many-One is the
conventional, the Occidental way. It seems historically to be a re-
action from the gross materialism into which anthropocentricism al-
ways—even now—tends to fall, and alsoa reaction from the religious
abstractions of the Orient, that always tended to make people good-
for-nothing in practical affairs. So it seems reasonable that we first
get skillin onr hardest way of the three, before trying the still harder
and ultimate way of using all tbree as described (in which event we

—_—

Two XI §100d

to using himself as an exact or absolute center or standard
(without however noticing that the use of a scientific infinite
pluralism makes himself formally or logically be conceived as
coincident with the absolute unit of the Many that he tempo-
rarily mentions; §66) that he often fails to see that he does,
and denies it. Yet itis glaring, in every bit of classic logic
and in all the orthodox dualisms, that man creates God in
man’s image—that man substantially takes himself as a finite
entity, and by ‘‘multiplying’’ himself in size by about a
thousand (which is about as ““high’’ as a barbarian can think)
gets what is actually a formally finite God; _ e. g., Jehovah,
and the God of Aquinas, and the late Kaiser’s Gott. All of
us Occidentals tend however (as mentioned in the footnote)
to think in no-centricism, or with the universe or the One
God as the fina] standard. But we are so much in the bad
habit of using classical or theological logic, and of failing to
shift to an actually absolute infinite pluralism which would
be correct enough (multiplying man by an absolute infinity
to get God is correct; the materialists are our present-day
barbarians who can’t think so ““high,’’ but stop at an exag-
geratedly emphasized finite anthropocentricism), that we are
a bit puzzled by the verbal sound of this no-centricism, or
definite That... X This..., when I state it explicitly. | That
puzzlement is simply the difficulty that onr nervous systems
always have in making a previously vague and indefinite and
dreamy idea into something more precise and useful. _—If in
addition to making that no-centric step definitely in this
bouk, I were to go on and make the last step mentioned in
the footnote, that puzzlement would be possibly too much;
as itis, there will be a number of persons with brains so weak
and soft and flabby that their nervous systems can’t make
the no-center step, which most of us have already made in
practice; I fancy some of those will be so senile that they
will exhibit their weakness hy public protests. But J think
that the majority of Americans are strong enough to make
also the last step of the footnote within a century. When
that is made, the aristocratic exploiters who befuddle stupid
men’s minds will find their field unprofitably narrow.

d. (2) Next, we have seen in general that any whirl
consists of ether in motion, the velocities of which ether
reach a maximum in the difference surface, and decrease (so
far as just one whirl is concerned) as the distance from that
surface increases. (That is Bernoulli’s principle in another
form.) Obviously if we had in the universe a stream of ether
which had a greater velocity than the streams on either side
of it, then as a truism that stream must finally close on itself

will be protected from the grave dangers of the easier ways—in all
‘‘soft-snaps’’ it is correspondingly easy to get into tronble).
As an example of what is stated in this footnote (and the example is
the concrete thing which caused me to add the footnote), the reader
is referred to Jordan’s Introduction. In it, when he talks of science
he uses infinite centricism—inclines towards using infinite pluralism
without however insisting that infinite pluralism is the ‘‘trnth’’ or
the only way. Then he substantially shifts to a use of no-centricism
when he sums up (particularly in summing biology). Jordan
thus is using valid logic in its ultimate ‘expanded’ form—a trick of
skill in using language that probably not a half dozen men have the
emotional strength to achieve, or the intelligence to use consistently
without confusion. But to repeat, that ultimate dynamic form of
speech is too hard to understand for an elementary book like this
(as proof of that, see the remarks about British biologists in §147,
who, perhaps without even knowing what they were up to, have
failed to follow Jordan all the way in that full dynamic form of ex-
pression—although as showa, in bare logic they may be considered
correct). Also, that final way Jordan is using is so hard to stick to
that I doubt whether I could have been successful at it if I had tried
it in this whole book. Asa matter of fact, this very statement of
the ultimate dynamic expression is hard to make clear; what it sums
to is that science, religion, and philosophy are identical in subject
matter, and that the three sorts of ‘centers’ determining their forms
should be shifted as the point of view changes.

§100d XI Two

in three dimensions: so we have as a result of that closing
a whirl. Then, if the velocity of the ether decreases as we
go from the difference surface towards the filiar axis, it fol-
lows that there must formally be ether on that axis at zero
velocity. But clearly, that can be possible only if there is a
part of the ether which is a geometrical point; hence, we
see again that there must be an infinite regress of parts in
the cell, and that no cell, in our Many language, itself has
such zero velocity—which truistically would take infinite en-
ergy to start it going again. Also, as we leave the difference
surface and travel out into the field the velocity decreases so
long as we decrease our perpendicular distance from the fila-
ment surface, down to the limit of velocity at which the ad-
jacent whirls are in fair equilibrium (or until we come to an
analogous balance near the main azis of the whirl), At that
zone, obviously another field, of another filament, would com-
mence (or at the main axis, the opposite part of the field of
the same filament, with increasing velocity), and there would
be a field difference surface.

e. Itistruistic that such a place of fairly balanced equi-
librium could occur inside either the original filament or
field; consequently, there may be secondary whirls inside of
either filament or field——and tertiary whirls inside the fields
or filaments of the secondaries; and fourth order whirls, etc.,
in infinite regress, down through the finite whirls we have
arbitrarily taken as cells, to ultimately point-cells. And in
the same way there could be no ““upper’’ limit of orders of
whirls. If we arbitrarily took a given whirl as being the
ultimate upper limit, it would be a One; its field would then
decrease in velocity towards its field surface, and reach abso-
lute zero at that zone or surface, which would then be the
outer boundary of the universe. But evidently, as that outer
boundary is zero, it differs in no respect from the pseudo ‘‘out-
side’? of the universe. ““Outside’’ is hence absolute zero.

f. It can further be seen, as a truism, that there can be
no actual] upper limit of velocity, regardless of what velocity
we practically use as a prime or standard velocity for split-
ting the universe (i. e., V, is by no means an absolute upper
limit of velocity, but it zs the highest velocity that can occur
except inside our atoms, as will appear). For obviously, at
any place in any order whirl there may be a field surface,
and on account of previous asymmetries the field velocities
on one side of it may increase very rapidly (have a high grad-
ient) to any velocity; we shall see tbat truistically there
must be such high gradients. It is obvious that if that ve-
locity is higher than /,, then the ether structure suitable to
be used to express such velocity must be smaller than ordi-
nary atoms; for clearly, the effective structures or atoms that
we select to give our ordinary light are, considered as whirls,
determined by filament surfaces at V; (XIII). Evidently, if
in a very minute cell, considered as a whirl, the filament sur-
face velocity became infinite, then the formally still smaller
cells that composed that filament surface would become
points or zero, that difference surface would become an exact
geometrical surface, the point cells would then turn in at ex-
actly 90°, and infinite energy would thus be displayed at
each point, as a result of each such birth (and those births
would be infinite in number—or zero, Just as you prefer, be-
canse clearly the whole whirl truistically reduces to a point);
or the energy would be zero, as each point cell was zero.
Obviously that gives the “‘conerete’’ details of the infinite
regress (IV-VI). That is another explicit way to reduce the
universe verbally to an absolute pluralism: obviously such
pluralism is identical except in verbal form to monism.

g. It therefore truistically follows from the last para-
graph that there exist coincident with this universe of ours—
this V; universe——an indefinite number of other universes.

UNIVERSE

106

That is an old idea; those other universes are conventionally
vaguely known as astral planes, heaven, hell, spirit world,
etc. But there is one very important practical] mistake in
the conventional idea of them:- they are obviously truistic-
ally not essentially different or separate from this universe we
ordinarily name and explicitly talk about in our positive
terms, but are merely verbally quantitatively different uni-
verses which have standard basic structures with surface ve-
locities different from V in any degree we arbitrarily care to
take. 1, e., we can name and describe just as many of those
*‘new’’ universes as we like; they all truly exist: but every
one of them is inseparably bound up in our ordinary one,
coincident with it, and if we (say) stub our toe, all those ad-
ditional universes are definitely included in the sensation and
general reaction labeled ““toe stubbed.’’ Hence, it is or-
dinarily a waste of time to be explicit about those others.
Also, as a different form of the same idea, there is
obviously an infinite regress of parts or structures of different
order:- secondary whirls, tertiary whirls, etc. HE. g., our
solar system can be an ether cell in some larger man, as we
saw. But in the same way as just above, that makes no
practical difference to us. _—‘ For if that larger man has (say)
a thought, its effect on us actually exists (perhaps it will
quickly to him smash up our solar sytem—and do it in a few
billions of our years to us), but that effect is included in our
ordinary That... X This..., and we usually need not go formu-
lating different order languages to talk about that effect.
This ad infinitum duplication of universes themselves
obviously corresponds to the ad infinitum duplication of lang-
uages shown in VIII. And we get the same conclusion:-
tbat the average man with his age-long commonsense has
adequately (even if not quite consciously to himself) collected
the whole affair into his everyday point of view.

h. (3) Next, it has been seen that in general there are
pluralistically no perfect whirls. E. g., in par. f, when the
difference surface became a geometrical surface, we lapsed
into mysticism. So it is clear that there may be any (finite)
degree of indefiniteness about a whirl. Any difference of
velocity implies a whirl of some nature. But such a whirl
may not have time to form very far. Only in a space where
there is comparatively steady equilibrium can whirls which
are relatively large for that size space form. (That can be
seen readily by a brief consideration of those spaces and
times; or the various experiments shown hereafter make it
directly obvious.) | Several important points of view of that
inexactness or lack of perfection of whirls are obvious :-

i. Perhaps the most important point of view is that it
means that there are no ‘‘perfect’’ phenomena. I. e., all
phenomena are simply the changes in whirls; and hence no
phenomenon may consistently be pluralistically sharply dis-
tinguished from any other (except in infinite pluralism). That
is identical with §83fe, and I need not repeat further.

J. But precisely the same thing concretely accounts for
what is conventionally called the purpose in the world. Of
course it is ““purpose,’’ in the real meaning of the word; IJ
am simply going to express purpose pluralistically here; us-
ually, it is oratorically used in a monistic, mystie way that
is at least not clear. When I express it consistently plural-
istically also, then I have absolutely explained it. Some of
the conventional figurative ways in which the idea of purpose
is validly pluralistically expressed are:- water seeks its own
level; in an otherwise fairly steady environment tempera-
tures tend to equalize; birds of a feather flock together.
| If at any place there are whirls of the same order in
which the velocities of the difference surfaces are consider-
ably different from each other, then as a truism there are
considerable asymmetries. Those asymmetries would, as a

107

further truism, keep on forming whirls of other orders un-
til the various velocities had become fairly equalized. So
over any space in the universe which is large compared with
the size of bodies of the most usual order in it, there is fairly
steady equilibrium for those bodies. That is equivalent to
the fact observed long ago, that “‘nature makes no leaps,”’
has no catastrophes, or displays fair uniformity. But from
our way of saying and observing that here, at once we see
that bodies of the same general order tend to collect to-
gether, thus forming with more or less definiteness a struct-
ure of a higher order; or, the reverse way of stating the fact
is the easy and more familiar and intelligible negative way :-
whirls of a given order that are in the majority will drive
away or change into their own order (‘‘destroy’’) whirls
which are out of balance with themselves (just as men fight
when they get badly out of balance or in ““disagreement’’).
Thus, certain bodies collect together as the solar system. In
one of those bodies, the earth, there collect secondary bodies,
men, who are of such a great difference in order or of poten-
tial from the earth that they scarcely interfere with it. In
men, certain physiologic cells of the same kind have col-
lected—into ““differentiated’’ organs. In the earth, to a
certain extent atoms and molecules of the same kind have
collected together. Briefly, all of what we commonly call
progress, or what looks to he “‘purpose’’ towards some sys-
tematic or unified end, actually is so; but it is also true that
it is, in more precise and intelligible words, an exhibition of
this truistic or ““mechanical’’ tendency to smooth out asym-
metries among neighboring bodies, up to a certain quantita-
tive point. Now, if all bodies were sufficiently close
to each other quantitatively in what I have here been calling
‘order’ or potential, the majority obviously would steadily
tend to wipe out the others, so that the orthodox increase of
entropy (§80) would be true. But when the quantitative
disparity in ‘order’ or ‘potential’ reaches a certain ratio or
proportion (the theory of which | call ‘harmonic periodicity’ ;
see Index), then whirls of one order do not much interfere
with or destroy those of the different order, for the reason
that, so to speak, they can’t ““get bold of each other’’ (that
refers to a comparatively brief time); e. g., it would be
practically impossible to handle a pin directly or atonce with
a 100-ton crane; and as mentioned above, man and the solar
system do not in brief times directly interfere. (Incident-
ally, in agreement with that practical point, in other places
in the book I use the phrase ‘order of structure,’ etc., to
mean such considerable quantitative difference. ) Con-
sequently, there is eternally a two-fold aspect, or mechanical
reaction, in the universe, showing it to be truistically an ab-
solutely automatic (i. e., perfect) machine:- (1) bodies of
the same order or ‘‘sort’’ tend to collect, to “‘fit’’ together,
to come together (and in doing so to smooth out, *“destroy,’’
each other’s inevitable slight variations—just as men are
**well bred’’) in a ““purposive,’’ suitable way, ‘appropriate
to some end’’ (as we saw in §86d); (2) onthe contrary, the
precisely similar efforts of bodies of a slightly different order
from those just mentioned, to do similar things for themselves
tend to destroy both themselves and also the first collection
when the two sets are more or less neighbors, and the result
is that the two sets of bodies are to some degree driven apart
spacially, the remainder of the reaction being that the part
of the less energetic set which doesn’t get away is destroyed
—i. e., changed—into whirls of considerably different order,
so that the resulting two sets can stay together without much
interference for a long time (i. e., they are ‘separated’ tem-
porally instead of spacially—an important mathematica] point
quite overlooked by Clausius, but which is implied by Ein-
stein). Thus, a difference of potential is built up at the

UNIVERSE

Two X1 §100m

same time that potential is smoothed out—and the process is
eternally reversible. | The process is very easily seen in the
history of men (it applies to all natural structures) in the so-
called rise and fall of nations; a very superficial knowledge
of these principles shows that there is no need of a nation’s
‘“falling,’’ as a very mediumly intelligent application of the
principles wil] reverse the direction at any stage-—givena
fairly steady climate. Truistically, the sum total of
that oscillating effect is zero—or infinity, if we speak *“opti-
mistically.”’ But because human beings started their lang-
uage anthropocentrically, anything of a different order that
tends to break up humans (to change their supreme This,
which is themselves) they call evil, thus asserting that there
is no purpose; and then they worry over the “‘problem’’ of
Good (or Purpose) and Evil which is thus started.
This paragraph is the general concrete or physical solution
(1) of that problem of purpose, (2) of all geological segrega-
tion, (3) of the stability of the solar system or any other
natural structure, and at the same time (4) expresses the
reasons for all “‘chemical reactions’’ (it being the underlying
principles of what is technically known as Gibbs’s phase law),
and (5) gives the reasons for biologic “‘trophisms’’ (XVI).
The paragraph also (6) directly implies the general theory or
reasons for the periodic table—is the concrete or That... <
This... expression of harmonic periodicity. Also, it (7) di-
rectly implies the total theory and methods (see §§140-1) of
how to get available energy out of any collection of whirls
(or put it in; it always is put in first somehow; but truistic-
ally 2f we could use the velocity of an atom down to the zero
velocity on the filiar axis, there would be taken out of that atom
infinite energy; however, it also truistically would take infin-
ite time to get that much out). Necessary details of such
problems are shown later by direct experiment. Volumes
of such details are omitted. A direct extension of this para-
graph is given by §101f.

k. The last point of view which we have to consider of
the fact that whirls are of all degrees of perfection (see par.
h) is that just as the multitude of resulting quantitative de-
tails is difficult to handle mathematically, so it is difficult to
see experimentally all the numerous details and describe
them ‘verbally.’ But it can be done experimentally and
verbally better (at first), as I propose to do it in this Part,
than it can be done mathematically (in the way indicated in
IX with the measuring member). E. g., the phenomenon
of heatis a considerably confused secondary whir] formation,
which occurs whenever any appreciable asymmetry of whirls
of the same order occurs.

]. Itis therefore a direct truism that it is not possible to
describe any experimental whirls accurately. | We can not
even observe them definitely in much detail, compared with
the infinite detail] they exhibit. We shall become aware of
that clearly when in the next section we begin with the di-
rect experimental proof of the mechanics of whirls. But it
is better to be thus admittedly quantitatively inaccurate con-
cerning things as they actually are, than it is to talk in the
old dualism about frictionless bodies, perfect gases, or con-
stant anything, when no such things exist. Many great art-
ists in various lines have been praiseworthily notable for
giving a sense of ‘mystery’? by their productions. That
sort of mystery is good, as it is the truth, being simply their
intelligible expression of the fact that quantitative details go
on infinitely so that all are not perceptibly expressed. There
is no proper reason why science, particularly mechanics and
physics, should not be more clearly truthful, and ““human,”’
and beautiful, and useful than the work of those artists.

m. (4) The last general thing which we saw about
whirls is that a whirl completely fills the requirements of all

§100m XI Two

machines (§86f), and is a concrete model of Newton’s laws.
(A) For first, each whirl consists of at least two react-
ing parts:- the filament, or Zhis...; and the field, or
That.... | We may note that the reaction between a given
cell in the field and a given cell in tbe filament is identical]
in principle with a lever, of which intervening cells form the
arms (§98b), and the difference surface the fulcrum (specific-
ally, it is a bell-crank lever; see Fig. 98q). That fulcrum is
truistically not a point—which agrees with fact about an or-
dinary actual lever. Also, it may be observed that the ex-
periment made with the cog wheels (S98b) to show the
nature of cohesion, very directly shows that cells are in prin-
ciple levers. And it can be noted from §98x that whirls are
mechanically equivalent to inclined planes. And if we con-
sider the single line of motion of a cell (§98m), it is obvious
that a whirl may be considered a pulley (the difference sur-
face is the pulley wheel). All those fundamental conven-
tional machines are obviously merely forms of levers, as has
been orthodoxly recognized for years. And it is clear thata
whirl includes them all. (B) Further, each whirl in-
cludes (even if only vaguely and implicitly inside the cells)
the dots of the formally consistent That... This.... There
may be as many ‘explicit’ or concrete dots as we like, in the
form of secondary, tertiary, etc., whirls, on “‘down’’ to the
absolute limiting One zero point-cel]l. As a truism of that
characteristic of cells as a model, we saw that our machine
exhibits al] the phenomena of growth and purpose, just as a
*“person’’ does—that the so-called machine, when it is really
a valid or workable machine, has those personal or ““human’’
characteristics. | Now, the truth of the matter is that any
actual or experimental /ever, properly and consistently con-
sidered (cf. §47), will promptly extend itself to include the
total universe as a vast inseparable system of levers, any one
of which formally gives “birth’ in either direction to infra-
levers and super-levers. But we are not accustomed to
thinking of levers that way; emotionally we are myth-ridden
by the classic logic perfect lever with rigid line-arms and ab-
solutely constant point fulcrum. Such myths are excellent
perhaps as preliminary verbal steps for untrained observers;
but certainly nobody should “‘believe’’ such abstractions.

n. It is so obvious that a whir] exhibits the solution of
the One and Many, as do Newton’s laws, that no summary
statement seems to be needed of how it does. So we are
ready to look at some whirls experimentally, and thus syn-
thesize all the above rather lengthy talk into a single com-
prehended working idea of a Many part.

§101. a. The remainder of this Part Two will be chiefly
devoted to observing actual whirls, asa means of understand-
ing and applying the foregoing concrete way of naming
That...’s and This...’s. | Probably the simplest and easiest
whirls to make and observe are those formed by dropping
soapy water off the side of one’s hand into a fairly large basin
of water. If the reader will do that occasionally when he
washes his hands, then probably without much expenditure
of time and effort he can see directly for himself the truth of
all the foregoing truistic mechanics.

b. Whirls which travel slowly are the best sort for see-
ing the important reactions—and even then whirls often
split into secondary whirls so rapidly that to see them it is
necessary to observe attentively. So far as I have observed,
any ordinary variety of castile soap will make a solution with
water of the proper viscousness or cohesiveness to produce
fairly slow whirls. I have tried numbers of other ordinary
toilet and kitchen soaps, and all produced whirls that tray-
eled faster—usnally reacting too fast to see much detail. If
the basin holds considerable water there is of course more
room for the whirls to react in. And it is well to have the

UNIVERSE

108

water fairly steady—at first, anyway. Afterwards an indefi-
nite variety of disturbances may be given the water, there
being no end to the variety of whirls and part-formed whirls
which may thus be visibly made. _ Also, if the experiment-
er’s hands are rather dirty before making these whirls the
whirls will be more easily visible. Similar whirls can
by made with numerous visible liquid solutions, using appa-
ratus of varying degrees of elaborateness, starting with fount-
ain pen fillers and going beyond million dollar laboratories.
I mentioned the most easily applied way, which I chiefly
used for about two years in order to formulate the general
mechanics I have just given.

c. Ifthe hand be held so that a thick soapy drop (with
no appreciable bubbles included) will fall from the flat or
outside edge of the hand held down (so that the drop itself
will not be rotating inside itself very much), for a distance of
three to six inches to the surface of the water, then the drop
enters the water with a velocity sufficiently greater than the
then surrounding water to form a well-defined whirl which
slowly moves downward, with its main axis about vertical, so
that from above we see the filament asa ring. A consider-
able part of the drop of soapy water is at first in a confused
looking field about the filament; but by the mechanics we
have secn, that field spreads or extends out until it becomes
rather imperceptible and we see chiefly the filament, with a
perceptibly indefinite surface.

d. Ifthe whirl forms in a condition of unusually steady
equilibrium it will look from the side, in cross-section, like
the top figure in Fig. 98n; the rotation of the filament and
field wonld be the same as shown by the arrows in that fig-
ure, and it would therefore travel downward in practically
still water. Usually, however, an experimental whirl is soon
noticeably asymmetrical. A bulge will begin to grow at
some place on the outer side of the filament (cf. Fig. 98w;
obviously the field inside the ring is held steady by the ring,
and it in turn steadies that ring or filament so that ordinarily
a bulge does not grow on the inner side of the ring—towards
the hole in the doughnut). That bulge will then break out
or away as a secondary whirl (Fig. 98w)—with its filament
appearing edge on to the experimenter from above. It will
comparatively rapidly travel out a little way perpendicularly
to the main axis and to the original surface of the filament
where it formed, and slowly tilt over and as a result start
downward. Sometimes, if the primary whirl has bounced
up from the bottom of the basin before a secondary is born,
the secondary will turn upwards. Also, if the whole primary
whirl has been almost symmetrical, and has traveled down
slowly, it develops more than one bulge on its filament;
then it may break up apparently wholly into two or more
secondaries at roughly the same time. I have seen a whirl
break into as high as probably fifteen to twenty secondaries;
such very smal] secondaries react so fast that it is hard to
observe them. Also, it is occasionally possible to observe a
secondary give off a secondary of its own (a tertiary), and
two or three times I think I have seen a fourth generation.

e. Another important phenomenon to be observed is
that when a secondary breaks out of a filament it retains
(often long enough to be easily seen) a distinctly visible film
of soapy water connection with the filament, which film is
like the sides of a barrel, except that it bulges in all around
ee out ne ee a evans ‘surface’ or zone of
rim of that tubular ate ee ee parca

surface, and the other rim merges into
eee! mene Sometimes that connection will per-
| y stretch out to comparatively great distances, becom-
ing attenuated to the apparent thickness of a thread.
that connection between the primary and secondary

Now,
whirls

109

consists of actual water ‘cells,’ strung out in identically the
same sort of spiral or helical nearly right-angle turn described
and pictured in §98q. Here
we have a number of such
paths in a summed up con-
dition, and made of visible
globules or cells of soapy
water, so that we can see
the sum. The phenomenon
(by §981) would obviously
be no different if the whirls
were ether instead of water.
It is indicated in Fig. 10le
that those spiral] paths, making about a 90° turn, would sum
into such a surface. If a whirl be made of smoke in air, it
usually on breaking up leaves considerable of such visible
connecting surfaces or summed spiral paths.

f. Those paths would (as shown in §98t) finally at any
exact instant be unified into just one path with infinite veloci-
ty. But because we are using actually finite bodies, in finite
time, we get a visible sum of paths. Hence, we can directly
from those experimental whirls now observe what in the dis-
eussion of ““purpose’’ (§100}) we called ‘birds of a feather
flocking together,’ and give it a more intelligible name. We
note that with a certain lack of equilibrium a bulge grows or
accumulates on the filament, instead of there being a more or
less instantaneous correction of it by the giving off of say one
water cell. That is because water as water (i. e., as a Many
—and not mystically or in the “‘pure’’ abstraction or meta-
physics sometimes mistaken for science) is truistically not
perfectly homogeneous (has a lot of unequal, smaller, asym-
metrical structures in infinite regress, even apart from the
soap, etc., in these experimental whirls; that lack of perfect
homogeneity applies in every respect; e. g., chemically
“‘pure’’? water is not ‘perfect’? HzO, but contains variable
molecules); or, in general, there is no exact science. So
there is truistically a certain amount of accumulation of un-
balance; the equilibrium begins to be restored by movement
of the very small structures which are imperceptible to us,
and it takes time to show an effect in the larger ones—to
show the bulge. We can take it simply that ‘‘water’’ struct-
ures are of finite size, and like bricks in a wall require a
finite accumulation of energy to dislodge them. Then, when
that unbalance or potential accumulates enough, the secondary
whirl is born. It seems to us ° fitting’’ that it should be
born; for a perceptible length of time we can notice that the
filament, so to speak, intended or purposed to give birth to the
secondary. No dualistic science—nothing in the classical
logic—will with verbal consistency permit any such phenom-
enon to happen: such science says it is logically impossible,
and yet it does happen before our eyes. For by classic logic
effect must follow cause instantaneously in the sense that any
force at once produces motion. Well; the actual pluralistic
fact is that never does any force which we say we *“measure’’
instantly start its motion or produce its effect: always in
science—in consistent positive language. which is not formally
mystic or religious expression—there is a lag in time. The
orthodox way of assuming and asserting that a reaction is
prompt on action is merely a One form of speech—true as a
One or zero or infinity; for the reaction does begin instan-
taneously on the zero parts at tbe end of the infinite regress.
Classic logic and dualism having thus omitted positive state-
ment of that time lag which is pluralistically usually glar-
ingly perceptible especially in biological phenomena, and
having further formally or logically denied the possibility of
any such thing, naturally commonsense persons observed the
existence of lag——naming it, in general, purpose. Then,

Fig. 101e.

UNIVERSE

Two XI §10]hb

truistically ‘‘purpose’’ could not conventionally be explained
as it had been “‘logically’’ denied. That time lag
implies an accumulation of energy or motion which then ob-
viously as a truisin (and also by direct observation) goes too
fur—-overruns, so to speak,—-and then bounces back some.
Hence, including that second and completing result (that
‘bounce’ is of course in infinite regress :—all this is obviously
merely a detailing in physical terms of the theory of incom-
mensurability, and the incommensurability is not ‘finished’
by one bounce or any finite number), we call this phenome-
non of an accumulation or summing of results by various
conventional names, depending on the way we look at it:-
purpose or intention, will (volition), lag (with its numerous
technical synouyms:- hysteresis, viscosity, elasticity in some
senses, latent heat, potential energy, ete.), overrunning,
rhythm, vibration (as of an ether cell—and our use of those
last two terms will thus have a more extended meaning than
is conventional), ete. Generally I shall use for this total
aspect of that summing up of effects (which is a deriving of
That... by beginning, so to speak, with the last dot and
building up the That... by going backwards), due truistically
to the finite size of parts, the names overrunning, rhythm, or
vibration. | Obviously, rhythm is a universal property of the
Many. The orbit of the earth is a rhythm (“music of the
spheres’’—though ‘‘music’’ implies a perceptibly sustained
and-or organized rhythm, which involves the definite addition
of the principles of harmonic periodicity to conventional
rhythm). All vibration is explicitly rhythmic; a pendulum
is rhythmic. Even “‘free verse’ is rhythmic—but percept-
ibly so only after a painful effort to perceive. But there is
no perfect rhythm—no exact cycles short of the total uni-
verse. So there is no perfect music short of the One.

g. It may be directly observed, and consistently ex-
pressed as Bernoulli’s theorem, that the filament throws off a
secondary when it loses velocity or energy, or when the field
relatively gains velocity or energy, so that the field has loc-
ally a relative asymmetry—i. e., locally its velocity tends to
become greater than the maximum velocity which is or de-
termines the difference surface, and hence truistically that
surface has to change in some way. Or, it could be said that
the inner field (the ‘hole’ in the doughnut) got energetic
locally, thus pushed against the filament in some spot, and
forced out a secondary on its other side, precisely analogously
to a whirl gun (§102b). There are a number of direct ways
of stating the actions and reactions of that phenomenon.
lt is then obvious that precisely the reverse can oc-
cur:- that the field loses considerable energy relative to a
place on the filament, and gives birth to a secondary into it.
We see that experimentally more definitely in §102d.

h. It is also obvious that it is theoretically possible for
such secondary whirl formation to take place in either direc-
tion across the field difference surface with respect to two
primary whirls, when there is considerable local asymmetry.
I have never directly seen that occur with experimentally
made whirls; but it is probable, e. g., that most ordinary
electrons (they are indirectly observed) are such field surface
secondaries (XIV). However, it is also clear that when two
whirls which have joining fields are rather free to move (as is
the case with the limited number of whirls which can be made
somewhat simultaneously in the neighborhood of each other
by the soapy water method), then an asymmetry of the two
whirls is more likely to distribute itself rather evenly over
the whole field surfaces (ef. history of solar system in XI1),
so that the two whirls repel or attract each other as a whole
(as largely happens in electricity; XIV)—-and in especially
free conditions will alternately repel and attract in percept-
ible long-continued rhythm, the two alternately threading

§10lh XI Two

through each other (§102b). If there is perceptible only a
‘*repulsion,’’ then truistically the two repelling whirls sepa-
rate spacially, but in so doing would approach towards or be
*‘attracted’’? by other whirls; i. e., as an obvious truism

66 * 93 . €¢é ‘ bP
there can not be repulsion’’ without equal attraction
elsewhere, and vice versa.

i. If two whirls are attracted together in ways which do
not start too much rhythmic change, the ‘direction of birth’
reverses, and the two join together into one whirl having one
filament and one field. This larger whirl is of a ““higher
order,’’ which we might call the first super-whirl. Itis very
difficult to form two soapy water whirls nearly enough simul-
taneously to join thus (i. e., the two drops have to hit the
water almost exactly at the same time at a Jittle distance
apart, as otherwise there will be so much relative asymmetry
between the two that they will not join—just as two rather
different sorts of animals wil] not breed together). But such
unions are readily produced in other ways (§102ef). This
joining of whirls into superwhirls is a very common phenom-
enon, being simply the quantitative obverse of secondary
whirl formation; in one side of the complete cycle the po-
tential “‘increases,’’ and in the other side the potential cor-
respondingly ‘“decreases’’—which is which depending solely
on point of view (§99b). ——E. g., the combination of ether
cells into a definite whirl is the most general example of
joining of whirls; in that case the degree of union is slight,
just as it is in (say) the joining of two or more atomic whirls
into a molecule, or in the bunching of molecules into a
‘‘higher’’ sort of molecule, such as a chemical] “*chain’’ or
‘“‘ying’’ is sometimes. It should be noticed that when
the degree of union is practically complete, as when two whirls
unite to form one whir] without substantial surviving traces
(asymmetries) of either, that larger whirl is conventionally
called a different order; but there is no essential difference.
By the theory of incommensurables there can be no perfect
union, and hence the question of order of whirls depends
truistically on the quantitative degree of union (cf. §100j)—
and that is in infinite regress. And that joining of
whirls will be shown to be equivalent in principle to the join-
ing together of two one-ce}]] organisms, or to ordinary fertili-
zation in two germ-cells (XVI). A biologic cell is a whirl
(just as the earth is), and is in principle equivalent to our
ether cell, merely varying in Z and T (XII, XVI).

j. That quantitative joining together of two whirls ex-
perimentally, or the reverse secondary whir) formation, tru-
istically depends upon the szzge of the whirls compared with
the size (energy) of the asymmetry. E. g., an asymmetry
that would break a smoke ring into pieces too small to see
well would be imperceptibly taken up by the solar whirl as
a whole; or, reversing, an asymmetry that would affect the
solar system perceptibly would be so comparatively huge
that a smoke ring would pass through it mostly unchanged,
in a short time (§100}). Thus there is truistically a rhythm,
or harmonic proportioning of sizes (at a given time), due to (or
which fundamentally is) the overrunning or accumulation of
energy—-and due fundamentally to the finite size of ether
cells, which in turn truistically rests on the arbitrary split-
ting of things by /;. Or, whirls which could form and sur-
vive in any given environment would occur in certain steps’
in size, with a very definite proportionality; i. e., this is the
I aspect of the 7 aspect that was called lag in par. f. That
is the statement of the principle of the periodic table (Appendix
B). There is nothing esoteric or hard to understand about
it. It is precisely the same principle as this:- that (say) a
woman can not have a continuous or ‘fluid’ stream of child-
ren, but has to have them in stepladder order, with all sorts
of variations inside certain probable limits, including possible

UNIVERSE

110

quintuplets (say), which however are never exactly the same.
The principle of harmonic proportions is the same as the gen-
eral statement in par. f (except that harmonic proportions
emphasizes L; or figuratively asserts concrete music—which
of course lasts for a while, or includes 7); or it is the same
as the fact that “‘statie’’ friction is for given substances a
fairly fixed proportion greater than ‘“‘dynamic’’ friction, but
varies with substances; or that a given vessel may be over-
filled with a given fluid in certain roughly definite propor-
tions. In no case however can there be exactness; e. g.,
there is perceptibly no exact weight of the Pb atom, but
what is called Pb are atoms which are in fair proportional
equilibrium with other whirls in the environment and hence
group themselves comparatively closely around some certain
average weight, but exhibit some decided variations in even
as general a property as weight where the past histories (en-
vironments) of the various Pb atoms have been somewhat
different. The same principle of harmonic proportion is very
apparent in biology; those different **elements’’ there are
named “‘species,’’ etc., and individuals of them vary percept-
ibly from each other, but group themselves around an *“ay-
erage.” The definite measuring-discussion of that
harmonic proportion—i. e., the explicit expansion of the
scientific theory of measurement—is scarcely begun in the
present day, as was noticed in IX; consequently, although
the principle is simple, and recognized in various forms by
nearly everybody, the expression of itis unfamiliar and hence
gives an emotional feeling of puzzlement. Kelvin was right
in saying that measurement was important in science (§2);
but he did not do more than begin to say what “‘measure-
ment’’ is—he just took it for granted that anybody with
commonsense knew; and I am saying here that such is the
case, but that that knowledge is exceedingly vague and is
not definitely expressed. I shall give various That... X This...
discussions of the principle hereafter. But that discussion
also is rather nove] verbally, and will lead us to things that
although really simple seem hard at first because the details
have not been very definitely observed by us. I don’t know
the details myself—merely the beginnings of them. For in-
stance, it is obvious from this paragraph that theoretically in
a chemical compound, because the “‘elements’’ are fairly
stable in their proportional sizes or energy-contents, the dif-
ferent element atoms would notin a great degree join together
into a superwhirl (obviously, if they did a new ‘‘element’’
would result—and under suitable conditions it is probable that
such ““new’’ elements do result; 8118); but there would at
least be always a variable and slight degree of union into larger
structures or compounds (or biologic cells, organs, etc.) that
are harmonically or spacially-proportionally fairly in symme-
try. So in comparatively steady conditions we would have a
*‘ecompound’’ that is a distribution or structure of ‘‘element-
ary atoms’’ in a‘ ‘space Jattice’’ in crystals, directly observed
with perhaps most thoroughness by the Braggs with X-rays,
and which is being worked on symbolically from a dynamic
point of view by Langmuir (ef. also Erwin’s “‘wheels’’). So
it becomes obvious that this general, seemingly abstract,
theory is the foundation for getting definitely at atomic phe-
nomona, structure, and measurement—implies the principles
of solids, liquids, and gases. Some few of the facts about
all that, and expansion of those principles into applicable de-
tails, are given below in suitable places. Most of them that
are known to the experts I do not know; and comparatively
only a few such facts are known to the experts. But it has
appeared that such ignorance is quantitative—not essential.

k. The fina] general sort of phenomena which whirls
display, and which may be directly observed in these ex peri-
mental whirls, is the general elastic reaction, or various sorts

lll UNIVERSE

of vibration of the whirl. Primarily it is of course easily ob-
served that there is no fixed or constant difference surface—
the filament surface is visibly variable. That is the general
principle of elasticity:- single cells have an infinite regress
of parts, and hence no surface exactness can be shown any-
where. AJ] phenomena are of course truistically ultimately
such elasticity——it is simply another name for motion. But
when we consider a whole whirl as for a time remaining
formally a definite structure, then the whole whirl visibly
varies, or is elastic: the filament moves back and forth, re-
maining ‘the filament’ (for marked and systematic experi-
mental evidence of that, see §102). Inaccurately and
briefly (it is a quantitative problem I have not worked out—
for general implications of the probable truth of the guess to
be given, see XIII), ordinary light is the wave motion from
vibrations or rhythmic processes in atoms; X-rays are the
waves from the rhythmic processes of secondaries in atoms
(from ‘electrons’ inside atoms); and electricity is a collection
of many atoms in a large or super-whirl or -whirls, so that
electric waves come from the vibrations of the large fields or
filaments of such whirls. Now, clearly the same harmonic
periodicity of size would hold between the dimensions of such
waves, as held with respect to the orders of whirls (taking
order here in its full formal meaning of §100j). So in our
ordinary average environment there would not be any persist-
ent or stable and hence readily detectible waves between
wireless waves and light waves; then there would be a simi-
lar rough gap between light waves and X-ray waves, just as
there is a gap (including a difference also in properties) be-
tween C (atomic weight roughly 12) and N (14), or between
an ape anda man. There is of course truistically possible
(using the full meaning of order) a continuous gamut of waves,
from those approaching the limit of infinite Jength that are
the vibrations of the ultimate whirl which is the universe,
down to those approaching zero length. But in a particular
environment such as (say) ours, by that theory of harmonic
periodicity there are those three ‘‘element’’ waves (each sort
has considerable natural variation about its ‘‘average’’; e. g.,
the different “‘colors’’). By changing the environment suf-
ficiently and for a long enough time we could produce any
length of wave just as it is possible theoretically to produce
any sort of chemica] element of any weight, or as it is pos-
sible to change an ape into a man or vice versa (with exough
knowledge we could take any given ape to pieces, and change
the pieces and put them together as a man: it is a quantita-
tive task—see XV1,—and in principle every quantitative task is
possible, given enough L and 7). This paragraph is
theoretically consistent. Quantitatively there is not a suffic-
ient amount of direct experimental] proof, as this particular
application of obviously true principles is somewhat novel.
Hence, I am perforce guessing at quantities, and quite likely
I am badly inaccurate in some guesses; e. g., there nearly
certainly are ‘organic’ waves normally existent, which consti-
tute an ‘element wave’ between electric or wireless waves
and light. But there are no positive measures and conven-
tional recognition of any such waves. Possibly the smallest
size electric waves (J do not know how short the experi-
menters have now got such waves: perhaps to 0. Imm) will
be finally shown to be near the size of waves that cause what
is named telepathy, the ‘“‘light’’ in a person’s eyes, **per-
sonal magnetism,’ etc.; but it is rash to guess at such wave
lengths. However, even if there are no such organic waves
of an ‘element’ length of their own (and with absolute cer-
tainty, the brain and al] sorts of organic cells will give off
some length of wave; §146h), they are obviously nothing
new. For light waves (say) truistically imply the existence
of al] sizes of waves. Also, as light waves may be

Two XI §102b

said to be themselves actual whirls (§8124-5, 130), then any
sort of wave may be considered explicitly a structure, or ex-
plicitly matter, and so they definitely show al] the phenom-
ena possible to any sort of ““matter’’—including *“spirit’’ or
‘‘mind’’ (see Part Three). So theoretically there is no diffi-
culty whatever in obtaining thoroughly consistent, intellig-
ible, and so-called ‘“‘conerete’’ explanation of al] the table
rappings, levitations, automatic messages and writings, etc.,
produced by “‘mediums’’ for the psychic researchers. _Per-
sonally, I never observed any such phenomena except some
I could see wasa fraud (I have myself experienced some very
inaccurate and uncontrollable telepathy, which is the dzrect
form of most such phenomena that isn’t fraudulent); but I
believe that Carrington, Hyslop, and Flourney, e. g., have
seen some such organic phenomena—mixed perhaps with
considerable frand which they have mistakenly thought genu-
ine. (The difficulty with observing such phenomena is that
most mediums have more than a touch of hysteria, and will
deceive even themselves in their efforts to attract attention
to themselves; hysterics frequently foo] experienced physicians
who are on their guard against just such a thing, with re-
spect to commonplace doings: see Weir Mitchell’s little
book on hysterics, which gives some of the almost unbeliev-
able deceptions practiced by them, and furnishes proof of
this sentence. So they easily deceive scientists, who are not
accustomed to dealing with liars; also, except after consid-
erable dealing with hysteria, recognizing it as such and
guarding against it, hysteria is temporarily very “‘catching’’).
However, although there are such “‘psychic’’ phenom-
ena, genuine and easily explained, that by no means proves
the existence of a “‘spirit world’’ or ‘‘spirits’’; it actually
disproves the existence of any such, as we implicitly see in
88152, 144, and elsewhere (Index, ““Personality,’? ‘“Im-
mortality’’). | The truth is, as is truistic with the theory of
this paragraph, that we have thus far in the existence of the
race perceived merely a few spacially isolated spots on the
unending gamut (or spectrum) of waves and-or molar “‘ele-
ments’’ (both are the same, as just seen). Not only have
we failed to observe the vast majority of things that exist,
but we have not formulated any very explicit statement of
the existence of the vast majority of things. In a universal
sense we are as narrow or provincia] as many New Yorkers
are in a mundane sense. Yet in spite of that limitation of
vision, with which we have formerly been rather content, we
shall never experience or observe anything with which we
are not already thoroughly familiar in principle—anything
which is not in general exhibited by a whirl.

8102. a. Practically all of those general phenomena of
whirls can, as has been stated, be observed directly from the
slow-moving soapy whirls. | Such are needed for direct ob-
servation of many of the reactions. But well-formed whirls
may be experimentally made in many ways, and in this sec-
tion I shal] mention some others which serve to verify details
which are perhaps not clearly visible from the soapy whirls.
Any relative change of velocity ina Many medium forms or
starts forming a whirl or whirls; if the medium is compara-
tively fluid and conditions are fairly steady a perceptibly
complete whirl will be formed.

b. Some smokers can make rather symmetrical smoke
whirls. | Volcanoes occasionally make them, as do locomo-
tives. Smoke whirls may be made readily by using some
sort of closed box having a hole of some sort in one side and
one or more sides relatively flexible or elastic. (Put two or
more holes fairly close together in order to make two or more
whirls at approximately the same time.) If the box is filled
with a visible fluid (e. g., smoke) and placed in a fluid medi-
um of about the same, or greater, density (e. g., in air) a

§10%¢b XI Two

sufficiently hard rap on a flexible side will force some fluid out
through the hole, which fluid will form a visible, rather sym-
metrical whirl. Such a box is usually called a whirl gun.
By varying the factors involved (sizes and shapes of holes,
location of holes, elasticity of diaphragm, rap, densities and
viscosities of fluids, ete.), indefinite variation in the whirls
may be obtained. If the hole is not round, and conditions
are otherwise fairly balanced, the filament vibrates markedly
—substantially in the plane of the filiar axis. Also, as a
well known experiment, if one whirl is made directly after
another one, the leading whirl will often expand the diame-
ter of its filiar axis (start what we might call a vibration as a
whole), and attract the following one, which will contract its
filiar diameter and thread through that increased hole in the
first, and get ahead. Then, the new leader expands, the
other finishes its whole vibration by contracting, etc., and
the threading through is repeated—and so on, until the
whirls wear out or hit something. That is equivalent to the
rhythm of pendulum action.

ce. An excellent experimenta) discussion of whirls is
given by Northrup (“An Experimental Study of Vortex Mo-
tion in Liquids,’’ “‘Jour. Franklin Inst.,’’ 1911; reprinted
““Se. Am. Supp.,’’ Sept. 28, Oct. 5, 12, 19, 1912). He
made whirls of colored water and colored kerosine. He used
a gun; and as the whirls moved rapidly, he photographed
them. [| shall give such description of his whirls as is needed
to supplement what can readily be seen with the soapy
whirls. That will be but a smal] part of his article, and the
reader who desires further details and some conventional
analysis of vortex motion, can profitably read his article.

d. Northrup does not notice any secondary whirl forma-
tion. It is obvious that with his rapidly moving, very sym-
metrical whirls the fields would constantly be losing energy
rapidly in a way that theoretically would make them give off
secondaries into the filaments ($101g), and because of the
well-balanced conditions such secondaries would tend to be
small. Also, as the primary field in Northrup’s whirls con-
tained more or Jess of a fluid in which were chemicals that
destroyed the coloring of the filament fluid when the two
were mixed, it follows that as soon as a field secondary was
projected into the filament a number of reactions are possible
which would result in a perceptibly visible uneven distribu-
tion of coloring in the filament; which reaction would happen
is a quantitative matter not determinable from the data giv-
en. Northrup repeatedly noted such a result, and it appears
clearly in a number of his photographs as a collection of
darker colored little roundish objects all along the filiar axis
of the filament. Northrup couldn’t account for them—said
they might be dirt.

e. Northrup (in his photograph marked View D) shows
two whirls made approximately at the same time and travel-
ing side by side. Each whirl shows a field confirming our
Fig. 98n; but on account of the rapid motion of the whirls
there is some perceptible trailing of the fields (cf. §101e).
One of these whirls looks precisely like the picture of an av-
erage comet (we shall see that comets are whirls; §120).
The two whirls, by the usual Bernoulli’s principle, have a
sideways attraction for each other—shown by their tilting
their main axes and approaching towards each other.

f. He pictures the same two whirls actually Joining to-
gether to form one whirl (his View F). Later pictures given
of the new whirl show its vibration in three dimensions;
i. e., its filament bends very considerably backwards and
forwards and in and out in rapid succession. The
mechanics of those reactions can be got by applying Bernoul-
li’s principle: or see Northrup’s article. Those details are
not explicitly needed by the general reader.

UNIVERSE

112

g. Northrup shows how whirls bounce off surfaces, pro-
ducing marked vibrations, with the following phenomena :-
They are reflected from surfaces just as light is reflected.
They will break up diffusely (not visibly as secondaries) if
the collisions are too violent. They will push aside relatively
light obstacles. If the obstacle is relatively small and too
firmly fixed to be pushed ont of the way, the whirl will en-
gulf it and travel right on around and past it without being
broken up as a whole: analogous reactions happen (XIV,
XIII) when electricity, light, electrons, etc., go through or
pass over atoms or any structure of different order without
being changed in whole structure. All those reactions
may be followed in detail by applying the mechanics above.
We see them in direct detail in various phenomena below.

bh. Kerosine is less dense than water (it will float).
Northrup shows that a water whirl, on passing into a layer of
kerosine floating on the water, quickly drops the water out
of itself, and forms itself of kerosine. That oil whirl may
then be deflected back into the water, and will travel in it
still made of oil. That is direct proof of the law that mass
varies with velocity and-or Bernoulli’s theorem. Even more
definite proof is obtainable:- For as the oil whirl wears out
in water, drops of oil visibly segregate in the filament, be-
coming visibly analogous to the ether cells | have described,
and travel around in the filament, outlining it, apparently
in direct violation of so-called centrifugal force.

§103. a. As another summary of the mechanics of this
chapter I shall give a rough statement of the mechanics of
gravity. (An ultimately precise statement of the mechanics
of gravity is formally given in §134j.) In Fig. 103a let
S be a collection of ether
whirls which is the sun, and
E a collection which is the

) — = > — ) earth. Then, speaking
? —_--—> sy ot ‘ :

ee ee — roughly, the relative motion

E of the earth about the sun

Fig. 108a. is equivalent to a flow of

ether between them, if we
consider them fixed. Or, the result is the same as if there
were a pipe, represented by the dotted lines, with the earth
and sun contracting the flow of ether as shown. Hence,
by the mechanics of this chapter there would be a lower
pressure of the ether fluid against E and S in the space be-
tween them. _As the ether is indefinitely extensive, and the
dotted lines of the pipe are merely formal surfaces with equal
pressure on each side, then that less pressure between S and
E is equivalent to attraction. That attraction is gravity.

b. That is the total of conventional gravity. For actual
gravity we have to be somewhat more precise, and not stop
thus with E and § tacitly rigid One bodies, and with the
explanation concealing a considerable collection of zeros and
infinities. In short, ] have tacitly expressed That... < This...
by SXE (without dots); to be consistent, and reasonably
accurate, we need to include dots. But when we do, gravity
is no longer separable from other phenomena ($134)).

ce. That inclusion of dots is accomplished by definitely
considering the actual fact, thatif E and S were (1) regarded
as simply two cells they would still in that elementary form
be elastic, so that the difference of pressure at the contrac-
tion would modify their size and bence in infinite regress
modify the resulting contraction and hence the “‘force’’ of
gravity. Or, (2) if E and-S were actual collections of whirls
then each would have what we shall see is a field ($1148);
and those two fields would react on each other, and theory
cally be or give precisely the same modifications as in (1), in
infinite regress. And the observed facts are that E
and 5 do have magnetic fields, and that the pull of gravity is

113 UNIVERSE

not absolutely steady or static (not exactly according to the
inverse square law; IX). Therefore, both by direct theory
and direct observation, there is some gravity attraction be-
tween E and S and some chemical (or electrical, or ‘field,’ or
whatever it is preferred to call it) attraction or union between
them. And obviously, it is impossible to say that there is a
real distinction between the two “‘sorts’’ of attraction (ex-
plicitly, the attractions are in infinite regress); each is what
we cal] irrational if asserted alone. Hence, we rigorously
have W... A... (874), or inexplicitly, S...XE.... Or,
the problem of any two actual or experimental bodies is in-
soluble (§83). Or, there is no exact science.

8104. a. In this section I shall directly unify the fore-
going mechanics with conventional mathematical science, and
with the measuring theory in 1X. That is the sum of the
book from a particular point of view, and so I have to con-
dense; the section can become obvious in detail] only to those
readers who follow out the thought from the hints given.
This aspect of the subject is so extensive that I have followed
the suggested steps only a little way in preparing for this
book, and had to write a volume or two to express that much.
The general reader has perhaps forgotten what he read in
his physics textbooks so thoroughly that he will have slight
interest in, or recognition of, what is here condensed to dry
bones. If so, a casual, careless reading will give him the
essentials and be less boring.

b. We have seen (§§80h, 82) that any “‘perfect’’ part
of the universe (such as pu—=Constant) is symbolized by a
rectangular hyperbola. For instance, if in the actual total

Fig. 104b.

universe the sun and earth were an absolutely separable per-
fect gas part, then SXE (without dots; §103b) would be
represented in Fig 104b by the rectangular hyperbola CBD
(including the third quadrant branch C3BsD3) in which the
general point B represents S and E. Clearly therefore, in
order that the geometrical hyperbola may accurately repre-
sent bodies, the bodies must, as a truism, be reduced to geo-
metrical point masses, of which there would be an infinity,
so that the universe would be validly represented by an in-
finity of such hyperbolas, and infinite pluralism would form-
ally be considered reality. In that case it is obvious that
the only way to represent azy phenomenon with logical

Two XI §104¢

consistency would be to travel on the hyperbola representing
conditions at the beginning of the phenomenon to the asym-
ptotes (i. e., revert to monism, or mystic 0-@), and shift on
those to the hyperbola or hyperbolas of the conditions resulting
(and for intermediate steps of the phenomenon an indefinite
number of those curves would have to be considered similarly
used). Now, if Carnot’s perfect heat engine, or any
perfect gas, or Newton’s gravity, or any absolute constants,
or any exact cycles be asserted, obviously such a geometrical
representation of them is consistent and valid. But, it is
equally obvious that such a representation is actually an ad
infinitum affair or regress, and in so far as it is explicit is mys-
tic or religious language; it formally and largely explicitly is
the old Maxwell science and is also identical with the meta-
physics of Hegel, which 1 understand he admitted was un-
intelligible to himself; it is obviously mystic language which
is the opposite of Many language and to the usual tacit valid
logic and commonsense used by science. I. e., every one of
the bodies B is in every explicit expression (every actual
curve) a perfect universe of itself. In metaphysical terms,
each perfect curve is Kant’s ““thing in itself’’—and most
other older dualistic philosophers had a pet name for it.
Maxwell’s pet name for it was molecule or atom; that infinite
collection of hyperbolas is equivalent to Maxwell’s kinetic
theory (except that I am finishing it here); for clearly, the
actual working together of the parts of the total universe is
merely implied—the describer of phenomena reverted to One
language (went into a verbal trance, so to speak) and_ said
God worked them—moving in a mysterious way his wonders
to perform. It is quite true; the universe did do them: but
science proposes to say positively how it did. Obviously, so
far as positive explicit expression of phenomena is concerned,
that old kinetic theory—and similarly al] dualism, including
classical logic and orthodox theology—makes no statement
whatever of how or why or where such a universe or God
works. Or what amounts to identically the same thing, it is
glaringly obvious that those old doctrines provided no struct-
ure, no real mechanism, no actual relationship (such as love),
no working together, no binding together which 7s religion—
provided none of that in any explicit way; but in geometric
expression, left it all to the asymptotes at a 0-point at ©.
Well; as is obvious, such doctrines are right ulti-
mately, provided we dig out their implications as was done
for classic logic (§24). Unquestionably that tacit taking for
granted of relationship is the entirely valid religion which
animals, ete., correctly hold; I remember that as a child ]
took such a tacit religion for granted and wondered why peo-
ple invented a God when all things worked beautifully and
justly right before their eyes. The only valid objection that
can be made to those dualistic, perfectly kinetic, orthodox
theological doctrines is that they merely fail actually and
positively to use the language tool; they stop before they
finish and then get into a stew because their God is as empty
as those asymptotes. Such doctrines obviously pretend or
seem to use language, whereas in actual effect they are using
formless interjections, like the clucks of a hen.

c. But if we use as B any actual body (a finite Many
part of our usual Trinity language), then the body does not
stay on the perfect hyperbola. If we use Van der Waals’s
partially corrected equation, which is a cubic equation, the
body takes a swerve at some place (Daniell’s ‘‘Physics,’’ 376)
and the body apparently usually has two imaginary values
(see par. i). Richards’s form of the equation, or our That...
X This..., or the S... XE... of the last section, obviously
makes the hyperbola become a continuously changing line of
infinite length, which is the single closed line we saw repre-
senting the universe in So98m. Hence, any phenomenon is

§104c XI Two

represented by an actual portion of that universe line. But
no phenomenon can be accurately described; only by sum-
ming it into the One do we get accuracy, and then it is
formal and mystic and sums as being the asymptotes, which
directly represent the One.

d. Also, although I shall not go into it explicitly, this
hyperbola model is being given in two dimensions, with the
third only implied. | We must add the third, and consider
3-dimension curves in order to be completely explicit. This
modification applies to this whole section.

e. If a symmetrical single surface ring of no thickness
and infinite width be revolved, this hyperbola will always be
related to the generatrix in ways suggesting mathematical
laws, including the- inverse square law—and also the non-
Euclidian geometries (by having the generatrix vary from a
straight line) and z-dimension space (by extending or “dupli-
cating’ the curve beyond the point where it touches the
asymptotes—as in orthodox projective geometry).

f. Suppose we take a formally infinite or One filament
(as in §100df) in which the surface is a geometrical surface
of zero or infinite velocity. Then suppose we change the
filament so that it comes just inside those One limits, its val-
ues becoming finite. Then the motion in its surface becomes
helical with pitch angle different from 0° or 90°, but ap-
proximately one or the other. Then a line of no force would
be normal to those spirals, and approximately in the surface
(we may take itso, omitting considering its other dimensions).
The projection of any such line on any plane through the
main axis would be (approximately, by valid logic; exactly,
by classic) our hyperbola—which is a line of no resistance.
But that line is at right angles to the line of no resistance of
S98m. So we see by this geometry how the inverse square
law comes in. This paragraph is condensed far be-
low the point tolerated by mathematical precision.

g. The last paragraph is another form by which par. b
can be proved (and understood, if you have the patience and
professional need to dig out the implicit truisms in the last
paragraph). Incidentally, use of explicit logical expression
in the last paragraph would make the One ‘line’ of no action
definitely 3-dimensioned, so that the two ‘lines’ mentioned
would be ultimately closed on themselves and identical.

h. Also, by explicitly and with pluralistic consistency
shifting from that One filament to actual or finite ones, we
get the actual universe line of par. c again. The hyperbola
of par. f is obviously simply the /imit or envelope of that act-
ual line. So from that point of view all of Carnot’s theory
and of old kinetic and cyclic theory can be seen to be only
limiting statements of actuality, and not actuality at all ac-
cording to ordinary language. That covers the whole theory
of calculus, and most of physical mathematics. Jf it be un-
derstood that each such dualistic or classic equation is summed
perfection or absolute abstraction from our actual world, and
hence (1) is actually inaccurate; and (2) is formally sepa-
rated from all others, so that logically explicitly there can not
possibly be any such thing as what is actually meant by ex-
planation, or knowledge, or continuity—if that be under-
stood or implicitly accepted, then even the mathematics of
Maxwell is correct. And science nowadays does implicitly
accept those things, as shown in the next paragraph.

i. As noticed (par. c), Van der Waals’s equation makes
a swerve (usually), giving two imaginary roots. Obviously,
therefore, those imaginary or logically absurd values result
when the actual observed curve, by everyday language leaves
that One hyperbolic curve and exhibits at least two of the
actual dots of 8... XE... or p... Xv...—and hence does con-
tradict the classic logic it started with. So it is further tru-
istic that the swerve in Van der Waals’s curve is equivalent

UNIVERSE

114

to the inverse square law (cf. pars. e-g), or to the principle
of Ampere’s law. And Van der Waals himself substantially
asserts that, when he says that the modification of the exact
pv is due to a variable extension or ““field’’ of the bodies—
which are molecules (““Ency. Brit.,’’ vi, 846). Richards’s
theory makes all that explicit. Therefore, vaporiza-
tion or melting or disassociation (etc., in infinite regress)
lines in pv curves (or in any curve of the general That... X
This...) are actually the verbal inverse square Jaw; or ex-
plicitly represent (never accurately) the 3-dimension differ-
ence surfaces of field and-or filament. Or, they are the
explicit geometrical model (or equational) representation of
the formation of whirls of a different order (cf. Reeve’s ‘‘En-
ergy’’). Or, Van der Waals’s “imaginary states’’ merely
mean that the M’s talked of become something else, that
are not of the same order or ‘‘state.”’

j. The last thing to be definitely suggested about this
sort of averaged or summed or ¢- form of model of the uni-
verse, is that it shows that we may reverse the direction of
naming of any quantity—i. e., that our location of the zero
potential of any phenomenon is purely arbitrary. Ordinarily
we fancy—without really thinking—that we name _ things
which would be represented in the first (trigonometric) quad-
rant as algebraically positive, and that all potentials are taken
so that such positive trigonometrical] directions increase them
numerically. But it may be readily seen that even science,
with its more careful speech, does not thus consistently name
potentials:- Ordinarily, with reference to molar bodies, the
extensive factors F, W, Ent, and Q, and their respectively
corresponding intensive factors L, A, Temp, and P, are
named positively, as indicated in Fig. 104b. But p is a force
which usually is named as acting oppositely to F; so a con-
ventionally positive p is in the direction of OY’, and p... X
v... is in the second quadrant— giving the conjugate hyper-
bola, or a language from a different viewpoint. Also,
when conventional science shifts from molar translatory mo-
tion to vibrations the point of view changes from out to in (or
vice versa, if yon prefer to look at it that way), and the
direction-naming shifts from the usual branch in the first
quadrant to the branch in the third. Hence, when Rey-
nolds substantially begins by considering vibrations as real or
positive sort of motion his whole nomenclature of molar bod-
ies practically reverses from custom. But his vibratory mo-
tions are consistent with the customary naming of vibratory
directions, because conventional science is capsized in its
language referring to them. Therefore, here in brief
is the general theory of potential directions. I omit the
several volumes needed to treat the matter adequately.

k. So this section is a summary of the mathematical as-
pect of the That... < This... member;
mathematics, or ‘“seometry. ts
repetition of IX, which gave the
of the measuring member.) 1 have merely very roughly
suggested its possibilities. I have not gone far enough into
them to be very definite about them; but the mathematical
physicists will have no difficulty in seeing that even this ele-
mentary discussion unifies their equations. There is no fur-
ther mathematical discussion in this book beyond occasional
brief reference; this section is not actually mathematical,
but only implies mathematics—as does the phrase ““Good
morning.’’ Such a large proportion of all orthodox mathe-
matics is infected with classic logic that it is a sort of neces-
sary evil that we have to endure, to refer to such mathematics
at all, The reason ordinary mathematics are so excessively
boresome and offensive is that they are so wrong and mean-
ingless (cf. §30¢). Consequently, they are not a pleasant
topic for discussion, just as bad health is not usually a pleasing

it becomes xaming

(Obviously, it is a general

ce = 393 *
algebraic’ mathematics

115

subject. Hereafter, I mostly use the That... X This... di-
rectly—usually asthe explicit machine Field... X Filament...,
or some duplication of it, as Those whirls or cells... X These... .

CHAPTER XII.

8105. a. It was shown in general in §100 (especially in
pars. be) that the practical way we had of using the form
That... X This... was to split the universe into parts on the
criterion V;. Parts of our skin (including our eyes, which
are physiologically parts of the skin; ‘‘Ency. Brit.,’’ x, 93)
are used as standard parts; and that fixes all other parts
with quantitatively a corresponding variation of limits (be-
cause the skin itself is variable). That actual standard
makes atoms the primary order of whirls, as atoms are the
skin structures, with a velocity V, of difference surface (see
XIII), so that other different-order structures have different,
but proportionally related, velocities. All “‘things’’ in the
universe are therefore in practice compared with that stand-
ard or ‘primary’; e. g., our nervous activity or ‘‘thought’’
is (in this “‘materialistic’’-seeming phraseology) directly
such atoms (XVII). ‘The first “‘higher’’ or superorder of
bodies is molar bodies—such as the skin itself, or any arbi-
trary part of it, as the eyes or nervous system; or such as a
house, a man, the earth, the sun. Conventional science gets
from the atomic order to the first super- or molar order by
means of the kinetic theory—by making the atoms dynamic-
ally fly around in 3-dimension space in order to produce a
static molar body. And conventional science, in full agree-
ment with the logic of this paragraph, finds that if the whole
of a body has /;, its mass theoretically becomes _ infinite.
I. e., the old Maxwell kinetic science has just two actual ord-
ers of structure; the experimental introduction of the elec-
tron, which is the first infraorder, thus promptly threw that
theory into mysticism.

b. We have seen that such a passing from one order to
auother order logically implied an infinity of orders. Mod-
ern orthodox science is in logical agreement with that. We
have made a verbal form or machine in which by using the
inverse square law we make the step from order to order.
(Aud this is an important point:- because the conventional
kinetic theory is logically one such step, it is clear that that
theory is nothing but a verbal form which definitely «implies
that inverse square in a negative fashion in its fundamental
formula, $mv?.) And we have also devised a “ concrete’’
machine by which definitely objectively to make the step:-
a whirl, or any of the indefinite number of machines to which
it is equivalent. The old Maxwell dualistic kinetic theory is
uot a machine at all, but a poetic adumbration of a machine.

c. Therefore, we combine molar bodies into a next
higher order, and get a solar system. The combination of
solar systems into a higher order gives a stellar galaxy. And
a combination of stellar galaxies gives a higher order for
which there is no conventional name, but which becomes
definitely identical with combinations of atoms into various
molar hodies. Ete. According to such naming,
molecules are molar bodies. The final truth is that those
““orders’’ are not sharply distinct from each other ($8101),
40); sol deliberately leave out molecules as an order, to
emphasize that. A molecule is a transition stage from atomic
order to molar order—sometimes a large atom and sometimes
asmall molar body. There is no such thing as a fixed *“ele-
ment’”’ or absolute atom. All other orders have ‘transition’
stages: the inverse square law never names actual bodies per-
fectly. And proceeding in the other direction of
orders from atoms, we get electrons, parts of electrons, etc.,

Astronomy.

UNIVERSE

Two XII §106b

on ‘down’’ to cells. (Between atoms and electrons are vari-
ous transition stages which are directly experimentally per-
ceptible in radioactive phenomena.) It has been seen in
principle that there is no essential difference between these
orders—only a quantitative, or Land Zone. We are now
ready to see, by directly observing the various orders, that
they are essentially identical. By doing that we get some
useful results. Those results are roughly anticipated in the
remainder of this section, so that the reader may know what
to be looking for.

d. By observing the various orders of whirls, and seeing
that they are qualitatively equal or identical, but truistically
never quantitatively equal, we shall get a rigorous, intellig-
ible proof and knowledge that men, as well as other things,
are qualitatively identical and equal, but never quantitatively
equal. J. e., it is absolutely impossible, and practically and
theoretically irrational, to average men or anything else into
FIXED classes. All of classic logic, orthodox theology, social-
ism, al] the Maxwell kinetic pseudo-science try to assert the
dualism that men are fixed in classes—that some are in-
trinsically “‘better’’? than others. They all try to impose
upon men hierarchies, autocracy, socialism, or some other sort
of “‘line’’ or bureaucratic rule like the German in 1914 or
the papacy, in opposition to democracy (XIX). We shall see
that all those conventional dualisms are irrational by seeing
that in the whole universe there does not and can not exist
any essential or qualitative distinction in order—no fixed
classes—no exact science. On the other hand, quantitatively
no two men, no two atoms, no two of any actual things are
ever equal (i. e., in size, or measure, or amount, or practical
or Many zeeds or worth. I stated above that orthodox
theologies arranged men in classes. As the truth of that
may not be immediately obvious, | state it explicity:- So
far as I can find, all those theologies technically assert that
their God, or each of their Gods, is a person who is superior
to, or essentially better than, other persons or men. That
truistically gives at least two fixed (or “‘line’’ or military or
bureaucratic or aristocratic) classes:- (1) men; (2) God.
And that is irrational. This book demonstrates that man is
God—that God or the universe is quantitatively different from
any given man as conventionally specified (i. e., ‘skin-
bounded’), but that God is in no essentials different.

e. Wecan see the solar system, comets, etc., in more
detail than we can see atoms. A comet, e. g., as is shown,
is an electron of the solar-system-considered-an-atom. So
from several points of view we may learn more about atoms
by observing the solar system, etc., than by observing atoms.

f. Also, as we have a consistent mechanics, we may, by
investigating such ““higher’’ order whirls that are easy to see
directly, get a thorough base for human phenomena— ‘life’’
becomes easily comprehensible (XVI).

§106. a. Therefore, because it makes no essential dif-
ference what order of whirls we use as a means of acquiring
a full understanding of our immediate environment, we may
without inconsistency employ such whirls as give us direct
quantitative details. The so-called astronomical or celestial
whirls seem to do that best to begin with. Those whirls ex-
hibit all phenomena directly, as we shall see. But I arbi-
trarily reserve light, electricity, etc., for other chapters.

b. Many of the quantitative details which we observe
have not yet been measured very definitely. So it is obvious
that I shall have to make rough guesses at some we need.
It is inevitable that there must be quantitative inaccuracy
in my description; but it is most probable that that inaccu-
racy exists in such a degree that some important and useful
phenomena are made vague. I can hope only to be logically
consistent.

§106c XIl Two UNIVERSE 116

c. It may seem at first thought that there is no need to
guess at anything—that such guessing is not science. The
general reply to that is obviously that there can not be any
exact science (§40). The practical reply to it is that we are
forced, as a means of continuing to live atall, to guess at the
characters or “‘properties’’—measures—of the people and
things about us. Every time we eat anything we in effect
guess at the motives and properties and attributes of the per-
sons who were perceptibly concerned in the production of it
—e.g.,as to whether they wished to poison us. The incom-
plete physics or other sciences and theologies in textbooks
furnish us with no definite or consistently expressed basis or
criterion for making such guesses. We have been going
through life without any consistent conscious basis of estimat-
ing or judging or guessing at the majority of the important
decisions which we actually do make. The universe or God
takes care of us, by it as a whole causing us to make fairly
correct guesses intuitively (i. e., with very vague conscious-
ness—as we are a part of the universe)—which fact is more
or less contrary to the hoary, conceited myth tbat man is a
reasoning (i. e., conscious) animal: for only in small part is
he conscious in the sense that he thinks or is intelligent. We
see the proof of that in Part Three—and how man pays for
sucb care by the loss of possible conscious life in some de-
gree. At present it may be noted that we do some consist-
ent guessing at astronomical quantities as a means of
becoming conscious of a consistent basis of making everyday
judgments. The more conscious we are of what we are do-
ing the more life we are aware of having; e. g., if we are
asleep we are unconscious and not aware of having any life.
Hence, as real science can do nothing else but guess, it is
honest to admit it, and then proceed consciously to guess.
That does not mean that ] am rashly abandoning observations
and measures; actually, I am doing much less guessing than
does an astronomer who doesn’t know the principles.

$107. a. Astronomers seem to agree rather generally
that our stellar galaxy is a nebula; see Hink’s ““Astronomy,’’
Arrhenius’s “*Destiny of the Stars,’’ etc. **The Encyclo-
paedia Brittanica’’ (xix, 332) gives eight arbitrary kinds of
nebulas, depending on their genera] appearance :- (1) irregu-
lar nebulas, (2) annular, (3) double, (4) planetary, (5) ellip-
tical, (6) spiral, (7) nebulous stars, (8) diffused nebulosities.
We shall see that nebulas may consistently be considered to
be whirls. In that case those descriptive names correctly
describe whirls seen from various points of view, and in vari-
ous stages of growth or of wearing out. EE. g., an irregular
nebula, of which the great nebula in Orion is a type (‘‘Ency.
Brit.,’’ Art. ‘““Nebula,’’ Plate I) looks very much like a
newly formed whirl, with its visible field, in a rather dis-
turbed condition; an annular whirl looks like a filament,
seen normally; a spiral nebula looks like a filament that has
become comparatively stationary as regards traveling in the
direction of its main axis, and has given off a number of sec-
ondary whirls which hence traveled spirally roughly in the
filiar plane (instead of revolving about the filiar axis as in
Fig. 98w). We see more such details as we proceed.

b. Thereis no definite agreement among astronomers as
to what sort of nebula our stellar galaxy is. As we shall see,
it probably is a rather flattened-out whirl, so that quite likely
it has the spiral appearance if viewed from a neighboring
nebula (§108b). However, our solar system is probably
comparatively near the center of such a spiral, even though
we are not (except in the direction of the Milky Way) per-
ceptibly surrounded by nebulosity. I. e., our galaxy is
probably shaped like a large double convex Jens—or like a
grindstone, to use another conventional simile. That is ex-
perimentally shown chiefly by the observed distribution of

stars, the appearance of the Milky Way surrounding us as a
ring, and by other details mentioned later. In Fig. 107e,
DA and BC are cross-sections of a conventionalized or
smoothed-out Milky Way or filament. We are near the cen-
ter, at S, and around us we see that filament. It probably
is smashed somewhat flat by surrounding whirls or galaxy-
nebulas of the same order, so that it (the filament or Milky
Way) has but comparatively slight motion of translation
along the main axis PP’ (say as a guess 100 miles per second,
which is very slow for such a whirl), and hence has compara-
tively more motion of rotation about that axis (resulting in a
spiral motion in the field, not shown in the figure). Our
solar system § is in the inner field of the whirl, a little above
the filiar plane (for clearness, the figure probably much ex-
aggerates its actual distance above), ina dynamic equilibrium
with that field—which inclines the ecliptic somewhat to the
filiar plane (the ecliptic is the rough plane in which the earth
revolves about the sun and which the other planets more
or less stay close to; that is not quite the strictly technical
definition, ‘“Ency. Brit.,’’ ‘‘Ecliptic’’; the inclined azis of
the ecliptic is roughly NS’), and which equilibrium also in-
volves the revolution of the whole solar system about the
stellar main axis PP’, as we shall see.

ce. Our galaxy is equivalent to an atom in everything
but size (and 7), and that is unessential. It is obviously
surrounded by other stellar galaxies. I do notknow whether
those galactic atoms constitute a ‘celestial’ gas, or liquid,
or solid (perhaps a solid; see par. g). We probably can not
see farther than a very few layers of such surrounding atoms:
light itself is absorbed by those surroundings (§§131-2), so
that comparatively speaking we are probably in the same kind
of darkness that we would say existed in the center of a lump
of coal (although there would be light there to the parts of
coal atoms). Even if our galaxy were an atom of a celestial
gas we would have comparatively short vision of surrounding
atoms (XIII).

d. In technical astronomy the usual unit measure of
stellar distance is now a parsec, which is the distance at
which the orbit of the earth subtends an angle of 1 second—
i. e., gives a ‘‘fixed’’ star a parallax of 1”. It is equal to
about 206,000 ‘‘astronomical units.’? An astronomical unit
is the average radius of the earth’s orbit, which is about
93,000,000 miles. An older measure of stellar distance is
the light year, or the distance which light at V; travels in a
year. It is equal to about 4 parsec, or to about 6 trillion
miles. I use light years, as that is more familiar.

e. There are no agreed upon figures for the size of our
galaxy. Eddington (‘‘Stellar Movements,’’ 225) roughly
guesses that the distance apart of the inner surfaces of the
Milky Way (the diameter of the hole in the ‘doughnut’; or
the distance from A to B, Fig. 107e; see par. b for prelimi-
nary description of this figure) is about 700 light years.
Other men guess considerably higher and also lower. I shall
to some extent use Eddington’s guess as a base (although it
probably is considerably tuo small), making other figures in
proportion. The field of the galaxy in the figure has a dif-
ference surface with much inaccuracy represented by the
outer dotted line (to save space, etc., one end of figure is cut
away). That field probably has a long diameter of something
like 20,000 light years, and a short diameter of something
like 2000 light years (the diameter along its main axis PP’).

f. The Milky Way filament has an ether flow as indi-
cated very roughly by the arrows. Hence, in so far as that
flow is not balanced by a rotation of the whirl around PP’
and a spiral reaction of the whole whirl] with adjacent whirls
(due to the spiral flow of the field ether, which is not indi-
cated in the figure), there will be a motion of translation of

117

the galaxy as a whole down, in the direction PP’, as was
seen to occur in Fig. 98n (§101d). Although I do not
show that spiral flow for the galaxy field in the figure, I show
in rough perspective the general spiral translation of the solar
system S (by the dotted line on
which the various S’s are):
the motion down of the galaxy
in the direction PP’ would act-
ually be a similar corkscrew
motion among the surrounding
galaxies.

g. Astronomers’ observe
motions of translation of neb-
ulas which are apparently ont-
side our galaxy to be as high
as 600 or 700 miles a second.
Several thousands of spiral
nebulas are observed around
us. The average motion of
snch nebulas is observed to be
perhaps 250 miles per second; hence, our nebula possibly
corkscrews down at about the same rate (but see par. a).
There is not much reliability abont such figures as yet; for
nebulas are faint, and are difficnlt to measure even in photo-
graphs. But it is already obvious in part, and will become
More so as we note more details, that such motions are very
slow compared with the size of the objects. I.e., very little
change in our galaxy as a whole is produced by that, to ns,
rapid motion. Such motions of translation are comparatively
speaking almost static conditions; i. e., the collection of
galaxy whirls in which onrs is one atom would be, if those
velocities are fairly good gnesses, abont as fixed and steady
as atoms in what we calla solid. And that possibility that
we are in a celestial solid is further strengthened by the fact
that observed distances of other galaxy nebulas are roughly
of the same order as the size of onrs; i. e., the galaxy
whirls about us are packed in as steady as the bricks in a
wall—always speaking comparatively, of course (and in spite
of the fact that it is conventional to hear of the ‘“enormons’’
“‘waste’’ spaces in astronomical structures). I shall keep on
speaking comparatively, and omit repeating the obvions and
unimportant and nnessential qnantitative fact that a short
astronomical distance is a long terrestrial one. We are cus-
tomarily expected to marvel at astronomical figures—espec-
ially velocities. The truth is that to anyone with a fair
judgment of proportion, astronomical velocities are compara-
tively slow. From analogous points of view it is Just as diffi-
cult to detect the slow motion of the solar system as it is to
detect the slow motion that is the growth ofa plant. So it
is to be hoped that the old-style popular writers on astrono-
my will stop tacitly inviting that we stand like rustics, with
our provincial mouths ajar in wonder, whenever they mention
a comparatively negligible number and tell ns that it is mar-
velons and stupendons—for relatively it is nothing of the
sort. The psychological effect on themselves is obvious.

§108. a. The last section gives in rough ontline the de-
scription of our galaxy. = All other astronomical structures,
as well as atoms, etc., are of the same general nature at the
youthful stage of their lives. | Experimental evidence of the
consistency of that description is given by the remainder of
this chapter. There are such a number of things in the gal-
axy, and the changes init are usually so nearly imperceptible
to us, so slow are its movements, that the experimental ob-
servations and measures are rather unreliable. So we shall
mostly use the solar system whirl instead of the galaxy.

b. Many astronomers are inclined to consider our galaxy
as being a well-developed spiral nebula, with the solar system

UNIVERSE

Two XIl1 §108c

at S, as in Fig. 108b (the figure is adapted from Arrhenins’s
“Destiny of the Stars’’; cf. p. 45ff). So far as I know, the
galaxy may be considerably broken up, as indicated in that
figure ;

but I am inclined to think that the Milky Way

Fig. 107e.

directly appears to be so well-formed as to indicate the better
preserved whirl of Fig. 107e. However, as that is not reli-
able proof, and as there are no other facts that I know of. to
decide the point, what I shall do is to describe onr nebula
(including details of the solar system) in a broad way—cov-
ering all the probabilities, which are innnmerable. Then, if
the astronomers by further and more complete observations
of stars as they actually are,
find onr galaxy to be of the
character shown in Fig.
108b, that will be a special
case of our description. My
personal guess at the qnan-
titative character of onr gal-
axy and solar system is that
the galaxy is a rather regn-
lar spiral that tends towards
being an annular nebula,
with the solar system rather
near the center, as shown in
Fig. 107e, which 1 shall
call a regular spiral or a whirl spiral. |The spiral shown in
Fig. 108b is more like a spiral that would result if two large
bodies or clusters pniled each other apart by gravity, and I
shall call that a gravity spiral. As we shall see in the next
two paragraphs, there can not be essentially different sorts
of spirals: the difference is quantitative, and each kind is
partly the other kind.

ec. I may here briefly anticipate some conclusions, in or-
der to state what are the two general kinds of nebnlas into
which I arbitrarily divide the eight sorts in §107a. If we
had a nearly homogeneons fluid whirl, practically as our ex-
perimental whirls may be considered tobe when first formed,
or as an ether whirl containing only cells would be, then as
we have seen, it wonld wear out or grow old by giving birth
to lower order whirls, and those whirls would tend to collect
into spherical “‘solids’’ like the earth. We shall see that in
detail later. (1) During the process of wearing out,
that fluid whirl, if rather closely surrounded by whirls of the
same order, would be what was called a regular or whirl spi-
ral. Or, some large secondary of the whirl, surrounded by
other secondaries, wonld pass through the stages of snch a
rather regular whirl or spiral. Or, finally, if two rather fluid
whirls combined (as in §102f), the resulting single whirl, if
surrounded by others of the same order, would pass through
the stages of a whirl spiral—as shown in one stage in Fig.
107e. But on the other hand, a whirl, which had

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§108e XII Two

reversed or aged or ‘ degenerated’’ into a spherical solid like
the earth (with usually one or more solid satellites like the
moon), might approach fairly close to another similar whirl.
(That would be possible because the field of that solid would
be comparatively weak, as we shall see. I do not think that
such approach is often probable, but I do not know the
quantitative chances: cf. the remainder of this chapter.) In
that ease the two solid whirls (never perfectly “solid’—always
there would be some sort of ‘atmosphere’ of satellites, etc.)
would combine by pulling each other to pieces. Some of
the pieces would probably stay rather “‘solid’’; most of the
pieces, for reasons which we shall see, would ‘evaporate’ into
ether—i. e., break up into pieces as sma)]] as electrons, etc.
The resulting single whirl would be what I call a gravity spi-
ral nebula (because ordinary gravity was the major force pro-
ducing the result), That whirl would become, more or less
quickly, practically identical with a fairly aged fluid whirl.
At some age of each sort of whirl or nebula they can not be
distinguished apart. The differences occur in their youths.
So the differences in the nebulas are quantitative differences
of past history. That history determines the kind of spiral.

d. We could say that the rather fluid regular whir) is
chiefly dynamic, and that the rather solid sphere is chiefly
static, and we have the same quantitative distinction. As
before, it obviously is not possible to have in any pluralism a
perfect fluid, or a perfect solid. That is equivalent to what
we saw in $80 concerning no perfect static or perfect dy-
namic phenomena: we see here in general that there can be
no essentially different kinds of nebulas. And we shal] see
that that is equivalent to saying that there can neither he
any gravity alone, nor chemical affinity alone; both act to-
gether in astronomical structures, sometimes one and some-
times the other temporarily having the greater effect (IX).

e. Ina fluid or whirl spiral, in the stage pictured in Fig.
107e, chemical affinity has perhaps the greatest influence
with respect to the whole whirl. Inside our solar system as it
is now, gravity has the greater influence with reference tothe
larger bodies in it, or with respect to the whole whirl.
As is now rather well known, the efficacy of gravity pull has
in the past been considerably exaggerated. The orthodox
nebular theory of Kant and Laplace (‘“‘Ency. Brit.,’’ Art.
*‘Nebular Theory’’) substantially makes gravity the whole
(i. e., infinite) cause—which obviously is correct as relig-
ion, but is pure nonsense if claimed to be expression in plu-
ralistic or scientific everyday language. Because
gravity pull has been conventionally so much overemphasized
I am here more or less forced to make a somewhat dispropor-
tionate amount of remarks about its completing factor, chemi-
cal affinity (or electric or magnetic forces, as they are more
usually called in this connection). The reader will note that
rhetorical result, needed temporarily now.

S109. a. We may briefly consider the general origin of
the galaxy, although it will merely be a ‘‘concrete’’ repeti-
tion of the previous proofs (X, XI) that any splitting of the
universe into parts implies, by our Trinity Janguage, a struct-
ure. If we like, we may commence with a perfectly fluid
ether universe—perfectly static or perfectly dynamic,—and
existing as anything, or nothing, just as you please. If we
consider it pluralistically split in any way, then by our usual
language we introduce time and space as methods of naming
the results, and the results are finally atoms, which by our
human criterion have difference surfaces at ’;. Some par-
ticular order of those whirls in infinite regress would contain
a particular whirl which is our galaxy. Its existence implies
us, with our V; criterion; and our existence with that cri-
terion implies that whirl. Like the chicken and the egg,
neither comes “‘first,’’ except by purely arbitrary agreement

UNIVERSE

118

as to what is precisely quantitatively a chicken, and what an
egg; and that agreement can not be made exactly in a finite
number of words. So ultimately the chicken and the egg
are identically the same (and we and the galaxy are identi-
cally the same), and are the universe. Like Topsy in **Uncle
Tom’s Cabin,’’ the galaxy whirl ‘just grew.’ This paragraph
consistently states what grew ultimately means (§35f).

b. Topsy was expected to state her immediate parents
—to talk in finite, Many terms. So we too may drop that
tacit infinite time of the last paragraph, and undertake to
state the finite origin or parentage of our galaxy whirl. I
am unable to find any observed data which will give that
parentage. Or, the whirl may not have had ‘parentage,’
but may be the result of a marriage or joining of two large
spherical ‘solids’ (those ‘solids,’ with their satellites, are us-
ually called star clusters or systems) which had previously
been born perhaps. I. e., our galaxy whirl (1) may bea
secondary of some larger whirl (an electron of that larger
atom); or it (2) may be that (A) two large suns, or (B) two
clusters that were not so far condensed into mostly only two
such suns, or (C) two more fluid whirls, united to make it.

ec. Both those general possibilities could produce our
galaxy whirl. Obviously, our machine is in principle per-
fectly reversible—going equally well “‘down’’ or “‘up’’ in
order of whirls. All we need to note is that whatever the
actual origin was, the primary whirl that gave off the new
secondary, or the old whirls which united to form a new one,
was or were partly fluid and partly solid, so that there was
at all times no perfect characteristic or property (no ‘egg’
that was essentially and absolutely egg and nothing else),
and no absolute homogeneity or heterogeneity of any sort.
(We shall see that those same processes apply precisely to
the birth of biological organisms; 8146). It may be
observed that this investigation of the origin of our galaxy is
perfectly general in principle. | Consequently, it will apply
as the description of the origin of any structural part of the
universe:- toa chicken and an egg, atoms, electrons, etc. ;
it will apply to (say) chairs, provided that the man and his
tools and materials which produce the chairs are considered
as partly joined together during a given time—as they are.

d. If we tentatively accept the guess in §107b that the
galaxy and the solar system are both roughly whirl spirals,
then a fairly reasonable guess as to the age of our galaxy
would make it as a minimum a trillion of onr years (10!2
years; I use the American and French style of numeration);
the solar system would as a reasonable minimum be a number
of billion years old (say 50 hillion), counting from its first
rough splitting off from the Milky Way filament. However,
both might be a million or more times older than that, as we
see later. Possibly the astronomers may readily find data
which will give more definite guesses at the ages. If the
galaxy is a gravity spiral, then I am unable to find any rea-
sonable basis for a guess, except that by geological observa-
tions the solar system must be a numher of billion years old;
as will implicitly appear, the galaxy must be older.

S110. a. We shall begin to get more explicit proof of
the last two sections by considering the birth and history of
the (our) solar system. Suppose we have the galaxy filament
(the Milky Way) somewhat as shown in sectionin Fig. 107e.
The difference surface would be continually subjected to
varying velocities (equivalent to pushes and pulls) from inside
and outside the filament—every phenomenon that happened
in the universe would in time be registered thus on the gal-
axy difference surface. Any push and any pull would form a
whirl in more or less completeness (§§101-2). Those whirls
would form in harmonic sizes (or else be quickly destroyed
or assimilated’ by sizes which did have such proportionality) :

119 UNIVERSE

see Index, “‘Harmonic periodicity.’’ Consequently, the
difference surface would continually form whirls of various
sizes. The smallest made in considerable number would
probably be the new-born forms of our atoms; those which
were not in fairly good proportions would be destroyed, but
in such disturbed conditions atomic weights would vary
widely in several ways from our present weights. For rea-
sons and facts we shall see, those atoms of a certain atomic
weight or size there, would, if it were possible to transport
them to our laboratories without changing them, be consid-
erably different from our analogous atoms in every property.
I. e., C atoms there would not quantitatively be much like
C atoms here; yet the collection of mutual ZL and T relation-
ships possessed by the carbon atoms would, relative to each
appropriate location, be practically measurably identical (not
exactly identical; if exact identity be required, then the
names of ‘‘elements’’ promptly require to become an infinity
—~as may be readily seen from the fact that any change in
conditions changes the spectrum of any ““element’’; XIII).

b. The small or atomic whirls would have difference
surfaces of a velocity which of itself gives visibility, or nearly
so (proof:- we see the Milky Way; also, the rest of this
book), That velocity would be of the same order as /; (it
differs somewhat, as those atoms are not in an environment
like our neighborhood; cf. XIII). The atoms would also in
most circumstances be visible by diffusing, reflecting, etc.,
light that came from atoms in other places that had light-
giving difference surfaces. The Milky Way atoms might
locally be in sufficiently dense and extensive clouds of them-
selves to become dark, if their difference surfaces were not
at a visible velocity. But obvionsly, without going into the
lengthy details which are implied in XIII on light, we may
take a short cut to the conclusion, and see that the chances
are that usually there will be enough visible atoms about the
Milky Way surface (or the difference surface of any galaxy
in our neighborhood, or any large whirl in those whirls) to
make the outline of that surface visible to us. We see more
of the details and proof of that under zodiacal light (§121),
and in §111 and XIII. What we particularly need to get
at now is the meaning of the ““‘temperature’’ of those whirls
that are new-born at the galaxy difference surface.

c. Those new atoms (and other whirls) would have
plenty of room-—they could not be rubbing each other hard,
but would have well-formed (newly-formed or young) fila-
ments, and comparatively extensive fields. If we could stick
an ordinary thermometer among them, its expansive sub-
stance would almost certainly freeze. For the ‘‘temperature’”’
of the “‘gas’’ which those atoms ordinarily form is almost
*‘absolute zero’’ in spite of the fact that they are glowing—
*‘slowing hot.’? The temperature of the ether which is the
difference surface of the atoms is ‘‘high’’—for its velocity is
near V, (if we could get our whole thermometer im that sur-
face zone of ether, it theoretically would indicate nearly an
“‘infinite’’? temperature: any actual thermometer in the usu-
al sense would explode into electrons and smaller pieces).
But that ether is obviously very small in amount compared
with the ‘insulating’ slower ether of the fields. Our ther-
mometer would come into contact with the comparatively
very slow difference surface of the fields, and there would be
nothing in the rather free environment near the galaxy differ-
ence surface to ‘smash’ that high-velocity ether close up to
the atoms of our ordinary thermometer and hence the ‘*tem-
perature’? would register low. There would be some rad-
iant heat; but radiant heat in quantities sufficient to affect
the thermometer very perceptibly can come only from a col-
lection of considerably smashed together atoms. In
brief, to sum up what has been said, the entropy of those

Two XII §110e

atoms is nearly zero (by our standards) and consequently one
of our thermometers, which requires an average entropy of
our environment before it will register an average tempera-
ture, simply would register almost no temperature of the whole
gas. (Asa matter of fact, for reasons later implied, the or-
dinary thermometer will itself most probably begin to break
up radioactively in such an environment. And precisely the
same low temperature will be registered when atoms are
very strongly pressed together, with high entropy, as inside
the earth; itis the opposite aspect of the wide departure
from the average conditions we use as a standard; cf. §§122,
120.) If we devise some method of forcing some of that dif-
ference surface ether that is at a ““temperature’’ of nearly
‘infinity’? close up to the atoms of the expansive substance
of our thermometer, those atoms will locally radioactively
explode, as implied above-—and the exploded atoms wil!
then tend again to bave a temperature, relative to the origi-
nal thermometer, of nearly zero.

d. We are so accustomed to judging heat anthropocen-
trically that it is difficult at first even to understand the last
paragraph, which (except for the “old heat’ inside the earth)
describes ‘young heat’ instead of our everyday “middle-aged
heat.’ But it can be seen at once that tbe paragraph is a
concrete summary of the theory of heat in §§78-81. As we
see additional details of heat below, the last paragraph will
become more intelligible. All we need to grasp now is the
general fact that temperature is an intensive factor (which
means roughly that if we want “‘high’’ temperature, we
must get high-speed ether at the spot where there is to be
such temperature), and entropy is the extensive factor of
heat (which means roughly that there must be an amount of
ether which will both build up a properly supporting struct-
ure about that point and also maintain the flow to it).

e. I have described atomic whirls as being secondaries
of the galaxy whirl. There may be snch a relationship of
periodic sizes that the galaxy difference surface can not give
off such comparatively minute whirls directly as secondaries,
but must in the ordinary course of quantitative events give off
large secondaries of (say) the order of the solar system, and
then have them give off atoms as tertiaries of the galaxy. Or
in the same way atoms may be an even lower order of whirl
with reference to the galaxy asa primary. If so, it is merely
a step by step quantitative process, which makes no essential
difference in the brief description we need. For rhetorical
simplicity I shal] make the experimentally unguided guess
that the galaxy difference surface gives off secondaries that
range in sizefrom electrons and atoms to solar system whirls:
that is valid in principle (§101h-j). If it is not quantitative
fact at a given time, then future closer observation of details
and investigation of mechanical size-relationships will show
what is so ata given time. But even then, atoms would be
formed near (not in or gf—as stated above) the Milky Way
surface; and the actual phenomena and subsequent descrip-
tion would be quantitatively about the same as that I give,
and logically identical. The same general remarks
as to the order of whirls will apply usually to my description
of them. In short, I can not get enough data to make a
reasonably accurate guess as to how many generations there
are usually between galaxy and (say) electrons. It is pre-
cisely the same as being unable to guess how many genera-
tions there were between Darwin and a given one-celled
ancestor of his; the actual facts are that by following differ-
ent lines of intermarrying ancestors there nearly surely would
result different numbers of generations; and also there is no
accepted arbitrary agreement as to what does constitute one
generation of one-celled organisms. But obviously, with
electrons and with Darwin, the essential thing is that there

§110e X11 Two

are generations and changes of order or “‘species,’’ even
though the numbers or measures vary with the point of view.
So it is obvious that in the description of all pbenomena I
give, infinite variation of quantitative detail is possible, and
does occur in varying conditions: there is no exact science.

S111. a. Thus we have the galaxy difference surface
outlined by atoms. That result happens only when that sur-
face is in fairly stable equilibrium. If there were rapid
changes in the galaxy whirl as a whole, that outlining would
disappear. Our galaxy may move about 250 mi/see (§107g)
—and that, though slow, seems to be enough to cause the
galaxy field difference surface to clear itself pretty much of
secondaries of all sorts, so that the outer field surface is not
appreciably outlined (cf. §112a). The same thing has hap-
pened to most of the solar system; i. e., its difference sur-
faces are nearly imperceptible, except what are now the
main difference surfaces of it, such as the surfaces of the sun,
planets, etc., as we shall see. Below we see encugh details
to make those galaxy phenomena clear.

b. And thus the galaxy filament surface continually
gave off secondaries into and out of the filament (it still is
doing so). We may guess that about 50 billion years ago
there was from some cause a knock, or addition of energy,
given to the galaxy field, so that a whirl which was to form
the solar system was pushed out of the filament at C, Fig.
107e. That unbalanced knock, which was almost negligible
compared with the size or energy of the galaxy, reached its
fair equilibrium, or was balanced, by the birth of that sec-
ondary, the solar whirl, according to the mechanics given for
Fig. 98w and in §101e. For severa] reasons which we shall
see, the solar system virtually lived faster than the galaxy;
also, we can observe it better. | Hence, I shall discuss its
general history, and thus imply the further detailed descrip-
tion of the galaxy whirl.

c. Asareasonable guess the solar whir] would be at
least several centuries a-borning, and would, as a fairly sym-
metrical whirl like our soapy water whirls, staré traveling out
from C to the right (more or Jess in or parallel to the galaxy
filiar plane) into and through the outer field of the galaxy at
a speed of say 300 to 400 miles per second—probably more.
This solar whir] would contain in its field ether a lot of glow-
ing atoms, and also quite probably a considerable number of
what we may call condensations (§114)—or more explicitly,
planetesima] condensations. Also, it would be born into a
disturbed environment; its very birth was due to asymme-
tries or lacks of equilibrium which locally were comparatively
marked. Hence, the solar whirl at once began to form sec-
ondaries and wear out (i. e., “‘live’’?) much more rapidly
than the larger galaxy whirl] had in general been doing, or
does now. ‘The galaxy whirl] is apparently still virtually
rather young, while the solar system is virtually middle-aged.
In the periodic table (App. B) column 0 (He, Ne, A, etc.)
are virtually young atoms; column VIII (Fe, Co, Ni, etc.),
virtually old; and column IV (C, Si, ete.), middle-aged,
and fairly stable like our earth, which is typically middle-
aged, tending to elderly.

d. Before proceeding to follow the solar system from
that guessed-at beginning, we may note the possible varia-
tions in its birth. In the first place, observation seems to
indicate a thicker collection of solar systems in the center
galaxy field where we are now, than outside (there may be a
thick collection in the plane of the Milky Way outside, as at
M,N, Fig. 107e: as we shall see, theoretically there is a
tendency for such a collection to form, and astronomers with
recently improved methods for measuring star distances are
rapidly collecting data that will settle this and similar mat-
ters). If that apparently thicker collection in the center field

UNIVERSE

120

is a fact, it then follows that the galaxy is moving rather
steadily and is gaining in speed, so that usually the knocks

are negative and the solar whirls are now mostly born into
the filament, where by rapid trave] they remain virtually of
the same density and are hence retained. A whirl born into
the filament would encounter a spiral fluid motion of rotation
and hence would revolve chiefly about the filiar axis, and
with the galaxy filament would also revolve about the galaxy
main axis PP’. That secondary in the Milky Way would it-
self revolve and rotate about its own axes, and proceed to
condense into a solar system similar to our present one.
Those solar systems would then interact, partly by affinity and
partly by gravity. | Those general interactions may be fol-
lowed through in detail by analogy with what will be said. of
the solar system. We on earth are not yet appreciably af-
fected by what happens inside the galaxy filament; we prob-
ably shal] be so affected some day, as what happens there is
likely to be the prelude to the Many end of this astronomical
speck, the earth—as will implicitly appear.

e. And there could also be anindefinite number of vari-
ations as to the relative locality on the filament surface where
the solar system was born. Birth at a different place would
give quantitatively a different subsequent history—consider-
ably different if the birth had occurred at say B, Fig. 107e,
instead of at C. Qualitatively, the histories would be the
same; all history must repeat itself qualitatively, as all prin-
ciples are identical; but no history can repeat itself quanti-
tatively exactly (all that being obvious truisms; Part One).
So the history given according to the quantitative guesses J
have made will implicitly contain al] those unending varia-
tions (and those following from other possible origins of the
solar system mentioned or implied later), and the interested
reader may fairly easily work out as many of such variations
as he likes from the following. The most probable
place of birth of larger whirls would be on the outer side, as
at C and D in the cross-section. Thatis so because obviously
the field is least stable there: in all other places the field in
greater degree supports itself more steadily. Consequently,
any really large whirl would, as a mechanical truism, tend
to be born on the outside. As we see in the next paragraph,
the same mechanical principle will tend to produce spiral
nebulas. However, the solar system is a comparatively smal]
whirl; hence, there is no great probability that it was born
at C unless it was born (as it may have been; cf. §112d)
when the galaxy was quite young.

8112. a. The young solar whirl starts out to the right
from C, as seen, and encounters a fairly vigorous upward
ether flow in the galaxy field. Consequently (as was seen in
§So8w, 10le), it rather soon (say in fifty centuries after it
more or less appreciably finishes being born) perceptibly be-
gins to move downward along the dotted path as shown in
Fig. 107e. Now, if the field had not been relatively vigor-
ous (and usually with a somewhat old whirl, or with respect
to a large secondary instead of our rather small solar whirl,
it relatively is not), then there would not have been enough
fairly steady reaction to push (pull) the new-born whirl down
along that dotted path. It would have kept in the galaxy
filiar plane, with more or less wabbling or oscillation up and
down with respect to that plane, depending on the minor
asymmetries it encountered. Consequently, it would have
steadied into some sort of fairly stable equilibrium while re-
maining more or less in the plane, as shown by the whirls M
and N. Those whirls theoretically could be tilted in any
direction, depending on local conditions, ete. There
was in the difference surface from which they were born a
component of rotation about the main axis PP’. The second-
ary whirl itself would @f its own internal energy continue to

121

propel itself in that revolution about PP’ and for a consider-
able time if it were a large whirl; for it would take some
time for enough asymmetries tu accumulate to stop its motion
in that direction and ““head’’ it some other way. Also, as
the secondary traveled out more or less in that galaxy filiar
plane it would keep on ‘spilling’ its field (like a comet;
§120) until it got into some reasonably steady equilibrium
(cf. §111a). And all those results, with a field not relatively
vigorous, would obviously produce the observed phenomena
and appearances of a fluid spiral nebula—the large second-
aries staying more or less in the filiar plane. The small
secondaries would proceed as we shall see in the case of the
solar whirl. (There would be whirls more or less on the
dividing line between those ‘small’ and ‘large’ secondaries,
which would produce a variety of intermediate phenomena. )
Also, the large secondary whirls which produce the
spirals would, in a considerable length of time (say some
hundreds of billion years), condense, and they too would
then fall out of that spiral (out of the orbit of revolution
arouud PP’) and shoot around the galaxy filament asa comet
(analogous to one of our comets; §120) on a path analogous
to the one to be described for the solar system. So it will
implicitly appear as we proceed thata spiral nebula, by whirl
mechanics, will gradually turn into a star cluster. The star
cluster, if let alone (if not too much knocked by an asym-
metrical environment) until entropy piled up too high, would
automatically break up (precisely a does a radioactive atom;
§§139, 141) into a largely fluid whirl. Or, two clusters
more or less colliding would produce a more or less fluid
whirl of the gravity type. The whole process will work in
either direction from any stage, and contains infinite possibili-
ties. And, as perhaps is already obvious, there is in that
process or life never any comparatively explosive or *“quick’’
or ‘‘violent’’ action; relatively speaking, everything always
works smoothly and rhythmically and without violence—
which means that there is always easily visible continuity, or
efficient cause, or least action. If we speak very carefully,
anything that may be properly said to be violent or explosive
refers to a comparison between different orders of whirls; if
in such comparisons we explicitly include the inverse square,
verbally even then no violence or catastrophe is apparent.

b. As the solar whirl traveled (Fig. 107e), the steadily
changing direction of the galaxy field, as it flowed about the
Milky Way, would force the solar whirl to change its direc-
tion into a revolution about that filament (about the galaxy
filiar axis), as shown hy the dotted path. The solar filament
and field, by their own rotation about the solar filiar axis,
would obviously keep the whirl moving ahead; i. e., at first
the energy which makes the solar whirl travel as shown by
the dotted line comes mostly from the solar whirl itself; the
motion of the galaxy field at that time serves chiefly to direct
its path (see par. g). Those fluid reactions are the same as
those shown generally in §§98w, 101e, 107e.

c. Now, some unusual combination of circumstances
may have caused the solar whirl S to move along practically
in the plane of the paper through S2 and §), as shown in the
figure ;—i. e., S might possibly have been given off with
scarcely any revolution about the main axis PP’; only in one
chance in infinity could there have been zero revolution (for
a finite tame, of course understood), which means not at all.
But even if S did move so “‘simply,’’ only by one chance in
infinity could it keep on in such non-revolving motion.
(Even if, as in par. a, a whirl wabbled back and forth in the
plane of the galaxy filiar axis, without perceptibly revolving
about that axis, it is but a temporary substantial non-revolu-
tion; for after a time definite revolution resulted, as shown.
We are seeing an analogous thing here.) Consequently, S

UNIVERSE

Two Xil §112d

would sooner or later begin definitely to revolve about PP’.
As a fact, S started out from C with a component of revolu-
tion about PP’, derived from the spiral in the galaxy filament
surface. So as a necessary truism, (cf. §§980, 101e,
concerning spiral motion), S revolves about the main galaxy
axis. In Fig. 107e the solar system’s spiral path is roughly
shown in perspective. | That path is neither a perfect or geo-
metrical spiral nor a similar helix, but is a combination of
both which is forever varying as the galaxy field varies and
as the internal processes of the solar system proceed, as may
be readily deduced by Bernoulli’s principle. Also, the rota-
tion about PP’ might have been in either direction; it depends
upon circumstances—perhaps usually chiefly upon birth con-
ditions, although analogously to man, ‘astronomical nurture’
may under certain conditions take a chief role. [That revo-
lution may be considered left-handed or counter-clockwise as
viewed from above, and as drawn. Possibly that agrees, as
it should, in relative direction with (1) the left-handed revo-
lution of the planets, and (2) the arbitrarily drawn fluid mo-
tions in the figure, and (3) the naming of the poles of the
earth’s magnetic field, and (4) the usual direction of twist in
the fiber of trees, the fact that man is usually right-handed,
has his heart on the left side, etc. But 1 do not know; see
Soob. | All of that is in direct agreement with the
fact that the galaxy field has a spiral motion. Consequently,
and as a further reaction, the spiral in the galaxy field be-
gins to tilé the plane of the solar filament (which is at the
present day still roughly the plane of the ecliptic), so that
the solar main field becomes or stays more definitely aspiral,
and so that the whirl is tilted with respect to the direction
of its path as shown at S; and S—the latter being the solar
system’s present location (exaggeratedly high; §107b). And
that agrees with the observed facts about the motion of the
solar system as a whole, now. Also, it analogously tru-
istically requires that the axes of our planets be tilted
just as they actually are. And it further truistically re-
quires that the magnetic poles of the earth, etc., be displaced
from the rotational poles somewhat; and it is observed that
they are so. Those magnetic poles continually vary in loca-
tion, which indicates that none of the fields is steady—which
is in agreement with ‘no exact science.’ Similarly, the tilt
of the whole solar system would slowly change some, as it
encountered varying strength and spiral of the galaxy field.
That is a motion of the solar system which has not been di-
rectly recognized yet, so far as | can find.

d. There are no data known to me which will deter-
mine whether or not the solar system in past ages has had
time enough [also youthful vigor enough, and-or environ-
mental non-interference| to go on spiraling upwards, turning
over the top of the Milky Way, until it made one or more
complete revolutions in a spiral path about the galaxy jfiliar
axis. Fig. 107e shows just a little more than one-half of such
a revolution—and I have guessed that so much of travel oc-
curred in 50 billion years. But there may have been many
previous revolutions of the solar system about the galaxy fila-
ment, so that it may be nearly as old as the galaxy whirl—
in fact, it is possible that by the calendar (by our arbitrary
L and T verbal forms) the solar system may be older than
the galaxy (but improbable):- for it may have been picked
up by the galaxy as a galaxy comet from another galaxy (cf.
§120), where it could have been born (or not) as described
above (the heat of the sun will indefinitely survive, depend-
ing on galaxy conditions, as we shall see, so that it is possible
that the solar system has been long wandering around as
more or less a particular structure, or galaxy electron, from
one galaxy to another). As a somewhat rash guess, based
intuitively on the present ‘smoothness’ of the solar system,

§112d X11 Two

my personal opinion is that our system has not made a com-
plete revolution about the galaxy filiar axis, but has had a
path somewhat as in Fig. 107e, although directions may gen-
erally be reversed from actual fact in that figure.

e. I shall here complete the general description of the
path of the solar system, although parts of the description
anticipate the statement of the concrete evidence. Such
evidence is implicitly given below in the description of inter-
nal details or processes of the solar system.

f. As the solar system moves around to the central gal-
axy field in Fig. 107e, it obviously encounters a stronger
and stronger spiral reaction from that field. Consequently,
the path of S flattens out (the helix pitch becoming less, the
path then expanding spirally). It is quite likely that now S
is revolving around the galaxy axis PP’ almost in a plane,
without helixing or corkscrewing up very much. It is some-
what probable (because S is so small) that S has, or nearly
has, used up its energy of self-propulsion in an upward helix,
so that the galaxy center field has made it spiral downward
for a while. Then in such a case, S would wabble or oscil-
late up and down with respect to the galaxy filiar plane in a
more or less circular orbit around PP’—which is mechanically
identical with the possible wabbling of a large whirl in an
orbit on the outer side (par. a). If the galaxy remains in a
fairly steady environment, obviously such an oscillating orbit
will finally be taken up by S, regardless of how many times
it may have revolved around the Milky Way (unless S pre-
viously gets assimilated by some other structure). Also, as
seen in par. a, all other secondaries finally get inside the hole
in the galaxy doughnut and take up such an orbit. Hence,
it then becomes inevitable, assuming sufficiently steady en-
vironment for the galaxy, that the systems in the central
field will get crowded and will proceed to combine plan-
etesimally into a central sun, as we shall see in the descrip-
tion of the formation of our sun. It is most likely, however,
that before that happens (before the galaxy turns itself intoa
system similar to our present solar system—which would re-
quire perhaps some decillions of our years), the galaxy will
‘collide’? with (which usually means ““side swipe’’) another
galaxy—both having become somewhat elaborate star el] ust-
ers in that process of condensing (so that their fields have
become comparatively weak and give less protection from
such collisions). So the ‘‘end’’ of the solar system will prob-
ably be its combining with some other system, in that pro-
cess of galary condensation. By the theory of chance (used
in our ignorance of the actual pertinent facts), our system is
likely to last more or less as it is now for some billions of
years. The human race will nearly surely be wiped out by
some comparatively minute changes in climate long before any
such combining takes place, as is implicitly shown in the re-
mainder of this section.

g. We proceed now to consider broadly the climatic
variations in the solar system and galaxy; the minor varia-
tions of climate—those on earth—are discussed in 8129,
As $ comes around under the Milky Way (Fig. 107e),
it is obvious that what chiefly determines its path is the re-
action of its field with the galaxy field. I. e., S is controlled
mostly by affinity there, and but little by ordinary gravity.
It is further obvious that the energy variations or asymmetries
of the galaxy field ether flow which S encounters furnish the
general, comprehensive cause of the variations in the internal
growth of S.__In general it is obvious that at first S uses its
own energy (more accurately :- potential) largely (being of
new-born, high potential), to screw itself along its path, in
the direction opposite the flow of the galaxy field. Asa gen-
eral rule, it is obvious that such a wearing out or aging of §
continues until such time as 5 oscillates near the galaxy filiar

122

UNIVERSE

plane (as in the last paragraph), although there could be

temporary reversals of that process at any time. We see the
details of that wearing out or condensation later. We may
note now that in general the reactions of the fields may be
considered as regulating the speed of the various difference
surfaces inside the solar system. And those speeds or poten-
tials determine what we know as temperature, and the gen-
eral phenomena of those difference surfaces or temperatures
are bunched together under the name climate. Obviously,
any variation of interaction of solar and galaxy fields modifies
all climates in the solar system in proper proportions. Ordi-
narily of course we speak of the sun as controlling our earth
climate ($122); we here merely go further back and see
what controls the sun climate——in fact, makes the sun itself.
We could go still further ‘back’ or **up’’ and show what con-
trols and modifies the galaxy field (and so on in infinite re-
gress), and say that that controls our climate; but the
principle is always the same (§110cd).

h. As S starts off on its dotted path we have seen that
it begins to revolve about the galaxy axis PP’. Now, as the
galaxy is not a perfect or symmetrical structure it immedi-
ately follows that the revolution of S around PP’ is eccentric.
I. e., S will approach closer to the Milky Way on one side
of PP’ than it does on the opposite side. As a result of that
rhythm or overrunning (analogous to the eccentric orbit of
the earth, say) there will be a corresponding rhythmic varia-
tion of energy of interaction of galaxy and solar fields (analo-
gous to the oscillations mentioned in the last paragraph, but
on a generally smaller scale), and hence of the climates of
bodies in the solar system. One side of the rhythm would
be a rather warm geologic age and the other side would be a
cold (glacial) age. I shall here proceed to write on the
quantitative guess that that rhythm has produced the observed
glacial ages; but obviously, the oscillations with respect to
the galaxy filiar plane would always be present in some de-
gree and would be a second general cause of large climatic
variations, ina rhythm superimposed on the rhythm due to
eccentricity of orbit about PP’. Similarly, it is obvious that
the fairly near approach of our system to another solar system
(say as close asa light year) would cause an appreciable varia-
ation in climate. And an irregular variation in climate could
be caused by marked variations from smoothness of the
Milky Way filament as S travels past them in its orbit; per-
haps that is actually the most efficient cause of conventional
“‘glacial ages.’’ A geologic time scale of the earth,
prepared from orthodox sources by H. F. Osborn, is repro-
duced from his “‘Origin of Life’’ as Appendix C (it is put in
an appendix so as to be easy to find, it being a useful table).
According to Sollas (““Age of the Earth,’’ 285), there are
observed to be at least three general glacial ages—‘‘once at
the beginning of the Cambrian; again, and more evidently,
during the Permian period; and yet once again in times
comparatively near our own,’’ and observations show that
three times there were intervening periods with climates con-
siderably warmer than now. According to Osborn’s chart
the time intervals between those three general glacial ages
are roughly 13 million years for one, and 16 for the other.

i. If we make a guess that the diameter of the orbit of
the solar system around PP’ is something like 100 light years
(that is probably too low a guess; ef. §107e), and that the
system moves in that orbit at an average speed of 18mi/sec
(that is probably too high), then we find that the length of a
glacial year that is due to eccentricity of orbit would be
about 34 million years. That does not agree with the 13 and
16 millions of the last paragraph. However, there are traces
in recent times of six glacial ‘‘advances’’ in North America
(““Ency. Brit.,’’ xii, 59), and it is quite possible that each of

123

those is a mark of a glacia) year or revolution about PP’. If
that is a good quantitative guess, then orthodox guesses at
geological time (those given in Osborn’s table) have, with
too much deference to Kelvin’s bad guesses as to how long
the sun could stay hot (he had no correct principle on which
to base guesses), been entirely too small (cf. **Ency. Brit.,”’
xi, 651ff). But we can get figures that seem discrep-
ant in the other direction. According to Eddington (‘‘Stel-
lar Motions,”’ 261), Charlier finds the node of the ‘‘invari-
able’’ plane of the solar system on the plane of the Milky
Way to have a motion of 0.35 seconds of arc per century.
If we assume that such “‘invariable’’ conditions actually do
give roughly that average motion through a revolution of S
abont PP’, then a glacial year would be about 370 million
years, giving the sun’s orbit roughly a diameter of 10,000
light years, if we take the same speed in it as before.

j-k. I have included those badly discrepant guesses to
show how uncertain and unguided by consistent principles
present geological and stellar measures sometimes are. The
obvious facts are that the revolution of S about PP’ is rather
irregular, but as it takes several million years to complete a
revolution the irregularities are not yet perceptible to us;
and that there are other rhythms in its orbit which probably
modify the glacial ages due to that revolution. Further, an
oscillation of S with respect to the galaxy filiar plane would
obviously make the orbit itself vary very considerably in size.
And the Milky Way is itself observably irregular. And the
orbit of S would have precession in the minor degree that
“‘gravity’’ applied. Also, it is obvious that every time the
solar system passed fairly close to another system, there
would be a variation, as mentioned. Also, it is entirely pos-
sible that the solar system in its orbit about PP’ is so distant
from the Milky Way that whatever eccentricity there may be
in the orbit makes no perceptible difference in the climate,
but that some of the other causes are efficient in producing
glacial ages. Out of those several possibilities of vari-
ation, and some slight knowledge of geologic speeds, I intui-
tively judge that the time durations given in Osborn’s table
ought to be at least three times longer in the cenozoic, at
least ten times as great in the mesozoic, and twenty or more
times as great for the remainder, with perhaps 40 or more
billion years for ages before the archean.

l. The “‘existence’’ of the human race obviously de-
pends primarily or truistically on climate—for climate is
simply the general name that implies certain conditions of
dynamic equilibrium. If conditions are too much out of
equilibrium the race as we know it will of course perish (or
change enormously); if conditions are sufficiently stable a
man could live almost indefinitely (see §123 for that consist-
ent, possible ‘“fountain of youth’’ or millennium). Any
‘‘end’’ of the race implies the entry of the solar system into
an environment somewhat different from the present. Such
a change could occur by our running near another system;
or by running into a considerably changed part of the galaxy
field (or by some analogous interna] change in the solar sys-
tem with reference to our earth and its field). However, a
little consideration wil] show that no such marked change can
rapidly occur—we are ‘protected’ by affinity or fields, and
are not naked with a lone gravity. We would obviously take
on such a change almost imperceptibly, and die off slowly
during several generations if it were going to become too
great for the present sort of race, and intelligent astronomers
could predict the approach of any such end for thousands of
years. Obviously, the solar system is supported and main-
tained chiefly by the galaxy field (mostly by affinity, and
only slightly by gravity) in a fairly steady equilibrium that
may last without perceptible disturbance for billions of years.

UNIVERSE

Two

XII §113b

So there is no need to worry about any ‘‘end’’ of the earth.
As indicated, an actual end would probably be so slow as to
be perceptibly painless. Also, any probable change of cli-
mate for the next ten thousand years could be met, by an
intelligent people, by building suitable shelter. The rain
will continue for a while to descend upon the just and the
unjust, and the unjust will continue to flourish except for the
process of slow suicide by stupidity which they practice (as
we see implicitly in XVIII, XIX). Finally, of course the
solar system will combine with some other system; and the
race will perish some time before that begins very percept-
ibly to happen, provided we do not detach the earth from
the system and sail off to a safer environment; theoretically
that is easy enough to do (§123).

m. It therefore follows that if the solar system has ever
made a previous revolution about the Milky Way (around the
galaxy filiar axis), it is likely that the climatic conditions re-
sulting eliminated much “‘life’’ that may have previously
flourished. Hence, it should be kept in mind that there is a
possibility that this earth has previously been peopled by a
human race far more conscious (i. e., intelligent and defin-
itely religious) than we are. So when in this book I speak
of human beings, unless otherwise indicated I mean the ones
on this planet that are included in the present time sequence
of history, and I neglect some possible previous race(s) on
earth, and races on other planets. They are all essentially
the same, of course; but historical (i. e., quantitative) facts
that apply to us, obviously do not definitely apply to those
others. But even if S has made only the part of a
revolution about the Milky Way, as in Fig. 107e, it is most
probable that on a number of occasions conditions became
sufficiently stable to permit primitive “‘life’’ to start ‘“‘spon-
taneously’’ (§144) and continue for possibly a million or so
years, and then be wiped out by some too great change.
That is all the more probable when it is considered that this
earth has never had a molten interior in the conventional
sense ($119, etc.); quite likely the surface has been more or
less molten on occasions even after it became rather large—
it is now so, locally, as in volcanoes (and the seas and air are
molten). I. e., ‘geology’ very probably began all over again,
so to speak, several times. | We could rather positively find
out (by principles analogous to those shown with respect to
meteors, 8120), and get the previous history of the earth
fairly well, by digging it completely up—examining al] of it.
I judge that it is not worth while to do that. But perhaps
the astronomers wil] in a few years, by plotting the paths of
stars, figure out our history fairly accurately for several hun-
dred million years back. At any rate, it is obvious that ge-
ology and astronomy have barely scratched the surface of
history, and that geology can stop skimping its time.

S113. a. We now begin to follow through the internal
processes of our solar system. For some of the details of
those processes I shall shift to a description of precisely
analogous processes in Saturn, in comets, and in meteors,
where the evidence is clearer. Such details will apply analo-
gously to any whirl, depending on relative quantitative con-
ditions. The chief new point to be considered is that im the
virtually older solar system gravity is now of more importance
than affinity, and we have ‘reverse whirls,’ or solid or spheri-
cal whirls, like our earth.

b. As soon as gravity does begin to be a rather effective
force the processes become something like those asserted by
the old nebular theory. That theory in effect used only a
force of attraction, or gravity, explicitly. So formally it tru-
istically would not work: for any positive language requires
at least two parts to a machine (Part One), and Kant’s start-
ing nebula was just a single condensing ball, and it was then

§113b XI1 Two

impossible, even as a truism of his own dualistic logic, for it
ever to become anything else. As a matter of actnal fact,
he tacitly did use an opposing force which be called inertia
or centrifugal force. But he failed to be explicit about it,
and to show definitely that it must be handled, logically at
least, as this book does it. There is nothing wrong with the
old nebular theory if that centrifugal force be consistently
used. If it be, we sball promptly get an infinite regress,
or mass varies with velocity, or an ever-varying machine of
two explicit parts like our whirl and filament. For instance,
Bjerknes (‘‘Fields of Force,’’ p. 10) is explicit about the
same thing the nebular theory is mystic about, thus:- ** Any
body which participates in the translatory motion of a fluid
mass is subject to a kinetic buoyancy equal to the product of
the acceleration of the translatory motion multiplied by the

mass of the water [fluid] displaced by the body.’’ That is
the same as saying that mass varies with velocity; and it is
concretely exemplified by the doings of a whirl. So we can

say that the nebular theory is quite right as religious lang-
uage; the difficulty with it is lack of pluralistic positiveness.
For details of nebular theory, see ‘“‘Ency. Brit.,’’ xix, 333ff.

c. Several men have with rather explicit validity worked
out the gravity condensation of the solar system, and showed
the detailed errors of the nebular theory. Chamberlin in
“The Origin of tbe Earth,’’ has perhaps done it best.
Chamberlin is such a first class all-’round man that I think
his book is worth reading merely from the point of view of
having the pleasure of looking at such a man closely. He
uses an erplicit machine, consisting of two or more celestial
[spherical whirl] bodies—which of course is theoretically
equivalent to Reeve’s theory (§92) if it be reduced to the
ultimate. © Chamberlin does not perform that logical reduc-
tion: on the contrary he tacitly takes it that the reacting
bodies have fields which modify the formerly-orthodox gravity
effect—and that is, in general form, equivalent to the whirl

theory. The explicit astronomy in his book is definitely
orthodox dualistic astronomy which he took over bodily from
an astronomer who merely repeated Laplace’s dualistic logic.
But Chamberlin himself twice explicitly recognizes the effect
of fields under the name of electric and magnetic action
(ibid., 29, 148), as modifying (and strictly speaking, repudi-
ating) that old Laplace astromical Jogic—or lack of it.

d. Explicit points in which the old nebular theory fails
to work, and additional details of how gravity collects small
bodies (planetesimals, to use Chamberlin’s felicitous name)
together into spheres such as the earth, when gravity is the
chief force acting (i. e., when the whirl field gets too weak
to hold the bodies mostly by its strength—by “affinity’), can
be found in Chamberlin’s book. Eugene Miller in “‘The
Origin of Our Planetary System’’ has expressed in an easily
readable form a somewhat similar, non-rigorous theory, in
which he deduces the solar system from two meeting spheri-
cal bodies, now the sun and Jupiter (without explaining the
origin of those two). Jeans has worked out the same genera]
idea mathematically—as have several astronomers. Miller
makes his spheres rhythmic or elastic or overrnnning; hence,
his description, which may be considered as a brief but ex-
tended application of the well known tide theory of G. H.
Darwin is logically equivalent to the whirl theory. But he
omits explicit statement of how (mechanically or-and logically)
a body can be elastic. To include that, he must explicitly
solve the One and Many, and hence become formally identi-
cal with this whirl description (§101f).

e. The reader may get from those books detailed ac-
counts of planetesima] action, if he wishes. So J shall con-
dense to bare essentials the description of the planetesima]
processes of the solar system.

124

UNIVERSE

We have taken the solar system as a general
case, having it a rather fluid whirl with a comparatively neg-
ligible amount of condensation of atoms when it breaks out
of the Milky Way. It is to be repeated that it might vary
from that in an indefinite number of ways. It is also to
be emphasized that endless variation of the Jater internal
processes is possible. I claim to do nothing more than show
typical reactions. On account of the numerons possibilities
—millions of perceptible ones,—for brevity Iam forced to
become rhetorically somewhat dogmatic. But it is requested
that the reader remember vividly here that al] quantitative
assertions are just guesses and approximations, even though
the inaccuracy may be of the order of only a second a cen-
tury. Adifference of that much in the period of the rotation
of the sun may have made the difference between there being
now an ultra-Neptune planet or not: the solar system is just
that delicately poised quantitatively, as we shal] implicitly
see. We can’t tell whether a leaf wil] fall this way or that
in a wind unless we make elaborate measurements that usu-
ally are impracticable in the time available. It is a quantita-
tive problem: the intelligible qualitative answer is that it will
move in some direction if not held. And the solar system is
a living being (for proof, see XVI) that perceptibly has far
more parts in intricate quantitative dynamic equilibrium than
any plant with its leaves—truistically; as a plant is only a
small part of the solar system.

b. As the system comes out at C along the path in Fig.
107e it encounters a comparatively rapidly changing environ-
ment, and itself has a youthful high potential, as we saw.
Consequently, the solar filament begins to break up rapidly
—to give off secondary whirls. It probably in a million or
so years began to take on the aspect of the whole galaxy
whirl as shown in Fig. 107e. I.e., it probably by that time
had many fairly large secondaries as outer spirals (the sec-
ondaries would be the ‘‘knots’’ in the spiral arms of photo-
graphed nebulas), and bad numerous small whirls that had
come around into its central field. The collection of whirls
in the centra] field would obviously constantly increase, as
we saw with reference to the galaxy; for as soon asa whirl
field wears out some, losing some of its affinity factor, that
secondary whirl is swept by the solar field into the central
solar field. | The secondary would there finally begin to os-
ciJlate up and down as we saw may now be happening to the
solar system with respect to the galaxy field. But if the
secondary keeps on wearing out, then it in turn will finally
break up into condensations (like an old, broken-up comet;
§120). Or in short, in aging the density of the inner struct-
ures of a whirl becomes too great, affinity can no longer sup-
port them as a fluid whirl, and by the experiments we saw
and obviously as a truism of Bernoulli’s principle or of the

dynamic buoyancy’’ of Bjerknes (§$113b) they are swept
out, the whirl condensing then mostly by gravity.

c. Thus the fields of the secondaries in the central solar
field themselves become weak, and the secondaries combine,
in some of the ways we have seen. Those secondaries ob-
viously become more numerous and crowded as time passes,
and the crowding accelerates the uniting of them, and the
formation of relatively harmonious sizes of condensations
(§100j). And with weakened fields, gravity bas a greater
effect between whirls, pulling them together (“‘electricity”’
is markedly or quite perceptibly the quantitative opposite of
that; XIV). That force of gravity ultimately in practice or
with respect to actual measuring is by no theory or measures
Newton’s or Laplace’s mystical mathematica] limit, but is
merely what we may express as being the field reactions of
touching whirls of lower orders—finally of cells (S103; Index,
“‘Gravity’’). | And that is obviously merely truistic; for as

S114. a.

125

soon as the whirls show signs of disintegrating, then what we
eall gravity steps in (the measure of the gravity factor rises
as and when the affinity factor falls; Fig. 104b), and makes
them hang together in another, ‘reverse’ way. Therefore,
the total universe is now seen, in the most definitely ‘‘concrete’’
aspect, to vibrate or oscillate or exhibit rhythm about a condition
of mean equilibrium. And if we observed and expressed our-
selves perfectly, then obviously by the principle of least action
(§98m), the deviation of the ultimate parts of the universe is
zero—which is the ‘physics’ or concrete form of the principle
that man can not make an error (§25). Or, all things in
the universe are ultimately balanced. Consequently, the
ultimate ethical law, expressed in pluralistic terms, is that
we should be balanced or temperate—consciously so, as we
actually in ultimate fact are anyway, and are truistically
partly dead, or part men, if we don’t see it, don’t ‘‘be’’ that
way (XVIII). Thus we promptly revert to an inex-
pressible One in a very obviously truistic fashion as soon as
we put gravity and affinity explicitly together. |The keen
reader can note that in all this “‘material’’ description I am
constantly on the verge of the One and Many. To use the
language of Cooke in his Introduction, only the austerity of
the mechanics of our ether cell prevents our slumping into
mysticism-—which, while highly valuable in its place (Index,
**Rebirth’’), is truistically out of place when we are under-
taking to talk a mutually intelligible language.

d. lt can be seen to be a reasonable quantitative guess
(in the absence of the mathematical establishment of a gen-
eral periodic table), that, inside any collection of atoms and
small whirls which constitutes what we call a molar body,
gravity and affinity are about equally effective. JI. e., in an
ordinary molar body there is obviously about average equi-
librium, and hence that equilibrium is so hard to upset that
there existed before the discovery of unbalanced radioactive
substances the erroneous quantitative anthropocentric guess
that only a molar body was **matter,’’ and that such matter
was indestructible. On either side (Fig. 104b) of that equilib-
rium which from our anthropocentric point of view is fairly
stable there is a less stable condition of equilibrium:- (1) that
in which the fields are directly more effective, which is the
condition we have been viewing in the solar system so far,
and which, e. g., occurs in electricity; and (2) that form of
matter in which the fields become comparatively less effect-
ive (never wholly ineffective or zero), and in which the parts
are held together mostly by gravity, as, e. g., the planets in
the solar system, and radioactive bodies as compared with more
stable ones (all atoms are somewhat radioactive, in that all
field surfaces give off some secondaries; XI).

e. Consequently, whether the worn out secondary whirls
be broken up and the pieces swept out of the solar central
field, or whetber they unite (collide, mostly by side swiping)
the result is finally identical:- the condensations or molar
bodies are formed. In fact, those different ways of naming
the processes are merely different points of view of the same
process. KE. g., if the whirls are broken up and “swept
out’ of the central field, obviously the condensing is merely
delayed, and takes place elsewhere, the condensations being
finally swept back into what we may cal] the central conden-
sation, as we shall see. I. e., the central condensations in
the solar system produce our sun; some of the secondaries
which get into the central field (as now happens with comets;
§120) would be swept out, and would not at once combine
with the sun, but would combine with (say) Jupiter; but, if
there is time enough, Jupiter itself will finally condense into
the sun (if there is not ‘time enough,’ then the solar system
will itself condense or coalesce with another system, so i
effect and in principle Jupiter condenses into the sun). So,

UNIVERSE

Two XII §lléa

regardless of the details, the processes of condensation con-
tinue—up to a point stated in the next two paragraphs.

f. However, at once the opposite effect appears (it act-
ually always accompanied the condensation), thus:- | When
the fields of the whirls get relatively weak, gravity becomes
of greater importance and pulls the whirls closer together—
two filaments may unite into one; two whirls may alternately
thread through each other; or there may be slipping or roll-
ing on each other: those indefinitely numerous quantitative
ways of ‘condensing’ give new elements, or chemical com-
pounds, or solids, liquids, gases, and various combinations
and modifications of those conventional things, ad infinitum.
In coming together, the whirls overrun and hence make their
field surfaces more energetic, and that produces in effect a
single field which envelops the whole condensation (or, the
fields may be said to coalesce into one; there being no ab-
solutely distinct fields anyway, the two ways of expressing it
are equivalent), the condensation and its unit field thus be-
coming in principle identical with an ether cell. That ether
cell is a ‘reversal’ of a whirl (§98); i. e., we simply take a
new point of view of it (mathematically, we emphasize the
other factor of the pair in Fig. 104b we happen to be using
one of, so that a numerical increase of it indiéates travel in
the other or ‘reverse’ direction on the curve); or we have
verbally created that new, unit field, although actually it is
nothing more than the summing up of the effects of two bod-
ies which start going together and which truistically would
verbally or logically keep on going or condensing until they
became zero or monistic unless we thus changed points of
view, or the trick of naming them (this being the dynamic
concrete form of the inverse square law or the explicit going
from one order to another). The definite mechanics of that
are given in the chapters on light and electricity. There-
fore, this summed up effect, or ‘reversed field’ of a condensa-
tion, by the overrunning of the gravity effects is truistically
made more energetic than the weakened fields it replaces, so
that for the whole condensation the affinity potential immedi-
ately rises and stops gravity’s increase. E. g., the eartb
does not continue ‘condensing’ (by falling into the sun), but
is supported by its and the sun’s field so long as galaxy con-
ditions stay fairly steady, revolving about the sun (§134j).

g. That is a general statement of the fact that potential
remains fairly steady or balanced (there being only a rhyth-
mic variation about a mean, due directly to the fact that the
original criterion V, is not fixed or exact, and can not be).
Or, it is a logical proof or self-consistent statement in terms
of gravity and affinity, that each factor is mutually depend-
ent and cannot become either zero or infinity with respect to
actual bodies; in terms of human life, no person (in tbe us-
ual Many sense of person) can be absolutely born, or can ab-
solutely die. And it is a little difficult to express and to
understand in that general form, for the simple reason that
we are in the habit of talking in terms of classical logic and
the nebular theory, which explicitly tries to talk about only
gravity, etc. So we may at once put the general form in
terms of observed facts about the solar system. The sun and
the earth are obviously existing condensations. Both are ob-
served to have a unit field (itis called electrical or magnetic;
ef. §§113c, 121; XIV). Obviously, those fields must modify
the pull of gravity. Therefore, regardless of any relative
values of those fields, it follows from immediately verifiable
facts that our argument or description is self-consistent. As
implied, the whole of XIV, on electricity, gives verifiable
facts proving this perceptible variation of gravity and affinity
about a mean, with a reversal of structure (it isa quantitative
fact: not an essential change).

8115. a. We therefore have molar bodies—planetesimals

§ll5a XII Two

—with weak fields being pulled together in the central solar
field. They keep on collecting to form the sun. There ob-
viously would be no conventional “‘collisions’’ of those bod-
ies, for all are protected somewhat by fields. When
mostly gravity pulls two towards each other, obviously the
fields as a result start speeding up the spherical difference
surface that then forms for each; and that truistically is an
increase of the surface temperatures of tbe two bodies (that
is merely the ultimate and consistent mechanics of the com-
mon fact that compression of a substance usually makes it
hotter). So it is obvious that the suzfaces of the planetesi-
mals will be comparatively hot, but their fields, and insides,
will be colder. Consequently, the surface of the sun will
always be kept relatively bot simply as the result of the re-
actions of the solar whirl with the galaxy freld. I. e.,so long
as our solar system has a certain proportional amount of en-
ergy (relative to the galaxy field), then that long will the
main bulk of the solar system (which is the sun—the rest of
it now amounting ronghly to less than 1/700 of the mass of
the sun) have a surface hot enough to have a general /j.
The sun simply is kept superficially hot by the whole gal-
axy (and similarly the surfaces of the planets, etc., in their
proper proportion). If the solar system tends to accumulate
an excess of either affinity or gravity, so that the sun, with
its certain relative size, cools or heats proportionally, then,
just as in the last section, the solar system itself will con-
dense or expand, and keep up the relative proportions and
truistically restore and steady temperatures—up to a certain
quantitatively critical point, at which the system will change
order of structure. Obviously, that is merely another
way of stating that the solar system is mostly supported in
its spiral patb by the galaxy field. So only as the galaxy
field around the solar system varies considerably in energy
can the temperature of the sun’s surface vary much. In
short, as the galaxy field as a whole is fairly balanced, espec-
ially with reference to smal] whirls like the solar system, all
the bodies in our galaxy, of a size perhaps slightly larger
than Jupiter as a minimum, usually have a surface tempera-
ture high enough to make their surface atoms visible—i. e.,
witbin 7}. And that is the quantitative basis on which this
description of the universe was started; hence, the descrip-
tion su far is in general self-consistent, as we have circularly
come back to that fact. And a direct proof of this
paragraph is Adams’s observation (I quote from a letter in
which he refers to an article in ““Astrophysical Journal,’ 45,
1917) that the smaller and less massive stars move more rap-
idly than the larger and more massive ones, the comparison
being made between stars having similar physical conditions.
And that is merely one form of the Jaw that mass varies with
velocity, or the astronomical aspect of Bernoulli’s principle;
or, as Adams puts it, the fact exhibits the principle of equi-
partition of energy.

b. And all that is obviously merely a particular way of
asserting our original observation that everything is interre-
lated. | We have seen that the sun’s heat is thus sustained
by the whole galaxy; so there is no fear of the sun’s cooling
off very soon. The conventional theories of the sun’s heat
(‘“‘Ency. Brit.,’’ Art. ““Sun’’) obviously imply the foregoing
explicit description; but they get somewhat confused by lay-
ing the explicit stress wholly on gravity——thus fancying that
the inside of the sun is hot so that the sun itself is directly a
reservoir of heat. We see additional detailed facts
confirming this section as we proceed.

8116. a. As the solar whirl S travels along its path in
Fig. 107e the condensation of the sun continues. Obviously,
the central field of the solar whirl is, dynamically, somewhat
cylindrical, as the virtually younger Saturn is observed to be

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126

now in perceptible measure (‘‘Ency. Brit. gat ‘*Saturn’’).
That same modification of the figure of the sun, earth,
ete., would still apply in slight degree. The exact figure of
the earth or any other actual celestial body is not known,
and is not exactly soluble. That figure approaches geomet-
rical sphericity somewhat; so I roughly speak of spherical
whirls. For the conventional mechanics of those figures, see
‘“Eney. Brit.,’’ Art. ‘“Earth, Figure of.”’

b. Obviously, that general mechanics of condensation
agrees with the fact that observed spiral nebulas have conden-
sations in the center. Also, in our galaxy the condensation
has not proceeded so far as to form any perceptible central
sun or visible beginning of one; but most likely the center
of our galaxy, on account of the comparatively numerous bod-
ies there, looks, from other galaxies, as if there were the
usual thick nebulous center—but possibly not; possibly our
galaxy it too young yet. Our mechanics obviously not only
consistently describe the formation of the sun, but they also
agree explicitly with the observed distribution of stars with
reference to the Milky Way:- they are thinly distributed at
the galactic poles (P and P’, Fig. 107e), becoming more
thickly sprinkled towards the Milky Way, as observed irom
our position near the center (‘‘Ency. Brit., ‘“Star’’). Also,
our mechanics obviously furnish an explanation of the various
observed star drifts (same Art. ‘‘Star’’).

c. It is observed that the ‘‘surface’’ of the sun (which
is fluid) rotates faster at the sun’s equator and gradually
goes slower as the poles are approached (the equatorial sur-
face rotates once in about 25 days, and the polar surface in
about 6 days longer). The same condition seems to have
been observed on Saturn, and there is considerable evidence
that our atmosphere acts in the same way (as we shall see,
the sun [ete.] has a ‘“‘solid’’ surface like the earth, as it is
cold inside: but just as we do not see the floor of the ocean,
we do not see that solid surface, except perhaps dimly in the
middle of sun spots, and we do not know its rotation time).
In the sun, the upper layers of the ‘‘surface’’ we see (i. e.,
hydrogen layers; ““Ency. Brit.,’’ ““Sun’’), rotate faster than
the lower ones, and the extreme perceptible outer layer seems
to retain its angular velocity as the poles are approached.
Obviously, all those otherwise unexplained phenomena are
directly consistent with our description of spherical whirls—
or follow directly from Bernoulli’s principle applied to ether
cells. Also, that explanation is obviously equivalent to the
discussion of temperature in the last section.

8117. a. The sun when condensing as described would
obviously not only acqnire a rotation ahout its axis, of the
nature just decribed, but the sun as a whole, by the principle
of asymmetry, would form somewhat away from the center
of the solar whirl field (i. e., the axis of the sun would not
correspond with the solar main axis). Hence, the sun itself
would revolve about the solar main axis (about NS’ in Fig.
107e, although the center of the sun would be close to NS),
and the primary result of that would be that there would be
an accumulated asymmetry which tended to make what was
left of the solar filament finally split into practically two large
secondary whirls (which process or stage of splitting would
correspond to conventional “‘dumbbell’’ nebulas). Or, we
can equally correctly say that the general unbalance of con-
ditions due to the traveling of the solar whirl] asymmetrically
in the galaxy field (i. e., the start of the solar path in Fig.
107e obviously is asymmetrical with respect to the main axis
PP’), would tend to give such a double splitting, while at
the same time the same general asymmetry caused the sun
to form with its center of gravity off to one side of the
solar main axis. Both ways of stating the condition obviously
give the same result, being merely different points of view.

127

And it can be observed in experimental soapy water whirls
that the inevitable asymmetry even in a basin of water that
is apparently still has a tendency to accumulate and produce
such dumbbell or two-part splitting.

b. Parenthetically it may be noted that the infant sun
would revolve in an elliptical orbit about the solar main axis.
Also, the very young sun would itself at first be composed of
many small condensations revolving more or less about each
other in orbits controlled largely by gravity; the sun in that
condition is a miniature star cluster. But that star cluster
would be comparatively small, and hence would condense
rapidly (say in a few million years) and form a structure with
chondrules as in meteorites ($120). And the ellipticity
of the orbit of the sun and also the ellipticity of the orbits of
its parts before it was quite condensed into a more or less in-
fant sun, would cause the condensations to sweep out consid-
erable space; also, the oscillations of those orbits up and
down near the solar filiar plane (roughly the ecliptic) would
sweep out a further space; and all those reactions would ac-
celerate the formation of the sun. For the details of that
roughly described planetesimal condensation see Chamber-
lin’s “‘Origin of the Earth.’? The essential point of the
process is that the reactions tend towards the same result.

ec. To take up again the probable dumbbell splitting,
we can see that at about the time the sun begins to be a
more or less dense cluster the solar whirl has a strong ten-
dency to become a spiral nebula with two rather definite
arms. Of course there could have been a number of smaller
arms (secondaries and their debris, tertiaries, etc.) previously
formed; also, instead of two arms, the whirl could have
completely split into a number of secondaries, forming as
many arms. Spiral nebulas of those varying characteristics
are actually observed in the skies. And when the
solar filament is thus nearly all dissipated as secondaries, ob-
viously the filament is also comparatively much weakened so
that the secondary fields are weak, and the gravity factor be-
comes locally more effective. That gravity factor then ac-
celerates the condensing into spherical whirls, which whirls
relatively have an effective strong difference surface (e. g.,
the hot or high potential surface of the sun), and those re-
versed whirls thus bring the affinity of the whole solar system
up again, balancing the system with the galaxy whirl
(S$114c). Thus we again see the rhythm of structure about
the One line of no resistance.

d. With that increase of gravity action there would be
rapidly formed in the central field of each secondary a nucleus
similar to the infant sun. § Those condensations would form
more or less in the solar filiar plane (which is roughly the
same plane still:- the ecliptic; for that data, and for author-
ity for other facts ] use about the planets, etc., see *“Eney.
Brit.,’’ Arts. ‘““Sun,’’ ‘‘Planet,’’ ‘“Planets, Minor,”’ “*Jupi-
ter,’’ ete.; for brevity I omit frequent citation of authority).
However, a good many of those condensations, especially
while they were in the rather sparse cluster stage, would ob-
viously have their general outer field get comparatively so
weak that the remains of the solar whirl field would sweep
them out of the ecliptic, around the filiar axis, into the cen-
tral solar field and likely into the sun (cf. §112a), ‘In the
past it is very probable that large planets (at least infant
planets) have been thus swept into the sun; in the future
when we get into the proper galaxy environment for it, other
outer planets will be thus swept into the sun; comets now
are obviously minor condensations which have had such a
history ($120). It is most likely that novas or new
stars which suddenly blaze up in a few days much brighter
than they were before (and then more or less slowly grow
dim) are stars which have thus been hit by one of their outer

UNIVERSE

Two Xll §l17f

planets. The general disturbance caused by the reaction of
the fields as the planet is falling could account for the minor
preliminary increase of brightness sometimes observed in
novas. One conventional explanation of new stars is that
they are caused by ordinary stars’ running into dark nebulas.
The objection to that is that the various fields would prevent
such a collision, and that the fields would in any partial col-
lision be so strong that only very gradual results could occur.
If Neptune swung around into the sun it obviously would
make the sun blaze up quite a bit, and probably would burn
up most of us humans; but it would not smash the sun ap-
preciably, but would be superficially spectacular, like novas.
It is therefore obvious that it is possible that the former popu-
lar fear of comets was a racial memory from the former days
when some comets did do a lot of local damage. Neptune
would make a rather large and dangerous comet. But no
one need get frightened, as intelligent astronomers could
predict such occurrences hundreds of years ahead.

e. If the solar whirl started ont as a fluid whirl, it is
likely that the larger secondary whirl of that possible dumb-
bell splitting was the beginning of what is now Jupiter, our
giant planet. It is possible, of course, that the sun and
Jupiter were two solar systems which approached each other
and pulled each other into a gravity spiral nebula, as is tac-
itly asserted possible by Chamberlin and others. It is im-
probable, however. Certainly it is practically impossible
that there were two /one stars, Sun and Jupiter, in the same
neighborhood in the galaxy field; and the combination of
the more probable Sun cluster and Jupiter cluster except by
extremely improbable chances would have produced a more
complicated solar system than ours is observed to be. _It is
likely that tbe astronomers already have enough data to de-
termine at once the probable actual history as regards that
possibility. The actual fact is, of course, that tbe solar sys-
tem was never (except by one chance in infinity) a whirl so
perfectly fluid as to contain no structures higher in order than
ether cells: always it would start with some “condensations.’
Analogously, neither could it be a whirl or nebula produced
by just two sharp and distinct bodies or condensations. Al-
ways there would be fields (affinity) to those bodies, and
more or less of a cluster condition which would produce some-
thing of a fluid whirl. Chamberlin in effect asserts that; so
there is logical identity between Chamberlin’s planetesimal
processes, and these whirl mechanics in which for rhetorical
needs ] am deliberately emphasizing affinity.

f. The solar system now, so far as has been observed,
consists of the sun with four planets (respectively Mercury,
Venus, Earth, Mars), then a gap in which there have been
seen over a thousand smal] planets or asteroids (those asteroids
often depart considerably from the ecliptic), then the four
outer planets (respectively Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and
Neptune), with various moons, comets, meteor trains, and
gases, It is likely that the asteroids form most of what is
left of the original solar filament (compare with the “‘dirt”’
in Northrup’s filaments; §102d); there probably still re-
mains a slight fluid motion of ether asa filament there, but
its spiral has probably become nearly wholly a revolution
about the main solar axis; some such motion might be de-
tected by close observation of the orbits of asteroids.
When the solar whirl became a rather well defined spiral it is
obvious that most likely a number of comparatively small
secondaries traveled around the solar filament into the cen-
tral solar field. ©The sun by that time would have been at
least a considerably condensed cluster, so that there would
have been considerable space around the sun in which there
was room for those whirls to survive, and to condense to-
gether in a proportionate way, thus sweeping out all that

S117f XII Two

space pretty cleanly. That would produce the four inner
planets; it might have produced forty except that the quan-
tities happened to be so related by the principles of harmonic
periodicity (or here, by the principles of Bode’s law; cf.
next paragraph, §128, etc.) that there were four. Probably
the other and smaller part of the original dumbbell splitting
(if there was such a splitting) was Saturn. It would be pro-
tected by Jupiter; i. e., Jupiter would sweep out its space
pretty cleanly, and would more or less break up the original
solar field, so that Saturn lived in a fairly steady and weak-
ened solar field, and hence lived very slowly and is now virt-
ually quite young—compared with the earth; middle aged
compared with the galaxy whirl. The two known planets
now remaining still further out, Uranus and Neptune, are
obviously condensations made up of other whirls left in the
outer space. There may be a number of outer planets yet
undiscovered ; it is a quantitative problem not exactly soluble.
There are surely some smal] condensations out there.
g. Now, all of those planets (including the asteroids as
the averaged equivalent of one planet) may obviously truis-
tically be considered to have field surfaces substantially equal
in potential—in energeticness. In short, the reason Newton
got his form of illogical law is that the planet field surfaces
are rather weak and about equal. It therefore theoretically
follows directly that, as their orbits are approximately in the
plane of the ecliptic (roughly, are 2-dimensioned), then the
proper harmonic periods for the space distribution of the
planets would be with radii of orbits related approximately
by the ratio 2—which by the theory of areas of circles (Area=
4rr2), dynamically balances the structure and verbally bal-
ances the inverse square law. If we take the number 0.15
and form a geometrical series by multiplying it by 2, we
have 0.15, 0.3, 0.6, etc. If we arbitrarily add 0.4 to each
number, we have 0.55, 0.7, 1.0, 1.6, 2.8, 5.2, 10.0, 19.6,
38.8. The radii of the planets’ orbits (the earth’s being
taken as 1.0; and roughly averaging the planetoids’) are re-
spectively :- 0.39, 0.7, 1.0, 1.5, (2.8), 5.2, 9.5, 19.2, 30.1.
Obviously those radii are approximately equal to the modi-
fied geometrical] series. That coincidence or empirical
rule is known as Bode’s law (‘‘Ency. Brit.,’? ““Bode’’).
Obviously, if Newton’s law were accurate and logical we
would not have those discrepancies, and would not have had
to use the 0.4 (the use of which corresponds to the actual
fact that the bodies are of finite size, and not zero or geomet-
rieal points as in Newton’s law). But because there are
fields, and bodies of finite size, the harmonic space distribu-
tion of the planets (including their satellites) requires first a
general modification of the series in more or less equal degree
for each member—that being accomplished by the 0.4.
Then, there are two considerable discrepancies :- in the dist-
ance of Mercury, and the distance of Neptune. The spheri-
cal field of the sun is comparatively strong; hence the field
of Mercury would be considerably modified, compared with
most fields in the solar system, and would have its gravity
pull considerably modified; and that principle properly ex-
hibits itself in the discrepancy noted. (It is also definitely
known from astronomical observations that Mercury percept-
ibly departs from Newton’s law.) Neptune is exposed to the
solar whirl field and hence like Mercury is pulled in closer by
gravity and thus speeded up, bringing its field to equilibrium.
In short, Bode’s law is a series of numbers which
roughly exhibits relative values of W... XA... in the solar
system. If Newton’s law were correct, Bode’s law would
be a series using 2 as a precise ratio: a perfect gas, where
all space sizes are formally 0 or ©, is sucha monism. Bode’s
law, logically interpreted, is equivalent to Moseley’s law, if
Moseley’s law is made to agree with the general law that

128

UNIVERSE

there is no exact science, so that therefore Moseley’s ratios
are not considered ultimately exact, any more than Bode's
are exact ($128). That identifies or unites the total solar
system concretely with one wave Or corpuscle of light, as is
made implicitly obvious in the chapter on light (XIII).

§118. a. While the solar whirl was thus forming the
sun, with planets revolving about it, each planet as a smaller
or lower order whirl would obviously by the logic of identity
and the mechanics of whirls be following precisely the same
process, and we may observe in a rough way the various
stages in the history of the solar system by observing the
planets as they now are. Except for being of smaller size,
and hence generally less energetic, Saturn is obviously now
in the stage the solar system was, shortly after the sun had
somewhat condensed from the central cluster of planetesi-
mals—say 20 to 30 billion years ago. | We may briefly ob-
serve some of the numerous details that are seen in Saturn.

b. Saturn has rings thatare slightly tilted from the plane
of its orbit (just as the ring of planets about the snn theoret-
ically is tilted from the plane of the sun’s orbit about PP’),
Conventional theories are not definite as to the composition
and mechanics of those rings (““Eney. Brit.,’’ **Saturn’’),
It is mathematically established that Newtonian gravity
alone would not support a fluid ring, and it is therefore ortho-
doxly assumed that gravity solely acts upon small bodies,
keeping them in revolution and forming Saturn’s rings. The
obvious defects in that assumption are :- (1) only by one
chance in infinity would the thin rings then be formed, or be
capable of remaining in the same plane if once formed (i. e.,
the sole-gravity idea—or rather absence of idea—gives no
fields to support or control the rings in that plane: the ordi-
nary sole-gravity hypothesis of the general ring or plane of
planets suffers from the same defect): (2) the rings are in
some places practically opaque; they are clearly visible; and
they cast a shadow on the body of Saturn; and those condi-
tions obviously could not exist with rings of scattered par-
ticles (and have them sum only to the actual small] weight of
the ring), unless the particles were rather close together
and mostly of smal] size, and hence were, by the electron
theory, in effect a fluid (and that contradicts the original
orthodox premise): (3) the whole ring has dark bands (or is
split into concentric ‘‘rings’’) which apparently vary, aud in
effect the whole ring has six outer concentric rings that are
six moons (there are four more known moons farther out,
not quite in the ring plane); and the orthodox sole-gravity
theory is helpless in stating why such conditions happened,
or even why they persist, having started.

ce. Clearly, if we consider the ring to be the vestiges of
the filament of the Saturn whirl every one of those outstand-
ing characteristics of Saturn is directly consistently estab-
lished as a mechanical truism, similar to the explanation of
the solar system, and the conditions of the ring are direct
evidences of the truth of the whirl theory.

d. The ninth satellite or moon of Saturn has a retrograde
motion. The pure-gravity or nebular theory can not account
consistently for that retrograde revolution (which also applies
to the two outer moons of Jupiter and to the moon of Nep-
tune ;— incidentally, IJ am not certain as to numbers of vari-
ous sets of moons, for new ones have been recently found and
I am depending on casual memory for these comparatively
trivial facts). Obviously, the whirl theory would require, as
being quantitatively most probable, that most of the inner
condensations should revolve about the center of their whirl
in the same sense as the revolution component of the spiral
in the original filament. But outer secondary whirls obviously
could easily get capsized, being exposed to the environment,
and would then revolve ina retrograde’’ direction; in fact,

129

such capsizing obviously establishes more stable equilibrium
in the weak outer field (Chamberlin’s planetesimal theory, in
using defective astronomy, omits showing definitely any simi-
lar strengthening of equilibrium that amounts to a check on
the gravity process; and the theory thus more or less fails to
locate positively the probable place for retrograde motion).
e. I shall be more explicit as to the ““dark’’ bands, and

the orbits of the six inner moons that are in the ring plane,
and are hence in effect equivalent to six more bright rings—
or, are equivalent to more or less definite electrons in an

atom :- The combination of the two forces W...X*4A...
would obviously, by our theory of harmonic periodicity, sort

out or sift out condensations of the same spherical field sur-
face intensity, arranging those of the same intensity ata
properly or harmoniously proportioned radial distance from
Saturn, thus arranging those of the same intensity in a ring
concentric with the rings in which were those of other inten-

sities—the least effective intensity being outward, and hence

truistically becoming distinct moons, in which and in the for-
mation of which obviously gravity is stronger than affinity

(than field surface). When the field surfaces of the conden-

sations become stil] weaker, they are obviously then not able

to hold the moons in the plane; and the stronger gravity dis-

turbances among themselves and other bodies throw them

somewhat out of the plane (enough out to strengthen their

field surfaces, and establish harmonic equilibrium with other

planets, etc.). So obviously, if we were observing the six

inner moons from afar and had retinal persistence enough so

that they remained perceptible streaks of light al] around

their orbits, they would appear as such streaks or rings located

in harmonious proportions or as a spectrum (XJI1); and the

irregular outer moons (irregular in the sense that for them

there is not a nearly complete balance of W and 4 relative

to just the Saturn structure) would be bright bands of per-

ceptible width—that might be bright enough over a wide

enough radia] distance to be a “‘continuous’’ spectrum. In

short, the Saturn rings, by exhibiting directly the varying

proportions or effects of W and A exbibit what we might cal]

a molar spectrum; also, they show a sifting out or “concrete

periodic table.” | Obviously, therefore, the dark rings would
be due to the fact that at certain places in the varying bal-

ancing of W and A, conditions Jacking equilibrium arose,

and the ‘atoms’ were pulled to one side or the other of the

circle in the whole ring which would have been their Jo-

cation had they been stable there (being thus changed or
‘condensed’ into the more stable-sized bodies away from that

circle): so in the neighborhood of the circle there would be
few if any surviving condensations of the particular size that
would balance there, and hence too few reflectors or givers of
light; and therefore ““darkness.’’ That is identically what

happens, with direct reference to harmonic proportions or
‘periods’ of comparative equilibrium, in the formation of the
periodic table. Obviously, there could exist a band in the

ring in which over a comparatively considerable radial dist-
ance there is such a proportionality of Wand A that there
is practically continuous equilibrium, and hence no percept-
ible trace of dark rings or gaps, but a thicker collection of
condensations: and a precisely analogous condition occurs in
the chemica] periodic table, with respect to the so-called
‘“‘break’’ containing the rare earths, which break corresponds
to one of the brighter, wider bands in Saturn’s ring (App. A,
atoms 57 to 72), and in the solar system as the rather con-
tinuous band of asteroids. It it not a ‘“break,’’ but the ab-
sence of a break—the actual breaks (where we may say that
the rhythms of various—several—properties get out of step)
or dark rings occur between the ordinary ‘felements.’’? And
a secondary and hence more pronounced rhythm of such lack

UNIVERSE

Two XII §119a

of breaks is evidenced by the groups in column VIII of the
periodic table. There is in the table a considerable
‘dark band’ between H and He. It is obvious that in that
space other “‘elementary’’ atoms could exist temporarily, but
not very stably; and Thomson (in experiments on canal rays)
made some of those atoms that existed for perhaps a short
time. This paragraph could profitably to physicists
be expanded to a volume. 1 haven’t gone far into the sub-
ject— which is why the paragraph is vague and ambiguous.

$119. a. Further, depending mostly upon the ener-
getic condition of the main solar field, it is obvious that ad-
ditional outer moons of Saturn might be held in the plane of
the ring. If the solar field were energetic, and the Saturn
filament were young enough to take up some of that energy
or were conditioned so as to balance with it, then the Saturn
field would hold additional moons in its ring, and tbe ring
would be wider. And in the same circumstances, the small-
condensations part of the ring would extend farther out, be-
fore those condensations would collect into moons of weaker
affinity. So as a truism, in such circumstances Saturn would
be ‘‘heavier,’? or would have a higher ‘atomic weight.’
Therefore, if on earth we subject atoms to considerably heav-
ier pressure for a long time (other conditions being fairly
steady—as would reasonably be the case deep inside the
earth), then that would be equivalent to giving them a wider
ring and increasing their atomic weights. It therefore fol-
lows that inside the earth there are most probably (in prin-
ciple absolutely are, {f the quantitative conditions are right)
atoms of higher atomic weights than any we have yet ob-
served—Just as there seem to he, by the same principle ap-
plied to opposite quantitative conditions, elements in nebulas
(where the pressure is light: where there is plenty of room)
that are lighter than any we have got hold of on earth. So
if any of the heavier internal atoms got extruded by volcanoes
($122), they would begin to have their “outer moons’ grow
more loose and unstable. And under proper quantitative
conditions (especially is time enough needed for the results to
accumulate) some of those outer moons would break loose
from the atom, and we would have the phenomena of radio-
activity—identical in principle with ordinary secondary whirl
formation described in XI, but quantitatively probably in-
volving considerable heavy condensations as just described.
In the solar system comets represent radioactivity with respect
to the internal parts of the system; i. e., comets nowadays are a
very mild degree of interna] radioactivity which would cor-
respond to internal electron formation with respect to atoms
—a breaking up so mild in degree as usually not tobe called
*‘radioactivity.”’ To get conventional radioactivity as ex-
hibited externally by ordinary atoms, we would have to bave
the solar system as a whole react percepitbly with other sys-
tems, and it happens that at present there seems to be no
such perceptible reaction, in which pieces break out of our
solar field and go as a comet to other systems—as a rather
large secondary. But obviously, the principles are consist-
ent and simple, as shown. Clearly, there could be a long
series (really in infinite regress) of ‘periodic rhythms’ of new
and heavier atoms under long-continued heavier pressures.
Obviously, in steady conditions of pressure the atoms would
not perceptibly change any more than the solar system as a
whole is doing. Therefore, inside (say) the earth where the
conditions are fairly steady there would be no perceptible
breaking up of the atoms (no ‘‘radioactivity’’), and hence no
appreciable heating from that cause: there may be a com-
parative trifle of heating effect from radioactivity in the sur-
face layers of the earth. So from that point of view also,
the insides of the planets, etc., must be cold (see also §122i);
only their surfaces have sufficient disturbances of equilibrium

‘

§119a XII Two

to produce much heat. There would be breaks in the
rhythm of those heavier elements, similar to those in our
periodic table. And the atomic weights would keep on go-
ing “‘up,’’ or the periodic table keep on extending itself, to
some variable limit in a given planet. The principle defining
that limit is truistically this:- if a whirl happens to be en-
ergetic enough to form an atom of a weight beyond the har-
monious limit, it will be unstable and break up.

b. Similarly in the other direction, towards the H end
of the periodic table, there is a lower limit of atoms for our
average conditions. At that limit there is a gap in our ‘mo-
lar spectrum’ which is equivalent to the change in order of
whirls from atoms to electrons. But that gap itself in differ-
ent quantitative conditions is subject to variation (ef. the dis-
cussion of spectrum in XJII). So obviously, this is merely a
repetition of the infinite regress of harmonic periodicity given
at length in a general way in §101. The way to get a defin-
ite and applicable numerical and rigorous statement of the
theory is to determine the structures of atoms in ways to be
shown, then tabulate the rhythms of their properties as
Richards does in his Faraday lecture, and combine the two.

ec. Furthermore, it is directly obvious that although the
harmony or rhythm of proportion of al] whirls or atoms
(based on Y\—or on any other given criterion) would remain
steady, so that relatively to its environment C always has the
same properties roughly, yet an atom of C in one environ-
ment by no means necessarily contains (and by only one
chance in infinity could contain) the same quantity of ether
cells, as a C atom in another environment. For it is obvious
that all of the condensations in the Saturn rings which are of
a fairly stable size and which as a sum form a ring of certain
radius, and which condensations we may say are analogous
to C atoms, would have to contain a different amount of
‘“substance’’ (really, of a fixed verbal or logical space and
time; cf. Part One) in order to occupy the same relative ring
(of relative properties) ina system otber than the Saturn sys-
tem. Yet in both systems those condensations at similar
relative locations would be C. For obviously, if the two then
differently weighing C’s (referred to a fixed standard quantity
of ether cells) were not both the same consistently named
C, then we would get a practically identical spectrum (with
reference to its most perceptible portion) from “‘different’’
elements. In brief, WW is only one factor, and irrational
alone, and there can be no constant atomic weights. Or in
familiar Janguage, circumstances alter cases—that quantita-
tive truism implying that the relations or principles stay
steady. Therefore, because of different past history
two atoms may apparently be built the same with respect to
easily perceptible properties of a certain sort (suchas roughly
having the same spectrum; or roughly having apparently
the same ‘‘chemica]’’ reactions), and still have perceptible
differences in weight. As a matter of truisms, of course
those different past histories have made the two atoms some-
what different in every characteristic or property. (And as it
is truistic that no two things can occupy the same space sim-
ultaneously, therefore each thing in the universe has had a
history, and hence has properties, different from every other
thing.) It merely happens that in the genera] theory of
harmonic proportions the weight of the two varied appreci-
ably more than some other properties: theoretically, there
is no reason why the reverse should not occur (that the
weight of two atoms should be practically the same while the
two differed appreciably in other properties); and allotropic
forms are actual] examples.

d. And obviously, any interaction of the Saturn whirl]
with any other whirl (planet) wil] make the orbits of the
moons (and everything else in the whirl) get smaller or

UNIVERSE

130

larger. Any sort of atoms are therefore directly compress-
ible, in complete agreement with Richards’s theory (§82).

e, It would be easy to go on for volumes giving the
general principles of atomic structures, as they are directly
evidenced by the structure of Saturn. Those volumes are
omitted for several reasons:- (1) The reader who is inter-
ested can work them out readily, and will find it more profit-
able and enjoyable to do it for himself. (2) The volumes
are actually rather useless until they are expressed in ob-
served measures with some fair numerical precision. And
that is an enormous work I have scarcely touched, and of
which I am mostly in ignorance. Quite probably [ have con-
sequently made silly quantitative errors in the foregoing,
and it is better to stop before I make those errors worse.

f. It is possible, by further using Saturn as evidence, or
by using other facts about the solar system, to go on and
show in considerable rough detail why the sun and various
planets should have their actually observed densities, masses,
tilts of axes, speeds of axial rotation, virtual ages, ete. Ob-
viously, all those properties are completely related by W...X
A,.., and we can readily get rough verbal] statements of the
relationships out to a considerable number of dots, even in
the absence of the more precise mathematical expression.
(The chief reason we can so readily get consistent expression
of those relationships here is because we are working in the
actual three dimensions; that verbally compels a statement
of rea] structure.) But probably most readers would find
such a necessarily lengthy statement of technica] astronomical]
detail both confusing (for this first general view of the uni-
verse), and also tiresome. It is not actually needed by the
intelligent reader, as it is merely a detailed application of
principles already seen in general working. So I shall end
this astronomical chapter by giving some odds and ends of
details that are illuminating, and also perhaps interesting.

8120. a. We briefly consider comets (for authority for
observed facts used, see ““Ency. Brit.,’’ Art. ‘“Comet’’).

b. We have seen that any whirl would have some con-
densations. ‘There would be numeyous condensations in the
older spiral nebulas snch as the solar system, or even in the
considerably younger Saturn. In the virtually very old spir-
al nebulas such as the earth-moon system, those condensa-
tions, especially the larger ones, seem to be rather cleanly
swept out by the planetesima] process. However, even in
the case of the earth-moon there is considerable evidence of
the existence still of lighter condensed whirls (§121¢). For
verbal simplicity and brevity let us explicitly consider only
the condensations which are scattered in the outer parts of
the solar whirl field. The nearest star to us so far as known
is nearly four light years distant (if I remember correctly: it
was discovered two or three years ago). So it is probable
that the field difference surface of the solar whirl is, in the
plane of the planets, at least one light year distant from the
sun—about-60,000 times the distance of the earth from the
sun or 2000 that of Neptune from the sun. Hence, com-
paratively there would be considerable room for condensa-
tions beyond Neptune. Possibly there are some fair sized
planets out there—probably retrograde. But at any rate
there would be some smal] whirls there that are more or less
aged into clusters. Also, in that weak outer solar field there
would be a tendency for the gravity of the scattered clusters
to become relatively strong enough to pull them into larger
clusters; and the process of forming those clusters would
create a sufficiently strong field (increase iis A) so that there
would be a stronger reaction of cluster field and solar field,
and the cluster would get swept out of the ecliptic, around
through the solar field into the central field where the sun is.
Also, precisely the same thing would obviously tend to occur

13] UNIVERSE

as the result of any disturbance of the solar field if the whirl
ran into a somewhat different environment—if our whirl came
close to another system, say. Those are merely additional
details showing again how outer fields are cleaned out.

c. Those clusters (or virtually old secondaries, or what-
ever else we name the possible variations) as they sweep
around into the central solar field are comets. | There is no
very complete orthodox explanation of comets and their phe-
uomena; butas we shall see, this whirl description completes
the orthodox explanations with obvious consistency, and
shows in even more detail] that the whirl theory is universally
consistent. Of course, those comets could be born from
practically any part of the solar system; or a planetary whirl
could give birth to a comet into the solar whirl field; but
only briefly in pars. gh shall we consider those variations.

d. Those clusters would have sucha comparatively weak
field that the sun’s gravity pull would act rather strongly on
them to pull them towards the sun when they got started in
their swings around. That increased speed would truistically
give more intense reactions of solar field and comet field, and
the comet field would therefore do two general things to the
comet cluster:- (1) the cluster would form into a rather defi-
nite whirl which comparatively very rapidly started condens-
ing into a central nuclens (central “sun’); (2) the comet field
rubbing energetically on the little fields inside would make
them heat up the surfaces of the condensations. And both
of those mechanical results give subsequent phenomena pre-
cisely as are observed in comets. In general those phenom-
ena are these:- (1) As the comet gets near the sun the
nucleus could be either a cluster or an actual condensation
into an infant sun (or of course any intermediate stage). Ob-
servations of comets have not definitely determined whether
the nucleus is an opaque condensation, or a cluster that we
ean see through pretty well; clearly, our theory would
give both possibilities, and that will make plain all the ques-
tions as to the mass and densities of comets, and of their ob-
served breaking up. (2) And the spherical surfaces could
heat to incandescence without much affecting the parts inside
of those fairly thin glowing surfaces (for direct proof, see
par. k). (3) Those surfaces could vaporize into more or less
fluid atoms or molecules, and all the visible phenomena of
comets would follow, as is readily obvious, but as will be
stated in slight detail below.

e. As the comet came nearer the sun and its speed in-
creased its spherical surfaces would gradually get hotter, and
would finally vaporize some. (That vaporization is obviously
itself a giving off of secondary whirls: a less degree of the
same phenomenon gives sun-spots, volcanoes, storms, etc. ;
§122.) That vapor or collection of atomic secondaries would
fill the field of the comet with visible whirls, and so we see
the whirl field in photographs of comets. Also, the rapid
speed of the comet causes numerous births of secondaries
from the outer field surface of the comet, so that the atoms
get ‘outside,’ into the solar field. Then partly due to the
pressure of light, and partly due to the fact that those field
difference surface secondaries have reactions of their own
which cause them to screw themselves rapidly through the
solar field in a direction away from the sun, the tail would
form. Obviously, the lighting-up of the comet and the for-
mation of the tail would take place gradually as the sun is
approached, and die away as the comet recedes (and both
are clearly functions of the comet’s mass, speed, etc.,—or,
in general, of the comet’s balance of W and A).

f. Also, certain sizes of those tail secondaries would ob-
viously not be in the necessary harmony of proportion to sur-
vive. Sothere would be a preponderance of certain elements
in the tail. Also, there would be a 3-dimension balancing of

Two XII §120h

elements in the tail, (1) in the direction of the axis of the tail;
and (2) because of the swinging of the tail, markedly in the
two dimensions at right angles or radially from that axis. In
Saturn the balancing of the condensations in the ring was
practically perceptible in twodimensions:- radially from Sat-
urn in the plane of the ring, forming concentric rings. Be-
cause Saturn moves in an orbit tilted with respect to its rings
there would theoretically actually be a component of balanc-
ing across the thickness of those rings. Such has not been
noticed: there is a remote possibility that it might he per-
ceptible if looked for. Consequently, we have the
‘elements’ of the tail being periodically separated or sifted
out in 3-dimension “‘fans’’ and “‘knobs’’ and ‘‘kinks,’’ etc.
And such phenomena are actually observed. A comet’s tail
is therefore obviously a 3-dimension ‘molar’ or ‘chemical’
spectrum; or, the tail gives an automatic ‘‘analysis’’ of the
whirls which can survive. So the description of comets’ tails
requires volumes, omitted at this point and practically un-
known to me. As a matter of rather obvious fact, the greater
part of the volumes J mention omitting is unknown to me.

g. Obviously, if the field of Saturn were in some way
rudely disturbed in the proper direction, the field would give
birth to a secondary that would be, with nearly certain prob-
ability, a small comet. Also, it would partake of the com-
ponents of motion of the Saturn whirl. Hence, usually it
would not be in harmony, either in size or orbit, with comets
formed in the outer solar field. So except in rare cases a
Saturn comet would not survive long, but would most prob-
ably be swallowed up by Saturn on the passing of the dis-
turbance. That shows that the tendency in the solar system,
so far as its internal processes are concerned (and if not “in-
terferred with’ by outside systems), is to keep on in the one
direction of ‘condensing’; for a large whirl in it can reverse
(as Saturn was there seen to do hypothetically), but does not
do so except temporarily. Hence, most of the comets prob-
ably come from beyond Neptune; possibly some are born in
the vestiges of the solar filament, and a few small weak ones
may come from the Saturn or the Jupiter whirl.

h. A comet may be bom at the solar field difference
surface, either into the solar system or out of it—any asym-
metry there obviously forming a comet or secondary (§98w).
But when comets are born into the solar system, in precisely
the same way as seen in the last paragraph (by the theory of
periodicity) only comets of some certain sizes could survive
very long—others being quickly assimilated. (And as an
obvious incidental fact, the formation of comets of any ap-
preciable size would mostly take place into the equatorial
parts of the solar whirl field, because the flat polar parts of
the field are more stable.) As those field surface comets are
obviously directly analogous to electrons, it becomes obvious
why electrons (i. e., electrons in an explicitly conventional
sense:- those given aff by “‘atoms’’) are roughly of a certain
proportional size, and why any disturbance of atoms produces
electrons. We see at once, again in complete agreement
with the last paragraph, that a comet born zzto the solar sys-
tem would have practically no chance of traveling very far
into the solar system in its original form. It would be mak-
ing a considerable disturbance of equilibrium along its path,
and unless the solar system had received a severe jolt (which
seems to be improbable in its present rather isolated loca-
tion), the comet nearly surely would not be large enough to
get far without being assimilated. And that agrees with the
observed fact that no comet yet measured seems to have
come from outside the solar system; it also agrees with num-
erous facts about electrons. The comet from outside quite
likely stirs up the solar system more or less to start a comet
in the regular way; and that is equivalent to saying that the

§120h XII Two

comet from outside does swing around the sun, but that it
has changed its quantitative character and thereafter is a
solar system comet—has been ‘assimilated’ in that way. And
quite possibly such a comet, in being assimilated, starts a
series of reactions which wil] in turn cause the solar system
to give owt a comet—so that an observer outside might think
he saw a comet pass through the solar system, whereas the
electron or comet that came out was composed of quite dif-
ferent materials, and was variously different otherwise. We
may observe that the way our own physiological cells ‘‘assimi-
late’’ food, or “‘eat,’’ is quite analogous to this comet or
electron formation. The cell and its molecules will turn the
food into its ‘‘own substance,’’ just as comets are finally to
some extent assimilated by the sun; and part of the food
will necessarily (it is necessary or truistic because ultimately
there is no symmetry or commensurability in any part) start
some series of reactions that will cause a ‘comet’ to be given
off by (say) some molecule, which rejected part is ‘‘not
wanted’’ or a poison (XVI). It is obviously all a matter of
quantitative variations in sizes, etc.; the principles are the
same: for when we consider that process of assimilation
with respect to a biologic cell, molecules of various sorts are
taken in, instead of electrons, and then molecules of different
sorts from those taken in are observed to be rejected—show-
ing in another way that the electron absorbed by an atom is
different from the one given out.

i. So it is obvious that perhaps most of the comets
would come swinging in to the sun on orbits considerably
elongated; in fact, in practice it is difficult to distinguish
some from parabolas. And because of the obvious theoreti-
ca] interference of fields, and to the gravity pulls of planets,
numbers of comets are likely to be slowed into short orbits—
and such is the orbserved fact (incidentally there is a per-
ceptible harmonic periodicity to the sizes of comets’ orbits).
The comet with the shortest orbit yet observed is Encke’s,
with a period of about 3.29 years. And that comet percept-
ibly fails to obey Newton’s law. We have now seen why.
Another fact of the same general sort about comets, which
shows directly that we must consider fields as well as ordi-
nary gravity is the observation that the long axes of their or-
bits tend to trail out in the wake of the solar system as it
moves in its own orbit about PP’; only the reactions of fields
—of A—could produce that phenomena.

je Comets are of a comparative size that is unstable.
Obviously by our theory, and by direct observation, they
break up, and the sun and planets begin to sweep up plan-
etesimally the pieces which have thus been transported from
the outer parts of the solar system, and from outside the sys-
tem. The pieces are called meteors or meteorites (I shall
not make the usual minor distinction; see ‘“Ency. Brit.,”’
**Meteor,’’ ‘“Meteorites,’’ for definitions and for details of
the observed facts I use). The earth sweeps up many mete-
ors, and we can observe them in flight as shooting stars and
fireballs, and examine the occasional ones which survive until
they reach the earth and are found. It has been estimated
by astronomers that 400 million meteors telescopically visible
fall on the earth each 24 honrs.

k. Some of those meteors fall as fireballs, which, accord-
ing to the vague observations available, seem to be clusters
of condensations (minature systems) that definitely form
whirls in our atmosphere—seem to be definitely comets in
our atmosphere. The meteors which reach the earth show
only two definite molar structural formations:- (1) tbere is
evidence of their surfaces having been heated; and (2) often
these are chondrules or spherules (roundish grains varying in
size from microscopic to that of a walnut) imbedded in a rock
matrix. The obvions explanation of those chondrules is that

UNIVERSE

132

they are planetesimal condensations with hot surfaces and
hence rounded forms that rain down upon a hot-surface nu-
cleus in a comet, and are imbedded there—sometimes the
nucleus afterwards being broken up by some large unbalance.
A reference to the Art. ““Meteorite’’ will show that no other
explanation is probable. So we have here direct experi-
mental evidence of the whirl theory or some equivalent one,
and of the fact that heavenly bodies are relatively cold in-
side. A comet exhibiting chendrules would probably be of
average size, whatever that may be; for obviously, larger
ones would melt the rain of planetesimals more or less homo-
geneously into the remainder of the nuclear substance, and
small ones would not be hot enough to imbed chondrules.

8121. a. It has been repeatedly seen tbat there can be
no perfectly fluid whirls, or on the other hand perfect spheri-
cal condensations which would exhibit Newton’s monistic
gravity. Always by consistent mechanics there must be dif-
ference surfaces giving off an infinite regress of secondaries—
or any actual body must be in some intermediate stage of
being a nebula of which the zero-infinity limits are (1) a nnit
fluid perfect whirl with no secondaries, and (2) a unit perfect
solid sphere with no interacting body. That sentence sum-
marizes this chapter in concrete terms of the One and Many.

b. It therefore follows that the sun, earth, moon, Jupi-
ter, comets, etc., would each severally, and all as a sum,
have in some degree an accompanying nebulosity. Comets
have that nebulosity in marked degree—being often accom-
panied by its extension into a tail. Also, in full agreement
with our verbal truisms of description, the sun, and earth,
and probably the moon, have nebnlosity which is visually
perceptible to us. And we shall see implicitly in electricity
(XIV) that any body has electrical fields, which are always
experimentally perceptible if its relative motion is sufficiently
great; and those fields are equivalent to nebulosity. The
nebulosity of the other planets is too far off and tenuous to
have been noticed yet, except for that of the young Saturn.

ce. That nebulosity which surrounds the sun is faintly
visible to us as the zodiacal light. The similar nebulosity of
the earth is named the Gegenschein (for description and more
detailed observations, see ‘‘Ency. Brit.,’’ ‘’Zodiacal Light’’).
The nebulosity of the moon has not with positive certainty
been observed, and it has not been named; obviously its
visibility would be interferred with by those other two nebu-
losities. | Such nebulosities would probably be somewhat
self-luminous (agreeing with Angstrom’s observations in the
article cited :—and in spite of the fact that they are in space
usually held to be at nearly absolute zero); also, they would
be luminous by diffused and reflected light (as our atmos-
phere is—they being obviously composed largely of thin
gases that are known to exist in the ‘‘free’’ space about us).
The nebulosities have probably been observed to vary in po-
sition, and perhaps to exhibit some traces of tails: they seem
to have a variable tilt, and seem to react mutually, Allsuch
observations obviously agree with whirl mechanics.

8122. a. It has been seen (§112g-1) that the reaction of
the solar whirl] field and galaxy field gives our general clim-
ate. We shall now see that the whirl theory consistently
gives minor climatic variations by the same principles—see-
ing it by considering the reactions of the sun’s spherical field
with the earth’s spherical or magnetic field. Also
it follows implicitly, but of course in far less quantitative ae
ae at eee a moon’s field on ours modify
phases is ae whol] en see ne hale 4 nae Seer
his rules of thumb ae ae Pige pecuen pean
merely racial Sane tiie eee puget
when the earth and moon eee pe tne ee days

were in a younger whirl, and their

133

mutual field reactions were much stronger. Even the old
astrology is not completely stupid; for millions of years ago
when (say) Jupiter swept near the earth spiral, it probably
knocked off an earth satellite which plunged into the earth in
a way somewhat disconcerting to live things in those days.
Astrology was perhaps perceptibly justified in some measure.
Of course the intellectual] grafters exaggerated it and ritual-
ized it until it became silly; they will do the same for this
book unless men take the trouble to observe for themselves.
Those grafters were not deep-dyed villains; they merely de-
sired to give their clients their money’s worth, and hence
“‘improved’’ their yarns to give them sufficient violence—
pep and punch and heart interest—to jolt even the weak
brains of their stupid dupes, and thus give them a sensation
to vary the ‘‘monotony’’ that is another name for an inactive
mind. Also, the dupes wouldn’t rely on themselves, but
relied too much on ‘‘experts’’—with the usual result that
both they and the experts (named astrologers then) came to
grief. All too specialized specialists are dangerous.

b. The chief cause of those minor disturbances of the
sun’s spherical field, and hence of the earth’s field and hence
climate, is obviously the eccentric revolution of various bodies
around the sun. Possibly the most intense of those variations
are the passages through perihelion of comets, or the remains
of comets; obviously those comets then stir np the sun’s
spherical] field sharply.

c. When one of those sharp knocks on the sun’s field
occurs, obviously there would shortly be secondary whirl] for-
mation at the sun’s difference surface, which ‘surface’ is con-
ventionally divided into chromosphere (at the bottom),
photosphere, corona, and zodiacal light (““Ency. Brit.,’’ Art.
*‘Sun’’). Similar knocks on the earth’s field would also pro-
duce secondary whirls here; those whirls are directly per-
ceptible to us as cyclones and anti-cyclones in the atmosphere
(which is part of the difference surface of the earth). <A cy-
clone is a whirl in which the central field travels up (is a

rd
——

re ‘ge 7
< OT:
is
ae EG!
aa Zp
ae Se
=},
3
t
5

Fig. 122c.

whirl born into the earth’s field), and which therefore is not
much interferred with by the ‘‘solid’’ earth, and so produces
or is comparatively rapid motion of the air, and is a **hur-
ricane,’’ “‘storm,’’ etc. Fig. 122c is a diagram in perspect-
ive of the wind circulation of a cyclone, and it vividly
outlines the filament difference surface of a whirl, even defi-
nitely as to the spiral motion. I did not manufacture that
picture and emphasize the whirl characteristics to prove my
point: the picture is reproduced from Knight’s ‘“Seaman-
ship.’? An anti-cyclone is a whirl traveling in the opposite
direction (out of the earth field); hence, the solid earth in-
terferes with the air motion of it, and the wind slows down,
and we have ‘‘pleasant’’ weather. All our “‘wind’’ is a re-
sult of whirl formation. ;

d. Those two kinds of whirls are observable in or on the
sun, in greater degree because the sun’s ‘surface’ is thicker
and relatively more fluid and extensive. It may be possible
that a sun spot is formed directly by an anti-cyclone; it isa
quantitative problem, and I guess that such is not the case

UNIVERSE

Two XII §122h

(chiefly because an anti-cyclone on the sun would spread out
widely, like one here, and a sun spot is rather sharply local).
A eyclone on the sun would obviously consistently produce
the observed high flare-ups of the corona, and the promi-
nences of the denser photosphere. A very small cyclone
here, over such fluid (e. g., water) will produce a water-
spout, or on land will lift dust, leaves, etc., high into the air
as a ‘‘whirlwind’’; any cyclone lifts up the surface of the
earth some, but not very perceptibly with the solid earth:
the barometer becomes ‘‘low,’’ showing that comparatively
there is some suction on the earth. The waterspout, on a
certain harmonic proportional wearing-out of the whirl,
slumps back into the water—one nearly slumped on me once.
Similarly, anywhere on the sun a localized, considerable act-
ual lift of material will take place as the result of a cyclone.
(That material seems to streak out in the high-speed winds
in the upper atmosphere of Jupiter, and make bands around
that planet.) That material will then slump back into the
sun, and by the usual principle of overrunning it will make
quite a hole or sun spot in the photosphere. So a sun spot is
most likely the dying out of a cyclone onthe sun. Obviously
the cyclone gave the material a rotation (that can actually
be seen in an ordinary waterspout; also see Fig. 122c), and
naturally the sides of the sun spot hole will have the compo-
nents of that rotation. Also, the dropping of the prominence
into the surface is equivalent to dropping soapy water into a
basin; and a whirl will result, with other sorts of rotary mo-
tion. So for all those reasons, the spot will endure for a
time—perhaps as long as a month or two. Also, the spots,
like the more violent of the storms on earth, will tend to be
near the sun’s equator, as it is there that both more field
energy and more chances of getting a knock exist. The
whirls from the knocks would obviously travel away from the
equator as they move down, by compounding their motion
with the sun’s rotation.

e. Every oneof those whirl results is definitely in agree-
ment with the observed facts about sun spots (“‘Ency. Brit.,”’
**Sun’’). Further, observations by Hale, and mechanical
guesses and observations by Julius, show that there are such
rotary motions. Turner gave a theory of sun spots to the
Royal Astronomical Society (““Sc. Am.,’’ April 4, 1914),
which shows that known comet orbits agree with the periods
of sun spots; the most marked one is about 11 years, but
there are other superimposed periods [ad infinitum, according
to valid logic]. It is also observed that electrical apparatus
on earth shows variations (““electrical storms’’), indicating
such variations of electrical fields, occurring for a few days
in advance of visible formation of sun spots. Further, a con-
siderable body of observations now exists, and scientists are
beginning to agree, that our minor climate in general varies
coincidently with variations in the sun’s surface (of course
after ‘‘seasonal’’ changes). It therefore is obvious that all
this evidence verifies our mechanical theory.

f. Obviously, we bave come to the beginning of writing
a consistent science of climate—of general, and daily or sea-
sonal, meteorology. That would require volumes—omitted.

og, And a general consideration of the foregoing astro-
noniical descriptions, combined with a more specific detailing
of the variations of the earth’s spherical field (including the
history of the earth whirl), would constitute the base of ge-
ology. Chamberlin gives that well in ‘‘Origin of the Earth,”’
although not explicitly about the earth field. I shall make
brief remarks on geology, indicating that expansion:-

h. Obviously, ultimately any asymmetry of equilibrium
of the earth’s surface would be referred to the earth’s field,
and so on to our galaxy whirl, and soon. Most likely, due
to past stirring-ups of the solar whirl by its approaching other

8122h XII Two

whirls, the earth’s surface has several times been hot enough
to be rather fluid. The earth’s field would then perhaps have
considerable effect in distributing the fluid matter (in prin-
ciple, precisely as the matter in a comet’s tail or Saturn’s
ring is sorted); in short, ultimately there is no ‘‘chance’’
about it: the earth itself is a chemical spectrum, probably
several times repeated, or superimposed—of which the con-
ventional geological strata would constitute one “‘layer’’ or
order. And that gives a rigorous qualitative beginning for
the geology of the shaping of the juvenile earth, which is of
course in agreement with Chamberlin’s balancing of various
factors with gravity, inhis chapter on the subject. I merely
bunch al] his various other factors into qffinity—or into the
concrete field, which primarily displays that affinity.

i. There would then, as a truism of such surface asym-
metries, be regions of less pressure in the earth’s surface
zone, so that the condensed, aged atoms there would move
around more, and thus in some measure hreak up, and thus
give off small, rapidly moving parts (‘comets’ or electrons,
or other larger parts in radioactivity) which sum as heat. In
the deep interior of the earth there would not be a high
enough degree of variation in stress to permit that breaking-
up to occur; that such breaking-up actually does occur when
pressure is removed is observed directly as smal] surface ex-
plosions in new walls of mines. And that heat would, under
proper quantitative conditions, as a truism, accumulate, melt
the more easily melted substances, and by keeping on in-
creasing if pressure is decreased at a sufficient rate, eat its
way upward, and out at the surface, as a voleano. Soa vol-
cano thus always tends to make a more stable equilibrium—
to smooth out past asymmetries,—which is substantially how
Chamberlin puts his more detailed description of volcanoes.
Therefore, from both points of view it follows that the inter-
ior of the earth can not be hot; for if it were, asymmetries
or differences of potentia] would automatically increase as we
approach the center of the earth, so that at the center the
potential, having nothing ever to start it the other way, would
truistically become infinite, and the earth would blow up—
and it obviously does not. Or, if that genera] proof that the
interior is cold is not readily intelligible, then a concrete
proof is that it is an obvious truism of the whole theory of the
shaping of the young earth (either as given here, or in the
form given by most modern geologists), that a crust can not
form on a liquid core which is asymmetrical or out of stable
equilibrium (which would have been the case with the earth)
unless the crust be nearly instantaneously formed with suf-
ficient thickness to hold the liquid core (which is a silly hy-
pothesis). Or in brief, as the little boy puts it, if the earth
were hot melted stuff inside it would largely leak out through
the holes. Of course, if we dig a large hole in the earth, it
follows from the foregoing that it becomes a voleano—the
walls would keep getting hotter as we went deeper. Obvi-
ously, if we went deep enough, with a hole big enough not
to be self-plugging, we would automatically get a flow of
‘melted earth.’’ If we could keep that hole from plugging
itself for a while, the flow of liquifying interior would soon
leave unsupported places that would more or less break up
the earth by earthquakes, and thus (probably before changes
in center of gravity, etc., became effective) would indirectly
plug the hole and stop the unbalance (the earth will “‘heal’’
a wound just as a human does—only on a larger scale). But
none of that proves that the earth is hot inside; it merely
proves that the earth is so constructed that we can make an
artificial voleano—by the simple process of digging a large
enough hole. The sides of the hole is a modification of the
difference surface (an extension of it); and the principle is
that that surface zs comparatively hot, and obviously the con-

UNIVERSE

134

siderable unbalance of the hole would make it locally hotter.

j It therefore follows that any prolonged asymmetries
or knockings-about to which the earth field are subjected
would produce, as an accumulated result, an age of volca-
noes. Any such series of asymmetries, given enough room
(and there usually is ample space in the galaxy), would inev-
itably be balanced by reverse ones, and there would be a
severe glacial age before or after the volcanoes. And such
rhythms are geologically inferred to have occurred. So the
general basis of geology confirms the whirl theory, even if |
do have to be a trifle unconventional and conclude that the
earth is cold inside. It has been my actual experience that
the same sort of people who were shocked by Columbus’s
heretical belief that the earth was round are greatly offended
by the proof that the earth is cold inside. So in order
to help those mentally rather run down people over
their emotional disturbance, I have devoted an otherwise
disproportionate amount of space to the point. The
keen reader will also observe that |] ostentatiously and em-
phatically give such people an unconventional] point of neglig-
ible direct practical importance to be horrified over. That
serves as a counter-irritant, permitting the painless introduc-
tion of an important point or two.

S123. a. Asa genera] summary of this chapter we may
consider, in terms of astronomy, the millennium, heaven,
Nirvana, or Utopias in general. Obviously, because our as-
tronomica] terms are universal, and are also consistent me-
chanics, we sha] be able logically to consider the “heaven of
heavens,’ or a sum of a]l Utopias (i. e., get an inclusive theo-
ry of heaven); and at the same time getit in an engineering
form capable of actual achievement, provided people want
such a heaven enough to achieve it. The way to get
it is to make the earth into a flying machine and move it to
wherever we calculate we need it in order to achieve such
equilibrium as we consider to be heaven—for, 2s we shal] see,
all Utopias are nothing more than quantitative perfection (at
least as an aspired-to limit) and hence eternity of balance be-
tween two or more bodies, which themselves therefore be-
come eternal as such finite bodies. In brief, the con-
ventional heavens and Utopias are quantitative: to be
blunt about it, they are grossly materialistic in the ordinary
dyslogistic sense—and in their aspired-to infinite limits are of
course not achievable. But we can approach as near as we
like to any Utopia or heaven by properly moving the earth
out of its orbit. People who in general are more or less un-
balanced, or intemperate, or radical or exaggerated in one
way or another, are truistically pained by the condition (see
XVIII); so they verbally invent a heaven where they think
the balance is better. For the human reasons for that, see
S155. Or, there is another sort of person who is
callous or insensitive nervously, who fails to get enough
stimuli from the environment that are violent enough to jar
him into much consciousness. So he complains bitterly of
too much monotony, and invents (or usually accepts from
others) a verbal heaven that is violent or ‘‘peppy,’’ and that
would be painful to the radicals; the Great White Way and
Greenwich Village in New York is somewhat such a heaven.
If the radicals could get their sort of heaven it would be
painfully monotonous to the callous people—would bore them
worse than this world does. But obviously, the callous sort
of heaven is the same essential sort of heaven as the radical
one, being simply expressed negatively or in the opposite
quantitative direction, so that the same principles apply. As
a well known fact, the practical achievement of some of one
heaven satiates, and causes the sufferer to strive for the other;
e. g., the denizens of the New York heaven ‘long’? for the

simple life. In general, orthodox heavens are

135

merely materialistic, quantitative, selfish daydreams. But
we now start to examine them a little in detail, as they give
considerable useful information.
b. We have seen (§114c, ete.) that any given geometrical
point in us or near us, or anywhere, is itself in eternal perfect
balance with the rest of the universe—moves in the path of no
resistance, as being or exhibiting either zero energy or infin-
ite energy. Consequently, eliminating merely formal time
and space we obviously have a perfect heaven, in all respects,
right now, and right here, eternally and everywhere. Fur-
ther, if we take any pluralistic (or time and space) part of
our world, we have seen by astronomy that it is actually in
perfect balance (so far as we can perceive) with reference even
to a fairly small environment. KE. g., we and all our things
are so perfectly in balance with Just a few galaxy whirls that
we can not perceive even with senses aided by our best tools
more than a few of them—the remainder balancing into in-
finity or nothingness, whichever way you want to say it. So
with reference to any time-and-space thing—with reference
to our personal, arbitrarily limited selves, say—there clearly
is, inside a quite restricted environment, a perceptibly perfect
balance (and then many people object to that heaven by
wanting to make a ‘‘stir’’ in the world; and having made
one, they find that such unbalance is not what they want).
It therefore follows that actually we are in a heaven or per-
fect balance so far as we can perceive, if we take a wide view.
ec. However, men look around them and by taking a
narrower view (by excluding or ignoring some of the things
which they actually see) they observe that in that narrower
world there are unbalances. KE. g., they see the lightning
kill an apparently innocent baby; or they see apparently
unbalanced distribution of food, so that some people not di-
rectly responsible for that distribution starve. So men start
making quantitative computations intended to remove those
more narrow unbalances, and the conclusion is called heaven.
E. g., the old Hebrews apparently judged that *“pain’’ was
bad, and all unbalances of day and night and climate were
bad (they having no electric lights and furnaces to remedy
such), and that there was not enough of brilliancy in their
surroundings (that judgment included the objection of the
callous to monotony): so they devised the grossly material-
istic heaven of Rev. 21, which sounds like a longshoreman’s
idea of ‘‘elegance,’’ and which is substantially the orthodox
ignorant ‘‘Christian’s’’ heaven still, except that the usual
Utopia of the ignorant person contains the additional proviso
that there be no “‘work.’’ The majority of the polygamous
Arabs apparently failed to have their sexual appetites satis-
fied, there not being enough women to go around; so they
figured out a heaven with an abundance of such satisfaction
—overlooking the needs and desires of women in it. Clearly
all Utopias propose to achieve some more or less narrow bal-
ance, and they ignore the perceptible unbalances that will be
produced elsewhere as an inevitable result. EE. g., all con-
ventional heavens I know of propose to reject some people;
obviously, the concoctors of those heavens thus tacitly admit
the existence of an unbalance in them, and so stultify them-
selves. All the people who propose to reform or remould
the world nearer to their heart’s desire, propose usually in
actuality to change a narrow unbalance which annoys them—
and they truistically produce perceptible unbalances else-
where (although they usually overlook that fact or deny it).
That is what is wrong with the reformer and radical: he in
effect denies that he causes unbalanees elsewhere, and is
hence rather foolish, as he does (and sometimes for the good
of the majority). Of course, everything we do is locally an
unbalance. We take up the solution of all that in ethics
(XVIII). We simply note now, from the typical evidence

UNIVERSE

Two XII §123d

given, that Utopias are quantitative. Our conventional
theological heavens are obviously grossly dualistic and aristo-
cratic, with their more or less benevolent potentate, or perma-
nent chief boss, who is reputed to require as much deference
or kowtowing as that desired by any small man in official
position or by a hysteric. A kaiser and Jehovah are obvi-
ously alike in essentials.

d. Therefore, as all Utopias and heavens are merely
more perceptible balances within certain limits atthe expense
of increased unbalances elsewhere, then the obvious goal of
intelligent Utopias is to get the unbalances located as much
as possible so as to be imperceptible to all men. Clearly,
the way to get a balance having the widest limit would be to
get the whole earth into some place where there was the
least variation in reactions received by its fields. Therefore,
if we create an artificial field (like an artificial house over the
whole earth), which will promptly react with most modifica-
tions from foreign fields, we can make the climate fairly
equable (probably we would have to take secondary steps to
prevent other undue unbalances). By moving the earth out
of the solar system, we could progressively achieve a more
and more perceptible balance:- its rotation could be sub-
stantially stopped, thus stopping most changes in light and |
radiation; its revolution about the galaxy axis could be so
smoothed out as to be imperceptible (or we could move it
out of the galaxy if we wanted less motion); and we could
progressively level off its surface, ete. By proceeding in
that way all perceptible change would be gradually elimi-
nated. Al] processes could be equalized until the passage of
time became practically imperceptible, there being nothing
happening in particular by which to mark time—not even
perceptible monotony. Hence, in that soothing, somnolent
environment men would practically quit dying (or being born
—for birth is a perceptible unbalance); death would be
abolished to the degree in which closeness of balance was ob-
tained (XVI). Also, all work and other perceptible activity
would be similarly eliminated. Further, our brains would
stop acting in the same degree, and we would have practi-
cally no pains, no troubles, nor any perceptible consciousness
of any kind. In short, concretely and literally we would be
bored quite “‘stiff,’’ and for all practical purposes be dead.
In fact, the consistent expression of the condition is
that we would be so completely bored that we could not even
die in the usual manner, but would imperceptibly enter npon
the equivalent of it without perceptibly physiologically dying
—a state of affairs worse, nominally at least, than the mythi-
cal fate of the Wandering Jew. Fact of course is always
stranger than fiction. The human race is far too stupid to
invent any quantitative complication that is nearly so surpris-
ing as those actually about us. Obviously, therefore,
the very perfection of that heaven is its condemnation, from
the point of view of our personal tastes. We simply do not
want any such millennium. The lion would lie down with
the lamb all right—and stay that way. In fact, the able
engineers who, it is tacitly assumed, would get the earth
started off towards that Nirvana condition would also auto-
matically lie down and stop work (unless they had built
themselves a private dwelling in which they could have some
manufactured unbalances)—and in the first case the earth
would automatically return into some condition sufficiently
asymmetrical to jar the sleepers into life. Incident-
ally, it is obvious that in such a heaven, where there is no
perceptible unbalance, there would be a practical and per-
ceptible constancy of all physical quantities, and also a prac-
tical exactness of all science. In conventional language,
bodies or things in it would be practically dead, and practi-
cally ‘‘really material.”’

§123e XII Two

e. Obviously, no one but a mental defective or some
man hopelessly worn out by this real] everyday heaven we
have now, would want that consistent astronomical Utopia or
summed-up orthodox heaven. If any man truly does want
it, he can easily get its substantial equivalent by buying a
few cents worth of rat poison and eating it. For obviously,
we have such a perceptible heaven when we are dead Cites,
we have no more personal consciousness—a condition equal
to that heaven; for proof, cf. Index, “‘Immortality’’), And
any scientist who thinks he really needs physical constants
and an exact science can readily get them, so far as his per-
ception is concerned, by the same judicious use of rat pois-
on; the only other direct way he can get them is by moving
the earth (or a part of it, including himself) to such a condi-
tion—and even then it is likely that perceptible exactness
would be limited to quite a narrow locality on earth ( perfect
exactness of course already now exists, and would then, with
reference to any zero point). It is a well known fact
that many people who claim or fancy that they believe that
the promised theological heavens exist after death, and who
go about asserting in effect that heaven is their home, they
being timid orphaned strangers in this present wicked world,
still refrain from proving their sincerity with rat poison. In
short, the people who claim to believe orthodox Utopias, in
practice fail to act as if they did (for their psychology, see
8155). They of course contrive some excusing “‘argument”’
about the wrongness of suicide—thereby unescapably imply-
ing that the God who inhabits their heaven keeps them away
from it, and hence is either a dog in the manger or else pos-
sesses that vicious, perhaps lowest Hun characteristic of teas-
ing, tormenting, tantalizing. |The obvious solution of the
problem of suicide (as implied by the investigation later of
immortality) is that it is a quantitative problem, and is right
action when the suicide thinks more good than harm is pro-
duced by his death (i. e., it is right from his point of view;
others often agree with him, in which case the action zs right
so far as it is possible to judge; §171k).

f. Having shown that the orthodox heaven is as stupid
as the already unfashionable orthodox hell, we may now ex-
amine the mechanical details of making a flying machine of
the earth. It is not likely that we shall ever want to fly
away to a consistent heaven; but it is possible that at some
time we may want to use the process to modify the climate
a trifle. If we get too crowded on earth, we may possibly
want to add the moon to the earth in the way of a real estate
addition. It would be an exceedingly hazardous business,
but it could perhaps be handled: the moon would bump
rather hard when it coalesced, but we would have acquired
quite an increase of potential, ete., if anv of us survived such
a get-rich-quick scheme. Also, it is well for us to know our
widest quantitative capabilities (anything is possible quantita-
tively): then we shall have an explicit means of refuting the
weak-sisters who insist on whining about impossibilities,
when what they really mean is that they feel comparatively
feeble—and want us to be like them.

g. We shall see in §§$140-1 the principles of how to get
enough power to work the machines we are going to use to
make the earth fly—fly differently from the present. We
can apply that power, by using large electrical machines, to
modify the earth’s field—such modification being obviously
the same in principle as creating a field in a motor (XIV).
Truistically, that will move the earth relative to the sun;
the earth field difference surface is obviously the fulcrum
Archimedes was looking for. By making the difference sur-
face relatively stronger we make gravity relatively weaker,
and we have in some humanly controlled degree harnessed
the solar whirl! field to the earth, and can work ourselves out

UNIVERSE

136

of the present orbit. Very slowly at first would we move
from that orbit; compared with any power we now develop
on earth, the power to move us appreciably would be enorm-
But as we moved out, gravity would have less and less
Theoretically, it is ex-
Prac-

ous.
effect, and we could proceed faster.
ceedingly simple thus to harness up the total galaxy.
tically, the quantitative difficulties are large.

h. This chapter shows explicitly how the earth and each
atom and electron in it is definitely and completely bound to
the total galaxy environment. If we actually know the
structure of such environment, then obviously we can, by
guiding parts directly in our reach, control the earth. Soa
summary of this chapter, showing briefly its consistency, is a
statement of how to move the earth. Unless sucha statement
can be given as a part of an explanation of the structure of
matter, then obviously that explanation is either not intelli-
gible, or is not complete and consistent (or both). So this
section is proof of the consistency of the chapter.

CHAPTER XIII. Light.

S124. a. It is obvious that I have been describing phe-
nomena as being ultimately the giving off of secondary whirls
—as being the result of asymmetries which accumulated at
difference surfaces in sufficient quantitative degree, compared
with the ether cell size, to cause a number of ether cells to
unite in some way to form a new whirl, or at least percept-
ibly start forming a new whirl. It is equally obvious that
because the ether cells are taken to be of some finite size,
then there may be asymmetries of insufhcient quantitive de-
gree to form such secondary whirls: but nevertheless there
still would not be a sero phenomenon (as the cells are finite,
as just stated), but as a verbal truism there must be some
phenomenon—and so on ad infinitum, as we arbitrarily take
ether cells to be smaller and smaller (cr larger and larger, to
go the other way :—e. g., we have in §128 the description of
the spectrum of the solar-system-considered-as-an-atom, in
which ‘atom’ the earth would tacitly be just a few ether
cells). Such a comparatively nearly zero phenomenon
is named light (that use of light is a relationship word).
Obviously, just as we have what were called orders of whirls
in harmonic periodicity of mutually fairly stable sizes, so we
would have orders of light (there light is definitely a Many
word, or light is just plain “‘matter,’’ if we take it as cor-
puscular, as we shall see we may; but if we, also properly,
take light as waves, then that use of light is the orthodox
combination of a Many word and a relationship word—a
double use which ordinarily is “‘ambiguous,’’ but which we
can use clearly as we know the logic of it; cf. §134a). Three
orders of such a phenomenon are conventionally named, as
noticed before:- electric waves, ordinary light, X-rays.
Ordinary light is given off by ordinary atoms, electric waves
by collections of atoms, and X-rays by structural parts
of atoms. We saw that there were no sharp boundaries
between those “‘orders’’ or species of light. | There can of
course be as many sub-orders of those orders as we care to
distinguish—or super-orders. It is probable that physicists
now lump together quite a number of rather distinguishable
sorts of light as ““X-rays,’’ as we shall see.

b. A logical or truistic proof of the general existence of
all that variety of lights, and probably a more intelligible
description of just what light is, may readily be obtained by
considering different sorts of difference surfaces and all of the
phenomena (in addition to secondary whirl formation) which
take place all the time at or in them. We are going to see
that in conventional language light is usually considered to

137

be waves, or definitely a continuous fluid phenomenon. And
that is verbally the reverse of our secondary whirl descrip-
tions—for obviously, in all of the latter we had some degree
of definite interna] structures; now, in wave light, we have
none, that being truistic with contznuous fluid. So we must
at once redefine our various orders of difference surfaces, to
agree with that new way of talking. And that is simply and
obviously done by saying that the ether cells of a given whirl
are large enough to be considered elastic and not to have
definitely named internal parts; i. e., we merely take elastic
parts of the various orders of whirls large enough to permit
us to leave unmentioned (but never absolutely ignored) previ-
ously considered internal] structures. Obviously, that is only
a verbal change; for we saw that an ether cell was merely a
whirl considered to be continuous (§§97-8). Hence, we now
have to notice all phenomena occurring when we do consider
whirls continuous. Heretofore we have tacitly ignored all
those of a ‘‘size’’ so small as not to form ‘secondaries.’ But
clearly, a secondary can be any size; so explicit whirls, or
Newton’s corpuscular light, can be used to explain all phe-
nomena, including light. Similarly, by increasing sufficiently
the arbitrary size of ‘cells,’ ordinary wave light can be used
to explain all phenomena, the earth (say) becoming then a
vibratory wave (see 8128). Light and (say) astronomy are
thus obviously identical; the two conventional subjects are
merely two verbally different ways of stating observed facts.
Because we are familiar with the wave-light way for many
phenomena it is easier to understand them when that way is
used. So I describe light largely that way, especially as it
furnishes a check on the way used for other phenomena.

ce. We therefore at once note that by our new or explicit
fluid definition of ‘cells,’ any difference surface (regardless of
its practical size) will be considered to be a layer of cells,
which layer rubs the adjoining layer of cells in (1) outwardly
the touching field and (2) inwardly its own structure. That
adjacent layer (in either direction) is in actual or virtual mo-
tion at some spiral angle between the monistic limits 0° and
90° to the surface layer (§980, etc.). Hence, as we
shall implicitly see, light waves (not necessarily ocularly vis-
ible ones) are generated everywhere always. But again basing
ourselves on the measure 7, we consider usually only the
generation of them at difference surfaces we have already es-
tablished by that criterion. That amply covers the phe-
nomena (includes positively all of them): for all the light
generated (say) inside a filament thus determined is summed
up in its surface cells, as we shall see.

dande. It clearly follows that as those cells rub across
each other, cohering or sticking to each other, then by the
mechanical principles of elasticity already established, they
will mutually distort each other, overrunning the equilibrium
and then letting go of each other, soto speak. The cells
will therefore vibrate or oscillate, truistically stirring up
their neighbors progressively into similar vibrations (Huy-
gen’s principle; §126)—the result of all that being light.
Obviously, any asymmetry will result in continuously chang-
ing or modifying those vibrations all over the difference sur-
face of any whirl; consequently, there is always continuous
light phenomena (perhaps not visible), because by our arbi-
trary agreement as to cells, such motion of parts, to infinite
smallness or in infinite regress, is truistic. Obviously, there-
fore, conventional light phenomena all explicitly imply the
infinite regress; here, we are merely having it explicit. In
definitely pluralistic language, such as the talk of secondaries
in astronomy, only an asymmetry of a certain size compared
with the size of the ether cells could produce a secondary ;
hence secondaries form only occasionally and at particular
places on the difference surfaces. Here, we see that light is

UNIVERSE

Two XIII §124h

not thus localized, but is continuous (not necessarily visibly).

f. It is possible in many ways to get a tangible concrete
model of the mechanics broadly described in the last para-
graph. Northrup’s whirls ($102) show a hazy vibratory sur-
face. Often smoke rings, or smoke sheets in still air, will
exhibit a more or less definite surface vibration. Practically
all of Bjerknes’s experiments (§94) are definitely vibratory,
and can be shown to be analogous to any light phenomena.
Possibly the quickest way to see the mechanics of the last
paragraph is to take an ordinary round bristle brush and flick
the ends of the bristles. |The ends will vibrate, often per-
ceptibly for a while, analogously to a small place on one of
our arbitrary cells, and by the same principles (although in a
different degree, as the quantitative relations of the anchor-
ing of the bristles are in considerably different proportion
from those of the ‘anchoring’ of the parts of the cell:—if it
be required to have a quantitatively proportional model, then
a tore can be made having a ‘surface’ of mounted gyroscopes;
Erwin’s model is substantially that; §94). The same sort
of vibration can be seen when the wind blows over a field of
high grass, wheat, etc. By revolving and sliding the bristle
brush mentioned under the finger the ends of the bristles
will temporarily perform oscillations analogus to cells. By
properly moving the brush in and out of water visible experi-
mental evidence of at least the general principles of any of
the mechanics of light is obtainable; however, it is usually
easier to prove those mechanics by reducing them to truisms
equivalent to Bernoulli’s principle.

g. The mutual reactions of those vibrations give all the
unending light phenomena. Because of those unending pos-
sibilities of reaction, of the ad infinitum orders of light, and
of the ad infinitum asymmetries which cause light, there can
be no complete description of light. For that reason, and
also because light is substantially a repetition of astronomy,
and because we have already seen the general mathematical
identity of light with other branches of physics, I shall con-
dense this chapter toa brief outline of the subject—yjust
enough to give a general understanding of it, and indicate
the foundations. The only substantial variation J] make from
the orthodox descriptions is that I have light 3-dimensioned,
and so describe it. Orthodox descriptions in actual effect of
course do have light in three dimensions; but the orthodox
mathematics are mostly of the 2-dimension, transverse-wave
sort that lead to difficulties, and are of course totally mean-
ingless when explicitly interpreted, because no such thing as
a pure’’ transverse wave ever existed or ever can—it being
merely a non-existent verbal abstraction of a mathematical
character. Quite naturally that sort of mathematics used in
the texts (which conceals the problem of the One and Many)
orthodoxly winds up in the well known self-contradiction in
light, which may be expressed in one way:- that Fizeau’s
experiments and-or astronomical aberration requires a still
ether, and the Michelson-Morley experiment requires an
ether dragged some at least by the earth (see Wood, ‘‘Physi-
cal Optics,’’ 1st ed., XXII). An ether cell is 3-dimensioned,
and by considering it as producing light we keepin 3 dimen-
sions and readily see the cause of the orthodox difficulty with
those experiments (§127).

h. Incidentally, because light may equally well be rep-
resented by whirls instead of “‘waves,’’ it follows that light
is whirls from that point of view. And that of course is
equivalent to saying that light is matter (cf. par. a)—or is
ether. And that again is equivalent to the conclusion in the
last paragraph that light is 3-dimensioned. We shall see
how ordinary atoms grow, or decrease, according as light is
added to them or given off. Of course that growth is minute
—nperhaps with no weight perceptible by present balances,

§124i XIII Two

i. This section is a general summary of light. If the
reader is not particularly interested in physics or mechanics
he may skip this chapter and the next on electricity, or read
them casually and inattentively, without losing anything es-
sential. Easily perceptible experimental details are so
numerous in light and electricity that I can on any line of ob-
servation quickly so overburden my memory with them as to
become almost hopelessly confused as to what are the next
consistent details. If the reader finds that he has the same
difficulty he need not feel alarmed: those details are merely
some of the infinite dots of our formula which have become
perceptible, and as they are infinite, everyone must neces-
sarily fail to follow them at some stage. Because I must
condense violently in this and the next chapter in order to
include explicit unifications which will be required by the
physicists and which must be known by the experts in any
branch of knowledge, it results that the two chapters are
hard to follow—especially if the reader has more or less for-
gotten his physics. He already has all the essential ideas of
the ““material’’ universe which he needs in order to follow
the last summarizing chapter of this Part (XV), and the de-
scription of man in Part Three. Some of this chapter on light
describes mechanical reactions so complicated (i. e., numer-
ous in one phenomenon’’) that I find it easier to think them
throngh ‘‘originally’’ with ‘‘pictures’’ of them in my *‘head’’
than I do to follow my own condensed written description of
them. There is no need for the general reader to worry
himself with any such stuff; but any good physicist must.

$125. a. Ata given cell ona filament surface we may
conveniently name the three directions thus (and we need to
remember these names, as they are frequently used in light
and electricity):- (1) the direction roughly perpendicular to
the filiar axis (or when the filament cross-section is not some-
what circular, then the direction roughly perpendicular to
the surface at the locality being considered) is radial or nor-
mal; (2) the direction roughly parallel to the filiar axis is the

filiar direction; (3) the direction roughly at right angles to
those two, or (what is the same thing) the direction roughly
parallel to the cross-section circumference at that cell, is the
circumferential direction. The same names are obviously
analogously applicable to similar directions at any difference
surface (at a field surface, e. g.). The last two directions,
filiar and circumferentia], together will be called transverse
directions. Obviously, any cell in the difference surface is
asymmetrically supported or held by the surrounding cells;
that is a truism of any pluralistic language (or the principle
of rhythm or incommensurability), as we have seen in the tru-
istic proof that whirls themselves exist (XI). Or explicitly,
under average conditions it is obvious that the cell is held
more or less steady in the transverse directions and hence
has a comparatively more free component of motion in the
norma! direction. Or, if the reader does not approve
that assertion involving such quantitative directions, then the
principles of pluralistic language or asymmetry require that
(in agreement also with all observed facts) there be different
energy of motion in the three directions, and he can assign
that difference in any combination of directions he likes. If
he changes from my (conventional) directions, he will need
to change the wording of the description, but will obtain the
same general result (ef. $99).

b. Therefore, the given cell in the difference surface
will by cohesion elasticly react with the field cell [or cells]
touching it, and because of the opposite spirals and asym-
metrical support produce in that field cell a minor elongation
having unequal components in the filiar direction and the
circnmferentia] direction. | But most of the elongation will
take place in the comparatively unsupported radial direction,

138

UNIVERSE

and will be similarly propagated by that cell to the next
cells, and so on (Huygen’s principle; §124d). The
whole reaction is a ray of light. Obviously, in the first two
directions—the directions transverse to the ray—the ether cells
are structurally supported so that the resistance to deforma-
tion is comparatively enormous, whereas the cells in the nor-
mal direction, or direction of propagation or travel of the ray,
are structurally held only by the comparatively weak field
difference surface, etc., so that the resistance to deformation
is slight, and the light wave would “form itself’ or ~ travel”’
in that direction very rapidly. Further, it is obvious that
always the ray would be encountering—would be composed
ef—cells which were in varying structural relations, and
hence the three components would always be varying; or, in
short, never on a path composed of as few as three ether
cells could the ray travel either straight or at a constant speed.
Equally obviously, the various components, being produced
by friction and hence subject to friction would wear out
(i. e., become diffused among many cells) in a length of time
depending on the character of the motions (or structural re-
lations) of the cells they become composed of, and would in-
evitably in time become visually imperceptible. (The whole
of those variations is the general statement of the ‘“bending”’
of light rays, of which Einstein’s predicted instance is merely
a special case; §66. Obviously, I have described them in
terms emphasizing affinity.) As an example of that
wearing out of light, if the ray hit some C atoms in the form
of soot the ray would rapidly become imperceptible; _ if it
traveled through the comparatively tenuous, but structurally
analogous, galaxies, it would travel far enough to permit us
to see a few lavers of galaxy whirls. That theory agrees
with what we do see. Reynolds calculates that a light wave
is reduced to $ its primary energy after traveling 56 million
years. So it is a reasonable guess that ordinary light would
remain rather definitely visible for a travel of a million years
through galaxy structures such as ours, and that might make
as many as 50 layers of galaxies visible to us.

c. The last paragraph is the mechanical summary of
light. It is obvious that it is zn effect directly equivalent to
the orthodox theory of light, but is logically rather different.
I. e., the orthodox theory substantially says that light is the
vibration of a geometrical point in the transverse directious—
a point of ether perhaps, having no mass, but thus vibrating.
against enormous (effectually infinite) resistance of a solid,
elastic ether;—and that comparatively the longitudinal or
normal resistance to travel is so small that there is none, so
that the wave theoretically orthodoxly travels on forever, al-
though the orthodox theory does not call that longitudinal
component a component of the wave. Further, in that ortho-
dox theory, it is obvions that if that point thus vibrates, it
can propagate itself only by acting on the next point; but
evidently, if it moves up to the next point it must occupy
identically the same space as that point; or, if vice versa it
makes the next point move by moving away from it, then
there is left an absolute vacuum, not even filled with ether,
and there is no way of getting the asserted reaction across it.
It is therefore obvious that the orthodox theory of light is
continually confused by its unsolved One and Many; and by
its efforts to talk in or of absolutely separate dimensions
(i. e., to say that a wave is absolutely only transverse vibra-
tions——or, even worse, an orthodox plane polarized wave is
only I-dimensioned), destroys itself and its classic logic con-
tinually, and gets numerous purely religious conclusions that
we notice from time to time. Now, all that I have
done is to sum all those orthodox verbal difficulties, get the
logical method which obviates them, and then consistently
describe a cell (§S97-8) which wll vibrate without again

139

introducing the verbal conflicts. That cell obviously gives
the 3-dimensioned components properly and self-consistently
combined, and we always have 3-dimensioned light and none
of the orthodox confusion. But obviously, 1 do not substan-
tially change any of the orthodox theory. I merely use a
consistent verbal] trick and make that theory intelligible, in
the sense that it is no longer continually self-contradictory.

d. However, it appears at once that becanse we do act-
ually use a finite body as the basis of light (and thus always
omit explicit expression of a part of the infinite regress of
dots), we are not actually talking an absolutely continuous
language (which the orthodox theory pretends to do), or
using an absolutely continuous theory. Of course not; it is
not possible to do so in a finite time. So we have adopted a
practical method of using a so-called continuous theory: i. e.,
we take a continuously moving (i. e., elastic) body of a cer-
tain size, and verbally ignore the inner structural details of
it (the orthodox theory actually ignores the inner structure of
the whole ether). So it then clearly follows (and it can be
seen to follow from par. b) that we shall be forced to reject
from such a positive, pluralistic science or theory all the re-
ligious or mystic expressions. I. e., in dealing with any
finitely perceptible light, there is no such thing as (1) a con-
stant speed of light anywhere, or (2) a simple or compound
harmonic wave motion in a geometrical sense, or (3) normal
dispersion, or (4) plane polarization, or (5) any other ‘‘per-
fect?’ phenomenon. All actual or experimental light phe-
nomena are the inseparably connected 3-dimension vibrations
of par. b, and in no case can any of the three components
become zero or infinity——although any or all may at times
become imperceptible.

e. Our elongation or vibration of cells is formally or
logically contradictory to secondary whirl formation, of
course. It is deliberately so; for in order to agree with con-
ventional talk, we have agreed to change our form of talk,
and instead of saying ‘secondary whirl formation’ (which pro-
duces at least one definite structure or dot in addition to the
original structure), we say ‘elongation’ (which continuously
retains the original structure, which now however becomes
explicitly variable in itself, or implies dots in infinite regress).

Obviously, a long continued or repeated process of
secondary whirl formation produces an elongated spiral nebula
(i. e., one stretched out or elongated in the “‘transverse”’
directions, and correspondingly flattened in the direction of
its travel—in the direction PP’, Fig. 107e); then, a longer
continuation of the same processes turns that spiral nebula
into a cluster in which those long transverse directions short-
en, and the other dimension increases. Hence, the sum of
the processes of secondary whirl formation may be expressed,
in a contrary form of language, asa vibration; for the sum
actually is vibrations:- i. e., the nebula stretches out sideways
and then shrinks in that filiar plane and stretches out in the
third dimension. We thus violate every explicit rule of the
classic logic, but actually kcep consistent by using our solu-
tion of the One and Many. The orthodox assertion of a
vibration also violates the classical logic—and then makes
matters worse by denying that it has done so (cf. description
of 3rd quadrant curve, Fig. 104b). So to sum up,
when we have whirls small enough (an unessential matter of
space) we see them go through all the nebular stages with
corresponding smallness of time, and call the observation
“‘light.’? Therefore, to a larger being, to whom our galaxy
is an ether cell, the history of our galaxy in the last chapter,
from its arbitrarily assigned beginning to its present stage, is
the history of one-fourth wave length of light from it.

f. The remainder of light consists of stating the relative

proportions of those three components of light in collections

UNIVERSE

Two XII §126d

of cells or bodies under varying conditions. Obviously, if we
made a statement of such proportions for all the bodies in the
universe, then we would have described the universe as light.

§126. a. The general principle of asymmetry of cells
may be putin modified terms of Huygen’s principle (§§124d,
125b), as one way of expressing Bernoulli’s principle:- that
any cell has asymmetry of motion in the three directions of
elongation (by the theory of commensurability, 850), and so
truistically becomes the center of elongation of the surround-
ing cells. We are going to apply that principle to cells:
doing so will actually be equivalent to the application of
“larger”? asymmetries to secondary formation, which was
done as the whole of the last chapter.

b. We may for convenience adopt a more explicit sym-
bolism for light velocities. We write V tor the average
velocity of light in our neighborhood (about 187,000 miles
per second, or 3X10!cm/sec). The lowest speed visible
light is red, and we may write its veloicity Vig; the highest
speed, violet, or Viy, etc. We may write a speed anywhere
between red and violet as Vigy, etc.

ec. I have been saying that an ordinary visible atom
would have a filament difference surface (or some important
difference surface or surface) at the approximate speed of
light. As will appear, a more explicit and precise statement
would have been that the difference surface had a speed such
that it produced the radial elongation which had an effective
speed of light. It is convenient to continne to say briefly that
surfaces of visible atums in our neighborhood have a velocity
Vi; 1 donot know what the varying three component cell
speeds are in various circumstances, as it is a mathematical
problem | have not tried—a part of the general theory of
harmonic periodicity. See Reynolds’s and Erwin’s book for
useful hints as to the methods of working it.

d. Since the vibration of a cel] on that atomic difference
surface consists of the nebular processes or stages of a galaxy
whirl (§125e), it is apparent at once that the component
elongations in the three general directions are never a simple
harmonic motion in any one of them, as is substantially held
by orthodox light (see Wood’s ““Optics,’’ 5-8, for a short
statement of the orthodox theory, and of the nature of sim-
ple harmonic motion: briefly, it is oscillatory motion (1) in a
straight line (2) with perfect rhythm—two perfections that
are absolutely impossible in any actual phenomenon). We
can see that the speed of elongation considered separately
(resolved) in each of the three directions rather rapidly
reaches a fairly steady value which it maintains until the re-
versal of nebular form (until the spiral begins breaking into
a cluster, usually by rubbing cohesion or collision with
another whirl—which completes half a wave); then, the speed
of elongation becomes again comparatively rapid (‘reversing’
or changing algebraic sign or direction), and takes up a
rather steady value of the other sign. In short, the speeds
of vibration never are represented by the orthodox perfect
sine curve, or any finite compounding of such curves; always
actual light, as seen by the direct analogy of that cell to our
galaxy, isrepresented by an infinitely compounded sine curve
which, as just seen, would ordinarily be a rather flat-topped
sinuous wave. The one ray which comes of this cell we are
discussing has not so far as ] know ever been perceptibly ob-
served to be of more than oze longitudinal or normal speed
during a time sufficient for the passage of one wave length—
i. e., to be of more than one color. That fact (that one
wave of the ray appears to be of one color, whereas obviously
theoretically it is not) of course tends to show that it is rep-
resented by a somewhat flat-topped curve. But, as just im-
plied, it is clear that every actual ray of light contains in
itself the complete gamut in infinite regress of different light

§126d XIIl Two

140

UNIVERSE

Reaeneas intensity in different L and T parts of the
<a imits of longitudinal speed (““color’’) from 0 to ©,
and limits of transverse speed (“‘intensity,’’ which depends
upon amplitude:- the length of such transverse elongation)
also from 0 to ©. Soa single ray—a single cell—has or is
or gives all possible light phenomena. But our perception of
light simply sums light from numbers of cells into an average
condition; and in experiments our perceptions are hence too
coarse to perceive that complete phenomenon just described.
But it is obvious that, although as usual the poets first ob-
served and stated that general truth (the truth expressed
here in the form that everything is exhibited by anything,
even by an ether cell; the poets expressed it by saying that
the see-er could construct a universe from a grain of sand, or
by the remark about the flower in the crannied wall, etc.),
stil] they were crude, vague, and coarse (except rhetorically),
about it, and only a careful scientific investigation and rigor-
ously precise statement gets at all the truth in its full One
beauty. No doubt a first class poet would improve
the weird rhetoric of this fearfully condensed paragraph, and
move the reader’s emotions more.

e. It truistically being hopeless to try to talk accurately
of those three components of elongation of a cell (as one cell
exhibits the infinite regress, and for accuracy would require
an infinity of words), we shal] at once proceed by mentioning
only the characteristic or more effective parts of the compo-
nents and implying the rest. A given cell on vibrating with
three components would obviously tend to set all the cells
around it vibrating in turn in the same way, following the
general principles of harmonic motion (modified by the fact
that such motion can not be perfect).

f. The amplitudes of the elongations in the transverse
directions are held in check by the structure, as seen. Or,
what is the same, when those components travel out (by the
law of action and reaction) in all directions from the first cell
as a center, the structure makes the ether substantially a
solid, sothat as the ultimate limit, the amplitude of vibration
of a single given cell has decreased as the square of the dist-
ance from the central cell—that being the same as saying
that the total transverse elongation of all the spherical shell
of cells remains the same (that assumes the medium to be
practically homogeneous). Or, the intensity of light, as a
One limit decreases as the square of the distance from the
source, assuming that it travels in dynamically homogeneous
cells, and that the cells have negligible size—both of which
conditions are never actually met with. It is usually ortho-
doxly stated that the amplitude of a wave decreases directly
as the distance increases; but that amounts in practice to
what I have just said above, because I am not talking of the
orthodox abstract (really mystic) waves which actually never
exist, but am talking of changes in particular cells, which
changes are various units of Exergy. ‘Then, as a sum of this
paragraph, we have our equation That... X This...—Energy
turned into the form Jntensity... < L...—=Energy, where the
structural unit is a cell, and /ntensity is elongation in two di-
rections, or really L XL, so that the equation amounts to
Unit M(L... XL... <L...)=Energy. And as those L’s imply
T, the light equation is obviously truistic with the various
forms of the measuring member, and with Energy (TX).

g. In the last paragraph it is obvious that in order that
there may be such a solid structure, so that truistically the
transverse components as they travel out may vary inversely
rather accurately as the distance, we must consider the origi-
nal normal direction as continually changing so as to keep
normal to the whirl flows as those flows vary in direction. Or
to put it perhaps more intelligibly, if we tilt the transverse

directions as may be necessary to keep them always cutting

e whirl stream lines as the

1 ‘ ry SS th
rather juerpend oulariy bch mponents wil] vary rather

wave travels, then the transverse C° fe aeyeatian tO them but
regularly, and we need not pay mucn § hanges in di-
substantially describe light by describing the cna 8 (the
rection of the normal component, the path oie ae Veret
chief exception to that is polarization ; $130). mo ee
paragraph is almost all we need to note about the transverse
components. In the equation Intensity 1s of course not ortho-
doxly steady; it needs the dots that were explicitly written.
But our chief emphasis is on This...—on L..-, the ever vary”
ing path of the ray. Now, curiously, but in accord
with the psychological principles of verbal balancing (§155),
orthodox theory asserts that light is only the transverse com-
ponents, and that the path of the ray is not light at all.
But the theory then, in order to describe light, does practi-
cally what I propose to do here:- describes the path which
it says is not light. We have, by the foregoing, de-
cided that it is more convenient to decribe light by having
the radial direction continually shift so as to be actually the
main axis of the light-whirl (i. e., the whirl that would be
corpuscular light), which we have seen points in the varying
direction in which the whirl moves except for the spiral
modification (cf. the path of S, Fig. 107e). It then follows
that the radial component of motion of the ray travels by vi-
bration in the ever-varying direction at cver-varying speed.
We begin the examination of the details of that.

h. An identically equivalent” way of reaching the above
conclusions as to the path of a ray is to consider that as the
three components travel out from the central generating
cell, they dynamically combine with analogous components
in other cells by the third law of notin, That way is the
orthodox way: but it involves a painful amount of direct
contacts with the verbal difficulties of the One and Mans—
as may be readily seen from the textbooks.

i. As constituting the typical light phenomenon, we
may consider the radia] component to have arrived at the
next outward difference surface beyond the one at which we
may arbitrarily take it to have started, and note the results.

If we are considering a simple fluid whirl, ignoring
possible condensations, the cells in that next surface will
have a slower speed of elongation, and also wil] have their
axes of radial elongation at some finite angle to the arriving
elongation. The result will in general be that the ray will
travel through, but will then travel at a slower speed and in
a different direction. I have expressed that as if the
ray suddenly changed. But obviously that change took
place gradually throughout the ray’s path, and the difference
surface is merely a gone in which gradually (i. e., not instan-
taneously, and not in zero space) a different gradual change,
due to the neat field which the ray is then entering, can be
considered to begin. So for brevity we may speak of the
difference surface as the place where the summed change oc-
curs—as otherwise we would attempt to express an infinite
regress; and as there another sort of summation starts.

j. That general phenomenon is in¢lusive of all specially
named light phenomena except polarizations. In those last,
it is further perceptible and expressed that at the difference
surface (as the end of the summing) the transverse compo-
nents are also in some degree rotated (also, they are changed
in energy or amplitude, producing rotary dispersion). We
consider transverse changes in §130; that dispersion in §129.

| k. Obviously, it is not possible (except by the impos-
sible one chance in infinity) for any ray at such a difference

Saree have any component entirely destroyed (or made

eae) ee ees cee eer ee tae te on eee
component. It therefore follows direct] Se otes Sere
y that any difference

141 UNIVERSE

surface roughly ‘bounds’ a process which has gradually taken
place and is there ‘consummated,’ which process involves in
some degree all the phenomena of light. (That is merely
the truistic reverse form of our general statements in Part
One that the convenient practical method we use for split-
ting the universe into parts is todo itat the places—surfaces
—-where our light phenomena “‘start’’; we are now seeing
that in a direct and experimental way.) That is true
even though we neglect all but the average values for the
components that started out to travel through the structure
to the next surface. So when below any given light phe-
nomenon is named, that implies that all others are happening
with it. There is nothing strange about that (it applies to
any sort of phenomena we can name):- an ether cell is a
stellar galaxy, and obviously every possible kind of phenom-
enon is happening zz the galaxy, and hence when the galaxy
is thus summed up as light, and stated in terms of light, tru-
istically all those kinds of phenomena are included.

]. Also, even though we start from one cell which is
giving practically one color light, adjacent cells will unite in
forming with that cell a sum giving slightly varying compo-
nents in the ray——-in any given cell in the outer difference
surface. Hence, that cell in the surface will exhibit a con-
tinuous spectrum—perhaps perceptibly so, as we shall see.

§127. a. The last section gives a broadly detailed me-
chanics of light in conventional terms, making no more vari-
ation from those terms than logical consistency imperatively
requires. However, even if they are conventional, they are
hard to understand. So I now give an equivalent unconven-
tional expression of the same thing, which although rough,
is intelligible.

b. Let us consider two adjacent solar systems in the
galaxy. They would then be in fair equilibrium with each
other, and would have a fairly balanced solar field difference
surface between them (more explicitly, a field surface for
each, with a little of the galaxy field between them, the sum

Fig. 127b.

of the three amounting practically to saying that there is a

common, somewhat balanced single surface between). Let
Fig. 127b roughly represent those conditions. Sand 5 are
parts of two whirls or solar systems in cross-section. A is a

cell on the filament surface of S, and B a cell on the filament
surface of S’. As S and S’ are taken to be approximately in
balance, it follows that the spiral motion in their differeace
surfaces (FC and GD) are ‘reversed’ or ‘opposite,’ and about
equal, as is roughly indicated by the two arrows. So for ar-
bitrary clearness we may draw them as in the figure, with
some of the galaxy field between-~although as a matter of
fact that part between the surfaces is merely an additional
thickness of the field difference surface that is common to the
two whirls. (That surface has some thickness; hence it is de-
sirable to show in the figure an appreciable thickness, and
the method used is equivalent to doing so.) Now, as light
travels out from A towards a point C on the field difference

Two XIII §197e

surface of S it constantly encounters a weaker field, compared
with its radial component: hence, by Bernoulli’s principle,
Huygen’s principle, Newton’s third law, ete. (all are equiva-
lerit), the ray travels in the curve AC’C, which continually
increases its angle with pipr (the perpendicular or normal to
FC at C)—thus arriving at the surface FC headed in such a
direction that its transverse components are in about the same
plane as the similar components of the cell at C; that thus
makes it at least nominally the same ray of light that started
(i. e., it is its dynamic result). The ray would pass through
the thickness CD which was arbitrary, in the therefore tru-
istically necessary arbitrary straight line CD to D—that line
CD being tangent to ACC at C (i. e., itis simply a continua-
tion of AC C—a geometrical verbal counter; sce par. d).
Then, at D, the conditions being reversed, the ray would
travel in the curve DD’B (the dynamical reverse of ACC) to
B on the filament surface of S’, the beginning of its curve
being tangent at D to CD. That is the identical summed re-
sult of the path of a ray by orthodox light, when it passes
from one medium to another (assuming that ““all’’ of the ray
passes the boundary, as of course is not the case; i. e., the
cell at C is 3-dimensioned, and obviously some of the energy
or components of the ray is absorbed, some reflected, etc.—
including all of light phenomena). As a sum, to agree with
orthodox summations into monism, we have the fields on an
average dynamically denser than their field difference surface.
Then we could, by such summations, take it that A was a
point inside the dense, practically homogeneous prism PQR,
which prism is as shown tangent at C to the surface FC; and
B is inside the similar prism P'Q’R tangent at D to GD. As
the fields were dynamically (roughly) equal, the prisms (as-
sumed of equal refractive power) would have their sides PQ
and PQ’ parallel, so that the summed ray would be the
broken line ACDB, made up of the three straight parts
shown. As indicated by the figure, that ray is the orthodox
ray (see Wood’s “‘Optics,’’ chapter on refraction).

ec. I shal] not go into the geometry of the amount of
that refraction—deviation—of the ray. It is simple: all
that needs to be noted in going into this thoroughly is that
when I[ put a space between FC and GD it was thus tacitly
assumed that the two fields were made denser dynamically
than that symbolic space, so that AC’C leaves A dynamically
bent from its average direction—and so on, similarly. The
general reader needs simply to observe that all rays traveling
in the universe, in any way, are continually being curved, and
that we seem to see things as if they were in the direction of
the tangent to that curve where it enters the eye. Ortho-
dox theory of light roughly asserts that light travels in brok-
en straight lines; but even that theory admits, in order to
agree with observed facts and actually in contradiction to it-
self, that no reflection (e. g.) does take place exactly ata
geometrical surface:—that admission is obviously identica]
with the general principle of no straight lines which I have
just asserted, and which is proved by this whole book.

d. Hence, at A, B appears to be in the direction AC’
(or accurately, in the direction of the tangent to ACC at A),
and the angle of that deviation from its true direction in the
straight line AC is in astronomy called its aberration. But
this sort of aberration (as shown by this figure) is not defin-
itely recognized conventionally, as we shall see. (The true
direction of B from A is AC: for if I had not arbitrarily put
in that separating space, C and D would of course coincide,
and ACDB would then be a straight line; but the space had
to be put in to show the theory well, as we shal] further see.)

e. It follows that everything in the universe appears
slightly displaced to us-~i. e., it follows, except in the one
chance in infinity that our finite eyes are in exact dynamic

$197e XIII Two

balance with the observed body. But that displacement is
essential if we are to see it visually clearly, and not with
more or less colored spectrums for boundaries. For obvi-
ously, all colors actually travel from A to B or from B to A.
Hence, instead of there being one path ACC, as shown,
each of the infinite number of colors, because it has a speed
of its own, would travel to the field surface in a path of its
own, and there (as a trnism of such paths) spread out into a
spectrum: then, the equivalent to the reversed prism ( prac-
tically precisely reversed, as the whirls were taken to be in
fair equilibrium) would recombine that spectrum, so that it
reaches B practically all together, and it therefore seems that
all colors travel at about the same speed, in “‘free’’ space.
Obviously they do not, anywhere; but are always dispersed
fan-like into a spectrum and then, because all objects are us-
ually fairly in balance, are ordinarily perceptibly brought
together again at tbe ohject to which they travel. Each col-
or thus travels at a different speed al) the time, but has trav-
eled over a path that is proportionally longer as its speed is
greater, so that the colors arrive practically together ordi-
narily. Numbers of men have elaborately observed that col-
ors ordinarily arrive practically together, regardless of their
origin in ““free’’ space; hence, some have irrelevantly con-
cluded that the colors must travel together at the same speed,
as it seems not to have occurred to them to consider whether
all colors traveled over the same path. They tacitly took it
for granted that al] light travelsin straight lines, whereas the
absolute principle is that none ever does, finitely speaking.

f. Sand S can not be in eract equilibrium, because as a
truism of their existence, in the language we are speaking
they are in mutual motion. Therefore, it is impossible for
all] the colors of B to arrive exactly simultaneously at A. Or
to state it otherwise, there is some degree of asymmetry at C
or D, and hence the spectrum which is spread upon the field
surface at that place can not be perfectly united at A. It is
obvious that ordinarily, in conditions of fairly steady balance,
there would not be much variation of color at A from its con-
dition at B; and as the colors kept on coming continually
from B, any slight retardation of one color would merely re-
sult in giving an apparent different color to B from what it
would have been if the balance had been more exact (i. G5;
the actna]l spectrum of B at A is so slightly spread that we
do not notice it as a spectrum, but merely as a slight change
in color; see below). But obviously, if we now consider B
to be a rather large astronomical body and hence giving off
light made up of a mixture of very perceptibly different col-
ors; and if it were in close orbital motion with a companion
which would eclipse it, then we could see the colors start to
come. And B’s orbital motion would also obviously cause
quite considerable local asymmetry of B compared with the
steady whirl S, and hence would tend to give perhaps a per-
ceptible separation of the colors if we were at A observing B
come into view after an eclipse. The whole tendency would
be for ns to perceive some of the colors ‘*catcbing up,”’ or be-
coming stronger after a time. Such phenomena have been
actually observed:- Tikhoff and Nordmann independently
observed a mutual variation in the speeds of different colors
in so-called free space from such a source in that way. That
is obviously crucial proof of the consistency of the foregoing.

g. It at once follows that all that is a description of the
principles of a complete sort of aberration, and that it is not
possible to measure complete aberration (it is an infinite re-
gress: that is another point of view of no exact science, and
I shall not explicitly expand it into truisms). The actual
aberration which we do note is only a part of the total aber-
ration described above. What is conventionally known as
aberration is the angular displacement of a heavenly body

UNIVERSE

142

from the line of vision in which it appears to be, and is due,
if we interpret conventiona] descriptions explicitly, only to
the earth’s spherical field. Aberration in the complete sense
in which we shall use it is due to all structural variations.
Such general aberration as a matter of obvious fact is practi-
cally negligible for us for al) fairly balanced tbings in our en-
vironment here (where the unbalances are great—e. g., as
between lenses and air—the phenomena are given different
special names); but aberration for celestial bodies is percept-
ible. The earth’s spherical field is in fairly good balance
with all other fields (but not in exact balance), and so gives
an aberration of any star, as in Fig. 127b, at any given time.
Then about six months later we are on the opposite side of
our orbit ahout the sun, in reverse balance, and hence the
aberration of the star is practically reversed (or the star ap-
pears to be twice the angle of the spherical field aberration
from its former position—neglecting the modification of its
aberration due to the ether structure in the distance across
the orbit of the earth when that distance more or less iner-
venes; that neglected part includes much of the aberration
in the infinite regress of it, as is implied in the next para-
graph; e. g., the ‘‘bending”’ of light near the sun predicted
by Einstein’s relativity theory is a special part of aberration
due to the sun’s spherical field—-when thus put in terms of
affinity; see §125b and the next paragraph). In
brief, the transverse motion of the earth relative to the star,
by Bernoulli’s principle, makes its spherical field the equiva-
lent of a prism. The radial motion of the earth relative to
the star is provided for by Doppler’s principle (““Ency.
Brit.,’’ ii, 818). It is obvious that we could take aberration
and Doppler’s principle as two factors giving the Oneor En-
ergy, and completely express—explain—the universe with
them. Al) that is omitted here. Obviously, this descrip-
tion of aberration is merely the description of light from the
point of view of its being received at a body; that is simply
the reverse or vice versa of its description in the last two
sections from the point of view of its formation at a body or
etber cell. Also, it can be seen that by following ordinary
language we get bent light by ordinary principles as to
structures in ordinary steady space.

h. Clearly then, what is usually named aberration is
simply the refraction of a celestial body’s light that is due to
or accomplished by the earth spherical field. The complete
aberration of a given body in another galaxy would have that
refraction by our spherical field as the first [or last] part of
itself. The next part of that body’s aberration is due to our
solar whirl field—and could be measured by us if we ob-
served the body’s direction from opposite sides of the solar
system’s orbit about the galaxy axis, taking into account
other changes. Also, there would be another part of its com-
plete aberration if we had to view it through the sun’s spher-
ical field: obviously the light from the body could not come
through that field perfectly symmetrically, and hence there
would necessarily be some degree of deviation of that light
due to that field (that being another statement of Einstein’s

bending’). And in the same way there is a part of the
total aberration added by every difference surface encount-
ered (more precisely :- by every field and filament passed
through). —_It is obvious of course that if we look at such a
body one part of that total aberration is usually in a sense op-
posite to the next, so that the path of the light from it is
actually a sort of wavy, corkscrew line (we saw that a whirl
corkscrews itself along; we now consistently see that light,
regardless of whether described as waves or whirls, does the
same); and the aberration due to our spherical] ‘field is practi-
cally all there remains of the body’s aberration over that al-
gebraic nearly zero—but possibly the aberration caused by

143

the sun’s orbit about the galaxy axis does not perceptibly
cancel out. Of course, the One absolute sum total of the
complete aberration of every body is obviously 0 (or arith-
metically, ©), so that qualitatively aberration, as a rigorous
truism, does not keep us in ignorance of anything but unes-
sential temporary quantities. Clearly, however, it theoreti-
cally would require infinite time to measure the complete
aberration of any star accurately.

i. It thus obviously follows that the consistent way of
describing aberration is to have the ether around the earth
form a structure that accompanies the earth. It could be
verbally described with valid logic in the opposite way; but
that would give all the enormous verbal difficulty that would
accompany Ptolemaic astronomy (§100c; has given the rela-
tivity theory as one such method). Hence, as we have been
seeing, in ordinary language the ether accompanies the earth.

j. Ineffect the Michelson-Morley experiments compared
the velocity of light under practically identical conditions,
except that (1) in one case light moved in the direction of
the motion of the earth from a point A to a point B and back
(those points being places ona large stone disk), both A and B
being considered as moving with the earth, and (2) in the
other case the light moved across that earth-motion in that
same path, If the ether does not move with the earth (or
the apparatus), then it can be shown by simple geometry
that it would take more time for the light to make the trip
across the earth’s motion; if the ether moved with the appa-
ratus it would make no difference how the line from A to B
is oriented (assuming, as is practically the fact, that the earth
field structure is practically homogeneous in that small por-
tion of it). The experiment showed that it made no percept-
ible difference—that within certain measured limits the ether
was dragged by the earth. See Wood’s ““Opties’’ (XXII)
for the details and for other details of orthodox light men-
tioned in this paragraph. We have just seen that a
consistent description of aberration agrees (if we use ordinary
language) with that. As stated in §124¢, it is orthodoxly
considered that aberration requires a stil] ether; it is ortho-
doxly held that all experimental evidence except this
Michelson-Morley experiment requires a still ether—one not
dragged by atoms (which orthodox view about atoms shows
clearly that orthodox light makes a dualism between matter
and ether—that the fundamental difficulty it has is that it
makes no explicit solution of the One and tbe Many). It is
now obvious that what orthodox theory requires is an explic-
itly expressed difference surface: for we saw in pars. b-d
that the so-called still or free ether which was required was
merely a formal counter of actual—not zero—space between
prisms (which prisms the orthodox theory assumed with logi-
cal inconsistency to be perfectly homogeneous or isotropic).
(Obviously, those two orthodox absurdities—absurdities from
a finite point of view: religiously or mystically they are all
rigbt—do cancel each other, and give a theory that is logic-
ally consistent, but is so only in one zero point.) In
implicit proof and agreement with all that, Lorentz under-
takes to show that the Michelson-Morley experiment can be
explained by asserting that there zs a still ether (as is
orthodoxly supposed to be required by all other light experi-
mental results), and that the stone dise which fixes or gives
the length AB is shortened somewhat by passing through
that still ether, so that the actual path of the light is
shorter—that then being [superficially] verbally consistent
with observations. That direct assertion is obviously
equivalent to saying that matter which measures space varies
as such a standard, so that space varies: and those ideas of
Lorentz’s are the base of Einstein’s work on relativity.
Well; obviously, if the stone is shortened by rubbing against

UNIVERSE

Two XIII §128a

the ether, then the reaction asserts that parts of tbe stone
move some, and that of course requires that the ether must
also move; for it would obviously be an absolute miracle,
using our language, (a flat self-contradiction) if the atoms and
ether thus reacted without causing the ether to move—to re-
act, to be dragged. (If the language be changed to the rela-
tivity theory, then in that new language Newton’s third law
is not so—for if space thus changes in order to avoid that re-
action asserted by that law, then that third law does not hold
in the new language.) Hence, to shorten the path
(even by the relativity theory itself) is identically the same
as saying that the ether moves. And obviously, by our
method of putting the ether into a structure we show the
character of the narrow or more or less xominal problem of
whether the ether ‘‘moves’’; for it is then at once evident
that the structural relations consistently describe all light
experiments, and it is entirely immaterial (from the point of
view of the total truth) whether we use the verbal form
*‘ether moves,’’ or the formula ‘‘ether does not move.’”’ The
everyday custom of speech is that the ether moves. The
orthodox theory means precisely the same thing, but puts it
mystically—not scientifically, or finitely.

k. U. A. Boyden a number of years ago entrusted
$1000, now known as the Boyden premium, to the Franklin
Institute, to be awarded to ‘“any resident of North America
who shall determine by experiment whether all rays of light,
and other physical rays, are or are not transmitted with the
same velocity.”’ In 1907 part of the accumulation was
awarded to a man who was believed to have shown that cer-
tain different colored light rays were transmitted at the same
velocity in “‘free’’ space, because he showed that they ar-
rived here practically together after starting out practically
together. We have seen (par. e) that that solution is wrong
in that it is quantitatively inaccurate and qualitatively totally
irrelevant. So far as I know the premium is still offered, so
apparently the problem is still unsolved, apart from this
book. Here we have the complete solution (cf. §§124-6).

1. The solution of those recognized outstanding prob-
lems of light is comparatively incidental. The important
application of this roughly stated section (the section is so
condensed that precision, and some intelligibility, had to be
sacrificed) consists of showing how the spectrum is formed.
Knowing that, then we can readily find the details of struct-
ures of different sorts of atoms, and be in a position to find
out qualitatively (and quantitatively, in so far as actual meas-
ures have been made) why certain atoms have certain prop-
erties, and how to use those properties—in short, we have a
rational basis for all engineering problems, chiefly in terms
of ““chemistry.’’ So we start investigating that spectrum;
it will have to be done briefly, and hence roughly.

8128. a. We shall go at the formation of the spectrum
backwards, so to speak. I. e., we start with the different
vibrating structures and see how they add together their ef-
fects as a final spectrum, expressing the mechanics in terms
of light. So that we may have no difficulty in forming a
clear conception of a spectrum—no difficulty in verifying the
mechanics by observation,—I shall show how our galaxy as
one atom will form a spectrum fora larger being, for whom
the cells in tbe surface of our galaxy filament have a velocity
of radial component that gives him visible light. To him,
therefore, our galaxy would not be large enough to be per-
ceptible if it is alone; so in order to avoid verbal complica-
tions let ns assume that it is in a collection of similar
‘atoms,’ so that the same sort of light will come from each,
and add together by Huygen’s principle to form an ordinary
so-called flat wave-front. That simply means that if we
take it that light is corpuscular, then two of those whirl

§128a XI1I Two

corpuscles can not occupy the same space simnltaneonsly——a
truism. Jn terms of the origin of vibrations it is the same
principle shown in §126:- that the radial component changes
direction. Or it means substantially the same as the ortho-
dox theory which shows that each newly vibrating cell
becomes the center of light vibrations, and that by **interfer-
ence’ light is propagated “‘rectilinearly,’? and hence in
““wave-fronts.’? That orthodox theory is well known (Wood,
*“Optics,’’ II), and I omit further details of it. I shall call
the results of Huygen’s principle the composition of light,
composition of components, or results of interference.

b. Then, omitting all other details of structural insides
of our galaxy, it is obvious that its filament will tend to form
in the galaxy field surface a continuous light spectrum—i. e.,
the infinite number of colors will tend to spread out as a con-
tinuous spectrum on that field surface, as we shall see in
more detail. | But obviously, we must consider interference
of light from various parts of the filament surface. If the
filament were perfectly symmetrical] and the field surface
perfectly symmetrical, obviously there would be total inter-
ference, and we would get no light: or, we could equally
well say that each ray would then be totally reinforced, so
that there would be infinite light—both being One state-
ments. So it follows that in our galaxy, which is not sym-
metrical (and remembering that we are ignoring all structures
but the filament and field), at any place on the field surface
tbere will be, as a result of what has been described as aber-
ration or what is usually called refraction, a continuous spec-
trum, some bands or portions of which are “brigbter’ than
other parts (that ‘spectrum’ is not what we see and conven-
ventionally name a spectrum; the latter is the reflection of
the ‘spectrum’ of light waves from a screen, body, surface of
our ordinary atoms; as we are interested here in the dynam-
ics of the light wave we may use spectrum, etc., to name the
condition of the waves). The darker parts of that spectrum
at the field surface are due to interference of rays from other
parts of the filament surface which have been “‘passed’’
through that part of the filament surface which is forming
the bright bands (or vice versa, depending on relative con-
ditions). The field surface is obviously fully “over-
laid,’ everywhere and in every direction, with those complete
spectrums; the place on the field surface at which we would
say a particular spectrum is located would depend upon the
relative location of the viewing point (analogous to the loca-
tion of arainbow; this is a rainbow I am describing except
there are ‘self-Juminous’ and refracting continuous ether
cells instead of drops of water). Hence, as each of us (or
each of those greater beings) has his own point of view in
seeing or describing that spectrum, each of us would have
his particular spectrum on that surface, specially oriented, and
differing somewhat from all others’ spectrums. Our descrip-
tion has here merely run into the infinite regress; we shall
get out of it with but negligible difficulty shortly.

c. We therefore see that a complete or continuous spec-
trum, having more or less perceptible darker bands, is the
spectrum of the newest, youngest, or most fluid whirl—a
whirl which has negligible secondaries and condensations.
It is called a band spectrum, and is orthodoxly considered as
being made of bright bands separated hy dark bands; obvi-
ously, there must be some light in the ‘‘dark’’ bands, or
else we have a zero-infinity error. It is further obvious that
every finite band in the spectrum, however narrow it may be,
is wtse/f a complete spectrum of the same sort overlaid on
the wider spectrum, coming from a structure of different
order. Or, we may briefly call it a different order spectrum.
Obviously, such different order spectrums, truistically with
different order whirls, will extend in infinite regress.

144

UNIVERSE

d. It therefore follows, that because the cell from which
any given band (regardless of how nearly zero in width, or
how nearly infinite in width, the band is) comes, is taken to
be of finite size (when we are using scientific language), then
there must always be a certain fixed ratio between the sizes
of those bands, or between their spacial separation (which is
the same in principle), depending upon the finite size of cell
which we originally take as a criterion (we ordinarily take a
cell with vibration at V as standard). Therefore, the pro-
portional periodicity of structure is seen to inhere in the peri-
odicity of spectrum bands (or spectrum lines: a comparatively
narrow perceptible spectrum band is customarily called a
line). That ratio would obviously be somewhat approxi-
mately proportional to the inverse square, on the same prin-
ciple as Bode’s law (§117). | And that ratio is observed to
exist, the assertion of it being known as Balmer’s formula:-
Wave length=h| R2/(R2—4)]<107-8cem, where for observed H
lines, k is a number, 3645, and RF is given successive values
3, 4, 5, 6.... That formula rationally asserts that the ratio
of wave length to the other two dimensions of space (to LI,
or radius-squared) is rather accurately, but admittedly ap-
proximately, proportional to the numerical ratio 1/R’—to
the inverse square,—but that because of the finite size of the
structures R? has to be reduced a little, just as was done ia
Bode’s law, and for the same reasons as were seen there, or
just as Newcomb and others have empirically tried to correct
Newton’s law by making the inverse 2 a little greater number
(““Ency. Brit.,’’ xii, 384). (Also, Balmer’s formula is sup-
plemented by Biot’s law; §130f. In principle the two are
the same.) Of course, a completely rational Bal-
mer’s formula and a completely rational Bode’s law would
state just how much that ‘little’ is, and the general mathe-
matical theory @f its variations—in short, would be the ex-
plicit theory of harmonic periodicity, the theory of the
numerical coefficients in IX. Erwin, in discussing Balmer’s
formula, gives some first steps in the statement of that fully
complete mathematical measuring theory of science.

e. And Moseley’s law (Millikan, ““The Electron,’ 194,
201, 213, etc.) is in principle the same as Balmer’s formula.
Moseley observed that “‘arranged in the order of increasing
frequency of their characteristic X-ray spectra, all the known
elements which have been examined constitute a simple
arithmetical series each number of which is [approximately]
obtained by adding always the same quantity’’—i. e., by
adding the same spacial distance on the similar spectrums.
Now, X-rays are roughly a different order of vibrations from
ordinary light, and hence a complete X-ray spectrum more
or less adds itself directly on to and beyond the violet end
of the ordinary visible light spectrum, with lines representing
the higher order, very rapid structures in the atom. _ It is
difficult to refract those high-frequency waves into percept-
ible spectra; so in the spectrums of X-rays it follows that
only the principal higher order internal structures manage to
give lines energetic enough to remain perceptible and con-
stitute those simple experimental spectrums. In ordinary
light spectrums numerous atomic secondaries give complicated
visible spectrums. And because our atoms are energetically
harmonically periodic, it follows that their higher order
structures are periodic. Hence, as the method of getting
X-ray spectra automatically analyzes the atoms for us by
showing only the chief energetic higher order structure, it
truistically follows that such periodicity would appear as
Moseley’s series. That is merely a repetition in concrete
terms of the last paragraph; see also par. k. If it
be desired to put Moseley’s law in the form of the inverse
square law, we have b//,=E,?/E,2, where the I’s are wave
lengths, and the E’s are respective nuclear charges of atoms

145

(Millikan, **Electron,”’ 201). As a matter of fact, Moseley’s .

law is no more exact than Balmer’s formula or Bode’s law
(being of the same nature, as just seen). Moseley’s law runs
somewhat out of step in the middle of the periodic table, in
complete agreement with the fact that there the rare earths
get out of step. Also, and obviously consistently, the atomic
weights of elements (App. B) do not always agree with
Moseley’s order, which is given by what is called the “‘atom-
ic number’ (e. g., elements 52 and 53). For the Moseley
number seems to depend upon the size of the chief or ‘‘char-
acteristic’ higher order structure in the atom, and truistically
some variation in another property (say density) of the whole
atom is likely to be enough occasionally to throw the atomic
weight out of order, precisely as every other simple property
of atoms gets out of step with any other given property.
That necessarily follows as a truism of the meaning of property:
for property means a particular way of considering an atom
divided into parts, and so if any two properties maintained a
regular step (stayed in step) they would be essentially iden-
tical and not two properties.

f. The last two paragraphs are brief statements of the
ultimate nature of structure and property in terms of light,
compared with all other terms. Because they comprise such
numerous details they are hard to understand.

g. Inorder that the spectrums at our galaxy field may
become perceptible, visible, to the larger man we have as-
sumed, they unite with others of adjacent galaxies, and build
up by interference more intense spectrums, that travel on
until they come to, and form spectrums at, the larger differ-
ence surface that in turn incloses these galaxy-atoms (making
those ‘atoms’ into a solid, liquid, or gas to that man, which
is self-luminous). | Now, if he looks directly at that larger
difference surface, his eyes, being another solid in what we
will consider to be a fairly steady environment analogous to
our own, are in fair dynamic balance with that collection of
galaxy-atoms; consequently, those spectra spread out at that
difference surface have their colors recombined at his eye and
he sees the spectrums as a bright body of a certain color just
as we see an ordinary self-luminous body. His particular
space location will determine what spectrum on that surface
is combined at his eye; hence, the color he sees is never ex-
actly the same as the color seen by any other observer, if we
use ordinary language. Therefore, obviously we can assert
and agree that we arbitrarily (i. e., for convenience—see that
important point made by Dewey in his Introduction) propose
to have verbally an exact science and also a verbally steady
space and time, and manage rigorously to achieve that by
being eract in naming all colors (everything would have a
differently named color for each observer, and for the same
observer at each different instant of time). And as the prop-
erties of bodies are not in step, such an eract science would
formally determine the exact relative names or measures for
all other properties in infinite regress of variability. That
would be a relativity theory (of color, I suppose you would
call it), essentially identical with Einstein’s (as well as being
essentially the same in meaning as our ordinary language),
but in which space and time would formally be our ordinary
steady Euclidian variety. But all color would be ““enrved’’
(i. e., would vary in measure continually, and after an infini-
ty of varying would naturally or truistically return to the
same value, or ‘‘close on itself’’ like Einstein’s curved space),
and would have time as a fourth dimension’’—i. e., must
always be dated, as it varies with time, as a verbal truism.
And obviously, any property may similarly be made the base
of a relativity theory—and as we may truistically designate
an infinity of properties, there are an infinity of another sort
of relativity theories to choose from if our ordinary language

UNIVERSE

Two XIII §198;

is not liked. If that observer introduces any appreci-
able asymmetry between his eye and the difference surface,
the spectra will truistically be appreciably spread out, and
from his space location he sees some particular, now visible
spectrum. Obviously that spectrum which he sees is differ-
ently dispersed both in relative and in total degree from its
dispersion on the difference surface (because by only one
chance in infinity could the prism be exactly the effectual
dynamic reverse of the various structures the light had been
corkscrewing through up to the time it spread on the large
difference surface). So it truistically follows in the same way
that the actua] spectrums we see contain in them the com-
plete traces of the dynamic conditions of ail the materials
that make them—of every structure through which the light
has passed (cf. §158c). And the other general rule which
we have seen is that all asymmetries in any part of
the path of a ray are represented in the final ray by varia-
tions in the composition of its components, and will be indi-
cated in some degree by lines or bands in its spectrum.

h. We shall now see the results produced in the spec-
trum by condensations in the galaxy whirl. Let us take our
solar system as being a secondary whirl, and the earth a ter-
tiary. | Also, suppose that the observer is stationed some-
where near the north galactic pole. One of the cells that
we have been considering to be on the galaxy difference sur-
face and to be the vibratory, arbitrary beginning of one ray,
is by our definitions a lower order whirl of the galaxy whirl,
just as the solar whirl] is a lower order whirl. The only dif-
ference in tbe resulting light phenomena of those cells and of
the solar whirl is that we have considered the cell phenomena
as being practically continuous (ignoring inner structures) :—
that is consistent in principle; quantitatively, there is prob-
ably such a great difference in the order of solar whirl and of
cell that the ‘light’ from one would be practically totally im-
perceptible by any means that makes the ‘light’ from the
other perceptible; the reader should bear in mind that J] am
making such vast quantitative discrepancies in this discussion
of light—deliberately, as a temporarily useful counterbalance
to the narrowness of the texts. Now that we consider
the solar whirl] explicitly we shall see some detail of its inner
structural results in the complete spectrum made by the solar
whirl—which is « band or line in the galaxy spectrum.

i. A complete revolution of the solar whirl or system
about the galaxy main axis is obviously one vibration of the
galaxy lower order structure which the solar system consti-
tutes. Clearly that vibration is a smal] asymmetry compared
with the total galaxy; but it zs always at a given time an
asymmetry. And obviously, that continua] asymmetry,
fuirly steady in all its temporary values, will steadily refract
or aberrate the ray which goes from the solar whirl to the
final spectrum. In each revolution the asymmetry obviously
reverses direction, and hence the aberration would swing
back and forth across a mean value and make a narrow line
or band in the spectrum (that ‘vibration’ lasts probably some
millions of our years, and would not ““persist’’ in our retinas
asa ~band’’: but I am using the time and space scale of
the larger man).

j. Inside the solar system there are bodies which will
again repeat that process (and bodies inside those bod-
ies, in infinite regress). |The sun has a small revolution
about the solar whirl main axis. And in the same way as
before, that revolution of the sun will make a still narrower
band on the narrow band that is the spectrum of the system
itself (I am not at all sure of the correctness of that quanti-
tative assertion; it sounds neat, but it is a problem in perio-
dicity I haven’t worked). But the earth would obviously be
vibrating asymmetrically in the solar whirl field in a way that

8128) XIII Two

is dynamically different from the asymmetry that is the sun’s
revolution. So the earth also would give a line, less intense,
and separated from the sun line; i. e., no two interna] bod-
ies or structures can ever give two coincident lines. That is
equivalent to the truism that no two bodies can simultane-
ously occupy the same space. So we have proved generally
that every structure in the universe is represented by a line
in every spectrum. Of course, quantitatively most of those
lines in a given spectrum are very close to zero in every re-
spect, and hence are imperceptible; and the fact that there
is directly observed to be no fixed, sharp, constant line in
any spectrum, especially when the conditions of the body pro-
ducing the spectrum are considerably changed, is hence now
direct crucial proof that tbere is no exact science—that mass
varies with velocity—of the general argument of this book.

k. Whether or not the solar system makes a line inside
the limits of that large observer’s visible spectrum obviously
depends upon quantitative periodic relationships. As a rath-
er rash guess I should say that the solar system moved rela-
tively to his own genera] large size so fast that it would be
an X-ray band, above his direct visual perception, and that
the larger and longer-enduring structures of the galaxy fur-
nished lines in his visible spectrum. It is obvious however
that the solar system is in a certain periodic harmony with
those visible lines, and that the same system of ad infinitum
relationships must exist in any whirl. So summing to the
One, it is truistic that each arbitrarily particular line corres-
ponding to each structure is itself a spectrum which has a set
of relationships infinite in ““number’’ (i. e., continuous), and
hence identical with the spectrum that is each other line.
There is then the final applicable truism that the spectrums
of all things or structures are ultimately identical, but that
the perceptibly vistble part of its spectrum is for each thing
different in some degree from that of every other thing, and
that the intensities of the bands similarly vary. It therefore

follows concretely that if a series of lines occurs perceptibly.

in one part of the spectrum of any given sort of whirl, then
the same series can be found in the spectrum of any other
sort of whirl if that other sort is stimulated in a way suffic-
ient to make the differently located series intense enough to
be perceptible. And that is merely a general statement of
the principles wnderlying Moseley’s observations and law
(par. e)—-or the fact that there are no absolute ““atoms.’’

]. This section has therefore summed, as being identical
in meaning with the last section—a proof of its consistency.
We have seen a very rough statement of how a spectrum is
formed, and of what that spectrum indicates about structure.
The reader has perhaps noted already that there are details
and modifications without end, which we could start on. So
far I have not been very explicit about any of the ordinarily
named phenomena of light except refraction (aberration) and
the consequent dispersion. But the reader may now see for
himself that it would take hundreds of pages to be fairly ex-
plicit about the things already mentioned. I dislike leaving
the descriptions in the above rough and glaringly unfinished
state; but the genera] reader has no special need for further
mechanical details, and the professional expert can get them
from the given method better than I can give them, and
nearly everybody will demand that J be brief. Brevity in
these days is coming to mean a Jazz syncopation demanded
by shallow persons; but it is reasonable to require that I
condense the rest of this chapter even more severely.

8129. a. In describing dispersion above I did not give
explicit proof that there was no such thing as the so-called
normal dispersion, in which (to use conventional terms) it is
asserted that the refractive index increases as the wave-length
decreases. Conventional experiments superficially seem to

UNIVERSE

146

show that such dispersion does exist. 1 shall condense the

proof that there is never such dispersion.

b. The light from the filament surface in the last section
(or from a vibrating cell, if it be noted that in any azimuth
the cross-section of a cell is a closed line) will obviously be
sent up to form the spectrum on the field surface from a line
of cells which, taken in any plane, is curved and finally closes
on itself. It therefore follows at once, by geometry which
would take hundreds of words to write with reasonable pre-
ciseness but which is readily seen if you make a diagram of
these conditions and happen to remember a little geometry,
that no dispersion line (band, color) in the spectrum is a
straight line—or what amounts to the same thing, is exactly
the same color (lying in a straight line perpendicular to the
length of the spectrum—perpendicular to the average direc-
tion of dispersion). So any spectrum, however formed, if
permitted to have lines of sufficient length, will have the
ends of those lines perceptibly curved, the curves fading out
of visibility (there would be in each band, before it starts
curving in the opposite sense with reversed direction of dis-
persion, a geometrical] line of infinite—or zero—refrangibil-
ity, which accounts for the perceptible fading out of visibility
and completely agrees geometrically with the fact that the
light started from a closed curve structure). Those curves at
the ends of the lines in a spectrum are perceptible in many
experimental spectrums, and are called wigs. And the de-
gree of curvature of each wing will truistically vary with the
variation,in color. It is reeognized by orthodox light theory
that so-called normal dispersion is merely a special case of
anomalous dispersion (Wood’s ““Opties,’’ 95): as a fact, the
details of which I omit, “‘normal’’ dispersion is a One state-
ment of dispersion, or the 0 - © Jimit.

§130. a. As we have seen, as a truism of the principle
of asymmetry there can be no ray with equal transverse com-
ponents (nor can either of those two components ever become
zero). So it is obvious that always, as a ray travels along,
it is encountering asymmetries which continually change the
relative length or energy of the two transverse components.
That is the same in effect of course as these:- (1) one com-
ponent may be made so small as to become imperceptible;
(2) they both may be made so; (3) a given ratio of the two
may be fairly steadily maintained, but the continual actual
change of the two is equivalent to the rotation of the two
about the path of travel as an axis; (4) or those relative
changes may be combined in any degree. And such phe-
nomenon of change in the transverse components of a ray is
named polarization. It truistically always occurs everywhere
in every ray (it is merely the same thing as the ‘spiral’ flow
of ether in a whirl). But it is not usually a perceptible
change; for ordinary light travels through whirls which are
not arranged in any very steady system (a crystal is obviously
a fairly steady system of atoms; but the fluid air is not),
and hence the two components are changed usually in alter-
nately more or less opposite ways so that no accumulation of
effect takes place; and hence there is said to be ‘‘no’’ pol-
arization, and all the rays in snch a beam of light have
approximately equal transverse components oriented in practi-
cally the same proportions in all directions in the transverse
plane. From that average condition (in which there is
merely imperceptible polarization, although it is convention-
ally unpolarized light’’) practically all sorts of departures
into perceptible polarizations have been observed and given
numerous names (see a modern treatise on optics), Obvi-
ously, there is an infinite regress of such polarization phe-
nomena, we may name such quantitative variation forever.

| b. Orthodoxly, there is asserted to be a plane polariza-
tion, in which one transverse component becomes 0. There

147

can not be any such phenomenon, of course; but we may
consider that in plane polarized light one transverse compo-
nent ordinarily is imperceptible. Then, orthodoxly,
the ‘““plane of polarization is defined as the particular plane
of incidence in which the polarized light is most copiously
reflected’’ (Wood’s *“Optics,”’ 233). Then a question arises
as to direction:- whether that vibration which is greater
takes place in that arbitrarily named plane, or in the trans-
verse direction perpendicular to it. Wood (ibid., 233, 242:
possibly he changes in later editions; I haven’t looked) as-
serts flatly that the light vibrations take place in that per-
pendicular direction. Drude (“‘Theory of Optics,’’ trans.
1902, 253) says that either direction is possible, and that
the perpendicular one gives simpler language; and the ‘‘En-
cyclopaedia Brittanica’”’ (xxi, 933) substantially agrees with
Drude. It is a question that has long been debated; ortho-
dox science agrees that the electric vector (in the modern
electrodynamic theory; XIV) is the perpendicular one, and
the magnetic the other; but as I am taking the electric vec-
tor to be the filiar direction (and to be that direction only
when a place on the difference surface is considered) it is ob-
vious that this direction of ““light vibration’’ depends entirely
upon what arbitrary point of view we take (for evidently, if
we take a given point of view, the filiar direction relative to
that point ef view takes every direction when the whole filament
is considered, as it closes on itself), and that therefore Drude
is correct when he asserts in effect that the directions are ar-
bitrary and that be does not know which is the finally con-
sistent one. We thus see explicitly that conventional science
is not in agreement as to a complete set of consistent direc-
tions; and that explicitly supports $99, in which I showed
that we need not dispute about directions in this book.

c. Itis obvious that precisely as shown in §129b, be-
cause light is sent to a spectrum from curved chains of cells,
then necessarily the transverse components must be both ro-
tated and changed in relative value (both those changes are
actually the same reaction, but it is convenient to consider
the reaction from those two nominal aspects). And further :-
as one monistic limit, a ray may be considered to approach
being perfectly normal to that curved chain of cells, and it
would then approach having a normal polarization and bence
dispersion; and as the other One limit, a ray may be consid-
ered to approach being tangent to tbat closed chain of cells,
and would approach having either zero or infinite polarization
in its various aspects, and hence similar dispersions. And
each effect when within the One limits would truistically be
of different quantitative degree for each color. The actual
phenomena are between those limits, so that all light (when
it is considered with respect to its transverse components, as
is being explicitly done in this section) always and everywhere
actually has ‘anomalous’ or *‘elliptical’’ polarization, and
“‘anomalous’”’ rotary polarization, and ““anomalous’’ rotary
dispersion (i. e., each color is differently rotated, so that its
wings curve differently, indicating again [$129] that it is not
possible actually to separate the three components of light).
Combinations of such phenomena are obviously indefinitely
numerous, and many are named in textbooks. Volumes of
mechanical! details would be needed to describe them.

d. It can be seen, as consistent truisms, that those
curved spectrums described in the last paragraph and in
§129b are essentially in three dimensions, and that the spec-
trums themselves are vibrations of cells in what can be called
the reverse direction from the vibrations of the cells which
sent out the light that made the spectrums. Therefore, the
spectrums (i. e., amy spectrum, considering it itself in ulti-
mate detail) are definitely the mechanical equivalent of a
whirl—they are whirls, which by definition (as we are using

en

UNIVERSE

Two XIII §130e

continuous vibrations) are not verbally allowed to go further
and become verbally distinct or ‘fully-formed’ whirls. That
is to say, when we start to considering a whirl in terms of
continuous vibrations, then each whirl] itself is, as absolutely
continuous matter, transferred, as a spectrum which 7s that
whirl, to all other whirls in the universe. Or, in short, if we
start using continuous language of light waves, and keep at
it consistently as we have done, then the universe becomes
verbally absolutely continuous and all definite whirls become
definitely all other whirls—becoming so by transferring them-
selves to all others as spectrums, which spectrums turn out
mechanically to be whirls. That sounds mystic and
unintelligible, of course. And it is both—except from a One
point of view. Even though I have been verbally ostenta-
tiously declining to let go our definite, pluralistic whirl from
which we started the “‘wave’’ or continuous description, we
see that the waves themselves, as spectra, have become the
whirl, and have made that whirl universal, or indefinite, or
monistic. So by being logical or self-consistent, it resulted
that the whirl disappeared as a pluralistic entity any way (ex-
cept in so far as we definitcly consider those cells of which
the spectrums are composed as being finite in size). ‘So it
truistically follows that for any definite language or science,
we must use a corpuscular theory of light. Otherwise, the
mysticism, or the ineffable total continuous universe, as mon-
istically expressed (i. e., not expressed at all, in any positive
sense) in this paragraph, is the inevitable result. However,
the foregoing verbal trick of hanging on to a definite whirl
(or cell) until we arc ready to sum the whole description
makes that form of “‘waves’’ scientific—for the final reason
that they are formally explicitly 3-dimensioned. For obvi-
ously, all of science, before it has any meaning, must be
summed into ineffable religion.

e. Itis obvious further that al]] actual whirls or atoms
are in some degree asymmetrical with respect to their chief
main axial diameter and to the two diameters in their filiar
plane; i. e., all atoms are spheroids with the three diame-
ters unequal in some degree. So it is clear that if atoms are
oriented in fairly regular simularity, as in a crystal, there
will be a tendency for a ray of light to be cumulatively ro-
tated so long as it keeps traveling through more atoms. Also
a conciderable relative difference in lengths of atomic axes
would make the ray tend to bave two perceptible dispersions,
corresponding to those two comparatively large cumulative
causes. Such phenomena and many more similar in principle
have been observed. If a ray of light be sent through
a transparent non-crystalline collection of whirls that are in
a magnetic field, in the magnetic direction (XIV) it would
obviously be rotated some with cumulative effect, and also
in decreasing proportion it would be rotated some if passed
in any other direction (up to the theoretical limiting direc-
tion exactly perpendicular to the magnetic direction). Then,
the ray, if sent back over approximately tbe same path, is
observed to have its rotation doubled (which phenomenon is
called the Faraday effect). Clearly, in the case of
the ray passing through a crystal each ray is subjected to the
total effect of the atomic fields (i. e., those fields are small,
and each ray is as a sum subjected to the effect of all por-
tions of the whole field), and the rotation is the algebraic sum
of the general, systematized asymmetry of those fields; so,
as is experimentally observed, any rotation of a ray is ap-
proximately cancelled if the ray is sent back along the same
path through the crystal. But in the magnetic field only
one direction of asymmetry is introduced (the direction of the
magnetic force); hence, if the ray be sent in one direction
it is rotated in one way, and if sent in the opposite direction
itis obviously rotated in the opposite way, which algebraically

§130e XIII Two

doubles the numerical value of its rotation and gives the Fara-
day effect. It therefore directly follows that a magnetie field
is a large field around an electrical apparatus or collection of
atoms, that is equivalent to the field of an atom. As
the Faraday effect is obviously merely a special case, we also
see that there can be indefinite variations of that effect, de-
pending on how we complicate eleetrical fields; many such
variations in the phenomenon have been observed. Perhaps
the most discussed variation is the Zeeman effect (for details
of it and of other phenomena mentioned in this paragraph,
see Wood’s “‘Optics,’? XVI, XVII):-_ briefly, it is observed
that the speed or color of a given ray is changed by subject-
ing its source to a magnetic field; e. g., the heavy yellow
line or band of sodium wil] be broadened in the spectrum,
and then be split in various ways (i. e., new bands percept-
ibly appear where before was perceptibly a continuous band).
It is obvious, from all our foregoing descriptions, how that
would occur. I might mention explicitly another point defi-
nitely involved in the Zeeman effect:- the filament (or any
structural part, such as a spherical condensation—remember-
ing it moves in an orbit) obviously has two dynamically opposite
halves. Now, in all cases any line produced in a spectrum
by such a structural part must necessarily consist of at least
two parts more or less perceptibly continuous; obviously, if
the structure were perfectly symmetrical there would be only
two parts, but asymmetries cause the number of parts to be
in infinite regress. Therefore, it is obvious that if the source
of light is subjected to magnetic force it has superimposed
upon it a heavy outer field which makes al] the whirls more
energetic, and will orient all their chief structures more or
less systematically, and hence will spread out their bands in
unending modification, with all variety of polarizations of the
newly perceptible lines.

f. Biot’s law is to the effect that rotary dispersion is
nearly proportional to the inverse square of the wave length
(Wood’s ““Opties,’’ 379). That is obviously equivalent to
saying that given the effect of certain transverse components
(of 2 components or dimensions of space), the longitudinal
component varies approximately as the inverse square. And
that law is clearly the rational completion of Balmer’s formula
and Moseley’s law (§128de). All three laws together obvi-
ously agree with our general equation in §126fg, and show
by direct experiment that the argument of this book is sound.

§131. a. Ihave mostly been describing the phenomena
of light from the point of view of following the ray out from
its source and observing how it changed with respect to its
longitudinal component (§§127-9) and with respect to its
transverse components (§130)—it being noted that the com-
ponents are not actually separable. © Now, obviously, the
whole of light may be described from the opposite point of
view:- considering rays as coming in from all directions upon
a cell which is to become a source, and observing how those
rays combine—what sort of source they make, or how they
modify the cell. Obviously, always the rays must first be
built into the structure of the cell as part of the cell, and in
the end sent away modified (that being a truism of what a
ray is); and conventionally that phenomenon is divided usu-
ally into two parts:- (1) some of the ray is sent away (re-
flected) almost at once; and (2) the remainder of the ray is
more extensively built into the structure of the cell (absorbed)
and later on sent away seemingly as ‘‘new’’ light. (The
orthodox descriptions talk of total absorptions, reflections,
ete.; but obviously, all of that zero and infinity talk about
“‘total’? means merely “‘perceptible,’’ relates to nothing
which aetually bappens if it be explicitly interpreted, and so
is not scientific and may be ignored). Briefly, all
those numerous possible phenomena may be described from

UNIVERSE

148

this other point of view by reversing the descriptions already
given, and picking out conventional names for the result, so
far as there are such names. The point to be emphatically
kept in mind in doing that is that the cell is itself bound by
a closed line in any cross-section, so that always ‘‘anoma-
lous’’ and “‘rotary’’ phenomena wil] necessarily occur.

b. Those various details of reflection, absorption, diffrac-
tion, scattering, eolor (all color is in some degree “‘body’’
color and not in any absolute sense “‘surface’’ color, as ob-
viously no light can be reflected by or at a geometrical sur-
face), caloreseence, fluorescence, etc., will have to be mostly
omitted here. I shal] imply a few of those phenomena in
the next section (the last on light), by showing the principles
of so-called cold light.

§132. a. It was implicitly shown that a self-luminous
source of ordinary visible light is a collection of atoms which
has some of its principal difference surfaces at V as a result
of its own internal energy. And that at once implies that
those atoms are considerably out of balance, or generally
high in potential with respect to most other bodies in our
environment; for obviously, most bodies in our immediate
environment are not quite self-luminous ** —the general po-
tential of our earth-surface is slower than that of the luminous
sun-surface which is our chief source of visible light. Visible
rays come from a source and fall upon the difference surfaces
of our usual bodies. First, a little of the light energy is ab-
sorbed by those slow atoms, and usually speeds up the whole
atomic structure a little, and that gradually and smoothly
and without much unbalancing brings some of the surfaces to
Viry. (If all the perceptible surfaces are too far below Viz
to be brought up in speed that way, obviously the body or
collection of atoms will be transparent.) It clearly would
take a little time thus to speed up the surfaces; there is a
time lag in all finite phenomena (§8101, 136, 149, etc.); in
light that lag is usually too short to be perceptible. [Ex-
plicit recognition and use of that lag in light would give for
light in the M(varying with)L?T~-2 member, two coefficients
corresponding to the electrical K and U, etc.; see the dis-
cussion of Ohm’s law, §136. So it is obvious that the ortho-
dox mathematical theory of light will have to be substantially
wholly rewritten, if a reasonably consistent mathematical
theory of light is desired. This parenthesis suggests several
volumes of mathematics, omitted here. ] Second,
after that absorption during a little time lag, the cells usu-
ally begin to give out rays (to “‘reflect’’ the light that falls
on them), ata rate and in a form of structure in nearly exact
balance with the rays still arriving (so that the angle of inci-
dence is approximately equal to that of reflection, except
when perceptibly modified by the eurved difference surfaees,
when various well known modifications of such reflection

18a That is implicitly shown by Le Bon, in ‘“‘The Evolution of
Matter’’ (Legge’s translation, 1911), by giving numerous experi-
ments on what he calls “‘dark light’’; i. c., our usual atoms are just
below the limit of visibility with our eyes. Also, invisible atoms
continually give out various other invisible rays: quite possibly some
of those rays have a velocity Vigy, but with intensities below per-
ceptibility; but there are probably rays of different orders (X-rays,
results of secondary whirl formation, etc.), which naturally are invis-
ible, although when given time enough they will register on a photo-
graphic plate. Those facts and guesses imply quantitative problems,
concerning which Le Bon’s book bristles with suggestions. He an-
ticipates many important general conclusions of science:- e. g., he
gives experimental proof of no constant atomic weights (in several
places), and definitely asserts that principle (ibid., 160). But he de-
nies the principle with reference to matter (121); or he vaguely as-
serts the need of a dualistic Creator, and in definite effect asserts
dnalism of ether and matter (74). Le Bon is a sort of bad boy of
science; he keeps bringing ont the family skeletons and advising
that they be thrown away—giving first class experiments to prove
his point. But he never actually throws them away.

149

occur). Those given-out rays are roughly what is conven-
tionally known, in other context than this talk of ‘‘reflec-
tion,’’ as cold light—the name implying that a high percent
of the energy received is given out as visible rays; of course,
all energy received may be considered to be given out as
some sort of rays (calling secondary whirls of any order rays,
as is possible: such whirls may be said to be light that has a
very large time lag), Sometimes, however, that light is not
so nearly exactly balanced as in the phenomenon called re-
flection, but makes the difference surface luminous by adding
energy that is then given off as rays of perhaps different col-
ors and not necessarily in definite relative directions: then
the ““cold light’’ is probably a little less cold (a little less
“‘efficient’’), and the phenomenon is called JSluorescence.
When there is a perceptible time lag (as there usually is with
‘fluorescing’ solids) the phenomenon is called phosphorescence ;
the lag may be for hours, Obviously, in principle cell reflec-
tion and absorption must be accompanied by some _ phos-
phorescence, and there can be no such thing as an exact
fluorescence with a zero time lag.

b. Obviously, the most efficient cold light is thus re-
flected light (or phosphorescence, in somewhat less degree),
and it is such because there does not have to be any general
raising of the potential of the reflecting atom. Only the
chief difference surfaces are smoothly raised to a higher po-
tential, without so many unbalances being produced that
(truistically) considerable secondary whir] formation percept-
ibly occurs (as heat or unsystematic formation, usually; as
chemica] reactions when continued long enough to be more
systematic; as radioactivity, if continued longer still—for
perhaps centuries—so as to systematically perceptibly change
even elements; or as electricity, when collections of atoms
are perceptibly systematized). That sort of reflected light
or cold light with no practically perceptible time lag is used

_by us all the time when the sun is available. When we
speak of cold light however, we usually mean that we want
a ‘“cold’’ source of light when the sun or other ‘‘natural’’
source is not available. Obviously, the best such source
would be to construct atoms which have an absorbing lag of
about twelve hours, and then a phosphorescing lag of about
the same time. It can be done of course; it is a quantita-
tive problem and the principles are simple; such a collection
of atoms would be a ‘light storage battery.’ It is perhaps a
dificult quantitative problem, however, and possibly imprac-
tical. So we consider other less efficient cold lights.

c. As the reverse of a fact seen in the last paragraph,
all chemical reactions are in some degree ‘‘phosphorescent’’
—often perceptibly so. Actually, all our sources of artificial
light in which we use what we cal] combustion (as in oil
lamps) apply that fact—are reactions in which the phosphor-
escence is intense. Because that combustion reaction is so
intense, usually there is much secondary formation, using
much energy in invisible rays. So if we make the chemical
reactions slower, as in a fire-fly or in some decaying woods,
there would result more efficient light. Also, it is obvious
that if we have more or less a ball of atoms, of great size
relative to the size of one atom, there will be many visible
rays formed which can not get out, and will build up Jarger
structures than visible waves. So, other things being equal,
it would give more light to have thin layers of atoms as a
source, Also, if the atoms may readily slip on each other
(have weak fields, as in a gas or liquid), they will use consid-
erable energy by such motions—with resulting secondary
whirl formation. So again, other things being equal, it is
preferable to have dense, strong atoms that are crystalized.

d. I omit the easily seen principles of how to get effic-
ient light from radioactivity and heat, except to show how the

UNIVERSE

Two XIV §133c

artificial lights we ordinarily use apply some of the heat prin-
ciples. Burning gases are fluids and not very efficient in
producing visible light; so they are used to heat mantles that
are comparatively thin layers of probably crystallized atoms,
and hence by the last paragraph give a larger proportion of
visible light. | And the general principle of phosphorescence
(that the atoms should be raised in potential smoothly ; par. b)
ought to be used. And that principle perhaps has been used
in those mantles (by trial] and error—certain rare earths be-
ing best so far as is known). Also, the same principles are
applied when tungsten is used for lamp filaments. Tungsten
except by one chance in infinity is not the best material.

e. Apparently the simplest form of the quantitative
problem of cold light is the electrical. | We can in a short
interval of time give a strong electrical] jolt to a thin crystal-
line material and remove that boost in potential before there
is time for much secondary formation. Such a voltage jolt-
ing is obviously analogous to light vibrations themselves—
the jolts are vibrations of large, enveloping magnetic fields.
And fairly good cold lights have been made on the electrical
principles just stated, by Dussaud (“‘Harper’s Magazine,’’
July, 1903); but Dussaud’s seem to me practically to cost
more to construct and maintain than is economical.

f. It appears again, in this summarized practical view of
light, that the chief importance of light in our future use of
the environment lies in applying it to get the definite struct-
ures of atoms. Obviously, if we know the structure of par-
ticular kinds of atoms and molecules we can find what
structures give particular properties, and what properties are
quantitatively consistent (i. e., are in harmonious periodicity) ;
and subject to such natura! quantitative relationships, we ob-
viously can design and construct atoms and molecules to
meet any given need. That applies, by the total of valid
logic, to molecules of our nervous systems also: given enough
knowledge, we obviously could make or construct first class
brains by giving proper food and environment. This book
proves in principle that such civilization is possible. I have
extensive ignorance of the quantitative measures.

CHAPTER XIV. Electricity.

$133. a. In astronomy we discussed formally or log-
ically separate whirls one by one; and in light we re-
versed that to a certain extent and had collections of whirls
which were considered continuous. In each case we were
simply following our usual way of observing identical phe-
nomena, which have been named differently because we do
take those two points of view with them. Now, electricity
is the same phenomenon (ultimately, that of reaction by cp-
hesion, force, love, etc.); but we take another point of view
and so the description is in new or different Land T terms.

b. And this new, but obviously entirely arbitrary point
of view of That’s and This’s consists of taking perceptible or
larger whirls (even molar bodies) as unit collections (as elec-
trical ‘“circuits,’’ etc.); viewing them sometimes one by one
and sometimes as if continuous, and with this additional
changeableness of point of view:- (1) sometimes we consider
ourselves in a static part of the universe looking at one of
those collections that is moving or dynamic (giving us mag-
netic electricity or magnetism) ; (2) and sometimes we con-
sider ourselves in that moving part looking at a collection of
whirls which directly displays no magnetism because we tac-
itly or logically move with it (giving static electricity).

ec. That new point of view, in which we see matter or
moving ether in a certain aspect, is called electricity (or more
precisely, the point of view is called the science of electricity :

§1338ec XIV Two

electricity itself is matter): and it obviously is logically in-
clusive of astronomy and light. We merely have new con-
ventional] names (many of which are used in everyday life)
for collections of whirls which I have heretofore usually de-
scribed without mentioning their ‘‘electrica]’? names. The
novelty of the new point of view is chiefly that we take two
points of view of the phenomena without conventionally be-
ing very explicit about what we are doing—and hence are
orthodoxly ““surprised’? when there bobs up at the end a
K-“U~% that is equal to V; (§77).

d. Let us, in order fully to understand that convention-
ally omitted condition in electricity (it does pop up finally,
as just stated), consider an astronomical analogy. Suppose
we fancy ourselves established at some convenient place in
the galaxy field, so that we can view the galaxy filament and
the solar system. If we are in that field, then we move with
the field Jet us say; but by ordinary conventions we omit
saying anything about our motion, taking the field as static.
There is nothing abstruse or difficult about that:-_ if
we wish to state how we go from Boston to Chicago, we say
that we go west, thus verbally or by language agreement
taking a static earth—while with reference to (say) the sun
we would travel in a complicated path, which was at one
time or another pointing in every direction.

e. In the next two sections we see those two ‘‘sorts’’ of
electricity more in detail. We need to note further here
that theoretically we can obtain from each of the two points
of view all the phenomena heretofore described. And we
obviously can not obtain any new kind of phenomena as elec-
trical ones—for all of electricity is merely reactions of two or
more parts of a machine (that being a truism of par. c), or
additional ways of naming the dots in That... < This... . So
former descriptions, with the names or L and T' changed,
wil] apply to electricity, necessarily an essential repetition.
Therefore, except for brief indication as to how to start any
explicit electrical description, I shal] omit the possible vol-
umes of electrical phenomena. The fact is that electricity is
the easiest phenomenon to decribe mechanically; the reader
who has grasped the general idea of mechanics can readily
do it for himself if interested.

8134. a. If any whirl be moved relatively to another
whirl, truistically the fields wil] react (by direct friction if
the two are adjacent; by indirect reaction of whatever chain
of whirls intervenes, if the two are not adjacent); and the
reaction or result is conventionally called electricity (actually
it is conventional electricity if the resulting series of phe-
nomena is perceptible; but we take it that any phenome-
non is perceptible if we observe closely enough). We
might of course say that an electrical phenomenon could and
does occur as the reaction or relationship of field and filament
of one whirl which is either the whole or a standard universe;
but so far as I can make out, conventionally electricity is the
reaction of at least two explicit whirls or collections of whirls.
That conventional definition makes electricity a rela-
tionship, or a force, or God the Holy Ghost—which shows
(cf, Part One) why the conventional ‘‘electricity’’ is so in-
tangible or ghost-like. But, as we saw in Part One, we can
not have a force alone; the force is a verbal device which
implies whatever concrete parts there are which are thus re-
lated—and those implied parts are ““matter.’? And orthodox
science, which holds that an electron is a unit of electricity,
obviously holds that a small whirl (a part of an atom) is elec-
tricity—-which is the same as saying that electricity is mat-
ter. And it is quite orthodox to say that electricity is
energy. So conventionally, electricity is used as a]] three of
the Trinity. So I shall use it as any of the three (§124).

b. Asal] whirls are, by our verba] agreements, moving

UNIVERSE

150

relatively to each other, it follows that electricity is a uni-
versal phenomenon (see par. c for experimental proof); elec-
tricity, in that One extensiveness, is clearly a new name for
asymmetry, incommensurability, or rhythm. It will be ob-
vious after a little thought that when two bodies have, zn our
environment, been in fairly good balance with each other for
some time, their fields are mutually balanced pretty well and
have no perceptible rhythm, so that we say that the two have
zero potential) of electricity—are not electrified. Then (1) an
unbalance occurring on one side of such equilibrium is called
negative electricity (negative potential or direction is what is
explicitly meant); and (2) the other, opposite direction of
unbalance is called positive electricity. As a fact, we do not
even know, with reference to any body of considerable size
(say the sun), just what potential our arbitrary ‘“zero’’ elec-
tricity is; i. e., it may by such a standard change consider-
ably from year to ycar (truistically, it does change some).

ce. If any two collections of atoms be more or less ener-
getically rubbed together (i. e., ‘moved relatively to each
other’), and the two collections be made of atoms the axes
of whose fields are not readily or quickly changed in direction
(i. e., if the collections are not ‘‘good conductors,’’ or are
*‘insulaters’’), then there will obviously result a consider-
able surface unbalance of equilibrium if the rubbings always
take place in the same direction (i. e., do not neutralize
each other); or, what amounts to the same thing, if the two
collections are made of somewhat different sorts of atoms
such as a piece of glass and a fur skin (so that the two sorts
of atoms are not oriented the same on the molar surfaces, and
hence the rubbings, whatever their mutual relative directions,
accumulate an unbalance). Such a considerable amount of
unbalance is perceptible, and is static electricity. Obvi-
ously, such a condition of unbalance would result from any
relative motion of two atoms, however small; but only in
special conditions such as described does the unbalance ac-
cumulate locally into directly perceptible ““static electricity.”’
Thousands of experiments prove that general statement.

d. Obviously, in the creation of that static electricity
the filaments of the atoms are either speeded up or slowed
down: are changed in energy. And that changed condition
of the filaments tends to persist (except in so far as the fields
are of such nature that they distribute the energy unbalance
—“conduct’’ it,—as is always the case in some degree:
i. e., there are no perfect conductors or non-conductors). So
it is evident that in so far as that “‘charge’’ of electricity is
actually static (in so far as the fields do not readily orient
themselves, be conductors, and move the electricity as a
‘“current’”’ elsewhere), then the motion (or Jack or decrease
of motion) has been taken up by the filaments, and the fila-
ments are what we might call the dynamic part of that static
electricity. The ‘dynamic’ electricity, which is thus ‘in-
side’ the “‘static charge,’’ then consists of a ‘‘current’’ that
is the filament of each atom (or, more explicitly, is a part of
the energy of that filament if we imply the usual arbitrary
zero electrical potential). That “‘current’’ is the filiar com-
ponent (§125a), and is probably the orthodox ‘‘electric
force’; the other transverse component (the circumferential
component) is the orthodox *‘magnetic’’ direction; and the
radial component (the direction in which light travels) is the
direction of electric pressure (or attraction—to name it from
the opposite point of view), and is perhaps the orthodox di-
rection which Maxwell calls ‘‘electrical displacement?’ (see
also §135c). I have not carefully checked orthodox
electrical directions, in comparison with those I have just
named and the point of view in §135c. The difficulty is that
in actual phenomena—as contrasted with the conventional
mathematical theory—one direction rather promptly closes

151 UNIVERSE

on itself (§135c), as do the others with less celerity, so that
like our filiar or current direction just mentioned it has really
a continually changing direction, instead of a mathematically
abstract fixed one. So it is difficult to judge what directions
orthodox mathematics, such as Maxwell’s, are referring to.
I personally cut the Gordian knot by not bothering to observe
when dealing with such theory, but we must know directions
in practical application. Clearly that current is in
all directions, and so that component internally approxi-
mately balances itself; the magnetic component similarly
balances itself; and the static charge therefore exhibits no
perceptible magnetism (because dynamic electricity does ex-
hibit magnetism it is called magnetic). So the only some-
what unbalanced and hence perceptible component is the
pressure or attraction, which is the accumulated sum in some
given direction resulting from the rubbing. That component
obviously corresponds to the direction of propagation of light
and truistically is directly analogous to light pressure. So
from this point of view electricity can obviously be put in
terms identical with light, with unessential Z and T differ-
ences. And that single perceptible component would evi-
dently be very weak compared with the other components,
which become perceptible in dynamic electricity.

e. To see definitely the ways in which that unbalanced
component of force makes the charged body move, we must
add other facts about the charge. Clearly, the charged atoms
must be just a thin surface layer of the atoms of the charged
body. That is a truism of the foregoing definitions, and is
directly proved by Faraday’s ‘‘icepail experiment’’ (Watson,
“‘Physies,’’? 641-2). It can be seen explicitly by the follow-
ing considerations:- A charge can be generated on a body
which is a conductor, provided the body is insulated. If in
the generation there is exerted enough energy to do more
than charge the surface atoms (which on their sides towards
the air, are not well ‘supported’ or balanced by the mobile
air atoms), then the resulting phenomena are called by other
names:- obviously, there can be perceptible heat, light,
eddy currents, ete. And evidently, for a body which is not
a conductor, the resistance to any perceptible charging of
inner atoms is greater. Truistically of course all the atoms
in any charged body are to some extent modified, or are
*‘charged’’ imperceptibly. The simple point is that the sur-
face atoms are supported by the surrounding non-conductors
(air, etc.) in a degree different from their inner support by
field friction with other atoms of their sort, and the rubbed
unbalance perceptibly accumulates as a “‘static charge.’’

f. The charged atoms truistically are in unbalance with
surrounding ones. We may take it that the spirals in their
outer field surfaces are in effect screw threads, so that the
atoms tend to screw themselves along in some direction (be-
cause unbalanced, and as a means of getting balanced—Just
as the solar system is balanced by its revolution about the
galaxy main axis). Or, that same tendency to move can be
expressed by Bernoulli’s principle, or by the principle of any
machine, as seen in analogous cases. Clearly, if there is an
unbalance ‘sideways’ (i. e., in any direction in the geomet-
rical surface of the charged body) the charged atoms move
in that direction, until there is fair sideways balance: that
implies all the remaining details of the icepail experiment,
of the accumulation of charges on points and more rapid dis-
sipation from them, the variation in the appearance of posi-
tive and negative ““brushes’’ of light during such dissipation,
etc. Thus, rather rapidly all the charged atoms become ori-
ented so that their tendency is to move in the (effectual)
normal or radial direction to the surface zone they are in—
they tend to screw themselves into or away from the body
they are on (one direction characterizing a “positive” charge

Two XIV §134j

and the other a ‘‘negative’’). If the charge is on a
fairly good conductor, which ends in a point, those reactions
cause the charge to accumulate thickly there, and a perccpt-
ible brush discharge may take place, which probably is a
translatory motion of some of the atoms, and certainly of
atoms of the air (for an ‘‘electric wind’’ can be felt). And
that phenomenon may accumulate until a spark discharge oc-
curs that is still more probably a translation of some charged
atoms (for the sparks will make holes in paper, etc.). The
problem of just what it is that moves is a quantitative one
that can not be definitely decided except by actual measur-
ing. I remember reading somewhere that those sparks have
been experimentally formed into “‘balls,’’ that move rather
slowly; in such cases it is likely that the discharge can be
experimentally shown to be a whirl. Obviously, it is theo-
retically possible experimentally to make the charged body’s
‘surface’ give off a collection of atoms, which will form into
such a “‘ball,’’ or secondary whirl—of the molar body. That
is an ‘electron’ of huge size—of a molar body.

g. Ordinarily, the charge is more or less rapidly distrib-
uted over the whole surface of the charged body (unless that
body is a poor conductor), and truistically, then the electric
pressure is the same all over a sphere, and analogously on
other bodies, balancing itself without motion of the body.

h. But if two bodies, with centers A and B, charged
with the same ‘‘kind’’ of electricity, be brought rather near
together, obviously the atoms will screw themselves through
the air in the same direction with respect to their respective
centers (i.e., the atoms of say the first body screw them-
selves towards its center A, and those of the other towards
B). Those directions are opposite to each other; so charges
of the same sign or kind “‘repel’’ each other, and of opposite
signs “‘attract.’? As charges of opposite sign are always cre-
ated by any mutual motion of separation of two bodies, then
obviously the “‘attraction’’ of opposite signs is nothing more
than a statement, emphasing ‘affinity,’ that is the reverse in
form to ‘‘inertia’’ (§88)—absolutely proving these mechanics
as it reduces the expression of electricity to truisms (§35).

i. In the last paragraph the actual perceptible motion of
the charged bodies themselves is obviously always preceded
by the motion of the atoms on their surfaces in the appropri-
ate directions, causing unequal piling up of the charges on
those surfaces. That is merely the reverse way of stating
the previous distribution of the charge, in par. g. That in-
dicates the principles of “electrical capacity,’’ ete.

j. It is obvious that that screwing action actually has
components in three dimensions. Or, expressing the ten-
dency of the two bodies to move apart or together by Ber-
noulli’s theorem, their ‘flow’ relative to each other as a
truism gives components of ‘pressure’ in the two transverse
dimensions. Obviously, in no finite, actual, positive science
can we absolutely separate those three components, or reduce
their number. So we truistically get these important general
conclusions:- The ‘‘zero’’ of potential is arbitrary —is merely
the average ‘electrification’ of our present environment. So
we may take an almost absolute zero of potential as being one
which is very near to the body’s not existing finitely. And
as no two finite bodies can be perfectly balanced, it follows
that every two bodies have different potentials; hence, with
respect to a fully absolute zero potential every body is of a
different potential from every other body, and, as a truism of
its existence, attracts every other body with a force having
three components. And it is obvious that the component on
the straight line between the centers of the two bodies is orthodox
gravity, and the other two components are orthodoxly un-
named, except implicitly as the “‘square of the distance’’ in
Newton’s law. That separate component can not exist alone

§134j XIV Two

with finite bodies; always it is inseparably bound up with
two other components—which in electricity I have named the
current or electric component, and the magnetic component;
or in light, the transverse components; or are combined in
molar mechanics and named chemical affinity (thus when
Einstein talks of light being bent, he introduces at Jeast one
of those two; when I talk of light corkscrewing, I introduce
both explicitly, and talk of ‘affinity’; §127). (Thus molar
mechanics can be made absolutely identical with electricity,
etc., by considering those transverse components as being
verbally separate.) So it is obviously truistic that if any two
.bodies get into an equilibrium so steady as to have the two
transverse or affinity components very smoothly balanced by
the bodies’ mutual revolutions, then the longitudinal attrac-
tion and repulsion is so smoothly balanced that we say there
is no ‘electrical’ attraction, and the comparatively minor
attraction or reaction remaining ‘externally’ perceptible is
named gravity; and as there is practically no change in it
(none was perceptible to Newton), then gravity is said just
to exist (implying, when we have knowledge that there are two
other components, that gravity travels at infinite speed—
which truistically drops 7 out of molar ““science’’).
This paragraph expresses the ultimate truisms of the nature
of gravity, in all three of its Trinity forms. And this section
therefore expresses the mechanics of gravity in complete gen-
erality—in explicitly implied terms of any variety of machine
and in explicitly implied terms of any sort of phenomenon.
No further mechanics of gravity can exist. But obviously,
many volumes of the explicit mechanics which are only out-
lined here could be written if needed.

k. Tbe verbal] trick in getting a consistent descrip-
tion or mechanics of gravity obviously is to use finite
bodies—3 dimensions,—and thus not drop time. Newton’s
law implies, and asserts in so far as it is explicit, two masses
at or as geometrical points; and obviously a consistent me-
chanics of gravity is forever impossible for such points. After
we have the simple trick of three dimensions, al] that is re-
quired is a little intelligence in recognizing the various con-
ventional names already given to the reactions of the other
two components, and to refuse to ever take them as really
splittable—dualistic. In this section I have been explicit
about those other two components. But Reynolds’s and
Erwin’s mechanics of gravity use 3-dimension space, includ-
ing 7. Descartes, with his 3-dimensioned vortices perhaps
may be said to have correctly implied the mechanies of gravi-
ty. Bjerknes probably has a correct gravity (§94a). _Cre-
hore with some indefiniteness gives the correct mechanics of
gravity in terms of the mathematica] theory of electrons
(““Se. Am. Supp.,’’ April 13, 1912). Gautier briefly and
generally gives a correct gravity (Le Bon, “‘Evo. of Matter,”’
98, quoting from “‘Revue Scien.,’’ Jan. 13, 1904). That
makes seven men | know of who have apparently independ-
ently stated the mechanics of gravity with fundamental con-
sistency. Probably others have escaped my notice.

§135. a. If the rubbing of the two collections of atoms
be continued, obviously the static charge will accumulate, and
there will be a greater and greater tendency for the charged
atoms either (1) to move bodily in the appropriate direction,
or (2) to give off secondaries in that direction (to give off
electrons, which will travel in the “‘negative’’ direction and
by the third law of motion ‘kick’ the remaining part of the
atom from which each comes, a little distance in the ‘‘posi-
tive’’ direction), or (3) to change the shape, speed, spirals,
or ‘pressure’ of their fields in such a way as to restore equi-
librium. Those same tendencies obviously existed with the
charge; as soon as they somewhat perceptibly act, then there
is an ‘electric current’’ and we have explicitly recognized the

UNIVERSE

152

existence of those fields (as expressly distinct from their fila-
ments or condensations) whicb previously we neglected; and
we have dynamic electricity. Clearly there is no sharp dis-
tinction between static and dynamic electricity—merely the
quantitative one of when it is that we care to say that the
field reaction (“‘magnetism’’) is perceptible. And that is cru-
cially proved by the Rowland experiment, which shows that
a charge moving fast enough is perceptibly a dynamic current
(we saw in the last section that all charges move some).

b. In the last paragraph we saw that a ‘‘current’’ may
be motion of nominally three sorts. Those three are ulti-
mately identical:- i. e., a change of shape or spiral of the
field will move the atom somewhat (and will keep on moving
it as an ‘‘ion,’’ if it is fairly free to move); and that change
of the field may accumulate an unbalance which splits a mol-
ecule into parts called ions, or splits small secondaries off of
atoms as electrons, or with more difficulty splits an atom into
different “‘elements’’ (as has been done experimentally in
vacuum tubes). Truistically, some of that actual motion and
actual splitting will happen in any current: but probably the
chief part of the current consists of the changed pressure of the
fields which exists throughout the circuit. And those various
aspects of the same final principle of temporary unbalancing
of whirls obviously give unlimited scope for various phenome-
na of currents—mention of most of which I omit. The chief
point to be noted is that consistently described currents do
not need to have a flow of any fixed or proportionate number
of ‘‘electrons’’ per unit of current (although taking electron
in the complete One sense of any size secondary, truistically
the current is all electrons). D’Albe (““The Electron Theo-
ry’’) gives as an outstanding defect of the orthodox electron
theory that such a fixed flow is required, but does not experi-
mentally occur (more modern versions of the theory attempt
to avoid the difficulty by tending to revert to the One mysti-
cism just mentioned, where an electron may be anything).
Electron flow—of scientific, finite electrons—occurs only if
the current is somewhat unsteady at the place where the flow
is perceptible. Truistically there can be no perfectly steady
current; therefore, the size of the jerks in the flow (or the
jerks or knocks in the vibration or spirality of the fields) de-
termine whether (1) electrons of a given size, or (2) ions, or
(3) new elements, or (4) new chemical compounds, etc., ‘flow’
as the current. In short, theoretically the current may be
used to give, or is, a 3-dimensioned spectrum. Such spect-
rums are actually exhibited in vacuum tubes (as striations,
bands, canal rays, etc.). This description is obviously applic-
able to the numerous novel experiments so ably made by
Thomson. And the good physicist can readily see from these
general mechanics just how the various quantum theories
give quantitatively consistent results. They are harmonic
periodicity, applied to electrical phenomena.

c. When the atoms thus form a dynamic current, that
collection of atoms which forms the closed cireuit of the cur-
rent is effectually (i. e., dynamically) a filament of a larger
whirl or “atom’ (and the filiar axis is the electric or Siltar di-
rection or current direction), of which the field is the magne-
tism. And the magnetic direction is the direction of the well
known “‘lines of force’’ that go around that filament, as the
field flows around the filament in Fig. 98n. And the direction
of (static) electrical pressure or displacement (cf. §134d) is the
direction of the vector sum of the normals to those magnetic
directions—i. e., it is the direction of the main axis of the
large whirl of which the current structure is the filament.
Thus, in dynamic electricity, we move ourselves into the atom,
so to speak—into this big whirl. So the first two compo-
nents or directions become perceptible (they are strong com-
pared with “‘static’’ quantities), and Maxwell’s displacement

153

or the static pressure component, which in static electricity
is the only perceptible component from our point of view
outside the circuit-whirl, becomes imperceptible in most cases,
for precisely the same reasons that the analogous component
of motion of the solar system (its motion more or less in the
direction of its main axis NS’, Fig. 107e) is practically im-
perceptible to us. But obviously, the whole current circuit,
with its magnetic field, constitutes one “‘statically’’ charged
whirl (§134d). And in this dynamic electricity, both the
electric direction and the magnetic direction are perceptibly
closed on themselves. And as truistically some or all of the
universe other than that large whirl is effectually a structure
that balances with that large whirl, forming a closed “‘cur-
rent’’ with it, the displacement direction itself becomes a closed
line.*®* So it is absolutely impossible to establish any direc-
tions in the universe, except locally and as finite ones that
are portions of an ultimately closed line (§99; that is another
aspect of ‘curved color,’ §128g). That is the rigorously gen-
eral way of proving that no principle—anothing essential—de-
dends upon direction: that any question of direction is quan-
titative, local, practical, a matter of arbitrary agreement (and
relative, in ordinary language—instead of space being so, or
curved as in Ejinstein’s theory). We also see defi-
nitely in this paragraph how a whirl can ‘reverse’ by our
taking a different point of view. | We change the naming of
directions, and in doing so necessarily imply changes in nam-
ing of speed relationships which we ordinarily assert vaguely
by the names static and dynamic. And obviously, the only
possible way to understand that reversal is to take both
points of view simultaneously (or in general, use inductive and
deductive thinking simultaneously), and compare them; and
the only way to do that is to take a universal view—solve
the One and the Many. It is not an intrinsically difficult
problem, being the old childhood problem:- if a monkey
sits on a pole and keeps turning to face you, and you walk
around the pole, do you go around the monkey or not? But
this problem of direction, or change in point of view, or
problem of what is the center of reference (in our “‘reality’’
there is no fixed center or the infinite universe is the center;
§100c), or what is the difference between static and dynamic,
or what does K~“U-“=P, mean, is a puzzling one (because
we have been trained to ‘“‘think’’—really, to avoid thought
—dualistically). It is identically the same problem as that
of Good and Evil (XVIII)—and we are so used to solving
that, that even cbildren do it correctly several times daily
(with etymological felicity calling it con-science). But if you
ever start meditating on the problem of Good and Evil, or
become so rash as to listen seriously to some dialectrician or
other sort of demagog bandy words about it, then for the re-
mainder of you life your will be confused by it, and will be
troubled by it, and unable satisfactorily to solve such continu-
ally recurring problems of whether it is Good or right to take
one slice of bread or two, unless you go into it vigorously and
thoroughly and get to the bottom of it in utmost generality
as above (or in any terms other than physical, if you do not
care for physics; see XVIII), or unless you permit your brain
to die a little so that you can no longer perceive the irritation
of such questions. The latter is the usua] human solution,

18e Obviously, as a truism of the principle of asymmetry, any
two atoms (especially of different elements) or any two molecules, to
some degree form a closed static circuit. So any phenomenon which
perceptibly disturbs the static electrical balance creates a perceptible
dynamic current. That gives the principles of currents that are ex~-
perimentally generated by heat, light, percussion, etc. Ultimately
any motion anywhere causes—is—a current, so that experimentally
the mere making of contact of different elements may give a per-
ceptible current. Also, the same general principle explains all kinds
of primary and storage batteries, electroplating, etc.

UNIVERSE

Two XI1V_ §136a

and gives peace at the expense of living less (the peace of
the grave). However, because of the infinite regress, always
we will use that peace-of-the-grave solution somewhat—auto-
matically, naturally, and hence rightfully and justifiably us-
ing it more and more as we get older and personally wear
out, finally wisely and contentedly wanting such peace com-
pletely. Henry Adam’s ‘‘Education’’ did such dying pub-
licly, and because he held it up as highly praiseworthy he
comforted us, and had a vogue. But Adam’s reasons—that
the grapes were sour—are obvious nonsense; only because
he was the champion snob this country has produced was he
able to commit the human indecency of publicly parading
his dying—and we are al] interested also in any sort of cham-
pionship performance. |Adams’s snobbery took the Higher
Expression of indifference; I have tried that myself in my
time, and it works fine—the trouble with it being that if a
man hasn’t already got the various Puritanica]l vices, that
breeds them in him. The Deep Thinking which Ad-
ams proudly implied he did is about 79 per cent piffle.

d. Those magnetic “‘lines’’ that surround the current
may be readily explored experimentally and are described at
Jength in most physics textbooks. Itis well known that they
have a spiral twist—that giving direct evidence of the nature
of whirl fields (experiments of Hittorf, Moulton, Spottis-
woode, Stewart’s ““Higher Textbook of Electricity and Mag-
netism’’; or see Tunzelmann’s ““Electrical Theory,’’ 192).
Obviously, if any body rotates in a fairly balanced way its
part (or parts) that is moving in the equator moves faster
than the other parts, and as that part is rubbing against
something it is thus dynamically equivalent to a current and
to a filament. Soa magnetic field will be built up about it.
That is why the sun and earth are magnets, and why the
spherical fields are called magnetic fields; the present way
of viewing the phenomenon is the reverse of that in §116c,
and shows that astronomy and electricity are indentical in
principle. | As the equatorial band of atoms becomes a cur-
rent, then such a current tends to be of the same shape as a
fluid filament, and wil] therefore speed up the equatorial
matter (as observed in the sun, etc.; and give equatorial
currents of air, electricity, and water, as observed on earth).
And that tendency of the equatorial bands to get ahead ex-
hibits the universal principle of overrunning, asymmetry, or
vibrations; i. e., any structure will tend to start a new one
on its equator. That sums our descriptions into universal
truisms from another point of view.

e. Therefore any whirl is a ““permanent’’ magnet; it
is not absolutely permanent, of course, and is always chang-
ing some; but its magnetism is due to, and as permanent as,
its own structure. Obviously, chemical affinity is in prin-
ciple completely analogous to magnetic attraction. Hence,
all atoms have some degree of ‘induced’? magnetism—i. e.,
there can be no such thing as a negative U (although other-
wise reputable physicists sometimes speculate on such a
source of ‘perpetual motion’’). Such magnetism of all atoms
truistically exhibits itself in some degree of orientation of
the main axes of a collection of atoms in the same direction
—a phenomenon usually imperceptible, or else given some
other name. In induced magnetism a perceptible field is
imposed upon atoms from their environment, and may be re-
tained for some time (lag); such atoms as Fe may stay so
energetically oriented that they are considered permanent,
and will in turn throw their environment out of the conven-
tional zero magnetic balance. That is quantitative, in
agreement with orthodox theory, but more generally stated.

§136. a. I shall now make a brief statement of the uni-
fication of al}! phenomenain terms of both the naming member
That... < This..., and the measuring M(varying with)L?T~,

§136a XIV Two

by using Obm’s so-called law. Orthodox science substan-
tially recognizes that Ohm’s Jaw is not consistently applicable
to all measuring of currents, and so correctly holds it to be a
rough empirical rule. Hence, I am merely extending ortho-
dox science in this chapter. As a fact, Ohm’s law is a One
law, a valid religious statement which runs A to infinity (as-
serts in effect that chemical affinity is the only factor), and so
flatly contradicts Newton’s law, which runs W to infinity (as-
serts that weight is the only factor). If we add the two laws,
revising classic logic in order to do it, we get the truth.

b. Ohm’s law (when its implications are explicitly ex-
pressed) is as follows:- (1) A steady current in a conductor is
directly proportional to the impressed (electrical) force (to E
—electromotive force or E.M.F., which in 1X was called P),
and inversely proportional to the resistance R; or, C—E/R.
(That C and R are not the same C and R used elsewhere in
this book.) (2) The conductor is supposed to be perfectly
homogeneous and of perfectly uniform cross-section; and its
resistance is taken as directly exactly proportional to its length
and exactly inversely proportional] to its area of cross-section.

ec. That law approximately agrees experimentally with
a current in fairly good conductors that has had time to be-
come as steady as possible. It is very inaccurate—quantita-
tively fails considerably—when the conductor is ratber poor
(say in gases, as an exaggerated example), and when the
current is “‘building,’’ or ““dying out.’’ —_It is obvious that
there is neither any perfect conductor nor perfectly steady
current, as would be required to make Ohm’s law both logi-
ca] and accurate; so it isa One Jaw, and never a scientific
Jaw. Wecan see that asatruism:- If we cal] the length
of the conductor L, its cross-section is L? (§68c); and sub-
stituting for R its value, as given by (2) in the Jast para-
graph, we have C=E/(L/L?2)=EXL. And in that equation
C is electrical matter or energy, and Eis a name for force F,
and we have the orthodox equation Energy=—F XL, it being
asserted that tbere are no dots, or that F and L are perfectly
sharp and distinct—that there is exact science, that classical
logic and dualism is true, etc. Or, E may be con-
sidered to be P in QP, and bence stands for L?; so that
C=EXL is equivalent to C=L’, meaning that C or matter
or energy, as a purely One truism, occupies 3-dimension
space. Or, in an even more directly obvious way,
CEL asserts that matter C is force E which exists per-
fectly smoothly over a straight lime—and no matter or struct-
ure can thus be infinite, but always closes on itself.

d. We thus see that essentially Ohm takes a filament
and asserts that only a filament exists, and that it exerts a
force throughout a line. Newton substantially says that
only a field can exist around a point-mass which is a zero-
filament, and the force then exists throughout the field, and
hence inversely as the square of the distance. Both exag-
gerate one half the truth by reducing the other half to zero.
Of course, neither man saw what he was doing that
clearly; if he had he naturally wouldn’t have done it.

e. In establishing a current a certain time truistically is
required for the motions (§135a) to be set up; there is a lag.
Hence, because of that lag, with reference to the steadiest
final current U varies; i. e., the magnetic field is not steady
(XI). Similarly, the static displacements are not steady (ef.
also XII); or the lag also makes K variable (cf. 8875-7)
Obviously, always an actual current is flowing over asym-
metrical parts so that always there are some local vibrations
or rhythms of current—a building up or down,—and hence,
K and U can never be in any way steadily proportional to
either the L, or to the cross-section L? (Ohm’s law tacitly
assumes that the are), even though that matter symbolized
by that space ZL and L? be made of the same sort of good

154

UNIVERSE

conducting atoms. If the atoms conducting the current vary
much, or if the current flows in loosely self-supported atoms,
those variations of K and U truistically must be greater,
And the fact is that with such atoms the variations are great
enough to give wide deviations from Ohm’s law. It therefore
follows that tbe rational scientific Ohm’s law is C=E.., X
L...=MK~“U-“L?T,— in agreement with IX.

f. As there is a time lag in every phenomenon (a truism
of the phenomenon’s existence, as seen before: or this is a
brief truistic proof of it:- if the phenomenon did not require
time to occur, it would be absolutely instantaneous, and
hence absolutely imperceptible, and hence would not be a
phenomenon), it follows that that general proof of the vari-
ability of K and U applies to the coefficients of al] phenome-
na. We thus complete the circle of proof and check IX.

8137. a. That finishes all the general suggestions about
the numerous electrica] phenomena for which we can reason-
ably spare attention and space. In this section I mention
three more or less important details, and close the chapter.

b. (1) Thomson’s electron theory has electrons which
produce phenomena by the travel of “‘kinks’’ in their tubes.
It may readily be seen that the locus of those kinks is identi-
ca] with a difference surface. Also, it may readily be seen
that his “‘positive’’ electron, or the “‘nucleus’’ of any atom,
is identical mechanically with the filament. Our whirl theory
is identical mechanically with Thomson’s electron theory.
We have seen the mechanics of electrons in three dimensions
—and that is merely an extension of the electron theory,
which can not take those 3-dimensioned mechanics far.

ce. (2) Experimenters are now tending to get equal meas-
ures for a]] electrons—tending to show *“by figures’’ that an
electron isa fixed, constant unit. Millikan (‘“The Electron’’)
has done some elaborate and able experimenting tending to
show that electrons are al] the same size, and constant. Sup-
erficially those experiments seem to prove that my proposi-
tion that electrons and everything else vary, is wrong.
Actually, those remarkably accurate and ingenious experi-
ments prove something else, as I shal] show—not only about
electrons, but about measures of atomic weight, conservation
of weight, about Perrin’s counting of atoms by means of the
Brownian movement, and in general about any sort of experi-
menting which becomes so remarkably careful and good that
it rather loses sight of its primary object and gets another.

d. Landolt (““Ency. Brit.,’’ ix, 257) weighed several
pairs of substances before and after they had chemically re-
acted or combined. He at first found a perceptible difference
of weight with some of his experiments—that agreeing with
our principle that there would be more or less transfer of
secondary whirls (of electrons) between the environment and
the substances (e. g., the substances would truistically lose
weight as heat ¢/ the reactions produced heat). But Landolt
apparently thought that the One law of the conservation of
weight (i. e., the total weight of the universe does not change)
ought to apply to bis little parts of the universe; at least he
acted as if he thought there ought to be absolutely no change
of weight with his parts, and began to make his experiments
more elaborate. Instead of driving simply and directly at
the point he wanted, as he did at first (and finding some
changes), he began in effect to try to average al] the condi-
fions—to make corrections for all perceptible asymmetries. The
ae See as a truism, was that he substantially included
ee ae pee S the results of his experiments to
as ee ray zs nae t imperceptible. Truistically, if
asymmetries we ey ce Seer sp atin
non—and there Aad ie oe nba} eee PEO Gs
Landolt’s wider conditions (it inet aca Doeeeh ones

€ principle seen in §25c,

155

that the late Kaiser was right and beautiful if we take in
enough of his environment). I. e., the total universe is ab-
solutely in balance: and if we observe enough of it at one
time we can not perceive any unbalance of that with the rest.
So Landolt’s measures are probably right in both cases; but
in the case of “‘correcting,’’? where he perceived no change of
weight, he proved, not that no change of weight occurred in
the chemical] reaction, but that none happened perceptibly
in the phenomenon of the reaction plus enough of the L and
T environment to make a perceptibly standard One. Inshort,
he became technically such a good and careful and exact ex-
perimenter that he lost sight of his real point. It is
possible to be just as intemperate and frenzied in exactness in
experimenting as it is to be intemperate in the use of alcohol
orin a refusa] to make any “‘material’’ experiments (to verify
dogma). Materialism is the result of taking experiments too
seriously; scholasticism or sentimentalism or the Wilson
pseudo-idealism is the result of taking principles (or in prac-
tice, dogmatic authority) too seriously. Both sorts of intem-
perance lead to equal error and human pain. E. g., excessive
experiments led to materialism and the Prussian militarism;
excessive dogmatic, dictatorial, unverified dogma or principles
led to the Inquisition, etc. | Valid science is a temperate
balance of experiment and of principle—is rigorously simul-
taneously inductive and deductive (as proved in §163}).

e. And the same thing happened in the antiquated ef-
forts to get ““exact’’ atomic weights. When atomic weights
of a given element are found in several ways by means of
different chemical reactions, often they perceptibly vary con-
siderably (Ostwald, ““Outlines of General Chemistry,’’ trans.
3rd ed., 1912, 126-50). The effort substantially was to sub-
ject the given atoms to a severe and lengthy bombarding,
and shaking, and smashing (by means of chemical reactions
mostly). They thus got nicely worn out and smoothed off to
a sort of aged average condition, and if the averaging were
sufficiently enthusiastic, obviously any element would give an
apparently exact atomic weight. But the conclusion to be
derived from that is not that atomic weights are constant:
the relevant conclusion is that we can by sufficiently widen-
ing conditions of given atoms get an average weight which is
perceptibly steady. That correct conclusion as to exact—
really, ““average’’—weights is a correct One conclusion ap-
plying to a standard universe that includes an elaborate,
rather standardized, violent laboratory environment: it tru-
istically does not apply to specific atoms in a natural condi-
tion. It would be more intelligible if it were made a whole
One conclusion:- that in the whole universe all atoms are
arbitrary anyway, so ultimately all atoms of all elements
have the same exact weight, namely 0 or ©, as we choose.

f. The Brownian movement consists of motions of very
small solids, etc., ina fluid, like the dust in the air that is
seen in a beam of sunlight. Evidently, if the particles are
small enough their fields, by reacting with the fields of the
atoms of the fluid will more or less support them against
gravity; i. e., the ‘“‘movement”’ exhibits some ‘affinity’ just
as do the structures of our galaxy (XII). Perrin (““Brown-
ian Movement and Molecular Reality,’’ Soddy’s trans.) sub-
stantially concludes that those particles (1) move in straight
paths to collisions, (2) are exact and eternal in their motion,
and hence (3) that such observed motion proves the existence
of exact and absolute atoms, of exact weights, etc. —which
measures he calculates. (Millikan gets different measures by
experiments of a different sort.) | Of course, as Perrin him-
self unconsciously admits, by tinkering with conditions long
enough he does succeed in getting perceptibly steady aver-
ages: but he had no such steadiness in his first unsophisti-
cated conditions. Truistically, the Brownian particles do not

UNIVERSE

Two XV_ §138c

move in straight lines, are not perfectly elastic, and do not
achieve any perfect or permanent distribution—they actually
will either agglutinate, or else will rub themselves into small
enough “‘pieces’’ to ‘agglutinate’ with atoms of the fluid (re-
act ‘chemically’ with them; or become a solution, or ions),
insofar as they do not agglutinate chiefly by gravity at some
stage. Obviously, by catching them in their career at just
average condition, ““exact’’ values apparently result.

g. The first measured weights of electrons varied from
about 1/1000 to 1/2000 the weight of a H atom. _ But the
experimenters, in more or less conscious imitation of each
other, are getting the conditions of measuring electrons
standardized, and getting apparently a more exact value. Of
course, those experiments have a value, as they indicate what
are the criterions of average environment of electrons. And
they really prove that the electron is a variable body that zs
amenable to changes in conditions (apparently much more so
than atoms), so that it will behave itself and give a certain
value for certain conditions. There would be a real miracle
if it wouldn’t. As soon as electrons and atoms get into a
laboratory they are hustled into a Procrustean bed.

h. (3) The last minor point is that an alternating cur-
rent is a rhythmic current which acts on the same principles
as cold light ($132).

CHAPTER XV. Heat, Chemistry, etc.; and Summary of
Part Two by Practical Applications.

§138. a. The remaining conventional general classes of
phenomena are sound, heat, and chemistry. Above I have
not fully and specifically considered phenomena under those
names; but it was shown that certain principles beld univer-
sally, and by a few suggestions in this section it will be
shown that they apply to these other classes of phenomona.

b. Sound is identical with light except that sound is the
vibrations of atoms (molecules) considered as continuous, in-
stead of ether cells considered as continuous. I. e., sound
is light of a different order. Orthodoxly sound is considered
to be purely a longitudinal vibration. But in such a descrip-
tion the transverse forces are tacitly taken for granted, while
attention is chiefly focused on the travel of the sound in the
longitudinal direction. For obvious structural reasons the
longitudinal component is more perceptible in sound. So
there is only a quantitative difference between light and
sound. Therefore, the general theory of music is obviously
analogous to—is—the theory of harmonic periodicity, or is
analogous to the principles of the order of lines in spectrums
($101fj). | So, as astronomical bodies make larger spectra,
or are directly in harmonic periodicity, “‘music of the
spheres’’ is a scientific fact.

ec. Heat is obviously, from the facts shown as to surface
temperatures of astronomical bodies (XII), the same thing as
electricity, except that it is less systematic. EE. g., when
electricity is formed locally in a large mass of conducting
atoms it forms eddy currents—little local circuits. And those
result in, or change into, heat. So heat is an eddy current
a trifle more unsystematic than a recognized eddy current—in
fact, it is not possible to distinguish a dividing line between
a systematicor ‘‘electric’’ current and its so-called degenera-
tion into heat (cf. the reverse, footnote 135¢). So truistic-
ally all phenomena may be described as heat; but when some
part of a phenomenon is systematic, that part is convention-
ally given another name. What proportion of the whole that
part must be to get a name of its own is not agreed upon—
nor the degree of system or perceptible balance required to
*“systematic.’’ The practical means of

constitute

§138c XV Two

drawing an arbitrary line between heat and other phenomena
is to compare the reacting substance with the ZL and T reac-
tions of a substance in a ‘‘thermometer.’’ If we use the
same substance in all thermometers (and select conditions so
that the time lag causes imperceptible variations), such com-
parisons imply an approximately fixed arbitrary line between
the heat part that perceptibly affects that thermometer sub-
stance and the more systematic part of the phenomenon that
ordinarily does not (although a part of that systematic part is
sometimes called latent heat). But even if everybody used
the same thermometer, its substance constantly changes as
time passes, so that in principle there would not be the same
substance thus to fix approximately the definition of ‘‘heat.”’
As a fact, thermometers made of different substances show
variations as to where or when heat becomes heat. Thus
thermometers give direct evidence of an infinite regress.

d. Those generalities about heat are obviously immedi-

ate truisms of the principle of asymmetry. Our natural
structures, taken one by one, are mutually asymmetrical in
some degree; so if taken in bunches (as atoms are taken,
relative to ‘‘heat’’), the same asymmetry is repeated (in step
by step ‘orders’ forever), and at some point the asymmetry
becomes perceptible. E. g., a larger observer, for whom our
galaxy is an atom, would perceive nearly any change in the
galaxy as heat; reactions rather systematic to us (such as
the earth’s revolution) would be tohim minor asymmetries or
*‘heat.’’ Truistically, the harmonic periodicity of that arbi-
trary dividing line between heat and systematic phenomena
is itself a kind of spectrum. That shows again that
regardless of what terms we use to describe any reaction,
identically the same terms will consistently describe the total
universe. E. g., we could describe the universe in terms of
smells or odors—finally writing a mathematical discussion of
the periodicity or spectrum of smells:- = For obviously, an
odor is an evaporation from a body, and would exist in some
degree for all bodies, regardless of whether it was perceptible
tous. And that evaporation would in some degree change
our atmosphere, and would truistically step by step change
the universe. Incidentally, if anyone fancies that be-
cause we now have a consistent logic to use as a general tool
in science, religion, and philosophy, no more ‘‘opportuni-
ties’’ exist there—fancies that all the ‘“‘big work’’ has
been done,—then the mildest truthful opinion I can express
of him is that he is a fool. For obviously this book is merely
a positive, firm first step in knowledge; nearly all actual
knowledge and its application (no knowledge is really know-
ledge until it is applied, for only the application can fully
prove it; §35) lies in the future, to be expressed in those
volumes I mention omitting. Just now we see how much we
must omit of heat. This book is an elementary first step,
the essential substance of which prebably in a century will be
familiar to children of fourteen (they will not need to have
many details of the concrete proof at that age—or the con-
fusing discussion of classical] logic which I have to give), and
will be their basis of conscious living.

e. Those things about heat may be stated another way.
We saw (§§134jk, 103, etc.) that gravity is what we may call
the unsystematized residue of reaction that is left when we
nominally separate out the more or less systematic electrical
attractions, or chemical] attractions. We may write that:-
Gravitation... X Electricity..., or Gravitation... < Chemical Re-
actions.... In heat we have seen that we may use the same
general formula, thus:- Heat... X Any more-systematized, more
definite, or ‘intense’ phenomena.... So it follows that if we
properly select the names of the intensive factor we may
similarly write, Gravitation... < Any ‘intense’ phenomenon...,
which (see §136c, where it is shown that the formula for

156

UNIVERSE

electricity is L?... x L...) is equivalent to saying An extensive
or L? phenomenon... X An intense or L phenomenon... ; and that
briefly is L?...XL..., so that if we name any general or ex-
tensive phenomenon, such as gravity, we imply but omit ex-
plicit mention of the L? by saying Gravity... XL... (the con-
ventional formula, in valid logic, is F... XL...; UX), and then
put that LZ? back tacitly by talk of the inverse square law—
which shows fundamentally why there is such a law. Also,
itis obvious that our naming formula is universally applicable
and amounts to simply the truism :- 13 is the naming of mat-
ter, or of Energy, or of the Universe; or, L? (implying T)=
Matter=M(varying with) L?T-*= Energy. That is rigorous
expression of the proof of the total argument. This
paragraph is a series of truisms which are so obvious that it
isa bit hard to stand off from them and see that obviousness.

f. It further follows in universal generality that the
form L?,.. XL... is a verbal representation of a spectrum;
the LL? is any 2-dimension band, and the L its relative loca-
tion with respect to all the other bands (indicated in infinite
regress by the dots). Further, it is then obvious that we
may interchange the extensive factor and the intensive factor
without doing anything but make an arbitrary change in our
description (cf. §§71f, 136c). When we do that, obviously
we change from static to dynamic, or vice versa; and that
truistically changes the naming of directions—as we saw was
explicitly the result in electricity (§135). Hence, there is
complete rigor in our argument. Or, this and the last para-
graph is a condensation of all valid logic, expressed in ‘‘ma-
terial’’ terms, and proved by the mechanics of Part Two. It
as rather hard to grasp such violent condensation. But those
who like brevity have a sample here.

g. This section bas therefore shown that chemistry is
the systematic or intensive part of any phenomenon after the
gravity or other extensive factor is verbally ‘separated’ out.
Conventionally, chemistry practically is that part with refer-
ence to structures of the order of atoms. But that is an ar-
bitrary L and T restriction; truistically, all this Part (and
Part Three, for that matter) gives chemistry—as the A and
analogous factors. Chemistry is obviously merely an irra-
tional] factor of a complete science—of any statement that
has an intelligible meaning. Chemistry, as a branch of
knowledge, is irrational alone. Similarly, so is any other
special] science. Thus, so rigorously is science act-
ually unified that it is now proved that any branch is irra-
tional and meaningless standing alone; so any specialist in
one branch is forced to include other branches in some per-
ceptible degree if he is to avoid being at least technically ir-
rational or idiotic—or else he has to show that dualism and
materialism is true, proving me to be idiotic. Of course it
is necessary to have men who specialize, in the quaatitative
part of certain branches (for implicit rigorous proof of that,
see discussion of division of labor, $170ko); and itis probably
obvious to the reader that no man has the capacity to handle
satisfactorily more than a fraction of the measures already
made when it comes to definite use and detailed advance of
some larger branch. But qualitatively, each specialist in ord-
er really to understand anything of his specialty must be able
in a general way to sum his branch with all others into the
One. The problem of how much to specialize—what pro-
portion of life should be spent say in measuring the phe-
nomena in the right hind leg of a certain species of fly, or
in business in sizing up customers and estimating prices—is
obviously a quantitative one, and will have a particular solu-
tion for each case. In this book I am consciously and em-
phatically being a specialist at being no Specialist. That is
a highly dangerous specialty, its follower being commonly
called a Jack of all trades, and rarely being strong enough to

157

avoid becoming a ne’er-do-well. I do not propose to spend
much of my life at it. Truistically, any man who steadily
and actually narrows himself to a specialty weakens himself.

h. Explicit chemistry is therefore another library of vol]-
umes, omitted at this point. Textbook chemistry is largely
a collection of empirical facts, except for Richards’s com-
pressible atoms, the Braggs’ and others’ work in the struct-
ural analysis of atoms (such as Thomson’s and others’ vacuum
tube analyses, Rutherford’s and Soddy’s and Ramsey’s work
on those and on radioactivity, etc.), and the beginnings of
electro-chemistry and thermo-chemistry.

i. Jn its ordinary arbitrary limits chemistry deals mostly
with the rather systematized reactions of atoms. Butclearly,
there are no Jimits to the orders or classes of such reactions :-
(1) a few atomic whirls may perceptibly more or less
unite as a molecule; then that molecule is obviously a whirl,
just as a star cluster, a cyclone, or an electric circuit is;
(2) and analogously, two or more molecules may unite to
form a higher chemical unit (and such are well known under
the various names of crystals, colloids, and biological cells—
of all of which, chemical ‘‘solutions’’ may be considered the
simplest or primitive form); (3) then such collections may
perceptibly rather unite as a higher sort of unit, such as a
man; (4) sexes unite as couples to form families; (5) fami-
lies form nations; (6) the biological cells always have some
reaction or relation with the environment, and thus form a
““higher’’ ‘unit’ or ‘chemical compound,’ the earth; (7) and
the next arbitrary step, with the earth as a chemical unit,
leads into ‘‘astronomy,’’ and so on ad infinitum (and truistic-
ally we could have stepped chemically in the other direction,
*“down’’ into electrons, etc.). The third and “‘higher’’
steps above are not conventionally chemistry; but obvi-
ously a cell and a man are identically the same sorts of units
that atoms and molecules are. So chemistry may rationally
be extended indefinitely, the practical extension of it depend-
ing mostly upon convenience and the need to avoid special-
izing in a weakeningly narrow degree, and some upon the
capacity of chemists. The only thing that rationally can
prevent a chemist from working out the sound and applicable
details of government in chemical terms is his lack of a sound
grasp of chemistry—a human weakness that is forgivable but
never praiseworthy. That also applies to other scientists.

8139. a. It at once follows from the last section that
we know all the various sorts of forces, or powers, or energy, or
phenomena that there are, or can be. That is merely a truism
of the general formula which was established :- Any extensive
phenomena... X Any intensive phenomena...—Energy. Or, as
all variously named forces and phenomena are identical, it is
truistic that if we are acquainted with one we are essentially
acquainted with all, and can never discover a new one. So
it is impossible that there are any forces or powers or rela-
tionships in the universe now hidden from any one of us, or
which can be used by some of us and not by others, or which
remain to be discovered to confuse and confound present
knowledge. Kings with divine rights, popes, © divinely’’
inspired priests and warriors, and other more or less self-
deceived quacks under various names, have for ages buncoed
the average honest man by substantially claiming that they
were privileged with knowledge and control of various eso-
terie powers or forces unknown to him and beyond his con-
trol. It has now been rigorously shown that such dualists
are wrong: after that rigorous proof has become somewhat
generally known any pseudo captain of finance who claims
to be ordained by Providence to be a trustee for the people

‘ ‘6 ?
(as one coal operator recently did), or any Ich und Gott
autocrat or theologian can be reasonably judged to be either
mentally defective or criminal. I think that most of those

UNIVERSE

Two XV_ §140d

self-privileged aristocrats have been self-deceived (aided by
the adulation of their dupes—a lot of soft-headed sheep and
sycophants): they began to talk just as the pseudo-
scientist does about the “‘stupendous forces,’’ the “‘secrets’’
of nature that can be understood only by highly trained per-
sons like himself, ete., and then believed their own yarns
—acquired a ““swelled head,’’ conceit, egomania, paranoia
(degrees of the same thing; Index, ‘“Power-madness’’).

b. But of course the last paragraph proves that qualita-
tively there can be no new forces. Quantitatively there is no
limit to the number of phenomena we may arbitrarily distin-
guish: in fact, we have seen that every structure differs
quantitatively from every other, and hence every phenomenon
differs quantitatively from every other and may consistently
be given a ‘‘new’’ name. All such newly named phenomena
(e. g., the recently named radioactivity and X-rays) are, as
we have seen at length in terms of whirls, merely different
quantitative aspects of ‘‘common’”’ phenomena. nd it will
continue to be so in the future. It is possible now to de-
scribe as many such ‘‘new’’ phenomena as we have patience
for: I could readily describe the phenomenon ‘polarization
of smells’ (say), and show how to go about perceiving it defi-
nitely; but there is no need for such new ones unless we
come en conditions in which they are useful.

§140. a. Part Two has therefore been formally summar-
ized and proved, and shown to be identical with Part One, as
the equation Extensive phenomena... X Intensive phenomena...
Energy. It now remains to show how to: apply our know-
ledge by describing all the possible ways of deriving energy
for our use. Such application will be concrete proof of the
foregoing consistently expressed proof—and to repeat, noth-
ing else can furnish such final proof (§35).

b. Obviously, that equation asserts generally that the
way to get available power or energy is to apply an intense
or high potential phenomenon to some rather extensive or
balanced parts of the universe which are truistically thus at
low potential; the intense phenomenon then acts as a trig-
ger, or releasing, force and sets off a series of secondary whirl
formations. E. g., a match thus lights a fire, and is typical
of all possible ways of getting ““available’’ energy, as we
shall see. That is a qualitative way of describing how
to get energy; quantitatively, the equation asserts that there
are an indefinite number of phenomena that may be used to
get energy; we can never finish using the possibilities. By
classifying those phenomena under conventional names be-
low, we can see the principles of all of them, and theoreti-
cally readily use those we judge convenient— efficient.”’

ce. Or, we can put the meaning of that equation—of the
last paragraph—in more familiar terms:- take some “nat-
ural’’ high potential body and put it into perceptible circuit
with a low potential body, and use the resulting flow of sec-
ondary whirls over the circuit. | Those terms are ordinarily
used for electricity; but we sball see that they are general.

d. The chief obstacle to seeing clearly and fully how to
get useful energy is the dualistic idea (explicitly embodied
in the pseudo law of increase of entropy), that man himself
is not an actual energetic factor in that general equation, but
that man stands aloof from the affair (machine) and, like the
dualistic theological God, “‘ereates’’ a condition of affairs that
then produces the energy. It is glaringly obvious that man
is usually an important part of the whole intensive factor
Intensive phenomena... in the production of useful energy; it
is so excessively obvious that man is one part of his machines
that science has acquired the habit of omitting statement of
the fact, thus getting into so many logical difficulties that the
problem has become a ‘‘mystery.’” All that is put into con-
crete, more intelligible terms in the next paragraph.

§140e XV Two

e. The galaxy whirl, considered as being fairly fluid or
homogeneous, is ‘‘running down’’ or lowering its potential
(XII). But the condensing of secondary whirls constitutes
that running-down; and those reverse structures have differ-
ence surfaces in which the potentia] has increased. And as
man results as a further working of precisely the same pro-
cess, man is a condensed secondary of one of those conden-
sations—of the surface of the earth. Therefore, each man
theoretically should be of high potential (cf. Index, ““Entro-
py, increase of’’); and it is a readily observed fact that man
is of very high potential relative to his molar environment. Or,
to put it less generally but more familiarly, man persistently
(i. e., through a relatively long 7) produces violent changes
in his environment. Other biological] structures are of the
same order of relatively high potential, but all of them are
of considerably less degree in that order than man. That is
merely a rather obviously true quantitative guess in definite
terms of the view that man is “‘lord of Creation.’’ Relative
to our environment it is true; but in general, other biologi-
ca! structures elsewhere would by the theory of chance excel
man. So man himself is the high potential] trigger
that is the essential ‘starter’ of his machines. Man himself
is of sufficiently high potential to arrange any series of poten-
tials which can occur in our environment (except that he can
not directly do that to atoms, which have a higher main dif-
ference surface potential), ina circuit that suits himself—and
he does so. Other potentials (e. g., that of a flash of light-
ning) may be temporarily higher, but man’s potential is high
enough to handle—over-top iz the long run—all of them (do-
ing that actually consists of man’s using the atoms of his
brain to manipulate the potential variations which always oc-
cur when order of structure is given time J to change; Part
Three shows why the brain can work that way—essentially
it is the ability to unify, connect, things). And man as that
high potential part of his machines (his hands are machines,
tools, e. g., as are his vocal organs) is obviously not a dualis-
tic ““creator’’; this paragraph shows that his potential is it-
self a consistent effect of all the universe. E. g., when J]
write this chapter I am acting as a high potential trigger
which after years may, as the result of other men’s adding
their potential to it, produce quite a fund of available energy
in ways quantitatively somewhat different from those used
now; but I am not creating that energy but am simply be-
ing consciously pushed by the whole universe to connect up
things in terms of L and T (that same thing has been done
consciously for ages by humans, under various names:-_ re-
ligion, science, philosophy, system, organization, engineer-
ing, government, discipline, education, etc.). I get my
energy from the universe, and inal] respects act mechanically
—which is the same as saying that I act with rationality, or
am spiritually or consciously consistent. |The sloppy senti-
mentalist, the half-baked thinker of the dreamer type, could
not support that potential: he would hecome bewildered, or
irrational under it—his refusal to be consistently mechanical
being mostly sour grapes, as I happen to know from personal
experience. This completes the discussion of increase
of entropy and the second law of thermodynamics. In this
paragraph ] have been acting like Maxwell’s well known de-
mon, with one exception:- I have been getting energy con-
sistently, whereas the demon, like his inventor in this matter,
was capricious or dualistic like the theological God or devil.
In short, Maxwel] could not solve the One and Many so he
invented a hypothetica] dualistic God for science:- his demon
—identical with theological ones. Such a God is now obvi-
ously an offensively “‘materialistic’’? nominal link in a disor-
ganized machine that is hence not really a machine and will
not work. By the simple process of observing the (to us)

UNIVERSE

158

most obvious thing in the world—man in: his glaring capacity
of being a high potential trigger: man as a fierce, enduring,
keen, strong animal, or organized rea] machine or person,~—
and seeing it (him) as it is, we know there is no need for
such puerile dualistic Gods or demons. And as we saw in
§47, and see again here by considering that an arbitrarily
skin-bounded man really connectedly extends from Intensive
phenomena... to the total One Extensive phenomena... X Inten-
sive phenomena..., man ultimately is the whole machine or
person, the real God or universe—that being a self-respecting
statement of the truth not grasped by the mentally weak
dualists who would truckle to a kaiser-like God and whine to
him to save their nasty little personal souls.

8141. a. It therefore follows from the last section that
to obtain utilizable energy the general process is to throw a
collection of available structures out of equilibrium, and let
the secondary whirl formation accumulate as molar motion of
lower potential, which molar motion we use in a reverse
cycle, or as ‘‘available’’ energy. Any size structures wil]
do; but for convenience we wiil talk of atoms:-

b. I shall give a general] description of combustion, as be-
ing typical of all such methods. Combustion is always
started by relative motion of two or more atoms—frictiona]l
rubbing of each other. So some degree of combustion is
truistically a universal phenomenon, being merely mutual
motion producing secondaries. Conventionally, combustion is
such rubbing done long enough and violently enough to pro-
duce rather violent secondary whirl formation, and usually
to cause such a resulting aging of the whirls (wearing out of
their fields and increase of interna) condensations) that those
condensed whirls in some degree combine (usually “‘chemi-
cally’’ in our ““combustion,’’ as O and C into CO,), and in
that combining throw off even more violent secondaries, some
of the energy of which keeps up the combusting. That also
builds up large and intense fields around the structures, and
that canses the collection to expand (or to transfer that ex-
pansion over some sort of ‘circuit’ to neighboring collections),
and we use that expansion or molar motion as *‘energy.”’

ec. That general sort of conventional combustion has vari-
ous names that indicate quantitative differences. | When the
rubbing together of fields is done in such a way that the
atoms more or less systematize their expanded fields the re-
sult is called electricity. And in such combustion (which
usually is not carried far enough to ““burn’’ the rubbing sub-
stances) the systematized expanded field, the magnetic field,
is transferred by a circuit of atoms (in wires) and is directly
used to produce ‘‘mechanical motion’’ by pushing other wires
arranged asa ‘‘motor.’’ However, that field may be used
to joggle atoms violently (as in a lamp filament), and it then
produces ordinary combustion (atoms like O that will com-
bine with the lamp filament readily and accelerate that com-
bustion are kept out, so that in one sense that combustion is
slow); or, more conventionally, it produces heat. It
appears from this paragraph that the way to produce elec-
tricity directly from heat (even where there are slight dif-
ferences in temperatures) is to systematize the relative
atomic field motions. It is thus theoretically exceedingly
simple to do; in fact it automatically happens in a smal] way
in thermo-couples. But the practical quantitative solution of
the problem involves acquiring knowledge of the actual
structures of some atoms, difficult measurements, and the us-
ual process of trial and error in the numerous directions in
which measurements do not at first reach definitely.

d. Ordinary combustion of € and O into CO, produces
what is usually called a change of state. _I, e., if we burn
coal, by some method (ultimately friction) we ‘‘start’’ the
fire. As seen above, that causes violent secondary formation

159

which accelerates and spreads the ‘‘fire,’’ and increases the
various atomic fields, until in this case they expand intoa gas.
They are said to change state. That increase of volume is
molar motion which we may use (par. b). The expansion
may be used directly in the cylinder of a gas engine to push
the piston; or the jolting of that secondary formation may
be conducted through the walls of a boiler to water, expand
it to steam which is transferred to a cylinder and pushes the
piston. Ete. So I am using combustion in a general
sense that includes both “‘mechanical’’ energy (i. e., volume,
surface, and kinetic energy, and transferred or ‘conducted’
or ‘‘potential’’ sorts of those, such as waterfalls, winds,
etc.), and so-called non-mechanical energy (i. e., heat, mag-
netic and electric, and chemical energy). Obviously no
other consistent qualitative definition is possible.

e. Soall “changes of state’’ are capable of producing
available energy. That is a repetition in familiar terms of
par. b, where it was expressed as change of order of whirls.
Such changes change potentials, making ‘‘energy’’ available.

f. A general illustration of the essentials of a ‘“match’’
may be given in terms of low temperatures:- Obviously, if
a collection of atoms is steadily reduced towards “‘absolute
zero’ of temperature, it is truistic that their fields are steadi-
ly weakened and the atoms become more and more aged and
cluster-like (that is proved by Onnes’s showing that their
electrical resistance is decreased to a point near “‘zero’’;
XIV). Truistically no actual zero can be reached; but if
the atoms were subjected to the very low temperatures for a
long enough time the clusters would evidently begin to com-
bine, releasing comparatively violent energy as a nova does,
and expanding. That expansion would be combustion, started
by “‘cold.’’ It would perhaps, with many sorts of atoms, be
of ‘‘explosive’’ violence—faster than an ordinary “‘fire.’’ If
element structures had been used, quite likely temporary
new elements would form by that process; etc. The pro-
cess up to the explosions is the reverse of radioactivity, and
the explosions would be radioactivity, although perhaps of
much different intensity. It is in principle analogous to the
process that causes volcanoes (§122). That extreme cold is
a trigger or match more intense than the ordinary match.
The fact that electrical resistance suddenly drops considerably
at a low temperature is crucial] proof of this paragraph.

g. In the same general way, if any atom be subjected
to sufficiently violent action for a short time, or to less vio-
lent action for a relatively longer time, the atom will break
up into parts (if there is no relatively heavy confining pres-
sure or other means permitting the atom to recuperate’).
Radioactivity is obviously one form of combustion. In it the
atom breaks up to a greater extent than in ordinary combus-
tion: so the available energy is relatively great, and ordi-
nary methads of starting a fire have, in the short duration of
time in which they have been applied, produced no percep-
tible effect in changing the speed of such radioactive combus-
tio. But if the comparatively few atoms in a vacuum tube
be subjected to the rather violent and direct jolting of electric
currents, they are perceived to break up in various ways.
That breaking up is analogous to radioactivity, and truistic-
ally releases relatively large amounts of energy: so far as I
know the release of such energy has not been experimentally
measured. But it is obvious in principle that the vacuum
tube and analogous devices will serve as a match to start or-
dinary atoms to burning (breaking up), and will thus give
available energy from atoms that nowadays we do not use for
‘csombustion.’? Again the principles of burning anything

UNIVERSE

Two XV §141j

are simple; the quantitative problem of getting some combi-
nation of atoms which will give such energy that is economi-
cally profitahle is a difficult one. But by the time coal runs
out something much better than coal] can readily be devised.

h. The speeds in atoms are of the order of V;, and so
a comparatively little breaking up of atoms gives relatively
great energy. Ordinary combustion, in which the degree of
secondary formation, or breaking up, is so slight that it is
exceedingly difficult to detect any change in the weights,
e. g., after the atoms have heen burned, gives an amount of
energy that is great compared with usual standard molar
energy. If we could break one atom totally up, into the ab-
solute infinite regress of parts, there obviously (as we saw
hefore) would come from that atom an infinity of energy.
But the practical, pluralistic fact is that it would take an in-
finite potential to do it (or use up infinite time, if we use a
lower potential])—and man can not command anything like
such a potential (or time) in practice. The obvious fact is
that there never is going to be discovered any “‘cheap’’ and
easy method of getting at the vast stores of energy that are
in atoms. There is an irresponsible sort of quack who, in
praising the flabby folks who have become too weak to
work over 44 hours a week, implies that al] we have to do is
to discover some sort of hocus pocus, and then sit on flowery
beds of ease (something like the theologians’ various parasit-
ical heavens), and casually tap an atom and get anything we
want. But no one will ever get anything which he does not
pay for exactly and in full. Anyone whotries in any respect to
““heat the game’’ is mentally defective (XVIII).

i. The source of high potential energy most available at
the present time is the radiant heat energy of the sun. Pos-
sibly no other genera] source of energy will ever be used
much by man. Anything which that energy will make grow
(or in the case of ““inorganic’’ matter such as water, *‘ex-
pand’’) may, if suitably arranged, be used as an accumulator
or storage battery, which later on is comparatively rapidly
discharged. Coa], oil, aleobol, natural gas, wood (any or-
ganic fuel), foods, and water and wind power are examples
of such sources. Even if we found it expedient to burn (say)
sand, we most likely still would use some of those forms of
sun energy directly as a match (and more remotely, the en-
ergy in that sand may be said to he stored there by the sun;
XII). The principles of such energy utilization as regards
*““expansion’’ are already known and applied to a consider-
able extent. And the direct utilization of ““growth’’ is ob-
viously simple in principle. The most of growth on earth is
ultimately due to a chemical] reaction in chlorophy] (so far as
is now known), by which C is taken out of the air, usually
more or less directly from the products of previous combus-
tion, and combined with other atoms in less stable combina-
tions, the sun’s radiation furnishing the energy required. As
there is comparatively little chlorophy] distributed over the
surface of the earth, but little of the sun’s radiation is thus
stored. Several] times more radiant energy falls on the Sa-
bara desert than is released by al] the coa] burned in the
world during the same time. It is a quantitative problem to
devise a chemical] structure which we can manufacture, trans-
port, and use in any location at any time, to store up that sun
energy. It is truistically possible to do it; but by the prin-
ciples of harmonic periodicity it may not be profitable.

j. Those applications fundamentally depend on a quan-
titative knowledge of atomic structures. And this Part of
the book, from one point of view, has undertaken to show
how such knowledge may be obtained.

a

§142a XVI Three

160

UNIVERSE

PART THREE

SPIRITUAL UNIFICATION;

CHAPTER XVI.

$142. a. This last Part will describe perceptibly organ-
ized or systematized collections of atoms, with reference
(1) to their relationships with the remainder of the nniverse;
and with reference (2) to their relations among themselves ;
and (8) to their own internal relations between their own
structural parts. Or, in terms of ovr naming formula, we
shall see respectively the expansion of the specific points of
view:- (1) ““Material’’ Environment... X Organized or Living
Matter...; (2) Other Organisms... A Given Organism... ;
and (8) Other Organs or Parts ef a Given Organism... XA
Given Organ... . I shall not trouble to treat those
obviously exhaustive heads with any formal separateness;
(2) and (3) are clearly conventional forms of standard uni-
verses; and other similar standard universes will be considered
—all of which will always imply the complete (1). In fact, I
chiefly take the single organism man and discuss him as being
of primary interest to us—it being understood that the more
complete formulas are thus implied. Therefore, because
this Part is chiefly concerned with describing a standard uni-
verse:- man (and mostly a smaller one that represents him :-
his mind or nervous system), it is called Aumanics—a poor
name perhaps, but the best I could find.

b. I stated that we had to deal with “perceptible organ-
ized or systematized collections of atoms.’ All atoms are
organized with their fellows—meaning simply that all are re-
lated, continuous, reacting. So when we here discuss per-
ceptibly related ones, the only difference this Part has from
One and Two is that some difference in ZL and T is implied.
And I do not know definitely how much that difference is:
no one has ever said explicitly how much, so the reader can
please himself as to whether he will say that the atoms of a
brick are perceptibly to himself organized——whether he will
say the brick is alive. It is usually tacitly agreed that the
atoms of an electric circuit are organized or systematized per-
ceptibly ; so there is no essential difference and not even any
conventionally definitely asserted difference between an elec-
tric current and a “‘living’’ structure. That impossi-
bility of making a sharp distinction between living and not
living is more explicitly shown in the rest of this chapter.
Here we simply note than any general statement or implica-
tion of the nature of “‘life’’ promptly shows that there is no
dualism or real difference between living and non-living mat-
ter. So the total universe is alive or is life; and we may
write a general statement:- Imperceptibly organized matter...
™< Perceptibly organized matter...— Life. For truistically life
in general or Life is possible only when perceptibly organized
matter is supported by—inseparably related to—impercept-
ibly organized matter. It is the problem of the One and the
Many in terms of ‘“‘life,’’ and it is not necessary to repeat
the solution here more explicitly than is given by that
condensation in the last sentence. So the only general
problem as to what it is that is “‘alive’’ is a quantitative one
of how much evidence of organization we want. I shall take
it that everything is perceptibly to me alive; when I wish to
put other quantitative limits on what I say is ‘alive,’ I vary
those limits as convenient, and as implied by the context.

$143. a. When we describe the universe in terms of the
naming equation ‘‘Material’’ Environment... X Organized or

Biology.

or HUMANICS

Living Matter...—=Life, or Universe, the description is conven-
tionally named biology. The Living matter... term is the in-
tensive factor; and as we implicitly saw, conventional biology
emphasizes it, by making it a standard universe in which
Environment... is usually merely implied. | Obviously, all
particular sciences follow a similar procedure. But, in agree-
ment with the pseudo principles of classic logic, men form-
erly failed fo recognize that the dots or infinite regress had
to be in that general equation, as indicating that there was
no essential difference between Environment... and Living
matter...: and they therefure asserted that living matter or
life was an absolutely separate, dualistic “‘creation,’’ and
that living matter was endowed with “‘vitality,’’ and environ-
ment essentially or absolutely was not. Then, to retain
classic logie consistency, those “‘vitalists’’ had to hold that
each species had an absolutely distinct variety of that vital
principle, and hence existed absolutely distinct and separate
from its absolute creation. But that was glaringly contra-
dicted by facts, as was finally overwhelmingly shown by Dar-
win and others. So the theory of evolution ($145) asserts
that our biological equation is right, and supports this book.

b. But conventional science still holds that its “present
state of knowledge furnishes us with no link between the
living and the not living’’ (““Ency. Brit.,’’ Art. ““Biology’’),
and that assertion (which the doctrine of evolution truistic-
ally repudiates) is a sort of half-hearted surviving trace of
vitalism. So I shall explicitly show (§144) the identity of
living and not living matter.

c. It is obvious, and will be made explicitly more so in
various places below, that there can be and are numerous
perceptibly different organized structures; and that they are
often made up of perceptibly different smaller parts, such as
organs, cells, parts of cells, ete. Over a million species of
‘living’ things are actually distinguished. As a result, and
also because of the classical logic view that each species is a
unique quantity, no definite biological quantitative standards
are agreed upon; we saw that there is no agreement on
the fundamental one:- of how much organization constitutes
““life.’’? So for the biological sciences there is not any
general formulation of the measuring member M(varying
with) L?T~* (but ef. §148). Obviously, such measuring mem-
bers may be formulated and used at any time people wish to
agree upon standards; the theory of it is given in IX, and
below such extensions of present science are occasionally
implied. In the biological sciences it is usually readily per-
ceptible that there can be no exact science (cf. Jordan’s In-
troduction); that fact has long been observed, and some
scientists term the sciences in Part Two the * exact’’ sciences,
and humanics the “‘inexact’’ sciences. Some of the intem-
perate experimenters of the German Landolt’s type ($137),
who tend to materialism, rather hold that humanics can not
be made science at all—which is throwing the baby out with
his bath on a large scale; on such a large one that those
““scientific’’ ‘inhumanists’ can not see their ridiculousness.
The intelligent reader sees that the biological sciences are,
truistically, as susceptible to “‘exact’’ measurement as any
other, but are more difficult in the only sense any science may
be difficult:- so many details are perceptible that memory
becomes overburdened, and some confusion may result.

161

d. Perhaps the simplest way to use measures generally
in the biologic sciences is to use the formulas of Part Two,
applying them to collections of atomic galaxy whirls making
up the biological cell. _‘I nay briefly describe the quantita-
tive complications that could ensue:- The molecules of what
is usually considered to be living matter are each composed
of an average of 1000 atoms, as a reasonable estimate. Thus
there are (say) 1000 stellar galaxies in mutual] combination
and reaction, as one biologic molecule. Then there are
numbers of those molecules which go to form a rather stable
or static structure called a crystal; and numbers that form a
more dynamic colloid; and numbers of such crystals and col-
loid structures go to form a biologic cell. (That cell itself
often perceptibly exhibits the same two contrasting parts,
the nucleus, and its surrounding more dynamic or colloidal
protoplasmic substance—the two corresponding to the two
parts of a machine, or to the filament and field of a whirl.
The cell itself often has other condensations that are percept-
ibly variable—showing that the parts of such a machine start
on the infinite regress.) As a reasonably low guess there are
something of the order of 100,000 of those large molecules
in an average cell—giving 100,000,000 stellar galaxies (sub-
stantially asa minimum) in one cell. And it is estimated that
in one man there are about two billion cells in the nervous
system; so if the cells of the nervous system are of average
weight there are perhaps in a man a total of something over
a hundred billion biologic cells—giving us far over a billion-
billion equivalents of stellar galaxies in one man. __ So if I
were to describe a man with the roughness and indefiniteness
which was required in XII to condense the description of
the stellar galaxy to 25,000 words, I would need at least
25,000 billion-billion words—and that rough description of a
man would nearly surely fill more than ten million times all
the printed paper now on earth. If we applied our
measuring formulas in any such definiteness the result would
be unmanageable. But because a cell is in general equiva-
lent to a single whirl, and a collection of cells into an organ
makes the organ equivalent to a whirl (§981), and because
organs react together as That... X This..., we could use our
measuring formulas (use L and 7) with respect to cells or
organs. At any rate it has been made generally ob-
vious that there are enough different parts perceptible in a
man to make it truistic that he will exhibit many phenomena.
Aud it is perhaps equally clear that if we had not first seen
the elementary descriptions of single structures—the easy
ones of “‘physics’’—we would be nearly incompetent to de-
scrihe man.

e. So I shall expand biology by considering those various
That...X This...’s, thus implying the L’s and T’s of the
measuring member. If we take the factor Living beings... as
a standard universe, the chief useful] conventional expansion
of it is that of mental and physical:- Other physical organs...
x Nervous system...== Body... Mind...= Living beings. That
is substantially an internal division of organisms, giving the
conventional sciences physiology and psychology (and obviously
leaving Environment... more or less implicit). But it will be
seen, if it is not already obvious, that no method of splitting
the biologic That... This... into its various dots is conven-
tionally followed which is based upon any consistent principle
other than the immediate usefulness of it. Clearly, any num-
ber of ways of dividing humanics into branches could be de-
vised. But I shall follow the usual method of making those
immediately useful divisions. What is at present im-
mediately useful will not long be so; my guess is that biolo-
gy will superficially change enormously in a century. But
the formulas given, explicitly imply expansions needed in the
future. However, humanics is such a vast subject that there

UNIVERSE

Three XVI §144c

is not likely to be any general agreement soon as to the best
ways of splitting. It is of course a quantitative problem;
but as we are intensely interested in ourselves, violent con-
troversies will continue—indicating that “‘inexact’’ scientists
are still alive, vigorous, and capable of learning.

$144. a. It is orthodoxly held (““Ency. Brit.,’’ ‘“Biolu-
gy’’) that the uniquely distinctive properties of living matter
are these three [in this paragraph I practically use the words
of that article, and they are not very precisc]:- (1) Living
matter has a chemical composition that “‘invariably’’ contains
C, H, O, and N in complex compounds (called protein or al-
bumen), united with a large proportion of water, and as such,
in its primary unmodified state, known as protoplasm. (2) It
‘‘universally’’ disintegrates and wastes by oxidation; and
concomitantly grows or reintegrates by the intussusception
[imbibition, intercalation, interpenetration :- cating, in short]
of new matter—an addition of new matter not to the surface
of the living mass, hut by interposition between the existing
molecules of the latter, and hence differing from agglutina-
tion or accretion to the surface in the manner in which a
erystal grows. (3) Living matter perceptibly undergoes cyc-
lical changes—in the ordinary course of nature al] living
matter proceeding from pre-existing living matter, in well
known cycles of birth, growth, and the cessation of the ex-
istence of that individual. To quote verbatim:- “‘But
in addition to those distinctive characters, living matter has
some other peculiarities, the chief of which are the depend-
ence of all its activities upon moisture and heat, within a
limited range of temperature, and the fact that it usually
possesses a certain [a perceptible] structure or organization.’’

b. The general defect with that argument that living
matter is absolutely distinct from non-living matter is that it
is taken for granted without proof that all its quantitative
words are perfect or absolute (that all its observations and
experiments are exact), whereas not one is, or can be. E.g.,
there is no perfect intussusception and no perfect agglutina-
tion; even the electron theory, which was generally accepted
when the article cited was written, holds that in some de-
gree there is always a combination of the two ways of in-
creasing. (Jf the writer did not hold that electron theory,
then he should have stated how he considered the two ways
possible—for otherwise he could not be regarded as having
said anything. ) This matter of disproving that par-
ticular orthodox vague jumping to “‘sbarp’’ conclusions is
itself scarcely worth the space used by this paragraph of gen-
eral disproof. But this paragraph, appropriately changed
verbally, directly destroys all classic logic arguments wherein
sharp essentia] distinctions are asscrted—and in such gener-
ality is uscful, even though merely destructive.

ce. It will now he shown explicitly why all matter is liv-
ing. Conventional living matter is matter perceptibly organ-
ized within that narrow range of conditions, the organization
being evidenced by its having those three characteristics. In
brief, given on earth a certain rather narrow equilibrium of
conditions, which has existed for the long time needed (long
because narrow), we observe that certain chemical elements
get into rather elaborately organized states. By every way
in which the principle of continuity or relationship has been
stated, that result is essentially a truism with the conditions.
By every principle, we would expect such *‘living’’ matter
to exist: given certain sorts of elements time enough in
fairly steady conditions they truistically must organize. It
is trnistically inconceivable how there could fail to be “live
ing’’ matter. Of course, the problem of why there are the
now actually existing quantitative sorts of living forms re-
quires for its solution the whole history of the earth: Darwin
and his successors have been giving much of it. <All of such

§l44c XVI Three

quantitative description can not be given, as it involves the
infinite regress. But this whole book shows that, given con-
ditions quantitatively steady enough, perceptible molecular
organization into ‘‘higher’’ and “‘higher’’ orders (e. g., solu-
tions, crystals that are gaseous or liquid or solid, colloids,
protoplasm, nucleuses and cells, organs) truistically occurs.
And just as there is no sharp line between a primary and a
secondary whirl (§101e), similarly there is no absolute dis-
tinction between atom, molecule, solution, cell, organ, and
so on ad infinitum; they pass imperceptibly from one to
another, as we shall see in more detail from time to time.
Fora more explicit and detailed statement of how life
could ‘‘originate’’ on earth, see Chamberlin’s **Origin of the
Earth,’’and Moore’s excellent “‘Origin and Nature of Life’’ ;
also Bastian’s ““Origin of Life,’’ which is disputed.

d. By the principles of periodicity, it is obvious that the
quantitatively harmonic elements on earth tend to organize
themselves into one ‘elementary’ combination of the next
higher order (into perceptibly living matter), just as the so-
lar system organized by Bode’s law, etc. Conventional iv-
ing’’ matter on earth is therefore one perceptible alive
‘element’ out of many possible such ‘elements’ which occur
in various environments; i. e., our protoplasm (mostly of C,
H, O,and N) is one element in a periodic table of alive ones.
And that is obviously theoretically true and necessary:- For
suppose that conditions on Jupiter are now steady enough
for some colloidal formation that will progress into a cell.
Then if that cell is going to be strong enough to withstand
the greater gravity pull of Jupiter (to give just one instance
of a collection of harmonious conditions there, which differ
quantitatively from those here), the elements of the cell would
be heavier and stronger, by our measures here, than our C,
H, O, N are. Possibly C would be replaced on Jupiter by
something as strong and heavy as our Fe; the Jupiter C—
which is quantitatively not our C—would perhaps be thus
strong, measured by our standards. “Protoplasm’ on Jupiter
would still bear about the same quantitative relation to Jupi-
ter’s periodic table that ours does to our table; but by the
principle of asymmetry, Jupiter’s would be somewhat out of
step with ours so that the intervals in it between elements
differ from ours. And if conditions were relatively more un-
stable on Jupiter than here, probably there the Jupiter-C
would be replaced by Jupiter-Si (say). It is likely that in
more violent past ages here, protoplasm mostly contained Si
instead of C (in short, there truistically are ‘species’ of “‘liv-
ing’’ matter, although possibly there is only one such ‘spec-
ies’ or ‘element’ existing in our present conditions). There
is some evidence that the chemical composition of “‘living’’
matter here is not so sharp as asserted by the authority cited
in par. a (cf. Bastian, ‘‘Origin of Life,’’ XII).

e. So there is nothing absolute about the chemical com-
position of “‘living’’ matter. Such matter follows the prin-
ciples of all matter in orderly organization. Probably some
perceptible degree of “‘living’’ organization forms in some
level of the surface zone even in such comparatively violent
bodies as the sun. Such protoplasm would probably be much
different from ours. The basis of the protein of the
earth protoplasm isan amino acid, the molecule of which may
be said to be acid at one end and alkali at the other—chemi-
cally analogous to the two poles of a magnet (Moore, “Ori.
and Nat. of Life,’’ 116). And obviously, such an atomic
electric circuit is alway possible in any conditions, but would
truistically with varying conditions vary in its constituent
elements—just as vice versa any ‘‘element’’ is magnetic if
we give it proper conditions (XIV).

f. The second so-called absolute characteristic of living
matter is said to be (par. a) that it wastes by oxidization, and

162

UNIVERSE

grows by interpenetration. That obviously means in genera]
and consistently :- (1) that if we have under certain condi-
tions a given perceptibly organized matter, it will, analo-
gously to a whirl, give off secondaries of a certain sort (which
in our protoplasm, in quantitative agreement with conditions,
happen to have an increased number of O atoms—are oxi-
dized); and also (2) that the same organized matter will, like
a whirl, take in secondaries, and perceptibly distribute them
internally. There is evidently nothing essentially unique
about that process, as it is the on/y process (itis reversible, of
course) which can occur with any natural structure—as shown
in all of Part Two. The authority cited omitted ex-
plicit mention of the fact that that oxidized waste also is of
an intussusceptible character—but again not perfectly so.

g. And the third alleged unique feature of living mat-
ter (cyclic processes) is obviously nothing more than a repe-
tition or truism of the fact that there is both waste and
growth. The two (waste and growth), as a harmonic peri-
odicity depending on the relative sizes and numbers of the
inner structures of the given structure, as in all other kinds
of natural structures (Part Two) accumulate into a certain vi-
bration or rhythm. Ether cells, by the same cycle, were
said to give off “‘light’’; obviously, these biologic cells by
the same principles ‘vibrate’ (incidentally, certain sorts of
waves are therefore, by the mechanics of XIII, given off by
living cells—which waves are truistically sufficient to explain
telepathy, mind-reading, and similar phenomena; cf. §146).
So again all other natural structures have the same processes
as ‘‘organic’’ ones. The difference is the L and T of cycles.

h. It further follows by the same principle of harmonic
periodicity that a certain internal structure of a given live
cell, in agreement with its environment follows a certain
course of growth and waste. I. e., for a given mass of pro-
toplasm, forming a biologic structure, and considered asa
standard universe, we have the equation:- Environmental
structures... X Live organs or structures...—=The life of the living
being. And that truism asserts al] the general principles of
heredity—asserts that quantitatively both acquired and in-
herited characteristics go into the living being and are trans-
mitted by him or it. The equation further asserts all the
general principles of the size and form of the living being,
and thus determines the species. If we expand that stand-
ard universe to include all such perceptibly “‘living’’ beings,
we have:- Environmental structures... X Live organs organized
as all living beings...—Ljfe. And that obviously valid equa-
tion asserts the principles of formation of “‘living’’ beings
from so-called dead matter, the variability of all species, etc.,
ad infinitum. Or more specifically, to revert to the first of
this paragraph, the so-called principle of biological teleology
(that an organism is fitted to its environment so well that it
seems to be “‘designed’’ or ‘‘purposed’’ for it,—‘‘Ency.
Brit.,’’ xxviii, 1024; for teleology, see §86) is more correctly
expressed by completing that “*principle,’’ and saying that the
environment is also in harmony with the organism:- for our
truistic equation asserts that both the environment and the or-
ganism (or organisms) react on each other to produce, mon-
istically, a perfect fit. In short, Darwin’s ‘‘mechanical’’
explanation of the observed fact that there are no constant
species, which explanation is expressed by the phrase “‘nat-
ural selection’’ (or Spencer’s ‘‘survival of the fittest’’), is
obviously a truism. Darwin’s phrase perhaps tacitly empha-
sizes Environment... too much (and Spencer’s, Organisms...);
for the balance is continuous or dynamic—mutual between en-
vironment and organism. So, as the principle of balance or

fitness’ is universal (being merely the dynamic balance
That xX This... ; §114c, IX), applying equally in the form
or name no constant atoms,’ “‘no constant species,’’ ‘no

163

constant anything,’ or ‘no exact science,’ therefore I express
it in those ways and finally as ‘harmonic periodicity,’ which
has been shown to apply to biology. That ultimately
absolutely unifies biology with other sciences, and indicates
the complete quantitative theory of humanics.

i. In discussing living cyclic processes in par. g it was
implied that there was birth and death. Incidentally, as it
has been proved that the cycle is the same for all natural
processes or structural parts of the universe, the fact that
those two everyday names for the ‘‘ends’’ of the cycle are
not the same is direct evidence that it has been observed,
and may be, that no cyclic process @f a part can be exactly
repeated—that no cycle short of the universe is perfectly re-
versible (Index, ““Cycles’’). Classic logic views of
birth and death are that they are sharp, exact, absolute pro-
cesses—that before birth the organism did not exist, and at
some exact time (the birth) it came into existence, and then
ceased to exist at some later exact time (its death). The ob-
vious fact is that there is no such definite thing or time as
birth or death—they are Land T words which rougbly and
without much exactness apply to a given living being (880m).
It is not possible, as shown in Part Two, to give any exact
space and time for the formation of any secondary, or its sub-
sequent consolidation with something else—for its birth and
death. It is now directly observable that we can not say
exactly when an organism is born, or where; or when or
where it dies. There is no agreement as to whether a chick-
en is born when the sperm cell and ovum unite, or when the
egg is laid, or when it hatches; and even if there were such
an agreement, obviously it takes time for the cells to unite,
time for the egg to be laid, and time for the chicken to peck
out of the shell, each of the three being just as surely a time
and space process as ‘life’’ itself. And physicians are not
agreed as to when a man dies; and if they were, the facts
would refute the accuracy of the agreement:- often all the
larger organs certainly perceptibly cease to work, and after
that ordinary ““death’’ the man is resuscitated; various org-
ans are perceptibly kept alive away from the remainder of
the body; when the “‘man’’ dies his organs are in some de-
eree still alive (e. g., his hair will often continue to grow).
In short, birth and death in any exact or in any essential
sense are names like zero and infinity——-One words that name
a limit, and apply to nothing quantitative or scientific (to
nothing that is exressed in finite terms), or to nothing in our
personal lives. Birth and death when scientifically or plural-
istically used signify merely some arbitrary quantitative
measure that is roughly guessed at as a matter of convenience
and are nothing essential or constant; e. g., a man’s con-
sciousness, or what might be called his own personality or
actual self which is perceptible to himself, obviously by no
means is born and dies coincidentally with his ‘‘ physical birth
and death’’; also, as far as he perceives, his self dies and is
horn daily at the beginning and end of sleeping soundly. So
obviously, there can be no possible agreement, so far as his
own perceptions are concerned, between a given man’s guess
and that of others as to his own birth and death.

j. So the obvious rigorous explanation of *“birth’’ and
““death,’’ as being things supposed to be absolute entities, or
absolute processes really different from any other processes,
is very simple:- there are no such things, and no ex plana-
tion is needed. The reader will say, that notwithstanding
all that talk, he will die. Of course he will, in the custom-
ary sense (but see §146Im). But he has never existed as
something uniquely separate and distinct from any other
thing, and so he obviously, as a mere truism, can not abso-
lutely cease to exist when he does not previously really exist
—but will keep on in the future as he has in the past, bearing

UNIVERSE

Three XVI §145b

continually changing quantitative relations with all other
things. | When he says he dies, he means that some certain
degree of change of relations oceurs:- what that degree is has
not been measured, and can not exactly be, and varies for
each man anyway. He has been having changes of relations
all his “‘life,’’ and each one is a unigue quantity; hence his
death is not in any essential respect a new thing, although it
too is another unique quantity, with which he is perceptually
quite familiar—having become so from having experienced
a process imperceptibly different from it in going to sleep
thousands of times. The theory is obviously rigorous.
I also happen to know from experience what J am talking
about, as I was physically, mentally, and medically dead
once, and was resuscitated. When 1 was a boy I wanted to
know how chloroform worked: so as usual in similar cases I
tried it on myself; and I accidentally killed myself. The
reader may verify the experiment himself if he likes.
I have used more space for birth and death than the intrinsic
difficulty of the problem warrants. But such emphasis seems
to be required because orthodox theology revolves so persist-
ently about death. Obviously, the way to remove the re-
puted sting of death is to know precisely what is meant hy
death. The theologians have held up death as a horrible
bogey, just as a peculiarly stupid nurse frightens a child with
the dark—the nurse usually, as an automatic punishment
called ““poetic justice,’’ coming to fear it herself. There is
no such thing as the theological dualistic death from which
the theologians promise to “‘save’’ us—if we will be ““good’’
by doing as they order, and turn various privileges, powers,
etc., over to them. Since I died I have had no fear of death
(and the theologians messed up my nervous system consider-
ably when I was younger); often when I persistently over-
work I find that it would be a great relief if I knew I could
at once go to sleep permanently. I have no doubt that
Metchnikoff (‘‘Prolongation of Life’’) is correct in saying
that it is a fact that people who grow old normally (balanc-
edly) desire death. Certainly his principle is correct, though
not always stated consistently. We take up the subject, un-
der ‘“‘immortality,’’ later (see Index).

k. This section, particularly par. h with its formulas,
outlines biology explicitly. I now proceed to expand some
of the more important aspects a little, starting with evolution.

8145. a. Wehave seen that the modern doctrine of evo-
lution is in effect the equation Environment... Perceptibly
living species...—=Life, or God, or Universe, and hence is iden-
tical with the argument of this book; and implies the use of
the valid logic (the doctrine almost explicitly asserts the use
of such logic, in that “‘natural selection’’ is orthodoxly ad-
mittedly a truism, or circular reasoning); and explicitly uses
““mechanical’’ or positive language; and admittedly sums
into the principle of continuity, or universal relationship (see
Jordan’s, Ritter’s, and Patten’s books). Of course, various
materialists and other sorts of dualists have perverted the
meaning of evolution into almost every sort of pseudo doctrine.
It would probably be a waste of time to consider explicitly
those perversions, except the most pernicious one (par. c) :-
that natural selection means “‘might makes right’’—means a
continuous *‘fight’’ for existence, universal ‘‘repulsive’’ force,
a nature red in tooth and claw, and all the rest of that
Nietzsche - Treitschke - Bernhardi- Bismarckian ‘“blood-and-
iron’? unbalanced attempt to run one irrational] factor to in-
finity. However, if any reader prefers to take it that one of
those perversions is orthodox “‘evolution,’’ then he may name
the rigorously consistent principles given here anything he
likes, and take it that I reject such orthodox **evolution.”’

b. The valid logic was not explicitly stated in past at-
tempts to say what evolution meant (although Jordan, Patten,

§145b XVI Three

and Ritter clearly used it). But obviously, the important
points shown by Darwin and others to be proved by the ob-
servable facts may be stated thus:- (1) all observed species
vary or are not constant (implying the infinite regress from
the biological point of view); (2) each creature and-or spec-
ies varies as a result of interaction with its environment, that
environment including other creatures and species as well as
*‘non-living’’ bodies (that implying the infinite regress from
all other points of view); (8) and all that is considered a
mechanical or positive way of understanding the whole uni-
verse, in terms of “‘life.”’ That is clearly directly
equivalent to our equation Environment... * Perceptibly living
species... Life, or Universe. And equally obviously it is
identica] with the total of what was proved in Part Two:-
All other atoms... A given atom...—Unwerse; or with the
That... X This...=Meaning of Part One. Species are more
easily perceptible, as being natural structures, than atoms
are; sothe general unification of science naturally took place
first in a fairly definite way in biology—as ‘‘evolution.’’

ec. But classic logic implies that there is a linear series
of facts that proceeds in a non-circular manner from an ab-
solute ‘“lower’’ to an absolute “‘higher’’ (whatever that may
mean: the ““high’’ aristocrats seem to think they know, but
ef. Index, ““Direction’’). So the aristocrats (who considered
that men also proceed thus in absolute order of class caste
from peasant to kaiser) ignored, or were too defective men-
tally to see, the fact that any living structure reacted with its
environment (implying both attraction and repulsion, depen-
ing solely on point of view [Index, ““Direction’’]; and also
obviously implying that even the environment is as ‘‘good’’
as the king, or has structures essentially the same). They
jumped to the unwarranted conclusion that evolution was
represented by the pseudo, unfinished ‘equation’ Living
structure, Living structure 2, 3, 4, ete..— quite analogous to the un-
finished materialistic ‘equation’—interpreting such ‘equa-
tions’ to mean that there is an absolute order of caste, so that
as a truism of such dualism those presumably ““higher’’ in
the scale always try to push down or back, or fight, those
‘ower.’? They took the phrase ‘‘survival of the fittest’’
(§144h), and instead of interpreting it correctly as a circular
truism that means a mutual give and then take in infinite re-
gress, they assumed the customary arrogant, selfish, or cruel
premise of the aristocrat (who when very aristocratic is the
pathologically insane egomaniac—or when no perceptible
nerve lesion exists, paranoiac), that they were the fittest or
best, and concluded that therefore they must follow the law
of evolution by fighting the others. Now, obviously, from a
One or infinite point of view, such an argument of repulsion
can be quite true, just as we saw Reynolds’s pressure to be.
But it would largely capsize ordinary language to apply that
sort of language to finite individuals—our ordinary language
uses both the One 0 and ®, action and reaction, repulsion
and helping (§114c). But the aristocrats didn’t have the
intelligence to see the absurd contradiction, while pretending
to speak ordinary language, of making evolution one irrational
factor always acting in one direction. So they and their
dupes fancied that along the road ‘might makes right’?
they were becoming “‘supernien’’; but obviously they were
merely proving the truth implied in the old adage:- whom
the gods destroy they first make mad. All aristocratic
doctrine, when put into humanistic form, primarily holds that
there is a real order of caste in men (fixedly separate or dis-
continuous), and that the aristocrat is the best, or the essen-
tially superior, or the divinely ordained or *called,’’ or the
partner of Gott or Jehovah, or the otherwise privileged person
(getting something for nothing—a truistically impossible ac-
tion without a reaction). Every such doctrine is at bottom

UNIVERSE

164

wrong—as I trust I have made so glaringly obvious that even
a mild aristocrat will have enough mental capacity to see it
(and of course thereby automatically cease to be a dualist).
But it is usually not possible, by the use of so mild a force
as words, to convince’ the very defective brain of the
“*higher’’ aristocat, such as a kaiser or a hysterical woman.

d. Taking the simplest view that everything is alive,
natural selection means that all parts mutually react, just as
the organs of a man’s body act together. Certain parts are
of course rejected froma given place; but that equally im-
plies that the part is attracted to another place. There is
ultimately exactly as much pluralistic repulsion or the con-
ventional ‘‘force’’ or “‘fighting’’ as there is attraction or the
conventional “‘love’’ or “‘peace.’’ There is no need to carry
the first to the degree of internecine warfare, or to carry the
second to the degree of deadly stagnation or boredom; an
excess of one is, by the principles of action and reaction, as
bad as an excess of the other (§8114c, 163b).

e. Because the valid logic implied by the rational evo-
lution was not definitely stated, conventional science explic-
itly recognized as an unsolved problem a biological form of
the One and Many:- whether (1) variation in an organic
structure is inherent, or proceeds from “‘within,’’ or (2) is
acquired, or comes from “‘without.’’ Obviously, (1) asks
whether the structure is an absolutely separate universe, not
affected by other adjacent universes, and (2) asks whether it
is continuous with the single universe, so that the ‘“without”’
can affect it. That obviously asks whether the Many or the
One is true: it is answered by Part One. The specific,
practical answer here, in biological terms, is that the ordi-
nary live structure itself contains perceptible parts, which
produce some perceptible variations from within, just as if the
structure were a little universe (i. e., incommensurability
truistically applies within the structure); also, variation must
similarly (in some quantitative degree) be acquired from
without. Asa matter of observed fact, both sorts of varia-
tion seem to occur perceptibly, although it is disputed; and
obviously, if both sorts thus occur, that directly shows that
circular reasoning is valid, and that there exists also the in-
exactness of the infinite regress thus implied. | And as both
those contradictions to the classic logic were more or less evi-
dent to biologists, they hesitated to admit that both sorts of
variation were possible: they were in the same dilemma as
Van der Waals (§82). But the biologists (except for Jordan,
Ritter, Adami, Patten, and a few other first class thinkers
I do not definitely remember) were not so clear as to what
that fundamental difficulty was (although in a vague way the
problem is given as ‘‘bathmism’’; ‘“‘Ency. Brit.,’’ x, 36).
And they have stated the problem less broadly:- whether
acquired characteristics are inheritable. We take up that
problem, in the less general terms of heredity, in §147. In
that form it is turned into the One and Many problem that
has recently been named Mendelism:- the more fanatic, ma-
terialistic Mendelians hold that each character or property of
an organism is an absolutely separate unit (an absolute bio-
logic ‘atom’)—that the Many is absolute.

f. That covers evolution generally. Obviously, by ex-
panding the general evolution formula (naming the dots),

evolution’’ becomes coextensive with humanics—with all of
knowledge, as all things are alive. So if the reader does not
like the particular names I have used in that evolution equa-
tion, he has an unending choice of names just as good. The
expert biologist is usually a prolific inventor of new names (as
he has practiced with the naming rather than the measuring
member), and a number of branches of evolution are named
(*“Ency. Brit. ,’’ Evolution’’); but as the principles have
been seen the reader will not be loaded with them here.

165

$146. a. We shall get a view of the principles of bio-
logical sex, growth, and reproduction by considering our stellar
galaxy to be a live structure and noting definitely what those
terms mean with respect to its mechanics, So I am going to
describe the universe in terms of sex. That obviously takes
the term quantitatively further than is conventional; that
extention of the term applies only in this section. At
the birth of the galaxy whirl (XI)) it is comparatively fluid —
i. e., all condensations are small (at least, smaller as a rule
than later on). So it is virtually young—meaning that all
“‘epigenetic’’ or “‘acquired’’ reactions or ‘‘factors’’ (i. e.,
all asymmetries coming, when noticed, from whirls in the gal-
axy whirl’s environment—from “‘without’’), and all ‘‘genet-
ic’’ or ‘‘inherent’’ reactions (j. e., all asymmetries coming,
when noticed, from its inner structures—from “‘within’’) can
be readily (i. e., in comparatively small Zand 7) met or
fairly balanced by secondary whirl formation. But as the
galaxy whirl gets older, the condensations get heavier (the
whirl becomes more a cluster; X11), and truistically an asym-
metry has to accumulate more before it can budge some of
those heavy condensations from their orbits to make the bal-
ancing secondary. Also, truistically such an accumulated
reaction has a comparatively large effect upon the whole gal-
axy, and is more perceptible than a small, younger one.

b. Ifthe galaxy whirl is considered a biologic cell, that
implies that in its environment there are, besides other cells
of the same order, natura] structures smaller than it, those
being less perceptibly organized structures—single molecules
of food, etc.

e, The whirl is continually exhibiting secondary forma-
tion at its field difference surface (its ce)] skin)—either taking
in food or rejecting waste, as secondary whirls or as some
form of whirl combining. Obviously, the fact that an actual
cell ever forms in a given environment truistically implies
that at the time the general sum of the asymmetries is for
the “‘food’’ to organize—that the cell grows. (There is also
an ‘“‘inner’’ cell life, due to secondary formation at the fila-
ment difference surface—at the skin of the cell nucleus, etc.,
—of which we have seen the principles in astronomical de-
scriptions.) But at the same time the biological cell is giv-
ing off waste. So, unless the environing cells can eat or in
some way remove the waste of the first cell, shortly the food
supply isinterfered with by waste, and the ce)] stops growing.

d. Ifthe food supply is sufficient (if there is a tendency
for the environment to maintain rather steadily an asymme-
try in the direction of growth, instead of there being an en-
vironment that is practically balanced, as we tacitly assumed
is the perceptible case—a fact, in the few thousands of years
we have observed it—in our galaxy in XII), the cell keeps
on growing, and getting older and hence unable (too unbal-
anced) to maintain such a steady growth. So at some stage
of the growth an asymmetry accumulates sufficiently to cause
the whole whirl to split—either by the mechanical equivalent
of dumbbell splitting (§117) into two nearly equal parts (bio-
lagic ‘‘reproduction’’ by *“fission’’), or more usually by more
or less perceptibly unequal splittings, just as with astronomi-
cal whirls—in which case the biological reproduction is known
as gemmation or budding, sporulation, etc. To save the
reader’s attention I ignore the fine distinctions in such terms.

e. Trnistically ($55, etc.), in no case can the splitting
or reproduction be exactly equal—and in that fact of univers-
al quantitative inequality of natural structures is exhibited all
of sex, that same inequality or sex (sex is there used as a re-
lationship word) including or resulting in the further tend-
ency (1) of one cell to connect perceptibly with other cells
to form multicellular individuals, (2) of such joined cells to
become “‘specialized’’ organs, and (3) of such multicellular

UNIVERSE

Three XVI §146¢

individuals to form societies. | (Identically the same process
of uniting is exhibited by ether cells, and by “‘higher’’ ord-
ers of structures, as we saw in Part Two; here we merely
have new names for such structures. ) The cell that
‘grows too large,’ so that it splits, has grown so old that it
has a perceptible asymmetry, or inequality of halves, or sex.
One unequal part is male and the other female—and it is ar-
bitrary which is which, and J do not know which part is male
with reference to distinctions in human sex. For sex is again
our general problem of direction (§99b): i. e., fundament-
ally it is impossible that there be any essential difference in
the sexes, as the difference is quantitative and reversible.
Also, any part of the Many has a sex relative to any other
part of the Many (not directly stateable, of course, when the
parts are of different orders—as we saw was the case with
temperature or any potential); for sex is simply asymmetry
of equilibrium, and always with two natural structures there
is some—some attraction and repulsion, in chemical or elec-
trical terms. Sex is the fundamental human name for po-
tential. (The term tropism is often used for such perceptible
variations in biologic potentials, and asserted to be a ‘“chem-
ical’’ process, etc. Also, some biologists use as a general
name for it, more especially with respect to the cell and its
food and waste, the probably preferable term osmotic pressure,
which is one form of our ‘chemical affinity.”) When no such
asymmetry is perceptible we inaccurately say that the biologic
potential is zero—that the body is asexual or neuter. And
as mentioned, different order structures, such as a man and
the galaxy, although not directly comparable in potential] or
sex, may be so compared by using the inverse square law.
That is the total general theory of sex. It probably
is not quite intelligible yet. And I can see no present need
to figure out the comparative sex of chemical] structures, etc.

f. It therefore isa truism that all growth (or waste) may
be considered a chemical exhibition of sex. And all so-called
asexual reproduction is by this rigorous theory sexual. Any
secondary whirl] formation is an exhibition of sex. But the
quantity of such asymmetry is not enough to be ordinarily
called sex until] a biologic organism exhibits an attraction for
another organism similar to the attraction of unlike electrical]
charges or magnet poles—with which it is identical in prin-
ciple. That sex attraction is exhibited by all single
cells if they are given enough time, thus:- The galaxy
whirl, even if adjacent whirls clear out its cell waste and
provide food, obviously keeps on condensing into a cluster or
growing older (see par. m for a special exception—or §123),
and its then relatively non-fluid or ‘‘ossified’’ internal condi-
tion stops its growth; and in the fairly steady conditions
which promote such growth no asymmetries tend to rise that
are sufficient to split the cel] into new ones. And now we
take it that the cell or galaxy is so much condensed that it is
hard to split as a whole. But, at the same time this cell is
thus reaching a sterile old age with respect to the sexual
comparisons or reactions of its own parts, other cells in its
environment truistically are developing a similar potential—
but again truistically differing some in quantity. So by the
time the food and waste in the neighborhood can no longer
produce an internal sex effect on these galaxies considered as
cells, resulting in ‘“asexual’’ reproduction by direct fission,
the potential of the food and waste no longer masks or bal-
ances the difference in potential of two neighboring cells, and
the two combine, in the same way that two clusters or whirls
do. That combining makes the new cell somewhat fluid,
restores its youth, and starts a new cycle. So far as has been
observed, all biologic cells do have such external “‘sex’’ un-
ions, given a long enough time to age or to mature sexually.

gs. Those phenomena obviously do not necessarily have

§146g XVI Three

to proceed in the direct step by step fashion described. Just
as two or more atoms need not ‘wholly’ interpenetrate each
other and form some new elementary atom, but may form a
more or less interpenetrating union (the fields and various
condensations in them to some degree coalescing) to produce
ions, solutions, molecules, crystals, colloids, etc., so two or
more cells need not wholly interpenetrate each other in such
a sexual union, but may have a partial union and thus build
themselves up into a special organ. |§And organs may simi-
larly build into an individual]; the individuals into a percept-
ible family and a society; and the society may theoretically
go on and build with others into a perceptible society of all
the living beings in the universe. (There are practical diffi-
culties in communicating with individuals in a galaxy so far
off that even ordinary light will not travel to it; we shall be
for a while doing practically quite well if we can have per-
ceptible communication and hence social relationship, not
largely destroyed by censors, with the people of Asia.) I.e.,
the dynamic unbalance between the environment of food and
waste on the one hand and a few cells that are at nearly the
same potential may be quantitatively just enough to cause a
partial union of the cells. That can consistently be called a
sex union; but conventionally that lesser degree of union is
not called one. That union may be perceived as a direct
growing together of “‘processes’’ of the skin (forming ““con-
nective tissue’’); or the cells may join in other quantitative
degrees—acquiring a single enveloping skin just as the solar
field difference surface is a dynamic skin of the solar system.
Such a union may be wholly of cells about alike, in which
case there isan undifferentiated multicellular individual (more
conventionally, it is called a colony, ete., of unicellular ones).
Of course no such collection can be perfectly undifferentiated
—but some lower plants have no perceptible organs (‘‘Ency.
Brit.,’’ 728-30). The “‘growth’’ of such “‘undiffer-
entiated’’ individuals is obviously by internal sex processes,
producing fission. But that produces no new individual;
and obvionsly, as their cells grow old two multicellular indi-
viduals can not ordinarily unite sexually as can two cells, for
the cell connections and outer skins interfere with such a pro-
cess. But as the cells of an individual can not be perfectly
undifferentiated or balanced, it follows that as the cells grow
old and more “‘solid’’ the unbalance tends to accumulate at
some outer location (by the principle of volcanoes; §122i),
and the potential difference (sex differentiation) is there built
up high enough to renew the growth of some of the cells and
throw them off as a newly “‘born’’ or started individual—
that internal sex process in its simple or “‘primitive’’ form
being, I think, conventionally called asexual reproduction by
terminal budding (sex is not conventionally understood well;
so conventional names for the varying sorts of reproduction
are vague). ‘Truistically, that budding is a cumulated per-
ceptible differentiation of the previously seemingly undiffer-
entiated colony—an example of biologic hysteresis or lag.

h. Again, it is not necessary that that internal sex pro-
cess or differentiation go to the limit of differentiation into
two individuals. For obviously, certain cells in an organism
may get perceptibly out of balance with their neighboring
cells, and the unbalance may be slight enough to permit the
two sets of cells to react with each other as two organs—
the unbalance being thus ‘sexually’ compensated by the re-
action of the two organs together in a conventionally recog-
nized “‘division of labor’’—a truism that is expressed by the
formula, Cells in one organ... Cells in another organ... (not-
ing the dots or infinite regress). Truistically, the number of
such organs can be increased as far as the stability of the en-
vironment (climate) permits (the **natural’’ determination of
the number of organs follows the same principle of periodicity

UNIVERSE

166

as the halancing of ‘‘increasing returns’’ with ‘‘decreasing
returns”’ in economics [$1700], or the number of planets);
always, in order that the individual may exist, two perceptible
relationships must remain:- (1) there must be a circulation
of small food and waste structures to and from all organs (as
in the respiratory, digestive, blood and lymph circulation in
a mammal; or railroad and other transportation in a per-
ceptible society); and (2) a quicker circulation of “field pres-
sure’ or trigger energy’’ or electrical potential, to maintain
for the individual a tolerable balancing reaction of organs
(such more rapid balancing or unified control is exhibited by
or as the nervous system in mammals, and by as yet unper-
ceived circuits in plants, and by verbal, telegraphic, post,
and other communications in a society). Those two are of
course merely the two usual aspects of the same need; _ that
one need can be summed:- ‘coordinating (or generally bal-
ancing) structures or organs.’ And recently it has been ob-
served that there is a more or less perceptibly continuous or
regressing series of coordinating structures of which those
two sorts are verbally too sharply distinguished:- There are
‘*chemical’’ processes of coordination (largely taking the
place of a definite nervous system in lower organisms), con-
sisting of internal secretions poured into the circulating
streams of food and waste. The substances are named har-
mones and colyones; the first are said to have been observed
to raise the energy potential of the organs they serve to keep
balanced, and the second to lower it. All organs, as a truism
of secondary formation, must give off secretions (they are
what I have been calling ‘waste’); so chemical coordination
in some degree is universal—but obviously may be said to be
rather haphazard coordination. The circulatory systems are
quantitatively more systematic coordinations. And the nerv-
ous system is quantitatively even closer coordination, which
works by direct field pressure rapidly (by electric currents).
Obviously, the next general quantitative step would be a
perceptible communication by waves given off by the nervous
system or other organs; such would connect the parts of the
given individual even more closely (rapidly), and also connect
him with other individuals rapidly. And a slightly percept-
ible beginning of such a step in coordination is observable as
telepathy, etc. That would be the last usually named quan-
titative step; the next general step would be gravity, in 2
sense or form that has no biological name now.

i. Thus we see how “‘organs’’ are specialized. It is
merely a statement in biological terms of the infinite regress
of structures. A number of such orders are actually percept-
ible in biology; inside the cell itself there are perceptible
some orders or differentiation of groups of molecules, the cell
nearly always having one perceptible grouping, the nucleus
and the protoplasm (an internal female and a male part).
That regress, or such mechanics, is proved by many observed
facts. E. g., there are numbers of probably correct observa-
tions (Paul Portier) that often cells and the body fluids con-
tain perceptibly living smaller individuals (symbiotes)—with
individual ““sex’’ life, etc. The regress of such ‘individuals’
truistically is infinite—their perceptibility is quantitative.

J. It is even more obvious that an individual with differ-
entiated organs can not unite externally sexually with another
individual—fully interpenetrate. | For the connective tissue
is in the way—furnishes bonds that too strongly preserve the
individual’s balance against such amphimixis. So the differ-
entiated individual can achieve general balance of potential
in only two practical ways:- (1) by internal sex processes—
i. e, by feeding, ete.; and by reproducing itself ‘‘asexual-
ly"’ by re-growing a cut-off part, by budding, by spore for-
mation or germ cell formation in general, or by other varieties
of parthenogenesis: (2) by external sex processes—in some

167 UNIVERSE

way combining its germ cell with one of the opposite sex.
The only process conventionally known as sexual, with re-
spect to that differentiated individual, is the second. But it
is now clear in detail that those various ways which the in-
dividual uses to keep himself in balance with the environment
(or it is equally true stated vice versa:- those ways the en-
vironment uses to keep the individual fairly balanced—to
“‘preserve”’ him) do not differ at all in kind (they all reduce,
from the point of view of the individual, to selfpreservation),
but merely have different names for different quantitative de-
grees. The process in general is “‘living,’’ and is usually
arbitrarily divided into metabolism and reproduction, thus:-
Metabolism... X Reproduction... Vital process, or Life.

k. Therefore, with a differentiated individual (unless it
be externally—i. e., “‘artificially’’—cut into pieces and kept
in a clean nutritive environment, as Carrel has shown), the
part of the process conventionally known as Reproduction...
or sex does not rejuvenate the whole individual, but rejuve-
nates only a certain cell or certain cells. So truistically, as
far as the greater quantitiative part of the individual is con-
cerned, he (she, or it) can not ordinarily he made young by
an external sex process (precisely as no physical potential can
be raised for a total structure; §§140-1, ete.), and hence he
for the most part grows old and in the ordinary sense dies.
Therefore, theoretically, assuming surgical skill millions of
times greater than now available, we could temporarily get
the connective tissue sufficiently out of the way to allow all
the cells of an individual to go through an external sex pro-
cess (with the cells of perhaps another individual), and thus
the individual could be made substantially immortal. Of course
that is a stupendous job for some sorts of organisms.

1. It is thus clear why man grows old and dies. Briefly,
it is because he grows so much connective tissue as a means
of preserving a steady balance with the environment, that the
tissue prevents a general rejuvenation when that is needed,
and so only a part of him can begin the cycle over again (ezr-
cept when and as disorganized from being a man into his
“chemical constituents’’: his atoms are individually reorgan-
ized then, but we do not call them the “*man’’), Or, we
gain one advantage at the expense of another. And
as a rather obvions fact, the truth of which is further implic-
itly shown in the next chapter, what we call our self or
personality or consciousness consists of a series of mental
phenomena in only one direction of time, so that if we were
able to go through the complete external sex sort of immor-
tality in a way perceptible to others, we would not see it as
a perceptible continuity of our personality (nature has made
one analogous step in such immortality in making butterflies,
and as it didn’t do them enough good, truistically they do
not make another such step). In thus regaining our youth I
judge we would forget our former self. That is a quantita-
tive guess; self is a quantity as yet unmeasured, and my
guess may be in a slight degree wrong. A child is a rejuve-
nated part of his parents; and that part does not consciously
remember his ‘aged self’ that was his parents, or is not con-
sciously immortal in that directly personal sense, although he
is unconsciously thus immortal—inherits instincts (§158de).

m. There is another view of preventing growing old—
that of internal sex processes, or Metabolism.... It is theo-
retically possible by keeping the proper food supply going to
the cells and sweeping out the waste, to cause all pairs of
adjacent cells to become sexually polarized and to coalesce,
rejuvenating them enough to produce the subsequent needed
fission. | Such a process theoretically runs Metabolism... to-
wards the infinity limit, it then becoming mostly inclusive of
and identical with Reproduction... (we saw in 8104, etc., that
one factor ultimately includes the other; e. g., the change to

Three XVI §1460

butterflies in the last paragraph probably more properly be-
longs in the customary extent of the factor of this paragraph;
the biological factors are also finally the same, or the so-called
Fundamental “‘instincts’’ of self-preservation and reproduction are
ulttmately identical. That method of continuous rejuve-
nation (if the degree of it is mild enough) gives a perceptible
immortality in the sense that the personality could manage to
change slowly enough to remember itself. But that method
requires more quantitative knowledge than we have now. In
order to achieve absolute immortality in that way, truistically
we would have to have infinite quantitative knowledge, which
is impossible for finite creatures. So we, as finite creatures,
can not achieve absolute “‘self’’ or ‘creature’ immortality—
the proposition being unescapably self-contradictory. | Con-
sidering ourselves as finally and readily infinite (which is the
exact truth; §47) we already have absolute immortality——as is
now obviously proved in a biological sense.

n. The practical way of applying the principles of age
in order to live longer is truistically to make as good quanti-
tative judgments as possible in keeping a balance of Metabo-
lism... X Reproduction.... Or, as Reproduction... directly
affects but a few cells of man, it is better practice, after pro-
viding for normal sex life (which of course has much influence
indirectly in producing the result we are to see), to make
narrower standard universes of Metabolism..., such as Food...
X Waste..., and keep those reasonably balanced. Such
practical balancing is excellently described in Fisher and
Fiske’s ‘“How to Live.’’ | Metchnikeff’s idea of prolonging
life by keeping the intestines somewhat clear of poisoning
bacteria is obviously one step in a general balance.
An obvious practical] fact, usually overlooked, is that a man
may spend most of his time or energy in carefully maintain-
ing his physical balance, leaving little to be otherwise useful
to himself or others. Then he is rather worthless on the
whole (except as an exaggerated professional example of
““physical culture,’’ a few of which are educative). | Much
Anglo-Saxon “‘overeating’’ is a proper instinctive spending
of the body or “‘health’’ to get and use additional energy.
In order to get the potential for beginning this book, for five
years I deliberately ate quantities of sugar which I knew
would end my life some years sooner (other things being
equal); I figured that it was worth the spending of health,
and possibly I have thereby acquired otbér means of regain-
ing more years—and what are a few years in the darkness of
ignorance and sloth worth anyway? In man, the or-
gan upon which most strain or unbalance tends to come di-
rectly, assuming the others to be fairly normal, is ordinarily
the nervous system. So if it is kept active and well nour-
ished (balanced), the other organs will be kept in fair balance
and some youth by it. If you grow a quantitatively new
idea, truistically the nervous system, and in turn the whole
body, is in some degree rejuvenated by it. But if the idea
is radical, unbalanced, not ‘‘so,’’ similarly you die some. I
may mention that my health is fine, and getting better; that
indicates that this book is generally sound.

o. As thevarious organs become more highly specialized
truistically each of them tends to become more and more
definitely polarized (‘magnetically’) with certain of the indi-
vidual’s cells, named germ cells, which are highly unbalanced
so that they strongly tend to combine with other oppositely
unbalanced germ cells in an external sex process (and in turn
truistically incline the whole individual thus). | Those germ
cells sum up the polarity unbalances of the individual’s other
cells. So they are comparatively unstable (‘‘variable’’), and
various perceptible degrees of “*sex’’ are possible with them.
J. e., those germ cells apparently always divide by gemma-

tion before they are “‘mature’’; and some germ cells give

§1460 XVI Three

several generations parthenogenetically and then the next
generation requires sex amphimixis; and some germ cells
can be fertilized by chemical structures of *“‘lower’’ order, as
shown by J. Loeb. Obviously, sex, even in its usual meaning,
is nothing exact and constant—a fact in agreement with our
total argument. Also, it is a fact that many sorts of cells
(e. g., some of man’s blood cells) subdivide, and lead what
is usually called a parasitic existence, with sometimes an ex-
ternal sex life. I. e., in a highly differentiated individual,
sex processes are perceptibly duplicated in infinite regress
(cf. symbiotes, par. i). And that shows further that a so-
called individua] or person is perceptibly by no means an ex-
act or absolute individual. If we look closely at a man, from
any point of view he is not an exact individual (cf. §47).

p. Some sorts of individuals (such as many plants) bal-
ance their various organs by producing germ cells of both
sexes. But obviously, by the principle of asymmetry, each
such individual tends to be more one sex than the other—to
bave a sum of unbalance other than exact zero. In agree-
ment with that, it is observed that such double-sex individuals
preferably cross-fertilize.

q. So, consistent with the last paragraph, an individual,
as it becomes more differentiated, tends to become more per-
ceptibly and definitely sexed—tends to have a chemical or
electric polarity of its own, as a summed up potential of all
its atoms. Consequently, that highly differentiated individ-
ual’s germ cells in turn react on the rest of it and produce
perceptibly specialized organs conventionally called sex or-
gans—we saying that their function determines the sex, al-
though it is true vice versa, sex being perceptibly ‘circular,’
like valid logic. So it definitely appears that perceptible
“‘sex,’’ being the summing up of the polarity of every atom
in the body, is a quantitative condition, subject al] the time
to changes. I. e., a man may be more male one day than
the next——a fact tacitly accepted by everybody, in respect to
such marked variations as the age of puberty, etc.

r. It then is a further truism, that for a highly differen-
tiated species like man, the fertilized ovum, which is the
perceptible beginning of an individual, is theoretically of a
certain polarity, and hence is definitely sexed. Recent ob-
servations show that ordinary sex is substantially fixed by
fertilization (J. Loeb, ““Organism as a Whole,”’ VIII; for
general proof that cells themselves often perceptibly show sex
in al} the variability bere described as pertaining to the
whole organism, see Loeb’s book, or ““Ency. Brit.,’’ ““Cy-
tology’’). But theoretically, if proper quantitative measures
are taken, the sex of amy organism can be changed at any
time. And it is now obvious that the male organism is at-
tracted, actually ““forced,’’ towards a female organism in the
same way that gravity and electric charges work.

s. This section gives the mechanics of the so-called vital
force {or forces) in enough detail to show how it works, and
that it is identical with the force or relationship of any phe-
nomenon. It has also implicitly but clearly appeared that
all biologic processes are mutual (act according to the third
law of motion)—being a balancing of forces from within and
forces from without,—that answering ultimately the biologi-
cal problem of §145¢. That balancing obviously takes place
in infinite regress in full agreement with That... This... .

§147. a. Conventional biologists usually imply the ques-
tions answered in the last section by:- ‘““the problems of
heredity.’? Heredity is the general relationship, or more or
less perceptible continuity or identity of successive genera-
tions. And as that conventional definition obviously involves
the implied assertion of the One in the ideas “‘relationship’’
and “‘identity,’’ and of the Many in the ideas that there is
a perceptible change and “‘successive generations,’’ and as

UNIVERSE

168

the observable evidence is of interest to men and easily seen,
then the problems of heredity obviously tend to involve
biologists in an at least tacit discussion of the One and Many.
And heredity actually has been the subject of debate for
years. It is equivalent to the debate among physicists as to
whether atoms are real or not.

b. The usual form of the biologica] question is whether
acquired characteristics are inherited. The average man,
automatically using the valid logic, has for ages naturally
held that they are inherited—and by customary agreements
as to the use of Janguage, is of course right, as we shall see.

c. But the biologists for some years tended to hold in
effect the idea that all life is derived from previous life (and
that is a One truism—for an atom, etc., is necessarily alive
if anything is); hence, they tacitly held (what is obviously
another One truism) that any cell has all characteristics, 1. e.,
the biologists, being scientists and constrained to split things
into the Many in order to nse positive language, vaguely but
in effect heid that there was perceptible an infinite regress of
characteristics in any living celi: they thus tacitly used the
formula, Inherent characteristics..... =Life. That formula as-
serts the truth of infinite pluralism, and is of course quite
right (Part One). And by such language, truistically adl
characteristics are inherited, and logically there is no such
thing as an acquired characteristic. Some of the best Eng-
lish biologists are now rather definite in their use of such a
language, which form (cf. Reynolds’s theory, $91) is not or-
dinary language. E..g., Bateson in effect says that a new
characteristic becomes perceptible in an individual when some
of the individual’s other infinite characteristics become im-
perceptible and hence no longer mask or hide that “‘new’’
one. That is obviously a backwards, Nirvana sort of lang-
uage (for in everyday ‘language we would say that that
“*‘new’’ one was old, etc.): The same infinite pluralism may
be seen to be implicitly used by J. Arthur Thompson, in his
‘“Heredity’’ (especially in VII, to which the reader may re-
fer for details (for a briefer statement of the debate in some
detail, see ““Ency. Brit.,’’ ““Heredity’’).

d. Therefore, if those biolézists would say that they are
talking infinite pluralism, which is formally opposite to ordi-
nary language, then they would be quite right. But they
would obviously mean the same as the everyday language
conclusion that there are both inherent and acquired charac-
teristics, and that both are inherited. Such everyday
language of course takes it for granted that when we talk
positively of characteristics we mean perceptible ones, so that
the formula (indicating the infinite regress of characteristics
or properties into imperceptibility) is:- Acquired characteris-
tics... X Inherited characteristics...-=Life. As a practica] con-
venience it is better to stick to everyday language in biology
—unless it be decided to change to infinite pluralism in all
science. It was shown in the last section that every phe-
nomenon can be expressed consistently in terms of sex. But
to make such a mere quantitative change in language is most
probably undesirable—it is a matter for the decision of the
majority (8171k). To reverse language nearly wholly, in
order to agree verbally with English biologists seems to me
radical—but then I am more conservative than the majority.
The English have taken on Weismann’s theory of con-
tinuous germ plasm (see next par.), which in its primary state
was 4 correct and needed assertion of scientific continuity in
biologic terms, and consistently and correctly carried it out
toa logicalend. At first the British, following Darwin’s
and Lamarck’s commonsense that acquired characters are in-
herited (which commonsense was of course exaggerated toa
formal infinity by materialists in spite of Darwin’s mass of
data to the effect that such inheritance was slight in degree),

169

opposed that idea of Weismann’s, and the beginning of the
present British theory was soundly established by American
biologists, led by Jordan and Brooks. After that valid infin-
ite pluralism in biology was established by Americans, they
naturally (i. e., with the practical commonsense which Ameri-
cans substitute for the showy and less sound European erudi-
tion that often is nothing but ponderous piffle that awes the
foolish) gradually changed to the more useful everyday lang-
uage of Acquired characteristics... < Inherited characteristics...
—and that sound and readily intelligible and useful form of
biology is being expanded in America now by such first class
men as Patten (who has unified the steps in the evolution
of man), Ritter (who has been writing the argument of this
book in terms of biology), Wilson, Kellogg, and Conklin.

e. And there are some biologists who are wrong—the
materialists, led as is usual with materialists by a German,
Weismann, who elaborated his originally valid idea of biolog-
ical continuity into a detailed assertion that there is a finite
and definite set of classes of entities which determine inher-
ent character, namely:- idants, ids, determinants, and bio-
phores (““Ency. Brit.,’’ ““Heredity’’)—which has much less
meaning and logical soundness than the poetic assertion that
little girls are made of sugar and spice and everything nice.
Those materialistic biologists are sharp, exact, precise, rather
insistent that there is nothing in life but what can be seen
from their experiments, generally scornful of everything not
falling within their finitely much narrowed purview. In fact,
although Weismann discussed general principles specifically,
he is by some claimed to have reversed his stand on the fun-
damental matter of acquired characteristics. In the article
‘‘Heredity’’ just cited it is stated that lately ““Weismann
has admitted the possibility of some direct modification of
the germ-plasm in the body of the individual acting as its
bost.’’ In short, he years ago vacillated about principle, and
seems to be doing it again. That is a direct, rigorous proof
of the unreliability of Weismann:- tbat he has perhaps twice
shown that he is incapable of recognizing the difference be-
tween principle and measures or experiment—between quali-
tative and quantitative—between the One and the Many.
The German chemist Ostwald showed the same fun-
damental incompetence (total, if we judge him strictly by his
words—which of course is not practically possible), in the
1908 preface to his ‘‘Outlines of General Chemistry,’’ in his
remarks about accepting the “‘reality’’ of atoms, which re-
versed his previous views of the principles involved. As
those men were perhaps typical pre-war Germans, having
perhaps more intellectual integrity than the average German,
those readily verifiable facts about them tend to show that
the pre-war German was not able to distinguish “measures”
or expediency from principle, a part from the whole, a *“serap
of paper’’ from an ultimate consistency of mind or **moral’’
obligation—that the pre-war German had become so mater-
ialistic that all of the genera] equation he could grasp was a
a few unfinished This’s. Or, apparently his most extensive
conception was a few This’s that summed into his former
aristocratic State. And that is what an aristocrat or autocrat
essentially is—a materialist, a provincial minded or weak
minded person who considers himself and a few associates to
be essentially the best, and the only people who need to be
considered. So he naturally wants to be ““boss,’’ and pose
in the lime-light. This paragraph is important in
that it indicates a method of judging the worth of men, and
implies the principles governing *“ changing one’s mind.’’
Fundamental principles are simple enough for a normal child
to understand. So when a man fails to grasp principles, and
stick by them, then trnistically he is shallow and superficial
and incompetent. There is but little excuse for an adult’s

UNIVERSE

Three XVI §147h

ever being definitely wrong in principle and needing to
*“change his mind’’ in the matter. When an adult vacillates
with regard to principle, especially unconsciously, he is of
little worth. But quantitative matters or measures are always
changing. So the reliable man sticks to his principles, but
always is ““changing his mind’’—his judgment—to agree as
well as he can with changing quantitative circumstances.

f. The usual technical way nowadays of naming the un-
its of the Many in the infinite-pluralism equation Inherent
Characteristics..... =Lyife is to say that each character is a unit
Mendelian characteristic. Such 2 characteristic in analogous
to an atom—a real atom in a universe of an infinity of them:-
Atoms..... =Uhniverse. So the briefest way to describe Men-
delism is to say it is a biological atomic theory. But some
biologists tend to be materialistic about the theory—holding
in effect that there are a limited number of such character-
istics, each a finite, constant, fixed unit that can be juggled
around forever without change. However, much direct evi-
dence has been accumulated (by Castle and other good ob-
servers) showing that there are no such sharp finite units.

g. A Mendelian character, in ordinary language, is a
finite “biologic atom’ which passes without much change from
generation to generation. Sometimes a unit characteristic is
observed to appear that was not perceptible in previous gen-
erations—thus starting what is often considered a new spe-
cies. Such an appearance is known as a mutation, or a
““discontinnous’’ change, in distinction from a variation, a
slight change or *‘continuous’’ step by step process from gen-
eration to generation. But clearly that distinction is merely
a quantitative one. Obviously, by the principle of periodic-
ity there must be organic structural parts (‘biologic atoms’)
in such various L and 7 relations; as a truism of our use of
L and T there can not be an infinity of organisms between
two actually perceptibly different organisms, giving a perfect
continuity of steps between. So truistically, neither a mu-
tation nora variation is perfectly continuous or discontinuous,
but both are perceptible quantitative different steps in the in-
finite regress that applies to all structures. So we see from
the direct point of view of heredity, that we can formulate a
spectrum or a periodic table of ‘elements’ of the inheritances
(biologic structures). And it is obvious from the last section
that there is no absolute distinction between one generation
and the next. So the table of biologic ‘elements’ of any gen-
eration is also in infinite regress in generations—which is
quantitatively absolutely identical with all other phenomena,
and again (cf. §144h) theoretically establishes a science of
biology as definitely quantitative and exact as that of (say)
electricity. | There is no theoretical! difficulty in making bi-
ology as ‘‘exact’’ as any science. But if biology were to use
any such roughly approximate equations as pass for ‘exact?’
astronomy the perceptible inaccuracies would be ludicrous.

h. Thus it is rigorously shown that any atomic mechan-
ics may be studied from biologic processes. But that huge
mass of possible knowledge, and further details of heredity,
must be omitted at this point. The general important prac-
tical conclusion about heredity is that probably mast of our
traits are the results of a quantitative balancing for millions of
years, and hence are mostly rather stably balanced with them-
selves (internally) and with the environment. So unless we
change that balance very considerably, we truistically usually
can not change a trait much. Obviously, it is excessively
poor quantitative judgment to fancy that if we cut off the tails
of rats for a few generations, then they ought to begin to be
born without tails; for evidently, to cut off their tails makes
little difference in their lives. If we cut off the tails of a
million generations, then the accumulation of little changes
might make something perceptible begin to happen to their

§147h XVI Three

tails. However, to make a perceptible change in their tails
quickly something that will intensely and widely throw the
rat out of balance must be done:- so if we cut off their heads
a violent unbalance results, and there is obviously an absence
of tails thereafter; in fact, there is an absence of the whole
ratin future generations—the rat has promptly and definitely
acquired a number of negative characteristics. That is not a
usual point of view; but it indicates what is reasonably good
judgment as to inheritance. In multicellular beings, truis-
tically the general communication and transportation systems,
the general coordinating organs (§146), serving to change
as the environment does and keep a balance, are most easily
variable. So it is a reasonable judgment that (say) man’s
nervous system may be fairly readily modified, and that such
an acquired character may be transmitted in perceptible
measure (but usually of course in much less degree than its
acquired degree). That is in agreement with the practical
judgment of all who believe that some “‘education’’ is desir-
able (for statement of the Environment... part of the continu-
ing changes caused by education, see 8166c). Soitisa
rigorous truism that human nature does change. ‘The total
facts of this book show that it can and does do nothing else
but change. But a good bit of the change is probably cycli-
cal, canceling in the long run. However, when the climate
stays fairly steady, as it seems to have done for at least the
past 9000 years (Osborn, **Men of the Old Stone Age’’),
there is a steady accumulation of nervous endurance and
hence extended grasp, and quite probably of increased inten-
sity—a very important change in human nature. In
a One sense—i. e., in the sense that there is a universal per-
fect balance—human nature does not change: but in pre-
cisely the same sense it is infinite in its manifestations, and
hence is also always absolutely new and different. So the
sententious people who assert no change, even ina One sense
assert but half the mystic truth—and sententious people are
those who deal in such half truths. But in any quan-
titative sense, theoretically men change. And so far as I can
judge the facts, men have better nervous systems or minds
oy spirits now than at any time in known history, in the usual
sense of ‘‘better’’ (given in XVIII). So prospective parents
may correctly conclude that their child can be improved both
by direct inheritance of traits they have acquired, and indi-
rectly by their giving the child better nurture or environ-
ment; and that it is probable, as a genera] average in a
steady climate, that the child will be better. As a matter
of fact, ordinary intelligent parents, guided automatically by
the universe or commonsense (or, to use the old phrase:- by
the grace of God), have held such an idea for centuries in
spite of the fact that recently (and probably at various times
in the past) it was in opposition to materialistic biologists,
and in spite of the pessimistic folks with their half-truthful
croak that ““human nature never changes.”’

$148. a. Inthesciences other than humanics, the asym-
metry or the potential between any two structures (or be-
tween any two ‘factors,’ as That... and This...) may vary
in any degree towards the limits 0 and © (§80m), and no ex-
plicit comment or name is conventionally applied to the dif-
ference in potential; sometimes enough difference causes a
new name to be applied to the phenomenon, but not directly
($83). But throughout humanics there is an important dif-
ference of terms:- those differences of potential are named,
thus:- as soon as an unbalance goes quantitatively far enough
the condition is given a name which is largely a relationship
word, or explicitly implies a quantitative ratio, or implies a
measurement (is in effect an ordinal number; §43b)—there be-
ing many such names. ‘The general name of large unbal-
ances in biology and psychology is abnormality or disease (in

UNIVERSE

170

psychology, specifically a mental or nerve disease or insanity).
And that part of humanics that treats explicitly of such un-
balances is called pathology: practical or applied pathology
is called medicine. In ethics such unbalances are called
evils; in sociology, crimes, etc. ; in economics they are called
usury, profiteering, greed, etc.; in everyday life unbalances
of less degree than those “‘abnormalities’’ are bad manners,
queerness, tactlessness, etc. There are thousands of such
words, direct or implicit. In general, our life from an IL and
T or practical, quantitative point of view is the preservation
of a balance (we must preserve a certain balance to exist;
88114c, 149, etc.). So all humanic words tend strongly to
imply at least, a judgment or guess as to the measures of all
things with regard to their balancing effect on our lives. A
whole branch of science, ethics (XVIII), is explicitly con-
cerned with such judgments; and all practical sociology and
economics is similar.

b. As a consequence all of humanics is so permeated
with at least implications that such quantities have already
been measured or judged that it is difficult to state any of
humanics ‘‘impersonally’’ or ‘‘impartially’’ or “‘unpreju-
dicedly,’’ as the “‘exact’”’ scientists would say. But obviously
such a persistent inclusion of quantitative judgments makes human-
ics actually more gf an ““exact’? science than the conventional
‘‘oract’’ sctences. For always humanics carries along a state-
ment of at least rough measures, and tends thus to be some-
what reasonable or not quite silly; whereas conventional
“‘exact’’ science perhaps half the time drops statement of the
measures that Kelvin substantially says is the basis of science
(§2c) and thus has a persistent tendency, repeatedly seen in
Part Two, to run to 0 or ©, which is religious expression —
and is merely silly or radical when claimed to be scientific.
E. g., when in §146 I started naming all processes ‘sex,’ I
promptly derived a language which was far from intelligible
and was much more vague than is everyday language, which
by ‘sex’ means well known tacit quantitative measures; and
when I showed in XIV that everything could be expressed
as electricity, I did precisely the same thing, but it was not
noticeable that such language became quantitatively indefin-
ite. In ‘‘exact’’ sciences we may obviously drop definite
statement of measures and experiments—and even talk of in-
increase of entropy, which is positively silly,—and still seem
to be conventional and to be reasonable in judgment, whereas
we are actually being wildly radical. Truistic with those
definite facts, scientists who blatantly claim they are *“ex-
act’’ are airing their hopes—practicing ‘make-believe’ (§155).
Such blatant ‘‘exact’’ experimenters are often the worst radi-
cals—depart worst from actual measures and usefulness.

c. In brief, al] the humanics are forced by conventions
of the ordinary man’s speech to carry along continually some
more or less explicit statement of judgment as to quantities.
Humanics are thus in actual practice far more nearly exact,
and demand far more knowledge of and direct reference to
experimental facts, and in one word are far more scientific,
than are the so-called exact sciences. So humanics theoreti-
cally are not only better mental training in science (they are
too hard to be dumped first on an untrained mind), but are
more directly useful, and serve as the best check I know of
upon wild inaccuracy, and that irrational running to zero and
infinity which we have seen so often occurs in the “‘hard-
fact,’’ ““experimental’’ sciences (e. g., Steinmetz’s silly
socialism, and even more puerile excursions into general
science). (I hold no brief for biologists, or other humanics
expert; I am not one, and never expect to be one, but sim-
ply state the simple principles and a few glaring facts.) The
practical objection to humanics is not that they are vague,
but that they are so difficult that we are likely in them to

171 UNIVERSE

become quantitatively confused. To approach humanics with
any considerable chance of remaining consistent, and fairly
balanced quantitatively, we need to train some on the simple
“fexact’’ sciences taken correctly as inexact. A vol-
ume or more of rather obvious conclusions from the idea of
this section is omitted here. But it is to be noted that these
quantitative measures in humanics are zot very systematic,
and often are not what we would call conscious and hence
definite. This paragraph is quite true, while at the same
time it is true that definite, systematic measurements are
badly needed in nearly every branch of humanics (experts
in humanics have no grounds for acquiring that smug self-
satisfaction from the fancied “‘perfection’’ of their science
that attacks as a severe dry-rot many “‘exact’’ men).

d. It follows further that to understand any of the hu-
manics, we must definitely know the general theory of what
is quantitatively abnormal, and get some standards as to
what degree of departure from the balance constitutes ab-
normality. The fact is that in no branch of humanics is there
any very definitely agreed upon standard of what is normal.
But there is a remarkably close tacit average agreement as to
human measures, and if we know the genera] principles and
are fairly average ourselves (i. e., not unbalanced or abnor-
mal), we shall find ourselves using those measures before
formal science can definitely make them. E. g., it has been
found that in a fairly steady market the prices of foods were
in much closer relative proportion to their actual nutritive
worths than dieticians were able to figure until after many
years’ work; even yet it is likely that the market price may
be more accurate in the long run than formal experiments.

$149. a. In this section we briefly consider biological
abnormalities, and the applied science that deals with them :-
medicine. A biological abnormality or disease is defined as
“any departure from the normal] li. Ci ‘“common’”’ or aver-
age| standard of structure or function [i. e., use] of a tissue
or organ’”’ (““Ency. Brit.,’’ xx, 915). That implies that the
normal, or ‘‘health,’’ is an exact balance. That is not a use-
ful, soundly scientific definition; as every thing is always
asymmetrical relative to others, tbat definition asserts pessi-
mistically that all organs, etc., are diseased. So if the
encyclopedia gives the orthodox definition, it appears in a
general way that the conventional theory of measures in hu-
manics is confused over the One and Many. (We shall see
that such is often actually the case; e. g., the usual ethical
rule for conduct, do unto others as you would that they do
unto you, is quantitatively wrong ; $162). So we may at once
make a consistent scientific general agreement, applying to
the whole of humanics, that for the ‘‘average’’ individual (or
organ, or any structure), from any point of view, there is a
certain quantitative departure on one side of the precise aver-
age balance, and another (usually about the same in size) on
the opposite side, which departures from an exact average
are quite tolerable, pleasant, and normal (a more precise and
definite picture of this is given in Fig. 163 for ethics, which
may be substituted analogously for the present rough intro-
ductory statement in biological terms); and departures fur-
ther than that are for the time being abnormal—or disease,
or painful, or ‘‘wrong.’’ Truistically with asymmetry or in-
commensurability, the normal quantities on each side, are, for
each individual, different from other individuals’, and are al-
ways changing for a given individual—what is one man’s
meat is another man’s poison (but in a very mild degree, usu-
ally). This quantitative matter of abnormalities is
the theory of harmonic periodicity; previously our attention
was on the structures that were built up out of broken down
ones, and now it is on the breaking and broken down ones.

b. Truistically the general cause (the ‘‘aetiology’’) of

Three XVI §149d

any disease (or other abnormality or ““wrong’’) is a sufficient
departure from the balance. (There really is no such unbal-
ance ultimately or religiously, as we saw in §114c; a disease
exists verbally, in formal L and 7 terms, when we are con-
sidering a finite part of the universe, such as an individual—
which is what we saw in terms of logic in §25). The
disease may be perceptible after a short time lag; and per-
ceptibly cease after a similarly short lag, upon the cessation
of the unbalance (in which latter case it is an “‘acute’’ one).
But the time lag may be greater, so that the unbalance only
slowly throws various structures out too far; the structural]
unbalance is then likely to lag, as a ‘‘chronic’’ disease, for a
similar time after the removal of the ““cause.”’ Ob-
viously, therefore, if we do not in experience learn what are
the normal] limits of our balance, and properly manoeuver to
keep within them (be temperate), we shall have disease. It
is a practical need that we learn such human quantities. And
we get such knowledge by having a sort of sensation to which
we give the general name pain when we exceed the limit.
We may readily observe that there is no sharp distinction be-
tween a feeling of pain and one of pleasure; there is a vague
‘neutral’ zone between, agreeing with our difference surface
and the total theory of That... This... (ef. $163). If we
do not feel (observe) sufficiently keenly, or interpret a sensa-
tion as being a pain when it comes of too much unbalance,
or if there is considerable time lag of the sensation and we
overlook its cause, then truistically we get out of a fairly
pleasant balance without at the time definitely knowing it
and correcting it, and sooner or later we die if the unbalance
cumulates. So pain is the physical (or mental, if you prefer
that word) price we pay for being stupid—if we are. And
so far as I have observed we are all of us sufficiently obtuse
mentally to get pained occasionally.

ec. Clearly, all of our perceptible life is the consciousness
of an unbalance or difference of potential (1) between the
environment and ourselves, and subsequently, as a circular
process, (2) between our own organs, and in turn (3) between
them and the environment—and (4...) so on ad infinitum
until our bodies wear out. If there were no such local un-
balances we would perceive nothing—as has been shown re-
peatedly. Obviously, such perceptions of unbalances can be
continually experienced without accumulating abnormally only
by «w cyclic process—by going first in one way and then the
other, giving off and then taking in secondaries across differ-
ence surfaces of the body. A general example of that
is the cycle or rhythm of feeding:- We eat, and a certain
amount of food, having flavor near the average, is pleasant;
but too much food, or food that is too much or too little flav-
ored, is unpleasant or painful, and if too painful perceptibly
kills (with slight time lag). Then after eating we do not
eat for a while, using or “‘assimilating’’ that food, and get
pleasantly hungry. If we go too long without food it be-
comes painful, and a cumulation of the unbalance in that
direction also kills us. In precisely the same way any struct-
ure is changed in order (‘‘killed’’) by too much unbalance.

d. All observed organismis tend to be active roughly as
a whole for a while, and then be similarly quiet—so that
there is a large or ‘individual’ rhythm of anabolic and kata-
bolic processes. Numerous examples are so well known that
they may be omitted. In the case of man that rhythm is in
general an alternation of waking and sleeping; i. e., after
we have been active for a while, accumulating a general ex-
cess of anabolic results, the coordinating nervous system, in
some more or less yet unmeasured quantitative manner stops

a : a cé . 9? . ata

unifying or making perceptibly conscious’’ the individual,
and each organ more or less ‘disconnects’ from the others,
and rests, and recuperates from the stock of food previously

§149d XV1 Three

accumulated. Obviously, during sleep we are more or less
dead. But we can not be absolutely dead, for the unifying
relationship of (say) gravity always persists between the ether
cells that are our bodies or minds.

e. The important point to note now is that if we go
through life keeping within the pleasant limits, sleeping at
the right times to give a painless, rather unconscious recup-
eration from the pleasing anabolic activity which always lends
to accumulate painful fatigue poisons (waste), then we can
as a general rule be perceptibly happy, or comfortable, or
cheerful—or truistically optimistic. But if we went along in
that pleasant existence very long, obviously we would (due
to the fact that our perceptions are poor) (1) fail to remember
just what were our quantitative limits, and would (2) also
fail to exercise our organs to the verge of those limits so that
they would keep the habit of having such limits for pain. As
a truism of both those reasons, we would either accidentally
occasionally run over the limit into pain, or else would re-
duce our limits of tolerance so much that our nervous systems
would have to make a painfully intense effort to stay inside
them, and we would be “‘bored’’—that boredom obviously
meaning a painful effort and impatience at maintaining a deli-
cacy of balance that is narrow (the result of too much cod-
dling in this case). In both events we would suffer pain. In
the case of boredom, it is sensible to choose to be pained in
some way in order to restore a reasonable wideness of percep-
tion that likes an ordinary unbalance (thus avoiding being an
‘‘exquisite,’’ or a mollycoddle or achieving an ‘ ‘artistic tem-
perament’’; ef. §159h, ete.). It sounds paradoxical; but it
is merely a case of harmonic periodicity. An application of
the same principle is furnished by this book:- I get tired of
maintaining a careful] precision of statement—making That...
and This... react in a delicate balance. The normal reader
is also tired by it: we are both bored by al] precise, ““ex-
act,’’ meticulous, ““bard fact,’’ “‘sure thing’’ discussion hav-
ing such narrow limits of tolerance, even though J show that
absolute accuracy is impossible. But that boring of myself
and you shows directly that those who fancy that they want
a life without pain, or exact science, are not aware of its nat-

‘ure. We do not want to play a “‘sure thing’ life, or have a

really exact science; we want to gamble more or less, de-
pending on the limits of what we (and especially the others
affected appreciably by it) can stand without much pain—
and if we can’t do that we become bored so much that the
pain of being a moJ]lycoddle or a similarly narrow Puritan is
greater than the hurts of quantitative risks and mistakes (for
rigorous theory of gambling, see footnote 163h; deliberate
cumulative gambling is death). And what we thus actually
want is hence proved to be what we can have: we can not
have any hard facts, sure things, or exact science, for there
are no such things. After your experience of being bored
by the precision of this book—by its ““austere mechanics’? —
you are trnistically experimentally competent to judge just
how much of asure thing in any part of life you want, and
can dodge falling into being a mollycoddle of either the lux-
urious type or the Puritanical mentally narrow and timid
(i. e., precise) type. In brief, I have demonstrated
by directly verifiable biological facts that there can be and
must be if an enjoyable life is to be preserved long, u temper-
ance in being temperate—an infinite quantitative regress in
temperance. The present age perhaps is intemperate chiefly
in demanding hard facts, and exact science and experiments.
The German materialists are a sufficiently horrible warning
example of such intemperance; but as it has not before been
proved that such intemperance is possible, I had to prove it
was by some intemperate precison as a sample (cf. §35).

f. Consequently, occasionally as individuals, because

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172

individually we are finite, we must accidentally (from our
point of view) be pained; and occasionally to escape the
worse pain of boredom we must deliberately (from our finite
point of view) subject ourselves to pain. The fundamental
error of the parasite is that it, she, or he is too stupid to
act on the Jatter fact. © We dislike the parasite because its
actions imply a fear of pain—~a fear of vigorous departure
from the balance,—~so that we judge it a coward. _—_ Clearly,
the pre-war German docility, the acceptance of military
‘‘discipline’’ and of “‘paternalism,’’ was one grade of para-
sitism, and implied some degree of shirking of life just as the
poor workman shirks. And the resulting narrowing of per-
ceptions led to or caused the customary autocratic egotisms of
the ‘‘leaders’’ that the shirks were then afraid to and incom-
petent to hold to account. It is quite rigorously consistent
and circular, you see. So from another point of view
it is obvious that a genera] unbalance in our lives must ac-
cumulate (due to subjecting ourselves to pain, to ‘‘hard
work,’’ in order to maintain perceptions), so that finally we
as individuals die. But as a general thing, if we are fairly
intelligent, life is pleasant and free from pain. Tbe man
who suffers very much does so largely because he fails to use
enough intelligence to avoid it—and not as a resultof extrin-
sic bad luck, an unkind Providence, etc. It seems to be
reasonable arithmetic to judge that, because we have a fairly
wide tolerance for unbalances, whenever the L and JT sum of
pain in our lives reaches 25 per cent (with pleasure amount-
ing to the other 75 per cent) we are automatically dead. So
in a quantitative sense it is a reasonable guess that the actual
amount of unhappiness, and-or warranted quantitative pessi-
mism in people’s lives is not likely ever to go as high as 25
per cent. Also, a quantitative amount of optimism equal to
100 per cent is never warranted. And as we by experience
vaguely know those quantitative facts, we find a large amount
of verbal pessimism to be as wrong (and because it tends to
unbalance us by suggestion, to be as offensive to us), as is a
large amount of optimism or asserted gladness. An at-
tempted 100 per cent ‘‘glad game’’ is totally illogical and
hence much more offensive than the bad guessing in a 50 per
cent ““grouch’’; but Mrs. Porter asserts (‘‘ American Maga-
zine,’’ Nov., 1918: I have not read ““Pollyanna’’—I didn’t
think I needed it after a course of Christian Science and some
years of the “‘wonderfully’’ glad people in advertisements)
that “*Pollyanna’’ herself sensibly tried merely to have any
inaccuracy of estimate of pain fall in favor of optimism [obvi-
ously that is correct in principle], and did not try to be a 100
per cent quantitative optimist. As a general problem in prin-
ciple, ignoring expression of quantities, the One is perfect,
and so in our everyday language the ‘‘rea)’’ truth is that opti-
mism is perfectly right, and pessimism totally incorrect.
Also, because all of the Many (because every finite structure)
in time ceases to exist as such, or “‘dies,’’ and as death is
a zero quantity customarily named “‘undesirable,’’ then from
a general Many (infinite pluralism) point of view, pessimism
is totally correct. So if we talk infinite pluralism, by ordi-
nary verba] agreement pessimism is correct. And relation-
ship or God the Holy Ghost words may validly imply either
pessimism or optimism, depending on the customary way of
considering the “‘direction’’ that they imply or name.

g. Truistically, therefore, the panacea for all diseases
is to restore the balance. And such a panacea is obviously a
specia] quantitative problem for each case, and often practi-
cally impossible for the general reason that we can not
perceive in the time available just what and how much the un-
balances are, or-and just what to do to restore balance. In
time we may acquire much of that quantitative knowledge;
but always it will be impossible practically to keep a finite

173

individual alive eternally (§146m). A German, Ehrlich,
formulated a theory of a reputed real panacea which was to
be in effect a chemical substance (i. e., had a molecule not
so elaborate in structure as a * living’? organism), that would
act as does a general sort of interna) secretion—traveling in
the body and restoring each cell to a balance, whatever its
diseased unbaJance. As is usual with the ideas of materia)-
ists, that theory of a panacea exhibits the failure of its author
to grasp the nature of the One; for a rea) panacea is a One,
and anything that approaches being a panacea approaches be-
ing infinite—a simple truism of which Ehrlich seemed to be
ignorant:- For such a chemica] panacea would obviously
‘have to be infinitely varied to meet and adjust the infinite
possible unbalances; and Ehrlich personally could not have
made achemical of that sort, and no individual man could have
swallowed one molecule of it if Ehrlich had. Further, he
apparently overlooked the time factor: for in order to cure a
disease such a panacea truistically would have to work faster
than the nervous system does, and in the ordinary sense of
the word, a ‘‘chemica]’’ will not do so. As a matter
of obvious fact, in a strictly rigorous sense there is already a
real panacea in existence, available for use by everyone, and
actually used by everyone:- the universe. There is no FINITE
cure-all for any unbalunce— biological, sociologica)], psychologi-
cal, etc.,—and truistically can not be. As stated, the restora-
tion is a special quantitative problem for each case, and like
all quantitative problems can not be accurately solved, though
practically a fairly good solution is usually readily obtainable.
h. But we can work out some general rules for the res-
toration of unbalances, which may be quantitatively adjusted
to particular cases. Physicians already know and apply
these rules, and continually try to get closer adjustments of
measures. So! shall be brief in outlining them, although
the total] universe could be described in terms of these rules
for curing disease. We need to agree first, as a tru-
ism of conventional meanings of words, that a disease is
““eured’’ when the organs chiefly involved are restored to
within normal] limits. Truistically, it is never possible to re-
store the various structures to exactly the same condition that
existed before the disease. And also, the diseased structures,
their host, the physician, his medicines or tools, and al] the
rest of the environment are mutually interacting in effecting
the cure, sometimes one and sometimes another of those fac-
tors being quantitatively more important. No one of the fac-
tors is ever totally absent, and no one of them alone effects a
cure. The pbysician and his tools may be perceptibly miss-
ing in a given cure, they blending with al] the other unper-
ceived environment; but when nature thus ““alone’’ does the
work, there is usually a comfortable, healing knowledge that
a physician is available—which makes him an actual factor.
i. Medically, a disease can be © functional’’ or *‘organ-
ic.’? When it is functional, it is meant that there is some
unbalance or structural defect (“‘lesion’’) inside cells or other
structures, which lesion is so small that it is not perceptible
structurally, but is shown only by the poor functioning or
working of the structures. When it is organic, the lesion is
perceptible or ‘‘gross,’’ so that both the structure or organ
and the functioning are perceptibly abnormal. Truistically,
ultimately the function and the organ are identical, and the
distinction of functional and organic is a quantitative one
and in practice is continually being further shown to be ar-
bitrary and never distinct. It is also possible to
divide all diseases into (1) those caused by poisons (unbal-
anced secretions) given off from the insides of cells or organs,
and (2) those caused by the introduction from without of
‘poisons’ (which consist of any largely unbalanceable foreign
objects, such as improper food or other chemicals or objects,

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Three XVI §149j

including live objects such as microbes and bacteria):- Un-
balances by foreign poisons... < Unbalances by internal poisons...
==Disease. There are obviously an infinity of such classifica-
tions possible; the doctors find it convenient to use a number
of such, but as the principle of them is obvious I may omit
them here—thus omitting volumes of quantitative experi-
mental detail. Such abnormal details, by their nature of
being very asymmetrical, would truistically give us the most
easily perceptible facts about biology. Such pathologi-
ca] details are offensive to a normally balanced person—that
meaning that he judges them to be an unbalance he himself
wishes to keep away from. As everything is connected, such
a “‘personal’’ point of view can not ever be totally avoided,
in spite of the erroneous, dualistic standard of complete ‘‘im-
personality’’ recommended by some materialists. So obvi-
ously, a doctor who can succeed in so thoroughly considering
any disease as a case’’ that he has no perceptible personal
attitude towards it, thereby shows that he has lowered or
narrowed his ability to observe (and diagnose and treat) in a
quantitative degree perhaps dangerous to the patient—has
unduly killed his brain. But the non-medica] man should
recognize that the physician must in some measure avoid
feeling too much personal sympathy in order to work; and
in the effort to do that, many doctors acquire an outward
habit of pretending to do so which helps them to ignore their
sympathy enough, but which make-believe by no means in-
dicates their actual perceptions or state of mind (§155). I
mention such a familiar condition with respect to doctors be-
cause the same outward pretense of indifference and imper-
sonality is often displayed in a normal degree by other men
for their work, and it is well to interpret it correctly. It is
especially so with scientists, who apparently coolly discuss
all sorts of abnormalities: the keen observer, by understand-
ing the principles ($155), can readily see under the make-
believe. Generally speaking, the person who actually is too
impersonal or calloused, pretends, in a half-conscious effort to
balance his defect, to be very sympathetic with many things
and becomes gushing, ‘“‘gay,’”’ ‘“‘sloppy’’—sentimental or
mildly hysterical (e. g., the professional patter of the average
trained nurse). But of course the few great doctors have the
strength not to need those pretences—can be steadily nat-
ural and unaffectedly poised, leaving their total strength un-
hampered in seeing more than the ordinary man can—e. g.,
Weir Mitchell, Goldthwait, Cabot, the Mayos. That applies
to other men, of course; e. g., as Dewey says in his Intro-
duction, I indulge in make-believe about the ‘trick’ with
words; I do it about another subject, too; hence I have not
the requisite strength to write this book properly. (I may
mention that the last ten lines were not in the version of the
book Dr. Dewey saw.) It thus is beginning to ap-
pear ina few details how very widely in our lives tbe hu-
manic quantitative estimates extend. We have already seen
that classic logic is incompetent in them: we now see that
the classical logic views as to the need of impersonality in
science are erroneous—in a way directly offensive to normal]
people. So it begins to appear just why and how *“logie’’ —
classic logic—got its bad name among men. Also, the
reader begins to see evidence that in humanics things are not
always what they superficially appear to be, and why only a
knowledge of principles, coupled with conscious experience
in estimating the measures of men, gives definite understand-
ing in humanics. Such understanding shows that our judg-
ments of human motives are usually very inaccurate (§148c).
j. As I must omit the classifications and descriptions of
biological unbalances in detail, we may briefly note some of
the principles of cancer, as being a sort of practical general
summary of diseases. In cancer some cells get out of balance

§149} XVI Three

(out of the control of the rest of the body), and start what is
substantially an ““individual’’ life of their own (and perhaps
they exhibit ‘external’ sex, although no definite observation
of that exists so far as I know). Obviously, there are two
general ways in which cancer can start:- the body cells
and organs other than the cancer cells—other than the cells
which later get out of control and are cancer—get relatively
weak or subdivided (become lacking in strong unity of bal-
ance, just as galaxies grow old) in innumerable ways, so that
certain otherwise normally strong cells have too high a po-
tential relative to those other cells and hence start out as un-
controlled cancer cells; or (2) the body cells in general stay
in normal strength of balance, or perhaps have even stronger
balance or unity than usual, and some undue external stimu-
lus or ‘‘irritation’’ acts on the cells that become cancer to jar
them into such a relatively high potential that they start off
individually. In the first case the cancer cells stay normal
and the body control or potential drops; in the second the
body stays at normal potential and the cancer potential goes
above normal—both producing the same relative effect. (The
directly quantitatively opposite disease to cancer is gangrene
or abscesses, where some cells get so relatively weak that
they die. All diseases, including cancer, in part exhibit some
dying of cells—agreeing with the principles of cycles and of
valid logic.) So again as mere truisms, the remoter
causes of cancer are very numerous, and cancer is theoreti-
cally an infinite series of particular diseases in which there is
locally an over-bigh relative potential that in effect is a re-
versal of the multicellular organism back to unicellular life
(analogous to the breaking up of too highly condensed star
clusters), or is a ‘biological socialism’ (§175d)—although
some cancers tend to differentiate into multicellular organs,
that may be called a ““higher’’ series or order of cancer, and
is a less radical biologic socialism. So all the orthodox theo-
ries of the cause of cancer are probably right, the varying
theories applying to the varying sorts of cancer (see ““Ency.
Brit.,’” Index, s. v. ‘‘Cancer’’; Bainbridge, ““The Cancer
Problem,’’ Sec. IV). And various differences in cancer po-
tential are observed:- some cancers are quickly brought un-
der control by the rest of the body (as in ““benign tumors’’),
and are often absorbed (e. g., warts on a child’s hands), the
potential not being able to remain above that of the rest
of the body. Other cancer cells act as if they had great ex-
cess of potential, grow rapidly, and can not be checked in
any way yet found that does not also kill the host.
Cancer when once started reacts unbalancedly in various ways
with the body, and if not checked finally kills it in some of
those ways. We may look upon the unbalance from any of
the quantitative points of view already mentioned:- (1) It
uses an undue amount of food, tending to starve the rest of
the body. (2) It throws some of its cell waste into the gen-
eral circulation, and that is sometimes perceptibly damaging.
Those are the inner and outer points of view with respect to
cells. Considering the body as made up of organs,
there are two similar points of view:- (1) The cancer cells
take up space needed by other organs and thus tend to block
or choke or squeeze them out of existence and grow in their
space. (2) The other organs similarly block off the cancer
cells, and tend to kill them. (A secondary result of that is
that often the cells in the interior of a tumor are blocked off
[the tumor, being largely undifferentiated, may itself help do
that blocking off], and die and decompose, more or less poi-
soning the host.) All diseases truistically go through
similar reversible processes—which are obviously the second-
ary whirl formations of Part Two. Cancer is a disease in
which the differences of potentia] are easily seen. In diseases
due to the introduction of foreign live organisms there may

174

UNIVERSE

usually be greater differences of potential; the processes go

faster, and “overrunning’ (acquired ‘‘immunity’’), etc., make
them harder to see clearly.

k. From that summary of the general processes in a dis-
ease the general methods of treatment are obvious—being
truistic. All diseases—all so-called wrongs and evils—are
local asymmetries which we judge we want in better local
balance. So we move around some of the things outside the
Land T that apply to the given local asymmetry, in order to
get a “‘smoother’’ (i. e., wider space and time) distribution
of the asymmetry, which thus becomes Jocally narrow—or
cured, as it falls within the limits of toleration (par. a). So
truistically the most important thing to note about the cure -
of any disease or evil is that it is a local process, and that the
universe as a whole is all right and needs neither any general
or total cure (reformation), nor any local reform so violent
or fanatical that it over-cures and makes an unbalance in the
opposite direction as bad as the one reformed. (To cure a
man of indigestion, and charge him all he owns for doing it,
so that he starves, doesn’t help him much—a simple fact
which second-rate “‘specialists’’ are too dense to see.) The
words cure and reform conventionally have taken on consider-
able implication that an essential or One meaning is intended
—that everything or the whole [usually a standard universe]
is wrong. The kindest thing which can with fair truthful-
ness be said of such an implication is that the quantities are
grossly exaggerated. Such radical cures or reforms are hence
so bad that they have cast a suspicion of incompetence upon
those who claim to cure anything. In actual practice the
ostentatious reformer or healer is usually as wrong as the
local unbalance he fancies universal—but in the opposite way.

}. Asa typical application in practice of that general
theory of reform or cure, we may consider medical cures more
specifically. A certain lot of cells are ont of balance, and
(1) the balance must, as a truism, be restored either (A) by
stimulating them in some way toa higher potential or toa
lower potential as may be necessary, or (B) by acting vice
versa on the other cells of the organism—or (C) we can com-
bine those two. And (2) as a further truism (of L and T, as
this is a quantitative problem), either of those variations of
potential may be produced either (A) by a direct and intense
action on the cells whose potential is to be varied, or else
(B) by a more or less indirect and extensive action upon the
cells’ environment (or a combination of the two, of course), so
that the environment in turn acts on the cells, varying their
potential. (That obviously makes the two arbitrary methods
ultimately identical.) And finally (3) either of those two
must be either fast or slow, compared with whatever standard
velocity we choose. Those three truisms are of course
trite and obvious; but as they constitute complete quantita-
tive statement of the methods of restoring all unbalances it
is well to have an explicit statement of them—as the obvious
is usually overlooked in emergencies (i. e., in unbalances).

m. So we may in general treat a disease by simply put-
ting the patient into a different environment; if the unbal-
ances are slight and obscure the chances are that ‘‘nature’’
will cure it—even though that ‘change of environment’ is so
slight as to consist of merely “‘absent’’ mental treatment, if
the patient is made quite cognizant of such treatment, by
(say) such a perceptibly concrete variation of the environment
as paying for it. If he has to work a bit vigorously to pay
for a ““chauge of air,’’ the change will probably cure him—
while just the reverse change will cure another with about
the same unbalance. In such cases of change of scene the
method is slow, and the environment is changed in unknown
degree, and acts indirectly. In a more severe disease the
patient may die before that method has time to work; and

175

when a patient dies it is commonsense finite judgment to hold
that there was no cure. All that obviously indicates
whatever there is of good in laissez faire methods: in case of
nearly complete quantitative ignorance about an evil, the
only sensible thing to do is to let it mostly alone while find-
ing out something definite (it is of course impossible to let it
absolutely alone), and to supply the slight ‘change in envi-
ronment’ by explicitly recognizing that the universe or ‘‘Prov-
idence’ is treating it. Truistically, a little way out on the
infinite regress all treatments become laissez faire (it is the
practical end of no exact science). But the other side of that
verbal half-truth is that we are always tinkering with all] un-
balances and that those tinkerings also have infinite regresses
so that there is from that point of view no such thing as lais-
sez faire. Therefore, any rational] laissez faire is that applied
to an evil so slight as scarcely to be painful, or is that which
is used when we do not know with reasonable certainty what
to do and have not had time to observe the details.

n. The opposite extreme of cure, both in shortness of T
and in direct application of the action to the diseased cells
(i. e., Lis also ‘short’), is surgery, where the diseased cells
are forthwith removed as completely as possible, or else poi-
sonous secretions or foreign substances are removed, or mis-
placed cells replaced. Obviously, in such a cure the most
nearly accurate quantitative knowledge that can be obtained
is required, as well as skill and art in directly applying it in
the shortest possible time. Perfect surgery truistically con-
sists of opening al] the diseased cells and repairing them
atom by atom or electron by electron, etc., restoring a nor-
mal balance, and doing it so fast and so directly that no sec-
ondary damage is done to the organs. Clearly, we are not
likely to get very close to that speed and delicacy soon;
surgery in practice must leave some unbalances in the organ-
ism (there are usually some new ones also, made by the sur-
gery) to be cured afterwards—largely by laissez faire.
When such remaining unbalances are about as bad and-or as
hard to cure as the origina] ones, truistically the surgery is
practically useless. And when the surgery kills the patient
with any perceptible directness, by ordinary language it is
truistically a failure, and I wil] not bore the intelligent read-
er discussing contrary quibbles. The surgeon who speaks of
a successful operation, the patient dying, is a materialist.

o. Between the extremes of laissez faire and surgery are
all varieties of cures. ©The most commonsense cure is of
course to use the various methods in combination:- Suppose
a man stuck a fairly large splinter into his hand, that intro-
duced enough poisonous germs to infect the wound. We at
first naturally use direct methods, cleaning out the wound
and disinfecting it as intensely as possible without causing
appreciable damage to healthy tissue. If the infection is
very hard to kill otherwise (which I do not think is the case
nowadays), we deliberately cut out some perhaps healthy
tissue so as to be sure to reduce the danger of infection, and
then cure the deliberately made unbalance later. By those
intense, direct methods we get as much cell balance as can
be quickly obtained, and as can be achieved with some cer-
tainty that we were getting at the right cells. In applying
those direct methods we protect the patient’s nervous system
by anaesthetics, both locally and generally, as may be neces-
sary to prevent any accumulation of marked unbalances due
to pain upsetting the nervous system and indirectly other or-
gans (and later the patient can recover from that anaesthetic
poisoning slowly and hence with tolerable discomfort). Then
we begin the indirect, usually slower methods. We intro-
duce (usually via the digestive tract) various chemicals into
the circulation of blood and lymph which are to exercise a
balancing effect on the abnormal conditions still existing

UNIVERSE

Three XVI §149p

about the wound and secondarily elsewhere. A trifle of defi-
nite knowledge of such drugging, with respect to killing for-
eign organisms, exists, and is constantly being added to; but
very little is definitely known of the effects of other sorts of
chemicals: and not much is known of the secondary effects
(unwitting unbalancings) of the infection-killing drugs. So
that indirect method of drugging is theoretically useful, but
practically in its infancy—a fact well recognized by leading
physicians, though they are often doubtful whether it is wise
to admit it to the average man, and thus give him a chance
to jump to unwarranted conclusions and despairing states of
mind. Yet I quite agree with Cabot that the patient ought
to be told the truth: for the proof that such a principle is
correct, see throughout XVIII; also, there is obviously no
more reason why a man should become mentally a molly-
coddle and be ““protected’’ from truth, than that he should
be a mollycoddle protected from vigorous work. Then
the next sort of indirect treatment is to feed the patient
properly, so that the normal parts of him will have their po-
tential raised somewhat if possible, as a means of healing the
wound. Similarly, we put him in an agreeable, restful en-
vironment—and do not go out of our way to tel] him unpleas-
ant truths just then. But possibly the most effective indirect
treatment available (and it may include as a part of it those
just mentioned) is to get the man to think that he is going to
get well quickly and want to. Then the strongest coordi-
nating factor of his whole organism, the nervous system, is
actively engaged in having the whole body give out proper
secretions, etc., to restore the unbalance in the hand. There
is nothing mysterious about that: it is what the nervous sys-
tem is for—why it differentiated into a definite organ. But
because for so long the dualists have taught that mind and
matter are essentially different, the average man often has a
vague notion that ‘‘thinking’’ he will get well will not do
any good without “‘material’’ drugs. So there is no objec-
tion to helping his ““thinking’’ with foods, drugs, and envir-
onment; those ‘‘material’’ things are part of his thinking
anyway, and if he is correctly told that they themselves will
help some, his thinking is likely to be normal. The direct
treatment thus supplements the indirect treatment; we apply
all the quantitative knowledge we have, in the proper times
and places, and get a cumulation of good effects. And when
we run into ignorance, we stop and leave the rest to nature.
p. But clearly the most sensible way to treat a wound
is to avoid getting it—the man ought, as a general rule, to
have kept his hand away from splinters,—such indirect treat-
ment, given by keeping the nervous system alert, being more
eficacious and comfortable than any other, up to a certain
point. In brief, a quantitative knowledge of the probable
situations of life should be obtained, and unbalances treated
before they accumulate to a very painful degree—that being
the principle of preventive medicine. A reasonably intelligent
man can usually manage to avoid any serious injury; and by
keeping in good balance by means of food, work, etc., is not
likely to be painfully affected by swallowing or otherwise ab-
sorbing disease germs and other foreign matter from the un-
avoidable ordinary environment. If he finds it advisable to
expose himself to injury and infection, he can, by the same
indirect methods, anticipate and ameliorate effects by creating
such resistance. Considerable knowledge has already been
gained by medical science as to how to create a chemical an-
tagonism to infection. And preventive medicine, like
other sorts of treatment, can not be perfect. The chief ob-
jection to it is that it itself will cause unbalances if taken too
seriously and overdone. Also, chemical indirect methods of
preventing infection (e. g., typhoid vaccination) cause per-
ceptible diseases that may on occasion be as undesirable as

§149p XVI Three

those they prevent. The use of preventive medicine by an
inhabitant of Cuba against frost-bite is usually not sensible.

q. Perhaps the most exaggerated idea advanced in medi-
cal science in recent years is the mental healing one—and of
those who propagate that idea the Christian Scientists seem
to be the most emphatic. | Those mental healers are obvi-
ously to a large quantitative extent right: clearly, if we can
be cheerful, and confident that we are strong enough to
‘“down’”’ any disease, we shall most likely prevent our get-
ting any disease—barring accidents not worth while trying
to foresee and avoid. It does help a certain more or less
hysterical type of person to avoid disease temporarily (it tru-
istically in the long run harms), to come flat out with the
absurdly exaggerated assertion that there are no perceptible
unbalances—no disease and no evil. The hysterical person
has an aristocratic type of brain, in wbich from some cause
(usually from generations of parasitism and docility: often
from intense sbocks, etc.) the perceptions are much narrowed
and in that actual unbalance with the environment there is a
tendency to consider everything more or less wrong. So if
such a brain, in a violent effort to -cure itself, asserts em-
phatically enough that there is no unbalance, the direct,
temporary sum of the two unbalances is a balance—health—
so far as the hysteric can see. So from his point of view (but
usually a hysteric is a woman—about twenty to one), there
is not any disease, and he is rather immune. And when he
has a ‘mortal error’’ that he has got a disease (in our every-
day language his ‘‘mortal error’’ is a concrete fact), he
stimulates (frequently with a “‘healer’s’’ help) his brain to
assert even more intensely that he is all right. It is truistic-
ally possible for a man to grow on a new leg in place of a
lost one if he can “‘think’’ a new leg with enough intensity.
But as as a matter of commonsense in quantitative matters,
be is not likely to, and would be sensible not to waste time
trying. Mrs. Eddy’s very elaborate “‘glad game’’ obviously
has oceasional] usefulness medically. Incidentally,
Mrs. Eddy’s ‘‘Science and Health”’ is a striking example of
a mystic book. It is not science; science is pluralistic ex-
pression (X), and ber book is surprisingly mostly the oppos-
ite—being an almost continual jingle of One words, which
judged by everyday pluralistic language, is largely nonsense.
But she keeps at the ineffable One so long that the book act-
ually does give a sort of religious grasp of things if the read-
er can avoid objecting to its nonsensicality from the scientific
point of view (so it appeals religously to over-sophisticated
people who have learned mostly what isn’t so; Index, “‘Re-
birth’’). | There are numbers of such mystics in the Middle
Ages: the Catholic church usually approved of those classic
ones. I rather think her book is useful when understood for
what it is. If she thinks setence is a fashionable word it is
ratber a good thing that she misuses it some, as it is bad for
science for it to be fashionable. And perhaps unquestionably
Mrs. Eddy cured herself by her unusually persistent ineffa-
bilities. _ What she had was severe hysteria: ample proof of
that will be obvious to the fairly close observer who reads a
panegyric of her:- Siby] Wilbur’s ‘“The Life of Mary Baker
Eddy’’: ef. §155.

r. It is therefore obvious that the quantitatively best
way to restore an unbalance is to use a practical, balanced
combination of the reasonably easy available ways. Leading
physicians nowadays definitely take the unified view of man
given by this chapter, and apply the unified methods outlined
in this section. The practical idea of the Mayos was to get
a unified competent diagnosis. Goldthwait has improved
that idea by showing defmitely that the human being is a
unit, and then collecting a coterie of experts to treat those
who chiefly have something wrong with their skeletons.

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176

Goldthwait thus finds a way, so far as formal] organization can
do it, of getting the advantages of specialization witbout its
worst disadvantages (the disadvantages, for obvious reasons,
almost unavoidably crop out in large organizations).
In sociological analogies, we have seen that a “nature cure”’
is laissez faire. Obviously, the surgery curé is a revolution,
going as far as a reign of terror. Autocracies try the Chris-
tian Science cure of jingo patriotism, paternalism, and saber
rattling, thus giving mental healing in an exaggerated way
by specious promises and scaring off devils, until some social
abscess blows up; and then there is usually a resort to social
surgery. Existing democracies more or less blunderingly try
more moderate methods, analogous to the cure for tbe splint-
er wound, and usually manage to muddle along some way—
which is better than blowing up. A conscious democracy
with a fair amount of intelligence obviously would use pre-
ventive medicine, and get along healthily; for preventive
medicine is merely having keen enough nervous systems to
observe a slight departure from a balance, starting correct-
ing it at once if it tends to accumulate. Obviously,
this section indicates the general method of correcting all
difficulties or wrongs. An intelligent child can understand
the method, and grasp the fact that it is truistically rigorous.
But the application of the method requires careful quantita-
tive judgment as to just what and where the unbalance is
(actual diagnosis, rather than mere complaining or calamity
howling), and as to the available means of curing it witb the
least disturbances of other balances. That application truis-
tically involves an infinite regress of measures, is absolutely
insoluble with accuracy, and for acceptable practical solution
needs strong, vigorous, keen observers, who see not only the
unifying relations in their specialty, but their extension.

CHAPTER XVII. Psychology.

§150. a. Psychology is the description of the universe
(or usually in practice, a standard universe), taken or made
from the reverse point of view, or in the opposite direction,
from that in which we start with ordinary or ‘‘objective’’
That’s and This’s. Or, in the book up to this point we take
That’s and This’s as ‘positive’ or given, and make an equation
That... X This...—Meaning, and consider that the Meaning is
our result or conclusion, or what we are ‘‘after’’; but in
psychology we start with Meaning, usually calling it the
mind (or some synonymous name), and going in the reverse
way, split it into arbitrary parts. Thus, we have an equation
from both points of view:- That... X This...=Meaning=
Feelings... X Intellect... .. And for those psychological terms
Feelings... and Intellect... we may substitute numerous other-
wise ‘psychologically’’ named factors, which are simply new
names for That’s and This’s.

b. Clearly, that definition of psychology is cireular. And
the total of all descriptions of the universe, including psy-
chology, is thns explicitly cireular—as Feelings... X Intellect...
(or some equivalent pair of factors) is identical with the vari-
ous That... X This...’s but is reached by starting from where
they ‘‘end.’’ So the definition of psychology, and the fact
that there zs psychology, are consistent with the solution of
the One and Many, and with valid logie—is final general
crucial proof of the validity of everyday logic.

c. Classic logic, with its dualisms, goes in only one di-
rection and hence can not give a consistent definition of psy-
chology as a science. For proof of that, see the attempts of
Ward (‘‘Ency. Brit.,’? ‘“Psychol.’’—xxii, 548) to give one,
and his admitted failure to make such dualism work, (He
was a very able British psychologist and philosopher; _ his

177

**Pluralistic Philosophy’’ and ‘‘Realm of Ends’’ are in effect
identical with the argument of this book, but formally not.)
Ward in the place cited finally defines psychology as
the “science of individual experience.’”’ If we take ‘‘indi-
vidual’? to mean any organized structure, then obviously
“‘individual experience’’ is equivalent to Meaning; and the
science of Meaning obviously is to “‘start’’ from it and split
it into parts—into That’s and This’s—and state their rela-
tionships. And that truistically implies that conventionally
our experience, or mind, or soul, or whatever it is preferred
to call it, is perceptibly a continuous thing, or is “‘really’’ a
universe—implies that we are persons, or are organized.
When we come to examine our consciousness minutely, we
sometimes seem to note breaks; and that has confused the
matter. I imply the solution of that as we proceed.

d. That much of this section gives a consistent state-
ment of psychology in the whole of knowledge, from a con-
ventional point of view that ignores theory of measurements.
A more rigorous description or definition of psychology (that
implies the solution of its conventional difficulties, and makes
it an ‘exact’’ science in the sense that it is as directly meas-
urable as is, say, electricity) is:- (1) psychology goes in one
direction, using arbitrary 7 or time to assert such a conven-
tion or convenience, while (2) the objective sciences goin the
opposite direction, so that the two together cancel the *“direc-
tions’’ and cancel I. and T (i. e., cancel all quantities as be-
ing arbitrary), and give us the real continuous universe or
Meaning. Or, to put that briefly, psychology is dynamic and
the objective sciences are static, and on/y the combination of
the two ‘‘sorts’’ of sciences gives a really complete or con-
sistent knowledge (§80, IX)—or a consistent epistemology,
as the philosophers name it. Or, to put it into still more
intelligible detai]:- Precisely speaking, the so-called object-
ive or material sciences do not exhibit a relationship known as
time. Obviously, we can not experiment, in a test tube say,
in the “‘past’’ or in the ‘“future’’ (§85d)—all our concrete,
objective experiments consist of a comparison of space loca-
tions (identities) in the present. And as the ““present’’ is a
zero time-duration (is the Jimit between the past and the fut-
ure), it follows that precisely speaking there can be no such thing
as a strictly objective or concrete science: al] our so-called con-
crete science is obviously multiplied by that zero (that zero
time or 7), and simply does not exist alone (i. e., as really
or absolutely ““concrete’’), and truistically can not. In short,
objective or material science (the science of ‘“matter’’ that is
sometimes asserted to be different, distinct, dualistic from
*“mind’’) is absolutely static in form and impossible. | And
on the other hand, again speaking precisely, in our observa-
tion of that concrete space or L—in all our *“experimenting’’
with L in the “‘present’’—we really do not perceive L, but
perceive a relationship that we call a time interval—a T
which is not zero, but an L which is zero. Or, speaking
precisely, subjectively or mentally we do not consider things
of thought as occupying space, but consider them as a series
of time intervals, which is the ‘“opposite’’ of space. Or, sub-
jectively, the One is formally infinite time, and space is zero:
objectively, vice versa the One is formally zero time, and
space infinite: and only both together gives formally the
complete expression of the truth (§147h), that expression ob-
viously containing the formal inevitable contradiction of the
One and Many. Therefore, there is in the science of psy-
chology (the science ‘opposite’ material science) always a zero
L, and hence such a distinct science can not exist.

e. The sum of the matter is that in all of science which
has any consistent existence we combine subjective and objective,
material and spiritual, concrete and ideal, static and dynamic
(IX), and get an absolutely unified science, in which it is

UNIVERSE

Three XVII §150¢

possible to make consistent but arbitrary L and T measures,
and which is therefore arbitrarily pluralistic—that Many sum-
ming into a One. Thus, psychology is inseparably combined
with so-called concrete science. And it is irrational to pre-
tend (as do the materialists) that they are separable.

f. The precise equation for all knowledge is therefore :-
Objective parts implying L... Subjective parts implying T...=
Universe, in which T is 1/L, so that we have the truism:-
L.../L...=1, ov Universe. We can analyze that equation in
more detail:- We have That... This...—Meaning, and
Meaning Feelings... X Intellect... or = Feelings... < Conscious-
ness.... In those equations (cf. Part One) That... X This...
is, explicitly, /’s that are static; so truistically, That... X
This...=ML.... And Feelings... < Intellect... is, explicitly,
M’s that are dynamic; so M/T...=Feelings... < Intellect... .
The solution of the One and Many requires that we combine
the two, in which case, by §36, we have a series of truisms.
So psychology comes in circularly, and can not be
dispensed with as a part of any ‘‘exact’’ science. ‘“Half’’
of the measuring, or ‘‘scientific’’ (§39e), member of our gen-
eral equation—i. e., the term JZ —is psychological; and that
member M(varying with)L?T~ thus implies an absolute, uni-
versal, circular, ineradicable identity of mind and matter.
That is true with such glaring obviousness that IJ have been
able to write this book up to the present point by tacitly
taking it for granted. The total theory of measurement—of
what is strictly science—is now explicit, and we see that
there absolutely can not be any science not inseparably con-
nected with ‘“persons.’’ There is nothing strange or novel
about that: it is merely the obvious fact that science is made
by men. The substance of pars. d-f is repeated, in a
more conventional and intelligible form, in §158 on memory.

g. It is thus rigorously proved that mind and matter are
identical—are not “‘parallel’’ in the sense of (1) mutual in-
teraction (except of course the immediate implication of such
is identity), or of (2) “‘occasionalism,’’ or (3) pre-established
harmony (see Index, ““Teleology,’’ for disproof of this third
dualism), or (4) the “‘monism’’ of Spinoza which had mind
and matter parallel attributes of One Substance (““Ency.
Brit.,’’ xxii, 600-1). In epistemology (i. e., in the most
general solution of the One and Many) we must have (as a
necessary truism of language; §§33-8) primarily at least two
points of view which may ‘logically interact,’ and so we take
this contradiction:- (1) we take ‘things’ (matter) one by one
(arbitrarily calling that ““separation’”’ :- space or L); (2) then
oppositely we take ““consciousness’’ or mind as continuous
(arbitrarily calling that continuity in taking things:- time or
T). That fundamental reaction or “‘contradiction’’ of static
(one by one “‘things’’) and dynamic (““taking’’ those things)
is truistically a prerequisite of any positive language. If we
do not want to talk, then obviously there is never any need
for any distinction between mind and matter. But if we do
use language, then all complete statements must truistically
contain the formal contradiction between mind and matter;
i.e., all sound “‘scientific’’ statement must contain both con-
crete science and psychology—both Land 7. So any valid
science may be said to be either concrete or spiritual (psycho-
logical), depending entirely upon the arbitrary quantitative
consideration of whether L or 7' respectively is more empha-
sized (hence man’s ‘ spirit’’ or soul is essentially the same as
the mental activity of any animal, but differs quantitatively
in the degree in which he uses Z7—which difference often is
not enough to speak of). In the foregoing parts of
this book I have conventionally emphasized L, as I was talk-
ing of conventional ‘“material’’ sciences. In fact, so conven-
tional is it thus toemphasize £, I often had toassert explicitly
that there was a 7 included (cf. IX). If I were to oo back

§150g XVII Three

and emphasize 7, more or less ignoring L, the descriptions
would become psychology. In that case various names other
than the “‘physical’’ ones used would be more conventional.
That extensive psychology will not be given, but the use of
such psychological names will be indicated in this chapter.

§151. a. There is thus no essential difference between
psychology and conerete science. The quantitative difference
is that psychology emphasizes J. There are two chief aspects
of that quantitative difference. One is tbat psychology is so
emphatic about 7 that in its conventional texts the problem
of the One and Many is so nearly explicit that the texts seem
much like “‘philosophy.’’ The second is that psychology is
always implying by its names a measured judgment—normal
or abnormal quantities. We noticed that in §148, and I
shall not again take it up explicitly.

b. <As psychology starts from Meaning, or the universe
considered as mind, the tacit emphasis is obviously on the
fact that there is a continuity. In order to talk about a con-
tinuity, it must be split or ““analyzed’’ (a real continuity is
as such absolutely ineffable). And psychological splittings
were so perceptibly not real splittings that always there was
a disturbing knowledge in the psychological writer’s mind
that he was trying to assert two opposite things at once. At
first, say in Descartes’s time (or even more in that of Aqui-
nas), before there was much clear thought on the subject,
the mind was made sharply dualistic with matter (though the
link, God, was then manufactured to repair the error), and
the mind was broken into similar sharp dualisms known as
““faculties’’—such as the faculty of memory, the faculty of
will, of feeling, attention, and so on as far as the ingenuity
of the psychologists could invent. Such faculties were held to
be constant, exact ‘mental atoms.’ But it is now unfash-
ionable to hold that there are any such things—there too ob-
viously is no sharp line or distinction between the arbitrary
parts—so that even materialist German thinkers like Muen-
sterberg, although they in effect use such “mental atoms,’
shy away from the name faculty. So now, more than ever,
the psychological writer of much sincerity and competence is
constantly engaged in a rather perceptible struggle with the
One and the Many. And that struggle is painful to himself
and often to the reader. There is obvious in Ward’s article
‘*Psychology’’ (a treatise of nearly 100,000 words, ‘“Ency.
Brit.,’’ xxii) a constant rejection of explicit dualism, result-
ing in a painful uncertainty as to how the logic must go.
The result is that nearly every psychological term is usually
run by good thinkers like Ward (who have not advanced as
far as our first class American psychologists like Dewey) into
all three Trinity forms. Hence the confusion as to the con-
ventional meaning of such words is dire—for one Trinity
meaning is used about as often as another, and in the ortho-
dox absence of explicit solution of the One and Many no logi-
eal distinction is clearly pointed out. As we know
the solution of the One and Many, that conventional] diffi-
culty will no longer bother us by making most psychological
writings vague and unintelligible—except that it will take us
about a generation to get used to that solution, and to learn
to apply it with easy skill. This book will look, to those of
of a few generations hence, as unnecessary and clumsy as the
old arguments that there are antipodes look to us.

$152. a. Psychology usually discusses individual ex-
perience—takes a man as being the universe, usually cor-
rectly as a standard universe. But obviously, we can let the
single man unbrokenly include the tota] universe, and the
mental sum of him in that aspect is (1) “‘social psychology.’’
If we take him bounded by his skin, then there is a psychol-
ogy of single although related men, or (2) “‘individual psy-
chology.’’ The principles of the two are obviously identical ;

UNIVERSE

178

the differences are quantitative, and due to the fact that the
means of communication existing between members of a
society are not so good as a rule as communication by the
nervous system of one man. No quantitative distinctions
between individual psychology and social psychology have
been definitely agreed upon; I shall indicate the principles
of both in this chapter, and give a few applied details of soc-
ial psychology under its usual name sociology in XVIII, XIX.

b. In concrete science we split the universe into parts
on the criterion of their having principal difference surfaces
at 7,—which splitting could never make any part exact. In
precisely the same way the entities of psychology, the ment-
al parts, are tacitly divided and named by that criterion as
arbitrary quantities. It has been found by observation that
changes in the nervous system produce directly corresponding
change in consciousness, and that such changes do so more
directly and intensely than do changes in other organs. Even
more directly, it is observed that changes in consciousness
are accompanied by electric currents in the appropriate parts
of the nervous system—truistically indicating organized field
structure (XIV). So by the whole of valid logic and the de-
scription of the universe up to this point, it follows that the
nervous system is zm general identical with the mind or soul
or consciousness. And as perceptible consciousness is ob-
servably accompanied by, and identical with, electric cur-
rents in appropriate parts, and as such currents are based on
V, (X1V), it follows that quantitatively perceptible conscious-
ness or soul is the result of such energy transfers to such con-
scious parts of the nervous system as suffice to cause their
principal difference surfaces to acquire a velocity of V;. That
is obviously directly proved by the readily verifiable fact that
if any ““stimulus’’—any transfer of energy to or from the ner-
vous system—gets proportionally weak it will fail to give a
perception; and if too intense, it will also fail (§156).

ec. Those same quantitative conclusions are identical with
biological facts:- |The nervous system is composed of cells
ealled neurons. Each neuron has at least one main process
or thread-like extension of itself that may sometimes be sev-
eral feet long, called the axon; and usually has small pro-
cesses named dendrites. The axon and dendrites in turn
usually divide into still smaller processes called fibers, and
some of those fibers unite the cell with other neurons, and
others may unite it with other sorts of cells in the body (by
means of at least seven recognizedly different small organs
that are “‘nerve endings,’’ not counting at least two sorts of
nerve endings in the retina, etc.); and so far as can be ob-
served there is no discontinuity in those unions (““Ency.
Brit.,’’ xix, 401). So obviously the nervous system is a con-
engous coordinating organ, joining the body structurally
perceptibly into an ‘individual’ (i. e e., continuous’) organ-
ism. No other general structure of the same order or
size as the whole body does thus coordinate it; the
various circulations in the body coordinate it by means of
their sinall ““chemical’’ structures. And if there is
such a thing as consciousness or mind in the universe, it must
by our solution of the One and Many (it must, as a truism, if
the universe is not chaos) be identical with the whole uni-
verse, and a part of it must be identical with some structural
part of the Universe: Consequently, as there must verbally
be consciousness’? (or some equivalent name for the T in
the general equation), it directly follows from the facts in
the first part of this paragraph that biologically the quantita-
tive or perceptible consciousness of the whole body must be
identical with the nervous system structure. Such was seen in the
last paragraph to be the observable fact. So this and that
paragraph circularly and rigorously prove the general argu-
ment of this book, and explicitly demonstrate the verbal

179

machine or equation:~ Nervous system or cells... Perceptible
consciousness...—Consciousness, or Soul, or Mind.

d. Therefore the customary meaning of personal con-
sciousness (not necessarily se{f-consciousness) is obviously a
quantitative meaning, given by the equation:-- Environment,
including parts of the nervous system not perceptibly working... X
Perceptibly working parts of the nervous system, or personal con-
sciousness...—=Consciousness (in general, or One consciousness),
or Soul, Mind, etc. That obviously rigorous equation (which
may logically be either for the whole universe or for a stand-
ard universe, according as we interpret the extent of Envi-
ronment, implies the solution of all psychological problems.
Most such conventional problems are matters of definition—of
observation of the language agreements used, to see to which
Trinity part a term used belongs: thus, 1 have used the term
‘consciousness’ in both members of that equation, as it is ob-
vious that conventional psychology and everyday talk do use
that word about equally in the two logically contradict-
ory senses (we also use it as a relationship word—against
which additional and worst puzzle the mathematical symbols
protect us; §30e-g). In order to he precise, I used the ad-
jective personal to indicate the Many usage. But psychology
and everyday usage give the term seul mostly a One mean-
ing; so it is fashionable in psychology either to avoid the
word (because as a One word it obviously is not a scientific or
Many word), or else practically to deny that man has a soul.
In everyday life it is getting to be bad taste to mention the
soul—for that psychological reason, and also for the common-
sense reason that we wish to avoid casual talk of something
we are uncertain of. But evidently, as soon as we make the
logical distinctions in the equation we know the nature of
soul, and there is no embarrassment in using it—although as
**soul’’ has been used with such gross irrationality in the
past (especially in the theological phrase “‘immortal soul,”’
meaning a personal immortal soul) the word may retain a
taint of stupidity, and perhaps may better be avoided.

e. Volumes of detailed psychological solutions explicitly
implied by the equation of the last paragraph must be
omitted. The reader is amply able to expand into the de-
tails that interest him the few general suggestions needed
here. The most important solution implied by that equation
is that there is no such thing as personal immortality—for
the most excellent reason that no fixed, constant, distinct, ex-
act, ‘real’? thing or person, or a personal consciousness, or a
personal or Many soul exists or can exist. As a glaring tru-
ism, if a certain thing can not exist it can not be immortal;
a prerequisite for immortality is existence. A person, or
personal consciousness, or a personal soul, is a continually
changing thing, as we shal] see in more and more detail as
we proceed, and as is obviously a fact from the slightest ob-
servation of our own consciousness:- e. g., our personal soul
changes so much that quantitatively it totally ceases to be
perceptible every time we go to sleep; and hence it never
is perceptibly ‘‘immortal’’ for so long as a few days.
But obviously, as our nervous system (and-or mind), exactly
speaking, includes or is the total universe, truistically in a
real or One sense we are immortal. I. e., time simply does
not apply to us, ultimately, so that right now this instant, we
have all the time there is—which we may equally logically
say is infinite time or zero time. In that One sense you are
an exact, fixed person——for you are, with absolute organic
connection in infinite regress, the total universe or God, and
as such immortal if we wish to say so (§47). We take up
the moral aspects of immortality in S167h.

f. Because personality is a quantitative thing it is alsonot
correct to say that it absolutely ceases to be—absolutely
dies. Death (§146lm) is itself a quantitative thing and not

UNIVERSE

Three XVII §153a

absolute. So it is quite possible that there may be in some
quantitative degree (probably a slight one) sometimes a per-
ceptible amount of personality that survives what the doctors
cal] death (but probably for only a short time). I. e., at
medical death the person’s nervous system may still in the
cortex, fora while hold a physical organization or physiologi-
cal unity sufficient in degree to give off psychic waves, still
organized as being the dead ‘‘person,’’ that might constitute
a telepathic message to a ‘‘living’’ person. It may be pos-
sible that those waves could affect a wireless coherer or some
such machine as Edison is reported making (which would be
more reliable than persons). That is all theoretically pos-
sible; the phenomenon is merely a quantitative one, and in
many cases the cortex shows no evidence of change shortly
after death. It is even possible that such telepathic mes-
sages have been received: judging from the triviality of those
reported by various people, and their grossly mutually con-
tradictory nature, if any are genuine some such quantitat-
ively defective, moribund “‘personalities’’? might have sent
them. But that does not imply personal immortality: it
proves the opposite, merely showing that personality is quan-
titative and changing when by a ‘‘person’’ we mean a finite
one. It may be an experimental] fact that some messages
from the ‘‘dead’’ were ‘‘received’’ after the sending cortexes
were organically disintegrated. If such happens, it is as a
first approximation quantitative proof of a time lag in the re-
ceiver’s brain. On the few occasions I have perhaps got
telepathic messages from the living there was a time lag;
apparently a message was stored up until my brain was about
half asleep before it could get attention. But regardless of
those quantitative possibilities, the truistic disproof of per-
sonal immortality is rigorous. Those possibilities obviously
imply others, omitted here. We saw (§144j) that in
biological terms there is no finite real personality; so
there can not be a real personal immortality. And as direct
experimental proof of the principle that there is no personal
immortality, when ] was dead (§144j) I was totally uncon-
scious of my personality in the conventional sense. I know
another man who was dead once and his experience as to
having no personality is the same as mine.

$153. «a. In orthodox psychology the nervous system or
consciousness in general is considered to extend out in a
vague way, and join on in some unstated way to the object-
ive things which are ‘‘perceived’’—in short, orthodoxly the
environment is joined to us thus hy the nervous system. So
there is a well known word, with many synonyms, for that
really-joined-on Environment... (including parts of the nerv-
ous system not perceptibly working):- (feelings; with
synonyms such as emotions, associations, sensations, subcon-
sciousness, the unconscious, or even consciousness. (There
are many such words that in principle are synonymous;
but all of them, including the ones mentioned, imply some-
what different quantitative splittings of the universe—though
there is some disagreement about those implied judgments. )
AJso, there is a well known word, ¢ntellect, for the perceptibly
working parts of the nervous system, or for the directly per-
sonal consciousness. And the term zntellect also has many
synonyms (varying somewhat quantitatively):- thoughts,
ideas, mind (in the sense of personal mind), sensations, per-
ceptions, apperceptions, reflection, the conscious, conscious-
ness, understanding, the reason, judgment, brains, sense,
commonsense, etc. Therefore, we have for our explicitly
general psychological equation in §152d, the more common-
place one:- Emotions... Intellect...—=Consciousness, or Mind.
But there are commonplace words for that [One] Conscious-
ness which are more precise. The word will (the psychologi-
cal or mental will) is almost always used to name the climax

§153a XVII Three

or summing-up of any mental action, and is obviously usually
identica] with that One Consciousness. Ordinary synonyms
for will are behavior, experience, mental life, conduct, pur-
pose, volition ;—again there can be a quantitative difference
in even those One words; that difference implies a quantita-
tive comparison of extent of various standard universes used
—an important logical point. So we may write the general
psychological equation (omitting the measuring member,
which is the same as in concrete science), in commonplace
terms, as:- Emotions... X Intellect...—=Will.

b. We may substitute synonyms, and get various illumi-
nating equations:- Subconscious... The Conscious...—Intui-
tions... X Perceptions...=—Behavior; Associations or Memory...
X Reflection or Apperceptions...==Mental life; or, Intuitions... X
Sensations... Experience, or Self; or, Intuition or fringes of
consciousness... XSelf...==Will. Clearly, we can take any of
the numerous psychological terms and by substituting them
in that equation assign to them a well-defined, rigorously
logical meaning. | And we see that some words (e. g., con-
sciousness) raay conventionally be put in any place in the
equation about equally well; e. g., above I shifted self from
the standard universe meaning to the intensive factor, in
which latter place it is obviously identical with James’s ex-
tensive description of the personal self or personality in bis
chapter on the consciousness of self (“‘Psychology,’’ X). A
number of those terms conventionally are nsually relationship
words, and would most appropriately serve to replace the X
(cf. §168b); such words are association and reflection, and
often intuition. Hence, it is obvious that only a defi-
nite knowledge of the solution of the One and Many can de-
termine just what a common psychological term does mean
in a given case; for we continually shift the Trinity form of
those terms. KE. g., when we have a faint desire to empha-
size the importance (i. e., quantity) of intellect, we pair it
as Intuitions... X Intellect..., which rather implies that feelings
too are intellect or faint intuitive thought. And when we
get specially weary of the erudite fanatics and eulogists of
the intellectual life who assert or imply that the intellect is
the “‘rea]’’ part of life, we use some such correct formula as
Intuitions, or Instincts, or Feelings... X Sensations..., which
leaves out any explicit mention of intellect—although obvi-
ously it is replaced by a synonym (i. e., the dots assert a
connected or organic infinite regress; so Sensations... means
the pleonastic phrase ‘organized or ‘‘classified’’ sensations’
—which is truistically identical with the usual meaning of
intellect, or with the necessary meaniug of ““reason,”’ if reason
is to have any consistent meaning).

ec. Inthe equation Emotions... X Intellect... Will, it is
obvious, as a truism of definition and by direct observation,
that Emotions... finally (if we consider the whole universe) is
the extensive factor that refers to al] the parts of the universe
and their workings which are not positively (we might say
name-ably) perceptible to us as Intellect... So obviously, in
numerousness of details included in a given state of mind,
Emotions... greatly exceeds Intellect.... That is the same as
saying that the greater part of our behavior or mental lives
rests upon or is emotions or intuitions or feelings in the sense
that the more numerous details are emotions—and such num-
erousness is what we usually mean when we say “ greater’’
or “‘higher.’’? _It is probably the correct quantitative fact:-
that usually in behavior practically the vast majority of the
details which we say are “‘consciously’’ involved are so vague
and indefinite in consciousness that we call them emotions,
so that the only definitely perceptible mental detail in ordi-
nary behavior is consciousness that those numerons emotions
exist. Such mental life, in which the intensive Intellect...
almost vanishes, is called instinctive or habitual or intuitive

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or reflex action and may symbolically be represented thus:-
Feelings.......0+. X Intellect.. = Will. Evidently, if conscious-
ness or Intellect.. disappears (as it may from one point of
view be said to do in reflex action), then, from a psychologi-
ea] point of view, provided we retain our usual language
agreements, the behavior has quantitatively changed, so that
the individual as such is not concerned perceptibly (is not
conscious), but the organ (or organs) of a “‘lower’’ order,
which produced the reflex, is conscious. And that is a pass-
ing from one order of structure to another, so that, in precisely
the same way that temperatures of different orders of struct-
uces are not directly comparable, here the same intensive
factor (now called intellect) can not be directly compared—
i. €.,a quantity of consciousness perceptible to an organ is not
directly perceptible to the whole organism (a principle—that
of periodicity—obviously truistic in those familiar terms).

d. So in “‘purely reflex’’ action, a different order of
‘individual’ (an organ, or part of the usual “‘individual’’)
logically has a perceptible amount of consciousness, or Jntel-
Lethe That amount is not directly perceptible to the ‘‘in-
dividual’’; e. g., we have no ‘‘intellectual’’ consciousness or
control of our heart, but still we do have a degree of cogni-
zance and control of it (I can deliberately vary my heart
action by running), which we may say is a dot of Intellect...
(so rigorously that factor never becomes zero), but which we
usually say is some part of Emotions... (and when the naming
or structural-relation thus changes or ‘reverses’ we have to
introduce the inverse square Jaw to preserve language agree-
ments). That is obviously precisely the same as saying that
the structures of a certain given order inside an atom have
temperatures which are not directly perceptible to us, or are
not at al] temperatures as such in the usual sense to us—but
which temperatures are ordinarily definitely existent to us
when translated by the space law (inverse-square, to ‘expand’
the ‘order’), and which temperatures can never become ab-
solutely 0 or © (because in that case the order of struct-
ure changes, and we become directly congnizant of them—
just as we directly perceive our heart as soon as it departs
only a little towards 0 or™). So we see that we can shift
a ‘dot’ from one psychological factor to its mate—change
what for want of a better name I shal] call the numerousness
of a factor ;—that being a truism of the fact that they are ar-
bitrary anyway. But, if we wish to retain our ordinary
language or logic, we can not run either to 0 or ®. (That is
the psychological form of the proof that entropy can not and
does not increase to infinity.) And all of that is precisely
the same as saying that the two factors are irrational if taken
separately; and that neither ever has any exactness. In
concrete science all that is a little difficult to observe directly
in some cases, as we are not very familiar with ‘‘materia]’’
facts; but in psychology it is glaringly evident.

e. The foregoing describes from only one of the two
well known points of view the tendency of the two factors to
vary in numerousness. Many men, on occasions when they
notice the existence of perceptible sensations (the existence
of Intellect...) of course promptly perceive a number of dots,
and tend to deny and ignore the vague emotions. Evidence
of that is shown in the proverbial assertion that man is the

reasoning animal, implying that he relies solely on the
numerousness of Intellect..., instead of being in fact mostly
affected by Emotions... (cf. §150g). On the other hand it is
conventionally implied that other animals have no such per-
ceptible sensations or Intellect... or reason, but are guided by
emotions—instincts. Truistically animals have some quantity
of perceptible Intellect... and reason (animals have no ‘‘reas-
on’’ in the sense of classic logic; neither has man; §25).
Probably animals have it in much less degree—a quantitative

181

problem. If man has reason, then truistically animals, atoms,
etc., also have it, in different degree—though like tempera-
ture, the “‘reason’’ of different orders of structures is not
directly comparable. But when men start thus exaggerating
the numerousness of the parts that are perceptibly included
in Intellect..., they are likely to forget the more numerous
parts in Emotions..., which in extent constitute the most of
God or the universe and which equally with the over-vaunted
reason guide us and support us. Those who thus illogically
prune and preen themselves on their ‘‘reason’”’ exhibit small
measure of reason, and are popularly named variously:- _ in-
tellectuals, erudite persons, the sophisticated, highbrows,
know-it-alls—and scholar shows such a tendency to imply in-
temperate intellectuality that perhaps it is safer not to ac-
quire that title.

f. We can see more of those two opposite tendencies to
exaggerate either emotions or intellect by considering what
the theologians call a rebirth or getting salvation or being
saved, and the psychologists call a religious experience.
There are many names for the phenomenon. Under
certain circumstances we may get a large and intense flow of
energy through apparently the most of our nervous system
(most probably actually through some large part), which we
designate by various names. EK. g., we may see what we
consider a beautiful picture, or scene, or action; or we may
observe in ourselves or others some good, heroic, or otherwise
remarkable and appropriate, suitable deed or quality; or we
may observe the general fitness of things, the apparent per-
fect ‘“purpose’’ of the universe or God, or the remarkably
consistent characters of such men as Christ and Lincoln; and
whatever it is that thus serves to make it more or less per-
ceptible to us that the whole universe is absolutely consistent
and fitted together as a real whole or organism or person,
serves as a sort of trigger to release in greater or less degree
energy from many nerve cells, and we have a greater or less
flood of nervous energy which gives us such an unusual sense
of well-being that we call it by a variety of names serving to
mark it off from our more routine experiences:- ecstacy,
rapture, inspiration, frenzy, transport, ineffable joy or felicity
or peace, being one with God, mystical union with God or
Christ or the saints, rebirth, intoxication (both “‘spiritual,”’
and with aleoho] and other drugs, as we shall see), orgy, or-
gasm, aura (as of an epileptic or hysterical fit)—and when it
is definitely abnormal or pathological in degree it is named
an epileptic, hysterical, or other sort of nervous explosion,
convulsion, or fit; and mania. In the mildest mentally per-
ceptible degree that flood of energy is humor {or when in the
reverse ‘direction,’ but with analogous principles, is pathos],
and results in a langh—or in less degree, in a smile. So the
reader has had a religious experience: even dogs smile. Pos-
sibly the reader has not had a rebirth that verges on the edge
of the pathological, as do most of those described in James’s
‘Varieties of Religious Experience,’’ and as do those the
theologians seem to require—but such more or less pathologi-
cal ones are unnecessary, and a bit dangerous ($162, etc.).
But as will appear (especially in $162), the reader, if fairly
normal, bas had ample religious experience to understand of
his own observation all such experience—religious experience
is as common as eating meals, although the somewhat patho-
logical varieties fortunately are not common: the theologians
have merely grossly overrated the rarity and pricelessness of
their wares, as does the usual patent medicine advertiser.
have had religious experiences myself that verged on the
pathological; and instead of making capital of them, as has
usually been done in the past by those with such experiences
(in that they or their disciples substantially claim that they
saw or talked with God, or were otherwise tremendously

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Three XVII §153i

favored), and implying that others ought to have similar ex-
periences in order to have the ‘‘real thing,’’ I shall prove in
a way that you can verify that (unless you need to know by
personal experience what you are talking about in order to
write a book like this) they are fine things to avoid (§§162-3).

g. When we have a religious experience, frequently its
chief characteristic is the vividness, or perceptibility, of the
‘parts’ of it—just as perceiving a joke consists of seeing in-
tensely the point, that being a mild rebirth. That stimula-
tion of our nervous system thus frequently causes a large
number of the dots of Emotions... to surge into vivid percept-
ibility and hence to become a part of Jntellect........ , and we
seem to perceive the total universe—to see all of God, or
actually to perceive al] the dots in the infinite regress. E.g.,
the devil took Christ onto a high mountain and showed him
all the kingdomis and their glories (Matt. 4); quite possibly
Christ did have some such perceptible view of the infinite re-
gress, which he could most intelligibly express in his day in
that way—and quite likely he thus in effect condemned the
violent rebirths recommended by the theologians by attribut-
ing that one to the ‘‘devil’’: instead of saying of them, Oh
JOY tavee os ~nevsaid, Ob heli. c.ceee. . As a matter of formal
logic, we can perceive that total infinite regress at any time,
so that we can with logical consistency write the explicitly in-
finite pluralistic truism:- Jntellect...... =Universe. Then
logically intellect becomes the total of everything; but so
does emotion, or any other Many thing we care to name, and
we have the trouble of learning a new form of language.

h. On the other hand we are accustomed to calling cer-
tain vague perceptions emotions or feelings. So ordinarily,
instead of changing our names for those, when in a rebirth
they become vividly perceptible, by nominally shifting some
of them over into Jntellect..., we merely say that the factor
(or the sort of experience named by the factor) Emotions...
has vastly increased. So there is truistically a tendency in
such cases to consider the equation the infinitely pluralistic
one, Eimotions...... = Universe. Perhaps most people
who have had a marked religious experience tend thus to
consider it emotional, and unconsciously to exaggerate the
view into an assertion that religion is wholly emotional. Of
course if wholly so they merely change to anew language (cf.
last par.). If we assume that Christ did have the religious
experience mentioned in the last paragraph, we may note
that his reaction to it was to tell the ““devil’’ to get hence,
which is obviously a refusal to change from the usual agree-
ment to consider the One real, to either an intellectual or an
emotional] infinite pluralism. It can be noted that Christ,
with extraordinary consistency considering the general incon-
sistency and ignorance of his time, adhered to the reality of
the One. Such consistency is so remarkable in such circum-
stances that it not only reasonably well demonstrates the ex-
traordinary consistency and hence fair approach to perfection
of his own character (so that his reporters were forced by the
sheer weight of it to make a roughly correct report), but it
also makes it probable that Christ mostly initiated, or at least
served to crystallize, the general establishment ef our present
language agreements. That is the greatest work any man can
do for the race, provided the agreements are the best possible.
And it has been shown throughott the book that ours are the
most economical (for the next step, more suitable for improved
minds, see footnote 100c). For the ethics of economy of
time, see §165. Here, we have a definite, specific proof of
Christ’s greatness—an improvement on intuitive guesses.

i. Thus we see in vividly verifiable detail) how mental
facts are so ‘fluid,’ so inseparably connected, that a careless
exaggeration of them led to the centuries-long warfare of
science and theology, of reason and authority. Very roughly

§1531 XVII Three

speaking, science tended to assert that the truth was, Intel-
LeGhes es = Meaning; and theology, that it was Emotions.....=
Meaning. If we consider such to be roughly the historical
fact, then obviously both were fanatics, and partly wrong if
they claimed to be using everyday language (§4.9j-1).

j. We have seen that in a condition of fair mental bal-
ance the parts of Emotions... are more numerous but lack
in vividness or intensity, whereas those of Intellect... are few
in number but intense. So considering the whole nervous
system as a structure, some few cells (experiment shows that
they are apparently always in the cortex) are, in any given
mental act, rather intensely energetic and hence conscious,
and constitute the intellect. Those cells may be considered
surrounded by-some sort of difference surface (nobody knows
what or where the variable boundary actually is: I am going
no further than to state a mere mechanical truism), on the
other side of which, and in fair balance with it, just as the
filament is in fair balance with the field, is the remainder of
the universe, the remaining nerve cells that directly are the
emotions being immediately adjoining.

k. A number of variously stated truisms of that are ob-
vious. One is that our intellect or conscious perceptions or
sensations at a given time consists approximately of some cer-
tain cells; then at another time, with truistically changed
perceptions, our personality is truistically composed in some
measure of other cells; or, the ** seat of the soul?’ is variable.
Hence it follows that at a given time it is possible for two
more or less coordinate souls to exist in one ‘ person.’’ E. g.,
one soul may be doing automatic writing while another soul
is carrying on the usual routine; or less emphatically, most
of us can at times read with our eyes and talk and think of
something else. Also, it is truistic that there can be occa-
sions when one part of the cortex suffers some abnormally
great disconnection from another, so that distinctly different
personalities may appear alternately in an individual. Such
different personalities have actually been observed in the
same person up to six or eight. Often a normal individual,
by getting drunk with chemicals, will successively, as one
part after another of his cortex is in effect disconnected by
(say) the alcohol, exhibit a series of perceptibly different per-
sonalities. If he has normally used his top cortex to hide
from people the unpleasantness of the rest of him, those other
parts then show up undisguised—in vino veritas.

1. Such truisms of par. ] may be multiplied indefinitely.
The only other explicit one | shall] notice is that practically
always Intellect... may perceptibly give two general person-
alities:- (1) the general personal consciousness, or thoughts;
and (2) a perceptible consciousness that we have that first
consciousness— self-consciousness, or awareness of an ego.
Thus we may more or less perceptibly bave at least two
simultaneous consciousnesses—which is a direct and crucial
proof tbat any part has an infinite regress.

8154. a. The expansion of Emotions... < Intellect...=
Will (which expansion is largely a matter of writing it in
terms of synonymous conventional symbols and indicating the
implied quantitative differences) is all of psychology, and is
so simple tz principle that an intelligent child ought to be
able to do it formally; but so difficult quantitatively (requir-
ing such good observation and judgment of billions of per-
ceptible structures that go to make one man) that the ablest
men can not as yet do very well at it (cf. §§1671, 170). I
proceed to discuss briefly some of the chief expansions, and

sum them up in considering the One member Will in §157.

b. The earliest fairly definite use in psychology of a
valid logic, and hence direct implication of forms of that
equation, so far as I can find is in Dewey’s ‘‘Psychology.”’

James afterwards in his ““Psychology’’ obviously tacitly used

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182

valid logic. But he said he didn’t, and was vague and con-
tradictory about it. Perhaps the majority of psychologists in
this country now use sound logic.

ce. Valid psychology in recent years has adopted the
useful but dangerous (countenancing fanatics and fads) ex-
pedient of dropping old names for new, in order to drop the
old “‘faculty’’ or dualistic errors. The chief new name is
““the subconscious,’’ and its rather verbally-irrational syno-
nym ‘‘the unconscious.’’ That new name is obviously equiv-
alent to the ancient terms emotions and feelings, so that we
have Subconscious... < Intellect... Will. So far as I happen
to have noticed, Morton Prince in “The Unconscious’”’ first
definitely dropped the dualistic idea that the subconscious is
a dualistic faculty—a sort of fixed, constant sub-individual in
us. Prince’s logic, while not explicit, is valid, although he
formally inclines towards infinite pluralism. Coriat’s general
principles, in ‘Religion and Medicine,’’ are substantially
the same in form as here given.

d. There has been much talk about the ideas of Freud.
His theory is substantially this:- | Dreams are always dis-
guised realizations of suppressed or unfulfilled wishes, which
in sleep can get past a ‘psychic censor’’; those suppressed
wishes may be referred to sexual matters. Further, mental
antagonisms (one part of the mind or nervous system contin-
ually suppressing or inhibiting another) obviously fatigue the
nervous system, and lead to disease if persisted in; so in
eases of various unbalances the mind should be analyzed on
the basis of dreams, and by the conclusions of such psycho-
analysis the suppressions removed and a comfortable balance
effected. Quantitatively, those ideas are useful, as
we shall see; but Freud has the usual defects of the German
materialists:- he persistently takes a part for a whole, or is
a dualist. E. g., in ordinary everyday meanings of words,
dreams are by no means always disguised, nor are they neces-
sarily the realizations of anything in the shape of suppressed
or other sort of long-entertained wish—al] of which can be
observed by any normal person who will take the trouble to
(say) overeat just before sleeping, and repeat the perform-
ance until he manages to get a remembered nightmare. Of
course, such a dream can be tortured verbally into being the
realization of a suppressed wish (perhaps a wish that the
owner of the over-burdened digestive apparatus might die)—
for everything is ultimately identical. And Freud might
logically validly express everything as sex; tbe reader has
seen it done in §146. But Freud pretends to use everyday
language——in which are named other effective instincts.

e. Clearly, ““suppressed wishes’’ are merely the couven-
tional Feelings..., and the “‘psychic censor’’ is Intellect... .
There is no real ““‘antagonism’’ between the two, but simply
an unbreakable, interacting relationship. At times we prefer
to let what is ordinarily known as one sort of emotions be-
come more perceptible, and discharge (proceed cyclically) as
Will, rather than let another sort do so. In that case, com-
paratively speaking, one sort or set is ‘‘inhibited,’’ just as
there is more attraction or ‘love’ between some electrical
charges than between others. Truistically however, if for a
long time we keep one set of emotions in definite interaction
(“‘harp on one subject’’ too much) we fatigue unduly not only
the structures that engage in that “‘conscious’’ activity, but
also the structures that are inhibited and do not get enough
exercise. So if we are intemperate (unbalanced), truistically
the brain sleeps unbalancedly (““poorly’’), and some of the
possible temporary personalities will perceptibly bob up as a
dream. Obviously, we can not possibly ““sleep’’ absolutely
—any more than we can ‘‘die’’ absolutely. So necessarily
there are, even in sleep, some parts of the cortex not quite so
completely disconnected as others, and a slight unbalance

183

due to former fatigue of the brain or to some unbalance of
other organs (or both: both interact on each other) may be
perceptible as a dream. And obviously, the brain will neither
go to sleep nor awake perfectly instantaneously. So there
is always on the occasions of ““waking’’ or “‘going to sleep’’
a period of especially perceptible dreaming. During those
periods the brain truistically is partly disconnected although
somewhat in working condition; so if a *“suggestion’’ (any
stimulus) be given it then, the suggestion can flow usually
through only narrow channels, and hence it makes an unus-
ually large impression on those channels; for obviously, ordi-
narily a large part of the cortex is engaged in judging and
sifting and switching an idea or stimulus al] about, so that
its owner will not rashly follow some ‘‘wrong’’ “‘suggestion’’ ;
so ordinarily a suggestion wil] have a more distributed effect.
That indicates the principles of the use of ‘‘suggestion,’’
hypnotism (where a part of the brain by too much concentra-
tion is put to sleep—which truistically is unbalancing for a
normal brain, but may be desirable in certain circumstances,
just as running a Marathon may be), and such phenomena.
The same thing is directly exhibited by hysterics:- A hys-
teric is a person with abnormally narrowed Intellect... (i. e.,
perceptible sensations are much less numerous than with a
norma] person; or a hysteric is never ‘“‘wide awake’’—
hasn’t an ‘‘open mind’’), and hence she is very suggestible.
But at the same time most suggestions made to her do not
become perceptible to her, and hence fail. When one does
‘Stake’’ it ‘‘takes’’ hard—often producing ““hysterics’’.

f. So we can judge somewhat from dreams (if we are
good observers, with excellent judgment) as to what some of
the unbalances of an unduly fatigued person are.
It is possible to get one part of the brain so intensely work-
ing when awake that even though it is tired it will keep on
working after the remainder of the brain is asleep, giving
dreams that are an exaggerated continuation of consciousness
—of the ‘‘censor’” himself. Also, as modern life more
often interferes with what are commonly called the sex ap-
petites than with those given other names, it is naturally
likely that more often the person who finds life a bit too hard
will have dreams that give some of the sex nerves a chance
to exercise, perhaps indirectly. I rarely remember a dream,
but I do remember two vivid ones during the war in which I
ate all the sugar I wanted. Neither the Biblical Joseph nor
a Freud is needed to psychoanalyze those, and in ordinary
language they were not the result of suppressed sex wishes—
or suppressed wishes of any sort, as I never concealed from
myself or anyone interested my wish for sugar. But,
it is glaringly obvious that it is just as correct, in order to
find out what his unbalances are, to observe the conscious
mental life of a person. Except in occasional cases the men-
tal balances are right on the surface in waking life with but
slight disguises ($155). As a matter of fact, most dream an-
alysis is sbrewd guessing from observations of conscious life.
Soa complete statement of a rational psychoanalysis is:-
Observations of dreams or other partial personalities that are usu-
ally emotions... X Observations of ordinary consciousness... .

8155. a. We have seen that even in the mental life of a
person who when awake is bad]y unbalanced there is a tend-
ency to get a genera] balance by means of the underworked
parts exercising during sleep. When there is such a consid-
erable persistent unbalance during waking hours that no such
fair balance can be thus, or similarly, attained, then the indi-
vidual truistically either will die, or else wil] go more insane’
(become more unbalanced, so that Intellect... or perceptible
sensation is more narrowed—in which condition truistically
there is more hope that automatically rest and thus balanc-
ing will be obtained:- i. e., insanity is nature’s method of

UNIVERSE

Three XVII §155b

balancing a man with the environment, by removing what
we call the control of the matter from his hands when his own
control, with only “‘normal’’ checks, is rapidly destroying
himself). The general theory of that is clear, so I omit the
numerous quantitative facts that are known. But before such
a considerable unbalance can accumulate that there arises
much dream-balancing, or hysteria, or double personalities,
or aristocratic egomanias (obviously involving a narrowing of
Intellect...—an inability to see other people very well); or
before such a considerable unbalance can accumulate that
there arise graver insanities with perceptible nerve lesions—
before any of those nerve unbalances can accumulate much,
there is a general more or less norma] method of psychologi-
ea] balancing that is observable in everyone, is confusing
even when recognized and understood, but which is conven-
tionally unrecognized except in its quantitatively excessive
form that is wel] known underthe name hypocrisy. Havelock
Ellis somewhat explicitly recognizes it as ‘“Bovarism’’ in
“Impressions and Comments.’’ We may somewhat descript-
ively name it psychological reversal, or psychological or
mental inversion, or much better, make believe. It is the psy-
chological phenomenon less intense than hypocrisy, and so
not quantitatively immora] (§163b). (Clearly, the milder
stages of hypocrisy must be moral] and useful—for truistically
nothing that is quantitatively wholly bad [0 or] can ex-
ist.) It is wel] known to children as make believe. It is
the generalized and balanced form of the ““glad game’’ or of
Christian Science (§149fq): for sometimes it is more neces-
sary to pretend a degree of calmness than to pretend joyous
excitement. It is the mental phenomenon that makes it so
hard to determine anyone’s conscious motives (even our own).
b. There being but slight recognition of this mental
phenomenon as such, and no conventiona] name for its more
norma! forms, obviously the way to make it known to the
reader is to describe it in some detail—and even then some
people will likely deny its existence. We may take
the popular routine story writer and his readers as exempli-
fying make believe. Many men find the world monotonous,
and seek a rest from an unbalance of bordom in excitement,
in the unusual, in the vividly emphatic. For proof of that
note the popularity of the movies—and in his day, of Shakes-
peare. Shakespeare hurls his meaning across with such vio-
lence that although the slang he used is three centuries
behind the times, it still is sufficiently intelligible to me to
be occasionally even painfully vivid; and his emphasis is still
more heightened by the fact that what he says is mostly right
and his poetic meter good (footnote 165d). The average
writer has difficulty in finding or inventing circumstances to
describe which actually are unusual and hence lacking in
monotony, or in seeing them in other than the routine way,
and especially in being self-consistent (i. e., right, **convine-
ing’’—as Shakespeare mostly was) about what he does see—
and that lack of consistency truistically destroys toa large ex-
tent what he does say, so that his rea] difficulty is to say
something. So our writer goes along writing what is intrinsic-
ally mostly nothing—and that in phrases so abused by misuse
that they couldn’t bear much load of meaning. So every
once in a while he forces his Emotions... to give, so to speak,
a hop, skip, and jump: he rising up to give in an apparently
excited manner three cheers for this, that, or the other thing.
(That is usually called pep and punch.) The reader lets or
makes his emotions imitate those excitements pretended by
the writer; and that artificial pretence of unbalanced emo-
tions does work backwards in some degree and give the
emotions some exercise, getting them slightly (and pleasantly,
if attention is kept off the fact that finally the pretense is in-
consistent, and not in agreement with the tremendously

?

§155b XVII Three

exciting and also calm real universe) out of their monotony.
I rather like to read such stuff myself, and enjoy it. There
are some of those writers so fearfully inconsistent, though,
that I can’t stand them:- Holworthy Hall, Gertrude Ather-
ton, Fannie Hurst, Kathleen Norris, Conrad, Hergesheimer.

c. Precisely that sort of make believe is more or less
practiced by everyone—some going in the direction of excite-
ment, and some in the opposite direction of calm. We may
note several exaggerated cases that possibly run into hypoc-
risy:- The hard, callous man who will ruthlessly foreclose
the widow’s mortgage (perhaps quite justly: the point is
that it hurts him negligibly to do it) often becomes a deacon
in the church and pretends much sentimental piousness,
and a sweetly concerned missionary interest in the *“be-
nighted beathen’’ who usually practice Christ’s ethics bet-
ter than he ever will; if be is a particular brute he may go
so far as to build a hospital for suffering cats. |The deacon
helps to get his narrow egotism expanded a bit (and thus
saves it from accumulating into a perceptible insanity) by
glaringly advertising a kindly unselfishness he has very little
of. The female parasite that becomes a ‘‘Society”’
leader and an ostentations ‘‘charity worker’’ and ““church
worker,’’ or a general community “‘uplifter,’’ is pretending
to herself and others that sbe has not the character of a para-
site. And such make believe, or reversal] of the original
quantitative fact, obvionsly does give her some proper Emo-
tions... and helps to balance her life mentally. Usually she
does not know she is doing that, and will indignantly deny
it. In tbe same way a kaiser or other demagog can
not understand that he does not actually care for his people
much, but exploits them. His unbalance has perceptibly to
himself been balanced by a pretense of much love, and much
talk about it. And in trying to get this book pub-
lished I found that there are ‘deacons’ in science who do a
large amount of talking about the need of “‘research,’’ etc.,
that is make believe. E. g., Angell, now president of Yale,
in my opinion talks too well on the subject (ef. his inaugural
address, ete.). Before I could believe that there were such
fine ‘deacons’ and demagogs in science I applied twice to
Angell (while he was head of one and then another institu-
tion chartered to advance science) for help with this book—
giving him some of the most competent endorsements of the
book. The first time he wrote me vagnely that he imagined
there were established ““precedents’’ to guide in the matter.
The second time he ignored it. J] am sorry for Yale.

d. Children deliberately and consciously practice a nor-
mal, moral pretense in their games of make believe. James,
without being very definite about it, in effect calls the same
game by adults the “‘will to believe.’’ If we deliberately
assume— pretend to possess—wbat are ordinarily the psycho-
logical or physiological results of certain emotions, we in
considerable degree cause those emotions in ourselves: men-
tal phenomena work backwards (valid logic is ciren)ar).
Actors often perceptibly exhibit the phenomenon of assumed
emotions producing the actual ones. Obvionsly, when our
unbalance is sligbt in degree, and we practice a correspond-
ingly slight degree of backwards pretence of emotions, we
can, and usually do, remain conscious of what we are doing.
In that case, where there is definite consciousness of what we
are doing, and no effort to deceive others, the process is ob-
viously normal, and useful (primarily to oneself, or selfishly);
and such a quantitative degree of reverse emotions I call make
believe. In order to be normal! it must be consciously and
undeceptively an unbalance being balanced—it zs an unbal-
ance of course, and while permissible is not the highest type
of either sanity or morality (it is the psychological aspect of
the zone BC, B’C, Fig. 163b). The deacon and the

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184

Society leader usually are so very unbalanced that their ex-
aggerated form of psychological reversal becomes so real to
them that it deceives themselves, and then they try to get
others to believe it. And that over-doing or intemperance in
make believe is hypocrisy (the psycbological aspect of the
milder part of the zone of the immoral, Fig. 163b), and is a
mild degree of insanity not usually considered pathological—
i. e., nature has taken control, unconsciously to themselves, and
is trying to balance their brains: but as the deacon and the
Society leader mildly fool themselves in only a few activities
when they are hypocrites, they are mildly and tolerably
insane—are just partly killed off by the universe or God.
When the deception becomes general], so that there is a more
orless systematized misconception in most activities (or when
there is an intense misconception or seeing of things as they
are not, in one or a few activities), then we customarily as-
sert a pathological insanity. The “‘glad game’’ or Christian
Science carried too far—not on appropriate occasions bal-
anced by a reverse ‘sad game’—is truistically a mania.

e. Therefore, a general test for the mental sanity or
balance of a person, which can be readily applied, is to note
whether he is conscious of what seems to other people to be
his most pronounced make believe—whether he is sane
enough to know where he verges on insanity (the man who is
certain he is quite sane, that he knows it a}] and knows it
right, is usually at least close to pathological insanity).
E. g., that test of sanity may readily be applied to me:- In
this book I emotionally pretend a calmness and commonplace
conventionality that may sonietimes not be in strict quantita-
tive accordance with fact. I am quite aware of it: the
method of make believe I use is that in every case of reason-
able quantitative donbt as to the fact, I incline to empha-
size its commonplaceness. That is what is recommended as
rhetorical understatement; as a matter of fact it is admission
of lack of sufficient strength to get along without that bias
(cf. §149i): I do it for my own protection, so as to stay bal-
anced with certain quantities. So make believe is the
explicit process that is sometimes vagnely called mental self-
control. To admit that we need to control ourselves—to be
temperate—at a certain point is to admit that we are too
weak to go beyond it (§159). And this make believe has
been neglected because men ohject to admitting weakness
explicitly (for obviously good reasons). So I have definitely
shown that the man who disclaims any weakness in any
respects, and consequent need of control, is really so weak
as to be in imminent danger of a lunatic asylum. The direct
result of avoidance of this subject of needed control, in
the various special points we each need it, has obviously re-
sulted in numbers of people passing the limits of normality
into hypocrisy. An enlightened public opinion on the mat-
ter will largely stop it—and I judge cut our taxes in two.

f. The recognition of make believe has possible practical
value in enabling us to play consciously (and hence sanely
and rationally) a general mental balancing process instead of
the theoretically one-sided glad game, or Christian Science,
or proceeding in heedless and unwarned ignorance and be-
coming hypocrites. Such a practica) “‘serenity’’ game is
described by Dorothy Canfield Fisher in ‘‘Fellow Captains’’;
this section gives the theory which shows its ultimate rigor
(cf. §170jm). And in addition to its practical] value, make
believe shows truistically that even in the man who superfic-
ially appears the most unbalanced mentally there is an actual
close approach to a balance. It appears that hypocrisy ordi-
narily begins in a normal man as a conscious pretence—and
then is not hypocrisy. But his unbalance for various reasons
(for them, ef. the description of Fig. 163b) tends to become
so great that his make believe becomes imperceptible to him

185

—and again strictly is not hypocrisy from his point of view,
and so from a general point of view is a mild insanity. But
he was responsible for his hypocrisy when it was on the verge
of leaving consciousness; and in practical life we continue to
hold him responsible until] he passes into the zone of definite
pathological] insanity (§§157, 163). It therefore fol-
lows that everyone’s intentions are always good. It is truis-
tically impossible that anyone, from uis point ef view at the
time of the action, can have an improper motive (§25)—on
the same principle that man can not make a real error. That
follows also from the theory of responsibility, and will be
made clearer in §157 and the next chapter.

§156. a. This section sums up the quantitative prin-
ciples of psychology. The Weber law or the Weber-
Fechner law (I shal] make no distinction; see ‘“Ency. Brit.,”’
‘‘Weber’s law,’’ or James’s “Psychology,” I, 533-49) as-
serts, as presumably stating the results of psychological] ex-
periments, that in order that the intensity of a sensation may
increase in arithmetica] progression the stimulus must increase
in geometrical progression—it being explicitly noted (1) that
in all cases there is a limit at both “ends’ (usually called the
upper thresbold and lower threshold) of the perception of
sensations; (2) tbat there is frequently a very perceptible
time lag in the building up and dying out of the sensation
(especially with ““chemical’’ sensations of taste and smel]);
and (3) that usually those progressions are perceptibly inex-
act near the thresholds. For experimental details
and discussion, see the authorities cited.

b. If we take Emotions... < Intellect...==Will as being
explicitly a standard universe, referring to the summed up
sensations or sensation of an individual at a given smaJ] time
interval, we may write it Emotions... < Intellect... =The given
summed up arithmetical increase between the thresholds. And
the Weber-Fechner law asserts that those summed up sensa-
tions are roughly the result of geometrical progression in the
stimuli [the Emotions... X Intellect... ]|—which obviously is a
truistic way of stating those equations (the X, or the inverse
square law, in the first members indicates such progression),
and is in agreement with the argument of this book. Or,
the Weber-Fechner Jaw is orthodoxly stated thus:-_ the dif-
ference between any two stimuli is [as the Will, or as a One
sun] experienced as an equal magnitude if the ratio of the
stimuli remains unaltered (subject to the inexactness stated
in the last paragrapb). That is obviously identical] in prin-
ciple with Richards’s genera] corrected gas equation (§82),
p... Xv...==A constant—and hence is the assertion that psy-
chological experiments are in agreement witb all our general
equations. It is thus proved in a directly experimental way
that psychology or humanics is identical with *“exact’’ science.

ce. And it is directly obvious that this Weber experi-
mental (psycho-physical) interpretation or truistic assertion
of our general equation Emotions... X Intellect...—Will is also
an assertion of harmonic periodicity in a ‘reverse’ or ‘time’
way, thus:- We saw that in the case of atoms (structures of
the same order) in general only certain fairly close approxi-
mations to periodical] ‘*elementary’’ sizes could survive in the
same environment for a given duration of time. I. e., each
surviving elementary size has an upper and a lower threshold
beyond which the structure becomes unstable as a whole (be-
cause of its reactions with an always incommensurate environ-
ment). Now, in psychology there is a recognized periodicity
inside the thresholds (which of course implies the reverse:- a
similar periodicity of the thresholds). The Weber-Fechner
law asserts just that perceptible periodicity inside a highber-
order structure like man—a ‘spectrum’ inside the thresholds,
and a different order of ‘spectrums’ of thresholds, in infinite
E. g., upon al] humanic spectrums inside the

regress.

UNIVERSE

Three XVII §156e

thresholds there is superimposed a quantitative periodicity of
normal and abnormal, pleasure and pain, good and evil, with
their thresholds again subject to inexactness (as are all differ-
ence surfaces), and to the same time lags (§163).
That threshold periodicity is probably anatomically observ-
able. Thus we saw in §152c that there were seven (etc.)
perceptible sorts of nerve endings. Theoretically, those of
course indicate a periodicity of senses (hearing, temperature
sense, muscular sense, etc.)—each sense being a psychologi-
cal ‘atom’ (higher-order structure) analogous to an atom.

d. The proper mathematical statement of that quantita-
tive theory is omitted. I have not formulated it, although a
good mathematician could readily make an abstract formula-
tion. Buta somewhat definite mathematical statement would
take me years to hammer out, as I know only enough details
of mathematics to see that an explicit revision of calculus
would be a necessary preliminary step, so that al] conven-
tiona] zeros and infinities may be handled consistently. But
a general mathematica] statement may be made similar to
the mathematical theory in Marshall’s ““Principles of Eco-
nomics’’ (6th ed., 838-58). His (economists’) “‘marginal
utilities’’ are “‘thresholds,’’ and his ““demand curve’’ ay°=c
(840) more explicitly is 2... X<y...—=Universe. In that place
Marshall shows fairly definitely the fina] infinite regress of
superimposition of one spectrum on another. But before we
get far on that infinite road to accuracy (as Marshall’s eco-
nomic equations show), the pains of complexity become more
than the pain of a slight quantitative gamble or guess.

e. The genera) reader wil] nearly surely not understand
the foregoing remarks in this section about the ultimate quan-
titative mathematics or measuring theory or periodicity of
science. Iam quite aware that I do not grasp it myself;
i. e., at some stage of the gameof going from That to This to
see Just what is the complete expression of the two I become
confused with the details and quit the process with some re-
sidual inaccuracy. Any mathematical statement of it, re-
gardless of the cleverness and ingenuity of its nomenclature
and logical consistency, must do the same quitting at some
point. Thus it appears that the difficulty of this section is
not a difficulty in essential knowledge, but one of grasping
infinite detail zn detail. It simply can’t be done perceptibly.
But we sum up the details as a One readily enough. In
short, in this section I deliberately got aboard the infinite re-
gress, and kept persistently at describing it, implying the
attempt to get at and seize the dots by mathematics, and the
inevitable result is to me a perceptible quantitatively baffled
confusion. If the reader has had enough mental endurance
to follow on that chase (analogous to a kitten’s chasing its
tail), he too wil] feel baffled. But we need that ex-
plicit, conscious experience so as to know what to expect in
the infinite regress. I used to be pained by it, and many
people have been pained to the extent of making despairing
qualitative errors about this fleshly prison, ignorabimus, etc. ;
but obviously, there is no need of feeling that way and we
automatically will not as soon as we really understand the
matter (it will probably take most people months to get over
previous bad mental habits). The thing to do is to judge
how far along the details on the infinite regress wil] do us
any appreciable good—have any marginal utility, or in or-
dinary terms, are worth the trouble (of getting, using, etc.).
As soon as we get that far, then truistically we should at
once get off the regress by summing it into a universe or a
standard universe (i. e., acting on the sum or Will, as implied
in the next section). If in that process we have not had
enough endurance to follow all the appreciable details (if we
have not bad enough mental integrity to perceive that it is
raining, and that ordinarily we have to come in out of it),

§156e XVII Three

then we can rest peacefully assured that the universe will
accumulate enough effects of the overlooked details to force
us at the proper time either to see them and react on them
in a way to preserve our lives, or die. We all truistically
finally die of the accumulation of such stupidity. But it
would kill us even more promptly to hang on too persistently
to any infinite regress; so we exhibit wisdom by reasonably
guessing at how much stupidity to exhibit. This para-
graph is the general psychological statement of the essentials
of what is valid in pragmatism (see Jordan’s Introduction for
a better one). Any attempt to grasp too many of the Many
is painful, and hence from our points of view as individuals
is wrong and foolish (but cf. §159g)—even if the attempt be
disguised in the mathematical theory which I indicated and
even though all the mathematicians assert that they can fully
grasp such quantitative details. Finally, Fechner, like other
German materialists, substantially asserted that se could
grasp the ultimate quantitative expression of his law. James
(“Psy.,”? I; 534, 549), as a sort of germ of his future prag-
matism, sarcastically repudiates the possibility of Fech-
ners being quantitatively so omniscient. The
Puritanical conscience consists largely of an agonized hanging
on to the infinite regress. Some of that—some “‘serious-
ness’’—is obviously needed to avoid reasonable possibility of
overlooking something important, and as a means of expand-
ing limits of perception and increasing mental! endurance and
strength (§159). Such persistent ‘“‘worrying’’ (or the up-
to-date names for it are psychic complexes, Freudian repres-
sions, sensc of inadequacy, etc.—in everyday terms it is
modesty) made able, fine, useful men of the early Adamses,
Lincoln, and others who had the strength to stand it and who
had something To ovo, thus stopping that mental effort at a
healthy, wise, balancedly modest point, summing it into Will
and thus getting a mental rest. But too much of it without
the balancing doing made Henry Adams a querulous snob.

§157. a. We now consider Will, in Emotions... < Intel-
lect...=Will. That term is the mental term that probably
is most often used (both in everyday life, and in formal psy-
chology) to name the summed up universe or personal stand-
ard universe from the mental or subjective point of view.
Perhaps the term for the same thing which js used nearly as
often is ““thought’’ (or one of its variations). But as seen,
nearly any psychological term may be used in a One sense.
Obviously, anything which we find applying to Will also ap-
plies identically to any term which replaces Will in the equa-
tion: the only difference is that the various terms in a vague
sort of way indicate standard universes of varying sizes when
such standard ones are being used.

b. When we receive a nerve stimulus the energy travels
through parts of nerve cells toward the cortex, and probably
acts as a trigger to release more energy from the cells them-
selves (i. e., the jolt starts considerable secondary formation in
the cells [they are “‘irritable’’ to such]: they renew that en-
ergy or structural loss from food). At any cell or cells in the
path the energy may be very largely (or entirely so, as far as
is perceptible in the cortex) collected together or focused (just
as small asymmetries accumulate to cause a whirl to be given
off); and then (equivalent to secondary whirl formation
this time in larger quantity) that energy from that ‘focus’ or
ganglion is sent out in more or less branching nerve paths to
muscles, which in their turn react with the environment (it
may be some internal organ). As the environment gave the
original stimulus the cycle is complete (but not exact in any
finite space). Truistically (by the principle of continuity),
all such energy cycles must affect in some degree the nerve
cells that give conscious sensation (I shall take it that such
cells are in the cortex-—a quantitative fact supported roughly

UNIVERSE

186

by observations). Those energy flows that go out to cause the
muscles to move, will also in some degree irradiate and affect
the cortex; and the movement of the muscles will also do
the same. Obviously there is an infinite regress of reactions.
All those sensations which only vaguely get to the cortex, and
there are, each of itself, below the threshold of “‘perceptibil-
ity,’’ are usually named emotions or feelings. Those emo-
tions as an accumulation are perceptible. From them,
truistically we are clearly but roughly conscious of our
identity with the total universe; for obviously those conscious
emotions necessarily include reactions with everything. At
the same time other stimuli from the environment are strong
enough to travel up to the cortex and be perceptible there.
Even those stimuli are a collection; e. g., we can not per-
ceive by any definite sensation a single atom, but get a sen-
sation accumulated usually from many thousand atoms. The
sensations which we (arbitrarily, as just seen) consider sep-
arately perceptible are obviously Jntellect.... | Now, as seen
above in physiological detail, those “‘perceptible’’ sensations,
together with the emotions in general, are focused in some
cell or cells in the cortex (we can see now that the phenom-
enon is truistic with continuity). And as before, that energy
must be discharged. We perceive that focusing and discharge
and name it wll,

ce. Or, if the discharge does not at once take place to
voluntary muscles, but first discharges partly to involuntary
muscles and partly to other nerve cells, then that first focus-
ing and discharge is usually not ealled will, but is named
thought, or reflection, or consciousness, or nearly any other
spiritual term. But obviously, even that phenomenon is
identical in principle with “‘will’’: merely quantities are dif-
ferent between a discharge mostly to one set of organs (vol-
untary muscles) and one to another set (involuntary muscles
and perhaps chiefly to other nerve cells). _It is truistically
impossible for the discharge to take place absolutely com-
pletely to any one part of the universe; in all eases some of
it goes to other brain cells and involuntary organs and is re-
flected back as further emotions, ete., in regress. (There
are no absolutely “‘involuntary’’ organs, but merely organs
which can not be directly and with fair precision controlled
by the cortex.) So the difference between will, thought,
etc., is quantitative. | And this paragraph obviously implies
the principles concerning ‘“‘men of action’’ or executives,
thoughtful men, meditative or contemplative men, etc. The
only one I need state is the obvious general one that no man
can be wholly one sort, and that the normal, wise man will
keep a fair balance of being the various sorts (ef. the evils of
Adams’s “‘thinking,’’ stated in less precise terms in §156e).

d. In strict logic it is evident that the act of will (or of
thought, etc.) is either definitely (1) the “process” between the
accumulation of nervous energy and its discharge; or (2) the
whole process of accumulation and discharge (the whole pro-
cess is obviously identical in principle with an electrical cur-
rent). Truistically, in the first case there actually is no finite
or pluralistic process ‘“between’’ the accumulation and the
discharge; the term “‘will’’ in such a view is a pluralistic-
ally non-existent limit or division between the two, or isa
zero term. And the second case makes the “‘will’’ the con-
tinuous name summing all the infinite details of that accumu-
lation and discharge in really unending cycles, and ‘‘will’’
is then infinite (possibly as a formal standard universe). In
either case, will is obviously consistently Will in our equation
~—a One in full agreement with our whole argument.

e. And that gives the complete solution of the age-long
squabble about the freedom of the will. We may look at
the solution in two ways (the first in this paragraph; the
second in the next). (1) The introspective observer

187

sees what he calls his will (or mind, or thought, etc.) appar-
ently as a continuous and hence infinite affair, and promptly
and consistently says it is free. Clearly, from such a point
of view it can not react with anything as it is everything, and
hence can not logically be in any chain of cause and effect.
Various systems of philosophy and ethics have been based on
vague statements of that way of observing the will as infinite,
or as at Jeast a formal One. But on the other hand the ob-
server notes that if he considers the universe divided into the
Many (even if he takes that pluralism as being roughly per-
ceptible parts of merely his own mental action), then his will
is not any of those parts, but is a sort of limit to them—is
perceptibly zero. In brief, a tangible Many ‘‘will’’ persist-
ently eludes him;—as proof, try to touch it yourself, from
that point of view. Then he in some way asserts that his
will is nothing—that it is “‘worse’’ than ‘‘determined’’ :-
that he (his will) is the sport of circumstances, or that
he is “‘predestined,’’ or in the absolute clutch of fate,
or “not as I will, but as thou wilt,’’ or in Nirvana, etc., etc.
This first way (with those two aspects:- © and 0) of
looking at the solution is obviously two One views of the uni-
verse—one aspect calling the will everything, and the other
substantially calling the universe infinite pluralism so that
everything which, like the will, then becomes a relationship
or a zero limit between the parts is “‘nothing’’ with respect
to the Many. Or, the second aspect calls the universe itself
Nirvana or zero or nothing. There is a wide choice of ex-
pressions as to just what that Buddhistic or fatalistic or non-
Anglo-Saxon view is. At any rate it is obvious that those
two possible ways of viewing the universe give different
names to the condition of the will; but clearly both classes of
those names mean the same:- which in Occidental everyday
language is that the will is free. ‘(If the will is zero, obvi-
ously it is just as free as if it were infinite—as it is a truism
that nothing can control a zero.) I have above com-
bined the discussion of the relationship form and the One
form of the three Trinity forms of the term will. That per-
mits the use of clearer familiar terms. From a logical point
of view it would be clearer to give the three views.

f. (2) The second and more common way of considering
the Trinity puzzle of the will depends upon whether will is
considered used in the One member or in the Many member
of the equation. Obviously, by our Anglo-Saxon verbal
apreements, if in the One member then the will is free. If
a man observes himself (his will), so far as he can perceive at
ihe time he does what he wants to (even when he says he does
not ‘‘want’’ to do something, he obviously sti prefers to do
it for some remoter reason—to do it rather than accept the
result of not doing it): he makes of will a standard universe
and it is free. But he (1) can /ater on recall by memory his
actions, and then see them as being his reactions as an indi-
vidual with the other parts of the universe; or, he (2) can at
any time observe other individuals reacting with other parts;
and in each case he readily perceives that what formerly to
him, or what at the time to the other individuals, was or is
the standard universe free will, is, in his now wider, and per-
haps whole, universe, a unit of the Many—that those standard
Will’s now come over into the Many side as being parts:- as
Wills..., or more explicitly, Intellect.... And of course,
from such a point of view the individual will is determined.
But with final accuracy, the person is really the total uni-
verse (§47); in that case his will is finally absolutely free (by
Anglo-Saxon language)—for the obvious reason that there is
nothing besides it to control it. The Oriental ““pre-
destination,’’ although it apparently speaks of a determined
will, now clearly means a free will (par. e).

g. That gives the general solution of the problem of the

UNIVERSE

Three XVII §158c

will, of reason, mind, thought, God the Father, etc. Obvi-
ously, the practical, everyday solution of the problem is that
if we see enough of the universe—seeing that it as a whole
works consistently and along the path of no resistance,—we
ourselves completely will to go or be carried along that path.
In that case, from our point of view, the will is free. But
from a Many point of view our finite will is completely de-
termined. If we fancy we resist going in that inevitable path
we are merely suffering from stupidity.

8158. a. In this section we get the explanation of mem-
ory. In objective science our quantitative or Many
agreement is that space is a fixed relationship which remains
or endures. [. e., London and Chicago are in certain rela-
tive spaces which can at any time during a considerable per-
iod be objectively viewed in such fairly steady relationship
by anyone who cares to verify such an assertion about them.
Or, we can and do experiment objectively by observing space
relationships or coincidences; and at any time the experi-
ments with such space relationships can be fairly accurately
repeated. So we say that space endures—or just zs, and re-
mains so;—thata structure or unit of the Many is objectively
verifiable by anyone because of the formally fixed and con-
stant space relationships. We can in theory perform an
“‘experiment’’ in any part of space—and in practice, if we
take the trouble to go there, etc. But, we commonly
say that with time it is different—that we can ‘‘experiment’’
only in the present. Now, the obvious truth is that all of
that “‘concrete’’ relationship of space has been asserted by
means of using time, so that the space endured, and we could
go about in it anywhere—7f we had the tzme—and experi-
ment. In short, the arbitrary, ““concrete’’ invention space
is the exact counterpart, formal opposite, or reacting part or
symbol or mechanical balancer, of the arbitrary “‘mental’’
time. We do not conventionally say that there is any ‘“men-
tal’? space—our ‘“thoughts’’ do not conventionally ‘‘occupy’’
space. And in the same way our thoughts do occupy finite
time, so that there is no ‘‘objective’’ time in the way there
is objective space. Space is “outer memory’ or object-
ive relationship, and time is “inner memory.’ Obviously,
without memory or an arbitrary mental agreement of inner
*“duration’’ (just as ““space’’ may be said to be outer °‘dura-
tion’’), there can not possibly be an arbitrary enduring relat-
ing space. All that gives the “‘abstract’’ or relationship
meaning of memory—its more usual sense. The real present
is either 0 or ©—a One term and-or meaning. Nothing plur-
alistic or Many can possibly happen init. So we can not
really perform any experiment in the present. All eaxperi-
ments are performed in the past and remembered. Clearly, by
classic logic it is impossible to have any experiments.

b. To get the Many meaning of memory in perhaps the
simplest way we may write the infinite pluralism equation

Many..... =One, and note that we have been considering it
objective. The subjective form (the form that emphasizes 7
of the implied L and 7) is obviously Memories..... = Meaning.

(If we put a Many term memory in our usual psychological
equation it conventionally would be an explicit name for part
of Intellect..., and implicitly a part of Emotions...; see rest
of section: to devise a definite psychology with an equation
——.,,. X Memories...==Will would obviously require mostly a
new nomenclature. ) So truistically Memory...... is
the psychological term that corresponds to the “‘physical’’
mass or M.... Therefore, when we use M in any science
which implies the use of L and T (and all sciences do; IV)
a part of its meaning is memory (cf. pars. c-e). Therefore,
in all our measuring members M(varying with)L?T~, the M
rigorously and precisely means mass and-or memory.

ce. The mechanics of our memory, as a matter of truisms,

§158e XVII Three

are obviously as follows:- | Any structure is the result, or
“‘record,’’ of what has previously happened to it in infinite
regress. Evidently, every asymmetry in the universe has
left its mark in any and every structure—has in some more
or less minute degree modified that structure. So any pres-
ent asymmetry of the structure exhibits in some degree all
those past records. And that inclusion or identical relation-
ship of the total past in the ““present’’ asymmetry is memory
—stated mechanically or physiologically, and giving memory
primarily its relationship form. As all M’s truistically are
such relationship, or (using conventional Many terms) are
entities in such relationship (Part One), we see again that
a memory isan M. So truistically all M’s have—are-—an
infinite memory. To assert that any structure has the ad in-
finitum record or memory of the past is identical with saying
that its structural parts baveacertain L and T relationship——
both L and T being with finally correct equal emphasis in-
cluded in the assertion. That, and the last paragraph, is
hence essentially a repetition of §150d-g. The real
difficulty in explaining ‘‘memory’’ is that its meaning is
so glaringly obvious and continually used that there is the
usual troublesomeness in disengaging, so to speak, the know-
ledge of it from ourselves and setting it off a little ways from
under our noses, so as to look at it “‘objectively.”’

d. So truistically, if anything happens to a biologic cell
(if there occurs an asymmetry in it) the cell tends to act in
the same summed up way it did in the past, subject to modi-
fication due to the fact that the present happening does not
exactly duplicate anything in the past. Hence there tends
to be a rough general fixity of function and-or of structure on
the one hand, and a balancing modification of it due to
changes in the environment on the other. So in a fairly
steady climate (environment) there goes on side by side a
rather steady balance of (1) ‘remembered’ form and function
and (2) a slight change to meet slight changes.

e. When such a monistic memory is exhibited by nerve
cells in a degree that is objectively perceptible to us, but is
not perceptible as a memory to the individual exhibiting it,
we call it znstinct; or if it is in a still lower degree of per-
ceptibility to us we name it reflex action, or tropism, etc. And
there is a vague degree of memory which so far as I can de-
termine is experienced at times by everyone, that might be
called an emotton ef memory. I have that emotion of memory
as an occasional vague feeling that some present incident and
a great deal more like it happened to me in the far distant
past— whereas if I examine into the matter I find that nearly
surely it didn’t. Apparently, the frequent occurrence of
that emotion of memory to various people accounts for the
belief in transmigration of souls. Truistically, in a One sense
we do have a ‘memory’ of ‘‘past existences’ ’—actually of all
such existences. But the usual orthodox quantitative belief
that one “‘individual’’ soul goes or transmigrates as a con-
stant unit to a later one is obviously wrong dualism of the
Maxwell-atom type. For years I have occasionally
experienced memory-emotions when stimulated by some
French word or phrase—particularly old names of places. It
obviously would be quite easy to make an exaggerated quan-
titative guess that I am a reincarnation of a Frenchman, al-
though so far as I happen to know I am over 95 per cent
British blood, and no French (for the benefit of the anthro-
pologists:- I am definitely Nordic type, cephalic index about
68—a marked long-head). Obviously, as it is theoretically
possible for our emotions to dig out the most ancient memo-
ries in a vague way, almost any sort of queer belief (even the
‘‘insane’’ man’s belief that he is Caesar) is based on adequate
psychological cause, and is correct ina One sense. But us-
ually such queer beliefs rest upon rather silly quantitative

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188

judgment. All the mystics are qualitatively right; but the
average mystic states a preposterous quantitative hash.

f. Memory commonly means perceptible memory. Any
nerve cel! consists of whirls which are moving in certain
paths; and that activity of the cell is normally probably just
on the threshold of perceptibility. Ifa stimulus (asymmetry)
comes along and speeds up some of those whirls the activity
becomes (say) perceptible. That stimulus obviously does
not change the total of the whirl paths much (the structural
energy of the cell is enormous compared with it), but does
probably change a few paths considerably. Now, if another
stimulus of sufficient energy comes to that cell, as a general
quantitative truism the whirls speed up to perceptibility in
about the same paths as before, and hence the perception
is somewhat of a repetition, or memory, of the first one. The
second stimulus is somewhat different from the first, and so
gives a perception quantitatively different from the memory
also produced. Hence, the “‘feel’’ of the memory is differ-
ent from the “‘feel’’ of the total perception—and also the
‘feel?’ of resulting irradiations (which result analogously
to Huygen’s law) is more or less different. So using that
second stimulus as a standard, the partial result of it which is
the memory is recognized as such a memory or repeated reac-
tion. Obviously, the infinite regress is included in that defi-
nition and truistic proof of the existence of ordinary memory;
and it is a circular definition. It is readily seen that
memory can not be consistently defined or asserted by classic
logic. E. g., by that logic a child’s first perception can not
be a memory, and he has no perceptible memories; then the
second perception can be in part a duplicate of the first, but
as the child has no single memory, he has absolutely nothing
to serve him as a standard by which to judge that the second
is in part stimulating a memory——and so on forever, he never
having a memory. Jn practice the classic logic in effect en-
dows the child’s mind with absolute creative power, making
the child God, who then in some unstated way manufactures
out of nothing a standard memory, by which to know he has
a memory. So classic logic essentially assumes memory (§35)
—and can be shown in precisely the same truistic way to as-
sume everything else. Therefore, the existence of memory
proves by intimate evidence the argument of this book.

g. We now look at that memory process from the re-
verse point of view. As the whirls ofa cell are moving in a
certain general arrangement of paths, truistically only a cer-
tain stimulus (a certain general field asymmetry in the form,
say, of an electric current) can readily “‘go through’’ it—be
conducted by the cell in the stimulus’s cyclic path from the
environment through will and moving-muscles back to envi-
ronment, and in or by that conduction stimulate the cell to
perceptibility or consciousness. So a given stimulus ‘searches
out’ its paths, and selects those made of cells already moving
in ‘periodicity’ with itself. If the stimulus is very novel (is
due to something unfamiliar in the environment—as the gi-
raffe was to the man who saw one for the first time), there is
no adapted path or memory rut for it to go through, and it is
likely not to go through perceptibly; for it gets rapidly dif-
fused by the resisting cells it comes to (the man in that an-
cient story showed that fact by his exaggerated assertion that
there was no such animal). Hence, we fail to see some
thing consciously and perceptibly until literally millions of
practically the same stimuli pound and pound at our nervous
systems until they (the stimuli) finally get “‘high’’ enough up
or far enough along to be perceptible. E. g., an aristocrat
-~any hereditarily or otherwise “‘privileged’’ or ‘‘divine’’
person——is as such truistically ““narrow’’ minded even to the
extent of paranoia, and is hence correspondingly violent or
coarse in his actions (is in an unbalanced degree an exquisite

189

or do-nothing and oppositely crudely active: e. g., Oscar
Wilde, the Medici popes, and parlor radicals); yet the race
for centuries took such aristocrats to be really the best be-
cause their actions were sufficiently unbalanced in both direc-
tions to furnish stimuli that would pound through nerve paths
to attention. Those stimuli from the aristocrat were in fact
uncommon or noticeable; but such easily noticeable unbal-
ances are not the best, but tend to be pathological. | Prob-
ably that fact as to the defectiveness of aristocrats, militarists,
and all varieties of privileged persons has got up to the con-
sciousness of the majority of people in this country, now that
another and worse war has pounded it in; we now take such
mental red pepper when we feel we need it by reading of the
crimes and scandals of the aristocrats—in low life and high
life—in the newspapers, with a saving knowledge that they
are pathological. And we have the opposite aspect of
the same thing (which is what makes us need such red pep-
per in varying quantities and form):- a stimulus may be so
very well known that it goes through deep memory ruts so
smoothly and continually that it causes no perceptible change
and as a usual thing we do not notice it. That is another
way of saying why it is difficult to express the obvions.
Also, when stimuli go through thus easily we say we “‘be-
lieve’’ whatever it is that they assert, whereas in fact we
usually don’t notice whether it is nonsense or not.

h. The conclusions from the last paragraph are obvious :-
Unless we already have fairly definite memories of a certain
sort of stimulus, such a stimulus will not reach perceptibility
unless it is comparatively violent or comparatively long re-
peated (or both). In either case the learning of the new
thing is obviously likely to be fatiguing—perhaps painfully.
Also, unless the learner has a thorough grasp of the One (i. e.,
actually has, at least vaguely, indefinite memories of anything
which could be presented as a stimulus), the new stimulus he
is to ““learn’’ or incorporate into his nerve cells is likely to
be so thoroughly unknown to him as to cause fear; and the
‘earner’? may be one in a negative direction by taking act-
ive measures to get away from the stimulus. Fear is obvi-
ously merely the structural nerve resistance to anew stimulus
that is violent enough to force itself painfully through partly
into perception (so persons who are so © dense’’ as to be sub-
stantially impervious to an idea are ‘‘fearless’’; §170r).
On the other hand we may wear memory ruts so deep that
conscious resurrection of the memories is difficult. In either
case there is truistically a nerve unbalance or instability.
The live person neither partly runs away nor partly dies by
deep ruts, but is balanced by grasping the One.

i. The technical word that asserts that stimulithus seek
out their paths and cause perceptible memories, is association.
Obviously, we could name as many “‘sorts’’ of association as
we like (doing that used to be a favorite indoor game among
psychologists); butall those names would be in effect equiva-
lent to ‘‘cause and effect’’ or “‘relationship.’’ Association is
the psychologists’ usual name for God tbe Holy Ghost. ———
But often there seems to be, as an unfortunate legacy from
the old dualistic faculty psychology, the dualistic idea that
memories are distinct, constant-atom, exact things that are
as such stored in pigeon holes in the brain to be taken out at
any time, in perfect preservation. = Truistically, all stimuli
in part cause ‘‘new’’ ideas or perceptions (i. e., cause some
ideas so novel that no perceptible memory accompanies them ;
e. g., breakfast this morning is perceptibly and uniquely thes
morning’s breakfast, and not any other morning’s breakfast) ;
and in the remaining, usually much greater, part all stimuli
cause ‘‘old’’ ideas-—cause memories. So truistically memo-
ries of the Many can not possibly be preserved unchanged,
or even brought to consciousness after a certain time (during

UNIVERSE

Three XVII §159b

which they have worn considerably). Quite likely anyone
can resurrect a few apparently trivial memories that have been
apparently unchanged for a comparatively long time: but
only a small percentage of such memories can be resurrected
—-in proof of which try to make a list of what you ate at each
dinner for a month past. Of course, in a One sense memo-
ries are al] “‘there’’; but quantitatively most of them can not
be unchangedly stimulated enough to be perceived.

j. Itis perhaps already obvious to the reader that it is
possible to keep on and describe the whole universe in detail
in terms of memory. It can readily be done with nearly any
psychological term, because most are customarily used as
each part of the Trinity. But the foregoing wil] have to
serve, instead of the explicit volumes, to imply the expansion
of the details, and to show that the expansion is identical
with the expansion of the description of anything.

§159. a. It has become obvious that there is no essent-
ial difference between any two so-called faculties. Ideas and
perceptions and concepts and memories and sensations, etc.,
are all essentially the same; the difference is quantitative:-
some of them contain more of quantitative time and the im-
plied space, and some contain less. Usually that difference
takes the form of collecting some whirls (formally at least:
nobody has ‘measured’ the actual facts) into a unit ‘“higher’’
structure (and such quantitative difference will have to be
considered by the laws of periodicity, inverse square, etc.,
when such measuring is made). Thus, a concept is usually
taken as a collection of ideas (some sort of nerve struct-
ures) organized together; a law is a higher order of concepts,
etc. But obviously, when we say That... X This...—=Mean-
ing we have asserted that always there is such an organism
or relation. So our psychological equation Emotions... In-
tellect...—= Will asserts all those possible quantitative variations
in psychological terms. Such quantities are in detail usually
considered to be ethics;—the development of the measuring
member would definitely be psychology, until] such time as
that naming of measures ‘also took on a definite meaning of
normal or abnormal—right or wrong. So] shall not verge
further on ethics here, but close this chapter with this sec-
tion, which gives a general quantitative summary of the psy-
chological equation by showing its application as (1) the
mental solution of any problem, and as (2) the statement of
the character or ‘properties’ of genius.

b. Obviously, if we have a “‘problem’’ it is expressed
as That... X This...—Meaning, and has its ““mental’’ counter-
part as Emotions... XIntellect...—Will. As we have seen
(Index, ‘‘Explanation’’), the problem is ““solved’’ when we
have so many dots perceptible that some of them are familiar
to us, and we recognize that the dots with unbreakable rela-
tionship run in infinite regress. So tbe mental method of
solving any problem is to keep on looking at whatever it is
we want to know about until the various stimuli from it force
enough perceptions or sensations into consciousness for us to
see their unbroken relationship and to see that they are
familiar—and hence may be correctly fitted in to our living. Of
course, all the stimuli or dots which do not become percept-
ible are related—as we know after we have once grasped the
solution of the One and Many. But sometimes in order to
get a surely familiar (i. e., ‘fitted,’ useful, applicable) one it
is necessary to make those stimuli from the thing keep on
coming in for years before the right stimuli will get through
to perceptibility. There is no need to “‘try’’ to “‘relate’’ or
connect the perceptible ones into a “‘system’’ or organization
—into concepts or laws or those pernicious baby-pacifiers
called hypotheses. They are so related—as parts of the uni-
verse,—and the object is to keep struggling until we see the
details and hence truistically their unity or relationship. That

§159b XVII Three

of course indirectly amounts to trying to relate the percep-
tions; but the emphasis is different:- when we ‘‘try’’ to
make concepts that are those pernicious hypotheses, we have
our attention on the matter of relationship, instead of keeping
it on the thing itself (men in the past then usually got ex-
cited and tried to ‘‘prove’’ the relationship—which in practice
means irrelevantly to clamorously assert its existence, and is
worse than painting the lily). The relationship exists; and
if we are intelligent we know it exists before we start: so
we should put our effort on seemmg the thing as itis. | When
there are enough details perceptible they automatically snap
together into an obvious relationship in our brain—the nature
of the universe makes them do so (it is a trnism that they do)
and not any ‘‘effort’?? on our part. And until there are
enough they truistically will not systematize—and that is al]
that can be said of them. The man who tries to ‘‘force’’
them to do so, calling the result a hypothesis, thereby shows
that he is innocent of making or ‘“discovering’’ any laws, and
does not even know what such a process may be. We do
not formulate laws or ““great’’ generalizations as if we were
the capricious God of the dualists: we pound perceptions
into our minds—observe and observe and work to observe
some more—and the laws ‘formulate themselves.’

ce. That is the whole of the method of “‘solving prob-
lems.’’ Every man truistically is competent to solve any
problem (even if he is a congenital idiot) provided he can
keep on pounding in stimuli long enough and hard enough.
The idiot quickly gets tired of paying attention and quits
(that is what an idiot is in psychological quantitative terms—
an early ““quitter’’). The man who formulates laws also gets
tired of paying attention, but he does not quit so soon as the
idiot, or confine himself to an eight hour day (although of
course many persons are too weak to work well even eight
hours). As a general rule heretofore, the man, who by some
means more or less accidental so far as he ““purposed’’ or an-
ticipated (and always those means resolve themselves into
sufficiently intensely and persistently pounding stimuli in)—
the man who by some means had once gota grasp of the One
or whole realized that a relationship did exist between the
things he was observing (and also between them and him-
self, so that he was “‘interested,’’ or knew that they mat-
tered, or that his work was worth while, and hence worked
vigorously with no energy wasted on considering ‘‘what’s the
use?’’); so he was able to take his mind off the effort to see
relationship, and put it at seeing the things. Naturally such
men were able afterwards to solve many problems, and were
able to avoid getting so tired that they practically had to
quit. But it is now definitely proved that such a grasp of the
whole is highly useful, and how it is; and it is shown just
bow to getit. Soitis possihle for anyone consciously and
with a positive and correct method to go at solving any problem
—and solve it if he does not get so tired as to quit. Some men
have tougher brains than others, as we shall see. Religiously
or qualitatively men are alike—are essentially alike and abso-
lutely equal.. Quantitatively, or in a skin-bounded sense, no
two are equal—yjust as no two atoms are equal.

d. The last two paragraphs are rigorous theory. We
may now look at the Many aspect of solving any problem.
There are, so far as I know, only two quantitative tricks that
are of much importance in solving problems (perhaps other
men will find others of more importance for them). One is
to learn the “‘feel’’ of persistently grubbing down into our
vague ideas and memories—into Emotions..., or the modern
subconscious,—so that we can tell when the perception feels
as if it were coming up clearly; then we are able to keep on
at just the right time until we yank up into perceptibility the
sensation (observation) we need. That sensation is always

UNIVERSE

190

there and will come up if kept after long enough, and if we
keep on taking in additional observations from the outside to
reinforce it as may be necessary. It is difficult to keep on
when the perception with vague consciousness first comes—
there being then a strong desire to call it finished or observed,
and to spout the resulting half-baked ideas as a lot of senti-
mental mush (often called “‘idealism’’); the trouble with
Woodrow Wilson was that he indulged himself by usually
quitting important things on that last hard but essential lap
(hiding the indulgence from himself by polishing phrases and
performing other trivial and easy austerities); all] aristocrats
become so by indulgence on that last fierce lap—as I happen
to know from having tried it for a while. That digging
after perceptions can be made more successful by getting
into an environment that makes the worker mentally uncom-
fortable and irritable. | Apparently the best way to achieve
that emotional irritability is to overwork (tbat can be con-
trolled and irritating associates usually can’t): of course the
solver has got to pay for that irritation in decreased health.
That discomfort, like all quantitative things, can be over-
done (§163); ata certain stage the solver’s digestive appa-
ratus will get ont of gear, and fail to feed his brain fast
enough, thus counteracting the irritation’s good effect of sbak-
ing ideas loose from the bottom. A minor trick I have used
is to eat much sugar and a Jittle chocolate to make my brain
work vigorously and also irritatedly. Tea and coffee and to-
bacco happen to work too violently for me; and I think the
present version of the book is made much more balanced and
reasonable by the war’s having habituated me to a normal
consumption of sugar—although I doubt whether I could
have done the preliminary rough work without it. ——~- The
second general trick of solving a problem is to go at it in the
reverse way when we get too tired of one direction. All our
everyday formulas have two terms, That... and This...;
when the brain is so tired that it will not work well to pull
up more dots of That..., then start on This... and dig up
a few dots of it. Any normal person, by applying
those simple principles, devising quantitative means suitable
to himself, can solve any problem if he can keep at it. But
be will have to pay for it by wear and tear of himself—which
as a general rule will be replaced by better growth up toa
certain point of ‘reversal’—of ‘‘elastic limit.’ And
I have unavoidably above given the impression that digging
out this book was “‘hard work.’’ _ Being interested, I have
considered it play, and have for so many years automatically
used the phrase ‘when I finish the book and goto work,’ that
my associates adopted it. So solving life properly is fun.

e. From an objective point of view genius consists of
the genius’s having a body, particularly a nervous system,
strong enough to stand intense work for a long time. Or,
put in terms of the psychological equation, the genius is a
man who can endure an unusually large amount of both Emo-
tions... and of Intellect... (of vivid feelings and perceptions),
and keep on standing them without becoming so painfully
fatigued that he quits. Obviously, that is merely a quanti-
tative, unessential difference from the average man. That
man is of precisely the same quality as the genius—is funda-
mentally and in principle the genius’s equal, and so can use
himself as a standard by which to judge a genius; he also,
as a truism of the biological equations, can train himself, by
reacting with the environment, to endure more and more
work and thus acquire nerve strength and irritability—there
are no measures as to how far the average man can goin such
training in his available time. The average man ean see that
he himself ultimately, and in a real, accurate sense, is God:
his definite perceptions of that identity quantitatively include
a certain part of the whole infinite regress of possible ones.

191 UNIVERSE

The genius has more numerous perceptions and more vivid
ones; but clearly his can not be essentially greater. The
genius is not so much of a quitter as the average man; so he
lives more of life in a given calendar time.

f. The insane person also has vivid departures from the
normal balance. The important quantitative difference be-
tween him and the genius is that the insane man is not suffic-
iently conscious of his departure from the normal balance to
be able to come back to a balance and compare his departure
with that, and also recuperate. In short, the insane person
has gone so far from the normal that he has structurally dam-
aged his nervous system (or vice versa, if preferred; the act-
ual process is usually small cyclic steps ina “‘vicious circle’);
so he can not really do the work required of genius. The
genius can stand the same departure without perceptible
damage—just as one person tears a muscle with a load that
another carries with ease. So the insane person truistically
shows exceedingly poor quantitative judgment about some
things—usually not about many things. Unless his insanity
quickly kills him his nervous system achieves a ‘‘natural’’
balance by having some part of it become very narrow in the
limits it tolerates, to compensate for the wide vagaries of the
damaged parts. _In those narrow parts he is truistically ap-
parently saner than the average man—is radically conserva-
tive or is reactionary or stand-pat. The real genius
on the contrary can shoot out to wide limits in any subject—
to limits perhaps wider than the insane person’s—and do it
at will; and then return to a normal balance, and judge with
fair accuracy how far he went, and the quantitative propor-
tions of all things he observed on those excursions from the
normal.
anced man than the average man—would live a more normal
and steady life, and his opinions or judgments would be con-
siderably more sane (i. e., more accurate). Well; as
a matter of fact, so far as I have observed, the men who have
been usually named as the world’s great geniuses have failed
to reach that theoretical superior balance in at least a few
things. They apparently all shot out so far in one or a few
respects that they damaged their brains and did not have
good judgment in such matters afterwards—were fanatics in
them. Generally speaking, the average man has taken a few
similar flights in genius, and has become mildly fanatical or
a practically permanent crank or eccentric. But he is still
better balanced, even as an individual, than those acclaimed
geniuses, as he didn’t usually shoot out so far (ef. §171k).
I am quite aware that on whatever subjects I happen
to be, unconsciously to myself, a fanatic, in those subjects I
am unable to recognize other similar fanatics as being fanatic:
and I would consider as being fanatic in those subjects those
who are not. So in strict principle I am incompetent to
judge whether those acclaimed geniuses have all failed to
reach a superior balance. This application of the principle
that there is no exact science is respectfully urged for con-
sideration by those who are cocksure in their opinion that
others may be fanatics and cranks, but they themselves never.

g. So obviously the man who insists on his right to be
erratic, or unconventional in many minor things—upon his
right to have an ‘‘artistic temperament,’’ or to have any sort
of special privileges (he usually disguises that crude demand
under some such queer phrases as “living one’s own life,”’
‘‘the new freedom,’’ having a “‘career’’)—-the man who in-
sists on such ‘‘rights’’ is demonstrating his own inferiority ;
is demonstrating that his brain is too weak to avoid that mild
degree of unbalance or insanity called fanaticism. So truist-
ically it follows that all the pre-war Teutonic chatter about
the superman is ordinary fanaticism. For, to repeat, there
can be no man essentially superior to another; and the

So this proper sort of genius would be a better bal- .

Three XVII §159j

quantitatively superior man exhibits his superiority not by an
unbalanced, ““peppy,’’ noticeable departure from the normal,
but by a closer, more delicate adjustment to the normal, and
by his temperate preservation of average standards. That
genius has to make wide departures from the normal in order
to gain experience and judgment as to how to keep more bal-
anced; but he makes those departures so far as possible at
his own risk and expense, and as a necessary evil instead of
a praiseworthy performance, and does it unobtrusively, and
goes as little away from the norma) as will serve—with the
clear knowledge that it is insanity and death to persist in
those departures. On the contrary, the aristocrat, particu-
larly the exaggerated superman and “‘artistic’’ type, consid-
ers that just the opposite conduct is proper. The ordinary
socialist and the ‘‘red’’ type—the contract-breaking, output-
limiting, class-conscious workman—are precisely like the
other kinds of aristocrats in persisting in departing from the
normal, I[ think an intelligent child can see how wrong
those two sorts of aristocrat or radical] are.

h. The genius receives impressions from the environ-
ment and those cause him to work to get more, and so on
until he has a very full life—lives more. Most other people
note that sort of life and want it. But many decline to work
to get it; so they fail to get enough exercise for their abili-
ties, whether they be muscular or mental (or both). Hence
they develop a chief make believe of verbally railing at what
they call their monotonous, uninteresting, meager, unsuit-
able, etc., environment, and at their narrow circumstances
and lack of opportunity, etc., etc.—you probably have heard
it; labor leaders will demand shorter hours and then in the
next breath thus bewail the natural result of loafing. It of
course has become easier for those make-believers to talk that
way than it is for them to go to work and use the infinite op-
portunities for seeing and living that lie right at hand, and
the talking widens their horizon a little—halances them
some, as we saw in discussing make believe. Obviously,
truistically that talk sets up all aristocracy—miracles, some-
thing for nothing, privilege—as a desirable goal. Then some
of their neighbors who are more energetic (such as kaisers,
popes, demagogs, and all grabbers and grafters whether of
academic honors, Society leadership, fame, or cash) take that
guessed-at goal of mediocre make believe as being the real
thing, and go chase it. Thus the ““upper ten’’ and the
*“submerged tenth’’ actually directly mutually support and
cause each other—the numerous stupid weaklings formulating
the ““ideals’’; as the tramp and the kaiser are both after the
same thing (dualistic miracles, something for nothing), it
naturally is needful to give them the same name::- aristocrat.

i. Mostly I have verbally taken the conventional point
of view that genius refers to mental ability. Mental endur-
ance is of course truistically the ““representative’’ ability of
the whole individual, and is also the rarest in the direct form
of Intellect... But obviously, anyone who exhibits the same
delicate, conscious balancing or poise in his life, is equally a
genius. As a matter of obvious truism, the rea] genius can
not be so one-sided as to exhibit merely good JIJntellect...—a
fact shown best I think by Howe, who has an extraordinarily
well balanced intellect and hence knows its place (“‘Ventures
in Common Sense,’’ and ““E. W. Howe’s Monthly’’). He
must also exhibit a balanced whole life. I am convinced that
a good mother needs and shows the highest type of genius.

j. All that quantitative description of a genius—a per-
son with excellent organs—is clearly general, and is indefinite
as to what structures, etc., constitute such organs. No one
knows very much about that. But I have given a wide circle
of truistic description of the genius, and in principle anyone
can enter himself at any point in that circle that comes easy

§159) XVII Three

to him, and by sticking consistently to it, make of himself
in his own environment his own particular sort of genius—
which in the end means mostly a person sufficiently widely
and vividly experienced to live, and to enjoy living, an ex-
quisitely temperate life (which by no means is an ascetic life;
XVIII); then secondarily he adds to that as great perform-
ance according to his special capacity as he can. Breeding
is perhaps the best name for such genius, that produces the
only sort of useful and enduring work—except that in prac-
tice ““breeding’’ has been somewhat grabbed by the aristo-
crats as a name for coddling, emasculation, and subsequent
hysterical forays into imagism, cubism, or whatever be the
fashionable cult of the day. I should call Lee, and Ford,
and Rockefeller well-bred, and the latest New York Society
leaders mild boors.

k. The foregoing description of genius has been mostly
from the objective point of view. Many geniuses have said
what genius is, from the subjective point of view of their feel-
ings. Those avowals mostly divide into two sorts:- (1) that
the genius they exhibit consists of the fine frenzy of creative
work; (2) that the genius exhibited consists of the delightful
peace and sense of belonging properly with things and hence
of getting all of life, which follows that fine frenzy. Both
sorts of geniuses are in substantial agreement that the frenzy
comes from *‘outside’’—naming it inspiration, revelation, etc.

l. Their agreement that the frenzy comes from without
themselves tacitly takes for granted that they are bounded
by their skins. Thus they assert that they themselves did
not create any of the relationships that they saw—that those
relationships existed. That much of their avowals is consist-
ent (par. b). The rest of the conventional implications of
*‘inspiration,”’ “‘revelation’’ is truistically nonsense. Those
geniuses observed the universe and saw that it was beautiful
or completely fitted together; and that gave them a rebirth
(§153), which ultimately consists of the consciousness that
they themselves are an inseparable part of the universe—a
beautiful fit, reacting and hence useful. That part of their
‘‘revelation’’ was usually so vague with them that they in
general effect verbally contradicted it by implying that they
personally were apart from God or the universe so that the
revelation had to be handed ““down’’ to them. So far as [|
know, Christ was the genius most definite about the fact that
the essential truth is that he too was an inseparable part of
the whole—a Son (§162e). Any fairly intelligent
person can readily see that the general agreement of geniuses
is essentially that they had a rebirth insome degree. And any
person with a fair amount of mental endurance can readily
experience a rebirth, and thus subjectively experience in some
measure precisely what the geninses did.

m. Most geniuses seem to hold that frenzied ‘‘creative’
work is a desirable departure from the normal. We have
seen that such unbalances are not themselves good (par. f).
But so common is that defective view that insane persons are
sometimes mistaken for geniuses. But as noted,
others hold the opposite view that genius gives a sense of
peace, and of a blissfully calm and finished universe or God.

n. Clearly either way is correct as a One view. In
a practical or quantitative view, the temperate conclusion
is that the genius will avoid exaggerating or overdoing
either the peace aspect (which may expand into Buddhistic
or Oriental quietism, or European mistaking of laziness and
inert self-indulgence for cosmic “‘leisure’’) or the frenzy
(which may expand into mania, or the New York pained hur-
rying to nowhere in particular or wearisome ‘“‘punch’’ at
nothing special). So you have to decide for yourself what is
a temperate, exquisitely adjusted balance of the two for you.
Christ seems tohave recognized the two classes of genius and

?

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192

their tendency to exaggerate their partial point of view, and
for himself to have adopted an excellent balance. So again,
in the next most important fundamental point in full living,
Christ was correct. And Lincoln was explicit both in word
and deed about the need of such balance in life.

CHAPTER XVIII. Ethics and Economics.

8160. a. Ethics is the branch of science which chiefly
expresses whether or not we as persons like a given thing—
the science of happiness. It expands, according to vague
general agreement, into the applied science of how to get
what we want or like, and avoid what we do not like. We
vaguely and indefinitely call what we like moral, and what
we do not like zmmoral. Sometimes with even more conven-
tional vagueness we puta neutral collection of unmoral things
between the moral and the immoral—those being the things
that are almost perfectly balanced as far as is perceptible to
us. So ethics is frequently said to be the science of morals.
The moral and the immoral commonly tend to be named thus
from a ‘‘subjective’’ point of view. From a more or less
‘objective’? point of view the moral is termed the good, and
the immoral the bad or evil or sin. So from that view ethics
is the discussion of the problem of Good and Evil. But as
‘‘objective’’ and “‘subjective’’ are ultimately identical and
are necessarily both included in any science (XVII), and as
everyday ethical conclusions tacitly agree with that conclu-
sion by making no definite distinction between ‘‘inner’’ and
‘‘outer’’ good things, I shall not bother in this brief discus-
sion of ethics to make such formal distinction, except to show
(S161b) that those two great technical schools of ethics,
hedonism and idealism (which respectively go after or ap-
prove objective morality or “‘pleasure,’’ and inner morality
or ‘‘ideals’’ or “‘virtue’’), are identical in meaning, and not
opposing and dualistic as often conventionally held.

b. Ethics as such a science is emphatically a collection
of quantitative or Many judgments—as we see definitely as
we proceed. All mental and material things are ethically
judged from the point of view of our personal Many selves as
criterions. If those things have no unbalances or asymme-
tries perceptibly affecting the survival of ourselves, then tru-
istically with that neutrality we say they are not °‘news,’’
not ‘‘interesting,’’ practically ‘“‘negligible,’’ or, formally,
are unmoral. If—-emphasizing L—those things are a little
further away from the exact balance, we perceive them, and
like them because they are within the limits of asymmetry
that conduce to the continued existence of our structure. If
they go a little further from the balance (Fig. 163b), they
come into a questionable zone, in which we do not know
whether they are more pleasant or more painful; they are
‘startling’? news, and are of dubious or questionable mor-
ality. Still further away things become unquestionably pain-
ful or damaging to our organism, and we name them bad or
immoral. E. g., under ordinary conditions, to drink a drop
of water is negligible; a glassful, pleasant; two glasses, per-
haps doubtful; and several gallons of forced drinking, prob-
ably fatal. And the same quantitative variation in
the ‘‘goodness’’ of a thing occurs when we emphasize the T'
point of view. Thus a raindrop hitting us is usually unmoral;
speed it up some and it gives a ‘‘stimulating’’ tingle; but
speed it fast enough and it will be fatal. So obviously, to
get a comprehensive idea of what is good and what bad, we
have to be explicit as to L and T-—something that conven-
tionally is only vaguely done (e. g., we then see in §165
that ““economy of time’’ is an important ethical law that is
conventionally sometimes ignored even in practice).

193

ce. All such conventional ethics expand still further into
asking why. Or, that extension may be called an expansion
into the One—to infinity; or to its logical equivalent, zero
or Nirvana. That expansion of ethics is ordinarily called re-
ligion. I. e., conventionally ethics refers to the Many, or
science, or pluralism, or quantity; and religion refers to the
One, or what is formally non-science, or monotheism or mon-
ism, or quality. Or, if we write our ethical equation in the
form Jdealism... X Hedonism...—=The Good, or Morality, the
Many member conventionally is ethics, and the One member
religion. By our total argument the two are essentially
identical: there is merely the formal difference between
them that there is between the Many and the One. And I
shall make that formal] distinction just as I have made the
same general distinction throughout the book (§39). Ethics
sums into religion. It is obviously not possible to state any
valid ethics or any valid science which does not.

d. Theology, to be definitely consistent, must include as
being identical, ethics and the sum of ethics into religion (ef.
§39). Thus theology would omit the summation of other
sciences into religion. But orthodox theology purports first
to be a science (it actually tries to be logic, taken far enough
to prove the existence of God). And at the same time it du-
alistically purports to be not science but religion (““Ency.
Brit.,’’ xxvi, 773; cf. remarks of Ryan, footnote 49b); e. g.,
the average theologian seems determined that the warfare of
science and theology means the warfare of science and re-
ligion. So theologians are broadly inconsistent as to what
they are, and as to responsibility for what they say.
(1) As a science, all of conventional theology that is called
Christian which I can find holds God to be essentially a dif-
ferent sort of being from man—a sort of superior, divine (as
absolutely opposed to human), aristocratic potentate like a
kaiser, who by fiat created the world, and by his autocratic
will now irresponsibly rules it, etc., etc. That dualistic the-
ology is obviously, by this whole book, wrong. Also, as
Christ seems to have held as being his fundamental observa-
tion that he was inseparably connected with God and man
($1591), then orthodox ““Christian’’ theology is not Christian
but is flatly anti-Christian, as it contradicts Christ fundament-
ally. (It may be held that Christ is in places reported to
have held opposite fundamental views. If Christ did hold
such opposite views, then I flatly repudiate Christ’s funda-
mental teachings as being wrong: and this whole book is
verifiable proof that they would be, in such case, wrong. But
what Christ actually did teach is obviously a quantitative or
historical problem that can never be absolutely solved.)
(2) Further, so-called Christian theology for centuries was
largely based on the doctrine of apostolic succession—which
is still held by many theologians. That basic doctrine is in
substance this:- essentially, the ecclesiasts have been (in
some claimed mystic way) given a dualistic “‘divine’’ right
to rule the members of the church (and others, if the others
will tolerate it)—an aristocratic privilege which clearly agrees
essentially with the claim to rule made by kaisers. The
world has had probably more trouble with the churches’ du-
alistic ‘“divinity’’—-with that ecclesiasticism which perhaps a
majority of theologians claim is religion—than it has had with
kaisers’ identical claims. In so far as conventional theology
quietly tolerates such essentially wrong ecclesiasticism, to
that extent theology is nonsense. Jf Christ did give any
such power to church authorities or meant to give it (as he is
reported to have done by one writer, Matt. 16, 18-19, ina
weak pun made in a language unknown to Christ—and for
that reason alone probably a forgery), then it is proved by
the total of this book that we either have to repudiate such
an error, or be irrational aristocrats ourselves, and like the

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §161b

theologians who hold the doctrine, set ourselves up as being
essentially better than ordinary folks. (3) Further, as
a last fundamental doctrine, the theologians tend to claim that
the Bible is ‘‘inspired’’ in some essential sense, and ‘“hence’’
is correct. The claim is logically completely wrong, in any
definite, positive sense; of course, in a One sense man can
not make an error, and it is fairly easy to see that the Bible
is the inevitable result of certain conditions, and hence accu-
rately displays an ultimate chain of cause and effect, and so
is ultimately right in a mystic, ineffable way. But it has
been so often shown that the Bible repeatedly actually con-
tradicts itself, and gives many evidences of having been in
spots forged by grafters and deluded fanatics, that it would
tend to be a calumny on the mental integrity and enlighten-
ment of the fairly unbiased reader for me to assume that he
needs to have it explicitly shown him here. There-
fore, as on those fundamental things orthodox theology is so
obviously self-contradictory, stupid, and disingenuous, I can
not decide just what theologians think theology is.

e. The final general remark needed in the introduction
of ethics is that the tacit verbal agreement underlying all of
ethics is that goon consists of activity or life, and evit or bad is
the absence of activity or death—the basis of quantitative guess-
ing as to the amounts of such good or happiness, or evil and
unhappiness, being their perceptibility or consciousness.

8161. a. Fundamentally, we consider that to be good
which is—which exists. Ultimately, unless we commit the
silly self-contradiction of asserting a defective, wrong universe
or Gad, we believe and assert that whatever is, is right—is,
from a universal point of view, good. Possibly our word God
etymologically simply means good—the sum total that is
good. Words for God in other languages mean Being in a
general sense—like our phrase ‘‘Supreme Being.’’ _In still
other languages the word for God seems to be etymologically
an assertion of human striving to expand consciously into uni-
versal being—by prayer, etc. So it seems to be a historical
fact that in a One sense the Good is that which exists, and is
otherwise verbally called God. — By our solution of the One
and Many, truistically the One is absolutely good (also, any-
thing else), so that whatever exists is good. If we say
the One is good, we can not by the same language agreement
say it is evil, or that any part of itis bad. But if we wish,
we can change our total language agreement, and say that
the One is absolutely evil. That would not agree with con-
ventional verbal names; but it has been repeatedly shown
in analogous cases that the final meaning would be the same
—Evil would simply be what we now name Good.

b. We thus see explicitly, as a truism of the One and
Many, that our whole basis of ethics or good or God is the
observation that they are synonymous with existence, or be-
ing, or life in general. ‘‘Really’’ or monistically good, right,
morality, God, existence, being, energy, Meaning, conscious-
ness or reason, and life in general or activity, are synonyms.
In the last paragraph we have seen that not only is the
equivalence of good and life and God a principle tacitly ac-
cepted by men for ages, as is more or less clearly evidenced
by etymology of words, but that it is in agreement with all
the proofs in this book. So far as | can judge, all the many
schools of ethics in general effect accept and start from that
One principle (““Ency. Brit.,’’ ““Ethics’’). As stated in the
last section, those schools divide into two sorts:- (1) one is
verbally ‘“‘objective,’’ emphasizing L or “outer space’ more,
by preferring to call Being exergy or life or ““things’’?; and
its adherents are called hedonists, epicurians, utilitarians,
evolutionists, biological evolutionists, and various other names
denoting shades in doctrine; and (2) the other school is verb-
ally ‘*subjective,’’ emphasizing T or the “‘inner life’’

more,

§161b XVIII Three

by preferring to call Being reason or conscience (a synonym
for One consciousness), or the ideal; and its adherents are
ealled idealists, rationalists, intuitionalists, and various other
names indicating minor differences in doctrine. As is clearly
recognized in conventional ethics, the idealists or intuitional-
ists are vague but comprehensive or extensive (thus empha-
sizing Emotions...); and the utilitarians are concrete and
definite or intense (emphasizing JIntellect...). So obviously
we have the ethical schools united in the equation Jdealism...
X Utilitarianism...==God, or Good, or Life. Clearly the two
schools react oppositely verbally, but actually supplement
each other, and are not contradictory as is orthodoxly held
by classic logic. There are many books of controversy
between the two schools. The total battle is essentially
identical with that over the problem of mind and matter, and
it is perhaps unnecessary to repeat in further detail than just
given the solution of it in technical ethical terms. We could
go ahead and expand ethics in terms of that equation. It
theoretically would be an excellent way of grasping ethics.
But there is the practical dificulty that our ideas of that
equation are decidedly messed up by the dualistic Paul in
the Bible. He recommended (so far as I can pick a consist-
ent statement ont of his self-contradictions) that this present
evil world (or Hedonism... or Utilitarianism...) be made zero,
and that the world of the spirit be made the total goal—be
made infinite. Paul’s logic in the matter is very confused;
he was continually tackling the problem of the One and the
Many (e. g., I Cor., Chaps. 12-14), and usually ‘expressed’
his form of solution by denying both essentially and formally
the Many which he had just the minute before been using to
express the ineffable—a form of obfuscation still a favorite
among doctrinal theologians and other aristocrats. So if I
were to start expanding that equation in ordinary intelligible
terms the reader probably wonld shortly be in a nearly help-
less and highly irritating maze of verbal contradiction be-
tween his long familiarity with Pauline stupidities, and things
as they actually are when named by the same names. Paul
and Kant are very much alike; both vigorously deny in effect
the need of paying serions attention to the Many, which both
vigorously use to express themselves. Paul’s remarks were
influential in producing the Inquisition and other ecclesiasti-
eal atrocities which still continue (cf. footnote 172c); and
Kant’s, the nearly equally unpleasant world war (Dewey,
“"Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays,’’
1910, p. 65). Both men were too unbalanced to get along
well with the Many; Paul, in practical terms, seems to have
had an overdose of ““learning’’ in yonth, to have been unfor-
tunate in love in about al! the ways possible, and so fond of
eating and drinking as to exacerhate his epileptic tendencies;
so he messed up the Bible with cures for his own ailments,
erroneously assuming that all humans had ’em. It
seemed to be unnecessary in this book to give more than
that general citation of the evidence that Paul asserted an er-
roneous dualism and ecclesiasticism which is the opposite of
Christ’s, and brief mention of evidence in other places that
Paul’s doctrine is in general wrong. I judge that such brief
evidence will convince the good observer. But since I wrote
that, an excellent book of detailed proof that Paul contra-
dicted Christ has appeared:- I. Singer’s ‘““The Rival Philoso-
phies of Jesus and Paul.’’ A number of articles showing
Paul’s wrongness have appeared in the last twenty years.

ec. The point of the last paragraph, from which we are
to proceed, is that there is general agreement that the One is
to be named Good, or God, or life, etc., and that we need
pay no direct attention to whether we take a ““material’’ or
a ““spiritual’’ name for that good. The reader may take his
choice, and we shall obviously go along together; personally

UNIVERSE

194.

I have no preference in the matter so far as I can perceive,
and without especially noticing which I am using, use both
sorts, But that agreement that activity or life in gen-
eral is good is a One statement. We must, to say anything
definite about any part of that ineffable good, shift to science
—use Many expression. The first direct truism is that as no
unit of the many has any but arbitrary ““existence’’ (and-or
as the Many is formally opposite the One), then the Many is
evil; or, we have the infinite pluralism, Fvils...... =Good.
We conld just as truly write it Goods...... =Evil. But such
a formally correct infinite pluralism is not consistent with our
usual language agreements. We require an explicitly con-
trasted machine That... X This... (§100c), so that we shall
not fall into materialism. So we may tentatively write:-
Evils... X Goods...—Good, or etc. And that is the everyday
form we use in asserting whether a given thing (any ‘part,’
whether an ‘“‘idea’’ or a ‘‘thing’’) is a “‘good’’ or a “‘bad.”’
So obviously, in our verbal practice the ‘“opposition’’ between
good and evil is merely language mechanics. It is also obvi-
ous that our language varies the Trinity form of the terms.

d. But that equation Evils... < Goods...—Good is of no
particular use to us, as it definitely represents little more
than onr bare verbal mechanics:- our standards of dividing
the Many into goad and evil are only truistically implied by
that equation. But it is the great human equation used by
every body, rather than the formal That... X This... Meaning.
And that ethical equation is equally a formal or verbal affair
in which the Evils... and the Goods... obviously require defi-
nitions (standardized measurements) before they have particu-
lar meanings. Yet that obvious fact is usually overlooked by
people (a point which explains much that is otherwise strange
in history):- it is so vivid to those people that they mean
their standards of measurements that usually those standards
and the theory of them (the theory of periodicity in ethical
terms) remain unstated and confused in their minds and their
hearers’. The result is, of course, sooner or later a verbal
squabble (palemics), which truistically is interminable so long
as the need of explicit measures is not met.

e. Obviously, in no other way than by considering the
experience of the race (and making more measures if needed)
can the question of just what is right for a given man be set-
tled fairly well:- the solution is to take ethics explicitly as a
science, as definitely measurable as any science. That popu-
lar ethical equation shows the ethical solution of the One and
Many; and with that we may stop using it.

$162. a. As existence or activity is truistically the ulti-
mate good or happiness, and is historically so accepted, it
follows as a further trnism that the ultimate or greatest or
absolute happiness is the knowledge or infinite perception
that everything is connected together absolutely or organized
or related together “‘personally’’ as the One or the universe.
Obviously, that is in agreement with the ordinary ways of
naming the greatest experienced happiness as:- ecstacy, in-
effable jay or felicity or peace, rapture, etc., or a rebirth or
religious experience (§153f): such happiness or general ethi-
cal good is “seeing God,’’ or being God, etc.!™ Also, it

16a The mildest evidence of a rebirth may be said to be a langh
—a sort of spilling over of nervons energy that has been set flowing
by humor as a trigger. As we have casually seen from time to time,
anything is humorous (witty, etc.: 1am using humorous ina rough
way) if it makes our perceptions of relationships spread out consider-
ably wider (usally, also implicitly ia a shorter time) than is nsnal.
Thus the barbarian or the child finds it humorous to see the discom-
fiture of another person: it causes him to see that by his (the bar-
barian’s) having a wider balance or relationship with the universe
than he was conscious of having before he noticed the other’s failure
to have it, he avoids such discomfiture. 1f the barbarian sees a little
more extensively he observes that the other’s discomfiture isa fallure

195

is a further truism that the object of life is to live. Further,
the truism agrees with the usual intimate desire that God be
a ““person’’—with the rather general idea that a person or
any real God, or that true “‘spirit’’ or ‘“‘soul,’’ is ““more’’
than the materialists’ supposed arithmetical addition of hard,
separate atom or thing to hard, separate atom; _ or the phil-
osophers’ arithmetical pantheism. Quite obviously, the ulti-
mate truistic necessity of there being such a real One, or an
actual universe, is that there be inseparable relationship.
When that relationship is perceived, truistically it makes us
see that we are not lonely, not unneeded, not separate and
apart, but are joined inseparably to everything. In ethics
that relationship or force is called love. So our rigorously
ultimate ethical good is equivalent, to use the God the Haly
Ghost part of the Trinity, to the usual conventional assertion
that God is love. Finally, it agrees explicitly with Christ’s
One statement which he said was the ““first and great’’ law
(Matt. 22, 37):- ‘“‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with
all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.’’

b. The last paragraph rigorously shows, by all the evi-
dence of history, and with explicit logical consistency, that
this book, in its destruction of agnosticism and establishment
of a unified science, is in common phrase a means of giving
“life more abundantly’’—shows that religion in a real sense
is synonymous with life. Further, the paragraph definitely
proves that whether we consciously know it or not, we are
ultimately God, and do love him absolutely—that being
merely the conventional ethical way of saying that we are
organically One. So I do not issue any “‘law’’ in the sense
of a command, commandment, or fiat, handed down as by one
in authority: I merely say that the facts, which may be
readily verified by the reader, are to the effect that he does
‘love God’’ that way. I am no “authority’’ except
in so far as I am comparatively an extremely minute part of
the universe—one fact.’’ The whole universe, all the facts,
is the authority, and it issues, zs, principles that are obeyed
—not principles that may be followed if a stiff-necked and
weuk-brained generation of fools fancies it will kindly conde-
scend to obey them, paying for that stupidity by having
about a half-life.

c. To express that infinite, ineffable good, happiness, or
God positively, and ‘apply’ it with more or less definiteness to
our personal lives, we divide it into parts or the Many (Part
One). Probably the most usual everyday means of doing
that are these two:- (1) We shift the One term Good or
God (or any of its synonyms) to a Many or God the Son form

in perception of relationships that actually in a wider sense is his
(the barbarian’s) own failure (§47); and it then is not funny (neither
is the barbarian longer a barbarian). But truistically, any compara-
tively quick perceiving of a wide fitness of things {which is often
given by the observing of an apparently or superficially contrasting
state of affairs, which we see we can overcome or change—of which
we see the deeper unity) gives us a surge of nervous energy, a mild
rebirth. That flood naturally irradiates to all the organs of the body,
and when it is in mild enongh measure it produces, apparently as a
sort of summing of a speeding up or increased living of all parts of
the body, varions muscular rhythms that are laughter. It may pro-
duce weeping, but not often in a person unaccus tomed to weeping.
Or, if in greater measure it may more or less paralyze temporarily:
it can, by variation in intensity, produce numerous sorts of biological
phenomena—to the extent of trances, manias, etc. The universe
may obviously be described in terms of humor—quantitatively ex-
tended from conventional measures into such increased ones.
The danger that exists in being explicitly humorous is that jokes
usually involve the use of some contrast to heighten the flood of per-
ception of relationship, Many people fail to see that such a contrast
ig a contrast, and intended as one, unless it is carefully labeled ‘‘con-
trast’’ or ‘‘joke’’—and the label truistically spoils the trigger action.
So it is especially dangerous to put jokes ina scientific or other com-
munication that purports to be usually straightforward rhetoric.

There are no jokes in this book.

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §162e

and use the general equation God the Sons... X Ourselves...
Good. (2) We tacitly take it that human beings are the uni-
verse which is of primary importance to us (that they consti-
tute our standard ethical universe), and use the human form
Neighbors... X Ourselves...=Good.

d. That first equation, God the Sons... X Ourselves...=
Good, or God, is often expanded so that God the Sons... is
explicitly Christ, the Virgin Mary, the apostles, and all the
saints and prophets. Clearly the equation is right, provided
its circular, identical logic is understood and used—provided
it is understood that Christ, and the saints, etc., are essen-
tially the same as ourselves, and (on that side of the equa-
tion) are not One or perfect or “‘divine.’’ Consistently,
God the Sons... includes Carlyle’s “‘heroes,’’? our friends,
etc. (see §166m). But obviously, often the equation is not
used in that valid way:- at least four “‘deities’’ often are
used as absolutely dualistic or essentially contrasted with our-
selves. And just as aristocratic and dualistic as that, and
patterned on such wrong usage, there conventionally follows
substantially a fixed classification or caste of saints, prophets,
popes, cardinals, archbishops, on down to the yellow dog—
which last Christ, in his effort to dis-establish such aristocracy,
too emphatically logically, but with perhaps justifiable emo-
tiona) disgust over such stupidity, said would be first.

e. The second equation, Neighbors... Ourselves...=
Good, or God, is obviously a valid That... X This... in human
terms. This total book proves its rationality. Also, as we
shall see in detail as we proceed, it is obviously the formula
for democracy; it is the formal and more accurate expression
of the ‘Golden Rule,’’ do unto others as you would that they
do unta you; and it is the formal and more accurate expres-
sion of Christ’s statement of the second great commandment
on which, together with the first, ‘““hangeth the whole law,
and the prophets’’ (Matt. 22, 39-40):- ““Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself.’’ Christ stated that the two (see par. a
for the first:- love God) are alike—as obviously by valid logic
they ure, one being the One assertion of the universe in ethi-
cal terms, and the other being the identical Many expression.
Christ also asserted correctly that the Golden Rule was fun-
damental general law (Matt. 7, 12).*°

162e Jn my opinion the remainder of Christ’s probable sayings in-
dicate rather clearly that he (1) actnally did distinguish the One and
the Many, (2) had a general knowledge of the valid logic (e. g.,
when he shifts expression from the nsnal Many terms to a One form,
he often indicates the shift by stating something to the effect that
the saying is for those with ‘“‘understanding’’), and (3) as a general
thing used the valid logic consistently, so that his definite recogni-
tion of the general ethical and religious law was based on competence
and ability, and not upon a happy accident, so far as he was person-
ally concerned, of largely subconscions cerebration. Many men hit
upon and state correctly ultimate genera] principles: everyone’s
brain works ont such all the time—it really being unavoidable. E.¢g.,
Luke (10, 27) pnts the general ethical law in the mouth of a lawyer,
and not in Christ’s—-presumably as having been distinguished from
the trivialities in the Jewish law (Lev. 19, etc.) by the lawyer and
people in general. And then the lawyer promptly asked Who is my
neighbor?—showing that his stating of the fundamental law was ac-
cidental and parroting (or it raises a doubt as to the reliability of
Luke’s reporting). The able, competent man is the one who recog-
nizes what be has done or said, asserts such recognition, and (unless
by more facts convinced of a mistake and explicitly acknowledging
such) thereafter consistently adheres to it. That last requirement is
the one on which most of us fail; we usually have not the strong
grasp on the truth which enables us to stick to it. It is easy to find
the truth, but hard to “‘live’’ it, because in living it we must always
avoid getting confused by the actnally present infinite regress.
So it appears definitely that Christ recognized the essential truth (cf.
§1591), stated it correctly in a rough way, and probably managed to
stick to it pretty well. And he did that in the face of dualism and
autocracy on all sides of him (the pre-war militaristic Prussian was a
meek lamb, with a gentle and gentlemanly Kultur, compared with
the scoundrels in Christ’s day); and he did it clearly enongh to get

§162f XVIII Three

f. Obviously, in both those equations the extensive factor
(God the Sons... in the first, and Neighbors... in the second)
is in practice liable to be confused or misunderstood, although
logically by our total argument both are equivalent simply to
Environment.... We just saw that God the Sons... is grossly
confused. And the ordinary meaning of neighbor is not defi-
nitely inclusive of environment. In fact, the lawyer asked
Christ to define neighbor (footnote par. e), and Christ accord-
ing to report responded with the parable of the Good Samari-
tan, which as an answer is (as itis written in Luke) irrational,
irrelevant, and dualistic. (I. e., the parable shows that the
Samaritan acted—perhaps exaggeratedly—as a man who is
conscious of being a neighbor to the man who fell among
thieves would act in order to show that consciousness—to be
moral. That is obviously irrelevant to the question Who is
my neighbor?; and the point is further confused by the de-
tails of the men who passed by; for obviously, in principle
they were neighbors, which is the point, but were substan-
tially asserted not to be.) The Bible is very full of such
irrelevancies—logical evasions of the point. The
same problem is in the even more ancient question:- Am
I my brother’s keeper? And itis nowhere positively answered
in the Bible, so far as I can find, and is not fully answerable
without explicit solution or the One and Many. So we may
more precisely and intelligibly combine our two equations
into this one:- Environment... Ourselves...—=Good. The
equation then explicitly includes everything, and shows that
atoms, etc., rigorously are ‘“‘neighbors.’’ The total evidence
set forth by this book obviously goes to prove that the equa-
tion is valid: that all things are related to us (that we act-
ually do love all things as being our neighbors—are in some
degree our brother’s keeper, even when that brother is an
electron in another galaxy). That is a definite and inclusive
answer, and proof of the answer, to all possible questions of
principle in ethics. It remains to discuss some of the quanit-
tative aspects of the equation.

g. A more convenient form of that explicit equation
would obviously be one stated in more conventional ethical
terms. Perhaps the simplest and most directly intelligible
is this:- Unselfishness... < Selfishness...—Good; or, Unselfish
acts or phenomena... <Selfish acts or phenomena...—Good.
That equation obviously means that we area machine reacting
with the environment, and shows that primarily we should
consider that the environment is attracting or related or lov-
ing, and that we give to it (are unselfish to it), so that it in
turn gives to us so that we, still retaining ourselves as the
point of view (the intensive factor), thus get, or are selfish.
Obviously, selfishness and unselfishness are then merely
points of view of the Many; Selfishness... is ourselves or the
intensive factor; and Unselfishness..., the environment in
general or the extensive factor. We could say that we and
the environment are mutually repulsive, or opposed to each

his solution stated fairly well by dualistic reporters who had but lit-
tle knowledge of what they were really saying. So it seems reason-
able to regard Christ-as an unusually great genius—or saint, or
prophet, if you prefer those terms. But that is a quantitative judg-
ment, and is merely my personal opinion, for which I have given
considerable evidence; there is much in the Bible that is explicitly
attributed to Christ which is grossly wrong both quantitatively and
qualitatively; and it is not possible to find out absolutely what he
did teach, as it isa quantitative question. So if you consider that
Christ was about as wrong as right, then I have to agree that possibly
itisso; if we take the Bible literally, as many theologians say we
must, then I have to agree that assuredly you are right. But, it is
unessential whcther we regard Christ as an extraordinarily fine man
or not: it is rigorously proved that he is essentially the same as any
other unit of the Many, and his quantitative size is unessential as a
matter of principle. As a matter of practical living, we ought to be
able to estimate him quantitatively, as will implicitly appear.

UNIVERSE

196

other with “‘force,’’ or fight. Even then truistically each

is transferring or giving something to the other (in physical
terms, transferring secondary whirls); so in ordinary lang-
uage we might as well call that giving a loving one.

h. The quickest proof of the validity of Unselfishness...
x Selfishness...=Good seems to be this:- If we are absolutely
selfish—are real Nietzschean supermen,—so that we totally
separate ourselves from other things, obviously they can give
us nothing; we would be in an absolute vacuum and would
necessarily become zero ourselves. On the contrary, if we
were absolutely unselfish—perfectly altruistic, as the extreme
socialists and the ].W.W. and Tolstoy and parlor intellectu-
als in general theory seem to pretend to be,—then obviously
we would totally give away all we had, including ourselves,
and would become zero, or absolutely go out of existence—
another impossibility. Clearly, the Many statement of
selfishness and unselfishness is like that of all other machines
or That... X This...’s of the universe :- both Many parts must
remain finite, and the sum total will actually be a perfect
balance of the two (which two spread out to include ulti-
mately the whole universe). So that balanced reaction must
consciously be striven for (it ultimately exists, whether we
are alive enough to be conscious of it or not, as shown in
§114¢: the profiteer who tries to grab something without
giving adequate return pays for it by having his brain die
some). It is the same solution seen repeatedly heretofore.
For an excellent statement in detail (and with no obtrusion
of technical logic) of how selfishness and unselfishness should
be balanced, see Lee’s “‘The Lost Art of Reading’’ and
““Crowds.’’ A definite application of the principle to actual
industry or everyday living or ““economics’’ is made by Tay-
lor under the name ‘‘scientific management’’ (§168}, etc.).

i. Christ’s Many statement of that ethical solution (and
a number of men anticipated him in making it) is:- do unto
others as you would that they do unto you; or, love your
neighbor as yourself. Clearly, that is vaguely a statement of
Unselfishness... X Selfishness.... But equally clearly,:if it is a
Many or quantitative statement, definitely interpreted as such
it is not true—is illogical. I. e., Christ’s form of state-
ment verbally tacitly assumes that you and your neighbor are
quantitatively equal, and such is never the case. Practically, if
I loved one neighbor as much as I loved myself, I quite ob-
viously would not have much love left to lavish on neighbor
number two—for love is definitely chemical affinity and grav-
ity, and as a Many individual I have a certain limited quan-
tity of it. (Of course it is unlimited, if I lapse into mystic,
One expression: but we are speaking scientifically, or in
everyday quantitative terms.) Or, if I definitely treated a baby
in the way I wanted the baby to treat me, obviously he would
have cause for grave complaint. In sbort, the conventional
quantitative statements of the ethical equation are only rough
implications—they are glaringly wrong if taken explicitly.
The reader may say that they are intelligible—that we under-
stand what is meant by them. I agree that if we are not in
the defective upper ten or submerged tenth (who usually do
their grabbing under a verbal aegis or bluff of the Golden
Rule), in ordinary routine circumstances we know pretty well
what we ought to do; and when we do it we are likely to
say that the doing did agree with the orthodox rules. But
those rules are obviously such an uncertain mixture of One
expression in a Many guise that we are practically nearly
without any valid quantitative ethical theory. But of course
much of valid existing economics and allied subjects are act-
ually ethical and serve in the place of the direct ethical rules
that the theologians have failed to supply although it was
their duty to do so: e. g., Taylor’s principles of management
are a precise and workable statement of those defective and

197

missing ethics. As a One proposition all men are equal, be-
cause each man ultimately is God. But when we react to-
gether as skin-bounded men we are by no means equal, and
can not possibly work by a rule which tacitly asserts such
non-existent Many equality—as the Golden Rule and its usual
theological and grafting (e. g., socialistic or “‘red’’) inter-
pretations do. E. g., even the coarse statute or lawyers’ law
does nothing else but define and handle individual inequali-
ties. A murderer is treated by it quantitatively differently
from a minor, and a murderer has effectually asked, by his
deeds, for such quantitatively different treatment. Sound
law does nothing else but divide people into classes depend-
ing on their actual ‘size,’ as measured by their acts, etc. ;
the unsound law to which we object as being “‘class’’ legis-
lation unnaturally and never really successfully tries to divide
men into fixed, constant, exact-science classes, instead of
recognizing that men are unequal and are continually by their
own acts and merits fixing their varying classes (XIX).

j. So Christ’s Many law or Golden Rule is inaccurate,
although as a rough general approximation it probably was
needed as a first step in democracy (or perhaps it is more
precise to say that the One implication the law correctly gives
was first needed). The more accurate law might merely
have confused men in that crude age. But now we have bet-
ter nervous systems, and can go beyond that child’s step in
democracy—i. e., perhaps the majority have strong enough
nervous systems. So we shall explicitly consider our equa-
tion or law quantitatively, and get the statements of what we
ought to do, expressed in terms of what we actually do do.
For we saw in the last paragraph that we do not follow the
inaccurate Golden Rule. By thus becoming conscious of
what we do, we very perceptibly get a more abundant life,
and can also anticipate the future somewhat-——make states-
manship a science, instead of having it as in wel] known hist-
ory, a sort of black art that rarely works, and so partly in
pursuance of an instinctive sense of decency that make peo-
ple hide defects and shortcomings from the pained gaze of
others, conducted as much as possible in secrecy.

§163. a. We have seen ($160b) that within certain nar-
row limits of reaction of Environment... X Ourselves. ..==Un-
selfishness... X Selfishness...==Good, or Energy the quantitative
summation or standard universe of Good or Energy is so little
perceptible to us as to be considered morally indifferent, or
unmoral. I. e., a perfect or nearly perfect balance or mor-
ality is not directly perceptible to us (see par. b). <A con-
sideration of that fact shows why what we call ‘“happiness,”’
or a fair balance in life, is so elusive, and why there are so
many conflicting opinions as to what it is and how to get it,
and why as a usual thing if we deliberately and consciously
*‘seek’’ for happiness the very seeking is an unbalance that
causes us to fail to get happiness or a fair balance. Obvi-
ously, in our daily small acts with the environment (whether
they be “‘spiritual’’ or **idealistic’’ acts with our fellows, or
even ‘‘spiritnal’’ reactions of parts of our own selves or nerv-
ous systems; or ‘material’’ or *‘atilitarian’’ acts with
‘‘things,’’ such as wearing clothes or eating), a single act is
usually not accompanied by any perceptible pleasure or pain
—to us the act is simply unmoral. But evidently each of
those acts actually does tend (1) in a direction towards a vital
or moral or ““good’’ balance, or else (2) away from it. And
if those acts, instead of being temperately rhythmic (first in
one direction and then in the other), tend steadily to accumu-
late in one direction (either in the direction of zero activity
or doing nothing, an intemperate parasitism; or in the direc-
tion of infinite activity, an intemperate hurry, mania, radical-
ism, fanaticism, etc.), then it is evident by simple arithmetic
that we shall run into a painful unbalance, and as a truism

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §163b

achieve unhappiness. Those unmoral acts are the
“little things’’ or ‘‘trifles,’’ aud in many lives sum up arith-
metically to more than the “‘big’’ things, and so have the
greater effect on happiness. A wan moral in the big, per-
ceptible things can readily accumulate great unhappiness by
heing iz sum very immoral in unmoral things. And many
men who are noticeable scoundrels in some big things have
kept themselves well balanced in the unmoral or little things
and so have been on the whole rather happy—in spite of the
fact that the big immoralities inevitably subtract something
from their sum of possible happiness. = Truistically the un-
moral things are not perceptibly indifferently moral zm sum:
each one is a dot in Emotions.... But if a man ‘‘seeks’’
happiness, he in practical effect magnifies each of those un-
moral acts into perceptibility, and thus becomes a sort of ex-
perimental laboratory of morality instead of a live person:
he takes out the wheels to see what makes life go ’round,
and it truistically largely stops going, and the world correctly
labels him over-conscientious, pious, a neurasthenic, a prig.
He does not gain happiness, but often imagines that he has
committed the unforgivable sin (the dualistic, fancied “‘abso-
lute zero’’ in ethics). The truistic remedy again is
temperance. Instead of nearly totally neglecting the un-
moral acts, or of trying to force each to a perceptible morali-
ty, we take a middle course of letting them accumulate for a
while (a week, a month, ten years—it is a quantitative prob-
lem, and primarily needs good judgment by each person for
himself), and then take out the wheels temporarily and ex-
amine them, and correct tendencies as may be necessary. It
is not likely to hurt anyone much to go to (say) a dance once:
but a hundred times might. So obviously there is no
mystery about getting happiness, nor any injustice in its be-
stowal. The rain does fall alike on the just and the unjust.
But there is the additional fact that the unjust in the long
run never have sense enough to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities thus afforded: they merely complain of the weather.

b. We saw further (§160b) that beyond the amounts of
Energy or Good which are unmoral, there is a range or zone
or spectrum of amounts in which the acts are perceptibly
pleasant or right or moral. Beyond that is a doubtful zone;
then an immoral zone; then an unlimited zone of destructive
but imperceptible immorality in which the individual is killed
as such—changes to whirls of a different order. I may most
clearly show those zones, with their limits, on a rectangular
hyperbola, analogous to the hyperbola used in Fig. 104b to
show the forms of That... This...—Energy. This human-
istic naming of the parts of the hyperbola serves to make that
more genera] equation clearer. We have the equation
Unselfishness... X Selfishness...—Good, or Energy. Let the
axes of Fig. 163b (see next page) show the two factors as in-
dicated. The points of perfect balancing of all structures are
on a line at 45° to the axes—one point being at O asshown,
this point being for a given Many man (compare that with
the physics statement of balance, 8114¢e). The rectangular
hyperbola through O is for the equation Unselfishness X Se(f-
ishness== Energy (a constant standard universe)-—a perfect equa-
tion (no dots or regress). Truistically, the man will be in
a rigorous monistic Nirvana if he stays on that perfect hyper-
bola at O. In a Many existence, a slight departure from
the balance destroys some of the man and makes some other
part grow, the change being a decrease of (say) extensive
factor and an increase of intensive—the unbalance not being
great enough to cause a general change to some other order
of structure. I. e., if there is too violent or extensive a
change in some part of the man, other parts can not perform
an equally reacting change, and the man dies. So we can
take it as being a rough approximation that so long as the

§163b XVIII Three UNIVERSE

man remains organically a man he oscillates back and forth
from O on a curve which on an average may be represented
by the hyperbola from D to D’. Beyond that, on the dotted
portions, the man as a whole structure changes definitely and

198

that quantitative ethics is.theoretically unified with all other
sciences (and incidentally, also that our ethics are identical
with those of birds and animals when properly translated).
Further, it is obvious that by the theory of incommensurabil -
ity the extensive limits and the intensive limits can not be at

even though it feels a little too hearty; but two in close suc-
cession (before we have time for re-growth) are likely to be
painful and immoral. We have to gamble a bit in this world,
there being no exact science; and ethically we gamble by
getting into this doubtful moral zone occasionally—and with

oe es the same distance from O, although they are roughly shown
of imperceptible o
* destructive pain: or aecer so in the figure. Also, of course A and B (and the other
Limit of perceptible pain limits, etc.) are only approximate for a given man during
eek mnmoral a wit ‘ some comparatively short period of time. The man is always
Zone ality: ace 4 changing——and obviously the limits, etc., are glaringly never
> ue es seo ie sharp and definite anyway. All that is a brief indi-
.8 1. 0F eee cation of quantitative ethics—which is explicitly identical
. a ~~
a 8 with the other sciences we have seen, and clearly not exact.
33 g e. Then from B to C is a zone which is so intense (or so
s 3 = extensive) thatit is a doub{ful zone: we do not know whether
na s it is pleasant or painful. E. g., we enjoy one hearty laugh,
a :
Oo
&
a
<

f imperceptible or destructive pains

Limit of perceptible pain

: courageous abandon when we do(§§149e, 159, footnote par. h).

2 f. The doubtful moral zone BC (and B’C) might rather

Raa: consistently be called the zone of legal morality. I. e., law-

- yer’s law usually undertakes to designate the limit C of
Csi eee doubtful morality as being the permissible legal limit. Such
Fie. 163b law recognizes that this limit is different for different persons;

but it recognizes it only in a rough way as beween minors
and adults, as to some differences of man and woman, and as
between some conditions of health and disease. Obviously,
every man has a particular personal limit C. ©—— }#Asa

general rule, the poorer (according to customary judgment) a
from O; so A and A’ are the limits of the unmoral—A being man’s brain and-or body is, the lower (closer to O) his pain
the selfish or intensive limit, and A’ the unselfish or extensive

limit. (Hereafter without further statement, the prime let-
ters are extensive limits, and others intensive limits—and
analogously with zones.) Then, so long as the man oscillates
inside A and A’ he is in the sone of the unmoral. In those
oscillations truistically some structures in his body are being
broken down and others built up——but imperceptibly directly
to him. So he continues to exist ‘averagedly’ or as one man
on (represented by) the perfect curve; but some parts of him
move off the curve and perform cycles. And obviously, those
cycles of small, imperceptible quantities of energy or struct-
ural changes in time sum to a perceptible quantity, which, if
in moderate amount, is perceptible and moral and gives hap-

piness. But if most of his departures from the balance O are
in the same direction, then parts of his body truistically are
being continually worn out without being substantially re-

perceptibly to other orders of whirls that can no longer be
represented by this average curve of one organism or order.

ec. We take it that the man in his swings from O to
either A or A’ can not consciously perceive the departure

endurance for one given act is; or vice versa, the ‘highly
strung’ or better trained man can stand much more of one
act. Theoretically the statute law should make dis-
tinction as to the actual inequalities of men in infinite regress:
practically the law correctly does so as far as the majority
perceptions go. Perhaps the next practical step in the law
will be the majority recognition that aristocrats (whether in
the “‘upper’’ direction such as kaisers, dualistic theologians,
and financial pirates, or in the other direction of shirking, ir-
responsible, socialistic workmen) are mentally defective, and
must in some respects be treated as minors (held irresponsi-
ble for most contracts, promises, etc.). | Those people are
instinctively always asking for such privileges; we see that
their instinct agrees with the facts about them, and should
not be completely thwarted (as is implicitly shown by XIX).

But they in turn truistically should be explicitly deprived of
grown (and possibly other structures increased), so that the the adult rights that go with adult responsibilities. EK. g.,
accumulation finally runs past the limits of morality and hap- in many places a labor union can not be effectively held to a
piness—finally into death. We all finally wear ourselves ont contract; if they do not want to be, then the obvious solution
by being unable to keep moral acts accurately cyclic. is to make them legally incompetent to bargain—including
d. From (say) A to B our acts become directly percept- authorized procedure by which they can leave such a status
ible, and easily within the limits our unit man-structure tol- whenever they feel disposed to put away such childishness.
erates (cyclically substantially re-grows), and are moral or

g. It follows as a truism that when any man considers
pleasant or happy (subject to the possible accumulations with

himself moral, or humanly justified, in continuing to react
time, par. c). So truistically our acts in the A to B_~ with others quite out to the limit C permitted him by

or moral zone stay fairly well within the tolerable limits of the lawyers’ law, then he is badly wrong. The man who
another man, assuming that he is quantitatively of about the says ° business is business,’’ and means by that phrase that

same strength as ourselves, which roughly in most cases he he will strive to take everything the law allows him before
is. But it is obvious that structures of different order must jailing bim, and the lawyer who aids him in that sortof busi-
have curves different from the curve for men (i. e., atoms or

ness, theoretically hold the pre-war Kultur which demanded
birds couldn’t enjoy and thrive on what we do); and those a continual striving away from the balance—an absolutely
‘different? curves obviously can not be directly compared, wrong view. None of them in practice make such abso-
but can be by means of the inverse square law, just as tem-

lute scoundrels of themselves: they automatically act better
peratures of different order structures may be—that showing than they profess to. Obviously, if a man thus tries to keep

199

acting in the zone of doubtful morality he rather quickly ac-
cumulates an immoral unbalance that damages both himself
and others. Generally speaking he damages himself consider-
ably more than any other one person; for obviously his activities
are usually spread over many others, but the reaction is con-
centrated on himself. If be and his accomplices, the lawyers,
can stand that reaction, and also stand the knowledge that
we see that they are fundamentally wrong morally and hence
undesirable citizens and neighbors—if tbey can pay that high
price, I think we can tolerate the damage they do us without
trying to fight them with their own fire, the statute law,
which they have in their pseudo theory spoiled (8173), and
have somewhat spoiled in practice. If financial] pirates and
their ““business is business’? lawyer-accomplices had enough
intelligence to understand the high price they pay iu personal
deterioration for that profiteering (and profiteering is an atti-
tude of mind—a desire to get al] that can be grabbed—rather
than the actual amount that is got), they would automatically
stop it. So the best way for us to eliminate such legally
permitted grabbing is to show the self-deceived grabbers
what they pay “‘out of their skins.”’ It is probably
a fact generally recognized, even by lawyers themselves, that
the average lawyer considers it entirely mora] and in every
way right for everybody, including himself, to act continually
up to the limit explicitly forbidden by lawyers’ law. This
paragraph rigorously proves that to the extent which that
notorious fact applies, the legal profession are morally and
mentally inferior. In my opinion the fact applies to a large
majority of lawyers. But of course the legal profession con-
tains some very able and honest men: Lincoln was such an
exception. And the leading lawyers seem to have a surpris-
ingly contemptuous opinion of most of their colleagues: e. g.,
Storey (““Reform of Legal Procedure,’’ 3, 5, 6) approvingly
quotes able lawyers:- Taft:- “‘The administration of crimi-
nal law in this country is a disgrace to our civilization’’;
Vance:- ‘‘The American Jawyer has proved a failure’’;
‘‘The legal profession in America is blighted by serious
faults. The first is a low moral tone, manifesting itself, in
its worst form, in deliberate preying on the public. *EX The
second is a lack of the knowledge of the law as a science,
as distinguished from a knowledge of the law asa craft.’’
For the legal theory of what is wrong with lawyers see 8173.

b. The remarks in the last two paragraphs about the d-
rection in which we act may be generalized:- Clearly, if we
continually strive to go away from the balance O, we are
striving to accumulate an unbalance. If we keep on irying
to grab more and more things for ourselves (go out continu-
ally towards the asymptote on the Seffishness... branch) we
are trying to make unselfishness zero, and will inevitably
blow up (get irretrivably out of balance, and change order of
structure; in business terms, **fail’’? unless we go to pieces
physically first and die or have to “‘retire’’). And precisely
the same result occurs if we try to keep going in the other
direction—try to be too altruistic. Asa general scientific
fact, we have seen that any given structure, so long as it re-
mains substantially itself, always tends to oscillate back to a
balance (§114c). Therefore, unless there are valid conscious
reasons why we should seek death (as may sometimes be the
case—truistically, as it is quantitative), we ethically should
try to pull ourselves and others back to a balance together;
we should not (using ordinary language agreements) try to
repulse people steadily, or use ‘“‘foree’”’ or ‘‘might’’ or (in
the latest weaselly euphemism) ““direct action’’ on them, or
‘‘drive’’ them; but we should love them, or like them or co-
operate with them, or work with them—thbose phrases indicat-
ing the reciprocating give and take or rhythmic cycles that
give balance. Kultur, or ‘*bJood and iron,’’ words, by ordi-

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §163h

nary verbal agreements, assert or imply that we are trying
to create an unbalance—be superior, ‘“‘better,’’ aristocrats
(except of course parlor radicals and Nietzsche use them to
make-believe that they are brave, fierce, wild creatures).
And obviously, to assert that we try to create more unbalance
is to assert a fundamentally wrong principle—actually it is a
stupid assertion that we are seeking death and destruction.
And as we shall see ($169d)—and this is the point those
repetitions are driving at:- such a wrong principle is intoler-
able. We will not and can not and never do tolerate such
wrongness in principle, regardless of what we may carelessly
and ignorantly say about it. All this is obviously identical
in principle with the theory of genius (§159), and need not
be further expanded. We saw an example of the
practical attempt at such a wrong principle by the people
who consider it even permissible to go continuously as far as
the Jaw allows. Precisely the same stupidity is exhibited in
the various ““public be damned”’ attitudes. The railroads
found by direct experiment that it did not pay; now most
railroad officials are so imbued with such ultimate buman
wisdom (expressed in common terms:- it pays to be polite, to
avoid friction, to be pleasant, to smile, not to get into any
fight that can be avoided {and all which do not directly in-
volve principle should be: §169d]) that they are our best
men. Some labor leaders seem to have adopted the * “public
be damned”’ policy. They will get their experimental wis-
dom to the contrary rather more violently and painfully than
have others, because as a usual thing a labor leader’s mind is
very poor. Precisely the same error inheres in al]
*“class wars,’’ or in the idea that labor and capita] are con-
flicting rather than merely interacting. As a matter of fact,
as a rule in this country the successfu] business men (exclud-
ing numbers of momentarily ‘successful’? money-grabbers,
brokers, and others whose alleged services consist mostly of
price gambling") very clearly recognize the truth of that

16h Gambling is an economic and an ethical and psychological
loss to everyone who in any given gamble is not with definite con-
sciousness engaged directly in it, and who thus has not the gambler’s
selfish satisfaction in obtaining the quantitative answer concerning
which the wager is made at once or quickly (the gambler arbitrarily
increases the importance of that answer in most cases by a money
stake larger than would be needed otherwise). For economic proof,
see Marshall’s *‘Economics,’’ (135, 843); tomake that proof rigorous
and also extend it to ethics and psychology, apply it to the Weber-
Fechner law as given in §156. It therefore rigorously follows (see
more familiar proof given below in this footnote) that the gamblers
(inelnding all business price-gamblers) get a selfish satisfaction (not
recognized by Marshall) at the expense of other people. _It is pre-
cisely the same as the obvious fact that the man who does not know
has to risk himself, and also in some degree the comfort of other peo-
ple, in finding ont. And nsually the price-gambler keeps stretching
his owa perceptions into the doubtful zone, so that his pleasure turns
into pain and immorality—which is some part of the canse of the
high death rate of stockbrokers and similar gamblers. Fun-
damentally, to give the proof of the wrongness of gambling in more
familiar terms, gambling in the widest scnse is our guessing at qnan-
tities, which is forced npon us by the principle that there is no exact
science. In that wide and very usnal conventional meaning, we can
do nothing in practical life bunt gamble. But ina narrower sense,
gambling consists of making it of greater importance to gness
than is ordinarily necessary. The gambler increases his stakes in
order to make his guess at a quantitative result of more importance
or perceptibility to himself; and obviously that consists in trying
to make activities depart from their normal balance (except in the
possible case where the gambler needs the psychological stimulns and
can and will substantially restore the disturbed balance). The gam-
bling forced upon us by ‘no exact science’ is usually an attempt to
go towards the balance, and then in temperate qnantities is moral
(e. g., when I started to work out this book one expert adviser said
I was immorally gambling with my sanity). Obviously, the well
recognized difficulty in deciding as to the morality or desirability of
gambling is due to the fact that we have to decide whether a given
act (not intention: all intentions from the point of view of the holder

§163h XVIII Three

ethical principle and apply it to the best of their ability,
Their chief difficulties in applying it consist some in the op-
position of the little ignorant, mildly incompetent business
men, but mostly in the opposition of the class-conscious,
output-limiting sort of labor, who still are ignorantly inclined
to ‘‘fight’’ and who have not enough mental integrity to
keep their contracts (to say A=A and stick to it).

i. At the limit of doubtful or legal morality (say C, Fig.
163b), the perceptions of given acts become painful, and in-
crease until at D we pass beyond the limit of perceptible
pain into the zone of imperceptible pain (into unconscious-
ness or deatb), in which zone the unit personal structure
changes to structures of different orders, and the man ceases
to be an individual man. If we pass beyond D into the zone
of unconsciousness the system may recuperate and after a
time re-unify and return to consciousness. Almost daily the
accumulation of unmoral acts forces us into the zone beyond
D, where we are unconscious in sleep. When we undergo
that phenomenon usually there are enough reserve parts (per-
haps nerve cells) to permit us, as unit individuals, to pass
through the zone of pain CD so rapidly as to make it imper-
ceptible. When we are in the zone of perceptible
pain CD we are obviously being automatically warned by
nature to get back toa balance (as a truism, or mechanical
automatism, that departure from the normal is pain); and
we usually heed that warning. So truistically pain or suffer-
ing in this Many sense is not a One evil at all, but a positive
good that saves us (for by verbal agreement, to be saved, to
exist, is good). Further, the next perceptible step on the
outward swing from the balance is Many unconsciousness;
and obviously that is not Evil either, but is usually merely a
means of automatically stopping us as unit individuals in our
swing out, so that we may have a chance to recuperate. But
sooner or later we swing into the unconscious zone and can
not recover as personal individuals, but as such are perman-
ently unconscious or ‘‘dead.’’ But we see again that this
is merely a little wider cycle than any before, and not essen-
tially different from the others. In no case was one of those
cycles a perfect cycle; i. e., in no case did we ever, at any
step of the actually infinite regress along the curve, come
back exactly to our previous personality.

j. We have seen that the whole individual does not
actually stay on the perfect hyperbola. This curve is merely
the average—a general way of showing the principles. What
actually happens is that there are parts of the individual or-
ganism which are in periodicity with the whole organism (or
galaxy’), and those parts build up and break down to some
degree without definitely changing the unit organism (just as
do the parts of the stellar galaxy). | We may say that the
‘smallest part’ remains such in the unmoral zone (for a time:
I omit explicit discussion of the 7’s), but at about the limits
A, A’ changes into structures of different order—perhaps joins
on as a part of a larger structure; perhaps break up into de-
bris: no one yet definitely knows those quantitative details.
Then the next ‘heavier’ or ‘higher’ structure survives inside

are good, as we have seen) tends toward a balance, or an unbalance.
The gambler who disturbs any equilibrium, hoping to grab some
profit for himself in the resulting confusion and uncertainty, is im-
moral in cases where he can not demonstrate an increased balance
for others, or where he does not restore the particular unbalance he
causes—or even try to. The gambler who proposes to make a busi-
ness of—keep on—making such unbalances is himself extremely im-
moral, but may perhaps be morally permitted to spoil himself if he
wants to, in order to give normal people occasional moral gambles.
In this matter we run into the quantitative regress practically, and
can’t be certain whether stockbrokers are moral or not. Witha
steady climate, it is likely that in a few years we shall develop
enough not to need such “‘artificially’’ violent activity as price
gambling, and then the present-day broker will be immoral.

UNIVERSE

200

the moral limits B, B’, And soon. The equation for those
parts is M(varying with) L? T= Energy. That ‘smallest part’
which survives in the unmoral zone is a standard universe
Energy or Unmoral emotion; then there is a ‘larger’ standard
universe Consciousness; ete. M truistically can be an ethical]
unit (cf. §158)—whether an ‘‘act of love’? or a ‘square
meal’’ being immaterial to the theory, but of primary import-
ance in practical measuring—in determining the selection,
naming, and evaluating of ethical coefficients. The qnantita-
tive theory of ethics is as nebulous as electricity was three
centuries ago; hence, I have too little definite qnantitative
experience to make a competent suggestion as to what sort of
ethical units should be used; but a tentative guess is that if
ethics is to be a fairly definite branch of science it will occupy
the ground between psychology and economics, with units of
money and human effort (cf. §8168b, 172b for equational
statement of that). F, W. Taylor’s scientific management
was the first rather definite work that substantially made
ethics a science, taking it out of its previous status of theo-
retical mushy “‘idealism’’ and practical exploiting. Taylor
was therefore a pioneer of the size of Christ, Newton, Dar-
win. His work is now being extended in a practical way,
usually under the name of management engineering, by such
leaders as Cooke, Thompson, Hathaway, the Gilbreths. In
a theoretical way his work is being extended under so many
names in the colleges as to make it seem that the name
ethics may not survive the odium of its theological misuse.
That equation in ethics therefore has the same theory
of periodicity as in any other science (cf. §158 in psychology ;
for ethics the structures are of different size). And the
mathematical discussion of those zones and limits (which con-
stitutes some of the definite details of ‘periodicity’) is obvi-
ously identical with the economic theory of marginal values,
etc. (which is simply a general discussion of our daily problem
Is it worth quite that much to me?). A “‘marginal value’’
is above called a ‘zone,’ etc. (see Marshall’s ‘‘Economics’’).
So all of science is again seen to be rigorously unified
and we now see in the most familiar detail that it is not
necessary, for a complete understanding of the variations of
any thing, that the conventional ‘‘measures’’ be made. In
short, it is possible to state the principles of all science a pri-
ori. It could not be strictly a priori: it would actually be the
conclusions from watching our own nerve cells act; but that
is usually called a priori, although there obviously is no es-
sential experimental difference between watching one of our
nerve cells work and watching the galaxy work. However,
the man who restricted himself to watching one of his nerve
cells act would almost certainly be so excessively poor in
practical judgment (in sense of proportion, or ability to guess
well at the proportions of phenomena in general—‘ ‘sense of
proportion’ is the common name for ‘periodicity,’ and as
artists admit they ought to have it, some may he distressed to
hear that it means not only practical, but “‘worse’’:- scien-
tific) that his observations would be practically worthless—
which shows why any man who specializes too much has poor
judgment and is poor as an executive. Several volumes
of expansion of those facts must be omitted at this point (the
rhetoric has already passed the point of condensation that is
tolerable)—such as showing that the solution of the One and
Many proves that a priori and a posteriori are ultimately iden-
tical—which is the same as saying that valid logic uses “‘de-
ductive’’ reasoning and “‘inductive’’ reasoning simultaneously
and hence without ultimate distinction.

§164. a. The last section gives in a rough elementary
way the quantitative establishment of ethics as a science.
We are now ready to consider some of its general principles
and applications.

201

b. As ethical good or happiness is activity or life, it fol-
lows that the basic ethical or human aim is to get all of it that
is quantitatively compatible with various Many aims or purposes
or relationships—in short, have a sense of proportion or peri-
odicity in “‘living’’ (a direct truism). The active achieve-
ment of that is virtue, righteousness, merit, morality, etc. ;
and the failure to achieve such fair quantitative balance is
sin, iniquity, ungodliness, wickedness, ete. For as seen, if
we swing too far from the balance and get too much of what
otherwise is “‘life,’’ the pleasure quantitatively reverses into
pain or immorality, and some structural part reverses or
““dies’’ and we actually get less life. So the prime ethical]
aim is to build up a biological structure (chiefly the nervous
system) that is more extensive and intensive, so that it will
survive greater excursions from the balance—for otherwise
much of a swing, much “‘prosperity,’’ hurts instead of pleas-
ing (truistically, ““too much prosperity’? hurts). We have seen
that such a strengthened individual is usually called a genius.
And such increase of quantitative tolerance by many men is
called progress, or increase of civilization. Or, in physical
terms, the nervous system is more differentiated (the quanti-
tative details are as yet unmeasured), so that slight parts of it
reverse when we experience numerous phenomena, or dots in
our formula—which thus makes the formula or “‘life’’ pleas-
urably perceptible a long way out. And al] that is a
definite, truistic, intelligible way of saying that the prime
ethical aim is included in what is usually called education—a
life-long process of extending or leading out the nervous sys-
tem to grasp and tolerate more life, including of course tru-
istically the “‘application’’ of what is grasped—a process of
grasping skill or art, and the use of that skill or art. (Con-
ventionally, ‘“education’’ often tends to mean verbally only
a taking in of stimuli; but asa truism the cycle must be
completed by an equally proper discharge of them, as “‘do-
ing’ things, or the application of such half-education.) And
equally obviously, that education requires the education of
the moral man’s neighbor. For if his neighbor is not able to
make as wide excursions as he can, then he is not able to re-
act (live) with his neighbor without hurting the neighbor and
in the reaction hurting himself. In short, if you get abead
of your age you pain yourself as much as you do your neigh-
bors, and more than you pain any one neighbor. There are
two quantitative modifications of that:- (1) if you are more
widely educated than your neighbor, you can keep away
from bim somewhat, and react directly with ‘‘material’’
things—invent something, make things, ““enjoy nature,’’
etc.,—a theoretically rather unsatisfactory sort of procedure,
in that it is not direct reaction with the same order of whirls:-
men; (2) and you can distribute your reactions among many
people, so that no one of them is much pained; but that is
also truistically unsatisfactory, in that they can not react
equally hard and make it interesting (just as an expert ball
pitcher would not care to pitch to a girl). So if you see any-
one priding himself on knowing more than his neighbors (so
that incidentally he ought to act as a sort of superior spokes-
man or Woodrow Wilson for them), you can correctly con-
clude at once that he is wrong about it, and probably knows
much less. If he actually knew appreciably more it would
be a misfortune to him, and he would say that it was a mis-
fortune, instead of being puffed up.

ec. So truistically the basic sin is ignorance or stupidity ;
for ignorance is a narrowing of life. And obviously, sin is an
unessential quantitative matter (in its ordinary meaning).
All of us soon reach the point where we can not perceive fur-
ther, and where we have to stay ignorant. Our intentions
are always good, and thus there can be no One sin—no un-
But there is, as we saw, a species of stupid

forgivable sin.

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §164e

person who substantially asserts that he wants to be contin-
ually trying to depart from the balance. Formally or logic-
ally he is guilty of One or absolute sin; but of course he in
practice does not do it—merely is stupid in high degree.

d. So the basic practical or quantitative rule of ethical
procedure is truistically (1) that we must try to make our
perceptions of life a little wider, but that we must not do it
more often or vigorously than will allow us each time to get
acycleof rest by going in the opposite direction; and (2) that
while we are doing it we must see to it that we do not make
our neighbor react unduly far, so as to pain him much (pro-
vided he is fairly normal or right). That is obviously identi-
eal with the psychological rule for being a genius (§159), or
the biological rule for living a healthy life (§149e), with the
addition that now we are explicit about considering the effect
on our neighbor. (Of course in the two former rules our
neighbor is implicit in Environment... .) And that
ethical rule is obviously identical with the conventional funda-
mental law of life:- the law of self-preservation. Clearly, that
law tacitly assumes that life is worth living—that good is
activity or life. And the law includes the principle that
while we are cyclically stretching our lives we will be equally
careful to preserve our neighbor’s life so as to obviate his
too large reaction in ours. Or it may be said that I have
merely verbally expanded the ordinary moral law (the one
that gives the “‘right’’ of self-preservation), by asserting the
principle of the so-called “‘sanctity of human life.’’ The
expansion makes the law intelligible, and proves it, by show-
ing the truisms upon which it rests—and shows that the total
argument of this book is in accord with the fundamental
judgment of the race. It then becomes evident that
the “‘right’’ of self-preservation and the “sanctity of human
life’? are-is not One or absolute. As is obviously the fact,
and as we now see is correct in principle, in Many practice
or living the right and the sanctity is accorded to others only
in the measure in which they in practice accord it to us.
The principle is that we give to others the sanctity of their
lives just as far as we can—giving them the benefit of any doubt
because we recognize their ultimate Oneness and identity
with us. That law, thus fully expressed, is conventionally
called the ““law ef humanity.’’ Obviously, when the Germans
in sinking various ships acted on what they called military
necessity, or upon any other similar tacit assertion that their
own lives were essentially superior in value, they violated
that fundamental ethical law or law of humanity, and in the
most vivid practical way (i. e., by deeds) showed in that case
at least that they were unable to grasp fundamental] princi-
ples. Yet, by the conventional theory of lawyers’ law (which
theory is wrong), the Germans were legally right (ef. 8173)
just as they contended; Wilson, by equating the law of hu-
manity and legal law, did poorer thinking than the Germans.

e. That basic ethical rule, the law of humanity, is obvi-
ously merely a fairly definite quantitative statement of love
for our neighbors. It also can be seen to be inclusive of the
more or less synonymous virtues of duty, reliability, service,
kindness, cooperation, responsibility, loyalty, toleration, faithful-
ness, politeness, cordiality, interest and ardor, etc. There are
numerous ethical names for that controlled, and temperate,
and balance-seeking or loving, human interaction with the
environment and-or other humans, which action yet strives to
grow as large as it may, having due regard for conditions.
Those various names designate various combinations of react-
ing parts as being given in certain conditions. Truistically,
our statement of the principles refers to all combinations and
conditions, and hence covers the principles of those virtues.
But we saw (par. d, (1), (2)) that in following the
basic rule we always havean intensive factor and an extensive

§164e XVIII Three

factor. So we need to consider the character of our conduct
when emphasizing (1) one factor, and then (2) the other.
Truistically, each cycle of conduct consists of emphasis on
one factor, and then reversal onto the other—of unselfish-
ness and then resting selfishly; of working and then baving
its pay get us work from others. Any definite and applic-
able knowledge of ethics requires explicit grasp of the char-
acter of such cycles, which is given in the next four sections.

S165. a. Fundamentally, the intensive or personal
factor in Unselfishness... < Selfishness... emphasizes T, and
the extensive or environmental factor emphasizes L. We
shal] definitely consider the gaining of the greatest happiness
from those two points of view of Z and L. That gives prin-
ciples which we all know and use, but which we have been
taking as commonsense, rather than lofty ‘‘ethies.”’

b. Asa truism, if there is some activity, some part of
the universe, for us to become conscious of, then the less
time 7 we use in becoming conscious of it—‘‘living’’ it—the
more we live, provided we do not damage ourselves (and
others) so that we can not then use the time saved to live
more. In short, one aspect of the fundamental ethical prin-
ciple is, that other things being about equal the faster we can
and do live the better we are. So economy af time is moral,
and waste of time is immoral. That does not require
“‘hurrying’’; it means being conscious gf living as much as
we are grown able to be, pleasurably, in a given time—rath-
er than being chiefly conscious of a clock or some equivalent
during that time, which is what hurrying, or being consciously
‘efficient,’ is. | The human aim of science for centuries has
been economy of time—to state that aim from one aspect
(the complete aim is the conscious use of energy, life more
abundantly, which includes both L and T explicitly).
Probably nearly everyone knows all that. But as it is not
particularly recognized by the Oriental] ethics of the Bible
we are not accustomed to seeing it expressed. The following
is obviously the way it happened that the Bible and Christ
substantially overlooked and omitted explicitly expressing
‘half’ of ethics, so that it remained for future generations
to add that half or T aspect as “‘science’’:- We see vividly
that our own consciousness emphasizes 7'; but there is more
difficulty in being conscious of ‘‘objective’’ things, or of
emphasizing L. So Christ and other Orientals (and this is
the only general way in which Christ is not mentally an Oc-
cidental), took for granted as obvious the T aspect, and spent
their efforts in seeing and talking about the space extension
of man (unified by the relationship of love) finally into God.
It is an example of make believe. The result was
that the universe itself or God automatically corrected that
omission of a definite 7 by shoving us along into a clearer
view of the morality of the economy of time—we gradually
learning to use time better and better. So if we take the
novel view, but nevertheless in fact the practically true one,
that theology or the ethics of the Bible (apart from its inci-
dental dualism due mostly to Paul, which the race in general
never swallowed—only the theologians and other aristocrats)
is Many expression emphasizing L, then we may take it that
““science’’ is the J emphasis; and we have the valid equa-
tion Biblical ethics or theology... <Science...—=God. Evidently
in that view of history and ethics there has been no warfare
of science and theology, but a necessary reaction. And all
that shows better than anything else I know of, that °° Provi-
dence’’ takes good care of us—that the universe runs itself a
great deal better than is often recognized. ‘‘Science’” is
usually supposed to refer to objective things or LZ chiefly, but
is here considered in its human aspect: thus the equation
shows fundamentally the tendency of extensive and intensive to
reverse into each other. Also that equation is the widest

UNIVERSE

202

historical generalization covering the past thirty or forty cen-
turies rather definitely, that I can formulate (the expressions
for man and woman are wider, and perhaps nearly as definite,
as we shal] see). The more or less obvious expansion of this
paragraph would require volumes, omitted here,

c. The other aspect of the gaining of greatest happiness
is the L aspect, or objective factor, or emphasis on neighbors
in wider and wider circles. Economy of time first benefits
ourselves, and so from that ordinary commonsense point of view
is Selfishness.... The objective aspect of morality consists of
first benefitting others—is altruism or Unselfishness... .
Obviously, as soon as we give to others a pleasurable reaction
with ourselves, they usually in turn directly react to give us
pleasure. So in that wider view the extensive factor changes
into, or identifies itself with, the intensive factor—just as we
saw in par. b happened vice versa (§7If).

d. The chief increase in the consciousness of extensive
morality—our chief gain in abundance of life froman ZL point
of view—that has taken place since Christ’s time, has been
through, or is, the invention and use of vastly more machin-
ery. (I use machinery for any part of the universe—any tool
—which we may employ as an intermediary, or perceptible
connection, between us and the more remote environment,
such as pencil, paper, gun, locomotive, telegraph, clothing,
fishing tackle, steamship, chair, house, lathe, ete.). The
deliberate invention and useof machinery is the most directly
moral conduct possible to us in the L aspect—it is a truism.
For obviously, a tool is, while we use it, essentially a con-
scious spacial extension of our body or nervous system or spirit

165b As an incidental general proof of the correctness of the fact
that the race has for centuries taken J'as being so obvious as not to
need explicit recognition (cf. 8150), it may be noted that it is consid-
ered that Bergson made a first class discovery in explicitly noting
the “‘subjective’’ existence of time or T. (Of course, many men did
it before Bergson—e. g., Ward, in ‘‘Realm of Ends,’’ claims to;—~
but perhaps they failed to emphasize it enough.) Aside from having
pointed out the importance of time (actually it is of importance only
from a formal or logical point of view: Iwas unable to make out
whether Bergson knows time is a mere form, or not), Bergson’s phil-
osophy seems to me to be trivial and vapid—the sort of stuff that
pleases ‘‘intellectuals’’ and ladies at tea parties. He fails to handle
even that ¢ime rationally in the only book of his 1 have ever had the
plodding patience to read through:- ‘*Creative Evolution.’’ Itseems
needful to notice Bergson because James recommended him so high-
ly. Itis simple why Bergson affected James so much:- James had
been over-emphasizing the *‘objective’’ for years (while in that state
of mind he acquired the dualistic Muensterberg—an error in his
judgment of men in the opposite direction from his acceptance of
Bergson), and had worked himself into the place where he saw
he must go on to One continuity—to infinite pluralism more defi-
nitely than he had often previously guessed at it. James was chiefly
a psychologist, and so that step was easiest for him via the T conti-
nuity of consciousness. So Bergson’s emphasis on 7, together with
its equivalent idea, the ultimate Oneness or identical infinite plural-
ism of consciousness which is given by Bergson explicitly in recog-
nizing or emphasizing Emotions..., was the last gentle push needed
by James to enable him to sum to monism (Bergson calls Emotions...
“intuitions’’ in an esoteric sort of way which seems to be pleasing to
people who are too lazy to think clearly but like to make believe that
they think—and very puzzling to the philosophers who politely took
James seriously, to whom Bergson has become a sort of conventional
enigma). So James in his first uncritical exuberance of gratitude
naturally attributed to Bergson what was really in James. James
had a rebirth, and wrote ‘‘Radical Empiricism,”’ which is in agree-
ment with this book although not commonly recognized tobe of such
anature. 1. e., James at the end was no dualist or finite pluralist,
as he is usually supposed to be; but he did not live long enough to
cool off, and see just what had happened to his views. The
reader of James should remember that James led a very sheltered
life; that gave hima delightful urbanity and sweet generosity, but at
the same time it made his judgment of men poor and decreased his
sense of personal responsibility for what he said until he apparently
verged on being willing to be considerably inaccurate, not to say
radical, in order to be entertaining. I like James as a man; but
technically he is unreliable—a carelessly exuberant enfant terrible.

203

or soul, and hence is additional life. If a man uses the tele-
phone, he obviously extends his senses and hence soul defi-
nitely as far as the other instrument. | When we travel on a
steamer we definitely put a large tool onto ourselves, with
which we effectively and pleasurably (in sum anyway, in
spite of seasickness) react with a comparatively large lot of
environment. The man who controls the steamer (by vari-
ous communicating apparatuses) can, if well trained, feel the
environment throngh the steamer and fee] the parts of the
steamer, precisely as he can feel his own internal emotions or
interna] parts of himself. | We reach out across a continent
and get things with a railroad, and live there as definitely as
we enjoy life’? by taking, with some other tool, a morsel of
food from the plate before us. ‘It is not customary to think
of the use of machinery as being moral—as being perhaps in
most cases more mora] than going to church. But the mere
statement of its morality becomes a self-evident truism.’™4
Machinery is a quantitative good, and so may be over-used or
under-used; and often is. We also sometimes misuse our
hands, which are also extensions of our bodies and tools.

e. We have seen (par. c) that the L aspect and the 7'
aspect of morals inevitably merge with each other. That is
the same as saying that Unselfishness... < Selfishness... truis-
tically becomes M(varying with)L?T~*, M being any organic
individual or natural structure (ef. §163j). That obviously
agrees with the general law, mass varies with velocity, and
may be expressed as the general ethical law (which may be
put in many other forms) :- happiness quantitatively amounts
to the extensiveness (L) of used perceptions that can be
compressed or “‘speeded’’ (7) into a given lifetime.

f. I omit all but a few ways of considering that general
scientific form of the ethical law. There is nothing novel
about that law, it clearly being simply a positively explicit
statement of the truism that happiness or good is activity (or
of Christ’s general summation) from which we started—a cir-
cle of reasoning proving our expression of observations.

$166. a. It therefore follows that that maximum living,
and-or maximum morality or happiness, consists (1) of con-
sciously perceiving (reacting with) the environment (includ-
ing in environment the parts of our own nervous systems or
souls that are, to begin with, very dimly Emotions...) just as
far out or extensively (L) as we can without going so far as
to have such interaction become unconscious or painfully

165d Gerald Stanley Lee, in ‘‘The Voice of the Machines,’’ shows
in effect and with overwhelming detail that machines are moral, and
when intelligently used are part of us. Lee J think is a great poet
—and much evidence of the correctness of that estimate lies in the
fact that he could actually feel the morality of machinery at a time
when ordinary poets sniffed at machinery. Their objectious really
meant that they were too callous and uneducated (§164b) to he able
to get the real feel of an extension of themselves through a tool; or
sometimes they did feel such an extension, and with equal nerve
callousness lost sight of the fact that they were using a machine, and
denied that they were. Poetry is the first form in which truth
is somewhat acceptahly stated. That first statement would he so
novel and repulsive as not to ‘‘penetrate’’ very well unless made per-
ceptibly rhythmic in some respect. The poetical rhythm (and usu-
ally rhyme) is a formal device that makes the measuring more or less
automatically pound its way up to the cortex (in the same quantita-
tive way that a slight but rhythmic stimulus will shake a strong
bridge down), in spite of the hearer’s pain over receiving the new
truth or idea itself (cf. §§158-9). And great poets like Lee have a
sense of proportion (of rhythm, of harmonic periodicity) for ideas
themselves, so that they can (with most persons whose brains are not
attuned to jazz—dualism) make ideas reverberate into rebirths, so to
speak. There is a primitive form of that in the Song of Songs and
Job; the queer new poets we have nowadays seem to have an un-
stated intuition that the highest poetry is a rhythm of ideas. But
their idea that they can get it by throwing away ordinary poetic
rhythms is equivalent to the delusion that if we are the fortunate
possessors of $10, by throwing it away we will have a million.

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §166c

damaging (including not damaging others), and doing it as
fast as we can (T), so that our memories of all the parts of
the process will be vivid or intense; and then (2) stopping
that swing out from the balance before it cumulatively pain-
fully disintegrates or changes the structural order of our soul
or nervous system, and then (after stopping) swinging back
in the cycle, “‘resting’’ or recuperating in order to do it all
over again. Each such swing by the theory of incommensur-
ables tends to sum perceptibly in one direction from the bal-
ance (i. e., each actual swing is partly Unselfishness... and
partly Selfishness..., but one or the other, by incommensur-
ability, is preponderant, and often perceptibly so); hence,
the maximum recuperation or final total morality consists of
swinging about as often with one preponderance as the other.
All that can evidently be stated in mathematical
terms of maxima and minima.

b. The last paragraph probably seems as dry as dust,
theoretical, abstract, etc. Yet it is a complete and definite
solution of What are the ‘‘important’’ things of life?, of What's
the use?—as we shall in this section proceed to see in a few
details. It had to be put dryly or ‘‘unemotionally’’ in order
to say so much. Of course the quantities which are tolerable
or pleasant to any given person can be ‘‘solved’’ or measured
only as a special case for himself (and usually he has only
himself to do that measuring for him). Clearly, the amount
of living or morality of a given person depends upon the sum
of “‘toughness’’ of his cells. If he starts with all his cells in
good balance, strong and healthy (has a ““good constitution’’)
he can usually live more than cana person less well endowed.
But it is clear that if he has a constitution strong enough to
understand or perceive the general scheme of the last para-
graph just once (and I judge that 90 per cent of children
reach that strength at some time in their ’teens), then by
conscious (“‘intelligent’’) “‘nurture’’ of his self he can readily
build that self up and live far more than a person of better
inheritance who does not consciously go after what he wants
but “‘trusts to luck.’ There is no space to expand
this important paragraph—showing, e. g., that such varying
inheritance is absolutely just (the key to that proof of justice
being that here we are talking quantitatively).

ce. Ina fairly steady environment there truistically is a
tendency towards wider definite organization (XVI). The
steadiness of the environment of man is in a wide sense con-
sidered under the name climate. In a narrower sense steady
environment consists of fairly stable societies, owning an ac-
cumulating amount of tools in the shape of recorded truth
(traditions, proverbs, books, “‘science,’’ “‘religion,’’ etc.),
as well as more material ephemeral wealth. [t truistically
follows that with a fairly steady climate men automatically
(rather unconsciously the first time; and on perceiving the
results on that occasion, more or less ““purposely’’ thereafter)
swing out in those happy cycles of the last two paragraphs.
Doing so establishes a physiological memory (§158c), so that
they as a rule acquire ability to swing further and further
pleasurably. (Some go too far, and some not far enough, of
course, and are killed off; or, in teleological terms, those
excessive ones are not sufficiently desirous of being moral and
happy to have the “‘will to live’’—a truism.) That ahility
of individuals to swing further and further truistically implies
a more definite, perceptible, and extensive social organiza-
tion. And that increase of ability is in general progress, or
advancing civilization. It is a circular process of cause be-
coming effect, and vice versa, like the cycle of universal
structural ‘vibration’ that underlies it. | And the tools or
machinery of accumulated ‘‘truth’’ (the “‘social inheritance’’
which is the steady social environment) obviously acts upon
each individual in that pretty steady environment and tends

§166c XVIII Three

to cause him to build his self up and live beyond the point to
which his physiological cell inheritance would go without
being thus supported. In short, it obviously may be quantita-
tively possible that ““nurture’’ in the form of **social inheri-
tance’’ will “‘civilize’’ a man (cause him to have more life or
happiness) in perhaps a more effective way than his inherited
characteristics—than his congenital cell memories. The en-
vironment—the social structure around him—may serve him
as a better ‘memory,’ as a stronger ‘constitution,’ than his
congenital ““personal’’ one. That quantitative possibility is,
in some measure, held to be the actual fact by those whu con-
sider humanics to be primarily “‘sociology.’’ For a very
explicit assertion that the possibility is realized in fact, and
that “‘sociology’’ is the ““master science,’’ see Kidd’s “‘The
Science of Power,’’ and his remarks in “‘Ency. Brit.,’’ xxv,
33). It thus becomes obvious that the ““difference’’
between sociology and ethics (taking ‘‘ethics’’ conventionally
as being more emphatically “‘personal’’) is a mere matter of
quantitative guessing. |My personal guess is that Kidd and
some other sociologists (more particularly the amateur sort,
who perennially rediscover a perceptible socia] structure or
relationship into a One, and usually give it a new name) are
specialists who exaggerate their specialty somewhat. The
principle underlying that guessing is:- Social inheritances or
social nurture... X Personal or congenital physiological inheritance
and-or nurture...—=Social or moral individual life (or, Sociolo-
gy... X Personal biology or personal ethics...—Life); and my
guess is that the perceptible phenomena may be about as often
*ethical’’ as ““sociological.”’ .So, to summarize this
paragraph:- the general application of the complete ethical
principle gives us the broad outline of what is commonly
called sociology by modern writers (it is sometimes called
evolution, or social evolution; also civilization, social aesthetics,
culture, ete.; ef. 8171).

d. The generally accepted ““most important”’ thing in
life, or its supremest bappiness, is ““religion’’—specifically
one or more religious experiences. Sometimes the ““greatest
thing in the world’’ is said to be love, and sometimes the
‘“power’’ that money, etc., gives; but as love and power
(over nature or material things, others, and-or oneself) are
simply the humanistic names for universal relationship of
identity itis obvious that that again means that the perception
of them, which we may conventionally and conveniently cal]
a ‘‘religious experience,’’ is the greatest thing. And obvi-
ously, that genera] judgment as to the greatest thing is rig-
orously proved by the foregoing to be correct. Fora religious
experience or rebirth (§153f) is a swing out so far (L) that
the infinite regress is more or less perceptible, and a swing
out so quick (7) that the perception is vivid. It is now obvi-
ous that a swing too far destroys the man (§163).'

166d Jt seems to me to be the fact that most geniuses, prophets,
saints, seers, etc., have swung out so far on some rebirth that they
were unable to recover very well, and hence were never afterwards
quite sane in one or two respects. I.e., they did not in some respect
recover the ability to judge what was the normal balance (§159f), and
so were not able afterwards to ‘‘control’’ themselves. They usually,
however, were quick toseeand condemn similar intemperance in get-
ting a feeling of universal unity in otbers when it took the form of
power madness—especially when that power was represented by
money, which is the sort of power easiest to perceive. So as a means
of kceping ourselves temperate in getting rebirths in the more usual
everyday forms of power and love, it is useful to note some of the
intemperances in the rebirths themselves. Often the genius
fancied that he should keep on in that state of ecstacy or rebirth or
definite perception of unity or power or intoxicated expansiveness;:
Swedenborg did manage to keep on considerably, and became ratber
definitely insane. Sometimes the genius temporarily allowed it ta
run along too much, and then violently avoided it the rest of his life
(became, so to speak, intemperately sane like a standpatter—a mild
insanity in the opposite direction). Some saints got such a painful

UNIVERSE

204

e. But obviously, if we in a reasonably tolerable way—
i. €., not too unbalancedly—see the infinite beauty of God
or the universe, or see our own personal inseparable unity
with God, or see that we are personally a part of the uni-
verse and hence ultimately indispensable or needed or useful,
and fit in or are beautiful] ourselves, or are not *“lonely”’ and
‘‘unsupported’’ but are held up by infinite ‘‘grace’’ (or pow-
er or energy, if we prefer more definite terms)—if we see
that general unity, without the ecstacy or happiness being
too painfully poignant or nervously destructive, it follows
that on that occasion of rebirth we have seen or experienced
or understood the fundamental] scheme of life and can hence-
forth know how to live—how to get the important thing out
of life. That is of course repetitious. I have been
deliberately repeating the description of a reasonable re-
birth in various of the many conventiona] ways, so that the
reader can scarcely avoid recognizing his own similar ex-
periences (I shal] give even more familiar descriptions of it
from time to time below); and can scarcely avoid recogniz-
ing that a rebirth is, in brief, a conscious grasping or perceiv-
ing or being (§28h) the infinite regress that applies to any
experienced unit of the Many. In that case (in the case that
the reader actually sees what this book by consistent logic
and direct evidence in all varieties of phenomena shows to be
the truth), he can then understand that the important things
in life are those rhythmic stretchings of his life or abilities—
those used or cyclic perceivings of Jove or power or unity—
as far as they will go pleasantly (for himself as well as others).
And on occasions he may indulge in a cycle which is a bit
poignant (such as earning a million dollars—earning it), as a
means of increasing his ability to live (and all that is merely

rebirth that instead of calling it the usual ‘‘seeing God”’ or talking
with God, they named it the opposite; thus Christ talked with the
devil (§153g), and Luther said he threw his inkwell at the devil. In
rough generality, one of two more or less opposite mental or physio-
logical make-ups is required to get a violent rebirth:- (1) the victim
much have a much disconnected (‘‘unstable’’) nervous system so
that one circuit may from rather usual] stimuli get violently over-
loaded; such a condition may be ‘‘natural’’ (as in hysterics, para-
noiacs, and other rather weak-minded or suggestible persons), or
may be acquired by drugs, or by various disease poisons; (2) the
victim must have a rather strong nervous system, which he by
persistent ‘stretching’ finally gets more or less as a whole into an
explosive condition. As the brain in a strong rebirth is perceptibly
‘‘exploding’’ (‘‘seeing’’ violently, or to a considerable extent break-
ing up into different order structures), violent rebirths usually are
accompanied by hallucinations (i. e., by perceptible internal ‘emo-
tions’ or sensations, which effectively stir up considerable collections
of memories, and hence if violent enough seem to be real visions, or
voices, etc. Usually, the first experience of those internal percept-
ible explosions (all sensations give or are slight ‘explosions,’ or
structural changes) is misinterpreted—considered ‘‘real.’’ So the
person having the violent rebirth sincerely makes a report of various
extraordinary ‘“‘visions.’’ By overworking (strongly keeping up a
concentrated strain of attention for two or three weeks), 1 can pro-
duce ‘hallucinations’ in my brain. The ‘‘seers,’’ etc., of India do it
that way (if they would concentrate on something more important
than their navels the procedure might be useful to them); so far as I
can judge, anyone can do it if he tries long enough, or judiciously
uses various drugs (nitrous oxide, hasheesh, e. g.), or a little starva-
tion. My first experience of those hallucinations was a bit startling;
but I readily learned to recognize them for what they were (so that
technically they are not hallucinations). As they are very wearing
on the brain I have for some years avoided getting them. Quite
likely if I had not known a little psychology and hence on the first
experience recognized the danger of a violent rebirth, in spite of its
feeling of infinite well-being and of power more vivid than money (or
even money plus champagne plus a banquet) can give, I also might
have been intemperately setting myself up in the prophet business
and grabbing for additional such power more unscrupulonsly than
the worst financial pirate—and paying for it out of my skin, as all
such deluded persons do, by going more or less insane (i. e., by
breaking down my brain somewhat and being unable to perceive—
enjoy—any but destructive overdoses, like a drug addict).

205

the truism that the important thing in life is really living).

f. It then is obvious that any occupation is essentially
able to give you those continual pleasant rebirths in a desir-
able and supportable cycle. The athlete at school engages
in such cycles largely with his muscles; if he does not shirk
(indulge himself by quitting before the last final effort or
concentration or unifying or summing of his powers; §159d),
or if on the other hand he does not overdo it and get into a
condition where he does not easily recuperate (go “‘stale,’’
or otherwise ‘‘injure’’ himself), then he obviously is stretch-
ing his capacities (including his sou] or nervous system), and
in some degree feels (both directly with his own nerves, and
also by the plaudits of others; Index, ‘““Fame’’) that he is
really infinitely fitting in, is being “‘successful’’ or needed
and an indispensable active part of an organism. (The reason
the athlete sometimes does not take kindly to ‘“books,’’ even
when he has the available energy, is that somebody has given
him the erroneous idea that the writer has done all the work
for him; also, nobody has shown him just how books fit in—
assuming that those offered him do,—or is able to judge the
athlete’s ‘“success’’ with them especially well.) The athlete
usually can not juggle words well enough to express al! that
definitely (word juggling is another form of athletics with
more possibilities and dangers than football); but obviously
that is what he feels—a bubbling well of nerve enthusiasm
that draws its energy from al] the environment and then
pours it out in floods, effectively and joyously and with in-
creasing quantity (provided not overdone), back to the envi-
ronment. His athletic contests are hence, rigorously, a
definite species of religiousness—an explicit religious experi-
ence he can grasp and apply. If his teachers can make it
clear to him that Greek verbs wil] bring him into perceptible
contact and union with all of life, and hence are ultimately
of infinite ““importance’’ and use and beauty, then he will
tackle Greek verbs in the same way, and get just as much
religion, or the habit of success and power and the whole-
hearted work that accomplishes the “‘impossible,’’ out of
those verbs. And obviously, Greek verbs are as inseparably
connected with the whole unit life or God as athletics are.
Their comparative values are small, so that few people are com-
petent and interested judges of either; so the person who
customarily gets his religion by either can get but little act-
ual guidance and support from others, and is likely not to
have the strength to keep himself out of quantitative difficul-
ties—al]l of which we implicitly see in discussing value.
If you are engaged in growing potatoes, then potatoes are
obviously a link that connects you inseparably with all, along
a path over which can flow all the energy, or life, or activity
you are capable of sustaining and enjoying. There is no
limit to the spiritual equation Environment... X Potatoes...=
Universe or God. This book rigorously proves that there are
more emotions, more facts, more sensations, more mathemat-
ics, more uses, directly and inseparably connected with Po-
tatoes... than you will ever be able to grasp definitely. It is
obviously just as moral or just as religious to exercise your-
self, to live, with that potato equation as with the general,
bookish one Unselfishness... X Selfishness...—=God—and much
more so than it is to go to church and hear a minister do it
indirectly for you. In actual practice, if you truly under-
stood and hence got enthusiastic about either equation, if you
began to enjoy ‘‘real life,’’ or to be highly active because
you wanted to be and enjoyed being, then you shortly would
have made yourself many other equations—would have neces-
sarily gained many ‘‘-nterests.”’ The equation you started
with is merely your prime quantitative standard. Any form
of That... < This... sams into a valid religion.

g. ‘Real’? living or moral and happy life therefore

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §166h

consists in persistently ‘observing’ (that including all varie-
ties of ‘‘reacting’’ with) things as they are until we con-
sciously get a vision or perception of their relationship into
the One, and then further consists in thereafter repeating
those rebirths in rhythmie cycles that are temperately pleas-
urable to us and our neighbors. Usually the mistake we
make is intemperately running one factor too high—hurrying,
grabbing, jumping to conclusions, getting rich quick; or,
in the negative direction, wasting time, shirking (which in
higher executive circles is called passing the buck), and, in
general, quitting. Clearly the fundamental error in life is to
get so in the habit of making that mistake of intemperance
that we begin to assert that such an unbalance is right, and
so begin to try to run various things or factors to infinity, and
others to zero, thus logically absolutely “‘separating’’ them,
and becoming a dualist or aristocrat—more or less dead, im-
moral, wicked, ‘insane,’ irrational, ete. As a rule nature or
‘Providence’? automatically controls us subconsciously in
greater part, so that such a mistaken outlook in life is usually
mostly verbal, and such a verbally wrong person ordinarily
does not become pathologically insane. Ordinary men often
try to follow and emulate an insane “‘Jeader,’’ but nature
automatically stops those quantitatively ordinary men far
short of achieving such insanity or gross radicalisms. They
take it out in ‘‘talk‘‘—one reason why “‘talk’’ is cheap.

h. Perhaps the most common of such general mistakes
of intemperance (apart from ordinary loafing by the poor
workman, and passing the buck by the cheap executive—us-
ually a politician) is the view that the essential way of having
a rebirth (or the spasmodic cure of that opposite loafing) is to
have theologica] technicalities pounded into us with sufficient
violence, more or less as © Billy’’ Sunday does it (cf. footnote
d). Usually that violent pounding of the brain with a nar-
row set of stimuli (if the hearer is not wise enough to avoid
it) results in putting all but a few nerve channels somewhat
to sleep (mildly hypnotizing most of the brain), and then and
thus overloading the active ones until they perceptibly ex-
plode—frequently into an obvious hysterical or even more
maniacal] convulsion. Precisely the same effect can
be got in possibly most cases by putting the brain largely
out of connection (to ““sleep’’) with alcohol; in that case the
ordinary affairs of life coming through the remaining channels
keep them at an explosive pitch of intensity, and that truist-
ically gives the somewhat drunken man the customary mod-
erate rebirth—a feeling of extraordinary well-being and of
power and complete living and infinite love. (Some men,
apparently ““stolid’’ ones that take up food and stimuli rather
slowly, are not much affected that way by alcohol; if they
were to take enough they would be, but usually some other
organ breaks down or rebels before the brain gets that ef-
fect). The worship of Bacchus (some of the ritual of which
survives in present-day **communion’’), as well as the use of
alcohol in conviviality (that word itself means a loving organi-
zation or unity of men), are objective proofs of the fact that
alcohol does give such rebirths. | The objection to that sort
of rebirth is the same as the objection to the emotional theo-
logical sort, or to any sort of ecstacy caused by persistent
harping on one narrow theme (such as the oratory of the
demagog, etc.):- the person who experiences it is likely to
overlook the fact that its value lies in the perception of the
One; sohe is liable to become narrowed instead of expanded,
making an idol of alcohol, or of the church, by consider-
ing it the end, rather than the means of the rebirth—yust as
money, or red tape, or oratory, or a narrow specialty is often
mistaken for the reality. A further objection to alcohol is
that it often wears out the nervous system faster than it can
recuperate (thus introducing the economic problem of whether

§166h XVIII Three

the rebirths are worth the time needed for recovery). Prob-
ably in former days when men were more stolid alcohol did
not have that latter objection, and was much more of a good
than an evil. But it seems to be a fairly safe guess that al-
coho] destroys a present-day keen and quick brain faster than
it can recuperate; if so, its use by suck men is immoral.
The change in the nervous systems of mankind has perhaps
on that ground of giving too violent rebirths (which is the
crucial] point) made the use of alcohol in appreciable quantity
in some degree immoral for the majority of the mature male
adults of this country. It has nearly surely long been defi-
nitely immoral for all the females (for psychological reasons
implied in §170). It is possible that the alcoholic rebirths
are somewhat needed by the young male adults, and by the
more stolid. But it also seems to be a reasonable guess that
this country needs legal prohibition:- for any kind of rebirths
in excess is immoral, as has been seen; the men in the liquor
trade by obvious principles would be, and in glaring fact in-
creasingly were, in general, fools who were determined, for
quick money profits, to force an excess of alcohol upon peo-
ple; and the only practical way to deal with them is to
eliminate them—as is being done. Alcohol is very easy to
make, and those who can profitably use it can also develop
self-reliance by making their own.

i. In contrast with those usually overdone ways of get-
ting rebirths by overworking some narrow channel, we may
observe the most usual way of getting the important things
out of life. In fact, so common is this way we are to see, of
living a real religious life, that it is rarely recognized as such.
But the fact that it tacitly is actually recognized as such
by most persons is evident from the glaring fact that they
spend more effort, time, and money on this way than on all
others combined. And that fact is truistic proof that the
race is fundamentally sound, vigorous, right, religious, lov-
able—in spite of all the superficial “‘intellectual’’ idiocies
and radicalisms with which it is afflicted: in spite of all its
ephemeral warring creeds and dualistic theologies. This or-
dinary temperate way of being religious and moral, of getting
the important things out of life, is marriage.

j. It is perhaps evident from the mere mention of it
that the most vivid or intense as well as extensive direct ex-
perience or personal experimental evidence that a human be-
ing can have that he or she is directly and inseparably related
to the rest of the universe is sexual intercourse under normal
matrimonial conditions. It is shown by the discussion of sex
in §146 to be a truism that the climax or orgasm of sex union
is the most perceptible normal rebirth that an individual can
have. —— That orgasm theoretically differs quantitatively
(in L and 7) with respect to man and woman; for that and
other remoter modifying details of this paragraph, see §170.
Further, the sex cycle of both man and woman is completed
only by the birth and up-bringing of a child; so in that the
intensity, and physiological extensity, of the rebirth is di-
rectly extended in perceptible infinite regress. In short, the
prolonged infancy of the child leads to the progress of the
child, but perhaps mostly does it because the prolonged in-
fancy first gives the parents (the father usually does not so
fully use this opportunity as the mother) a wider grasp of
reality, so that they then impart it in some degree to the in-
fant. John Fiske first worked out the details of that.
This paragraph can not be adeqnately discussed in less than
avolume. The short parenthesis about the father’s often
neglecting his opportunity might profitably be expanded that
much. Some additional comment is given in §§167, 170.
In the rest of this section we may briefly note a few general
ideas implied by this paragraph.

k. The chief implication is that such sex life is rhythmic

UNIVERSE

206

if normal, and so, for persons with fairly keen and sensitive
brains, requires monogamy. For such persons a greater de-
gree of promiscuity (even legal monogamic unions that are
intended to be temporary) is obviously likely to be destruct-
ively intense (cf. par. 1). So various sorts of sex promiscuity
or deliberate temporariness (including levity and carelessness
in divorce; par. n) is obviously moral for a barbarian, and is
the mark of a barbarian or a person still so youthful or unde-
veloped as to be psychologically in the barbaric stage; but
it is immoral for an adult in the degree in which he is civi-
lized. (Those quantitative remarks apply to a male; they ap-
ply in much greater degree to a female; see §170).

1, The general historical evidence in support of the last
two paragraphs is the fact that in older theologies sex inter-
course was rather definitely recognized as being a religious
rebirth, and a ritual was made of it—i. e., sex intercourse
became a formal way to “‘worship.’’ Such promiscuity, even
though verbally sanctified by the theologians, as alcoho] is
now doing, slowly became too violent even for the coarser
men, and was mostly dropped before Christ, although occa-
sional sects still arise among callous people which try to ritu-
alize sex intercourse. Immediate objective evidence in
support of the two paragraphs is that literature uses sex, or
**romantic’’ love, or ‘‘passion,’’ as the chief spring of action.

m. The important practical implication of par. j is that
in a normal marriage each spouse truistically is to the other the
chief or primary or most important God the Son in existence, or
ever in existence. | That conclusion sounds queer, of course;
various demagogs and autocrats, especially the priests, so fill
the air with verbal clamor that we must come to them to be
furnished with the chief God the Son, that being obliging and
peaceably inclined and a trifle lazy we have grown superfic-
ially accustomed to taking their word for it. Yet that odd
looking conclusion (that a person’s own, selected spouse is
his or her chief God the Son) is glaringly a truism in a normal
marriage (it is quantitative, and not invariably true) :- Christ,
or the pope, or a deified Nero, or even a local autocrat or
boss, is obviously much further off from us in most ways than
our spouse, and so we necessarily primarily react with the
environment through the spouse (if the marriage is fairly real
or successful—as I judge about 75 per cent of marriages in
this country are: more than in any other country or in any
past age). At the beginning of marriages, when the relation
is novel, the conclusion is usually clearly asserted by the
couple:- as they do not understand orthodox theological
terms (even though it pleases them to use such terms ritual-
istically), they use direct and intelligible terms and see and
state that to each the spouse is the most important, ‘‘best,”’
finest, etc., person in the world (it being further tacitly ac-
cepted that persons—structures of our own order—are the
most important thing to us; even in a machine shop). And
that statement made of spouses is clearly equivalent to our
conclusion as expressed in ethical terms. And the conclusion
is further proved by the obvious facts that the majority of
people (1) are primarily interested in working for their spouses
and for the more or less parts of their spouses:- children;
and (2) generally use the spouses as a chief standard by
which to judge their own acts. _It is quite true that a mar-
ried couple often do not keep on very long stating the con-
clusion definitely in words to each other; it is too real and
obvious for ritualization. (If we keep on repeating the same
thing after the novelty wears off, it implies either that we do
not with any definite conviction believe it or really under-
stand it, or that we still doubt whether the hearer does.) It
becomes so obvious to them that they are each other’s chief
God the Son that when the theologian talks about Christ’s
being the primary God the Son they really do not know what

207

he means (and usually he does not either: if he does he is
publicly depreciating his wife, if he has one); so with a deep
consistency not appreciated by the theologian, they go to
church if it doesn’t rain and drop a penny in the plate.

n. Clearly therefore marriages are not made in heaven
but are heaven if they are made. The theological claim that
the priest can by fiat make a marriage (so that it does exist—
each spouse being the chief God the Son to the other in fact,
so that the marriage is indissoluble in the sense that what is,
is) is obviously a trifle too silly to be discussed by this book.
(Our neighbors for various evident reasons need to know
when a marriage is entered into; sothe priest fundamentally
serves as a town crier.) Obviously, a marriage may be
entered into honestly by the partners and may be successful
for a while, but may in fact cease to exist because of a differ-
ent rate of growth of the spouses. Or, the spouses may have
been mistaken, so that the marriage never in fact existed—
regardless of what the priests or lawyers may assert concern-
ing it. The existence of a marriage is a question of quanti-
tative fact. If by ordinary agreements as to measures it does
not exist, then the principle truistically is that the priest or
legislator or Judge who asserts that it does exist is either a
liar or a fool, or both (that of course applies to the men who
refuse divorce entirely, or base it upon arbitrary grounds—as
will appear), As the legal and-or theological ceremony of
marriage is necessarily a quantitative guess that a marriage
will exist in fact, it follows that if it does not come into ex-
istence, or happens to go out of existence, then another
quantitative announcement called divorce is truistically re-
quired. A volume is needed for a definite discussion of the
quantities involved. Possibly the safest practical way to
judge whether a divorce should be announced is this:- if a
person applies for a divorce he [or she] obviously thereby
publicly admits that either he has been sufficiently foolish to
make a mistaken Judgment in an extremely important matter
or is in effect such a poorly developed person as to want sex-
ual promiscuity (or both); so if the legal formal existence
of the marriage will force that public humiliation, it is rather
obviously proved to be nota real marriage and to warrant a
legal divorce. There is no space to consider the complicated
quantitative problems of children, support of children and
other directly economic problems, remarriages, etc. String-
ent divorce laws, however, neither solve nor obviate such
problems, but simply wholly or partly deny that they arise
when no legal divorce is granted—which is as silly as deny-
ing that the sun rises, and as immoral] as any other lie.

o. It is probably a historical fact that up to modern
times most men verbally considered woman to be an inferior
and a sex machine (meaning that she was chiefly a means of
gratifying sex appetite), or to be without a soul (for details,
see §170h). St. Paul, with genuine Prussian or Athenian
arrogance and stupidity, very definitely asserted woman to
be inferior and to be a sex machine; and the orthodox theo-
logians and many men verbally have not yet developed past
that barbaric coarseness and primitive dualism. (I am of
course aware that such radical, classical logic talk has been
largely make believe—that the mass of commensense men in
practice but slightly inclined to such nonsense. ) It
follows even more strongly in the face of that historical tra-
dition and present orthodox theology, that the much noticed
tendency of the men of this country to consider women to be
more or Jess ‘‘angels’’ (1) is a proof of the progress in civili-
zation, (2) is a proof of the general correctness of the conclu-
sion as to who is the chief God the Son, and (3) indicates the
general moral soundness of the people of this country (the
upper ten and the submerged tenth that aristocratically agree
with Paul are merely almost negligible scum and dregs).

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Three XVIII §166p

Perhaps the men have overdone the “‘idealizing,’’ resulting
in some damage to women. It has been a good thing for the
men in some ways, but possibly rather bad for numerous
women. I. e., many women has been so weak (narrow vis-
ioned: unable to stand “‘prosperity’’) as to take a selfish ad-
vantage of American men, and become more or less parasitic.
Such women substantially consider that to catch a man in
marriage is to have secured a living for the rest of their lives
without work or further return to the man. In practice it is
possible that the woman is not able to live up to the high
place that is assigned her before she works for it and earns
it. It seems to be becoming more or less necessary for the
American man to require the woman to earn her high place.
That of course is an individual quantitative problem to be
personally solved by each man and woman. The only general
solution I can see for it is this rough one that must be modi-
fied for special cases:- |The worst sort of female parasite is
probably the woman who after capturing a husband and a
living thinks it right to keep the living and drop the super-
fluous husband. She is the alimony chaser. I found by a
too slight investigation that apparently the majority of finan-
cially fairly well-to-do women have the poisonous belief that
if they wish to divorce their husbands they will still be en-
titled to support—the alleged right having accrued simply
by matrimonial capture. Mrs. Gertrude Atherton plainly
implies (“‘Delineator,’’? Dec., 1916, p. 12, “What is Femin-
ism?’’) that men ought to be “clever enough”’ to sup-
port financially all women “‘without independent means.’’
So perhaps we need a general educative law that divorce will
be granted much more easily than at present, and that ali-
mony will be granted only in rare (described) cases. That
would be equivalent to serving formal notice that men can
not be matrimonially exploited, and such feminine parasitism
or something-for-nothing as there may be, would die.
The difficulty of passing such laws lies in the fact that men
of the Prussian Pauline type who wish to domineer over their
wives, and the equally barbarous meek and docile type of
women who like it, are a very noisy minority. They prefer
and demand difficult divorce laws, with women convinced
that they are financially dependent on men, as such laws
save their face in such coarse and callous conduct. E. g.,
§79 of Cummings’s ‘‘Marriage and Divorce Laws of Massa-
chusetts’’ mentions a matrimonial atrocity explicitly permitted
by that presumably civilized state which is so nauseating as
to be unfit to print in anything but a book on lawyers’ law
or pathology, where such things are expected. It is not ac-
cidental that the rate of insanity is much higher in Massa-
chusetts than in Western states which, as a cause and a result
of such cleanliness, have freer divorce laws.

- p. There are numbers of people who assert in one way
or another that marriage is not the most effective or desirable
way of living the best life. As the problem is a quantitative
one, and as the theory given above is rigorous, it obviously
follows that such opposite opinions are quite correct for cer-
tain abnormal persons. Frequently those who assert such
opposite opinions merely indicate by them that they are not
normal, Perhaps adverse opinions are expressed most
often by those who have not been married. As they have
had no experience of marriage we may neglect them as being
incompetent until they are able to give theoretical support
for their views. Possibly the next largest class who
considér marriage of secondary importance or even undesir-
able, are the hysterical, or others of the aristocratic, parasitic
types who have narrowed, abnormal nervous systems. Many
hysterics are sexually insensible (or, in order to be ‘‘differ-
ent’’ and thus attract attention, or to seem to be “‘refined’”’
—a corpse would be much more so,—they keep pretending

§166p XVIII Three

to be sexually anaesthetic until it probably comes to be so);
hence it is probable that they could not get a rebirth by mar-
riage, and their adverse opinion is correct for their pathologi-
cal selves. Many men will be saved years of trouble if the
hysterics refrain from marrying for parasitic purposes. In all
cases people with narrowed nervous systems are obviously
liable not to be able to withstand that necessarily long con-
tinued need of delicate mutual adjustment between two per-
sons which builds up the successful marriage. So they are
forced by their defects to make marriage a secondary part of
moral living. The last general type of people who
oppose marriage may roughly be named the **artistic’’ sort
—meaning those who tend to be the unbalanced genius who
wants not a full life but a “‘career,’’ a career being an os-
tentatious bid for attention and reward with considerable
neglect of the essential point that they should be earned. It
is possible that such people by avoiding marriage may thus
conserve energy to produce useful work. Newton prided
himself on not marrying. | Newton also became practically
insane for some months and for years wasted his abilities by
acting like a prima donna. It is obvious that if a person can
manage to generate enough enduring nervous energy to keep
steady in a normal married life, and still have enough over
to use for the occasional abnormal! requirements of any unus-
ual work, then such work, by the principles of a flywheel or
rhythm, tends to be balanced and enduringly useful—not
momentarily spectacular and bizarre, and usually grossly ex-
aggerated to the point of vitiating dualism. Itis well known
that the person who is able to depart widely from the normal
usually finds it difficult to retain enough surplus energy to
balance bimself [herself] in marriage: his wife finds it hard
at times to live with him. But clearly, if he is not strong
enough to balance himself with a fairly normal wife (but he
usually picks a hysteric; e. g., Carlyle, Socrates), he is not
strong enough to do enduring work. ‘The bizarre, rather
dualistic stuff he does do will be very noticeable, but some
stronger man will always have to straighten out the mess and
throw most of it away. In brief, this last class of opponents
of marriage is identical in character with the hysterical and
more or less pathological class of unbalanced persons; the
““artistic’’ or “‘career’’ class is simply less unbalanced.

q. Because marriage is so important we may readily
judge people’s general character and the value of their work
by their attitude towards it:- |The youth’s usual scorn of
marriage merely indicates ordinary human conservatism to-
wards the unknown and unexperienced. The extreme
socialists (§175c) disapprove of marriage or want promiscuity
or varions other barbaric modifications of marriage. The late
kaiser, Paul, and the theologians, with similar aristocratic
dualism also consider woman essentially inferior. And their
**work’’ is useful chiefly in showing how not to do it.
There is an extreme type of feminist who substantially says
that women should fight men—makes an absolute dualism of
the two. It is hard to say just what that ultra-feminist does
want, as she (or perhaps it would be biologically more accu-
rate to say it) is very self-contradictory; but she seems to
say that women should oppose marriage, although it will be
a good thing if the woman can get a man to support ber if be
will not then hold her to the responsibilities of marriage.
At least that is what I make out of what Mrs. Gertrude Ath-
erton says feminism is in the ““Delineator’’ (Oct.-Dec., ’16;
also cf. par. o). If that is what she meant, then this book
is not the proper place for fitting comment. Mrs. Atherton
says she was delicate, witha weak back, and strolled through
the woods, and considered her two children as dolls, and her
husband looked after the housekeeping and did the cooking
when the cook left and died shortly. I understand that such

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208

is what she thinks is fitting; it sounds somewhat like hysteria
to me, but I would not venture to guess that the lady has
hysteria or ever had it. (I quote some quite restrained re-
marks about the husbands of hysterics from p. 911, Health
and Disease in Relation to Marriage and the Married State,’’
edited by Senator and Kaminer:- “It almost appears strange
that so many marriages of hysterical persons last until their
natural end and are not dissolved long before that. *** [The
husbands of hysterics] appear predestined for their severe or-
deal which they often endure so bravely as to call forth the
wondering admiration of their sympathizing friends and
medical advisers.’’) Mrs. Atherton herself rather implies
that she is an artist, and in that connection, in **Woman’s
Home Companion,’’ Dec., ’18, warns young women not to
marry if they have talent, letting their careers pass them by,
and then substantially says that when they get older they
may have commonsense enough to refrain from passion and
marriage. She says that one’s sense of responsibility for
what one writes is satisfied when one sees the last proof sheet
(that isn’t so for me), and objects to the continuing responsi-
bility of children and a husband. All that is obviously a du-
alistic chopping of the world into separate parts, and open
praise of lack of enduring strength, or patience, or reliability
(which is the normal woman’s charm and valuable contribu-
tion to the race; §170). And in consistency with that
“artistic”? temperament, her writings are hard, brilliant,
self-contradictory, and shallow. In the true artist’s equa-
tion Style or form... <Ideas or substance... Truth or Useful
Work, she attends emphatically to style and does write tech-
nically well—is easy and sharp and facile and flashing, and
hence as noticeable as a conflagration. But she attends so lit-
tle to getting in real substance, that what she does say in that
fine style is practically worthless. Quite likely she will
make for herself a fairly enduring name among the famous,
which she implies is her desire: so did Ananias.

r. On the other hand we have women whose explicit
recognition of the fundamental] value of matrimony is so clear
and balanced that it with others like it is the base of religion
and the stabilizer of all work and character. In the same
magazine with Mrs. Atherton’s disruptive screams (‘“Wom.
Home Com.,’’ Dec. 718), Mary Heaton Vorse, in her usual
calm and truthful manner, gives a description of a home that
is explicitly ‘dotted out’ to a One and a normal rebirth; the
argument of this section is the bare logical] skeleton of her
more humanly intelligible remarks. And Maude Rad-
ford Warren has written much about the normal woman that
is more appreciated by an intelligent person than Mrs. Ath-
erton’s brilliant errors—although the style is not ‘“‘up”’
to the taste of a jaded ‘‘woman of the world‘‘ (i. e., one
mentally mutilated by tea fights) and other sorts of ‘‘ Artists’’
who need tobasco and various sorts of catastrophes and New
York inspiration before their worn-out nerves begin to regis-
ter perceptibly. I think that Dorothy Canfield Fisher
most clearly and beautifully shows in her books the most im-
portant things. In the story “Vignettes from a Life of Two
Months’”’ (in ‘“‘The Real Motive’’) she precisely describes a
normal yet infinite religious experience in caring for a baby.
All of her books have the same temperate activity that is at
the same time so universal as to pleasurably stretch the life
of anyone as far as it will go. And that is actual art (8171),
because it is true and important; it is clearly both the One
and the Many, apparently overwhelmingly infinite, yet at
the same time most simple and commonplace. By being
a simple, everyday mother, like most American mothers ex-
cept probably with more enthusiasm and liking for that most
difficult job, Mrs. Fisher experienced enough to write an ex-
pression of universal motherhood :- “‘Home Fires in France.’’

209

As a religious writing I believe that book is better than Job.
S167. a. We saw in the last section that maximum or
most moral living consists of a series of cycles as far out (L)
and as fast (7) as we can comfortably live them. Then we
saw that any sort of life or activity (expressed generally as
any That... X This...) is capable of giving that maximum life,
but that the most direct way, both extensively and intens-
ively, of getting it is the immediately personal way of mar-
riage. Evidently, in such personal union Unselfishness... X
Selfishness... has Selfishness... and Unselfishness... directly
personally and hence very perceptibly represented respect-
ively by one’s self and one’s spouse. Then the dots that
must pertain represent, first, children, then one’s work or in-
terests, and so on ad infinitum. We shall in this section
make a rough general survey of those dots and the reactions,
omitting from it explicit consideration of the important dots
children (it becomes verbally complex and takes much space
to take children even nominally distinct from the spouses).
b. We first, for simplicity, consider a married couple,
W...XM..., with the man, conveniently named M, the in-
tensive factor M... or Selfishness..., and observe their reac-
tions (more or less omitting erplicit mention of the dots), as
a means of getting the general names and an understanding
of such activities. Then we apply those familiar names to
the wider whole universe. If M considers himself, he
is a skin-bounded God the Son, and ultimately is God the
Fatber; and as the latter his wife W is a part ef himself with
which be reacts. In order to get that ultimate One feeling
or life or happiness, he must be able to react so intensely
with W that he perceives the reaction from her as identical
with his own actions. So when M shifts from ineffable mon-
ism or mysticism to a positive and tangible science or plural-
ism or practical life which clearly ‘supports’ and gives
definiteness to his religion, W truistically becomes to him his
most important God the Son. So M uses bis reactions with
W as standards, or class names, or base of judgment, of his
interactions with the Many, and it is at those standards we
are to look briefly. Clearly, there are thousands of sorts of
human interactions conventionally named (i. e., meas-
ured); so [ shall not go further than show the method. If
the reader will refer to Hobbes’s ‘‘Leviathan’’ (part “‘On
Man,”’ especially Chaps. 6, 10), or to Cabot’s ‘‘What Men
Live By,’’ or most modern American texts on ethics, he will
find implications that will guide him as far as he cares to go
further with those humanistic names. Hobbes wrote about
three centuries ago, so bis logic is much too sharp; but
Cabot uses the valid logic excellently—-almost explicitly,—
showing that he is a first class thinker and reliable.°”

16% That implies a valuable practical point. Those men (and
women, of course) who before the publication of this book were so
sound and balanced that they antomatically and tacitly used the valid
logic in a perceptible fashion, and applied it consistently through a
wide range of practical details, thereby demonstrated their unusual
reliability, and the thorongh excellence of their characters. You can
trust them; the most of them made some easily-found logical mis-
takes, but those mistakes were superficial and trivial, the characters
of the writers preventing any serious error. But you can not
in the future broadly judge men that way; for any fairly intelligent
child will be able in the future ostensibly to use the valid logic. You
can not safely judge my character by the fact that I use the valid
logic, for 1 am conscious of doing it, and have formal rules to follow.
We saw (§43) that the one logical error is to exaggerate anything to
zero or infinity. So as long as I do uot do that {as long as | formally
avoid becoming absolute when talking of the Many, and vice versa
with the One) I am logically unassailable. But, now that I know
how to be logical and find it reasonably easy to be so, it is obvious
that I can in practical effect lie to you rationally if I so desire, by
the simple process of subtly overemphasizing various quantitative or
practical measurements. You see, before the valid logic was formally
stated, anyone who tried that little game of subtle exaggeration of
emphasis (anyone who was not inherently honest—which means

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §167c

ec. Ifthe man M reacts with his wife W with his atten-
tion primarily on the fact that he acts because he likes to, and
without waiting to see any resulting reactions from W, then
he obviously is playing. Truistically (taking it that he is
fairly normal) he will stop such activity as soon as he becomes
a trifle tired of it. So such play is pluralistically free—i. e.,
there is no perceplion of constraint, of subsequent reaction
that has to be met appropriately. (In a One sense, the man
is always absolutely free; $157.) But, if M has his atten-
tion perceptibly on the fact that his action with W produces
a desired reaction, then M is working; and he is pluralistic-
ally perceptibly constrained or not free—for he has to control
his action so as to produce the desired reaction, which is
equivalent to saying that W controls his action. When he is
playing, his action as a truism of definition is selfish; when
he is working his action is usually called unselfish, because be

inherently sane and hence reliable) was practically certain to fall into
the trap of going to zero or infinity,and use dualistic logic. So those
men who before not only rather definitely used the valid logic,
but also applied it to wide classes of details consistently, are the most
reliable. Cabot’s logic is applied extensively. Jordan has applied
valid logic to practically every phase of life and knowledge (§49p).
Dewey has applied it for many years to the multitndinous details of
psychology, philosophy, pedagogy, and ethics (§49p). Lee has ap-
plied valid logic to democracy. Taylor and many of his co-workers
—Gantt, Cooke, etc.—have applied valid logic to the vast domain of
industry. Hoover definitely uses valid logic (‘‘Saturday Evening
Post,’’ Dec. 27, 1919) in the wide range of economics and sociology,
and has also applied it in actual business. Taft uses valid logic with
remarkable steadiness and precision. Lorimer and Bok have applied
valid logic in their publications, by trying to give as much as they
could tothe other fellow,and using commonsense in publishing truth
{and the fact that they have made a financial success of it is direct
evidence that the American people are sound, and appreciate such
reliability). And Ellery Sedgwick is doing the same thing with the
‘‘Atlantic.’? Lorimer has also written sound logic extensively (in
his various letters of ‘‘old Gorgon Graham,’’ which seem to me in-
trinsically much better than Montaigne), and George Ade, Tarking-
ton, Harry Leon Wilson, E. W. Howe, Stephen Leacock, and Dunne
are still doing so. Schwab and Grace and Foster are applying the
same thing to the difficult job of making steel. Mrs. Fisher, Mrs.
Vorse, and Mrs. Warren (§166r) have applied valid logic to the ex-
tensive range of daily living, and Mrs. Fisher has done it in peda-~
gogy also. A. D. Little is a successful pioneer in soundly applying
chemistry to industry—the widest engineering of the future. And
that list is not complete—there are Edison and Wanamaker and Ford
and others. So there are as great men and women now as there
were in the olden days—in my opinion greater and better. And this
footnote shows definitely why they are great (for proof that those
people are courageous, which is also a necessity of greatness, and
another aspect of reliability or honesty, see footnote 170r). And I
judge that there will be better people in the next generation. If
there are not, that generation should be ashamed of its failure, and
go to work in silence to remedy it, instead of with gentle futility
reminiscivg over past glories. So obviously you may judge a
man’s general character or reliability by those principles. But that
judgment depends upon your own sanity, temperance, or reliability:
you trnistically must use youself asa standard of comparison. If
you think that if George Washington said some man was great, then
you can take his judgment and be correct, you are wrong: you have
to use yourself finally to judge Washington’s reliability, and merely
becanse you do not mention or think of that basic estimate does not
in the least change the fact that you use yourself as the standard and
that you are doing the judging (else you truistically are merely
mouthing some words that are meaningless to yon). So why should
anyone be so silly and verbally cowardly as to say that he is accept-
ing the judgment of “‘posterity’’ and other such ‘‘anthorities’’?—but
of course the reader who has lasted so far in this book has too much
intelligence to fool himself that he can dodge responsibility that way.
Also, no positive logical way can be devised to catch a liar who
knows the valid logic, if he keeps liis wits about him (for a lie in that
sense is a conscious quantitative perversion, and there can be no ex-
act science: possibly a lie iu the old sense is a conscious total or flat
or qualitative or 0-«% perversion; but that is now merely a logical
error, and silly to tell to anyone with a knowledge of logic). But
the liar always labors under the disadvantage that he is less intelli-
gent than other persons (otherwise, he would not be so foolish as to
lie). So in the long rnn all liars are certain to be detected.

_—

§167c XVIII Three

is primarily attending to a reaction of W—an objective thing.
(But clearly, monistically there can be no distinction between
selfish and unselfish; and pluralistically the distinction after
a few steps along the dots fades out.) The essential point
in M’s working is that he can not stop when he likes, but
must attend to W’s reaction and stop either before he likes
or keep on after fatigue sets in, depending on W’s wishes.
If M must keep on working until unduly fatigued his work is
named drudgery (and there correspondingly, in the opposite
direction, remain some parts of him unduly under-used, or
bored, or ‘‘suppressed’’), Also, such undue lack of freedom
is named slavery, which obviously can not be absolute.

d. If we use religious’’ terms for M’s activities we get
some verbally unconventional conclusions.
free, or playing, in his activities with W, his activity is
equivalent to what is called worship. Worship is primarily a
selfish activity—play. It obviously does not do Christ him-
self as a skin-bounded person any good to be worshiped now;
he is dead, and personally knows nothing about it. It does
the worshiper good—stretches his perceptions somewhat, in
an effort to encompass as much as Christ did (although when
the worshiper labors under the delusion that he is graciously
doing something that Christ highly appreciates and hence is
‘‘working,’’ probably his perceptions are being blunted: I
should call such activity self-worship; cf. the late kaiser’s
“‘worship’”’ of Gott). When worship is considered to
be controlled by its object, then it obviously begins to be in
the borderland between play and work, and its most usual
name is service. But there is so much lack of perception as
to the true nature of worship that conventional distinctions
are confused :- the minister ‘‘serves’’ the Lord by °‘worship-
ing’’ by some schedule, and he gets paid for it (he has his
attention in some degree on the money that will come back
or else he is a species of dualist:- economic idiot); but the
layman worships because he likes it, and hence he pays for
the privilege. (Sometimes however he works at worshiping
so asto be paid the approbation of the community—in which
common case ‘‘religion’’ becomes actually a sort of “‘police
force’’ in which the “‘pillar of the church’’ shines—but at a
terrific cost to society, as such ‘worship’ involves some ly-
ing; e. g., the well-‘‘policed’’ Middle ages; see Walsh’s
Catholic ‘“The Thirteenth, Greatest of Centuries.’’) Ritual is
a formal routine of worship. When it becomes thoroughly
rutted into the nervous system it will obviously run through
so easily as to give, if in large enough doses, a mild and nor-
mal rebirth (mostly of an emotional nature, because it is im-
possible for a sane intellect to accept as literal truth most
rituals). Like the use of all things, the temperate use of rit-
ual is good (1 like to hear the Episcopal musical ritual so far
off that I can’t distinguish the obnoxious words); but if rit-
ual is taken seriously, or as a substitute for work or actual
thinking, it becomes pernicious just as do fairy stories if they
are believed. Fairy tales ignore the existence of relation-
ship, of cause and effect, to some extent. If it is not recog-
nized that such is the fact, and that we are playing at being
foolish and thoughtless (as we, even as little children, clearly
are doing in “Alice in Wonderland’’), then fairy tales truist-
ically are immoral. Fairy tales are often supposed to exer-
cise the ““imagination.’’ But obviously, unless clearly taken
as a lesson in how not to do it as in °‘Alice,’’ they truistic-
ally kill the imagination (a reaching out for the unknown
next related or consistent thing or fact). In moral ritual we
do not play at being foolish and thoughtless, but play at be-
ing children again, with disregard of practically all intellect-
ual relationships: we are stirring up pleasant emotions. So
ritual is primarily emotional. Corresponding to it on
the intellectual side is prayer, in Ritual... X Prayer...=

UNIVERSE

So long as M is’

210

Emotions... X Intellect... Worship,—that standard universe
Worship being expanded thus:- Unselfishness... X Selfishness...
=‘* Deeds’’... X Worship... Work... X Play... = Life, from
which we may see the principles. There is not a great deal
of intellect about some orthodox prayers (in which case they
have reversed to Ritual...); but obviously Prayer... is effica-
cious in the same sense that intellect is (§§153-4).

e. Because people have been uncertain and often self-
contradictory as to what they did mean by those various **ye-
ligious’’ terms, those terms are vague. They conventionally
show a tendency to be used as both extensive and intensive
factors; above I had to guess at the more common usage,
and I did that simply as a means of showing the principles (I
have no perceptible desire to regulate verbal usage, but am
glad to take conventional meanings if there is consistency in
them). That conventional uncertainty as to the meaning of
‘‘-eligious’’ words itself shows that the average man does not
take orthodox ‘‘religion’’ or theology very seriously.
We may note further that there is conventionally no widely
agreed-upon word that indicates intemperance in religion—a
proof that theologians in effect urge intemperance. The
word pious, which formerly eulogistically denoted excellence
in the important things of life (tacitly taken as being the re-
ligious things), is now tending to indicate intemperance in
religion and hence wrongness. Sometimes “‘fanatic,’’ or
**religious crank,’’ is used to indicate too much **religion.”’
When the man M gets to worshiping W too much he is said
to be fascinated or bewitched by her, or to put her on a ped-
estal, Most Americans tend to exaggerate that worship at
first; it then is perhaps usually useful—jJust as a rather vio-
lent religious rebirth is needed at first. But no doubt just
one such departure from a balance is often so violent as to
be damaging. It is much less damaging in any case if its
nature is recognized, so that it is consciously made temporary
enough to be tolerable, and no ignorant disappointment be
afterwards felt because the world no longer runs along at
white heat. A woman naturally does not have very
intense rebirths or worship of her spouse (§170; I am aware
that shallow hysterics of the Marie Bashkirtseff sort make-
believe considerable tempests-in-a-teapot); so she is in far
less danger from rebirths of her own, She is therefore liable
to be coy or to ‘run away’” at first in a make believe that
causes the man to depart more widely from his balance—in
some cases in destructive measure.

f. Thus we have observed M react with W without our
explicitly considering W’s point of view. Obviously, if M
takes both his point of view, and also W’s point of view, he
truistically takes a monistic view of the restricted standard
universe W,. M.., orof the whole universe W..... Me :
In short, the view becomes ineffable, inexpressible. The es-
sential of Many language and practical life is that we retain
a given point of view in any given statement (A=A; § 22).
Obviously, the way to consider W’s point of view is to write
the formula M...* W... and repeat the foregoing discussion
with W substituted for M. In that case some quantitative
changes would occur, as a woman W is perceptibly different
from a man in numerous quantitative ways (§170). But, we
can take the point of view of an observer O and note the in-
teraction of M and W thus:- (WX™M)...XO.. That is a
very precise logical way of considering it: in actual practice
O is a ‘temporary personality’ of M or W, or one of the dots,
which in a so-called impersonal manner observes the two ‘us-
ual’ personalities (§153k) M and W interact, thus:- W..(.)
<M..(.), in which either of the (.)’s may be O. Then,
from the point of view of O, when both M and W are working
to make their dots action thatis agreeable to the other (when
both M and W are attending to the agreeableness of their

911

activity to the other), the conduct is called cooperation. Other
names for it are reciprocity, mutual helpfulness, team work,
partnership. | When more than two persons are engaged in
that mutually-regarding activity, the combination is called a
democracy—but I shall not trouble to make the perhaps con-
ventional distinction that cooperation is mutual reaction be-
tween two, and democracy, between more than two.
Obviously, cooperation or democracy is impossible by strict
classical logic. | For in cooperation each one of the at least
two parts of the machine (team) which is working, substan-
tially contains in itself a secondary personality (or structure)
that is a duplicate in miniature of the reacting part (and so
on in regress), so that the reactions of the reacting parts
are known simultaneously with its own actions. And that
statement is illogical by classical logic; it is really an asser-
tion that The Many—=The One—i. e., that upon a given act
simultaneous One knowledge of a subsequent act is possible
(cf. §150). Or, to put it in everyday terms, we know we
ean feel our own actions and at the same time feel roughly
(inaccurately) how the reactions of our partner wil! subse-
quently affect kim; and we can thus work together. But by
the classic logic that is not possible. So we have eliminated
such nonsensical logic. But the reader can now see in ulti-
mate detail] that it is rather dificult to say precisely what co-
operation or democracy is. The race, in its usual manner of
being considerably better than it is able to say, by practical
trial and error established democracy in a general way before
it could recognize democracy well enough to describe it.

g. It is also obvious why it has taken the world so long
to decide that it wanted democracy, or even that democracy
is right. The universe forces us to apply democracy; no
other sort of action is possible, for democracy is merely the
action of That... X This... in which That and This are always
really identical with each other—their infinite regress of dots
in a very few steps being merged into an identity so far as
we can definitely perceive. The difficulty the race had in
being conscious of that was the difficulty each man has in
putting himself in the other man’s place, in being sympa-
thetic, or in being what is commonly called unselfish (and
the inevitable penalty he pays for such blindness is that he
truistically unseeingly blunders into other men or parts of the
universe and painfully damages his *“skin’’; the aristocratic
grabber who deliberately shuts his eyes to the damage he is
causing usually rapidly becomes so blind to other things
that often he hasn’t sense enough to dodge such simple
things as soft living). We see others suffer or be happy, and
that (by the universal That... X This... law) causes us in a
less degree to suffer or be happy; but then the stupid or
rather blind person considers that feeling with nearly sole
reference to himself (restricts his vision of the universe or
tends to make the zero error—which is the same sort of stu-
pidity as putting out his eyes), or else he with equally bad
estimation of measures guesses that he ought to make those
others do what would be appropriate action jor him (thus
substantially making the infinity error by jumping to a vague
sentimental monism and insisting that the others should have
just his feelings, and must do just as he would do—which is
what Paul seems to me to have meant by charity or love
in I Cor., 13; or it is a frequent variety of socialism or uplift;
or it is the usual ‘‘missionary spirit,’’ or the altruism of the
silly Tolstoy or Wilson sort: note that in the typical Wilson
case the vague sweet altruism tending to infinity followed the
zero talk of perfect neutrality).

h. The aristocrat, ‘‘swelled head,’’ egotist, or privileged
or protected or mildly selfish or hysterical person, quite
frankly sets himself up to be fixedly or constantly superior to
others. Even the exceedingly stupid extreme socialists or

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §167h

*“proletariat’’ and I.W.W.’s have shown that the idea of that
superiority is always present in such people; it psychologi-
cally consists simply of the truism that one’s self is easier to
see, and so on casual or stupid inspection does bulk large.
In the development of the brain that aristocratic point of view
naturally comes first; it can be observed as a stage in the
growth of vigorous children. So that selfish, ‘“superior”’
point of view determines the older historical forms of govern-
ment. It similarly determines the “‘line’’ or military or ec-
clesiastical or bureaucratic form of ‘‘organization’’—they are
all essentially the same, there being a ‘‘superior’’ head man
and formally fixed ranks of “‘inferiors,’’ in a “‘line,’’ so to
speak (or, in common terms, the buck may and must always
be passed down but never up). Obviously, such formally
fixed ranks can not possibly actually exist, and never do
(S$37, 174); in so far as the line or military or bureaucratic
or king or pope type of organization is actually what it osten-
sibly is, it simply fails to exist, and hence is in that degree a
failure—non-existent (obviously, if in practice any bureaucrat
and his line actually tried to pass the responsibility or buck
alwavs down they would become unbearably ridiculous in
their own eyes; so they naturally use democracy some).
That theory or principle is absolute. | Even the presumably
fixed heads of the extreme line type are not actually fixed or
constant (XIX; note the forced abdications of the czar and
kaiser). There is no exact or constant science; by the same
principle the theory of line organization is wrong. In
precisely the same way, M can not in principle be the Su=
perior’’ or ‘“‘master’’ of W. Paul’s command that wives sub-
mit, etc., is in principle absolutely wrong. In the same way
there can be no infallibility of the pope, either in actuality
or as an official rule; “‘infallibility’’ is the same as saying
that in some way the pope (or a kaiser, or president of a coal
mine) is absolute, and he is not, and can not be made so in
any Many sense (Parts One and Two). In the same
way, Christ as an individual was not a real ““Master,”’ or a
divine or absolute God; what Christ said can not be appli-
cable to anyone but himself (and is not ultimately correct,
even for himself). I judge that Christ did not set himself up
as a Master, or an infallible leader, or a superior we must
follow (for much evidence of the soundness of that guess, see
Singer’s “Rival Philosophies of Jesus and Paul’’). But if he
did, then he obviously was thoroughly wrong verbally.
In the same way, there can not be any “‘true’’ or absolute
creed, or any superior, fixed, constant “‘authority.’’ This
book I think tells the truth fairly well for this day; but any
man who accepts me for an authority without verifying for
himself what he believes of what I say, and taking the re-
sponsibility of such belief, is either a fool or a scoundrel, or
both. Also, if the race can not in a short time restate the
truth considerably better than I state it, then I think the
race would be a sorry affair, composed of dubs. Incidentally,
practically all fathers and mothers naturally have morals or
intelligence enough to want their child to become better than
themselves, and more often than not they succeed in making
him so. Yet some theologians in bland disregard of such
commonsense would have us believe that Christ acted as the
dog in the manger and wanted to remain better than we, and
*‘superior,’’ and that he actually was so poor in his work that
he failed to he]p anyone after him to become better than he
was. And in the same way that all aristocracy is
wrong, all fixed classes or castes of people are wrong. The
actual fact is that no class zs fixed, and hence any assertion
that one is, is untrue, and any attempt to make it completely
so is immoral. So truistically, all hereditary titles (i. e.,
presumably hereditably fixed) are immoral. And all entailed
wealth is immoral. And the inheritance of wealth similarly

§$167h XVIII Three

tends to be immoral, as we shal] see ($$168, 173); it would
be flatly immoral if it were possible to say just who owned
any given thing. (We can properly say, as was done above,
that classes, hereditary titles, organizations, etc., are flatly
immora) because those are mere formal ways of stating rela-
tionships, and a relationship is or is not; but wealth is a
Many thing, and the problem becomes explicitly quantitative
and never absolute; footnote 175e.) And in the
same way, it is immoral to fancy that we have a personal im-
mortal soul (such would be self-contradictorily an absolute
Many soul). Some of the foregoing aristocratic immoralities
are rather directly derived from the belief in an immortal
personal soul or a practical attempt to achieve it in a more
or less quantitative fashion. In order to keep this book short
I have to omit the glaring historical evidence of how man has
suffered from his erroneous belief in personal immortality.
Thus we see a general statement of the long train of
immoralities which result from being aristocratic—seeing
our self so wel) as to let it shut off seeing our neighbor very
we)]]—being selfish, in short.

i. The opposite immorality of complete altruism, or of
considering our neighbor as practically everything and our
self as negligible need not be considered further (except in-
directly as socialism, §175). The fact is that such verbal or
ostentatious altruism is a make believe for self-glorification in
most cases—note Tolstoy’s selfishness to his family.

j. Although there is not much of actual exaggerated
altruism, there is a practical error nominally in that altruistic
or unselfish direction, which is usually of mild quantitative
degree and so not very immoral, but which does destroy some
cooperation. There does not seem to be any technical or
otherwise ‘‘refined’’ name for it (like other immoralities it
instrinsically is not refined; but it isn’t yet so bad that we
have had to invent euphemisms for it). Primarily it is inter-
fering with another’s business—wanting a finger in al) pies.
It is the reformer’s itch—the idea that “‘if you would only
let me do it, I could do it so much better.’’ It is butting in
—the craze to give advice, or instruction, to establish a cen-
sorship, to be didactic, or to act as the traditional autocratic
schoolmaster (e. g., Wilson). Of course, avowed aristocrats
often act in this nominally helpful, altruistic way: all forms
of intemperance, by the principle of rhythm, balance them-
selves by reversing to the opposite direction, to asceticism,
just as the drunkard at times goes on the ‘‘water wagon.”’
This butting in is sentimental democracy, or a sort of emo-
tional, over-‘idealistic,’’ vague effort to get a democracy to-
morrow by high-speed, incompetent guessing. The idealistic
dreamer does not care to be bothered with working out the
hard, distressing practical details, and so is usually densely
ignorant of practical methods of getting his large “‘ideals’’
applied. That is the general defect of our American
efforts at democracy. It isa generous error (provided the
butter-in doesn’t insist too much on having his own way, or
upon grabbing too much lime-light, even to a ‘place in his-
tory’’)—a mildly exaggeratedly-unselfish one that is a useful
relief from too much selfishness, and as a verba] counterbal-
ance to aristocratic talk (such as ‘“too proud to fight,’’ ‘‘all the
traffic will bear’’). It is the same in nature as the American
man’s idealization of woman (for which I have an apparently
ineradicable fondness; so the reader should be on his guard in
judging the quantities in my discussion of woman—the theo-
ry is simple, and that given is al) right). In spite of the
fact that we like that defect (we always prefer our errors at
the moment, else truistically we would discard them as fast
as we can drop the hahit of them), it often causes trouble,
even though it is useful as a counterbalance to the European
aristocratic view of woman as a toy and drudge. From

UNIVERSE

212

another point of view this exaggeration of unselfishness is the
result of our looking at the other man and saying that he is
our quantitative equal—‘‘as good as] am.’’ _—_ But he actu-
ally is always either better or worse, Just as no two atoms are
ever equal. If he actually were our quantitative equal, then
the advice which works for us would work for him, and butt-
ing in would be moral. We perhaps largely get the habit of
butting in from the bombastic Declaration-of Independence,
which asserts that all men are free and equal: monistically
it is true, but ethics is a Many subject, and ethically it is not
true (a matter of ordinary commonsense fact, or as is proved
rigorously by Parts One and Two and specifically in XIX);
so our efforts to act as if it were true are mildly immoral.

k. Well; that is not nearly so startling as we, in our
ritualistic worship of the Declaration, at first fancy. When-
ever we stop playing at being Idealists with a very big I,
and goto our daily work and forget about being self-conscious
*“Leaders’’ of the Wilson and kaiser sort, the majority of us
then see that we can not run our job and the other man’s
too—that being our brother’s keeper does not quantitatively
extend so far as doing his thinking and eating his meals for
him. So we then act so as to give him the best chance to
run his own job—to react with us,in a team. The best busi-
ness men of this country clearly have founded their success on
the basic principle of helping the other fellow react in his
way, democratically—regardless of how much some of them
may be considered to have failed to apply that principle to
all the people. It is exceedingly difficult to apply the prin-
ciple of democracy to any of the people with perceptible accu-
racy (“‘satisfaction’’) to both sides, and if we start with a
few (instead of lazily slumping to a defective-brain aristoc-
racy:- ‘‘me over al]’’ in one direction, or socialism [$175] in
the other), there is hope that a few of us can grow big
enough to apply it toall. Ford probably manages to please
most of his customers, dealers, employes, and himself; but
I understand that some of his competitors do not think he is
democratic, and like the socialists want the automobile busi-
ness divided equally between the able makers and the dubs.
In our simple case of W...<M..., M is obviously co-
operating with W when he attends to her actual ability to
react—works so thatshe can act in her best way—without her
having M as a dictator, or other verbally-unselfish Leader of
The People. In order that M may be able to work that way
he has to be able to see that W is not his quantitative equal
so that she can not be expected by him to react tohis acts as
he would to such acts. He must have the really good observ-
ing ability, mostly lacking in the socialists and autocrats, of
seeing what W quantitatively is, and hence how she can best
react, and letting her react that way, and expecting her to,
and anticipating such action. That is all hard to do. Obvi-
ously, al) acts of M and W interfere with each other some-
what—there can be no perfect judgment and adjustment of
them. So the object of M and W is to work together as ac-
curately as possible in a series of cycles. Truistically, if
either fails to act democratically the algebraic sum of the cy-
cles of at least one of them (other things staying fairly steady)
accumulates in one direction, and there is an explosion of
some degree—perceptible conflict; there is conflict in an im-
perceptible degree, or incompatibility, as soon as one of the
team stops trying, when working (cf. par. m), to make his or
her reactions fit with the other’s best abilities. And all that
is the complete principle (in one of its indefinite number of
forms of expression) of the labor-capital problem. Capital
has intelligence enough to see that it is to its advantage to
iry to cooperate with labor; hence there need be no conflict
on the capital side—which helps some, and delays the explo-
sions. But although most workmen intrinsically have ample

913

intelligence to see that it is to their interests, both financial
and in mental comfort and contentment, to cooperate, it is
not to the immediate interest of the labor leaders to have in-
dustrial peace (for the same reasons that petty kings of an
olden day started fights). In the long run it would pay the
leaders to cooperate; but they have untrained brains, and
most of them can’t see that. And it seems that, like the sub-
jects of olden kings, most workmen have not the intelligence
to handle that more complicated problem of making their
leaders see. So it is likely that for some time labor in gen-
eral will not try to cooperate, and there will be conflict on
the labor side. The practical solution obviously is for capital
to try to show labor in general the facts, and to try to get
the labor leaders in particular to see those facts. Some of
the more autocratic leaders will perhaps require legal treat-
ment by psychiatrists. In the same way we can react
cooperatively with ““material’’ things instead of with another
person—have the formula Material things....>< The man M...,
or Material things... >< Ourselves.... If we use those material
things or react with them with some intelligence as to how
they can react, and will last, can be replaced, will not be
wasted, etc., such ‘material democracy’ is called conservation
in economics, and by more familiar names in business. Any
stupid use of material things is waste:- ‘material aristocracy.’
One of the conspicuous characteristics of aristocrats is that
they are wasters—partly deliberately so in order to exhibit
their mental defect, aristocracy, to the world, but largely
because they prefer to loaf rather than to acquire sense
enough to make a balanced use of things. The confirmed
manual laborer has the highest pecentage of waste (except
paupers and criminals and insane). E. g., he has an idea,
vaguely but often vociferously expressed, that he is the only
worker (that only more or less direct manual labor is work),
stupidly overlooking the fact that he left school, and refuses
mental work or study, because he found that to be too hard
work for him; thus, simply because he won’t do the work re-
quired, he wastes his opportunities and a large part of his life.
The summary of this and the last paragraph is that
we should, as a demonstrated moral principle, try to pay
others fully and in carefully precise measure for what they
do for us; and we should, instead of indnlging in wordy sen-
timentality about altruism, be careful that others pay us in
just measure for what we do for them. It is immoral to fail
to pay; it is equally immoral to fail to get our money’s
worth. Actually, the universe is exactly balanced all the
the time (§114c): ultimately, the universe does not **keep
books’’ or ‘“extend credit.’” And it is merely a truism that
the most moral life most widely ‘sees’ or gets that balance.
l. The last paragraph is a mathematically definite state-
ment of democracy. ‘Trnistically, we can never achieve a
perfect democracy: it involves the infinite regress, and we
must be continually guessing at the dots or quantities. We
see that a basic requisite for the practice of democracy is to
‘‘size up’’ the other man as he is—not to take men as quan-
titatively equal. So it is again obvious (see §164be) that
the fundamental practical need in being moral (in doing anything
right—in being “‘successful’’) is to make a fairly accurate
quantitative judgment of ourselves, others, and things. There is
nothing very novel about that conclusion; it is merely a spe-
cific statement of Socrates’s ‘‘know thyself,’’ or of the gen-
eral object of science. Nearly everybody tacity accepts that
conclusion in practice, and primarily tries to estimate himself
and others. All personal gossip consists of making such esti-
mates; even the astronomer figures his ‘personal equation.’”’
Most of what we call news is personal gossip. And in spite
of the beratings we receive from those butters-in who urge us
to ‘‘higher things,’? we keep on with personal gossip. And

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §167m

we are profoundly right. As there is no exact science we
can never be accurate about men. But even when a physi-
cist measures the length of a standard yard his measure is a
series of personal opinions as to just when two marks coincide.
If we indulge in personal gossip with consciousness of why
we are doing so, and of what we want (a mutual comparison
and checking of values, and training in estimating persons),
we are acting very morally.

m. If M can with reasonable accuracy estimate W’s
characteristics, then, and only then, can he consciously trust
her and thus he able consciously to rely on her reactions, so
that he can at times let her take the load of responsibility of
running things while he rests, or goes the other way in his
eycle. That is an essential part of democracy. But the
only conscious phrase we have for it, so far as I can find, is
‘“In God we trust’’—and as will appear, we usually do not
know what it means. The aristocrat fancies that he is
always superior, always on duty and strained away from the
balance in that direction, that he is ‘“personally’’ indispen-
sable, that the dear people can’t get along without him; for
according to his dualistic theory there is no one available to
react with him on a formal equality. In the practically
pathological case of aristocracy of the late kaiser, we see him
substantially taking on the theoretically unceasing infinite
burden of instructing Gott what todo. But in the democ-
racy of M and W, if M really trusts W, first he can do his
work, and then so to speak abandon himself to her, and rest
himself while she takes up the tension of the proper and ex-
pected reaction. He can do his work: and then rest (go
through the other part of his cycle) “‘without a care’’—with
an actual conscious temporary lack of responsibility. | Theo-
retically, in no other way except that general democratic way
can he actually rest. (Also, truistically a man can never have
all his parts simultaneously resting, nor any one organ abso-
lutely resting: for brevity I omit such precision below—such
explicit inclusion of the infinite regress of democratic action. )
In theory it is not possible for a person in a line organization
or bureaucracy to rest; for in “‘principle’’ there he must al-
ways carry the burden of his rank or duty. When anyone
gets the idea that he must maintain his rank or his “‘awful’’
responsibility or ‘‘dignity’’ or ‘“‘position,’’ that he is the
fixed boss or ‘‘leader,’’ then in his conscious pseudo theory he
misses moral democratic living and ean not rest. Of course it
is impossible that he actually stay in just that one side of the
eycle; after he unduly fatigues himself with his silly beliefs,
nature (the rest of the universe) makes him rest—blowing np
his brain to do it if he is too stubborn, or killing him. But
probably there are numbers of people who have never con-
sciously and willingly slacked up the tension of being an
aristocrat (the tension of conflict in par. k) and been a con-
scious democrat—rested, had peace. When we trust God we
actually, in Many or practical life, estimate or judge that all
the things, including people, directly concerned, take on the
responsibility of reacting while we rest. Every time we go
to sleep we have thus trusted God; and when we get insom-
nia we haven’t. An aristocrat often can not be consciously
democratic enough to trust the part of God which is his
wife as far as she deserves—much less the “‘people’’ he
condescends to ‘‘lead,’’ or the employer whose wishes he
tolerates. This paragraph states the ultimate applica-
tion of religious experience in daily life. If the reader has
not had conscious experience of such a last step in democracy
he may think it queer that this paragraph means anything in
particular. But if he keeps on trying to understand it he
may see its great importance. Anyone who fails to act on
the principle stated will in due time he dealt some painful
but just reactions by nature. A few years ago a notoriously

§167m XVIII Three

autocratic financial pirate died in a long-drawn-out quivering
fear—a truistically ““natural’’ reaction conventionally named
poetic justice. A fairly intelligent person would consider
that a high price to pay for the ‘‘privilege’’ of aristocratically
osrabbing wealth—especially when it is noticed that that
pathological condition was merely the explosion of years of
fear. Nature finds no least difficulty in extracting millions of
dollars worth of payment in pain from the profiteering boob
who thinks he can run the game by his silly rules.

n. I donot urge or beg anybody to trust God, or find
rest in God—or more practically, in his wife, or friends. 1
merely point out the fact that everybody does actually trust
God, and does so by trusting, knowing, the people and
things nearest him. If he observes that fact, becomes con-
scious of it, he thus gains more life and happiness, because he
can consciously rest. Complete morality not only implies life
more abundantly or wider activity with economy of time, but
it also implies the other side of the cycle:- rest, or peace.
Democracy includes both activity and peace. The man who
whines of a “‘heavy burden’’ is not religious, not a democrat.

8168. a. We now consider some conventional ethical
names for the reactions of ourselves with a wider environ-
ment of persons and things than the W... XM... in the last
section. We have seen that in general we get the
important things of life by acting cyclically with our environ-
ment—the important thing is the consciousness, and hence
enjoyment, of those cycles. There are a number of ways of
naming or recognizing such consciousness—of estimating or
asserting what we call the worth or value of certain activities.
We consider worth, or value, in this section. It will become
implicitly an obvious truism that all worths or values are
identical; so J shall make no effort to separate “‘material’’
and ‘‘spiritual’’ values (that is already covered by §161—we
seeing that hedonism and idealism are essentially the same).
The term value usually has a relationship meaning—is a God
the Holy Ghost or “‘abstract.’? So it is often confused.

b. If Mand W cooperate in W...XM..., the result,
from the point of view of naming values (which names or val-
ues here become Many terms), is ordinarily tacitly this:-
Love... X Work, or worship, or loyalty...—Happiness. That
equation looks queer because we probably use the factors
more often as relationship words; if we write W...XM...
with such words used conventionally as relationships to re-
place (§30e) the X, we may write, W...(love, work, worship,
loyalty, or PAYMENT in any material or spiritual way)M..., in
which those various values definitely name the general X.
Those values relate any That... and This..., and apply or act
‘both ways,” so to speak. I. e., in an ultimate sense any
reaction of Other men... >< Given men... implies that each factor
is ““paid’’ by the existence of the relationship symbolized by
the <,—the relationship necessarily going in doth directions,
to each set of men, or being ultimately circular. (That is
the explicit ethical or economic form of the truism of exist-
ence, §22.) But in humanics we usually name the values
differently for each of the two directions of relationship, thus ;-

Employes... aan Employer... . That difference in

names is an implicit commonsense recognition of the fact that

no finite cycle may be exactly reversed (Index, ‘“Cycle’’), and

is the same as the theory of direction of reaction in thermo-

chemistry. We may write W...xM... in terms of value:-
Love?

Waste LSA TE: ; or the democratic formula, thus:-

Reaction—>
<— Action

love W gives to M is quantitatively different from the love M
gives to W; in the same way the quantities or measures on

Other men and things... Given men.... The

UNIVERSE

914

the two sides of the relationship in the democratic formula
are not identical, which agrees with the last section. (Bas-
icly, that is the principle of incommensurability ; 850.)

ec. The last paragraph gives the theory of values explic-
itly and rigorously. “The volumes of its expansion are mostly
omitted at this point, there being below merely a few gen-
eral suggestions as to that expansion. I shall use values
mostly as Many terms, as that is more definite and simple.

d. The general value-equation is obviously :- Fame or
money... < Work, or worship, or loyalty, or service...==Happi-
ness. In short, we name the reaction to our activity :- fame
(good repute, honor, respect of the community, ““face,’’ etc.),
or money (wealth, or any material or other thing which we
agree to let money symbolize). If we acted and could per-
ceive no reaction, then truistically we would not be able to
know that we acted, and so would be in a monistic Nirvana
—or, in Many life, would stop acting, and be dead. So, as
ultimate truism, we are ‘paid’ for all our actions; the im-
portant things of life are measured by those payments, or are
made perceptible to us by them (that statement substantially
makes payments into relationships, though our formula is
using them as Many terms). Of course, we can and do make
a standard universe of our skin-bounded self, and get numer-
ous reactions or much pay as the reflected emotions which
follow each act of will. If we act morally we truistically get
such reactions—as sense of well-doing, peaceful conscience,
“‘virtue is its own reward.’’ But if we “‘deceive ourselves,’’
lie, suppress the truth, or fail to react fully to things, prosti-
tute our brains by pretending to believe self-contradictory
theology and other inconsistent stuff, refuse to see or admit our
mistakes, or otherwise act in an aristocratic manner, it is ob-
vious that we shall primarily cut down those reactions that
are emotions, and deprive ourselves of some happiness. In
short, the punishment of the liar, profiteer, or other sort of
aristocrat, is that he ‘contradicts’ or opposes his owz nervous
system until it fails to act, so that it partly dies—or ““comes
to believe his own lies,’? or commits piecemeal suicide by
stupidity. The liar can often deceive other men into making
payments to him that are too great for the work he did; but
obviously the liar pays for such ‘over-payments’ by partly de-
stroying himself with the lie—literally takes it out of his own
skin. And the persons who were so foolish as to let them-
selves be deceived by the liar get the rest of their money’s
worth by being painfully partially destroyed as an automatic
lesson (which even an idiot will consciously or morally profit
by if accumulated enough) to observe actual facts for them-
selves when they are of direct importance (and not be easy
marks or boobs that furnish a constant temptation to vigorous
men to become exploiters). It is therefore directly
obvious (and in agreement with our total argument), that it
makes no difference in principle whether we measure morality
by ‘inner’ or by ‘outer’ payments—by spiritual or by mater-
ial measures (§8167k, 114¢c). Obviously, the temperate and
most moral man halances the two sorts of measures, circu-
larly, so that each serves as a check or measure on the other.
Clearly, the man who “‘Idealistically’’ professes to think that
there is nothing of appreciable value outside his skin in the
““material’’ world is a trifle insane—as is his brother crank
who “‘Scientifically’’ fancies his nervous system is a vacuum
as to Emotions.... So for brevity I pay no explicit attention
to whether value is inner or outer, but tacitly include both.

e. Whether we are conscious of the fact or not, we
measure our happiness by fame and-or money. We may
work for our own approval, in which case we have fame as
inner self-respect or self-love. Some people claim they want
only that (e. g., all highbrows and “* Artists,’ etc., who
talk of “‘art for art’s sake,’’ ‘““knowledge for knowledge’ s

215

sake,’’ etc., ad nauseam). Clearly, such talk is equivalent
to the dualistic assertion that their skin-bounded self is the
universe or God, which is so obviously wrong that it shows
that those ‘Artists’? are make-believing that they are suc-
cesses—talking as if ordinary outer fame, especially money,
were sour grapes. But, though inner fame may be thus
exaggerated, some is essential; e. g., all initiative is the re-
sult of anticipating to ourselves that a certain action which
people do not know they want (or which they even emphati-
cally deny they want when they first see it—as, for instance,
sometimes happens to this book), will first please us, while
we wait for their later approval and their then giving to us
praise and-or money. In such initiative we have to take
a chance on being right. And while we normally value the
inner self-respect some, we also by ordinary commonsense want
that confirmed (§171jk)—which is proved by the fact that the
promoter charges high prices for his services:- he has to
take a chance that he is right, and has seen better than prac-
tically all other people in a certain detail; usually he is
wrong, and gets negative instead of positive pay.

f. And just as there is a normal limit of extent of activ-
ity (Fig. 163b), so there is a limit beyond which either hav-
ing fame-money, or the effort (ambition) to get it, is painful
and immoral, Fame-money is the re-action. Clearly, when
we work or play we should primarily have our attention on get-
ting our acts performed: we are at the time not directly con-
cerned with fame-money or payment, but are concerned with
sending our energy or ‘pre-payment’ in the contrary direc-
tion. So it is truistic that if we get too much fame-money,
or if we attend to getting pay primarily, or exaggerate pay by
collecting all the traffic will bear or ““the value of the ser-
vice’? (i. e., use a practical monopoly to gouge the other
fellow until he is pained into legal rate making—an evil to
everybody, but one which inevitably follows such gouging),
then we must take or have taken our attention in some de-
gree off the work or play and naturally do it unsatisfactorily.

g. Only by primarily attending to getting fame-money
is it likely that we shall get more than is good for us (the
only other way of getting too much that is at all common is
by inheritance). And although the direct effort to get fame-
money is wrong (just as the negative aspect of it, rate fixing,
is wrong), an indirect or secondary effort to get itis essential.
I. e., in our resting half of the cycles we should observe
whether we get it or not; and if we do not get it, then we
must come to one or both of these conclusions:- (1) our act
was rather worthless to others; i. e., is ‘wrong’; (2) the
ather persons’ reaction or pay is wrong. Then we must in-
directly go after fame-money by modifying our future action.
And that obviously is another way of stating democracy, but
I need not repeat the details in those new terms. We
may note the reverse aspect of that:- We should examine
at times the fame-money we are getting to see if it is actual,
and examine the people who pay it to see if they are moral
in awarding it (to see mostly whether they are competent to
judge whether they are getting their money’s worth). In
short, we are morally bound to examine the gift horse and
the donor. Willingly or appreciatively to receive praise or
money (particularly a ‘“tip’’) from an aristocrat for any serv-
ice other than such service as a defective may estimate fairly
well is to make oneself an aristocrat in some measure. E.g.,
a grocer may safely give an aristocrat a standard food and
willingly receive the standard price (maybe notin the present
disordered market); but if the late kaiser were to approve
my remarks on ethics, I should promptly begin to try to find
out why. Or, if a child of ten said that this book was fine,
I should value his good will towards me, but would not think
his judgment of the present form of expression of much value

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §168h

(though he could easily judge the book when put in his lang-
uage). But I would value the general judgment of this book
by the average college student of twenty, as being consider-
ably more competent in my opinion than that of the pope, or
the average lawyer or theologian or business gambler, or of
practically any radical or materialist. To be more
specific about the foregoing generally stated principles:- The
practice of tipping is a mildly aristocratic one, which however
damages democracy by its extensiveness—being a training
school of economic and ethical vice. Aman gives a waiter a
dollar, and expects the waiter to judge him to be ‘‘superior”’
—to return the money in measures of fame, good repute.
(That is the case when the tip is willingly given; in the case
where we are forced to tip or suffer worse consequences, it is
in a mild degree blackmail.) The essential character of a tip
is that it is money paid which is over the price that it was
implicitly contracted to pay for a certain thing; so truistic-
ally the only way the receiver of the tip can pay for it (all
things must be paid for; §114c) is to give fame to the giver
(for otherwise, the receiver implicitly says that the service
which he was implicitly under contract to give was to be an
inferior and careless sort—which even by such coarse morals
and economics as the legal law is equivalent to his breaking
the contract). That reaction (of the receiver giving fame to
the donor) could be moral; but in practice the pay for the
tip which the tipper gets (when it isn’t blackmail paying for
the tolerable performance of a contract otherwise paid for) is
almost necessarily a cheap, dishonest sort of fame; for the
receiver obviously ordinarily has not data enough on which to
form a reliable judgment. And that amounts to debasing
personally the receiver of the tip—amounts to his admitting
that he belongs to a class which is essentially inferior; and
to his saying that he will sell his opinions even when he can
not properly form them (which truistically is some destruction
of his self-respect). Also, the donor is dehased by willingly
receiving such servile abasement—even paying for it and
thus showing that he thinks it a fine thing which he himself
is willing to do when the tip is a bit larger (or else uncom-
fortably shows himself and others that he is weak in some
degree by submitting to such minor blackmail). Ob-
viously, in order to be very precise about the principles of
tipping this should be extended to several pages. A suffic-
ient practical proof of the truth of the above rough quantita-
tive statements is that a self-respecting person does not take
tips. Also, the best business men will not tolerate tips;
e. g., Filene does not permit his employes to accept tips, and
his employes are usually not the sort who would debase them-
selves to get them. The intelligent reader I believe
will agree that I display a proper sense of proportion in giv-
ing a half dozen lines to showing the principles of the ““large
and important’’ subjects of monopoly pricefixing, rate making
and regulation, ete., and dozens of lines to tipping. If our
very children have their innate honesty or sense of correct
price principles warped and distorted by such common prac-
tice as tipping, we had better talk in their terms of cents, as
the same simple principles apply in “‘large’’ terms of mil-
lions. I try always to ““begin at the beginning.’’

h. Money (or any other material thing) is obviously a
part, and hence a symbol, of the total universe or God, and
hence of our “‘real’’ selves or souls, considering them mon-
istically. And ultimately, real value is relationship (pars. ab)
—or in human terms is love. We really ultimately do every-
thing for love—which from usual points of view is named
fame, good repute, honor, respect, recognition, ““face’’ by
the Chinese, etc. But that love can be expressed definitely
only by symbols of the Many (Part One)—to express love or
give payment is again the problem of the One and Many.

§168h XVII1 Three

We give another person love or actual value in a Many or
practical or everyday way only when we give him some of our
lives or activity in terms of Land T. We can not absolutely
give another person such Many love (for absolutely, love is
inseparable, and he already has our love); the giving of it is
merely symbolical—involves Land T. So truistically, any
part of the universe may be used to symbolize or measure
that part of our life we give to another. By ordinary conven-
ient agreement we select a part that is as durable as possible,
which as a small and hence easily transported unit represents
considerable human work in its original production and as
nearly as possible a steady (and preferably equal) amount of
actual work to reproduce at later times; a part which is
homogeneous, readily dividable, and readily recognizable as
itself and not a similar substitute, and which has an actual
usefulness or intrinsic value as a raw’’ material in industry.
Such a standard Many part is usually what is actually meant
by a unit of ‘“‘money’’; and the best substance yet found to
meet those truistic requirements is gold (for details see *“En-
cy. Brit.,’? ““Money,’’ or modern economic texts). The es-
sential characteristic that would make a part of the universe
a unit of absolute money (a constant for the measurement and-
or relating |““exchange’’ is the technical term] of human life
or work, like physies’s exact constants) is its acceptability as
a symbol of a constant unit amount of life by every body on
sight, without question, at any time—so that the unit symbol
has an ‘‘absolute market.’’ There obviously can be no such
absolute money——no exact science. Jf we could rely on a
person’s promise to give a unit of life on demand, and could
agree and stay agreed on what a unit is, money would be un-
necessary—a nuisance. But men’s brains are entirely too
lacking in steadiness or durability, from many obvious causes
of which dishonesty is but a trifling one. So we need a dur-
able symbo] of a man’s brain condition at any given time,
and the barter of any Many parts as such has disadvantages
(see ‘‘Ency.’’). And obviously, if gold is agreed to be mon-
ey, then anything else by logic, form, or agreement is abso-
lutely not money; and, dropping the agreement, then by
physics, anything less enduring, steady, and certain than
gold is ina less degree available as a money. A simple
promise to pay is not money, but is the real thing (relation-
ship, love, ““credit’®) which money is used to symbolize. The
equation is:- Parts of human life, or Human effort or work, or
its Products...(<—Credit—>)Money [actual physical parts, such
as units of gold, apart from agreements]|...—Standard or whole
universes of living, or Certain transaction, or the sum of Money
where it is the agreed-upon standard. The principles of money
are obviously the solution of the One and Many. The usual
befuddlement about money, from which comes most financial
panics, etc., consists in or arises from confusing money and
credit (cf. footnote 28h). That covers the principles, but
some practical details of money are in the footnote."

168h i, The meaning of the proverb that money (or love of mon-
ey) is the root of all evil is that questions of money are the practical
ways of stating the problem of the One and Many, and obviously lies
in two practical difficulties we have with money:- (1) the standard
unit of money or Money... constantly changes with reference to what
it ‘‘buys’’ or evaluates (that change is commonly implied by the
phrase “‘high cost of living,’’ and is the economic form of the law
mass varies with velocity, and is practically due to the fact that the
truistic requirements of a good money are imperfectly met by all sub-
stances, gold in particular having been rather continnally relatively
easier to produce for some centuries); and (2) the psychological or
human nature aspects of the same difficulty, which we may consider
under two heads:- (i) when men do agree that (say) gold is money
they rarely stick to the agreement but actually try to make the ab-
solute error of having credit money (we consider that below); (ii) it
is so hard jnstly to measure human acts in terms of money (the Su-
preme court practically gave up the problem of saying what is *‘fair
value’’) that people have often made the One assertion that life can

UNIVERSE

216

i. So ina fairly civilized or moral society, money will
serve as a roughly accurate measure or symbol of all values.
Words of love, or fame, will constitne a *‘spiritual’’ symbol,
and at the same time a proportionate measure of money wil]
be given as a ‘material’’ symbol, for each work or service.

not be measured, and so have refused to try to use money consist-
ently except as a measure of the most concrete things (e. g., aristo-
crats for centuries have substituted more or less careless tips and
‘‘patronage’”’ for definite and considered payments). The more pre-
cise statement of that proverb is that the root of all evil is the dual-
ist’s stupid effort to get something for nothing—to get something for
too little payment; to get something for one of his ‘*kind’’ words or
careless promises, which he thinks costs him nothing, but which
when insincere costs him (trnistically destroys) a part of his nervous
system. So the sentimentalist’s objections to sucha ‘‘vulgar,’’ *‘ma-
terial’? thing as money are practically invariably the aristocratic ef-
fort to get a “‘privilege’’ (to get something for nothing); or else his
objections are more or less thoughtless parrotings of the aristocrat’s
objections. As a practical rule, when anyone is so ‘‘refined’’ that he
avoids mentioning the precise price he wants for something, it can
usually be correctly judged that he intends to try to get a money
price that he himself, at least subconsciously, thinks is more than
the buyer should pay.

ii. Those practical difficulties with money can easily be theoret-
cally obviated. The natural or truistic law that the unit of economic
mass, say the gold in one dollar, varies [in valne] with velocity may
be analyzed into two practical parts:- (1) that a unit of gold meas-
ures, originally or as a nominal static measure (the ‘nominal’ means
that we neglect in economics the fact that the physics mass of that
gold itself varies witb physics velocity; the economic law mass varies
with velocity is a higher order of the physics law, as I had to indicate
by the bracketed phrase in line 3 of this paragraph) the amount of
average human effort or life (love) required to extract it from the
environment; and then (2) that its continuing or dynamic value after
that depends upon the cost in effort at which it can be passed from
buyer to seller, and the average effort required at that particular
time to extract a similar dollar from the environment. I.e., the gold
unit “‘wears out’’ (is partly lost) on passing, requires effort to care
for and pass, requires effort to recognize, requires even more effort in
case a symbo) of the symbol gold is used to ‘‘recognize’’ or verify
that actual gold is represented and may be had (but in theory, though
not so in present practice, as implicitly appears, the greater effort in
recognizing that secondary symbol is more than compensated for by
savings in not having to move the actual gold; see textbooks for
details); also, with increasing knowledge, so far a new unit of gold
can be produced with usually less effort. Obviously, those things
(which ] have so roughly stated as to cause some expert economists
to tear their hair—but 1 shall keep on endangering hair in order to
get essentials clear of the numerous details that litter up men’s
minds)—those things trnistically cause the gold dollar to vary in
value—in the amount of human effort it pays for. And in theory,
all we have to do to make a gold dollar constant in value is to com-
pute those changes and apply a suitable correction at any one or
more of the infinite ‘‘number’’ of steps in the process. We note be-
low some suggested ways. Of course those variations are in infinite
regress, and can not be in a finite time accurately provided for. But
the worst objection to that theoretical stabilization of the gold dollar
is that it doesn’t touch the worst difficulty with finances:- that after
agreeing on a dollar we then try to make the absolute error of abol-
ishing it (by using credit or relationship direct, instead of that Many
money). Of course, we could also undertake to include in the com-
putations an estimate of how far we shall daily succeed in throwing
away onr money unit. But it is much easier to decide whether we
want a money or not and then exhibit a little elementary intelligence
by sticking to it—sticking to 4=A financially and morally (§22).

iii. 1f promises of possible gold (in some degree representing
actual gold. and the rest credit—what we shall call fictséious money,
as it is partly pure fiction), such as printed notes of any sort which
do not actnally represent 100 per cent gold, pass so rapidly or in such
volume as to show clearly to most people that the actual gold does
not exist, the value of the fictitious money truistically decreases—
such money becoming worth only the fraction or per cent of its face
value that represents actual gold. If the bearer of the fictitious
money is fairly sure he can in time get the actnal gold, the value
of his ‘‘money’’ will perhaps lack something of decreasing that much
if he can compute how much interest he may lose. But it is truist-
ically impossible on the average to keep the value of such fictitious
money above the human effort it in fact represents. I. e., in plain
language, if we have a 40 per cent gold reserve, in the long run our
fictitious money issued against that will theoretically be worth

Q17

Obviously, then words will begin to have a definite conscious
value. As it is now, the customary opinion is that ““mere
words’’ are practically valueless: ““talk is cheap.’’ It is the
most expensive thing there is; but the fact is that by the
classic logic, and in practice when used by aristocrats or dual-
ists, words are unreliable and nearly valueless to us except
as showing how not to usethem. The selfishness or stupidity
of the aristocrats, which makes them unable to say A=A
with a dollar and stick to it, also makes their words in prac-
tice unreliable and unstable, and has considerably dislocated
all measures of humans. But that unreliability with words
obviously costs the aristocrat some destruction of himself: he
pays in pain and in loss of some of his life for what he spoils
—his selfishness and get-rich-quick schemes with words as
well as money are simply stupidity or ignorance:- he pays for
them, and pays much more than an intelligent person cares

40 per cent of its face value (a little less in fact, to provide for cost
of printing it, etc.). That is a simple truism, and inescapable: the
fictitions money is 40 per cent money and 60 per cent not money
but credit, and nothing can change that fact; the credit may be
good, and worth nearly its face value, in which case the gold miner
exchanges his gold for the fictitious money with buta slight loss from
the nominal pay he gets for producing it; but just now in this coun-
try it costs about an average of $1.50 of presumable gold to produce
$1 actual gold (probably most of the loss of gold producers is hidden
in the Jong run as underpayments for their improvements in method).
And truistically everybody who accepts the fictitious money is gam-
bling, and in fact does not know what actual gold is worth in terms
of (say) food (a fact that is glaringly true just now, and always at
rhythmic intervals with fictitious or ‘‘watered’’ currency). I. e.,
when there is fictitious money all actual money truistically ceases to
exist; or, we have destroyed the unit of money we agreed on (by as-
serting that credit is money, when in fact it is not—although credit
is absolutely indispensable: it merely should be correctly named);
the gold still exists of course, but is no longer a standard of money,
but merely partial security of often widely fluctuating value; or,
in technical economic terms, Gresham’s law (good money drives out
poor: people keep the poor, and circulate, give to their neighbors,
any legal money which is nominally but not actually worth so much)
—Gresham’s law goes to the limit, and the nation possesses zo actual
money, but merely printed promises, hopes, dreams, ‘“‘blue sky,”’ or
what not—you accept some of snch money, and become a creditor
(not an owner), and by the inevitableness of facts have to figure on
what you will lose if yon keep it long enough to give somebody a
chance to fail to pay. And that that is true practically is proved by
the notorious facts about panies, ‘‘reserves,’’ etc.

iv. This country, in spite of repeated resulting disasters called
panics (we are in one now—a long-drawn-out sort—the change from
our customary rapid panics being due to certain features of the new
banking laws: the Roman empire got in the habit of having our new
sort, and naturally there shortly wasn’t any Roman empire)—our
country issues all sorts of things which look like rcal money but
which are pure-money-substitutes and actually fictitious—so that by
what we may call the ultimate Gresham’s law, which works by facts
and not by congressional fiats, we usually have no actual money at
all, but a governmentally conducted credit system or bank, run by
people who are often densely ignorant of money or the One and the
Many, and who are mostly financially irresponsible for results. No
man and no government can possibly make fictitious money real
money, because truistically it is not. To issue fictitious money which
looks like real money, and is intended to, is obviously the same sort
of stupid dishonesty as mislabeling and adulterating our own food
and expecting it to fool our digestive apparatus.

vy. We saw in the text that there are a number of practical or
perceptible reasons why an actual gold dollar varies in value, and
that like any other unit of the Many it varies in infinite regress in
valne—in relation to, buying power of, reaction with, any other thing
or set of things. Irving Fisher has shown that the unit of valne can
be stabilized by varying from time to time the weight of gold in a
dollar to correspond with the variations in work required to get gold
and the other usual needs of life. Obviously, if the work required to
get such a variable unit of gold thus varies precisely as does the work
required to get other needs, the value of the dollar truistically does
not vary for those other needs, and insofar as that stabilization is
accurate a dollar may be accepted as a steady unit. Fisher gives a
good short statement of the practical proof and details of it in
“American Problems in Reconstruction’’ (Frieaman, editor), (and
he has a book, ‘‘Stabilizing the Dollar,’’ which 1 have not read; I

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §168i

to pay. But words have thus been debased so much that
now neither what a man says nor the word of praise or cen-
sure which he is awarded forit is regarded as of much conse-
quence unless definitely accompanied by money measurement.

It is right in principle that money can measure any kind of
value. Money actnally does talk—honestly and definitely
(except the part that is water). Even the aristocrats’ money
talks far more honestly than their words do—for they vary
the value of their words infinitely and they can’t juggle gold
so violently. Words ought to talk much more precisely than
money does; the present greater reliability of money will

help to rehabilitate words if both are used consciously and

consistently. Those principles practically show the
average characteristics of government officials and other per--
sons who occupy nominally important positions—who have

more title than work, like the imposingly gaudy doorman of

don’t know whether he proposes to stabilize the fictitious or the act-
nal dollar). (Other methods of stabilization have been proposed in the
past which are nltimately identical with Fisher’s, are theoretically as
sound, and have more or less the same practical objections; two are
mentioned on p. 227, Gide’s ‘‘Pol. Economy”’ [2nd Am. ed.], one of
which is to water the curreacy—issue fictitious money—in amounts
as are needed to correct the varying gold value; my §123 implicitly
shows one way of stabilizing the dollar—and the unfortunate results
of a foo stable dollar in such a millennium.) As noticed before, Fish-
er’s method can’t accurately stabilize the dollar, as it deals with the
infinite regress (his method is substantially the economic equivalent
of Einstein’s theory, §66, with a jelly-fish dollar—financial papers
call it the dancing dollar). But although that theoretical difficulty
is readily obviated in the same way that we live in everyday life,
it includes two practical difficulties (in addition to that of guessing
hew much the next congress will water the currency), that make the
stabilization in my guess undesirable:- (1) It is impossible to change
even nominally the weight of a gold dollar continuously; it can be
changed practically only occasionally, and the intervening time in-
tervals will allow unequaled opportunities for grafting, ‘‘leaks,’’ and
almost sure-thing gambling at the expense of the government (I
have seen aod analogous thing done). (2) But the worst defect of
such stabilization is that substantially all the people of the world
would have to accept the gold standard and change the weight of
the unit simultaneously and equally to make the method safe. If
they did not and just the United States stabilized the dollar as far as
was practically possible, then truistically we would be forced to buy
or sell all the gold supplied or demanded by the other peoples with
their different units (theoretically the present more or less natural
laws of foreign exchange wonld prevent that; but practically they
wouldn’t, for the simple reason that our unit wonld move in appreei-
able steps—or if the changes were arbitrarily restricted to stop that,
then we would have a fictitious stabilization superimposed on a ficti-
tious money, a double attempt to say 4=A and d is not= A identi-
cal with our ‘‘free-silver’’ stupidities). It is doubtful if we have
enough gold and other commodities thus to meet such world supply
and demand and thus stahilize it at our unit. We might be able to
do it successfully materially; bunt the psychological side then comes
in, to the effect that it would put a terrific strain on the honesty of
some men (to say nothing of the worse strain on their inotellectnal
knowledge of prices), so that if those men crumpled our condition
would be far worse than now. In our present state, if all men were
fair minded there truistically would be no painful price variations
except as a result of intellectual ignorance as to what are fair prices
(inability to gauge supply and demand); and in our present state
no great temptation to gouge is ordinarily loaded on one man, so that
all but the few defectives are fairly honest; also, now the majority
tries to work ont what are fair prices, and the intellectual result is
sure to be far more accurate than the guesses of the wisest, best in-
informed stabilizing committee. That present state, ] judge, is pref-
erable; further, for most of the people to be engaged perforce in
often estimating values—even concrete money prices—is the best of
edneations, and a paternalistic stabilizing board, or any sort of rate
making commission in theory deprives them of such real living.
There are flabby minded people who would be glad of such an ex-
cuse to avoid more of the work or really vigorous life of getting their
money’s worth; they sit in apathetic, half-dead sloth and yelp like
a whipped puppy to the government to protect them from foreign or
some other sort of competition, from the middleman, or, in short,
from having to live. They need a nurse—not a government.

vi. So it appears that besides some ordinary self-reliant work,
the practical thing we need financially is an actual dollar—a Many

§1681i XVIII Three

a department store. Such persons chiefly get fame as pay:
and that is largely what they work for. And as just noticed,
fame unaccompanied by, or unmeasured in terms of, money is
an unreliable guide. In a business, ordinarily the money
profits are a reliable measure of the worth of the fame re-
ceived; the pompous business title-bearer works for casual
words of fame, doesn’t do much work for the business, and so
profits fail, and in the end he loses his job and has acquired
ill fame as a final result of that failure to make money.
But obviously, in politics, as ordinarily viewed, there is no
such money check, and the fame which is worked for is un-
reliable. Or it is even worse than that:- a government offic-
ial is often given money-measured fame for the money he
takes from the whole people and gives as nearly gratis as
possible to his fame-bringers—is rewarded in the degree
he succeeds in financially ruining the country. So truistically
the average official tends to be irresponsible and incompetent

unit that is fairly steady and so serves rather definitely to symbol-
ize human relationship or credit or promises to pay. Promises are
credit, are dealt with by banking, and perceptibly include the es-
timating or measuring of thonsands of human characteristics and of
material possessions; banking is the relating factor, the coordinator,
the Holy Ghost of finances or ‘‘business.’’ Every transaction in
credit obviously is a perceptibly unique quantitative problem. And
the pay which is promised is finally money: in sum it is a standard
universe or One, and is made up of unit Many parts or dollars. The
total problem of ‘‘money’’ is to agree that a certain mass of (say)
gold is a dollar—that gold itself is the dollar, and not the chance of
getting it,—and then to stick to that agreement definitely. 1f we
like we can have that mass or weight of gold vary by certain stated
rules; that is a mere matter of convenience, and in my opinion is in-
convenient; but the essential point is that we be definite about
sticking to that agreement; which means in practice simply that all
money be the actual bonafide gold, or a secondary symbol of such
actual, possessed, available gold and that such symbol be so defin-
itely and easily distinguishable from promises to pay if the gold hap-
pens to be available that a child can tell which is money and which
is some species of mortgage or promise.
vii. And the solution of that problem of money itself is obvi-
ously child’s play. The difficulty is fundamentally to get men to
stop trying to fool themsclves as to what they own and what they
hope to own, and the only cure for that is education, or in numerous
cases, death. A practical partial cure for it is to take the govern-
ment out of the banking business. Our government has so thoronghly
demonstrated its inefficiency in business in the past few years that
there seems to be no need to state the evidence and reasons why the
government should not engage in banking, which when properly
condneted is the most difficult of all businesses and the most indis-
pensable—the flywheel of all business. The government would
then simply make fair rules for the bankers (a job more than cnough
for the wisest government), fix the weight of a gold dollar, issue sec-
ondary symbols of the gold it stores, see to it that nobody else is-
sues anything that can be easily mistaken for such actual money,
and in particular kcep itself from doing so. I am aware that there
will be the customary protest that that will make the currency in-
flexible, restrict it, etc. Naturally: it climinates the fictitions mon-
ey which never nourished us anyway, and truistically never can, and
which we with painful offensiveness vomited up at frequent inter-
vals. And that clears the way for bankers to do a real business with
credit—issuing any sort of credit instrument that works well, so long
as it does not deceive its holder as to its nature. If bankers or any-
body else try to do business on make-believe, deception, lies, they
truistically will fail. 1f the bankers and other people haven’t the
slight intelligence to see that we can’t correctly estimate the valuc
of anything with a fictitious unit which isn’t a unit, with a dollar
which is largely and in an unknown degree water, and next (which
is where the rub comes) haven’t the strength or moral courage to
drop such wildcat currency, then the simple answer is that the nation
has gone to the devil. Our method of fooling ourselves by is-
sning fictitious money as to what are hopes and what are achieve-
ments {real money) is the economic or business form of a continual
Pollyanna ‘‘glad game’’ (§149f). Naturally human nature, espec-
ially that of the “‘tired business man,’’ can’t stand the strain of such
continual ecstacy or departure froma sane balance, and we neces-
sarily have revulsions from such abnormally optimistic, price-raising,
speculating tensions—those sick-spells, forced upon us as resting
periods by the absolutely just universe, being panics, depressions.

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218

and more interested in attending to getting fame for himself
(note the plethoric plethoricalness of their speeches) than to
working for the government, the whole people. There
is no general remedy except education—especially in sizing
up men, and in considered, careful use of words in praising
the able officials. There are one or two minor practica] helps
which are obvious:- Asthe business of government, in terms
of money, is to spend money for the greatest good of the
greatest number, then the available money check consists in
rating the success of government officials by the smallness of
the percentage taxes are of peoples’ total income; if they can
buy menta] and material improvements with double the sum
of taxes which triple the people’s income, they have been
highly successful. My rough guess is that we pay about 25
(twenty-five) per cent of our incomes, if not more, for gov-
erninent (federal and state and county, etc.), and that a fair
business man could supply better for 5 (five) per cent. Of
course that guess includes an estimate of actual cost of in-
direct taxes: good officials would have to abolish those
(they are immoral] on other grounds; §176d), in order to per-
mit themselves to be judged by a reliable money standard.
And, as there is no definite money check on him, the good
officia) will exhibit both good taste and ordinary fairness by
endeavoring to keep the government from engaging in busi-
ness, or from interfering specifically in any private business,
except to restrain defective individuals from violating general
laws. Other details are given in appropriate places.

j. It also follows that in principle Taylor’s doctrine of
scientific management (expressed briefly in ““The Principles
of Scientific Management’’) is perhaps the most explicit and
extensive advance in ethies or the science of living that has
been made since Christ (§163j). Taylor required (1) co-
operation or democracy, as it has been explicitly described
above. That basic conscious human Many ‘‘machine’’ or
loving society is then (2) to be maintained in a delicately
adjusted balance by careful and explicitly conscious measur-
ing of its reactions—by a deliberate application of ““science’’
or measuring to humanics, with a conscious economy of time.
Obviously, only such a continually adjusted buman machine
is the maximum democracy or maximum life—Taylor had no
get-rick-quick scheme or hocus-pocus panacea, but would
definitely measure and consider each quantitative or Many
problem in accordance with its perceptible facts——a glaring
exhibition of commonsense that has irritated the shirks, sen-
timentalists, quacks, and bright wonder-workers and “‘sys-
tem’’ mongers ever since (we have ““systems’’ in business
now, instead of in philosophy; the philosophers have learned
better). | And then, as the final general principle, Taylor
showed (3) that a definite money value could be given a
democratic reaction; and that the actual use of sucha symbol
or measure did give all the theoretical benefits of democracy
—in definite practice did give life more abundantly. Of
course, Taylor’s work is so extraordinarily extensive that it
has been perverted by some smaller men, and labor in gen-
eral has not had enough intelligence to grasp it. Ostwald,
for instance, took it up and perverted it considerably, to fit
and agree with the pre-war German materialistic idea of “‘ef-
ficiency,’’ which bids fair to make the word efficiency join the
word pious. Taylor was a supremely great man. He
was a democrat more beautifully balanced than Lincoln.
There is no space to go into much further explicit detail of
his principles ($1742). | Essentially such detail consists of
the establishment of human measures—is the science of hu-
manics. And that science will develop just as has physical
science, having for its goa] the continually more accurate ex-
pression of human measures in terms of money,

k. So men play or worship for inner fame, or self-respect

219

or self-approval; and work for money or for outer fame. But
in both play and work the primary attention is on the game
or activity; and on the rest side of the cycle the attention
goes to the payment, which is the reaction. So when we
name what men play or work for, we have to name the re-
action or payment, and do not state the character of their
activity. The equation is:- What the play or work is for... X
Work or play...—Meaning. Usually we incline towards con-
fusing the parts of that equation in our minds. But obvi-
ously, no intelligent man works for fame or money as an end.
The ““end,”’ or the One Meaning, includes the pleasure of his
own activity or living; in a continuing society that is neces-
sarily supplemented and completéd by the perceptible ap-
proval of others whose opinions he values, expressed in fame
or money (preferably in both, as checking each other). The
fame and money, combined with the work and play, give the
man some degree of rebirth, or a Meaning. That Meaning is
conventionally named power—which thus really means ener-
gy, or universe, or God. So we again finish the circle, get-
ting the truism that the ““use’’ of living is to live.

1. So truistically men work or play for the sense or
feeling of power it gives. The man who wants to work or
play so that he gets his pay from somebody far off is correct
in thinking that getting it increases his life (the LZ or ex-
tensive factor is increased); but he often makes the practical
mistake of neglecting his own affairs or family to care for the
“*heathen’’ or make love to another man’s wife, so that he
largely loses the intensive factor and by doing so destroys
much of bis ability to enjoy the wider L. And the
“‘ambitious’’ man who strives to pile up more fame or money
as a sort of end in itself is merely more or less insane (power-
mad); probably it is kinder to him to agree that bis brain is
defective in a pathological degree. The sane man who
strives for power, the properly or morally ambitious man, is
clearly conscious that the equation has two factors (Fame or
money... X Work...—=Power), and that the intensive factor—
the one he primarily sees, and chiefly tries to get directly —
is the work. Obviously, this working and playing to
get power is identically the same as striving for activity
or life or happiness, or getting religious experiences or re-
births, or the same as being a genius. And clearly, the same
principles apply; power is Meaning, or the “springs of ac-
tion,’’ or God, or energy, or the universe, named from the
point of view of value. So a man works for power
because it essentially is religion. But as we saw ($8153,
162), a rebirth can be too violent, and easily drive a man
mad (cf. §173e). And it is even more easy to get too much
power, which is one sort of rebirth (one which is ‘reinforced’
by perceptible ‘objective’? things), and go mad—become
unbalanced or overloaded to perhaps the degree of pathologi-
cal insanity. | We consider the details of power-madness in
various places. We may note here that the selfish grab-
ber of power, either in money or fame, usually gets it if he
grabs a little vigorously—and then he pays for it by its de-
stroying him in a just degree. He always pays.

m. As the money or fame acquired should truistically be
in fair balance with the work delivered (because the two are
a cycle, Money... < Work...; 8167k, 114c), it then is an
equivalent truism that if a man is given more fame or Money
than he can use, both he and the people who give it are
wrong and immoral. (As verbal love or fame is so carelessly
given, for brevity and precision let us confine this discussion
chiefly to money.) Clearly, if the man is given so much
money that he can not use it all before he dies to pay for
things he can actually perceive for himself (including of
course fair money payments for all the services he receives,
especially for the reactions of his immediate family), he then

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §1680

can not take the money with him, and truistically has been
shown by such reaction of the universe to have been over-
paid. Carnegie discovered that the man who dies rich dies
disgraced; clearly that is a first class discovery, that makes
him a peer of al] the great prophets. | He also made other
first class discoveries (see his ““Problems of To-Day,’’ which
is surprisingly valid, the only logical error of much import-
ance being his idealization of woman substantially to infinity).
And he handled men in a first class manner, which is a good
deal harder to do than to make first class discoveries and
shows him to have been a great democrat in character. So
I judge that Carnegie fully earned all the money he got—
which is something I think can not be justly said of many
manual laborers. There are of course numbers of rich men
who are just as bad grabbers as are loafing workmen and ex-
treme socialists; the first step in the process of dealing with
them is to learn to distinguish one when he appears. But
there are many rich men who have thoroughly earned their
money, and are peers of Carnegie:- Rockefeller, Eastman,
Ford, Hoover, Wanamaker, Edison, Schwab—to name only
a few well known ones.

n. The principle obviously is that a man gives work or
energy to others on his catabolic swings from the balance;
and then as a just reward (in physics terms, a necessarily
equal reaction) should receive as much money as he can use
to get him in return an equal amount of energy on the ana-
bolic sides of the cycles. If he labors prodigiously for others
as those rich men named above have done, then by all laws
and morals be must consume equally prodigiously to keep
balanced. There can be no exact science; so it is
not possible that the man die with exactly no money left.
But if he is highly intelligent or moral, after paying his fam-
ily what they have actually earned, he obviously would have
left (or owe) but a trifling fraction of what he earned. So it
is an absolutely rigorous principle that if a man bas wealth
left when he dies, it belongs to the people and should be re-
turned to them. Or, no man can morally bequeath wealth
nor can others morally permit him to. As a fact, our com-
mon law for centuries has held that principle and itis vaguely
enforced as inheritance taxes. A man zs disgraced if he dies
wealthy, provided he hold that in principle he ought to die
wealthy. But of course his family and others may have act-
ually earned some of the money that is merely nominally his
and should be awarded that part (as a right, and not as a
gift or ““bequest,’’ in whatever amount or percentage the
majority thinks just). Clearly, to give a child wealth so that
he need not ‘‘work,’’ or may have “‘advantages,”’ or “‘op-
portunities’’ (or whatever else the euphemism may be), is
(1) to cheat the people out of money that they overpaid, and
(2) to cheat the child out of a chance to live just that amount
of life (for in order to got rid of that wealth he has to “‘rest”’
and die inwardly in an amount corresponding to that wealth
—he truistically having to pay for it, and that being the only
way left him to earn it). | The son who inherits his father’s
wealth is as pitiful an object as a son loaded with his father’s
surplus fat, assuming the foolish father could devise means
of fastening that fat on him (the simile is grossly vulgar: so
is the inheritance of wealth). There being no exact
science, obviously there will never be any general agreement
as to how much the family of a deceased rich man has earned
and how much ‘infancy’ care his children should receive, and
how much ought to go back to the state. If the simple prin-
ciple is accepted, I think it safer to let each rich man decide
his own case, subject to revision if much disagreed with.

o. It is obviously just as immoral for a man to want to
die in debt, and without paying his family (especially his
wife), as it is for him to want to die wealthy. Most men

§1680 XVIII Three

recognize that side of the truth. Sometimes society decides
that it has not paid the man enough, and morally discharges
the debt by pensioning the man or his family. Truistically,
the man should not have permitted himself to be thus under-
paid, and society should not make a mistake that requires such
correction. But it is obvious that these money measures are
in such a primitive state of uncertainty and vagueness that it
is scarcely just to criticize anyone for making a mistake of a
fairly small percentage of his total earnings in either direc-
Problems of fame are even more uncertain than
those of monoy. The outstanding qualitative one is of course
obviously solved rigorously:- that it is immoral for a man to
desire to leave a hereditary title to descendants; his descend-
ants are immoral to accept it, as are the public who approve.
Such titles are an attempted dualism.

p. There are some people who fancy the world owes
them a living—owes them money and fame enough to permit
them to survive, regardless of how they work. Truistically,
such people in effect assert that they have a right to rest all
or most of the time, and do no work or little. That is para-
sitism, being an assertion of getting something for nothing—
an absolutely wrong, immoral, impossible principle (§§88,
Il4c, ete.). Frequently the delusion that the world owes
him a living takes the form:- that one man deserves as much
fame and money as another—that men are quantitatively
equal; that is obviously wrong and impossible for the same
reasons (it is considered in detail, as a form of socialism, in
8175). My observation of the world have been that those
who hold such delusions are the “‘submerged tenth’’ (or are
becoming members)—people who are so nearly worthless and
unreliable and generally obnoxious that they richly deserve
to starve to death (which they usually do do, in a slow way).
Further, the submerged tenth are so callous, unfeeling, and
generally defective in nervous action that in my best judge-
ment it hurts them much less to starve than it does me to
have to notice such unlovely beings. It is quite true ina
wide sense that nature, including us and them, has made
those nasty beings what they are; it is also equally true that
nature, with finally beautiful consistency and justice and fit-
ness, is now eliminating them without much pain to them by
starving them. The fairly correct judgment or meas-
ure of the deserts of those dregs of humanity is:- J see the
process of their elimination, and in my nervous system there
is pain from their squalor; they themselves are considerably
more comfortable in their condition than J am in seeing it
(else truistically they would struggle out of it). (They all
the time have the very mild pain of degenerating, and I have
it only when J have to notice them; hence, although my pain
is more intense, they have pain and its causes longer (7),
which kills them more effectively than it does me.) So be-
cause I can not practicably help being always in indirect
contact with those slum-dwellers and lazy casual laborers and
shirking dregs (they breed crime, and disease, and dirt in
general, which can not be even perceptibly isolated), I desire
to give them enough money, love, etc., to make their condi-
tions fairly tolerable to me, in return for my trouble. But,
obviously that is a selfish activity on my part. Those dregs
are so obnoxious that I selfishly slow up the rate at which
nature is eliminating them. The good which I get out of
that selfish action is that I keep my perceptions keen and
uncalloused by avoiding subjecting them to the sight of too
intense misery (misery from my point of view): those dregs
have to pay for my improvement by dying more slowly. They
fancy of course that by their whinings that the world owes
them a living, and other misapplied One conclusions as to the
equality of man, they get desirable pay. In the same
way there are some men on earth who richly deserve hanging.

tion.

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220

We are selfish when we do not hang them; for the real ob-
jection tu capital punishment is that it badly destroys the
nervous systems of those who have to do the killing or see it;
so we, for our benefit, avoid killing when we can. ]
am aware that this paragraph sounds a little unconventional
at first. But I think the reader can readily see that it is a
point of view that conduces to the widest grasp of facts as
they are. Of course, it is correct to take the other point of
view that theoretically we can ultimately lift any given hobo
or all present hoboes (in several generations, if required) to
a quantitative level with ourselves. Certainly we can; we
can also make a Venus of Milo of mud, and then turn it into
marble. But by using marble already available, or working
with more promising human material, we can do much more.
While we were uplifting the given hoboes a new crop would
grow from our neglected children. We simply have to do
what we can to keep those dregs from damaging us: to re-
move from them all hope of ““patronage’’ will itself in con-
siderable degree stop such damage (S176g). Given
a steady climate the standard of living steadily rises. The
submerged tenth (as a result of the efforts of geniuses who
entertained no parasitic delusions) now live physically as
comfortably in this country as the wisest people did three or
four centuries ago (and those dregs do not profit by such op-
portunities). But truistically there must always be, as long
as there are men, a zone or difference surface of mankind,
composed of men merging into organic structures of other
orders (dying off): it is merely the infinite regress. Such a
difference surface, by absolute principles, is at (or is) each
“‘end’’ of society:- being the aristocratic “‘upper ten’’ at
one end, and the aristocratic ‘“submerged tenth’’ at the
other end. So regardless of how much we raise the standard
of living, in the very nature of things those two degenerate
or dying zones or ends or difference surfaces of society re-
main—that being a truism. It is absolutely impossible to
remove such zones. If we “‘rescue’’ one hobo, or one finan-
cial pirate (i. e., educate him as well as know how:- make
his brain of ‘mud’ grow), and get him thus into normal hap-
piness, we have to neglect rather painfully and unjustly to
them perhaps a dozen fairly normal persons so that they start
slumping into one of those dying zones.

q. This section gives only the outlines of the theory of
values. The last paragraph would require a volume to notice
merely the details we use daily. E. g., it implies that the
principle truistically is that “‘punishment’’ should be auto-
matic or natural (the offender’s attention being called merely
to that automatic reaction), and never be the formally capric-
ious fiat which punishment is dualistically supposed to be by
aristocrats (§173b). And that shows that the top scum and
the bottom dregs—the two aristocratic ends—are not essen-
tially evils: they are, the natural results or punishment of
certain sorts of living, and are useful in teaching us how not
to do it. We have to pay something to learn, and we pay by
being annoyed by their presence.

S169. a. We have seen that morality consists of con-
sciously maintaining a balance from a Many aspect, that re-
sulting in more or less vivid religious experience or Life or
gain of power in a One aspect. But obviously, that point of
view of ethics is mostly a personal or subjective one—a state-
ment of how we view our own happiness, or get it. We now
see a short equivalent statement of how we view such morali-
ty in others. Such “objective ethics’ strictly is sociology.

b. We first judge the morality of others, and then com-
pare that morality with our own. That truistically amounts
to putting the appropriate conventional names into our ethics
equation Unselfishness... x Selfishness...—=Happiness.

c. As there can be no exact science, it follows that no

221

one can be perfectly temperate no matter how hard he tries
to keep balanced. So truistically we should tolerate in various
degrees a quantitative failure of others in temperance. As a
One proposition or principle, as a/l action in the universe is
finally balanced (§114¢), we should, as a truism, tolerate any
quantitative departure from temperance in others, as itis only
local (§25c). But such departures have for us zones of pleas-
ure, pain, death, etc., just as our own acts have (Fig. 163b).
So we in Many practice must (if we care to preserve our-
selves) limit our toleration in quantity by the principles of
$168. But so long as the other person does not consciously
intend to burt us by bis departures (except perbaps for what
he thinks is for our benefit), we must in principle tolerate his
acts if (1) we have any available means, in case we disagree
with bis judgment, of separating ourselves from bim by
enough space (making L greater), or-and (2) can make T'
brief enough for us to endure:- for obviously, the extensity
and intensity jor us of his acts can be lowered by such with-
drawal on our part until] they are easily bearable by us. So
the general Many principle of toleration is to increase L and
decrease 7’ with respect to the acts of others who try to be
temperate. If the other person is practically unable to con-
trol his acts even though intending to do so, and we
ourselves are practicably unable to move away from him,
then we effect the needed increased L and decreased 7’ by
putting him in jail or an insane asylum, in accordance with
the guesses at measures of the majority (8171k). Inthe case
of married partners such a needed change obviously may, and
in principle must, be provided by divorce. And so on.
Clearly there is a vast science of toleration (of the best ways
of getting a balance, Others’ actions...(<— Toleration—>)Our
actions...==Happiness of society) omitted at this point.

d. We shall next consider toleration from the One
point of view. If any man consciously asserts that be pro-
poses to make either factor of any That... * This... formula
become either zero or infinity, then he verbally is absolutely
wrong in principle—hbe asserts that the One is something
other than what it is, denies God; and his assertion is abso-
lutely intolerable. In short, he in effect asserts that we must
stand from bim some infinite action, and he is verbally infin-
itely intolerable. As an actual fact, be cannot perform any
such infinite action: his logic is silly. | But of course his
conduct is then formally uzpredictable, and in principle intol-
erable. Formally or in principle or from a religious or One
point of view, any dualism is intolerable. There can be no
compromise with formal error. That is absolute. And when
the dualist insists on acting so far as he can according to such
lawless assertions, we are absolutely justified in killing him,
and are morally obligated to do so if it is not practicable or
convenient to restrain him otherwise—that being a truism too
obvious to need explication. But of course it is usually easy
to restrain such foolish or insane persons, as their weak brains
make them generally weak: for our own well-being we ought
selfishly to avoid killing except as a last resort, as it is too
crude and violent—as I bappen to know from direct observa-
tion of numerous killers and killings, and as the reader can
readily verify from history if he suspects the obvious theory
and hasn’t made the observations.

e. It therefore follows that socially we have a balance of
rights and duties, of pay and work, of privileges and obliga-
tions, thus:- Rights... * Duties... = Privileges... x Obliga-
tions...==Ethical or natural law (or Legal law, if those are legal
rights and duties)= Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Freedom, Law
of humanity, etc. That equation indicates the general prin-
ciples of those much-discussed terms; those principles are
merely various points of view of the general That... DL tS 5.
formula, and I shall give only a few further suggestions about

UNIVERSE

Three XVI11 §169¢

them, putting those suggestions in terms of freedom of speech,
—the principles clearly applying to those other terms.

f. Ina One sense we obviously in our ultimate capacity
as God can say anything we like. So truistically we have
One freedom of speech. In a logical Many sense,
compared with the One sense, there can be no freedom of
speech—it being determined absolutely, by the same prin-
ciples that the Many will is (8157). We practically
use the equation Freedom of speech... X Duties or obligations
of speech...==Law, or Contracts. There, of course, “free
speech’’ by technical logic is not free; but practically, obvi-
ously by that equation (or natural law) we as individuals bave
complete freedom of speech jf we want to tell the truth and
also want to tell such truth as is quantitatively tolerable to
the majority as well as to ourselves. (E. g., it would be
painful to our skin-bounded selves to talk all the time; so
we do not want to. But obviously, if we stop to sleep we
personally have not absolute freedom of speech-~although
we do not regard such actual restriction as any restriction on
our Freedom of speech....) If we do not want to be truthful
and temperate in speech in that way (or haven’t the ability
to be so), then inevitably the other men (if they are to sur-
vive, be moral, etc.) must constrain our speech in some de-
gree—for they, like ourselves, have a One right to a just or
balanced sum of speech into Social contracts or unjfication.
Speech from us that is tolerable to others and fairly accurate
under given conditions of Land 7’, may become painful to
others or-and somewhat untrue with different ZL and 7. That
principle is usually tacitly accepted—-definitely and glaringly
so in time of war, when men have neitber the energy nor
the time to bother with much intempcrateness of speech in
an obvious minority. The principle is simply one way of say-
ing mass varies with velocity. So we, from our point of
view, are as a general rule (are, except when we use initiative)
moral when we conform our speech and want to conform it to
the limits of toleration of our neighbors. If it pains them to
hear certain assertions, over or below certain amounts of
speech, or certain speech in certain places or times, then
(1) courtesy or minor kindness, (2) good morals, and last
(3) the statute law, make us want to conform, or constrain
us to conform, to their measure of nerve toleration (Fig.
163b). But, there is the other side of that Many balance.
Our neighbor may be badly wrong in his estimation of the
truth, and so narrowly tolerant of any speech but bis own as
to indicate brain defects (cf. the lese-majeste laws of the late
kaiser). All aristocrats—Bourbons, reactionaries, autocrats,
incompetents, parasites, hysterics-~-consistently bate criti-
cism to such an abnormal degree as to try to restrict the
speech of others, while trying to retain for themselves tbe
right to speak recklessly. So at times it is desirable that the
moral man take the initiative, and with carefulness and tem-
perateness, exceed somewhat the traditional limits set up by
those defectives, and pain them by his speech, if that speech
is designed to be useful to the majority of people.

g. There is another aspect of the problem of measuring
the freedom of speech. We may consider that aspect in
readily grasped concrete terms, altbough the principles will
be obviously general:- If the authorities of a college hire a
teacher, they evidently have the right as a rule (unless
there is explicit statute law which asserts that it is not tothe
best public interests—and there may be such law in places,
and it is an interesting quantitative question whether the
Constitutional provision for freedom of speech is such a law)
to require of the teacher a constraint in bis speech that is in
their opinion in keeping witb his official position, and also in
fair agreement with their own views of the truth. They pay
the teacher for his speech, and they clearly have a right,

§169¢ XVIII Three

if they demand it (and if the majority have not decided by law
that it is against public interest; Si71k). (The teacher does
not have to accept such a contract, and of course should not
if he does not agree with the authorities; etc.) But,
if they demand that constraint in speech they should put it
explicitly in the contract that they do; for the teacher obvi-
ously has an equal right to take it for granted otherwise that
he is constrained only by the usual laws about speech, and
there is a presumption that the authorities are the high-grade
tolerant men described in the next paragraph, and are not
too cowardly to put any such requirement in the contract or
so stupid as to forget to. Also, although if they de-
mand it they have an unquestioned right to require such re-
stricted speech (subject always to what the majority say is to
the public interest: it is possible that the public will soon
hold that the Constitutional requirement of ‘‘free’’ speech
applies definitely to a quasi-public institution like a college),
they truistically have to pay these prices for the exercise of
that right:- (1) No intelligent person can believe that such
a restricted teacher is always stating what he believes to be
the complete truth (as a truism he has no right to, and
his credibility can not extend beyond his restrictions).
(2) The teacher to be comfortable may not inquire or observe
beyond the limits of his restrictions. If he does go beyond
the authorities’ limits he is in danger of finding that he is not
speaking the full quantitative truth. So he is often narrowed
to those limits—not necessarily so, of course; unusual men
have energy enough to take a chance on being uncomfortable
and resigning or being discharged. (3) The authorities form-
ally set a limit on their own growth or lives, and forbid any
useful criticism (perhaps they may “‘welcome’’ private or
secret criticism—which is easily pigeonholed), and similarly
in effect forbid any progress in their school. (4) They in
some circumstances (not in al]: it is a quantitative matter) in
clear effect assert to the world that they are not strong
enough to bear the possibje truth about things; and also that
(under some circumstances) they haven’t enough sense to
select a teacher who will talk with judgment, discretion, and
courtesy—or the courage and will power promptly to admit
the occasional] mistake the wisest authorities wil] make, and
discharge the temperamentally unfit teacher. Clearly
they have to pay those various prices, subject to the various
actual circumstances, whether they wish to or not: there is
no way to get something tor nothing.

h. Also, there is a price automatically extracted of those
who insist on too much freedom of speech—of the teacher
who fails in fitness and courtesy. If his words are of so little
weight, exert so little force, that he can expect to speak
them quite freely, with no appreciable sense of responsibility,
then he has advertised them as being in his own view practi-
eally worthless. Truistically the highly moral person
(the genius; §159) conforms to the following rule, which de-
fines what freedom of speech (and analogously, any other
liberty, right, or privilege) means to him:- He has such a
wide personal limit of toleration that he pleasurably receives
al] the words that others wish to say, on the basis that none
of them can exert enough force to go beyond the limits of
what unduly pains and unbalances him, but that all he has
time to attend to, especially the adverse ones, can teach him
something—even if no more than that the author of them is
pathological. But with respect to others, he will carefully
weigh his words (without overdoing it and becoming pre-
cisian or other variety of prig who underrates his audience by
fancying that they are unable to enjoy an occasional stiff
jolt), so that they will serve to give pleasurable and healthful
activity to normal people. In short, the moral genius allows
others all the freedom of speech they want (he may point out

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222

but he will-
169h

that careless freedom will harm themselves) ;
ingly and enduringly severely restricts his own.
And the aristocrat is opposite:- | He allows himself intem-
perate, exaggerated, dualistic speech—-swearing ($438k).
But as we saw, he wants others to restrict their speech, and
above all to refrain from any criticism or verbal opposition.
The aristocrat is ‘‘touchy’’ and personally secretive, like an
old-style diplomat, and inordinately sensitive to criticism of
himself—which a]though superficially contradictory to the fact
that his brain is narrowed, is seen to be consistent when it is
considered that what brain he has is strongly exercised on his
own ego. The aristocrat is often unable to recognize his
neighbor’s existence until his neighbor makes a slight criti-
cism that would not trouble the normal person; but then the
aristocrat observes the criticism with painful intensity. That
queer but consistent susceptibility of the aristocrat or parasite
accounts for the curious thing known as ‘‘Society,’’ which
with superficial paradoxicalness runs on the they-say’s of
servant girls, waiters, and rumor. But at the same
time it is quite possible that (say) the authorities of the col-
lege could properly consider that they had not time or ener-
ey to attend to any sort of disagreeing views. A censorship
is desirable in certain circumstances. But in most cases a
censorship is probably immoral, and indicates that those who
establish it and those who docilely and weakly submit to it
are aristocrats—at least that is what the Constitution implies
is the view of the majority in this country (§173).

S170. a. We saw under biology that the race has auto-
matically in its progress and as a marked part of the progress
divided into, reacting sexes, Female... Male..., which are
quantitatively perceptibly different. © We saw under ethics
(S166) that the conscious reaction of the sexes then truistic-
ally gives the maximum of life in norma] cases, and hence
the maximum of morality or happiness. (There is no abso-
luteness about that quantitative proposition, which is a state-
ment applicable to present conditions; under conceivable
conditions perceptible differences in human sex could disap-
pear.) And as a further ethical truism, we saw (SI67k) that
maximum morality or democracy requires that in all reactions
we cortsciously recognize the quantitative differences of the
two parties or factors. So as an obviously circular or rigor-
ous truism, we need a general theory of quantitative differ-
ences of human beings as a genera] basis of being moral—as

16ch K. g., this book would have been easy play to write if I conld
have written as many words as | thought of—letting loose without
regard toa complete fair balance and emphasis. But often it re-
quired painful nerve tension or concentration to condense and save
the reader’s attention while at the same time making no omission of
important points, and getting what seemed to be a fair balance of
emphasis. The degree of success with which I accomplished that
general quantitative balance while at the same time avoiding inflict-
ing any of that tension on the reader is the degree in which the book
is ‘‘literature.’’ In my judgment that degree is low. But the point
of the example is that the principles of freedom of speech give the
standards for determining what is ‘‘literature.’’, ——- Incidentally,
the only way to conceal that tension from the reader—to make the
book seem easy, simple, natural. and true as a matter of course—is
not to have it. And the only practical way not to have it is to keep
thinking hard just what you do mean—if anything—and rewriting
it; after enough of such work you are really thinking clearly, and
naturally can say it easily, with no tension. The difficulty with this
book (or with any similar scientific book) which stops its being liter-
ature, is that as fast as 1 work out something clearly then I intro-
duce the next step, which isn’t clear and shows tension and lack of
‘finish.’ There are numbers of sentences in this, the umpty-
somethingth, version which have no appreciable meaning; so if you
strike a doubtful one it is not safe to judge that I meant something
or that I didn’t. A thought for literary experts:- nature is never
neatly finished and dead like Henry James, or largely full of crude
raw material like Whitman, imagists, futurists, impressionists;
nature ‘tries’ to be finished enough to still keep going; so maybe
this book is a species of literature.

223

was also shown in §167]. We have implicitly seen that such
a theory is the application to humanics of the law mass varies
with velocity, or is an application of harmonic periodicity ;
or more definitely, the increased use of money as a symbol! of
human measures is the application of such a theory (named
economics); and finally, in practice such a theory of quantita-
tive differences in human beings is given by jurisprudence
(XIX). Obviously, those various aspects of the theory of
human quantities imply its complexity—the numerousness of
its perceptible details. But it is imperative if we are to suc-
ceed in life that we not only have some clear knowledge of
that theory, but that we apply it.

b. So throughout this book I have been trying to show
clearly the general ways of estimating human characters. To
do that I] have used three rough classes:- (1) The first class
comprises those who successfully try to be temperate and
balanced—moving in cycles of activity and rest so that the
activity and rest perceptibly balance. (2) Then there is the
fringe or zone of dualists or aristocrats on each ‘side’ of the
first class, made up of those who go too far in both rest and
activity, acquiring a steady accumulation of either too much
rest (parasitism, loafers), or, at the other end, too much
activity (egotism, power-madness, hysteria, etc.)—and some-
times both, in succession, like manic-depressive insanity
(““Ency. Brit.,’’ xiv, 603). This class is not normal, but is
not usually considered to be pathologically abnormal; so its
members are in practice considered to want to be unbalanced
and hence to be responsible for their unbalance—although in
a broader view nature is merely killing them off, and ulti-
mately the universe is concerned and responsible. (3) And
last there are the definitely pathological persons on each end
of society, who are insane and considered irresponsible.
Those aristocrats in class (2) and the pathological varieties of
them in (3) are the same sort of people Christ called scribes
and Pharisees (Matt., 5, 20; 12, 38; 16; 23; Luke, 7, 30,
etc.; 20, 46; 11; Mark, 3; 7; 8; 12). I have merely
been more definite about them, used their modern names,
and shown the biology of their defectiveness. I] have not
‘““condemned’’ them, but I have shown that the universe is
simply destroying them. And I] bave been more accurate in
my descriptions than is the Bible. We saw that truistically
there must be those abnormal classes at the two © ends’’ of
our race (8168p), just as there are painful zones on each side
of normal activity (§163). In a wide sense it is beautiful that
those abnorinal classes exist (S25c): for as we saw, they are
needed to show us how not to do things, furnishing evidence
of what would happen to us if we became intemperate. 1
know quite a lot about those abnormal classes from direct ex-
perience in being intemperate in numbers of ways myself.

ce. But the statement of those broad measures or classi-
fications of people may be profitably extended here by a brief
practical application of the theory of human measurements or
character judgment to normal people. Our perceptions have
to be keener in judging such balanced people, for truistically
there is less variation in Land 7' to be observed in them.
So we may note the general differences between woman and
man, as a general example of normal human measurement.

a. The basis of all measurement is L and 7 (Part One).
So we observe man and woman with the purpose of finding
in what fundamental way their activities have a perceptible
difference in L and 7; and when we note a definite variation
that holds for normal persons we have the total theoretical
solution of their quantitative differences. Obviously, that
same principle applies to the finding of the differences in all
other human classes: the principle is merely the truism that
a property or characteristic 7s an L and T difference.
Or, we can take this view of what we are about to do:-

The

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §170d

foregoing ethics has in general been static or ““abstract,’’ or
“‘theoretical’’ in the conventional sense of not being directly
used as a whole. We are now going to summarize concretely
or get some dynamic ethics (in popular estimation, I am defi-
nitely “‘rushing in’’—dynamically—where angels fear to
tread). The obvious L and T variation between man
and woman that always normally occurs (also, in principle
the variation is a truism of the theory of sex, $146), is that
the sexual cycle of woman is longer or slower in 7 than that
of man (or physiologically definitely involves more biologic
L). The total normal cycle of woman obviously includes
copulation, pregnancy, and birth and suckling of the infant
—a matter of months ;—whereas the cycle of man is, so far as
is similarly perceptible, surely not more than a few days,
and is practically only a few minutes.’ So it is obviously
truistic that as a whole the nervous system of woman normally
works more slowly and hence less intensely than that of man.
Therefore, woman’s nervous system as a whole is more inte-
grated or ‘strong,”’ is more stable or extensive, or extensively
unified, so that she is of a more child-like or ““undifferenti-
ated’’ type than man, and does not react so violently with
the environment as man, but can endure more of a long-
continued reaction with the environment than man. Clearly
all those general traits of women are merely truisms of our
original observation of her slower sex cycle. And those dit-
ferences between woman and man are J think usually agreed
by most observers to exist. E. g., the final and most remote
truism we just got is that woman can endure a Jonger reaction

1704 That of course implies that copulation for a woman is not
of itself what might be called a practically satisfying act—implies
that she has no orgasm in the sense that man has. 1 know of no di-
rect proof that such is a fact, although it is obviously theoretically a
truism; appropriate measures of physiologic processes, such as blood:
pressure, would prohably give such evidence. But there is ample
indirect evidence that copulation perceptibly alone, does not satisfy
the normal woman; some such evidence is given, e. g., by various
nervous abnormalities of prostitutes—or by the very fact that prosti-
tutes are female rather than male. The proposition is clearly quanti-
tative, and what is quantitatively true of it in the present age by no
means was fact in the past, or need be in the future: e. g., in many
fishes the sexes would theoretically have a practically equal (and ‘fin-
ishing’) orgasm; and man was once a fish, and theoretically can
again be one. 1t seems probable that just now man and woman are
tending to become less dissimilar in immediate results of copulation
(more ‘‘human,”’ or alike, in the terms of popular man-woman dis-
cussions); but that is a rash guess, which even if correct now might
not continue to be true in slightly changed conditions. IT men-
tion those vague suggestions, for which there is slight direct experi-
mental guidance, to show how much variation is possible. __E. g., it
is probable that for twenty or thirty centuries women have been de-
veloping more and more a definite orgasm; some trends of history
seem to show such a change—a comparatively rapid one to be thus
perceptible. And if that is true, then the most important quantita-
tive change and hence cause in history—-the chief ‘‘key’’ to history
—for that period would be that relative change in man and woman.
As a fact, some historians think that the most important key for that
period is the rise and decay of religious systems; it is shown (par. h)
that woman is chiefly responsible for man’s perception of religion
(the theory of the morality of marriage, 8166, implies it); so truistic-
ally religious changes are themselves due to relative changes in man and
woman. Thus sex biology may serve to show a clearer history.
Truistically, any That...x This... formula may validly serve as a base
of history, or quantitative description of the past of this earth (which
usnally includes mankind as the chief object of interest). The
‘*best’’ history is the one which uses the most vividly familiar and
perceptible terms (‘‘facts’’) for the two factors (provided they are not
too vivid). It is generally agreed now that history should be more
vivid and familiar or ‘‘real’’ than it has been made—especially that
Kings..., Generals..., Priests...,and such terms are rather frothy (are
merely the scum that implies the deep, important, familiar flows of
history), and hence give history that is not especially relevant to the
actual understandable factors, such scum being only superficially
vivid. Also, history based on kaisers and such scum truistically is
pathology; so necessarily it is as unpleasant as listening to a poor
hysteric detail her symptoms—and analogously, mostly isn’t so.

§170d XVIII Three

with the environment: and that is usually in quite percept-
ihle agreement with comparative death statistics, and with
the generally accepted fact that women are more patient.

e. Those immediate general trnisms are obviously easy
to get. They refer to the whole nervous systems of woman
and man. But when we estimate a person’s character we
divide it into parts—‘‘analyze’’ it. So we must now make
a step often confused in people’s minds. We change the
point of view from the total or the large standard universe of
Environment... X Woman..., or Environment... Man..., or
Woman... <Man..., to the smaller standard universe of
Other parts of woman (or man)... Given parts ef woman (or
man).... As soon as we do that we note that we may use
the ordinary psychological equation for woman (or man),
Emotions... < Intellect...—Nervous system. We have observed
that woman’s nervous system is comparatively stable as a
whole. We have seen that the larger part of the nervous
system is concerned in producing emotions, and that only a
small part (perhaps a part of the cortex) is concerned in pro-
ducing conscious intellect or perceptions. Now, because it
is a truism (the total argument or thesis of this book) that
any That... This... does ultimately exactly balance, then
Emotions... * Intellect... must theoretically balance in a given
person, regardless of which of the factors is most easily per-
ceptible. So it follows that as woman’s nervous system as a
whole is slow, then the larger part, her emotions, must be
slow and steady and sure and stable, etc.; and then that her
intellect, in order to balance that in the Jong run, must be
fast—or is intense, weak in a broad sense, jumps at conclu-
sions, sees details excellently but begins to be unable to see
details when they extend widely.

f. In precisely the same way, man’s emotions are fast,
intense, unreliable or undeveloped over a long time (com-
pared, of course, with the average woman’s), not so enduring
as woman’s, not very perceptibly unified or religious, fickle,
violent, etc. And his intellect comparatively is slow, strong,
steady, controlled, extensive, “‘thoughtful,’’ “‘reasonable,’’
unified, “‘cold,’’? ““hard,’’ persistent or reliable, or “‘philo-
sophical’’ or inventive (i. e., abstractly religious).

g. Clearly, man and woman are in general the ‘reverse’
or complement of each other. As soon as we consciously
follow the theory of quantities by using specific That...
This... formulas with definite observation of just what sort of
universe we are considering, it is easy to keep consistent
even in such a puzzling problem as that of the nature of man
and woman (and below we proceed with more details). In
fact, it is almost too easy, for J] readily get verbal contrasts
between the two which sound as if man and woman were as
different as night and day; but actually the two are so much
alike, just as all human beings are closely alike, that it is
often impossible to perceive many of these quantitative differ-
ences in a given couple. So the reader is requested not to
take these clear verbal differences too emphatically quantita-
tively, and to note carefully that all the practical conclusions
J draw are obviously based on my clear recognition that the
differences in man and woman are quantitatively slight usually.

bh. It is clear that woman, by slow, steady, reliable uni-
fication of emotions (in practice, by the application of them
to the holding together of the family and the property of
man), has in actual effect had more todo in directly establish-
ing religion or civilization than man has had. (E. g., it was
seen in §$155f, 166r that women today are foremost in
expressing in a directly applicable way [par. j] fundamental
advances in religious practice. Even Taylor’s scientific man-
agement is not such a direct or humanly familiar and appli-
cable ‘“binding together’’ or religion as Mrs. Fisher’s books. )
Obviously, all the great religious or human generalizations or

UNIVERSE

224

conclusions have been first formulated by the emotions of
woman, and weakly or “‘intuitively’’ expressed by her com-
paratively poor intellect. And a superficially queer
thing truistically resulted and still results from her poor in-
tellectual expression of those generalizations. She was not
able, because of the rapid and weak way she jumps at intel-
lectual conclusions, to state or observe clearly consciously or
intellectually the relationships between her various conclu-
sions—she can not very well ‘‘come to the point.’’ So
she used an apparently dualistic logic—one omitting formal
assertion of identifying relationships. (1. e., woman actually
is formally logica] in a classical] sense: man does not natur-
ally tend to use classica] logic, but was so overwhelmed with
the truth of woman’s emotional conclusions that he formally
copied woman’s curious logic, which when considered explic-
itly and intellectually, and not emotionally or vaguely con-
sciously [$17cd], is invalid.) So when woman had two
general conclusions, she could not intellectually or consciously
directly relate or identify them; hence she would intellect-
ually ignore them, allowing her emotions to work on them,
and soon they would automatically pop up into consciousness
in a related or run-together condition— ‘telescoped together,’’
so to speak, precisely as the classic logic ‘‘works’’ it. And
neither she nor man knew how it happened—could say how
it happened. So man with his steady intellect objected to
that unconscious method of telescoping, and asserted sincerely
that woman has no soul (in recent years it has been the mild-
er assertion that woman is illogical—that being asserted in
the face of the glaring fact that woman uses the classical
logic man professes to use). It evidently does follow that
she was not conscious of her mental processes: and as soul
substantially means consciousness, it superficially did follow
that she bad no soul.

i. On the other hand, man, with his comparatively strong
intellect, appropriated the general conclusions obtained by
woman and strung them together (by the invalid classic logic
—his very using of which is truistic proof that hedidn’t know
how to get the conclusions he appropriated). He called
that intellectual doing “‘reason,’’ or religion, or science, or
law-making, etc., after the fashion of the day, and claimed
that it is a superior process, and that he therefore is °superi-
or’’ to woman (formerly it was the essentially identical but
verbally more emphatic assertion that woman has no soul).
And woman in effect accepted man’s criterion of general
**superiority.’’ Even yet al] but a few rarely wise women
(and truistically they can’t express themselves clearly) accept
that intellectual criterion of comparison as being correct and
essential; e. g., the ‘‘advanced’’ woman, the extreme fem-
inist, asserts her equality by specifically claiming to be intel-
lectually the same as man, and proceeds to “‘prove’’ it by
being “‘intellectual’’ (a few typical examples are given later).
It has been seen to be truistic under present conditions that
in general woman can not equal man intellectually (of course
numerous individual women intellectually excel the majority
of men); the historical fact (so glaring that even some of the

advanced’’ women have enough intellect to see it) is that
there are no women intellectual geniuses who begin to be in
the first class (some of those ‘‘advanced’’? women then whine
that woman hasn’t been given an opportunity to be a gen-
ius intellectually—which shows that they are intellectually
incapable of grasping the simple generality, or seeing the
often glaring fact, that genius pays for all the opportunity it
ever takes). The rigorous principle obviously is that intellect-
ual superiority, which by customary meaning of words is as a
rule man’s, is not a complete or essential criterion (woman
is superior in emotions, which, as we shall see, is a variety of
genius just as important and necessary and praiseworthy).

225

That superiority is merely man’s ostentatious, showy, some-
what superficial, secondary male characteristic like the similar
proud and arrogantly displayed tai] of a rooster—and nobody
claims that his tail makes the rooster superior to the hen,
although as a tail the rooster’s tail is superior to the hen’s.

j. The question of “‘superiority’’ is the quantitative one
of direction: as we saw in §99, there can be no ‘‘solution’’ of
it, as it is merely an agreement asto methods of measurement.
There are no absolute directions, and so men essentially are
neither superior nor inferior to women, but are merely quanti-
tatively different. The same principle obviously applies to all
**races’’ of men, etc.: they are quantitatively different.
Whether one is superior to another depends entirely on what
is agreed as to arbitrary directions." In the case of woman
and man, woman is superior in Emotions..., and man in Jntel-
lect... . Woman does the usually unnoticed foundation work,
patiently stabilizes the important everyday things of life,
half-consciously formulates all the fundamental religious rela-
tionships and turns them over to man, and gives a_ practical
example of normal, useful rebirths. |The man does the in-
tellectual expressing of the further formal or logical union of
that essential foundation work; it is a less extensive work,
but emotionally intense, so that man notices it and makes a
lot of talk about its and his “‘superiority.’’ For an example
take this book. I make some vivid, wide generalizations that
are emotionally intense, and which require a cool,’’ enduring
intellect (I notice that even some men who merely read it
can’t keep cool—moderately judicious); and by bygone ideas
I would receive credit for far ‘‘superior’’ work than could be
done by woman. Well; my generalizations are useful and
did require intellectual steadiness; but they are substantially
slight and indeed almost negligible in comparison with the
vast foundations of facts and relationships established by
people before me—the valid greater part of such substance
being furnished by woman. I merely happen to do the spec-
tacular showy part; but I personally am under no delusion
that it is ““superior’’ to be showy.

k. We saw that maximum morality requires cooperation
and hence fairly accurate judgment of woman by man, and
vice versa, and a primary knowledge that in cooperation the
two reacting parties are not quantitatively equal. It follows:-
(1) that cooperation, or maximum life under given conditions,
required that at first man and woman be comparatively much
different so as to force the perception of the differences of W
and M (in W...XM... of §167b) upon each other—that the

17] ] judge that the differences in various races (white. black,
etc.) may best be summarized by saying that they are perceptibly
different in virtual racial ages. They are different quantitatively,
just as a boy is different from an old woman; aad there is obviously
no question of essential superiority. For precisely the same reasons
that children born of a boy and a woman of forty-five are likely to he
not of the best inherent quality, and are alsolikely to receive inferior
nurture, intermarriage of differently aged races is in some degree ob-
jectionable—although some things resulting from refraining may be
more so (§176h). However, the conditions of life of a race make
the race virtually grow older or become younger, just as a galaxy
fluctuates in virtual age (and as can a person in considerable degree,
though not nearly so much). So ## is possible to make the races ap-
proach some fair equatity of age. It may become necessary to do it;
for as we improve our tools it becomes more and more impracticable
and immoral (a waste of life) to keep the races ‘pure (§176). . If
the races are to be kept somewhat pure, then the earth S population
must be kept less. The population ina better and wiser civilization
than we have achieved will have to be consciously controlled, instead
of being, as now, more painfully controlled by rain, potato bugs,
power-mad statesmen’s wars, etc. Those are questions largely for
future men; they can best be solved by the people who are to use
the solutions. We rather unnecessarily trouble ourselves when we
undertake to solve such quantitative problems for the posterity that
is more than twenty years ahead—and about one man ina million
can make a sensible guess that far ahead; and 1] am not that one.

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §1701

man be intensely male and the woman intensely female.
(Before such sex differentiation occurred, the environment was
similarly intensely different from the rather undifferentiated
or rather non-sexed individuals—the same principle, giving
amphimixis of individuals after several generations, etc.; cf.
8146.) It follows next (2) that the perception of such wide
and easily seen differences of M and W made M and W “‘pro-
gress’ so that they could see, and react to, less differences:
then they would be pained by such great differences. So it
results as a truism of (2) that M and W normally, or in the
course of that progress or ‘‘increasing’’ civilization (attain-
ment of more delicate differentiation under fairly steady cli-
mate), tend to bave less wide sex differences. To abbreviate
that complete cyclic statement of ‘“progress’’ given by (1)
and (2):- all human phenomena with steady climate tend to
approach a balance perceptibly (that is obviously identical
with the theory of genius, §159). So, as an example,
the genius, the properly developed person, will more and
nore tend to stop bragging about his orher extreme sexuality.

Stallions and some male savages have to be kept away from
the opposite sex; but in this reasonably civilized country
even young men and women associate to their mutual benefit.

And that tendency of the sexes to become less violent-
ly different—of each sex to become more of a balanced gen-
jus that includes in itself much of the other sex—is obviously
accelerated by woman’s make believe that man is superior
because of bis intellect (wise women are practically conscious

that is a make-believe, and smile kindly at the man, or the

woman like Mrs. Atherton, who takes intellect very seriously),

and by her trying to imitate man’s intellect to some extent

and to do some of man’s work, such as voting and other-
wise wrestling witb the extensive environment (where even

the strutting male frequently comes out second best; note

the infant manufacturers who wail to the government for
suckle and protection from bad men in a cruel world).

Clearly, that makes the woman understand man better, and

enables here to cooperate with him, and is moral provided she

does not overdo it and really fool berself with the exagger--
ated feminism of Mrs. Atherton, that obviously tends to

dualism, with the practical conclusion that men and women

conflict. But balanced feminists like Mrs. Fisher, Mrs. War-
ren, Mrs. Vorse (§166r), who both believe in being women

first, with woman’s superiorities, and act on that belief, and

who then try some of man’s intellectualities in order to un-

derstand man better, are truistically the best sort of women

there can be (and incidentally, the intellectual work is good,

as it has a sound, honest base).

l. The man’s idea that his intellectuality makes him
wholly superior is rather silly, and so mildly immoral. But
the man has a sort of make believe that is the counterpart of
woman’s. Originally it was called chivalry, and consisted of
his claiming to like to practice the womanly superiorities of
emotional gentleness or patience, faithfulness or endurance,
ete. That helped him become more feminine. And such
pretense truistically would destroy somewhat bis masculine
strength of intellect.” So male chivalry is recognized (in

1701 On the contrary, and as an indication of the consistency of
this argument, it is obvious that pretence or make believe (§155) by
woman does her less perceptible damage, as her intellect is already
of a nature to pretend more or less automatically (which is shown by
the fact that it is women who usually have hysteria, which is an un-
due exaggeration of this normal feminine characteristic). So we
usually do not expect the mediocre woman to be very truthful, though
such truthfulness (especially in keeping his contracts) is demanded
of the mediocre man, and is beginning to be demanded even of the
casual laborer and labor leader and diplomat and press agent. But
the mediocre woman is required by the majority to be emotionally
stable or reliable, which in practice is translated into the demand that
she be sexually chaste, whereas that is not required of the mediocre

§1701 XVII] Three

this country at least) as being an offensive pretence or else a
meaningless ritual. But men of this country have generally
substituted for that chivalry a real belief that women are
more or less angelic ($1660). Such idealization of woman
truistically tends to make men acquire somewhat the feminine
superiorities, and works better than the ritualistic forms of
the decaying chivalry.

m. From an intellectual or ‘‘spiritual’’ point of view we
may get rid of the objectionable vagueness of such idealiza-
tion, and its frequent untruthful exaggeration of the quanti-
tative differences between man and woman (which encourages
parasitism, and al] the less evils that any considerable inac-
curacy does), by explicitly recognizing their ability to exper-
ience norma] emotional rebirths and thus give men religion.
The normal woman is angelic, and an essential] complement
or ‘‘comfort’’ or partner (cf. par. p) to man, in that she does
not have the vivid and shrill variety of rebirth (with al] that
implies) of the normal man or of the emotionally narrowed or
“‘unsexed’’ female (usually one who is clearly a hysteric,
such as St. Theresa). That normal-emotion, feminine sort of
actual genius is not dazzling or ‘“brilliant’’ from an intellect-
ual point of view; yet it is fully as valuahle in life as the
male sort of genius. As aman I naturally take the point of
view that it is harder to achieve that feminine genius than to
make the shallow even though universally extensive generali-
ties which a man can make. So like any normal man I have
very little use for the glittering “‘intellectual’’ woman; but
I have a profound interest in the talk of a woman who has
developed considerable intellect on the honest base of her own
superiorities. Women have trouble in grasping intel-
lectually or consciously a universe that is much larger than
their own family or circle of friends (men have the opposite
characteristic; e. g.,I have it badly enough to pass my own
wife on the street without seeing her when I happen not to
be thinking of people). So they tend to pick out a man who
can generalize intellectually for their religions guide. So
women tend to take Christ more seriously than men do.

n. Concretely, man can honestly and practically idealize
women, without any danger of making parasites, by under-
taking to some extent to fee) with his wife the importance of
family life, and especially the deep and wide sort of continn-
ous rebirth which is experienced in caring for children. For
the details of that, see the books of the sound women writ-
ers; Ihave the male incompetence to state them without
making a mess of it. Women who use their superiorities
readily make a fine standard universe out of their homes (or,
of a small circle of associates, if they are unmarried), which is
perceptible enough to them to be a very real religion. A
man who does not want to attend to those multitudinous de-
tails of woman’s life thereby implies that he wants to depart
from the balance instead of approach it—and hence is im-
moral. Men will not have the patience to stand much of
that domesticity; it will be work; but work is an essential
part of happiness, and of course the man should not subtract
energy from his intellectually-enduring work, whatever it is.
That concrete idealization of woman by men will ob-
viously also profoundly discourage the radica] feminists and
parasites who object to much domestic life—especially those

man. In short, a difference in ‘‘moral standards,’’ mcaning sex

standards, is, for mediocre men and womcn, consistent with facts as
they are,and is moral. If the mediocre woman were as truthful and
hence intellectually as just as is the mediocre man, she would stop
complaining so much abont the unchasteness of the mediocre man.
That man is more just, and hence makes little complaint of the un-
truthfulness of the mediocre woman. That truthfulness in man pays
or compensates the mediocre woman for her chastity—balances it.
Of course, both, in order to lead fuller lives—be more highly moral,
—ought to eliminate their mediocre traits.

UNIVERSE

226

who object to being personally responsible for the care of
children. All female parasites are the lazy women who do
not care to use their emotional patience; so practically they
dodge personal care of children. They experiment more or
less irresponsibly with children, and having acquired obliga-
tions, turn the real care of the child over to servants.

o. That explicit statement of cooperation between man
and woman, with definite recognition of their quantitative
differences, is equivalent to the theory, in economics, of spec-
ialization (or division) of labor, or to the combined laws of
increasing returns and of diminishing returns. These quanti-
tative differences of the sexes, from that economic point of
view, give the great ‘‘natural’’ division of labor that produces
the greatest results. We have seen that any machine
must have at least two reacting parts before it will work, or
logically even exist. If all persons do the same things, then
truistically humanity as a whole would not be a machine, or
a mutually reacting democracy: there would not be any
“‘competition’’ or love or friction, but merely a zero inter-
action of men, and hence no economic product of such a ‘so-
ciety’ (Parts One and Two). I.e., if we run what is usually
called competition to infinity, the race itself merely logically
disappears. (It practically would be like trying to run num-
erous series-wound dynamos in paralle]—and the physicist
can finish extending that simile to all aspects of this problem.
The dynamos would be destroyed.) If we are all alike eco-
nomically, meaning that we in general] all try to do the same
job (suppose everybody tried to catch fish—and nobody sup-
plied water, or fishing gear, or needs for cooking), the prod-
uct diminishes to zero—or the race perishes. When numbers
of the same sort of bacteria live together, doing the same
things, they interfere and their growth practically stops, etc.
The same law of diminishing returns is a universal truism stat-
ing that the growth of any structure or organization slows up
as we depart from the optimum balance of direct action and
reaction (it is a partial statement of periodicity; see Index).
On the other hand, if some persons react with others
~—in an explicit machine, or That... X This...,—then we begin
to get an organism, or a perceptible or increasing product (a
mere truism for growth; see Index). The product goes on
increasing until there is a balance of ‘‘competition’’ (which
does not imply “‘fighting,’’ but a reaction) with organization
—a balance of specialization with a coordination, or general
growth, or integration of social or any other sort of structure.
Beyond that balance the same diminishing return recurs.
I. e., the principle is shown by the hyperbola representing
That... X This... (Figs. 104b, 163b). Germany in rouch ef-
fect tried to make a total specialized organization of the whole
state (a military, or bureaucratic, or paternalistic one), and
being a vigorous people, blew up into a war; Rome, having
largely weak people, went towards the zero side and slumped
more or less into nothingness. It was intemperate “‘effic-
iency,’’ or too much organization or centralization; it was
like trying to make the digestive tract [government] extend
directly to every cell in the body, which scheme would, to
succeed, have to destroy al] the body but the digestive tract.
When we try to have the government “‘pass a law’’ to regu-
late every little detail we are destroying the government and
incidentally ourselves. Also, every little law adds to the tax
bill. So obviously, we have the general economic law
implied by the following formulas, which are in agreement
with our whole argument:- Various organizations or compan~
ies or ‘staffs’... X The specialized men in each...; or, Special-
ties... X Particular men in each...; or, Increasing returns... X
Diminishing returns...; or, Capital... Labor... ; or, Supply...
*Demand.... There must be a division of labor, or a “*ma-
chine,’’ or temperance or balance in economics (S81 l4c, 149,

227

etc.); otherwise destructian results. I have tried in
this one paragraph to give a general outline of the whole of
economics. So it is extremely condensed. But as the prin-
ciples are obviously identical with the principles of That... >
This... J shall not add a chapter of repetition of them in
terms of economics. The reader who wishes to see directly
and vividly in some detail such economic principles is referred
to the first fifty pages of Reeve’s ‘“Cost of Competition.’’ On
p. 45 of it Reeve gets a genera] economic equation equivalent
to our That... X This... equation, although his explicit logic is
wrong. The remainder of the book is, as economics, piffle,
although it is a beautiful mystic statement of altruism carried
substantially to infinity and contains some extraordinarily
useful facts. | He shows the difference in money price that
exists between what the producer gets and what the consumer
pays (it isa surprisingly large per cent—probably after making
some needed deductions from Reeve’s figures amounting now
to 50 per cent); he calls that amount, which is got by the
middleman, the cost of competition, and proposes that it be
wiped out by turning buying and selling over to the govern-
ment (which he tacitly takes as being practically perfect in
all respects). As a matter of obvious fact (which shows the
truistically correct solution of the middleman problem), that
“‘cost of competition’” is actually the cost of ignorance, and
is borne in rather perceptibly just proportion by everybody :-
the producer doesn’t know just what it costs him to produce,
how much, when, and what to produce, who wants it, when,
where, and how much, and how to get it there, etc.; and
the usual ignorance of the consumer is too abysmal to detail
in the limits of this book—"he wants what he wants when he
wants it,’ he usually resents being asked to use his mind ap-
preciably in the matter, etc. The middleman is mostly en-
gaged in trying to do the responsible thinking for those two
—and such thinking is almost the hardest and highest priced
work there is;—so usually he doesn’t actually do it (can’t,
in many cases), but simply gambles, and nature takes the
cost out of him by spoiling his goods in some way. And for
reasons so obvious as not to need statement, although the
chief ones have been stated, the government is less fitted to
do that thinking than are the people more directly concerned,
and government participation in the affair will not only theo-
retically increase that cost of ignorance, but in recent prac-
tice painfully did do so. The only solution of middleman
costs is responsible thinking—plain, old-fashioned gumption
or intelligent and active self-reliance (including some in the
middleman himself). Marshall broadly states the prin-
ciples of this paragraph in his Book 1V, Chap. XIII (he has
difficulty in being definite about the Oneand Many—specific-
ally, the infinite regress); but his extended application is fine.

p. We may definitely come back to man and woman.
Clearly, in order that there may be a division of ]abor so that
all persons shall not try to do the same kind of work and so
in practice destroy the race, it is necessary that persons be
necessarily quantitatively different (that is merely the reverse
aspect of incommensurability): we ought not (as a figurative
truism) put square pegs in round holes. We saw that women
and men are the two natural divisions of the race for such a
primary division of labor, or general specialization. So if we
take a married couple as a standard universe, there is natur-
ally a specialization of jobs; but, that specialization can not
be complete in practice (an attempt at it gives line organiza-
tion, or too much organization, Pauline psendo ethics, and a
burned-up couple). I. e., the man must compete a little
in being rather feminine, and the woman must exercise
some in being rather masculine. So obviously, generally,
and in agreement with practice in this country, there should
not be any particular line drawn as to what jobs are for men

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §170p

and what for women. A woman would be aboutas useless and
misplaced in a life job as a professional philosopher as J
would be as a governess. But although some women com-
plain that they are barred from industry, etc., I think they
could get a jobas philosopher as easily as J could one as gov-
erness—and J] am not aware that any cruel person is stop-
ping me from being a governess. In most jobs a woman can
not get as much pay as a man, for the simple reason that
she is not so responsible or reliable:- her intellect is as
arule not so dependable, as seen; and also, she is not
expected to stick to the job, but is expected to marry (and
if she does not, or does not get some other job which mostly
uses her superiorities, she is naturally correctly judged to be
a somewhat wasted and spoiled human being, not of great
value). Nobody would be likely to stop me if I experimented
at being a governess; but I would justly receive an ama-
teur’s pay and fame. If I tried to make governess-ing my
life work, I should naturally expect to be considered a fool
for wasting my other abilities in order to be a mediocre gov-
erness—but, if | thought I would accomplish really more as a
governess, I would stick it out and prove the others to be the
fools. The same principles apply to women; I should expect
«a woman who tried to be primarily a philosopher to fail to do
nearly so much as she would in more suitable jobs; 1 number
of practical failures are available as evidence; and I would
unhesitatingly call any young woman who started out to be a
professional philosopher a fool. But J would not otherwise
try to stop her; maybe she would prove me wrong, and
make a success at it, in which case I would conclude hoth
that she was a biological sport, and that the female proper-
ties were changing faster than I expected. In the mean-
time, if 1 were hiring philosophers I shouldn’t pay her more
than about half what J should pay a run-of-the-mine male one.
That general principle of utilizing the properties of
people applies to all businesses and all partnerships. It is
simple to use our broad, ‘‘natural’’ formula Emotions... X
Intellect... to classify all persons on a comparative scale be-
ginning with high intellectual strength at one end and going
to comparatively high emotional superiority at the other (the
difficulty is to guess reasonably accurately where a given per-
son belongs on the scale; also, there is another scale of in-
trinsic measures of at least equal importance—e. g., two men
may have a good balance of the two strengths so far as it is
possible for a male to have, and yet one man may intrinsic-
ally have fifty times the strength, power, drive, assimilative-
outputing capacity of the other). I used man and woman
because they naturally tend to occupy the respective ends of
that comparative scale, and thus automatically enter into the
widest specialization combined with non-specialization:- mar-
riage (which is thus an extreme but sound type of all busi-
nesses, in opposition to the unsound line organization). (That
‘comparative’ scale is the extensive factor, and the ‘intrinsic’
scale the intensive factor of the rigorous theory of human
measurement. Obviously they can not be separated; but I
shall not go further into the mathematical theory; see Index,
"Harmonie periodicity.”’) E. g., of two men, onc is more
enduring intellectually [perhaps not perceptibly so] and un-
stable emotionally than the other; so in a business the intel-
lectually strong man should be given a thinking, planning,
investigating, imagining, talking, or salesman job; while the
other should be in an executive, managing, conserving, buy-
ing, organizing, steadying-flywheel Job, with general mild
wet-blanket duties to counteract the other and make him
more useful (and that obviously won’t hold if the intrinsic
measures of the two differ widely; in that case the only satis-
factory way to get an actual democracy or sound business or-
ganization, is to put the weak man in a position in which he

§170p XVIII Three

is not expected to give continual reactions; a pygmy can’t
wrestle with a giant satisfactorily to anybody, and no business
title or other hocus-pocus can make a pygmy into a giant; to
expect a manual laborer, who usually has the nerve develop-
ment of a child [cf. army tests] to tell Ford how to run the
business is a ridiculous travesty on democracy or any other
aspect of commonsense; Out the laborer is competent to say
what he thinks about his own job, and such remarks, which
he has ebvious democratic right and psychological need to
make, although they probably mean something much differ-
ent from what they actually say, are valuable to the greatest
business genius). And actual people do not fixedly occupy a
constant place on those scales; they change. That
is the genera] theory of all business or industry, or of hand-
ling men (including women). Itis the definite application of
democracy, which explicitly notes that men are not quantita-
tively equal. | Handling men is the greatest of all jobs be-
cause it is the hardest:- requiring responsible thinking (of
course including estimate of measures), and then application
of that to men (which requires more intrinsic energy or drive
than they have, at least in the affairs concerned). House-
keeping, including handling a husband and children, is tru-
istically just as hard. Usually the actual objection that is
found by women to housekeeping comes from the fact that
women who object are too mediocre to grasp and-or intrinsic-
ally measure up to the possibilities of the job.

q. So the fundamental practical ethical and-or economic
error a person can make is to fail to find what he is quantita-
tively fitted to do, and then to fai] todo it. The average
proper job for a man has been seen to differ somewhat from
the one for a woman. So in general the economic doctrine of
extreme feminists, tacitly or explicitly to the effect that wom-
en ought to be given the same work as men, same pay, etc.,
is wrong. Mrs. Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s ““Woman and
Economics’’ seems to be the leading ‘‘authority’’ for that
extreme feminism. The book is the sugar-coated picture of
a matrimonial establishment which actually is what is now
usually known as an apartment hotel (male real estate in-
vestors took the hint that many women wanted thus to duck
hard, life-giving responsibility and supplied them with their
Utopia—at a price). Her man and woman do the same sort
of work [i. e., they have vaguely a ‘‘career’’—nature not
specified, as it would have been distressing to be too intimate
with responsible work], and return at night to glance at
the children, who merely vaguely happened, and are in charge
of an assumed-competent nurse [who more or less material-
izes out of the nowhere, and who rather seems to be of neu-
tral sex]. It isa “‘lovely’’ picture. The glaring practical
defect with it is that in her grossly amatuerish way she sub-
stantially forgets that the nurse and the more hidden domes-
tics who run the apartment hotel and the children, are parts
of the race; she substitutes them as zero-counters for moth-
ers, in blissful disregard of the multitude of actual economic
facts involved. Obviously, her book, as economics, is merely
silly. © What it means is that she wants to eat her cake and
have it too; and naturally a person showing such dense ig-
norance of -fundamental economic principles does not even
know what real cake is—what a sound woman can get out of
life. Her book is typical of many such female books.

r. Finally some men may object that they do not wish to
become any more like women than they can help. The
characteristic which is probably most commonly named as the
essential masculine trait is courage. And that is truistically
correct :- for courage is the outward result of conscious know-
ledge or intelligence, and can be possessed only by those who
have consistent, sure, stable intelligence and the intense
emotion needed at any given time to back it up—live by it,

?

UNIVERSE

228

or stick to it. We are afraid only when we are ignorant;
when we are not fairly sure what is going to happen we wor-
ry, which is minor fearing. And obviously, a woman would
not have as much courage asa man.” Often men admire
the patience of women to the degree of holding that women
have more courage, or a better sort than men; I am inclined
to be that way myself. But that simply means that those
men are more or Jess conscious of a deficiency in patience:
for precisely speaking a woman is usually cowardly with re-
spect to the unknown or unpredictable antics of a mouse, or
a washing or other sort of machine, etc.; but they have much

170r Roughly speaking,a man is said to have (noticeable) courage
only when he is actually afraid of the immediate unknown Many,
and, with a little make believe, pretends not to be afraid—or, per-
haps to speak more precisely, forces himself to go on in spite of the
actual and inevitable fear. (His capacity for intense emotions truis~
tically gives him that courage in a degree superior to a woman’s; as
a rule the woman can’t concentrate her whole nervous system to that
pitch of intensity, or conscious sticking point.) If we knew every-
thing, courage would then disappear with all other things into the
ineffable One, and we would have infinite courage or zero courage,
just as it pleases us tosay. So the courageous man actually intel-
lectually grasps a very wide sort of God or Meaning (he may call it
‘‘carrying on,’’ or ‘‘playing the game,’’ etc.), and makes it work
backwards, to pull him over the fear of the immediate unknowns he
will never be able to know accurately (e. g., the common saying that
soldiers become ‘‘fatalists’’ means that they thus substantially con-
sciously use the One more frequently than other people use the same
thing under the name religion). So it is a truism that the
braggart (who is verbally a truculent, militaristic, aristocratic bully)
is not especially courageous; he actually is either make-believedly
whistling to hide his fear and exaggerating the hiding of it so much
as perhaps to be hypocritical and thus prove that he is too much
afraid; or elsc he is so stupid and dull witted that he is unable to see
that there are unknown things that ought to make him pause a bit.
Usually the militarist is a mixture of both, and too stupid to see that
he is exhibiting some cowardice. But he always exhibits cowardice
by cxpressing the earnest desire that people load themselves down
with arms and armor so as to be ‘‘prepared’’—to protect him, pre-
sumably. That glaringly contradicts his ‘‘war-like spirit,’’ and much-
advertised courage. So it is a truism that the worst objection to the
militarist is the directly human one that he is too cowardly—is not
quiteaman. (Or, if he is not actually afraid to be without increas-
ing protection, then when he says it is needed he is either stupidly
parroting someone else, or is lying for some selfish purpose of his own
—both of which are higher grades of cowardice.) Of course,
there is such a thing as a foolhardy ignoring of ordinary prudence—
the question of armament is a quantitative one, and the reader will
have to judge for himself. Truistically, the best defence against any
variety of bully or militarist is to have a well balanced, self-reliant
nervous system. Jt is now obvious that the truly courageous
man is the one who in numerous things in practical life has used the
valid logic soundly. So all the unusually reliable men and women
mentioned in footnote 167b are obviously also courageous. Most of
them have shown easily observable courage in various ways; so such
objective evidence in turn proves the principles here. And clearly ,
the supreme courage is that possessed by the real leaders of the race
—is that courage which with full consciousness of the risks run will
unselfishly, without demand for, or any certainty of, payment for
themselves, support others in right-doing. This book is verbally a
trifle novel in spots, and ] have found that it takes truly courageous
persons to admit that they approve it (the argument is so self-
evidently true that ] have never seen anyone try to attack it; and ap-
parently people accept the book as substantially correct, so it clearly
is simply a matter of their courageously facing the ‘‘unknown,’’ the
slightly novel, and either standing on their own feet and taking it,
or running away). So for some years I have had an unusual oppor-~
tunity to gauge people’s real courage. AndI finda surprisingly
large amount of it in this country—and a negligible amount in Eu-
rope: there they occasionally blow-up prominently with some half-
baked radical idea, but there is little steady, hard working courage.
Of course, there are numbers of persons in this country, occupying
nominally important positions, who are painfully timid; I have
learned to recognize them pretty well (mostly by their large and im-
portant sounding talk, which is very cock-sure in tone, but vague as
to specific facts): some day I may publish an interesting list of
them. It requires no appreciable courage, of course, to work
out and publish or support ideas of our own. Even if the ideas are
silly kind nature usually keeps us from seeing it to a fatal degree.

229

“‘eonrage’’ of the sort called (fortitude, which is patient en-
durance of the disagreeable and somewhat passive acceptance
of the unknown. The equation tacitly used is Fortitude or
bravery... X Courage or bravery...—=Courage, etc. So
truistically, the more a man knows about women the more
courage he has, or the more masculine he is. And he can
know about them only by becoming more like them—getting
a better balance of that equation. The exaggerated males,
with too much specialized courage and not enough fortitude,
‘are the masters, superiors, bosses’’ of their wives (who pub-
licly exhibit their condition by following their lords a trifle
in the rear, like little dogs); such aristocratic, bullying, mili-
taristic males, from the time of the over-masculine Greeks
down to the pre-war Prussian military bully, have been over-
emotional, sentimental, cruel, brutal, and treacherous—and
have invariably been soon licked and wiped out by more bal-
anced men. A person with so much male courage as to be
pathological is called a sadist: with pathological feminine
endurance or fortitude, a masochist (often the sexes reverse
in tbat highly exaggerated psychological unbalance). So
the man or woman who labors under the delusion that it is
nice to achieve large quantities of the respective braver-
ies—who disdains to be a little like a woman, or a man—
should read some of that highly unpleasant sex psychiatry,
and see what will happen to him or her in some degree. So
we see that there must be temperance in democracy or divi-
sion of labor—especially in the great ‘‘natural’’ one of sex.
S171. a. The summing up of ethics or sociology or eco-
nomics is known as art (when mostly ‘outer’ or objective),
and culture or civilization (when mostly ‘inner’ or subjective).
b. It is generally held that art is the method by which
things are best done—art being there substantially a relation-
ship word. So truistically that which most perceptibly fits
with its environment, is most obviously related to it or iden-
tified with it, is the best art—art there being the correspond-
ing Many word. The One word for art is usually beauty.
Clearly the universe is completely related or absolutely fitted
together, and so is absolutely beautiful:- Environment...
(<Art, or relating—>) Objects of art...=Beauty, or Art.
ce. Those definitions of art make it commonplace, norm-
al. <Any easily perceptible moral or balanced action or the
result (mental or material) of such action is art by those defi-
nitions—or, when in some less degree, is skill, skillful, effic-
ient, workable, useful, etc. So art as a Many word tends to
refer to things out near the normal limits of activity (Fig.
168b); we use other names for quantitatively less things.
So obviously, if we speak of anything as being artistic it us-
ually means that it stretches our nervous system so far away
from the balance that the thing gives us in some more or less
perceptible degree a rebirth. And hence, when used asa
One word, art more or less consciously means religion, with
the added meaning that art is definitely any sort of summa-
tion into the One: religion actually is that (§166e), but in
practice “‘religion’’ usually means only an ethical summation
—the word ethical then being restricted arbitrarily to human
actions. It thus appears that the almost interminable dis-
putes as to what is art and what is not, and as to who is an
artist, and the value of art, are due chiefly to the facts
(1) that the word is used almost equally often as each part of
the Trinity; (2) that art tends to refer to matters near the
normal limits, and there are no agreed-on measures of those
limits (or even any conventional recognition that the disputes
over art refer to such quantitative matters); and (3) that be-
cause art gives religious rebirths, the priests and the artists
are in competition so that exploiters in both classes have de-
liberately added to the confusion (there are many examples;
e. g., Mohammedan theologians forbid some arts).

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII 817If

d. Butclearly there need be no disputes about the theory
of art. That theory is identical with the principles of morals
represented by Fig. 163b. But until fairly definite measures
are made in humanics there can be no reasonably definite
standard of judgment as to whether a given thing is artistic.
If art in the Many sense be taken as things in the narrow
zone of doubtfully pleasant, just below the painful or patho-
logical] zone, then obviously there are only narrow limits of
tolerance within which things are art, and what is art for one
person may easily and often does lie entirely outside that zone
for another. Quantitative judgment as to the zone in whicha
thing falls is called taste—and obviously there can be no in-
telligent disputing about taste until] such time as we have
systematic human measurements. But by means of that theory
many prattlers about art may readily be shown to be persist-
ently self-contradictory and hence to have negligible taste.

e. We can readily make a thing quite true or consistent
with the universe (ultimately, it can not be otherwise), but
at the same time make it so abnormal—so far outside our
everyday balance—that we can stretch to it, vividly grasp its
actual consistency or have a rebirth from it, only if we make
a painful effort. It would be art to us if we grasped it. But
by ordinary standards it is not worth grasping, just as it is
scarcely worth while to strain to see the beauty in the late
Kaiser (§25c), if our purpose is to see beauty directly; if we
have a wider purpose, such as to solve the question of the
beauty of the whole universe, he is an excellent detail to
puzzle over and sharpen our wits on, ashe is so confoundedly
ugly at first sight. A highbrow drama is an example of such
over-high “‘art’’ that ordinarily is not art, but an offensive
abnormality. 1 can get various rebirths from Ibsen’s plays
if ] work hard enough; but I have to supply from myself so
many of the relationships that the abnormal Ibsen omitted or
erroneously denied, that the result is not worth my work,
except occasionally as an intrinsically worthless rebus in the
puzzle column to sharpen my perceptions on. So by my
measurement Ibsen was a brain-sick man, and not an artist.

f. Because art generally implies exercise up to the pain-
ful limit (C or C’, Fig. 163b), the average artist seems to
fancy that the more he stretches the better artist he is—that
he ought to be abnormally strained. He then has the “‘ar-
tistic temperament’’—and is wrong, as we saw in discussing
genius (§159f). Artistic stretches are usually consid-
ered to consist only of stretching Intellect... to see the One
—to be ‘masculine.’ But obviously, it is just as rea] art to
stretch the activity of the emotions; and truistically, by this
whole book, the highest artis a well balanced amount of both
(and of course it is impossible to separate the two—run either
to 0 or ©). The masculine way is commonly called artistic
or literary idealism [a considerably different idealism from any
of the philosophical meanings], and tends to be general, ab-
stract, and impersonal. The second or feminine way is real-
ism, and tends to be definite, concrete, and personal. When
a man tries to be a thoroughgoing realist he obviously (to me
at least, and in theory—unless he happens to be too feminine)
makes an awkward, unconvincing mess of it—actually evolves
a rather disconnected list of things. (There is a modern ten-
dency for realism to mean any kind of obscenity—a dualistic
disconnection of any things from their fitting place and use;
—that is the pathological exaggeration of things, especially
obnoxious in the hands of the females who do it, as they can
go further.) Although it is explicitly considered hy
usual conventions that art should primarily be intellectual,
the good artists instinctively make the balance of intellect
and emotion. Then the second raters try to copy that, and
exaggerate, the men overdoing being realists, and women
vice versa (e. g., Mrs. Atherton’s books); or, the second

§171f XVIII Three

raters do not know enough even to try to balance themselves
and so exaggerate their own sex properties (e. g., Wilson’s
obscenely autocratic exaggeration of ideals in his **New Free-
dom,’’ the very name of which implies that he alone knows
about that ancient idea). Henry James is a good example
of a ‘‘realist?’—giving thousands of rather useless details,
making us work hard to coordinate or unify them. And that
is not realistic art at all, but masculine intellectual gymast-
ics, which is usually as damaging as having to go out and
aimlessly walk ten miles for ““exercise’’; some people do it,
of course, and say it is fine—thereby furnishing considerable
evidence that they have not much of importance and real in-
terest todo. In consistency with that principle I have sev-
eral times told the reader that he need not burden his memory
with the details in this book—that they are not art, not par-
ticularly fitting and useful, for anybody but the specialist
whose business and interest it is to work with them. So that
realism of the highbrow or Henry James and Walt Whitman
typeis notart, but a conscious straining after art that is over-
done. (Incidentally, Whitman seems to me to be as large and
gorgeous a bluffer as Paul, and not a democrat but a hobo
aristocrat; J tend to become intemperate when I point out
Whitman’s painful abnormalities, as only thus can they be
fittingly described: so I omit statement of the evidence).
Extremely good examples of balanced art | think are
Dorothy Canfield Fisher’s “‘Understood Betsy,’’ which at
first glance seems to be idealism so simple is its realism, al-
though it probably inclines toward realism, and Gerald Stan-
ley Lee’s “‘Crowds,’’ which at first seems realism so fully
does it show in vivid detail just what the great human gen-
erality or ideal, democracy, is. The artistic equation clearly
is Realism... Idealism...=Art, or Aesthetics; and if a piece
of art is sufficiently great it has both the factors smoothly
joined, like the nniverse, and conceals its art by giving us a
grasp of the infinite regress without making us work too hard.
Such first class art is thus so simple and commonplace in its
details that those familiar things catch the observer or reader
or hearer of the art, and push him out to grasp the rest of
the universe. Thus all good art is an obvious and readily
graspable solution of the One and Many. A good picture
makes us understand and be God by suggesting the unbreak-
able relationship of the universe. And a good machine does
precisely the same thing. Obviously, for both factors of
that general artistic equation the formula Style... < Substance...
(§166q) holds, and we need some training in Style..., logic,
method, form, tricks of the trade, or whatever we call it,
before we can fully appreciate art. And the volumes needed
to expand that science are omitted at this point.

oa, Truistically, when a man or a people becomes boast-
fully and ostentatiously ‘artistic’? it is a symptom of either
degeneracy or crude ignorance. The commonplaces of life
are beautiful or artistic, and the normal man needs very little
of what is technically art. Too much art is precisely the same
as too much food, and leads to the same degeneration that
too much prosperity of any sort does. The person who ‘con-
sumes’ much art, and claims he appreciates it either has pro-
digious assimilative capacity or is a hypocrite (§155)—usually
the latter; which agrees with the well known facts as to the
intemperance of dull and sodden aristocrats in art.

h. Culture or civilization or progress is obviously a sum-
ming up of all art, considering art chiefly from the spiritnal
aspect, or taking it to be relationship. So clearly culture is
a continuous growth of all things (usually considered from
the ethical point of view), which growth must, in a fairly
steady climate, take place as the result of stretching a little
more in our cycles, but no more than ean be happily endured
by the majority. A person who has become “‘cultured’’ (who,

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230

e. g., is ‘‘finished’’ in a “‘finishing’’ school) is obviously not
the possessor of real culture. Because culture is such
an inclusive word, naming the change in all our personalities
and rather explicitly in some of the environment, it is clear
that it is not very precise to say that one person differs from
another in culture. Such words as culture and civilization may
be called exaggerating words, or spread-eagling words. They
are so inclusive that even as Many terms they tend to mean
too much, and to elude the grasp of the strongest mind; so
it is more sensible to leave them to demagogs, aristocrats—
vague-thinking persons who are fond of large words. The
man who claims that he is highly cultured or civilized (or,
what amounts to the same thing, that he is a member in full
standing of a highly cultured nation) is truistically claiming
that he is in a great number of things quantitatively much
superior to others. Nearly al] of us are superior in some
things to other persons: I can wash my own face much more
satisfactorily to myself than can any other person. Buta
sweeping claim to superiority is usually grossly inaccurate;
and unless accompanied by some definite evidence of its cor-
rectness is properly held to indicate egotism—a mild form of
insanity in which one’s self is over-estimated.

i. The pre-war Germans summed up their dualistic,
materialistic errors in their Kultur, claiming a high superior-
ity for it, and congratulating themselves on possessing it.
They considered it substantially finished, and that it was
their duty to impose it on others—which is the usual theo-
logical missionary spirit (see remarks on butters-in, §167}).

j. And finally we see that art and culture, like religion,
tend to become ritualistic—and then of course cease be-
ing anything more than a comfortable, resting play or less
intense imitation of the real, vigorous thing. When Homer
made the ‘‘Iliad’’ the most vigorous minds of that day were
stretched and trained by it in a fine balance for that age: it
made them grasp the universe or God in a fashion, starting
with what they were familiar with—it was the current relig-
ion. But nowadays the ‘‘Iliad’’ is so narrow that it scarcely
stretches the perceptions of a child. And its former familiar or
simple ‘realisms’ are no longer full of implication-ghosts and
so truistically do not serve as good starting points from which
to grasp anything; and the poem’s argument is very much
out of balance when compared with our everyday morality—
with our more delicately balanced standards. So truistically
the “‘Iliad’’ is not real art now; asa fact, it bores me, as it
does others I have questioned. But because it formerly was
the highest art (I readily see the now practically dead reas-
ons why it was), many people have been made familiar with
it and now do use it as a ritual art thing, and get some pleas-
ure out of it, and possibly even very mild rebirths. In pre-
cisely the same way people get even more than that out of a
treasured lock of somebody’s hair, ete. That hair is not art
now (in its day and place it was better art than any man-
made technical “‘art’’). To most other people the more or
less dead hair is a little offensive—‘‘trash,’’ from their per-
sonal point of view. So, to me from points of view other
than the historical and of sympathy with the people who act-
nally like it as a ritual, the “‘Iliad’’ is trash. About three-
fourths of the Bible is similarly trash to me—some of it quite
offensive. And to me many of the ‘“‘Old Masters’’ and other
antiques are atrocious trash from the point of view of art. I
see no great objection to those things being used as art ritu-
als by those who wish. But reasonably sensible people are
well aware that numbers of those who praise the Bible, those
old masters, etc., are merely hypocrites. But in spite of the
danger an honest person thus runs of being classed with the
hypocrites, there is an advantage in using the old art first
to develop on, ‘‘cut one’s teeth on’’ (provided we omit the

231

immoral ones such as ‘Jack the Giant Killer’’ and much of
the Bible). For the old ones that sti]] remain decently bal-
anced by our standards have had enough merit to survive the
judgment of many men; and “‘modern’’ works are cluttered
up with pathological puzzles such as Ibsen and Whitman.
What actnally happens is that the good of a great work
becomes assimilated into our body of knowledge (becomes a
part of our ““physical’’ bodies, in fact), and the unsuitable
parts die—change into something else. No work of art in a
Many sense can survive ina perceptibly distinct form (§152f).
So the moral man wil] take his art ten:perately:- using what
is good both of the old and of the new—avoiding spending
too much time on playing with easy ritualistic art, and avoid-
ing the unbalanced “‘Art’’ which, like the poor aristocrats,
we have always with us—that “‘Art’’ being in fact the prod-
uct and pet of such aristocrats. And truistically ethics, or
what is quantitatively right and wrong, changes with time,
just as does art. We have to be similarly temperate as to
ethics, or its sum:- culture.

k. It therefore follows, as the sum of this chapter, that
the majority, which rules in any sort of democracy (and act-
ually rules throughout the universe, as a principle; and
perceptibly rules among the people of this earth if they be
considered over a long time—even though their governments
be called autocracies, etc.; XI1X)—that the majority is always
right FOR THE GIVEN TIME AND PLACE 1N WHICH IT ExisTs. That
is obviously a mere truism. We may apply it with reference
to this book, and thus see its evident truth, and the use of
the principle. This book is mostly a brief formulation
of what the vast majority of people have worked out in the
past and handed on to us, and which we tacitly believe and
act on—act upon so nearly completely, in fact, that in some
cases we have forgotten how to express it. So the book sub-
stantially accepts majority views as being right in most cases;
I personally rest in secure and serene contentment upon the
fact that our ancestors saw things as 1 do. (“‘Communion of
saints’’ is the queer theological phrase naming that serenity
coming from the conservative way in which we act; the
phrase implies that the majority, as thus symbolized by the
previously accepted good observers, rules; and the phrase is
grateful to us because it delicately implies that we too are
equal to those great men—as in fact we are, when we thus ac-
cept and use their teachings.) In short, I substantially agree
with the vast majority of the dead and the living: that tru-
istically is equivalent to saying that I love them and love my-
self. But, after getting on that sound foundation with most
other people, in some rather negligible ways (say to the effect
that the earth is cold inside) I stretch a trifle further than
others do, and get a few lesser conclusions that are in the
minority. | Now, I have deliberately endeavored to keep on
that majority base while I stretched, and thus to have per-
ceptibly connected those slight minority conclusions with the
Majority ones. (The aristocrats, especially the tribe of fa-
natic Artists, try to jump up off that base, and stay up and
be ‘‘superior.’’) I may be right in those slight minority con-
clusions; I of course think I am. But, those conclusions are
not yet right for the race. They may be actually wrong:
what I took to be consistency with the sound majority base
may be a defect in my brain—for I often make mistakes.
And even if those few minority conclusions are correct, as a
glaring truism they can not be used by the majority until the
majority at least see that they are true. So they are not
right in a practical or Many sense for the majority until they
can stretch up to them and make them a part of their conclu-
sions. Although I may be quite right from a broader L, and
especially 7’, point of view, I most assuredly am wrong for
the majority here and now until they can at least see that I

UNIVERSE

Three XVIII §171m

am right: for as a truism (to repeat it again, as many people
do not see it), the majority can not usefully, safely, or mor-
ally know or apply my minority conclusions when they do not
know them. (So truistically all views that it is possible to
rule by fiat, by “‘passing a law,’’ are obviously merely silly.)
I would be right ina minority conclusion in the long run if the
conclusion is right; for then others would have time to hear
of it, discuss it, verify it, and acquire skill applying it, and it
would then, after a time, be a majority conclusion (even if J
didn’t formulate it, the universe would shortly pound it thus
into people via somebody else). In short, education
has to come in as a relationship between me as a minority in-
dividual in regard to some minor views of mine (and every-
body is in some respects similarly in the minority), and the
majority, before any improvement in precision of balance, or
“‘advance,’’ will work. And then, the majority move ahead
together. The majority...(<-Education—>)The individual or
minority... Democracy, or a Republic.

]. So I as an individual may be emphatic in this book at
times—be “‘individualistic’’—in stating my occasional slight
minority conclusion. But I obviously am not “‘fighting’’ the
majority, or considering them ‘“wrong’’; nor do] feel any
resentment if they do not instantly agree with me. In fact,
it literally would be deadly dull for the majority and for me
if we did agree completely: I enjoy the reaction or formal
opposition in the mere quantitative matters in which we vary,
and I am not in the least ‘“polemical,’’ or impatient, or try-
ing to impose Kultur on anybody. So from a broad basic
view, J am not particularly disturbed if you have not got
sense enough to see that I am right; I will even take your
point of view occasionally and agree that it is perhaps I who
lack the sense. And that shows how it is that only
in a democracy can there be rather intense individualism: it
is not a paradox, but simply the circularity of the demo-
cratic equation in valid logic. The majority is always
right at the time. And truistically the majority judgment is
always wrong when a considerable period of time is included,
as things change. And of course a minority of one theoreti-
cally always perceives first such change as in fact exists. But
usually the minority of one who thinks he perceives a change
is mistaken—or even if he isn’t, noisily exaggerates the size
of the change. So you must ask minorities for clear progf.

m. And the majority is credited with hitting a head that
sticks or stretches up above the crowd. As a practical work-
ing rule in the past, it was advisable. Possibly we may now
safely make a distinction. I admittedly stretch up above the
crowd to or in a few little minority conclusions (some will say
the admission exaggerates the facts: I] am consciously exag-
gerating here for verbal clearness). | But with just as much
emphasis as that with which I stick my head up, I keep my
feet on the base, and promptly pull my head down and ask
the majority to stick their heads up and verify what I saw,
assuring them that the view is pleasing and that nothing there
will hurt a moderately vigorous person (of course some timid
stick-in-the-muds will call mea liar, as R. S. Woodward in
clear effect did for several months; and numbers of rubber-
stamps will say to get somebody else to do it first, as in effect
Stewart Paton, W. W. Campbell, ete., did tell me). It is a
reciprocal game—the democratic game. ‘To change the fig-
ure:- you hold me up to see, and I tell you where to look,
and hold you up to see. You held me up first, unconsciously
to yourself, and now I have simply come down and offered to
hold you. AsI said, that democratic game may be a safe
game to play now, but I have indicated some men who in
effect didn’t think so. All the aristocrats, bosses, °‘authori-
ties,’’ demagogs, have pretended to jump up off the ‘‘com-
mon’’ earth, and stay up, above the “‘herd’’ or majority,

§171m XVIII Three

“‘superior’’ to them; or else those pluralists had a trifle more
sense and recognized that the “*herd’’ was holding them up,
and asserted that they were privileged or divinely appointed to
be held up all the time—that it was essential that they be,—
whereas it obviously was merely quantitative. So the major-
ity cracked their heads as a practical] solution.

CHAPTER XIX. Sociology and economics.

S172. a. The theory or principles of democracy (§8167-
170) is the theory of sociology :- simply that all society, re-
gardless of how it is considered divided into parts, reacts as
our general machine That... X This.... As noticed, the only
difference between ethics and sociology is the quantitative
one that sociology includes the consideration of as many peo-
ple as we care to mention, distributed over as wide L and T
as we like; whereas ethics is tacitly taken to be more re-
stricted, and hence tends to be confined largely to our own
selves. Truistically, itis not essential that ethics and sociolo-
gy consider only persons, and in practice they do not strictly
do so, but confine themselves mostly to persons, thus being
an extension or application of psychology. | When those
sciences are explicitly quantitatively extended to include some
of the environment, often under the technical name wealth
(including money, property, etc.), they are called econonzics.

b. We have seen (chiefly in 8168b) that ethics, sociology,
and economics may be represented by suitably selecting
names out of this extended equation:- That, or Neighbor,
Spouse, Others, Environment, Climate, Employers, Capital, or
Supply... This, or Ourself, Certain given men, Employes, La-
bor, or Demand.,..—Meaning, Happiness, God, Real Life, Co-
operation, Democracy, Society, Industry, Commerce. And for
the X or relationship sign we may substitute these relation-
ship names in various conventional ways:- activity for
(<Activity—); see S168b], action-reaction, cause-effect,
love, payment or labor-wages, or payment in any material or
spiritual way, loyalty, education, etc.

ce. SoI necessarily gave the principles of sociology and
economics inthe last chapter, in giving ethics. The quantita-
tive, Many application of them, if it were given in enough
detail to include rather useful everyday facts, would extend
to volumes, and must be omitted at this point. And I must
omit reference to important facts about existing foreign gov-
ernments, etc. '”* So I shall merely show in principle and

172e The explicit reason for doing so is that I am a retired lieuten-
ant in the Navy, and Federal law limits my speech in ccrtain matters
(see ‘‘Navy Regulations, 1920,’’ issued in accordance with Sec. 1547
of Rev. Statutes of U. S., by the last administration, Arts. 113, 100,
ete.). The last manuscript version of this book was written under
that Wilson gag law, which was in keeping with his make-believe
‘pitiless publicity,’’ and I had to make some queer looking omissions
in order to conform to the law. But the new administration substan-
tially abolished that gag law in a general order, June 14, 721. The
only restrictions I can find in the law now that affect this book is
that I] am not permitted to comment on our foreign policy (I conldn’t
have done so anyway, as nobody has confided it to me; but I have
refrained from guessing what it may be); that I am not permitted to
comment on foreign governments; and that I am forbidden to praise
or censure other persons in the Navy. I had no desire to censure any-
body in the Navy at present (Wilson, the late commander-in-chief,
is no longer in the Navy); so the law bas cut out some specfiic
praise. 1 have had to dodge mentioning foreign governments:
nothing in this book is iotended to refer to any existing foreign na-
tion or government, except insofar as such is merely remotely and
unspecifically implied as a naturally inseparable part of the uni-
verse. That of course makes odd blanks. And there are traces in
the book, which I haven’t succeeded in revising out, of obedience to
the Wilson gag. [I once wrote a version which declined to obey the
Wilson gag as unconstitutional. But it later scemed better taste to
obey it (i. e., al American citizens were responsible for the law, and

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232

scientifically that the Constitution of the Uuited States is a
general valid statement of democracy, and is substantially in
agreement with natural law, and then make a few general
further applications of sociology and economics.

S173. a. The total Constitution is an explicit assertion
of a That... X This... Many machine, or democracy—as we
now begin to see. The preamble repeats in six conventional]
ways that the total purpose is to establish explicitly a relation-
ship, or love, or a mutually reacting machine. I. e., the
preamble explicitly names the X sign as being six conven-
tional names (all of which are implied to be identical [§2s8h]
by the first):- (1) The preamble names the X sign as being
“more perfect union’’; the body of the Constitution gives
the conventional names of the That...’s and This...’s, and
the preamble primarily asserts :- That...(<-Forming un-
ion—>)This...—=Union, or United States. The preamble thus,
by the use of the phrase ‘more perfect’’ troubles grammar-
ians, but soundly implies the infinite regress. The Declaration
of Independence with bombast and cock-sureness ignores that
infinite regress. (2) Then the preamble states that
the Constitution is to establish justice. That is the legal or
juridical term for balance or temperance between all That’s
and This’s; justice means reciprocal love or paymeni:- That...
(< Justice, or Payment, elc. >) This... . (3) The next
synonym forthe universal relationship which gives democracy
is ‘‘domestic tranquillity.’’ That, even more explicitly than
*“justice,’’ asserts that no painfu) departure from the halance
is desired—that no fanatical, radical], pathological activities
or persons of that sort are desired. That is a purpose clearly
in full consistency with the ethical principles that oppose all
aristocracy or excess. (4) Then the Constitution is
to ‘‘ provide for the common defense.’’ That obvivusly recog-
nizes the possibility that other nations may (unlawfully, in a
“‘natural’’ sense; i. e., in some degree insanely) try to de-
part from a natural, mutually self-preserving balance with
this nation, and hence in a dualistic, wrong fashion, aggress.
(A formal, legal, logica] establishment of the correctness of
this part of the Constitution is omitted here; footnote 172c).
Then, if there is such aggression, the language clearly pro-
vides that this nation may defend itself. We saw (§164d)
that that is fundamentally moral, or in agreement with nat-
ural Jaw. But the Constitution does not in any place provide for
aggressive war; therefore, as aggressive war is national aris-
tocracy or insanity in some degree, it is unconstitutiona] to
declare any but a defensive war—which truistically is a war
against an aristocratic nation which perceptibly attacks us
first. ‘The next paragraph is a parenthetical one which con-
siders that, and its implications (which are of importance).
(5) Next, the preamble purposes to ‘‘promote the
general welfare.’’ That is an assertion that the people in
general are to ‘“‘progress,’’ or to become more and more civi-
lized. It obviously explicitly asserts as a purpose of the Con-
stitution al] the remaining natura] ethical laws stated in the
last chapter. (6) Finally, it purposes to ‘‘secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.’’ That is
a sort of One summation of all the other purposes, as liberty
or freedom is usually a monistic term (S169). So it
follows that the Constitution (if its body adheres to the prin-
ciples laid down in the preamble—as we shall see it does) is

I could scarcely be courteous to the reader and flatly decline to obey
his wishes, as expressed by his Icgal representatives; so in the later
version I made that null-law ridiculous by temperately obeying it).
The present law seems to me sound—but if I were to say it is needed
I would unfortunately imply that there were foreign governments so
aristocratic as to be unbalancedly touchy (§169h), even to the re-
marks of an insignificant individual like me: so I refrain from even
the non-particnlarized remote implication that socha government or
people may now exist.

233

with extraordinary completeness and explicitness based upon
and in agreement with natura] law. I know of no other ex-
plicitly stated legal law which bas such completeness and
definiteness of statement. In fact, as shown in the next para-
sraph, the Constitution is naturally valid Jaw which not even
yet, after over 130 years, is followed in its principles by law-
yers in their pseudo science of the law, which adheres to
the classic logic and dualism and is wrong.

b. <A positive legal or statute or lawyers’ law is, accord-
ing to the lawyers (““Ency. Brit.,’’ Art. ““Jurisprudence’’),
a command or order ‘‘set by a sovereign [or superior] person,
or sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the
independent political society wherein that person or body is
sovereign or superior.’’ Al] rules or natural laws or princi-
ples which are set and followed by men living in a state of
nature [i. ¢., without a ‘‘sovereign’’], or which are set by
“equal sovereigns’’ [i. e., all international law], and all those
rules in a state with such a superior but which rules are not
explicitly ordered by the superior, are themselves not laws in
that Jawyers’ sense, but are or accompany anarchy (ibid., p.
572). So truistically, orthodoxly the Jawyer’s law, and his
so-called science of the Jaw, is logically a step by step, prem-
ise on premise, affair that proceeds in only one direction—is
classic, dualistic logic in legal terms,—that can not consider
or formally admit mutual] interaction, or any real science of
action and reaction, or any democracy, or be finally circular
and actually proyable like valid logic. The lawyers’ law
requires a superior, an aristocrat, and denies that a state of
natural interaction or democracy or That... * This... can be
law, but explicitly asserts that it is anarchy, or an absence of
positive lawyers’ law. It therefore is obvious by this
whole book that that strict theory of lawyers’ law is wrong;
that it is flatly contrary to the Constitution and to al] true
rights and morals; and ts unconstitutional for this country. So
truistically alawyer by his legal theory is incapable of correctly
interpreting the Constitution, and in general is not competent
to interpret any Jaw validly. For, in keeping with that legal
theory, strict lawyers must bold that if there is a doubt as to
what a Jaw (or also the juridical acceptation of a custom or
practice——a “fscommon Jaw’’) means in a given case, the
doubt must be settled (1) by a careful and strict investigation
and interpretation of the wording of the law; and failing that
solution the doubt must be settled (2) by interpreting the
law as having the intended meaning of its promulgators, as
historically given. In short, strict lawyers recognize only
the superior sovereign, and attach infallibility to his (their)
word or presumptive word. But it is obvious by this whole
book that such logical or juridical infallibility is impossible:
no word can be given an exact meaning, and all meanings of
words change witb time, and there is no possibility of histori-
eally determining exactly any intended meaning (in fact,
frequently the sovereign, instead of being superior, was ignor-
antly unaware of what he did mean). So the only rational
way to resolve a doubt as to the meaning of a law in a given
case where there is self-contradiction or omission, is to make
its meaning ‘‘balance,’’ or agree with natural law, in as close
agreement as possible with the wording of the lawyers’ law
(the judge should not be permitted to depart further than
that from the code, as such further departure constitutes that
pernicious juridical legislation for which the orthodox pseudo
theory, while exaggeratedly claiming the opposite, actually
serves as a cloak or make-believe; see footnote h:—and a
practical suggestion is obvious :- that the judge be required to
report clearly the omission or self-contradiction to the legis-
lature—that giving a method by which the judge and legis-
lator ean democratically work together if they have enough
intelligence, instead of often conflicting). I. e., interpret the

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Three XVIII §173b

defective law “‘reasonably,’’ and thus eliminate any impossible
and confusing hope of the infallibility of a non-reacting or
non-democratic ““sovereign.’’ Obviously no other practical
method of applying the law is actually possible. In legal
practice that law of “‘reason’’ actually is followed, as the un-
escapable laws of nature force at least its unconscious accept-
ance. Our investigation hence sums up into the simple rule
that it should be followed consciously and so with less bung-
ling and pettifogging.*“” So by natural] law or morality or
commonsense (and also by the plain statements of the Consti-
tution itself), the sum total of the Constitution provides for a
healthy, natural democracy, and implies that it is unconstitu-
tional to declare an aggressive war: and Amend. X, which

173b All that, as explicitly stated, gives the strictly orthodox legal
theory of jurisprudence. It hinges on the conception of sovereignty,
as seen. But that theory of law has been combated by the real
leaders in the law since prehistoric times (see Maine’s ‘“The Ancient
Law’’). The article ‘‘Jurisprudence’’ from which ] quoted the ortho-
dox theory acknowledges that legal struggle between explicit classic
logic and what is in effect our valid logic—between aristocracy and
democracy. Our Constitution, as we shall see in more detail, rejects
the orthodox classic theory of law. But Marshall, as an early chief
justice of our Supreme court, in some degree forced the aristocratic
pseudo theory upon lawyers (see footnote h, which also shows how
he was wrong and in disagreement with the Constitution). So it is
probably the quantitative fact that most lawyers in this country
weakly follow the arrogant and physiologically forceful but legally
and intellectually stupid Marshall, and accept that wrong legal theo-
ry. Of course, the able leaders in law have been in effect steadily
combating Marshall’s autocratic stupidities (Lincoln is quoted to
that effect in footnote h). But until a rigorous solution of the One
and Many was available the battle was indecisive: now there isn’t
any battle, and I shall merely read the burial service for Marshall
and his quibbling bullies. In practice, lawyers for ages have
to a very large extent openly followed our valid theory of law, and
our lawyers to a considerable extent practicaily accept and apply the
Constitution. | We proceed to see the historical facts in proof. Sir
Henry Maine is a reliable authority on such facts, his ‘‘Ancient
Law’’ from which I shall quote being accepted by most lawyers
(some of course being too stupid to see what he was talking about).
Maine tried to enunciate the principle of ‘‘reason,’’ or valid logic, or
of our constitutional cooperating-sovereignty, as being the theory of
law, and did make considerable success of the attempt; bnt as we
just implicitly saw, the ‘‘Ency. Brit,’’ holds that technically he
failed. But our leaders in law in effect accept Maine’s valid theory.
Maine shows that what is technically called ‘tequity’’ |etymo-
logically that part of the law which deals with actual justice, the re-
maining part, or “‘law,’’ consisting of mere classic logical quibblings]
began to be formulated in earliest history on the laws of nature, or
justice, or commonsense valid logic, as a relief from the obvious in-
justices, delays, and stupidities of the classic logic law, which were
far worse then than now. Maine (ibid., Chap. II) defines equity (in
part) as having its authority grounded, not on any lawyer’s ‘‘sover-
eign,’’ but on the nature of the principles to which it is alleged that
all law ought to conform [i. v., it ought to be sensible, ‘balanced’ J.
It has a higher sacredness [legal sanction] than that of ordinary law.
Maine says (I]]):- ‘‘The progress of the Romans in legal improve-
ments was astonishingly rapid as soon as the stimulus was applied to
it by the theory of Natural Law.’’ —-—— Thus it appears that 1 am
saying nothing new, but am showing the valid theory of the law that
lawyers themselves largely practice and tacitly accept. Of course,
as a truism, if there hadn’t been mostly truth and validity in what
lawyers actually did, in contradiction to their mere talk, long ago
there would have ceased to be any lawyers. Soin spite of the em-
phatic clearness with which ] state the sound theory of the law in
this section, ] am not radical—am not trying to ‘‘reform’’ law. 1
merely suggest that in practice it would help them to stop wasting
time and effort if lawyers would preach what they frequently pract-
ice—if they would consciously (intellectually; in theory) accept the
Constitution: because natural] law will make them in effect accept it
anyway. Such acceptance would make jurisprudence actually a
science, so that a man could then safely engage in the study of law
without danger of debanching his intellect—debauching it so thor-
oughly that, according to the legal authorities quoted (§163¢), it
often debauches his morals (which include emotions). Such valid
jurisprudence, except for the mere suggestions of this section, must
be omitted from this book; buta number of legal leaders have the
competence to formulate that science:- e.g., Taft, Hughes, Pepper.

§173b XIX Three

reserves to the people powers not delegated to the govern-
ment, explicitly makes it legally unconstitutional for anybody
but the people to declare an aggressive war. The first im-
portant need for that consistent interpretation of the Con-
stitution is:- to announce to everybody that as a nation we
will be democratic, and not aristocratic and predatory (the
advantages of which are implied below), and definitely and
explicitly to make our armament a police force (which solves
rigorously the fundamental question in the problem of dis-
armament, the remainder of that problem obviously being a
never-ending quantitative one ; §176ef). The second
and last important need for sucha consistent interpretation is
fundamentally the same as the first:- the destruction of the
aristocratic, dualistic delusion that there can be a superior,
capricious sovereign. This consistent interpretation is a gen-
eral concrete destruction of the conventional theory of uncon-
stitutional lawyers’ Jaw, showing constructively that the
constitutional or legally sound theory of law, as well as the
naturally sound theory, is that the people themselves spoke
and speak the law to themselves. Specifically, that constitu-
tional point of view obviously abolishes all orthodox LEGAL sANC-
tions, or -evils’’ (ibid., 576) that in orthodox law follow on
the refusal of an inferior to [essentially] obey the superior.
Those sanctions are truistically a tertium quid or a logical
link (§§23-4) invented (in a really impossible way) out of
nothing, to make an otherwise glaringly unworkable theory
of law seem to weakly-seeing people to work. Of course
those sanctions could make an infinite pluralism that is form-
ally valid (Part One); but the actual practice of the lawyers
is that it is assumed to begin with (and it is a libel against
the race—and reacts somewhat on the lawyers themselves,
making them into what they say others are, 8163¢), that
humans do not want to obey the laws and have to be forced
to do so, and have evils or sanctions threatened them. Sanc-
tions are the lawyers’ holy things or idols, like the theolo-
gians’ dualistic God (see also par. c). So ‘’sanctions’’
give a negative, repulsion way of founding law. The nega-
tive way is the best first way (Index, “‘Negative’’), and is
quantitatively useful with barbarians and present defectives:
Moses used the negative way, and most lawyers have not
been able to improve on Moses. The Constitution does.

ce. The Constitution baving thus effected in an extraor-
dinarily able way which is perhaps but slightly appreciated,
a complete and valid reversal of orthodox lawyers’ law in its
preamble—having made in it a succinct statement of valid
natural Jaw,—the preamble was followed by the body of the
Constitution, in which the various reactions or reacting parts
are definitely named. As that was a Many or quantitative
procedure obviously it can never be exactly perfect. And
that practical existence of the infinite regress, or of the fact
that there can be no exact science, was provided for in three
explicit ways (which indicates the framers’ practical recogni-
tion of the importance of the principle) :- (1) Art. V al-
lows amendments. (2) Amend. I provides free speech,
and specifically freedom to assemble peaceably and criticize
the government and talk back to it. That obviously means
that nobody in the democratic nation was to be assumed to
be infallible, or essentially superior, even officially, or to be
so superiorily wise that he could safely do without interaction
with his fellows. It also means that the founders of our na-
tion were not afraid of adverse criticism—that they were snf-
ficiently men to have the courage to take it, however much
they humanly disliked it—were sufficiently past the infantile
stage of mind growth to be aware that they sometimes made
mistakes and could be helped by criticism, and were strong
enough themselves to tolerate tranquilly the intemperate
speech of the few inevitable unfortunate defectives—in short,

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934

were cognizant of the advantages of free speech and strong
enough to pay the price for them. (3) The Constitution
chiefly is concerned in specifying the acts permitted to the
government, in the formula People... < Government..., Govern-
ment... (or more precisely Government officials...: government
of course constitutionally includes people; but I verbally gen-
erally use that conventional abbreviation) —Government... be-
ing the intensive factor and truistically most emphatically
and explicitly talked of. But Amend. IX (‘‘the enumeration
in the Constitution of certain rights [of the people] shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple’’) explicitly provides for that customary and necessary
verbal vagueness, and allows the regress in People... . We
saw in the second sentence in par. ) that lawyers assert that
such natural rights or ordinary laws of nature are not laws in
a Jegal sense, but are anarchy. The Constitution here con-
tradicts (or legally abolishes, if that face-saving phrase is pre-
ferred) that barbarous legal pseudo principle. So if this
Amendment means anything that is recognizably consistent
with the ordinary meaning of the words it uses, it means that
the rule of reason is to be used, and that the orthodox legal
**procedure,’” stinking of sanctions, is interdicted.

d. The remainder of the Constitution names the various
practical This’s and That’s which must be definitely put to-
gether as a machine in order to achieve the Constitution’ s
general purpose of obtaining a democracy, or general That...
<< This... The Constitution merely keeps on at that process
until it becomes reasonably certain (for the time being, at
least) that no clever exploiter or legal grafter, or other species
of defective, can find a verbal or ‘legally’? uninterdicted op-
portunity to run some That or This far out of balance (with-
out check other than the natural limit). But as direct
evidence that it is not practically possible to rule by fiat, we
just saw that the sweeping interdiction or ‘‘aw’’ enunciated
by Amend. IX against the pseudo legal theory and procedure
has not yet worked, after over 130 years, because the major-
ity of the people have not insisted that it be definitely com-
plied with. So there is no magic in the Constitution, even
though it is an extraordinarily valid statement of democracy,
to make it work unless people want it to and themselves do it.
But the Constitution as at first written and amended
seriously failed to be sufficiently explicit in providing such a
balance, in that it did not definitely assert that there could
be no (legally) fixed classes, such as ‘‘superior’’ owners and
their slaves. That defect, in view of the fact that some slave
owners insisted on being essentially aristocratic, inevitably
brought on the Civil war, as such fixed class distinction was
not only naturally immoral, but was in direct violation of the
stated democracy or varying That... <This.... That war
corrected the deficiency, which truistically would not have
caused war, but would merely have produced an agreed-upon
amendment when the point was called into question if the
rule of reason, and not the lawyers’ dualistic procedure, had
been followed. (Of course, numerous sorts of exploiters sup-
ported the lawyers in their short-sighted procedure [par. f];
they still do—as otherwise such silly verbal quibbling could
not last. Please do not understand me to fancy that lawyers
unsupported could maintain such a monstrous barbarism as
their unconstitutional theory of the law. Also, a lawyer
has to deal almost invariably with defectives who don’t admit
defectiveness | with criminals who more or less can’t, and with
litigants who are usually so angry as to have judgment so de-
fective as to want to fight, which strictly speaking makes
them out-laws or mildly insane by the Constitution]; so the
lawyer has an enormously difficult job to handle his clients
and not become like them, with a fighting or unconstitutional
procedure. A physician’s patients admit defectiveness; yet

235

he has trouble avoiding the acknowledged danger of becoming
like them. The dyer’s hand, etc.) Similarly, the
Constitution does not now with complete explicitness assert a
perfect balancing; it is impossible that it do so in a finite
time, as such would require the complete assertion of the in-
finite regress. Several possibilities of further explicit balanc-
ing by further amendments are sometimes suggested :- e. g.,
one allowing Federal divorce laws; and one definitely for-
bidding willing of wealth unearned by the legatee, as such
bequests arbitrarily disturb the natural balance, and also fail
glaringly to give people equal natural opportunities. But,
truistically, 7f we follow the rule of reason, and the Constitu-
tion’s own explicit general enactment of such a balance, we
can never have another civil war. (And personally, I think
we would better add amendments very sparingly; if we
haven’t got sense enough to get along by legislating under a
reasonably steady basic Jaw requiring us to keep balanced,
we aren’t likely to acquire sense in the process of making a
jellyfish of it.) But, e. g., atany time that the lawyers
and their exploiting supporters undertake to uphold persist-
ently (cf. §169d) the orthodox, unconstitutional legal theory
of law, we truistically sooner or later shall inevitably come
into another civil war. The Constitution as a statement of law
is valid and natural law (the best rules and instructions yet
made, for the biggest game ever played, and of interest to
those who can understand them—we are all in the game);
but even that soundness can not of itself mend deficiencies in
men’s nerves or souls. Our own dynamic daily majority use
of the principle of the Constitution makes it work, and keeps
us out of civil war and lesser troubles.

e. We need not here notice all the That’s and This’s
balanced by the Constitution. I shall state the chief balances
as being enough to give the general principles of its practical
workings. The chief balance is in providing for the
election of the important government officials more or less
directly by the people, with lémited time of service in the cases
needing it (par. h), and explicit means of removal in al]
cases:- there was definitely established, with explicit LZ and
T measures, the formula People... < Government.... That
explicit mutual control or interaction of people and arbitrary
Many government (ot the absolutely sovereign government
of the dualistic lawyers’ law) obviously formally, and legally
in a constitutional sense even if not in a lawyers’ sense, re-
moved all fixed, aristocratic governing classes—eliminating
orthodox sanctions, fiats of superiors, ete. Tbe places of
power were limited in time, so that even if their incumbents
went power-mad, they would automatically shortly be re-
moved, before their power-mania had time enough to grow
much or do much harm. ‘That principle of time measure is
an exceedingly important one in practice, and might profit-
ably have a volume devoted to it. Anyone will go power-
mad if given a little more power tban bis character or nerves
can stand (81681); similarly anybody will go insane if given
enough food so that the excess poisons him enough (nature
often kills completely in that case before the insanity is long
apparent). Power does not usually kill quickly, and many
men are seen in places too large for them fattened or swollen
up with pride, ‘‘dignity,’’ and various sorts of queer and
sometimes dangerous unbalances. (Such ‘swelled heads
occur in business; but they rapidly kill the business.) Any
excess, all prosperity, will unbalance a man if it measures a
little more than his particular endurance. Prosperity and
poverty are perceptible departures from the balance. They
make a man strongerif they do not pass into his painful zone
(Fig. 163b). But if they just pass into tbat zone they ac-
cumulate a fatigue or poisoning, and truistically destroy the
man if not removed soon enough. A little power thus always

UNIVERSE

Three XIX §173f

makes a little, weak man show himself to be such by making
him perceptibly unbalanced or ridiculous. Usually he begins
to show it by being ““dignified’’ and pompous (like many men
who have similarly slightly poisoned their nervous systems
with alcohol); then he becomes either too secretive, or too
talkative—usually mostly the first, although there is often a
cyclic rotation of the two, as in the case of Wilson. After
that the symptoms are very variable, approaching paranoia
and similar insanities. The “‘newly rich’’ are over-prosperous
in money. We can observe power-madness in many
different people. The healthy young have a normal physio-
logical cockiness, with a belief that they could handle some
big job without going mad; _ but if we are older we doubt if
we are big enough to take Lincoln’s job and stand quite
steady although we may not be afraid to try. So the Con-
stitution sets a time limit on power, to save us and to save
the man given official power.

f. The next balance in the Constitution is the abolish-
ment among the people of all fixed classes (i. e., those with-
out a time limit—in full agreement with the natural law that
there are no physical constants), by interdicting titles of no-
bility (Art. I, SIX, 8; §X, 1). That makes an always variable
or natura] balance:~ Other men... <Any given man.... The
same sort of balance is further obviously explicitly extended
inside our nation by more or less prohibiting bills of attainder,
the suspension of habeas corpus, ex post facto laws, internal
tariffs, and all internal privileges or ““preferences’’ (Art. I,
§S1X,X; Art. IV). Then, in further explicit assertion that
the ‘‘rights’’ or dots of Other men... (or Bodies of other men...
or States..., as contrasted with the intensive factor Govern-
ment...) could not be fully stated in those internal balancings,
Amend. X (‘‘The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people’’) sup-
plies that explicit statement, and clearly and definitely makes
our formula for al] the people, zncluding government:- States,
or other people... X Government, or given people...—Unton, or
Democracy, or Republic. Obviously, there is a beautiful nat-
ural validity, and definiteness, about that general internal bal-
ance. ———- We may note the illuminating fact that as soon
as there arose a dispute over the right to have the dualistic,
fixed classes, owners and slaves, that dispute as to balances
would be identically or synonymously expressed by putting
it into any other That... This... form. The first form that
is wider than Slaves... >< Owners... is States... < Government...
(named “‘states’ rights’’). The problem of plain slavery was
too easy to solve if kept in the simple buman terms Slaves...
Owners...: many aristocrats could not blind themselves to
the fact that there were not many perceptible *“blessings of
liberty’’ for tbe slaves. | So those exploiters evaded in tbe
age-old way—putting the problem into larger or wider terms
to confuse the issue, and in some degree to hide their own
wrongness from themselves (a sort of reverse make believe).
(I speak with no animus against former slave owners, but
sympathetically give simply the obvious facts: my own fam-
ily on both sides lost their slaves by the Civil war.) Clearly
the problem of slaves and the problem of states’ rights are
identical in principle. To assert that states have a right to
withdraw from the union is equivalent to asserting that there
exists a right for men to try to separate and hecome fixedly
apart, just as slaves and owner are (nominally ; but impossibly
in fact). Such an assertion is also in direct contradiction of
the contract made in the Constitution, which requires the as-
sentof both parties to terminate. No such assertion will ever
be true (except ina quantitative sense, when men degenerate
and are quantitatively unable to hold together in as large a
union as now; cf. 8176). Always exploiters will try to put

§173f XIX Three

that same simple principle of the Constitution—balanced co-
operation—into wider terms. But with a rigorous solution of
the One and Many we shall be very stupid if we get confused
and exploited. Quite often in history the Monroe doctrine
has been given an imperialistic, aristocratic interpretation by
the dualists; but as the reader may readily see that by writing
a few formulas we will not go intoit; also, see footnote I172c.

g. The Constitution thus made first a balance between
government officials and the remainder of the people; and
then a balance between all the parts into which the people
were arbitrarily or conveniently divided. In short, it explic-
itly abolished privilege, or aristocracy, or unearned power or
other unearned perquisites. And it did not do that in any
sweet, sentimental, vague way: it got right down to definite
measures, to L and T science, to ““brass tacks,’’ with such
precision that it worked pretty well. The Constitution is
science of the highest order. And as it was made by the
whole people it is another indication of the fact that the im-
portant average or majority judgments of men are sound.

h. Then the Constitution proceeds to the details of the
government officials. It makes a balance of executive and
of legislative branches, relating them by the judiciary, thus :-
Legislature...(<-Judiciary, or Jurisprudence— )Executive...=
Government. The Constitution, in the absence of its makers’
specific knowledge as to relationship terms, is a trifle vague
verbally or formally as to the judiciary; but it obviously as-
serts that formula, which implies all the sound principles.
The judiciary in reality has no power in the usual sense, but is
merely a connecting link or relationship that interprets, or
makes each branch ‘perceptible’ to the other. The judiciary
is the sociological governmental Holy Ghost (in wider sense,
‘“public opinion’’ is—represented mostly by the press). The
judiciary, having no power, is hence, so long as it attends to
its legitimate and constitutionally allowed business, and
keeps away from holding the lawyers’ law, truistically in no
danger of becoming power-mad; so with implicit recognition
of that, the framers did not put a definite time limit on the
terms of judges. Obviously, the business of the judiciary
is to say what is truth; the truth has what is commonly ac-
cepted as one form of power, that of “‘prevailing’’—i. e.,
of simply being, or existing:- as the ultimate relationship of
identity (§28bh). The press has ““power’’ only as it tells
the truth. The judiciary and the writers as such truistically
have no power: insofar as they are diligent in finding truth
and honest and skillful and courageous in giving it to others
they are good workmen and deserve high payment—aznd that
pay which is then theirs to spend is their power. but, as we
see below, by unconstitutional lawyers’ law the judiciary is
the agent of a superior sovereign, andas such has power (both
delegated power, which ultimately is the only sort anybody
can have, and the nominally first-hand power of in effect leg-
islating). If the lawyers do not agree that all that is
true, then they automatically assert that the Judiciary should
be given a term limited in time or else terminable at will
without cause by the sovereign (and they also automatically
assert that their job is not to find the truth and state it, etc.).
I am quite aware that Marshall in effect disagreed with the
view that the judiciary has no actual power constitutionally ;
by so doing he proved himself a poor thinker and incompe-
tent judge. To give crucial evidence of Marshall’s errors :-
He (together with the notoriously aristocratic imperialist
Hamilton) held that a state is sovereign in a lawyers’ dual-
istic sense, and can not be sued without its consent (Bryce,
‘““American Commonwealth,’’ New York, 1908, p. 235).
That view truistically makes the judiciary the agent of the
sovereign and thus gives it power (which as a matter of hist-
tory and common law—which common law the Constitution

UNIVERSE

236

in direct effect enunciates as law—was long ago in England
forcibly taken away from the judiciary). And
in general proof of all that, in direct legal terms, the Su-
preme court, before Marshall was on it, with ordinary com-
monsense and reason, decided that the Constitution did not
hold a state to be thus sovereign (Bryce, ibid., 235). Asa
result of that, and probably of Marshall’s and the lawyers’
and exploiters’ dualistic views, Amend. XI was added in 1798
(‘the judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or
prosecuted against any one of the United States, by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
State’). By that states have in practice repudiated their
debts, and otherwise acted as a capricious ‘‘sovereign’’ in an
immoral and unbusiness-like way—like a robber baron, or
a dead-beat kaiser or panper. According to its practical and
to its customary legal interpretation, that Amendment is the
one blot or error in the Constitution. By the Constitution
(strictly interpreted: see below), and by all natural law, no
state is absolutely sovereign; neither is the Federal govern-
ment; and so constitutionally all are liable for damages for any
mistakes, and subject to suits. (To admit that would be simple

17h That interpretation (that he considered the judiciary the
agent of the ‘‘sovereign’’) is the most charitable opinion to take of
Marshall’s views; and J have adopted it because I haven’t bothered
to read munch of Marshall’s autocratic dictums. J am inclined to be-
lieve that the historic fact is that Marshall was much more unintelli-
gent and irresponsibly lacking in knowledge of jurisprudence and its
history than that mild opinion indicates. I am inclined to think that
he was, with customary irresponsible, aristocratic power-madness,
trying to make the judiciary into the orthodox lawyers’ ‘‘sover-
eign.’’ And that seems to be the customary view of Marshall’s ex-
ploits. That ‘‘sovereign’’ status of the judiciary was historically
nearly an invariable phenomenon in all races of the Western world,
where aristocracies which claimed to be the depositary and adminis-
trators of the law sncceed ‘‘sacred’’ kings (we call that the buying
np and capturing of the courts by the rich). And they all regularly
failed to work and broke down (Maine, ‘‘An. Law,’’ I), the people
demanding that the law be written in codes. And that dualistic and
naturally unworkable pseudo judiciary is explicitly provided against
in the Constitutiuion, which gives the legislature the duty of enunci-
ating laws (so that it is none of the judiciary’s business to legislate),
and the executive the duty of examining them and sending them
back for reconsideration (if thonght needed), and of executing them.
So obviously, all that is left for the judiciary to do is to discover and
state the truth (so far as it can) regarding those varions matters (un-
fortunately, the Constitution speaks of judicial ‘‘power’’; but obvi-
ously, no meaning other than ‘duty to speak truth’ can consistently
be got from that carelessly used word). Marshall could have
discovered that legal history if he had tried; and a trifle of intelli-
gence would have made it clear to him that this present statement
of the nature of the judiciary as a truth-stater is the constitutional
one. But actually Marshall wasn’t a judge at all: he was a grabber
after power—essentially a robber baron, a kaiser, a bar-room bully.
So by direct implication—by directly assigning the power
elsewhere,—the Constitution prohibits the judiciary (practically, the
Supreme court) from issuing any binding or compulsory interpreta-
tion or fiat as to a law’s constitutionality. The judiciary can merely
try to show the congress and executive that a given law contradicts
the Constitution in principle, if it thinks the law does. As we have
seen, any matter of principle can be shown rigorously, and so clearly
that a child can see it. So if the jndiciary can not show congress
and the executive that the Jaw is wrong, and have them repudiate it
of their volition, then the law isa law. (Of course, if there is a fre-
quent conflict of opinion in such matters, and recalcitration, the gov-
ernment would come to a standstill; but the practical solntion is
obviously for the people to throw out all its officials, inclnding im-
peaching the Supreme court, and get some representatives who
haven’t gone power-mad.) Lincoln clearly saw the substance
of all that, and stated it at his first inangural (quoted in J. T. Rich-
ards’s ‘‘Abraham Lincoln, the Lawyer-Statesman,’’ 170):- ‘‘If the
policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole
people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court
*** the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to
that extent resigned their government into the hands of that emi-
nent tribunal.”’

237 UNIVERSE

good business and elementary morality and constitutional
law.) Now, by referring to the wording of that Amendment
it is at once obvious that the aristocrats did not state openly
or definitely what they apparently were trying to get:- the
legal right for a state, as absolute sovereign, to repudiate,
shirk, any of its acts or contracts (the Constitution repeatedly
interdicts that lawyers’ pseudo principle that ““the king can
do no wrong,’’ or the pope is infallible, ete.). The Amend-
ment does not give or state such a legal! right by its words,
but is merely a legal evasive statement of such probable in-
tention on the part of the grafters, but undoubtedly not the
intention of the majority the grafters pretended to represent.
So it is not necessary to repeal that Amendment, for it can
obviously be interpreted justly thus:- upon the request to
the Federal government of any person who has been refused
redress by a state acting on that pseudo principle, the Fed-
eral government may, in strict accord with this Amendment,
and must, by the rest of the Constitution (and by all natural
law and morality), institute a new, separate, and distinct suit
of its own against the contract-breaking state for damages to
the public welfare, etc. By such good Constitutional law
those repudiating states would undergo on their own motion
a quick and permanent change of heart, and pay what they
still owe. Also, such practice would educate lawyers as to
what the Constitution both says and means.

i. The expansion of details of the last paragraph must
be omitted. We can merely note the most essential fact:-
that the Constitution explicitly provides a democratic or
balanced-cooperative government or organization of officials,
and not the line organization that we saw was flatly wrong in
principle (S§37f, 167). The next section implicitly shows the
meaning of that. Another important explicit agree-
ment of the Constitution with natural law is that Amend. XVI
allowing graded income taxes is a definite recognition of the
democratic or moral principle (§8167-8) that men are not
equa] in a quantitative sense. That same principle is obvi-
ously implicitly recognized by every definitely quantitative
statement in the Constitution. And that Amendment is ob-
viously also competent practically to stop inheritance of un-
earned wealth (§168mn), if a definite basic law is needed.

j. That makes the Constitution an enactment of al] nat-
ural law and moral Jaw—except perhaps it does not definitely
assert the morality of economy of time (although the whole
of it does promote economy of time, as is implied in the next
section), and except that Amend. XI is practically a blot
and should be eliminated.

$174. a. Many people hold that in practice democracy
or the Constitution does not work well. E. g., Faguet thinks
so, and gives such views emphatically (and what he fancies is
proof of them) in a book called ‘“The Cult of Incompetence’’
—his name for democracy. Many hold that the Prussian
autocratic type of organization gets things done, while democ-
racy can not—that democracy muddles along in a chuckle-
headed way, and wastes, and wastes, and wastes. We have
seen that theoretically autocracy, or the line or king or sanc-
tion type of organization is absolutely wrong and can not
possibly exist in reality. | For, autocracy requires theoreti-
cally an absolute superior to hand down orders without there
being areverse, equal reaction (“Theirs not to make reply’’).
Autocracy tries to go to infinity—claims in theory that it does.
Socialism goes in the opposite direction from autocracy—to
zero, in its impossible dualistic or equally aristocratic theory ;
i. e., (as we see in §175) it theoretically has nobody giving
orders (or as everybody is explicitly a government official,
the government is 0 or ©, just as we choose to say). Obvi-
ously, in a strict theoretical sense both socialism and autocracy
are impossible (Part One; specifically, Index, Increase of

Three XIX §174¢

entropy’’); and the two are essentially identical (as 0 and ~
logically are the same), merely going in opposite directions.
But if we take the two in a quantitative sense, as species of
actually existing organizations which therefore truistically do
not strictly go to those extreme limits that in a Many or act-
ual sense are impossible, then necessarily the two are merely
attempis to depart, in the two respective directions, from the
balance; see Figs. 104b, 163b. So both are persistent in-
temperances or aristocratic, and both are immoral and kill.
Democracy is obviously simply the temperate mean hetween
the two. We shall look at some of the practical details of that
very simple principle—that of That... This... or of Social-
ism...(<—Democratie reactions—)Autocracy... (cf. Fig. 104b).
A more or less autocratic ruler (no absolute one is pos-
sible) will usually get a thing done in a shorter time than a
democracy will (if he gets it done at all). But it is not done
so well or so completely. Ifhe keeps on for a while getting
the same thing done, its accumulated deficiencies in com-
pleteness of being done (in L, formally) will amount to its
not being done. Or, the autocracy will blow up, go to
pieces, change iuto another sort of structure (cf. recent hist-
ory; and change of structure in Part Two resulting from any
persistent accumulation of potential).

b. <A reasonable genera] conclusion is that those who
prefer, or fancy they prefer, having things done in a some-
what autocratic manner (we of course repudiate absolutely
the impossible absolute autocracy or line organization), are
those who tend to be somewhat impatient, and imagine that
they could do things a lot better than other people (they are
likely to take that “‘radical,’’ autocratic view if they have
never done very much themselves: young people and labor
leaders are much affected that way in practice, while often
verbally make-believing with opposite-direction socialism).
But al] of the conspicuons autocrats in history so far have
failed (gone power-mad and made quite a mess)—from Alex-
ander down to Wilson, who made an extraordinarily good
ruler for war, where an autocrat is needed.

ec. In democracy there is recognized a mutual natura]
(i. e., inevitable; see Part Two) interaction between parts of
the Many. When two people in a democracy thus cooperate
the first tells the second what he wants in the way of reac-
tion. As there is no exact science he can not possibly tell
the second just what he wants—he can not give an accurate
or completely intelligible order or ‘law.’ So, because the
second has a recognized right (legal and natural) to react, he
assimilates such part of the order as he can, and reacts with
(1) an ‘objection’ to such part of the order as he thinks is
unfitting (is not as accurate as he can make it, or thinks be
can), and with (2) a question as to what other parts of the
order mean, if he fails to understand them. Truistically,
every order must theoretically (because of the infinite regress)
have a part that is thus objectionable and a part unintellig-
ible. If we are dealing with a keen man he will definitely
perceive such two parts of each order: if we have a ‘thoroughly
disciplined’’ soldier of the docile Prussian type, whose busi-
ness is not to reason why,’’ then his mentality or soul or
nervous system has of course in some measure been destroyed
by that ““discipline,’’ so that he will take an order as being
“‘verfect’’—as coming from a divine-right superior. Then,
in our democracy, the first cooperating man after giving an
order considers the second’s objection and question, and re-
vises the order if desirable. And that action-reaction con-
tinues until doth are sufficiently intelligible to each other and
in agreement, to get the order done properly and well, to the
satisfaction ef both. It takes more time, of course. But the
two men are helping, each the other, to get the thing done
so that it satisfies both (so far as it was practicable for them

§174c XIX Three

to go along in the infinite regress), and so they both grow
and are conscious of living—are happy. On the con-
trary, an autocrat will in ‘“first class’’ militaristic fashion bark
his order at his theoretical slave (who in a “‘first class’’ line
organization is frequently definitely admonished not to think:-
all autocrats try to keep the ‘‘lower classes’ ignorant; e. g.,
the Catholic church used to bury people alive for reading the
Bible—‘‘Ency. Brit.,’’ xvii, 891). And then the slave very
promptly—‘‘on the jump’’—goes in an unthinking (i. e.,
more or less dead) way and does a poor job which he does not
understand or care for very much. Of course, an imbecile
or even a horse can excellently perform some few trivial or-
ders well—such as March! or Halt! Obviously, the longer
such orders are barked at the slave, the more stupidly he
performs them, and the more narrowed be becomes—except
for the occasional toughly enduring one who steadily dislikes
them. Also, the autocrat who barks them misses most of
the possibilities of learning from the other person: the auto-
erat does not have to think much (thinking is hard work; so
his order that the slave do not think is actually an order that
the slave do not by thinking force him—the autocrat—to
think:- ““theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and
die.’’? Finally the slave (perhaps in the third or fourth

174c Obviously, it is the work done under such autocratic or line
organization thatis the sort of work objected to by intelligent people.
Clearly, that sort of work is what has given ‘‘work’’ most of its bad
name; that sort can not be anything but painful and degenerating
and debasing if it accumulates enough. For its characteristic truis-
tically is that its need or use or place in the universe, or its relation-
ship, ¢s not perceptible to either the worker or the autocratic boss in
a sufficient degree. Usually the worker knows less about its wider
relationships than the boss; but the boss in turn knows less of its
minor and internal relations, so he is subject to the same drudg-
ery and discontent—as the inevitable result of not acquiring compe-
tence at the job by using the demoeratic way of learning it.
There is pleasure and joy in all work if its relationships (finally, its
religious character) are seen; it is a normal rebirth (§166e). So the
way to eliminate the sort of work which is objected to, and to elimi-
nate the demand for shorter hours and other labor tronbles, is (1) to
educate the employer (and his agents) to stop being antocratic, and
(2) to edueate the employe to stop being a more or less willing slave
who is too lazy to think and keep at thinking. Beeause of the infin-
ite regress that simple and obvious principle will never be perfectly
applied and we ean never finish trying to apply it better. I shall
give a few details of its present application:- Primarily, labor in
general are mentally children, compared with employers; their lead-
ers are usually men with very strong emotions and courage, but are
deplorably weak and untrained mentally and hence short-sighted,
and truistically unable to use any but autocratic methods themselves
(the top leaders are of course honest; but many of the lower ones are
too stupid intellectually to be honest). Ample evidence of all that,
and of other quantitative facts ] assert briefly here, is in the news-
papers, and reports of investigations, trials, army tests. The major-
ity in this country have tacitly long recognized that incapacity of
Jabor, and have treated them as a class something like minors (not a
jixed class: any laborer can leave the class in either direction sim-
ply by evidencing changed size; obviously, the whole Constitution
consists of dividing people into classes, into This... and That..., but
explicitly not into fired classes which disregard actual size or worth
of men). I.c., the majority substantially exempted labor from keep-
ing its contracts, from abstaining from conspiracies, and from keep-
ing the peace. Now labor has developed into a strong, overgrown
boy, and the majority are finding it necessary to class labor legally
more and more with adults—and labor, like most boys in that condi-
tion, is complaining, and demanding that people ‘‘stop pickin’ on

’’ Of course labor should still be granted some of the legal privi-

me.
leges and immunities granted to immature persons—but fewer, as
they in fact grow. The ‘‘one big union,’’ the 1. W. W., and
the ‘“‘closed shop’’ ideas are obviously the same:- an effort to make
labor sole dictators, autocrats, or the lawyers’ aristocratic ‘‘sover-
eign.’’ Of course it is wrong: but I rather think it better wisely to
‘‘ignore’’ the Jabor-children in that matter and let them wrestle with
that problem of autocracy themselves; the rank and file of labor are
suffering severely from the autocracy of their leaders, which natur-
ally gets worse in the degree in which they succeed in getting closed
shops, etc. Of course the rank and file should be shown what sort

UNIVERSE

238

generation) sees that he is being deprived of most mental
activity, and that there can be nothing worse to fear; so he
then fails entirely to obey the autocrat and kills him—and
usually take on the job of being autocrat himself. In the
previous process of carrying out the orders he has learned
more—the autocrat merely pushed the button, and truistic-
ally the longer he is an autocrat the more incompetent he
becomes. So even in that autocracy there actually is a re-
action. It is the final reaction of the slave’s killing the auto-
crat—in that violent way taking his turn at objecting and
questioning. After many such fatal cycles, in a steady cli-
mate both autocrat and slave learn to see better, and with
such mental growth learn the advantages of less violent ways
of getting things done. So obviously, in the autocracy in the
long run advance in doing things properly is slower than in
a democracy. But in an autocracy particular orders are exe-
cuted with far more speed (provided they are made trivial or
detailed enough—such as the orders for marching through
Belgium in ’steen volumes, none of which worked well), but
with steadily decreasing ‘“morale’’ or life or happiness or ef-
fectiveness. So in a democracy, if it is agreed, as in
the late war, that for a while it is imperative to get things
done quickly even though a bit poorly and unintelligibly,
then such autocratic barking will produce at once extra-
ordinarily effective results (and incidentally a large crop of the
power-mad, composed of men who have to be entrusted with
imitation money or authority). But obviously, that sort of
autocracy can not continue and produce good results; truis-
tically the incompetency would accumulate until the whole
thing blows up (e. g., the last election was the slaves’
present-day moderate way of eliminating the power-mad
Wilson, who ran a fine autocracy). An autocracy (also, a
socialism) is the sociological get-rich-quick scheme.

d. It is thus obvious that aristocrats—kings, military
autocrats, priests (with their identical-twin brothers:- soc-
ialists or savages; §175)—have been a necessary stage in the
growth of the race or advance in civilization. They violently
emphasized——at two extremes—that there was more life
when there was perceptible social organization (or division of
labor; 8170). So they proceeded to make classes, or divide
labur—probably back in the prehuman stage. Naturally
they did it violently, crudely, coarsely—by our standards;
but they were doing excellently by universal standards. And
that lumbering, slow-moving, nearly imperceptible, and us-
ually verbally denied democracy has, after a million or more
years, become our conscious democracy.

e. Ina democracy a thing can not be done to the com-
plete satisfaction of both parties to the reaction (par. c). The
democrat truistically has intelligence or “‘life’’ enough to see
that, and ‘object’ (we see the incompleteness of our actual

of power-mad baby-czars they are suffering: and legal measures
shonld be taken to see that employers who do not care for the closed
shop, and the public, are protected from the unions’ breaking the
peace; and that the unions keep their contracts. There should be
temperate, non-autocratic labor unions, of course. Some reasonably
strong organization of labor is needed by employers to keep them re-
minded of the fact that they must not be autocrats. 1 think the facts
are that most actual employers today are intelligent enough, and
have enough self-control, to act democratically—and do do so fairly
well themselves; the actual difficulty is that the larger ones have to
delegate much of their job to agents (managers, foremen, ete.), and
those agents haven’t the capacity to be democratic—and it is a huge
job to impart it to them. Finally, as employers are quantita-
tively superior in most of the characteristics that make a man valu-
able in industry, then by the principles of genius ($164db), or free
speech (§169h), or democracy in general, employers should let labor
make young asses of itself in various ways (as it has been doing) and
still be patient and make no more reprisals than they would on their
erratic college sons; and by the same principle they should initiate
ameliorations in the lot of labor which are just and pay—no charity.

239

handling of the infinite regress). (So, incidentally, because
there is so much conscious ‘objecting’ or perhaps *“divine dis-
content’’ as a needed part of democracy, short-sighted peo-
ple mistakenly conclude that autocracy is better—for in it
dissatisfaction occurs as a matter of course and is dully and
silently accepted, as per lese majeste and gag laws: ‘‘theirs
not to reason why, theirs but to do and die.’’)
Because of such failure of perfect satisfaction, and objection,
obviously one party of men in a democracy are conscious that
they can not advance faster than another party; soa con-
scious balance, or majority rule (§171k) is willingly sought.
Nature of course forces an autocracy to keep in balance; but
the autocratic pseudo theory denies it, and each party tries
to deprive the other of satisfaction (i. e., push it down; the
euphemism is:- ‘“‘keep it in its place’’); so naturally, as
soon as such people thus stupidly accumulate a violent unbal-
ance, an ‘objection’ in the shape of a war restores it.

f. Soa democracy as a truism of its nature tries to edu-
cate its members. Any democratic reaction (cf. especially
par. c) is, truistically, education—a drawing out of the vision
or activity of each party; which is the reverse way of saying
that each party gives to the other love or more abundant life.
An aristocracy (autocracy or socialism) is simply a more vio-
lent natural or unpremeditated education, and hence is suit-
able for the callous people who need such violence in order
to begin to perceive. The reader will note that our theory
does not “‘condemn’’ aristocracy, but simply concludes that
it is good for those who need it. So democracies de-
liberately set about training the spirits and-or bodies of their
children so that they can react well in a democracy. Usually
only the formal training is called education. But it would
necessarily proceed, when consistently done, as democratic
reactions (““work,’’ etc.) of a character graduated to the per-
ceptions and mental endurance of the children—and it would
not stop except at death; at a certain stage the apprentice-
democrat will be putat producing reactions of immediate use
to others, that stage theoretically beginning at three or four
years of age, and the apprentice part of it (or stage of partly
“earning a living’’) being completed at from sixteen to thirty
(in practice, of course, the child begins to support himself
more abruptly). That lengthy last sentence generally de-
scribes a consistent education: I omit the volumes of expan-
sion. Dewey, in “Democracy and Education,’’ gives an
extraordinarily sound consideration of the principles of educa-
tion which is based directly on the democratic principle—on
That... X This... . The reader can get the rigorous expansion
in that book, which I think is the best statement of the gen-
eral theory of education that has been written—and there are
many good books on education. Dewey shows (ibid., XXIV)
that the formal subject of education (which be there names
philosophy, just as we here name it democracy) sums into
infinity or religion—gives a rebirth. >

g, Education worthy the name is truistically an all-
’round’’ education (one that at least in effect recognizes the
infinite regress) which finally gives ability to estimate the meas-
ures of men, and hence to react cooperatively with them. Aristo-
cratic ideas of education considerably neglect that summing
up, erroneously emphasizing the need of an accumulation of
facts. Just an accumulation of facts is not education—a tru-
ism so obvious that I shall not waste the reader’s time with a
proof of it. Democracy gives balanced education, as
seen; so circularly, valid education gives democracy. So
truistically, a sound education gives ability to be useful to
others. It is not a private affair in which the scholar stuffs
himself with more or less dead and rather useless classics
and then fancies that he feels pleased because he has spent
so much time prinking his brain, and is superior in knowing

UNIVERSE

Three XIX §175c

rather duhiously applicable stuff. All facts can be useful, of
course (just as the kaiser is beautiful; §25c). So education
is measured by its practical or Many usefulness—which is the
same as saying that we must apply to it the theory of value
($168). The most definite measure of usefulness is money.
So Taylor’s principles of educating or management, which
insist that at least some money measurement be required,
soundly formulate a democratic measuring rod that had been
increasingly used by men as they have developed in keen-
ness, delicacy, and definiteness of perception or living.

$175. a. As noted in §174a, socialism is essentially the
same aristocracy as autocracy: it merely would strive to be
intemperate by going in the other direction from the balance
(Figs. 163b, 104b). Autocracy would go to the extreme
Many limit of having one man give all orders, with no reac-
tion: socialism would go to the opposite extreme of having
everybody “‘equal’’ in the government, so that again there
is no reaction. There is little agreement as to what
“‘socialism’’ means. I shall give a consistent statement of
its possible meanings, assuming that it is different in some
way from democracy and autocracy; and if people who cal]
themselves socialists can not find their beliefs included in
those meanings, then they are in some degree either demo-
crats or autocrats, and would be more intelligible if they
named themselves conventionally.

b. Numbers of high-minded and generally admirable
men view the race as being very emphatically an organism, or
a One. It is, of course. Then they call that One socialism.
Or, they name the universal) relationship of identity or
*“brotherhood,”’ socialism. Obviously, as a One word, or as a
relationship or Holy Ghost word, socialism is permissible and
sound. But sociology, or some such phrase as communion of
saints or human equality or brotherhood of man, is the more
conventional One name or relationship name. In that sense
socialism is of course a synonym for democracy, or for any
other of the numerous One words or relationship words—and
is of course absolutely ineffable, meaning nothing definite
nntil it is put in positive That... x This... terms. Many of
those admirable One socialists admit that they can not give
such a statement. They simply mean that they prefer to be
religious in terms of human beings:- Other men... X Us...=
Socialism, or Human equality (i. e., 1pENTITY), or Religion. Us-
ually those men begin to describe democracy as well as they
can when they shift to positive Many words; in practice they
are democrats, with a tendency to have more faith than the
average in the capabilities of government officials —which of
course makes them better men than those who have a faith
less than the actual facts warrant. The objection to
such high-minded or religious socialism is that it does not say
what it means very well, and sois a cat’s-paw for scoundrels.

c. The socialist who expresses himself in Many terms,
especially the extreme socialist, usually definitely states his
aristocratic belief in fixed classes—and their antagonism. In
practice at any rate, his difference from the autocrat is that he
believes that jis class, the proletariat or ‘“working’’ class, is
the **superior,’”’ and should rule—and should, as the mildest
view, seize all property and distribute it ““equally,’’ what-
ever that may mean. The justification for that is that autoc-
racy doesn’t work, and is unjust [that is true; but it does
not justify the same methods by a different set of men|. Such
definite socialism was mostly made in Germany, largely by
Marx—although the idea and practice of socialism is older
than the race (see next paragraph). (The technical logical
objection to Marxian and Many socialism is that it is materi-
alistic—a dualism so obvious that I won’t waste the reader’s
time with formal statement of it.) The reason is ob-
vious why the socialist should fancy himself the opposite of

§175c XIX Three

the autocrat in principle, whereas he is merely opposite in
direction and is also an aristocrat:- The autocrat does have
a perception of the natural relationship or ultimate identity
of men. So he vigorously does something about it: he pro-
ceeds to organize men, so that they percepiiby to themselves
get that religion in terms of humanity—and along with that
fuller mental life truistically get a higher material standard
of living. The autocrat naturally exaggerates that idea and
doing, in order to pound it into the duller people, and he
shortly reaches the limit of zs capacity and begins to fancy
that he personifies the relationship—that being the divine
right of kings (and the weak ones he lifted out of animal sav-
agery also highly appraise that great work). The autocrat
does act by the idea that if a little is good more is better:
but I have trouble myself seeing in practice that that isn’t so
past the point of balance, and nobody can judge exactly where
that point comes. A socialist sees that relationship of man,
and he sees the autocrat’s mistake of going too far. So the
socialist thinks he can personify that relationship by talking
about itand keeping everybody from the intemperance of the
other or more material sort of doing into which the autocrat
fell. And the socialist promptly falls into talking intemper-
ately—personifying himself more or less as a sort of abstract
mouthpiece of the divine human race. And his verbal intem-
perance is usually atrocious. As seen, democrats try
to balance “‘talking’’ and ‘‘doing’’—in practice act on the
fact that mind zs matter. So truistically they are conscious
that ultimate relationship, unfailing cause and effect, does
exist, and that there is no need to exaggerate either aspect.
So democrats do not have to symbolize the divine right of
the autocrat or the socialist by a lot of fuss and feathers, a
special ship and entourage to get to Paris, glittering uni-
forms, high masses, the dirty collar and hair of the ““high’’
thinker, etc. The objection to those symbols (more import-
ant than the time and money they waste) is that we are prone
to forget that they are symbols, and take the idol for the re-
ality. Indemocracy the real boss or acting person constantly
changes, the person who gives the reaction becoming the
boss or acting person. (Of course a moderate amount of sym-
bolization of the person who is expected to do certain acting
is convenient.) The essential thing that makes red tape be
red tape is that a Many formality is erroneously substituted
for an existing relationship: red tape is idolatry in trivial
things for trivial people.

d. Socialism therefore truistically means in theory abso-
lute government ownership, everybody a government official,
and no division of labor. So there is nothing novel about the
practice of socialism. It is simply a new name for the way
in which ‘‘solitary’? wild animals live:- | Each member of
the species (except when nature forces some democracy upon
him in the form of temporary family: perfect socialism is im-
possible) takes what he wants when he wants it (or else fights
for it, if another animal disputes the want). He does every-
thing especially for himself, and hence gets all he produces.
I. e., property is common; and there is substantially no spec-
ialization of work with its necessary reactions or ‘law’ or
‘ordering’ between individuals. Each animal is in the “gov-
ernment,’’ holding an office equal to any other (except for
unavoidable natural sex, etc.), with natural result that there
is no government in any ordinary sense. Clearly, perfect
socialism implies (1) an impossible quantitative equality, or
(2) the impossibility that two finite beings can not interfere
in finite space. But the sincere socialists can join (if I may
say ‘join’) the solitary animals and at once have their Utopia
as closely as nature permits. Thus socialism practically is
extreme savagery. Most savage tribes of men are on the up-
ward path to democracy via a violent autocratic reaction from

UNIVERSE

240

that worse savagery. —— Ina One sense we all are in the
government, and we all are equal (to the universe or God or
infinity——which ought to be enongh to satisfy a reasonable
person), and all property is under the government (even the
common law asserts that).

e. Possibly no socialist would urge going tothe extreme
of animal savagery. But it has become obvious that both the
socialist and the autocrat are aristocratically fancying that
they should (in opposite directions) get a government with
fixed classes—with of course jixed superiority (and its ma-
terial symbol or measure:- money or property) for his re-
spective class. Both being contrary verbally to natural law,
each fancies he is fighting the other: actually, the two are
naturally interacting, but doing it somewhat violently and
painfully—nature’s method of pounding sense through to
their consciousness. The democrat is the man with sufficient
intelligence to see the actual principle, and to desire a bal-
anced cooperation of Citizens and their property... X Official
government and its property..., or Labor... Capital... .*"°

Me Ultimately, all the unbalanced theories of the socialists and
of the autocrats are simply a demand for more life, more activity,
more ‘‘good.’’ Those unbalanced theories are-is a selfish demand—
an excessive demand—of ignorant persons for the right to live—for
self-preservation. And that demand usually practically takes the
form of a demand for the ownership of property—regardless of the
disguises it may wear. We saw (§164d) that it is a fundamental law
that all of us, as a payment for existing ourselves, must allow others
the “‘right’’ to exist. So far we mostly have discussed that ‘‘right’’
in terms of people—giving democratic reactions between people. But
it was definitely stated that the right to exist trnistically involves the
need or ‘‘right’’ to react with so-called material things. And such
things are property, as we shall now see (money is the general repre-
sentative or measure of property; §168h). Mostly 1 have discussed
relations with people because people are perceptibly moving and vari-
able, so that the balancing of reactions with them is more difficult
than a balancing with property, which is less variable and exacting
than people:- land will not usually move away, or actively hit back;
and a cow is not so difficult to react with as a sponse. __ So it is com-
paratively easy to get the principles of property and keep balanced
with property. But that does not lower the intrinsic importance of
property in human life. In any normal life it is just as imperative
that property be temperately owned and handled as it is that we be
temperate in other things. 1 mnst omit volumes of details of prop-
erty: but such details are important, and must in actual life be given
an equal place with personal or so-called spiritual democracy.
Clearly, if by agreement we allow the ‘‘right’’ of existence to each
normal man, we trnistically allow some similar quantitative right to
the ‘‘material’’ means of existence:- food, shelter, clothing, etc.
Thus we allow a right to property:- for if anyone deprives a man of
material air or materia] water, the man will die; and the same prin-
ciple applies to all other property in varying quantitative degree.
Volumes on that variation in degree must be omitted (e. g., just what
does a stockholder in a holding company own?). But we may here
summarize, and consider the essential part of the right to property :-
which is the indispensable right to ‘‘own’?’ (i. c., as surely and posi-
tively control, or anticipate-all-the-reactions-of, as is humanly pos-
sible in such a quantitative matter) land, that is possessed by cach
person, and includes the eqnally indispensable right to some water,
air, and produce, that goes with the land. The principle of each per-
son’s right to such property is that truistically he has the right in
proportion to his own reactive or cooperative measure of worth as a
person (with proper distribution as to 7 during his life-time—a huge
quantitative subject of pensions, minors, ete., which | omit). If his
reactions with other men havea given value or quantity, then as a
simple truism he hasa right to control or own an amount of land
which is the same fraction of the total land (measured by its useful-
ness or desirability) as his work is of the total of all men’s work
(measured the same way). So obviously, as the next inevitable tru-
ism, socialistic talk about dividing property equally is glaringly im-
moral, as men are not quantitatively equal. That principle of
ownership needs volumes of expansion into practical details. The
chief need in that expansion is to consider the matter dynamically.
One of the gravest troubles men have had has been in more or less
accepting the static, dnalistic proposition that if a man once gets
legal possession that possession becomes a jixed, unchangeable fact,
an eternal aristocratic ‘‘privilege’’—so that property accumulates by
inheritance in the hands of a privileged few who neither earned it in

241

f. Men ordinarily are normally at a given time some-
what slightly unbalanced pleasurably either towards more
centralization or autocracy in official government, or else to-
wards more socialism. Those varying classes form two nat-
ural parties; but it is not possible to give steady names to
the two, for as soon as a party becomes too violently auto-
cratic (e. g., the Wilson administration) it automatically flops
over or reverses to a dangerously exaggerated socialism.
And as both extremes are radical, names of parties tend to
reverse——as has occurred several] times in our history (and
during the confusion a substantial third party arises tempor-
arily). So truistically the most highly moral or balanced man
will change from one party to another, remaining always in
opposition to the party which is most unbalanced. The in-
telligent men thus hold the balance of power in a democracy.

g. Asa practical fact, Marxian and similar socialists are
rather ignorant persons, and fail to see the difficulties of man-
aging a large organization, and particularly of getting one
made. They rather fancy that simply to name a man gen-
eral manager will automatically enable him to run the largest
railroad properly—will make him zn facta general manager—
overlooking the truth that actually generations of toughening
and sharpening of nerve fiber is needed as an educative pre-
liminary to prepare a man to begin to ‘see’ a railroad system.
So the ignorant and sentimentalists tend to want government
ownership expanded. And there are many selfish persons
calling themselves socialists who think that they can manage
to grab an easy job if there are enough available—thereby in
effect admitting that they expect to see socialism fail. Those
socialists are in principle identical with the autocratic politic-
ian who in bis heart believes that ‘‘to the victor belong the
spoils.’” On the other hand, the autocrats, with a
stupidity going in the opposite direction, exaggerate the dif-
ficulties of that job; but by then inconsistently fancying that
they personally can measure up to it, at least in prestige,
*‘pull,’’ ete., they insist that it be quietly given to them to
be run by divine right. The democrat has to estimate
men in fair agreement with the facts, and steer between those
aristocratic exaggerations. Being a democrat is a hard job.

8176. a. So the success of any human organization de-
pends upon the size of men. The limit of tbe organization
here is one man reacting democratically with all the other
people in the world, as a perceptible organic whole, or as a
world state or league.

b. That single organization would, from the human

fact nor pay for its continued possession (except by personal deteri-
oration and crippling; §168d). Socialism is the natural reaction
against that erroneous static view; socialism usually exaggerates
equally in the opposite direction. But at the same time even the
autocrats usually accepted theoretically the principle which annulled
or compensated for that exaggerated static practice:- that the legal
owner of property owed continued proportional pay to other peo-
ple in return, usually called a tax. And as we shall see (footnote
176d), owners paid too much as taxes (bnt apart from that brief note
I must omit that vast dynamic expansion). The compensation made
for their error by the socialists is their personal discomfort and all-
‘ound fajlure and more or Jess approach to animal-like squalor, that
gives us the valuable evidence that we do not want socialism (as a
well known practical fact, as soon as socialists bestir themselves todo
something more than talk, the primitive savagery they begin to exper-
ience is ample Jesson for them, and they reverse to a rather extreme
autocracy). My general guess about property is that there
has been and is now an astonishingly just perceptible distribution
of wealth; but people’s statements of the principles on which they
fancied they accomplished that distribution are just as astonishingly
contradictory—being one long series of emphatic
the simple fact that as both socialism and au-
tocracy in practice say they will take your property if they can, it is
the part of wisdom—except in democracies, where the reverse holds
—to conceal what you have, bow you got it and where, and what you

are going to do with it, etc.).

wrong and self-
make believes (due to

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Three XIX §176b

point of view, chiefly require a man of so much strength that
he would not go power-mad; and of such keenness of vision
for details that he would not be afraid of too many unknowns
and as a result be the opposite of power-mad, and so worry
himself into uselessness and red-tape (all autocrats, circularly,
have attacks of timid red-tape; ef. §169h). Or, the
nominal head of the people of the world could be a commit-
tee of some sort—a collection of men. However, one man
(by the principle that no two men are quantitatively equal)
would actually at any given time lead the committee and be
the head of the world. But, in the usual committee the
men are so nearly equal that no one man can in fact lead for
long; so the responsibility is practically divided, with the
truistic result that the committee is a socialism, and dawdles
along not doing much; and even worse, when the committee
is so large as to be called a congress, the nearly-equal mem-
bers are liable to spend time in childish bickering, irrelevant
to their duties, in what is actually a comparison of strength
—unless some man is strong enough to sit on them. The
advantage of a committee is that if the strongly-working real
manager of it goes power-mad he grows weak, and another
man in the committee is in duty bound to replace him: the
committee-scheme automatically puts the proper time limit on
its members. A committee is also a device that allows the
person or persons who select it to have several guesses as to
who is the man able to do the work. Soa committee, or
triumvirate, or legislature, etc., is ise/f in principle a rather
unconscious or slow-moving democracy, which inclines toward
being a socialism if the members are mediocre and about
equal, and toward autocracy if it has strong members who
begin to go power-mad. And from the point of view
of environment, that world state, if it is to be a fairly per-
ceptible democracy (is to exist in fact), requires that there
be sufficient celerity and explicitness of communication, both
mental and material, between that one man and the others
to enable him and them to act and react perceptibly (and
similarly, but in varying degree, between any and all other
combinations of men). E. g., if some men steadily insisted
on departing from the democratic balance, then that one man
must have that fact communicated to him soon enough to en-
able him to react (before they went far enough to damage
themselves or others much)—that being an effort to educate
them into a desire to go towards the balance. Then if after
reasonable reaction of that sort they continued to act so as to
break up the democracy, the communication should be suffic-
iently good to enable others to see that the recalcitrant or
““lawless’’ ones were defective in some degree, and to have
them either restrained, or killed, as expedient. Evidently,
communication inside the United States is such as to enable
the Constitutional government and the people (who have
been trained into sense enough to use it) to do precisely that
—and do it rather definitely, although slowly in come diff-
cult cases. But I think it is obvious that it could not have
been done here two centuries ago. So from the point
of view of communication, a world state at present will work
with some perceptible defects. | The principles of harmonic
periodicity will apply to it: and so it is quantitatively pos-
sible that a world state would be of such a size that if nomi-
nally formed it might be out of harmony with other world
quantities and break down—with disastrous damage in the
exploding. | On the other hand, communication is now so
good that we already have considerable of the opposite de-
fect:- of being pained because we have messages or things
we can send and want to send to others, and there is no or-
ganized (definite) agreement that those others will take them.
If we arbitrarily get in the way of a world state that by the
same principles of periodicity is about to form ‘‘naturally,’’

§176b XIX Three

we also shall get hurt, justas if we stood in front of a moving
train. And as communication (under a steady climate) is
constantly improving, that pain is constantly increasing; and
we shall be forced sooner or later definitely to organize the
communications (establish a world state), just as the thirteen
colonies bad so much trouble that they substantially had
to make the Constitution. It is a question of quantitative
judgment as to what we ought to do now.

c. So if we think we can steadily get a man who is of
sufficient size (replacing him fast enough to keep him from
going power-mad or the opposite, and at the same time be-
ing able to leave him in office long enough to learn the job),
and if we also think that communication is good enough, and
if we think that the varions peoples have sense enough to try
to react democratically a little (to “‘hold up their end’’), it
follows that we shall be consciously conforming with natural
law to establish a world state. We of course are already
more or less in a world state—in a universal state, for that
matter (with gravity reactions, etc.). If we had a more
conscious, more explicitly organized state, it would truistic-
ally give a more abundant life, in terms of cash and every-
thing else. But if we pretend to run a world state and in
fact do not, we destroy some of our life (unless we have the
strength to pay highly for a while for the education, and are
able to survive the violent civil war explosions). So if we
fail to start a world state at once it is because we are afraid
to tackle the unknown and do not amount to much as men,
unless there is fair quantitative evidence that it would fail, in
which case to start it would be reckless stupidity. In that
latter case the part of wisdom is to build up a world state
gradually for a while longer by more definite treaties, postal
and similar conventions, international courts, etc. (which is
precisely what the thirteen colonies did for some years, un-
consciously acquiring education for the final definite crystal-
lization). It is a quantitative problem. No man can
be absolutely sure which way it should be decided. I omit
my opinion in the matter (see footnote 172c).

d. If itbe decided to start a world state, the determina-
tion of the principles of the organization is easy. They are
in our Constitution, and are simply the principles of democ-
racy, or of That... X This.... There being no exact science,
the application of those principles truistically will not work
perfectly. No man, from his personal or imperfect
Many point of view can be satisfied with a fairly just democ-
racy or balance; from such a point of view any sort of fair
balance ina world state involves his making ‘‘sacrifices.’’ But
those are bis payments for what he gets in return. We have
seen throughout the book that it is impossible to get some-
thing for nothing. Because consciousness is life, truistically
the intelligent man wants to know he pays, and how much;
and the highly intelligent man (as shown in §8164db, 169b,
footnote 174¢) wants to initiate payment—pay first; sacrifice.
We need an apparent digression:- that it is thus rigorously
truistic that an indirect tax is wrong, immoral, and bad busi-
ness (i. e., in a democracy; in an aristocracy it is an evil
needed to compensate; cf. last of footnote 175e).

176d Those remarks on taxation, and the more explicit remarks in
par. g below on tariffs, are true only in rigorous theory. As will im-
plicitly appear, customary methods of indirect taxation more or less
correct conventional errors in principles of taxation; and such prac-
tical balancing is of course correct. The orthodox theory of
taxation is that taxes are “‘a self-levied contribution which each man
pays according to his ability’’ (Hadley, ‘‘Economics,’’ §498) so that
it becomes an unsolved’ question “‘whether we should try to tax the
strong man at a relatively higher rate than the weak man’’ (ibid,
§517). Thus it appears that the orthodox theory is uncertain; but
that there is a general view that in strict justice all men should pay
an equal fraction of what they receive, although orthodoxly, in prac-
tice perhaps it is better to tend towards having the poor or weak man

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942

Most of the people who agreed to our Constitution made sac-
rifices, and were willing to do so (as is proved by the fact
that they did). That is largely how it happened that the
Constitution is so extraordinarily good:- it was consciously
paid for by everybody, without any perceptible aristocratic
privileges being given as bribes—no “‘log-rolling.’’ To form
a world state, various nations would consciously have to pay
for the organization at once and would not very perceptibly

pay a smaller fraction (speaking in economic terms of concrete
wealth). Both those general ideas of taxation (equal fractions; and
the weak a smaller faction) are wrong (even with regard to un-
earned wealth got in an aristocracy by inheritance or grabbing; then
the correct principle is that all which is unearned should be repaid).
The successful, ‘‘wealthy’’ man in a democracy, usually in just-
ice ought to pay some smaller fraction of the concrete wealth
(property; money) he gets, than does the less snecessful, ‘“‘poor’’
man. And it is a continually asserted quantitative fact, which prob-
ably is true, that the successful man does thus “‘pay less than his
share’’—which probably shows again that we act better than we say
in our make believes. And the way we achieve that probably correct
result, in the face of a wrong orthodox theory, and sometimes in the
face of actual efforts to make the successful man pay a larger fraction
becanse he is ‘‘able’’ to, is to levy indirect or secret taxes. They of
course get passed on to the poor nearly entirely (in ways so simple
and well known that the person who is not a fool or a self-blinded
aristocratic grabber scarcely requires statistical proof of it, although
that can be got from many stock-selling circulars); and that serves
to restore a correct quantitative balance. The really correct thing
to do glaringly is to state openly that an indirect tax is wrong (fit
only for savage socialists and barbaric autocrats,and naturally tend-
ing to make us similarly blind and partly dead when used on ns),
and that we won’t use it but will directly tax everybody, taxing
the successfnl some agreed-on smaller faction of their wealth (putting
the aristocrats in jail, if such extreme measures are needed to stop
their grabbing). The rigorous truism (footnote 175e) is that a
man should return to society services equivalent to what he receives
(that is the trnism that action equals reaction, which we have seen is
universally true; the orthodox theory of taxation is wrong in that it
expresses that truism only partially, as we shall see). Obvionsly the
‘successful’? man in a democracy (who is not always rich in concrete
property, although he usually is nowadays) is one who of his own
initiative or enterprise, or at least without being ‘‘watched”’ or sup-
ervised by others at the expense of much of their lives, gives all the
work or reaction that he can. The successful man gets useful things
done: gives better products and methods, etc., that help us all indi-
rectly. The unsuccessful or really poor man is one who fails to give
much reaction to others, doesn’t like his job or care to do it well, or
has to be watched by foremen, policemen, etc. So what he gives to
society is meager and of poor quality; but he usually puts energy
into demanding good pay, and consequently ordinarily receives much
more than his fair share of conervete pay—of wealth. So as a rnle the
successful man has already, before he comes to pay taxes, given pro-
portionately more to society than the poor ones. So he ordinarily
should pay a smaller fraction in taxes. It is a quantitative proposi-
tion, of course with a few exceptions: the rigorous theory is that the
man in a democracy who has deserved little should pay a larger frac-
tion of concrete taxes if (as is usually practically unavoidably the
case) he gets a larger fraction of concrete pay. —— And it is clear
from the fundamental theory of taxation (the theory of That...x
This...) that the best hope of achieving reasonably just taxation,
which next to honest money is perhaps the most important economic
balance wheel, lies in taxing people from several points of view.
]. e., no “‘single tax,’’ no solution of the infinite regress involved in
taxing a single sort of unit of a man’s wealth is practically soluble
very far out, and so it is better to try to average the important items
of wealth. Any single thing, such as land, could theoretically furnish
a just base ofall taxes. The practical difficulty with the land single
tax is in determining just who owns or controls or uses a given bit of
land (e. g., as one of thousands of equally difficult questions:- How
much use does an aviation company make of the land it flies over;
or may it drop monkey-wrenches anywhere free of charge?). That
probable solution of this quantitative problem of the base of taxation
is opposite that of the base of money (§168h); for it easy to deter-
mine the actual controller of a given piece of actual money.
And obviously, the foregoing general theory of taxation fits with the
actual general practice in this country (except that we are a bit vague
yet about putting a profiteer or financial aristocrat in jailif need be).
So it would be intelligent, and save much money, to enunciate and
practice those simple principles openly.

243

get repaid foratime. So obviously, any world state will have
to be made largely on credit (J), by the able men who can
work now for a benefit inthe future—just as most large busi-
nesses are made. There would perhaps be an immediate
**spiritual’’ return in some dropping of the tension of national
distrust and refusal of credit (which distrust is concretely
shown in expensive armaments); hunt many people are too
defective nervously to see that (especially some armament
niakers who are quite similar in every way to liquor dealers;
§166h). And it is certain that some men will betray that
trust: the aristocrat we have always with us. If a nation in
the world state betrayed the trust we could not put it in
jai] or an insane asylum; and the milder equivalent, ostra-
cism or boycott, might not work; then we would have to kill
it off more or less—perhaps a more unpleasant and expen-
sive business than not having such a world-state obligation.

e. As we have seen, democracy is a conscious effort to
approach a balance, and truistically if successful prevents
war—which is the social surgery needed to cure an unbalance
which is bad (§149n)—the attempted cure for hell. When
the pain of an unbalance becomes great, the nation with the
weaker nervous system becomes maniacal first and starts the
war, The nation that keeps on preparing for war more in-
tensely than another nation openly admits its fear of the other;
and such open indulgence in cowardice (footnote 170r) and
babying of its “‘nerves’’ will truistically make it wear out its
nervous systems, just as any coward who gives way to his
fears gets panicky:
relief from that pain of fearing—often becoming so crazy
with that pain that it sincerely fancies the other nation at-
tacked first. Obviously, any aristocracy, in consistence with
its pseudo principle of repulsing the other nation and grab-
bing from it “‘a place in the snn’’ and any other little thing,
must keep piling up its *“preparedness’’ as much as it can
(thus, by the unavoidable laws of nature as just seen, giving
way to cowardice and destroying itself). A democracy tries
to approach the balance, but it recognizes the inevitable nat-
ural fact that always there must be a fringe of defective
aristocrats at each end of society (8168 p); hence, demnc-
racy forms a police force large enough to take care of the
probable number of aristocrats who will go insane enough to
need watching or become violent. But as that police force
is an admission by the democracy that its educative efforts
have inevitably failed of perfect success, it will truistically try
to reduce the force. And that being in accord with natural
law, all other advantages follow:- the democracy does not
become cowardly, or panicky; it saves expense; etc.

f. There are three sorts of extreme pacifists in theory
(none in practice, as the theory is quite wrong and can’t
work):- autocrats or militarists, socialists, and religious ob-
jectors. (1) The theory of the autocrats or militarists is that
they will prepare so thoroughly that they can or will lick the
rest of the world, and thus there will be absolute peace. It
doesn’t work, as we just saw, but it does superficially sound
nice enough to delude those extremely pacific militarists.
(Another pet delusion of those queer pacifists is that | pre-
paredness’’ is national insurance. Insurance is distribution
of arisk over Land 7. The risk of war is naturally distrib-
uted over the wbole nation, so it is merely silly to talk of
distributing it further. And as regards T distribution :- in-
stead of storing up wealth, as insurance premiums, to pay
for war when some other extreme pacifists become violent,
they spend it on ‘‘preparedness,’”’ and then have to get more
out of an impoverished nation. Buta police force is, intelli-
gently, an admitted expense—what it costs a democracy for
its failure to teach extreme pacifists to think.) (2) The so-
cialists in theory are extreme pacifists in that they would

UNIVERSE

and it finally starts a war as a welcome.

Three XIX §176g

have everybody an official of a single world government, so
that there would be absolute peace because there would be
nobody to fight. Incidentally, they in practice will first
wage a war of extermination on those who disagree. (3) The
first two extreme pacifists claim they want absolute peace,
and are willing to fight for it. The third sort is the religious
objectors who are going to get absolute peace by refusing
to fight. Obviously, their ‘religious, scruples’ amount to try-
ing absolutely to confuse the One and the Many; also, they
deny that anything can be intolerable and they thus practi-
cally deny the One or religion (§169d), and force sane men to
restrain them or kill them—which is war, merely under its
zero name. So the difference between the aristocratic
preparedness and the democratic preparedness is this:- the
aristocrat has a fake panacea for war (in three guises) that
actually produces or is an unbalance or disease for which war
is one cure; so they consider it admirable to zxcrease their
‘““panacea’’ or armament: democratic preparedness recog-
nizes that war is a last (or surgical) cure for a bad disease,
a definite admission of democracy’s imperfection and hence
an armament or police force that we want to keep as low as
possible. The aristocrat boasts of his preparedness, and
flaunts it in the face of the world: the democrat regrets the
need of his preparedness, but tries to keep it adequate to
deal with the probable number of rather crazy aristocrats.
A genius with words can do the race an enormous ser-
vice by inventing good distinctive names for the two things:-
democratic preparedness and aristocratic preparedness.

g. The next general quantitative result of a world state,
or partial trial at one, is that it tends towards an economic
balance, and so repudiates commercial exploiting or repul-
sions. In short, as is definitely recognized in effect by the
Constitution (Art. I, §X, 2), any tariffs or imposts, or duties
on imports or exports, between the parts of a democracy tend
to disrupt it and destroy life, and so are immoral and explic-
itly forbidden. Asa truism there must be free trade (even
though there is no formal world state) jf we are to be moral
in our economic relations with other nations: the instinctive
conclusion of mankind is glaringly to that effect, as is proved
by the fact that at no time in history has appreciable mora]
stigma attached to smuggling. A tariff for revenue
only is an obvions logica] self-contradiction, and so spoils the
brains of those who try to ‘believe’ it:- for it truistically
by the infinite regress protects some industries. Also, a tar-
iff that is merely thus largely for revenue is an indirect tax,
and immoral on that ground. If “‘infant’’ industries
need to be protected for a time (and they practically do, as
will implicitly appear), a direct bounty is obviously the open,
non-secret, moral] procedure. But that protection of infant
industries is mora] only temporarily; it is immoral] and para-
sitical for anyone to accept aid long, just as it is for a grown
child to live on his parents—and as unlovely. (I have heard
of “‘key’’ industries: any argument for continued pro-
tection for such is merely the wailing of a spoiled baby
lacking in resourcefulness and seli-reliance; for rigorously,
no industry or part of the Many can be absolutely essential]
or changeless.) In the long run, if you are unable to get
better or-and more work delivered to you for a given price
from me, than you can from any other laborer on earth, then
truistically that laborer ought to do it for you:- for I am not
of superior clay that you should take poorer work from me.
You might today take my poorer work, 7f you thought that
I would thus learn, and tomorrow give you so much better
work than anybody else that you thus gained in the Jong run
(that shows how a bounty for infant industry is right, just as
it is economically right to support a child—and a volume of
details on the two subjects is omitted:- e. g., the parents

§176g XIX Three

ordinarily get their money repayment for supporting a child
directly from society at the time {not later from the child],
the care of the child increasing their earning capacity). In
the long run you are immorally wasting human life if you do
not buy in the best market:- your life, the life of the better
laborer, and that of the poorer by making him a privileged
aristocratic parasite. So the intelligent, democratic way is
obviously to stop putting up those immoral tariff barriers to
the best market. We shall usually prefer to react with those
closer to us if they actually prove themselves to be friends
by giving us good work (they have the economic advantage
under normal conditions of being at less expense for trans-
portation, and our inspection of the goods). But if a ‘““heath-
en’’ in the other hemisphere can prove himself the better
man by overcoming that natural economic handicap, then he
is a better friend than the slack, incompetent workman next
door. The biological and other human ways in which
poor workmen get the job in an aristocracy and then pay for
their “‘privilege’’ are these:- They verbally tell the aristo-
cratic, fiat ruler that they depend on his protecting them, and
standing for their poor work; they thus acknowledge that
the aristocrat is superior, and that they (al) tariff-protected
business men who approve the tariff and all union-protected
workmen who approve making the employer pay regular pay
for poor work) are rather worthless, and they thus confirm
the aristocrat in his power-madness at the expense of degrading
themselves mentally—it is the road to uselessness. The aristo-
crat is similarly debased by that self-abasing, incompetent,
and lying adulation, and his business is always really in an
unhealthy, running-down condition. The good business man
obviously can not afford to be tariff-protected, as it makes
him soft and flabby, and wastes his time running to Washing-
ton with whines that not even a self-reliant baby would emit,
and worst of all it costs him the publie’s good will. And in
precisely the same way the labor unions can not afford their
aristocratic game of protecting incompetents,

h. The last general quantitative result of a world state,
or partial one, which I shall consider explicitly is the racial
one. Because of the comparative difficulty of transportation
and communication in past ages, various races have stayed
rather steadily in somewhat different environments (climates)
and truistically have lived at different rates, and so are now
biologically different in a way which can most intelligibly be
expressed as different virtual ages. The difference is so slight
as not to cause mutual sterility (mo doubt such sterility oc-
curred in the past, and by the principles of periodicity nature
promptly eliminated the weaker), and ta make it unprofitable
to give specific comparison here of such ages. _Truistically
intermarriage of those races produces a biological unbalance,
just as the children of » couple of the same race wide apart
in age are noticeably variable. Some of those half-breeds
have little survival strength; a few are a mixture which is
better than either parent stock (and of such half-breeds we
spring). We have almost no knowledge of what crosses are
good in the long run: it truistically clearly is silly to say that
we imperatively must preserve racial ‘‘purity.’? And equally
clearly and truistically one race is not essentially superior to
another—mierely quantitatively different. Truistically, if
we force races to refrain from intermarriage, that increases
the difference, until inevitably the unbalance will precipitate
a race war in which one race is exterminated—and the advo-
cate of race purity has no real facts to show that it won’t be
his race to go (I cheerfully agree that I have the usual human
belief that it wouldn’t be my race; and that I like my racial
qualities and wouldn’t care to take a chance on mixing them;
but that is merely healthy emotion, and I retain, or have got,
sense enough to know that I am ignorant of actual facts—

UNIVERSE

wlike nearly thoughtless rabbits.

244

and I have read Madison Grant’s ‘Passing of the Great
Race,’’ and a lot of other such cheap, dualistic guesses. )
Sa a democratic state will, just as the Constitution does, take
races as essentially equal but quautitatively unequal, and will
let alone (§149m) the question of intermarriage until there
are some more-definite facts. It will be grateful to the per-
sons whose strength or foolhardiness or environment forces a
crossing, for having furnished data. Jf we decide that we
must not cross with a certain race, that means that we will
exterminate them—or become hypocrites and be exterminated.

i. Connected with that is the problem of birth control.
The United States has over 35 inhabitants to the square mile
—nearly 20 acres or ordinary city ““blocks’’ to each person.
If present knowledge were intelligently and vigorously used
our larid might be made to support 20 times that number.
But practically, every increase of population causes some un-
balancing which is often perceptible. Aristocrats hold that
uunbalances should be increased, and consistently with that
they often explicitly want the birth rate increased—ordinarily
the more aristocratic, militaristic, and imperialistic a person
is, the more he objects to what he calls race suicide. (That
phrase “‘race suicide’’ is scarcely rational:- if I avoid getting
fat I do not commit suicide, and a race that avoids over-
growth does not; the phrase is stupidly used by aristocrats
to beg the question as to actual facts.) The upper ten aris-
tocrats of course want more people to lord it over and use as
eannon fodder. And the submerged tenth aristocrats breed
Neither have enough intel-
ligence to understand democracy or temperance, but again in
this case proceed on the pseudo principle that an unbalance
is desirable—that if a little is good, more is better. Some
few couples are geniuses at producing say as many as ten
vigorous, useful children: but the ordinary family with five
nowadays is a calamity to the state and early death to that
parent who takes the responsibility seriously. In the old
days large families were worse on both children and parents;
but in those days people were so stupid that the majority
blundered into an accidental death before thirty, so that
quantity was then of more importance. Democracy requires
a balanced degree of racial] increase. Perhaps we are up to
the point in our history where the great and useful pioneering
will be in quest of quality, to restore and if possible maintain
the balance Quantity... < Quality.... That pioneering has
already been begun as regards the race itself by the average
person in this country—-which birth control is probably the
most important symptom of our sound social health. Tbe
pioneering in business ethics—the intelligent building-up and
seeking of “good will’’—is perhaps the next.

j. So it appears that a consciously formed world state
will not necessarily end war. Any severe climatic variation
is likely to cause war—and would, unless men were agile
enough mentally to meet the change rapidly with appropriate
balancing of Unselfishness... < Selfishness... A world democ-
racy based on the sound principles of the Constitution will
ordinarily prevent disturbances of much size—will ordinarily
prevent a “‘war.’’ The chief danger will be the same as al-
ways in the past:- a power-mad, selfish boss and citizens too
unintelligent to size him up and to see where they will land
if they follow him a little way on his primrose path to sudden
glory and wealth. There is no automatic way to end war:
it all depends on men in the end. Wars cure the worst un-
balances by weeding out the worst aristocrats—and a new
crop starts at once. A knowledge and use of democracy can
keep the aristocrats from growing, by education if that is
done well enough. And that is work. When we get
out of balance with the environment there is in effect a “‘nat-
ural’’ war called famine or-and pestilence.

Democracy

24.5

involves keeping a tolerable balance with the environment
(cf. footnote 175e). Part of that is called maintaining the
standard of living; and roughly, in business the ‘standard of
living’ is called overhead. The aristocrat dualistically fancies
that such standard (including various heavy business expendi-
tures for costly stationery and palatial furnishings, etc.)
is a sacrosanct affair that must be maintained of itself. But
an intelligent child can see that if that standard and over-
head does not enable its possessor to react better, with both
material and men, and thus do better than any “cheap
foreign labor,’’ then that expense is in some degree a waste
—a destructive evil instead of a good.

8177. a. Thus any democratic state involves us in quan-
titative problems impossible of accurate solution, with grave
perils on each side of the balance. That is what life is: we
like it. Everything in the universe is engaged in the same
sort of balancing, and in time wears out and changes into a
different order structure, just as we all die—thus being a
part of keeping the perfect balance of the whole.

b. The race has for ages been increasing its life or hap-
piness—extending its limits of conscious balance with the
environment, and becoming more consciously God. Thus the
race has grasped and enjoys the universe in a rough way, and
has grasped the ““material’’ earth in a rather definite way;
and has already substantially formed a more or less organized
world state, thus also grasping its homan members in a rather
definite way. Most of the race enjoy braving and balancing
the dangers at those two limits or outer zones—and thrive on
them, even though those dangers sound objectionable when
explicitly described as in the last section. The spreading of
the limits of consciousness into those dangers is an increase
of the definiteness of relationship——of love. Because the race
is as a verifiable fact now consciously related toa wide extent,

UNIVERSE

Appendix A

we as a truism of that fact love the race unless we are de-
fective. But there are a few of the race who get out into
those danger zones and are so weakas to be damaged and be
unable to get back to a balance, or see that they want to.
They are the aristocrats—the submerged tenth on and as one
dying fringe or breaking-up difference surface of the race,
and the upper ten on the opposite fringe. Those fringes are
where the consciousness of relationship or love begins to dim.
But in a wide sense we see we love those failing and quitting
aristocrats as being inevitable in the nature of things, and as
interesting and entertaining horrible educative examples.

ce. And that generally satisfactory condition of human
affairs, with always some perceptible unbalances that are on
the way to a balance if we take enough time into view, out-
lines what we have seen in this book. The book is a de-
scription of the universe, given chiefly in terms of humans
because those are familiar and intelligible. It is a rigorous
unification of the universe, because that infinite universe zs
our ultimate selves—we being God in that religious aspect.
That unification is expressed as the solution of the One and
Many. The race for centuries has tacitly been using that
solution or logic—knowing the principles and applying them
to the objective world as science, and to ourselves as morality
or democracy.

d. The essentials may be briefly stated, although it re-
quired a number of pages to make them positively evident :-
The One is the Many. We grasp and are the One by
working personally with the Many in a temperate or demo-
cratic way. From the point of view of our feelings or sense
of well-being that balanced rhythmie grasp of the One is
happiness; from the point of view of our seeing or know-
ing or intellect that balanced rhythmie grasp of the One is
ineffable beauty.

APPENDIX A

ABBREVIATIONS

No attempt is made to include ordinary abbreviations, or to in-
clude those used in short passages wherein they are first explained
(in several such cases abbreviations are used in a sense different
from that listed below as their usual meaning).

‘“‘Ency. Brit.”? ‘“The Encyclopaedia Brittanica,’’ 11th ed.

Daniell’s ‘‘Physics.’’? Alfred Daniell, ““A Text Book of the
Principles of Physics,’’ 3rd ed. (1902).

Marshall’s ‘‘Economics.’’ Alfred Marshall, ““Principles of
Economics,’’ 6th ed. (1910).

Watson’s ‘‘Physics.’’? W. Watson, ‘‘A Text-book of Phys-
ies,”’ 5th impression (1904).

Wood’s “‘Opties.”’ Robert W. Wood, ‘Physical Optics,’
Ist ed. (1904).

?

eh

Subscripts that are used in the text with several of the abbrevia-
tions below, are given separately.

A (1) a general symbol for any given thing; (2) chemical
affinity, or intensive factor of dynamic molar energy.

C variable numerical coefficient for molar or static masses.

Ent entropy, or extensive factor in heat energy.

Energy energy.

F force.

G variable numerical coefficient of ‘dynamic’ or gravitation
masses; also sometimes used, as indicated by context,
as the conventional gravity constant.

H variable numerical coefficient for ‘dynamic’ heat; also
used, as indicated by context, as orthodox heat constant.

J variable numerical coefficient of ‘static’ heat: also used,
as indicated by context, as constant Joule’s equivalent.

K variable numerical coefficient of ‘static’ electricity; also
used, as indicated by context, as the conventiona] con-
stant specific inductive capacity.

L length or space—one unit measure of length.

M mass—specifically, one unit or part of the universe.

P potential of electricity or intensive factor of elec. energy.
Q quantity of electricity or extensive factor of elec. energy.
Ra conventional constant used in heat.

T time—one unit measure of time.

Temp temperature, or intensive factor of heat energy.

That that; anything, as compared with a This.

This this; any given thing.

U variable numerical coefficient of ‘dynamic’ electricity ;
also used, as indicated by context, as the conventional
constant permeability.

V velocity.

V, average velocity of light ina “‘vacunm’’ in our neigh-
borhood. See §126b for other subscripts.

W weight.

e (1) current of electricity ; (2) see §82a.

d ()) distance, same as L; (2) differential symbol.

ConTINUED oN Next Pace

e [subscript | zero or standard formal unit (S7Ib). r

’

Appendix A

length, same as L.
unit magnet pole.
[subscript] dynamic.
any number.
pressure,

UNIVERSE

radius, same as LL,

, [subscript] indicates a relationship word.
; [subscript] static.
v volume.

indicates infinite regress ($33g).

APPENDIX B

PERIODIC TABLE OF ELEMENTS

2 He
3-99

10 Ne |
20.2 |

rr Na
23.00

19 K
39.10

24.32

WA
39.88

20 Ca
49.07

30 Zn
65.37

8 Cd
‘eas oa

54% \|55 Cs

112.40 |114.8
56 Ba |57 La 58Ce soPr

27.1

2t Sc
44.3

33 Ga | 32 Ge | 33 As
69.9

51 8b
120.2

50 Sa

49 In
118.7

130.2 | 132.81 137 .37|139-0 149.25140.6 144.3

67Ho 68 Er 69Tu 7o Yb 71Lu 72—
163.5 167.7'168.5 173.5 175.9

$27.5

60 Nd 63-62 5m 63 Eu 64 Gd 65 Tb 66 Ds
150.4

44 Ru

126.92

52 Te | 53 | |

157-3 159.2 162.5

760s 77 Ir 78 Pt
190.9 193.1 195.2

152

This periodie table of elements and their atomic numbers is adapted
from Millikan’s, ‘‘The Eleetron,’’ published in 1917. The weights of
elements not in the order of their atomic numbers are in italics.

Hydrogen
Helium
Lithium
Beryllium
Boron
Carbon
Nitrogen
Oxygen
Fluorine
Neon
Sodium
Magnesium
Aluminium
Silicon
Phosphorus
Sulphur
Chlorine
Argon
Potassium
Caleium
Scandium
Titanium
Vanadium
Chromium
Manganese
Tron
Cobalt
Nickel
Copper
Zine
Gallium

eM Ore WO

SO RO ee ae Oo
mM Oe mr oanrf WOH ©

22
23
Q4
25
26
QT
28
29
30
31

32 Germanium
33 Arsenic

34 Selenium

35 Bromine

36 Krypton

37 Rubidium
38 Strontium
39 Yttrium

40 Zirconium
41 Niobium

42 Molybdenum
43
44. Rhuthenium
45 Rhodium

46 Palladium

47 Silver

48 Cadmium

49 Indium

50 Tin

51 Antimony

52 Tellurium

53 Todine

54 Xenon

55 Caesium

56 Barium

57 Lanthanum
58 Cerium

59 Praseodymium
60 Neodymium
61
62 Samarium

63 Europium
64 Gadolinium
65 Terbium
66 Dyprosium
67 Holmium
68 Erbium

69 Thulium
70 Ytterbium
71 Lutecium
12
73 Tantalum
74 Tungsten
15 —

76 Osmium
77 Iridium
78 Platinum
79 Gold

80 Mercury
81 Thallium
82 Lead

83 Bismuth
84 Polonium
85
86 Emanation
87
88 Radium

89 Aetinium
90 Thorium

91 Uranium X2
92 Uranium

APPENDIX C

GEOLOGIC TIME SCALE

Prepared by H. F. Osborn
and by C. A. Reeds after

Schuchert.
from Osborn’s

Reproduced
“Origin

and Evolution of Life.’’
The times given are much

too short

MILLIONS
Or
YEARS

235

3Q
MILLIONS
YEARS

35

43

u
-

ROCKS GENERALLY METAMORPHOSED IGNEOUS PREOOMINANT

ISNEOUS SECOMDARY
ENTOMBED FOSSILS DIRECT EVIDENCE OF FORMER Lif

ROCKS CHREFLY UNMETAMORPHOSCO SEQHMENTARY PREOOMINANT,
RATIO 12, 18.000 000 YEARS

SEDIMENTARY SECONDARY LIMESTONE IRON ORE, AND
GRAPHITE INDIRECT EVIDENCE OF FORMER LIFE FOSSILS SCARCE

8

Cal

RATIO 6, 9,000,000 YEARS

“PRECAMBRIAN, RATIO 20. 30.000,000 YEARS

($112hi; XI}).

| GUATERNARY

TERTIARY

UPPER
CRE TACEO Us

LOW!
CRETACEOU
{COMANCHEA

AGE

!
JURASSIC

TRIASSIC

g
a
a
a
Es _
v ent |
0 Ea
— NS
nermuee. |
W
=
I

| PERMIAN
8 PENNSYLVANIAN
IUPPER
3 | cansonirencuss
-
5

AGE

OF
AMPHIBIANS
MISSISSIPPLAN

wy .
CAARTOMIFEROUS)

SILURIAN

PALAEOZOIC

3

+
a
2

QF
INVERTEGRATES

ANIMIKIAN

EVOLUTION
OF HURONIAN
INVERTEBRATES

ALGOMIAN

PROTEROZOIC

SUDGURIAN

LAURENTIAN

EVOLUTION
UNICELLULAR
LIFE

ARCHAEOZOIC (ARCHEAN)

GRENVILLE
(KEEWAWAI
ICOUTCHICHING

Q47

How to Use.

‘48b’ refers to section and paragraph;
‘f48b,’ to footnote; ‘Fb,’ to section and para-
praphin Preface; ‘One,’ to Part One; ‘ii,’ to
page ii in Introductions; ‘IX,’ to Chap. IX.

This Index is not full. The names of per-
sons are not always the actual legal names;
the names of subjects are not always the act-
ual names used in the text. The Index is a
compromise, with no special consistency ex-
cept in an attempted ready usefulness. It is
not satisfactory to me, except in that it is
the best I could do in a reasonable time. In
theory it should be less so to the reader.

aberration, 127, 17c; see Jight.

absolute, 28b; see perfect.

— zero, 80e, 114g, 134), 141f.

abstract, 28f, 59.

action at distance, f77b, 88a.

—-reaction, 86e, 98b, 167; see balance.

Adam and Eve, 100c.

Adami, G. 145e.

Adums, H. ete. f48b, 1355c, 156e, 157c.

= War Sul loa.

Ade, George, f167b.

affinity (chem.) 74e, 134hj; see sol. sys.

age, 146k-n; ages (geologic) App. C;
see astronomy.

agnosticism, 5, 22h, 23, 32, 35d, 40g,
88d, Ac, iv.

Albertus Magnus, f48b.

**Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”’
(**Carroll’’) 23a, 99a, 167d.

Ampere, A. M. 76, 74b, 77, 83f, 94g.

analysis, 21b.

Ananias (Biblical) 166q.

Angell, James R. 155c.

Angstrom, A. J. 121c.

anthropocentricism, 73h, 100cd.

applied or used, 85e.

a priori and a posteriori, 163).

Aquinas, Thomas, 24c, 46d, f48b, 151b.

aristocrat, v, 7j, 14d, 37e, 48d, 85c, 88),
89i, 100c, 105d, 139a, 141h, 145e,
147e, 149r, 158g, 159f-n, 162di, 163f-h,
166q, 167h, 168-9, 171jkm, 173-4.

Aristotle, 26g, f48b.

armaments, 176d-f; see war.

Arrhenius, 8S. A. 107a, 108b.

art, 171; artistic temperament, 159g,
166pq, 168e.

assimilation, 120h; see growth.

assumption, 22, 88b, 97a.

astral planes, 100g.

astronomy, XII; ages, 111¢; velocities,
111; unified witb electricity, 135d;
see solar system, ete.

asymmetry, 98; see incommens., balan.

Atherton, Gertrude, 155b, 1660q, 170k.

athletics, 166f.

atom, 74e, 15j, 89, 90, 119a; no con-
stant —, 101j, 128e, f132a; getting
energy out, 141; see Richards, etc.

UNIVERSE

INDEX

attraction, repulsion, 13493; see gravity.
authority, 162b, f167b.

autocracy, 174; see aristocrat.
Avogadro, Amedes, 89g.

axis (filiar, and main) 98n.

balance, 1l4c, 146s, 7j, 163, 177;
temperance, genius, democracy.

Balmer’s formula, 128de, 130f.

banking, f168h.

Bastian, H. Charlton, 144cd.

Bateson, Wm. 147c.

batteries, storage, f135c.

behavioristie psychology, 490;
Dewey.

Being, 22, 98, 95e, 161b;
assumption.

Bergson, H. f165b, 20a, 64c.

Berkeley, George, lc.

Bernoulli’s theorem, 95, 98hi, 100d,
101g, 102, 114b, 126a; see fluid theo.

Bible, 85c, 99a, 160d, 161b, 1635b, 170b,
Ty

biologists, British, 147, f100c.

biology, XVI; definition, 142-3;
organ, Jordan, Darwin, life, ete.

birth, 144ij, 96d, 8m; control, 176i.

Bjerknes, V. F. K. 94, 95d, 113b, 114b,
194f, 184k, 84e.

*“blood and iron’’ 145, 163b.

Bode’s Jaw, 117g, 128de.

Bok, Edward, f167b.

books, 491.

boundary, 47, 55c, Two; see Vy.

Boyden, U. A. 127k.

Bradley, F. H. iv, v.

Bragg, W. H. and son, 101j, 138h.

breeding, 159}.

brevity, 30g, 50h, 138f, Db.

brokers (stock) 163h.

Brooks, Wm. K. 147d.

Brownian movement, 137cf.

Bryce, James, 173h.

Buckle, H. T. 490, 87b.

Buddha, Buddhism, 39a,
157e; see Nirvana.

business, 163gh, Fe, vi, vii, 173e; see
labor, sizing up men, money, etc.

““business is business’’ 163g.

butters-in, 167).

see

see

see ether,

see

49, 59eg,

Cabot, Richard C. 149i0, 167b.
ealeulus, 30b-f, 104h.
Campbell], W. W. 171m.
eancer, 149).

capital, see Jabor, wealth, property.
Carlyle, Thomas, 162d, 166p.
Carnegie, Andrew, 94g, 168m.
Carnegie Institution, F.
Carnot, M. F. Sadi, 104.
Carrel, Alexis, 146k.
Carrington, Hereward, 101k.

Index Cycl

Castle, Wm. E. 147f.

catastrophies, 100).

Catholics, 24c, 46d, f48b, f49a, 86d,
149q, 174c.

cause and effect, 86;

caution, f 40g.

Cavendish, Henry, 89}.

cell (bielogic) 120h, 143d; (ether) 97d,
Two; (nerve) 152c.

center (of reference) 40f, 88], 100c.

Chamberlin, T. C. le, 113ced, 117be,
118d, 122g-i, 144¢c.

chemistry, 138g-i; see atom, etc.

ehicken and egg, problem of, 109.

Chinese, 17¢, 168h.

chivalry, 170]-n.

Christ, 6, 19¢, 24c, 29, 39h, 47i, 48b,
49, 891, 153fh, 155c, 159In, 160d,
162, 165, 167h, 168), 170bm.

Christianity, see Christ, religion.

Christian Science, 149q, 49a, 155.

circular reasoning, 22, 35f; see logic.

civilization, 166c, 171; see progress.
classes (by legislation) 162i, 163f, 167h;
(of men) XVIII, XIX, 178fi.

classic Jogic, 23a; see logic.

Clausius, R. J. E. le, 80-2, 100).

climate, 99d, 112g-m, 122, 166c.

coefficients, 71, IX, 68, 77d, 83f.
cohesion, 47}; see friction, force.

cold, astronomical bodies cold inside,
see planets.

cold light, 132.

combustion, 141.

comets, 120; see solar system.

commensurability, 50; see incommens.

commonsense, v, 2f, 39, 491t.
competition, 1700; see balance, democ.

Conklin, Edwin G. 147d.

“Conrad, Joseph’’ 155b.

conservation (of resources) 167k; of en-
ergy) see energy, religion.

constants, 50d, 82, 89k, 100c. 123d.

Constitution of U.S. 173, 7j, 37d, 169h.

continuity, 26, 86; see relationship, in-
fmity, unification.

contradiction, 26-7, 28e, 51;
and Many.

Cooke, Morris Lilewellyn, vi-vii, Gb,
114c, f167b, 163).

cooperation, vii, 167; see balance.

Copernicus, 40f.

Coriat, I. H. 154c.

courage, 170r, Fe, Gb, 150h, 176e.

credit, 167k, 168h.

Crehore, A. C. 134k.

criterion of molar bodies, 105; see /j.

culture, 166c, 171; see progress.

cure, 148h.

““eurved’’ color, 128g;
see Euclid.

eycles, 50e, 101f, 144i, 149c, 164e, 166m.

see relationship.

see Que

— space, 60;

Cyni Index

cynicism, 21b.

Darwin, C. 87b, 89i, 144ch, 145, 147d.

= G. Tl isd.

death, 80m, 114g, 144i}, 1461, 163g.

deism, 47i.

democrat, XIX, 173-4, 167-70, 7j, 48¢,
49ru, 105d, 149r, 162.

Democritus, 89c.

Descartes, 24c, 46d, 134k, 151b.

description, 85a.

devil, 49f; see God.

Dewey, John, iii-v, Cc, Gb, 15b, 17d,
Qla, 22f, 23a, 35d, 87b, 490p, 1282,
1491, 151b, 154b, 161b, f£167b, 1744.

difference surface, 98n, 47g, 80m.

dimensions (of space) 59, 62, 63h, 78a;
languages of different — 62; theory,
68; dimensional equations, f38c, 68.
directions, 99b-d, 32b, 43f, 50e, 88k,
101i, 104j, 130b, 134d, 135c, 145¢,
146e, 1703; in light, 125a; elec. 134d.

division of labor, 1700-q.

divorce, 166no.

dogmatism, 5, 39f, 44g, 48d, 85c.

Doppler effect, 127g.

Drude, P. K. L. 180b.

dualist, 5b, 19, 21, 49, 89k, 104b; see
materialist, aristocrat.

Dunne, F. P. (““Mr. Dooley’’) f167b.

dynaniic, 73, 77b, 98], IX; see static.

Eastman, George, 168m.

economics, 156d, 1700, XVIII, XIX;
see Marshall, A., money, taxes, etc.

Eddington, A. S. 74a, 107e, 112i.

Eddy, Mary Baker Glover, 149q.

Edison, Thomas A. 152f, f167b, 168m.

education, 174fg, 163b; see learning.

Ehrlich, Panl, 149¢.

HKinstein, A. 66, vii, 36b, 42b, 57b, 100c),
125b, 127g-k, 128g, 134), 135c, f168v.

elasticity, 97d, XI, 74f.

electricity, XIV, 75-7, 15}; static, 134,
mag. 185; see electron, Ampere, etc.

electron, 89bf, 98y, 120h, 137bg.

element, 101j, 118e, App. B; see har-
monic periodicity, atom, etc.

Ellis, Havelock, 155a.

emotions, 153, 17d, 20d, 30g, f 94g.

‘*Rnevclopaedia Brittanica’’17a.

energy, 15i, 1X, 39g, 100); getting —
139-41.

entropy, 7lh, 77-82;
140de, 174a.

equality, no quantitative, 105d;
One and Many, quantitative.

equation, 39a; see mathematics.

error, man can not make, 25b.

Erwin, M. 94, 84c, 96d, 98i, 101), 124,
126c, 128d, 134k.

ether, 93-4, Two, 66a, 125d; see Being.

ethics, 160, 170, XVIII.

Euclid, Euclidian space and time, 60-2,
330, £38a, 57, 66, 87b, 104e.

evil, 85e; see good.

evolution, 145, 98p; see progress.

increase of, 80,

see

UNIVERSE

exact, no exact science, 40-2, 50, 66,
95d, 26g, 35fg, 36g, 52b, 82b, 85d,
881, 98], 100cl, 137e, 143c, 147g,
148b; see infinite regress.

exaggeration, 43k.

executives, {94g, 157c, 170p.

expediency, 40k.

experiments, 1, 84b, 85e, 88f), 158a;
excessive, 137c-g; see proof.

explanation, 40h, 85a.

factors, 7le-gi, IX, Two.

faculties, 154be, 159a.

fairy tales, 167d.

faith, 5, 40).

fame, 168, 166f; see power-madness.

Faraday, M. 87b, 89dj, 98i, 99); 130e.

fear, 158g; see courage.

feminism, 166o0-r, 170k.

field, 98n; see tube of force, fluid theo.

fighting, 145, 175e; see war.

filament, 98n, Two.

Filene, A. L. and E. A. 168g.

Fisher, Dorothy Canfield, 155f, 166r,
167b, 170k, 171f, Ce.

— Irving, f{168h; and Fiske, E. L. 146n.

Fiske, John, 166).

Fizeau, A. H. L. 124¢.

Flournev, Theodore, 101k.

fluid theories, 94, XIII.

force, IX-XI; all forces known, 139;
fields of, 89; residing, 73f; of words,
52e; see gravity, elec., love, etc.

Ford, Henry, 47j, 159j, f167b, 168m.

Foster, James H. f98g, £167b.

fourth dimension, 62, 66g, 128¢.

Franklin Institute, 127a.

freedom, 169e; of speech, 169f-b, 173¢;
of will, 157e-g.

Frend, 154d-f, 156e.

friction, 97h, 15f, 98c; see force.

galaxy, 107-9, XII;
gambling, f163h.
Gantt, H. L. f£167b.
Gautier, 134k.
genius, 159e-n, f166d, 169h, 170ik.
geocentricism, 100c; see center.
geology, 122g¢-i.

Germans, pre-war, Ic, 19a, 49, 147e,
164d, f 172c.

Gibbons, James, Cardinal, f 49a.

Gilbreth, F. B. and Lillian M. 163}.

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins Stetson, 170q.

glacial ages, 112g-m.

glad game, see make believe.

God, 2led, 25b, 29, 46-7, 98m, 104b,
123e, 140d, 153f, 158i, 159e-n, 161,
166m; see Trinity.

Golden Age, 87b.

Golden Rule, 162ei)j.

Goldthwait, Joel E. 149ir.

good, Good and Evil, XVIII, 160-1,
135¢c, 100).

government, see Constitution, democrat,
aristocrat; —~ ownership, 168i, 1700.

Grace, Eugene G. f167b.

spectrum, 128h-k.

948

grain theory, see Reynolds.

grammar, 27e, f30b.

gravity, 74, 134jk, 64d, 70, 75d, 75e,
83f, 91f, 103, 108, 120i, 158e, 146h;
see solar system, Newton.

Gresham’s law, f168h.

growth, 980-q, Two, 76d, 80fm, 100m,
109, 120h, 146.

guessing, 106; see quantitative.

gyroscope theory, 96d.

Haeckel, Ernest H. v.

Hamilton, Alexander, 173h.

— Sir Wm. R. 2g.

Hale, George E. lc, 122e.

*“Hall, Holworthy’’ 155b.

hallucinations, f 166d.

happiness, 163, XVIII.

harmonie periodicity, harmonic propor-
tions, 801], 83g, 84a, 100bj, 101j, 110a,
118e, 120f, 128d, 156c, 163), 170p, 176b.

Hathaway, H. K. 168).

lieat, 78-82, 188c-e; see entropy, ete.

heaven, 123.

hedonism, 160a, 161b.

Hegel, G. W. F. iii, v.

Heraclitus, 42b, 66h.

heredity, 147.

Hergesheimer, J. 155b.

Hering, Carl, 53b.

high cost of living, £168h, 176), 176g.

Hinks, A. R. 107a.

history, 165b, f 170d;

Hobbes, Thomas, 167b.

Homer, 171).

Hoover, Herbert, f167b, 168m.

Hopkins, E. M. 49r.

housekeeping, 170p; see mother.

Howe, E. W. 159i, f£167b.

Hughes, Charles E. f173b.

human nature changing, 147h.

humanity, law of, 164d.

humor, f 162a, 34b, 43k, 50h, 153f.

Hurst, Fannie, 1355b.

Huygens’s principle, 124d, 125b, 126,
128a, 158f.

hypocrisy, see make helieve, aristocrat.

hypotheses, 159b.

Hyslop, J. H. 101k.

hysteria, 37e, 101k, 154e, 166pq.

[bsen; 1706, 171).

idealism, v, 20, 49r, 160a, 161b, 163i; lit-
erary idealism, 171f.

identity, 28; see One and Many, logic.

idolatry, 14d, 49q, 52c, 85e, 173b.

ignorance, 5, 164c; see agnosticism.

immortality, 152d-f, 101k, 123e, 144),
146k.

implicit, implication, v, 52.

incommensurability, 50, 125a, 126a, Two.

increase of entropy, see entropy.

individualism, 1711, vii; see democracy
hysteria, power-madness, balance.

industrial democracy, 170p.

ineffable, iv, v, 34, 40k, f51h, 162c; see
infinite regress.

length of, 112m.

3

249

inertia, 88; see motion.

infinite regress, 36gn, V, 20d, 24d, 42c,
Sle, 52b, 53e, 6la, 72e, 76d, 77d, 96d,
100g, 101i, 135e, 141h, 1531, 173c.

infinity, 43, 50g,24c; see number.

Inquisition, 161b.

insanity, 155ab, 159fg.

intellect, 153, XVII]; see reason.

intentions, good, 155f.

interest (psychological) 159c.

intuition, see intellect, Bergson.

inverse square law, 76d, 73, 77cf, 80),
832, 94e, 156b; see structure.

ion, 135; see atom.

irrationalism, see agnosticism.

James, Henry, f169h, 171f.

— William, v, vi, 15b, 49p, 113d, 153hf,
155d, 156e, f165b.

Job (Biblical) £165d, 166r.

job, any religious, 166f;
men.

Jordan, David Starr, v-vi, Ce, Gb, le,
Q3a, 84ce, 87b, £942, f100c, 143¢c,
145abe, 147d, 1356e, 167b.

Joule, J. P. 79.

judgment, 42d, 31a, iv.

Judgment Day, 86d.

judiciary, 174h.

*“just and unjust’’ 1121.

K, 75-7, 68c, 66f, 136.

Kaiser, 25c, 50e, 85c, 88}, 137d.

Kant, I. 4b, 19a, 104b, 108e, 113b, 161b.

Kellogg, Vernon, vii, 147d.

Kelvin (Wm. Thomson) 2g, 3b, 7e,
96df, 980, 101j, 112i, 148b.

Keyser, Cassius J. 60c.

Kidd, Benjamin, 166c.

kinetic, 77h; theories, 89, X-XI, Iwo,
15}, 104.

Klyce, Laura Kent, Ce.

—§. Sa, 7i, f34c, 49t, 99d, 138g, 144),
152f, 153f, 158e, 159d, 162b, f 166d,
170m, £170r, 1711m, £172.

Knight, Austin M. 129c.

Kultur, 163gh, 171i.

see sizing up

labor, labor leaders, 174be, vii, 163h,
167k, 170p, 176g.

lag, 101f, 132a, 138¢, 146g.

laissez faire, 149mr.

Lamarck, chevalier de, 147d.

Landolt, H. 143c.

Langmuir, Irving, 101).

language, One; model of, VIII; of dif-
ferent dimens. 62; see One and Many.

Laplace, marquis de, 118e, 113c, 114c.

Larmor, Sir Joseph, 79a, 80c.

lawyers, lawyers’ law, vii, 163fg, 173.

Leacock, Stephen, f167b.

learning, way of, 158g, 159b.

least action, 98m, 104fg.

Le Bon, G. f132a, 134k.

Lecky, W. E. H. f48b.

Lee, Gerald Stanley, Cc, 159}, 162h,
165d, f167b, 171f.

UNIVERSE

Leibnitz, G. W. 30f.

lever, 15f, 100m.

life, 143-4, 5c, 112m, whole book;
maximum, 166-7.

light, XIII, 15j, 101k; formation of,
124-8; bending of, 125b, 127g; color,
126d; corpuscular, 130d; dispersion,
128-9; polarization, 130; reflection,
131; refraction, 1281; veloc. 36b, 127.

— year, 107d.

Lincoln, A. 34b, f94¢, 153f, 156e, 159n,
168}, £173b, 173h.

line organization, 37f, 167h, 174c.

literature, 99a, f169h, 171f.

Little, Arthur D. £167b.

“living, world owes a’’ 168p.

Loeb, J. 146or.

logic, One, 1V, VI, 4; Christ’s, 153h;
necessity in, 34-5; rule, 43h-k, 44;
users of valid, f167f; woman’s, 170b.

logistics, 4a, 44h.

Lorentz, H. A. 66, 1273.

Lorimer, George H. f167b.

love, 47b, 162, XVIII; see force.

Luther, Martin, f 166d.

machine, 15f, 21b, 47j, 50e, 86f, 98),
100m, 165d; language, 63i.

magnetism, see elec.; personal, 101k.

make believe, 155, 48d, 149i, f168hvii.

Maine, Sir Henry J. S. f173bb.

majority, 171k-m, 173¢.

man, 46-7, Three; average, 6b, 171k-m;
compared with woman, 170; great
men, f167b; measurement of, 148,
140e; part of machines, 140de; theo-
retical, 40k; see classes, sizing up m.

Many, 14b, 65; see One and Many.

marriage, 166)-r.

Marshall, A. 84c, 156d, 163), f163h.

= Jobn, ¢ 178b,-178h:

Marx, Karl, 174.

mass, IX, 96b; varies with velocity, 41,
66, 72e, Two.

materialism, materialist, 49h, 80, 46de,
7, 51h, 66i, 88j, 98m, 100c, 137d,
145, 146e.

mathematics, Be, 3, 9, 30, 36k, 39a,
48-4, 49p, 58, 60-2, 104k.

inatter, IX, Two, 98m.

Maxwell, J. C. 2g, 15d, 46c, 74f, 80f,
89, 90b, 95d, 98cijy, 104, 105, 134d,
135c, 140e.

Mayo, W. J. and C. H. 149ir.

measures, measurement, 2, 32, 36i, 491,
67, 84a, 101), 148.

mechanics, 86f, VIII, 98, Two, 9, vi;
gravity, f74b and see gravity.

medicine, 149.

memory, 158, 36f.

Mendelism, 145e, 147g.

Merriam, John C. Fd.

Metchnikoff, E. 144), 146n.

meteor, meteorite, 120jk.

method, 86, One; see trick of words.

Michelson-Morley experiment, 66ag,
1272).

Inodex Paci

middleman, 1700, Fi.

militarist, f170r, 176f, 52c; see aristocrat.

Mill, J. S. 490.

millennium, 123.

Miller, Eugene, 84c, 113d.

Millikan, R. A. 41¢c, 89h, 128e, 137cf.

mind, 153, XVII; and matter, 150fg.

Mitchell, S. Weir, 101k, 149i.

modesty, 5b, f94g, 156e.

inolecule, see atom, structure.

money, 168.

monism, 49, 17c, v.

Montaigne, M. de, f167b.

Moore, Benjamin, 144ce.

Moseley’s law, 12Sek, 130f.

Moses, 173b.

motion, 36], 72a, 73h, f98d;
87-8, lig.

mother, 159i.

Muensterberg, H. 151b, f165b.

music, 101f; see harmonic periodicity.

mvstery, 4c, 40}, 1001.

mystic, 20, iv, 34, 49, 7la, 73b, 88c, 90d,
100h, 130d, 158e.

laws of,

name, 35e, 48, 49r, 76d, 90;

Napoleon I, f 94g.

nebula, 107, XII;

nebulosity, 121.

negative (— form easier) 41, 88cd, 173b.

neighbor, 162; see ethics.

Newcomb, Simon, 128d.

newspapers, 158g, 173h.

Newton, I. 74, 87-8, 2a, 15g, 30f, 49p,
64d, 66b, 75a, 77i, 83f, 89i, 93, 97e,
98m, 100In, ll4c, 117g, 127), 134jk,
136d, 163}.

New York, 99b, 101k, 123a, 159n.

Nietzsche, F. W. 49ei, 145a, 162h, 163h.

Nirvana, 43e, 88], 163b; see Buddha.

non-Euclidian space, see Euclid.

Nordmann, C. 197f.

Norris, Kathleen, 155b.

Northrup, E. F. 102, 117f, 194f.

nova, 117d.

number, 43, 26, 36h, 44, 50, 55, 58.

see logic.

nebular theory, 113.

observation, 22i.

Ohm’s law, 136, 73a, 77i.

One, One and Many, 14-16, 28, 49, 157,
One, whole book.

Onnes, H. K. 141f.

ontology, sce Being, ether.

opportunity, 138d, 166f, 40k.

optimism, 149f.

oratory, f 28h.

orders of structure, see structure.

organism, XVI, 15f, 86df; see struct-
ure; organs, 146hi.

Osborn, H. F. 112h-j, 147h, App. C.

Ostwald, W. 137e, 147e.

overeating, 146n.

*‘overhead’’ 176}.

overrunning, 101f; see incommensurab.

pXv, 82-3, 71i.
pacifists, 176f.

Pain Index

pain, 163; see good.

panacea, 149¢.

panic, business, f168h, Fe.

pantheism, 47i.

parallels, 60.

paranoia, 37e, 158g.

parasite, 149f, 155c, 1660p; see aristoc.

Paton, Stewart, 171m.

patience, 176r.

Patten, Wm. lc, 84c, 145abe, 147d.

Paul, Paulineism, 6c, 89bi, 161b, 165b,
1660, 167gh, 171f; see Christ.

payment, 168, 89k.

Pearson, Karl, 49p.

Pepper, George Wharton, f173b.

perfect, 101i, 104b; gas, 82; see ex-
act, One and Many.

periodicity, see harmonic periodicity.

periodic table, 80], 100}, 119, 144d,
App. B.

permeability, see U.

Perrin, M. Jean, 137cf.

personality, person, 42d, 47ij, 86d,
101k, 152ef.

pessimism, 149f.

phenomenon, 980, 139b.

philosophy, 39, iii, 7d, 52h, 66h, 88f,
89c.

phlogiston, 15).

physicians, 149.

physics, physical science, 67a, 68e-i,
IX, Two.

planetesimal, 113, 115, 126k.

planets, 117f (see solar system); cold
inside, 119a, 122]; direc. of revo. 112c.

Plato, le, f48b.

play, 167c-m; see democracy.

Plotinus, 15c.

pluralism, 17b;

poetry, f165d.

Poincare, J. H. 3c, 30b.

**Pollyanna’’ 149f, f 168hbvii.

pope, see aristocrat, theologian,

Porter, Eleanor H. 1409f.

Portier, Panl, 146i.

possible, 101k; see quantitative.

potential, 73h, 76, 134b, 146e; — en-
ergy, 801; infinite, zero, 80, 99b-d;
of man, 140e.

power, 73h (see energy): human, 166df,
168k], 173h; see rebirth, power-mad.

power-madness, 168], 173e, 174b, 176,
85c, 139a.

pragmatism, 49p, 156e.

prayer, 167d.

prediction, 85d.

Prince, Morton, 154c.

principle, 147e, 169; see qualitative.

printing, typography, E, F, f34c, 40g.

privilege, 48d; see aristocrat.

problem, see solution, One and Many.

progress, 98p, 147k, 170k.

prohibition, 166h.

proof, 35, 22, 49h, 50e, 53e, 88).

property (physics) 56, 88bd, 119c, 128ef;
(wealth) £175c.

prophet, prophecy, 85d.

see materialist, logic.

UNIVERSE

prosperity, 164b; see power-madness.

protection (tariff) 170k, 176dg.

psychic phenomena, 161k, 152f.

psychology, XVII; modern, 154c; see
will, mind, ete.

Ptolemaic astronomy, 100c, 127i.

punishment, penology, 168q.

Puritan, 135c, 149e, 156e.

purpose, 5, 42d, 100), 101f, 144h.

qualitative, 40, iii, 5, 66, 148, 162i;
see One.

quantitative, 40, iii, 4e, 37, 66, 148,
162i; see Many.

quitters, 2lb, 159.

race, f170j, Three; end of, 1121; puri-
ty and war, 176h.

radioactivity, 119a, 141g.

Ramsey, Sir Wm. 138h.

realism, 20; literary, 171f.

reality, 49g, 100c, iii; see truth.

reason, reasoning, 25a, 153be; induc-
tive and deductive, 163j; see logic.

rebirth, 162, 153f-h, 28h, 46h, 48e, 85b,
98m, 149q, 166dfh, 168], 17Ic.

Reeve, S. A. 84c, 89be, 92, 93e, 97,
100c, 113c, 1700.

regress, see infinite regress.

reincarnation, 158e.

relationship, 28fgh, 44ef, 47h, 57, 583.

relativity, 66; of color, 128g; see Ein-
stein.

religion, 39, 6, 85b, 160cd; any job re-
ligious, 166f; see rebirth, ethics,
One, Trinity, Christ, theologian.

responsibility, 164e, XVITI.

rest, 36] (see static); 167m (see democ. ).

reverse, reversal, 32b, 50e, 98k, 104),
135c.

Reynolds, Osborne, 91, 49g, 84c, 87b,
89be, 93e, 95d, 97, 100c, 104j, 126c,
134k, 145c, 147c.

rhetoric, 52gh.

rhythm, see balance.

Richards, T. W. 81-3, Ce, le, 23a, S4b,
89, 90c, 92b, I3f, 100c, 119d, 138h,
156b.

riddle of universe, 14de, 40hj, 49k.

Riley, Woodbridge, 15b.

ring, single surface, VIII.

Ritter, Wm. E. 84c, 145abe, 147d.

ritual, 167d, 171j, 97b.

Rockefeller, John D. 159j, 168m.

rotary engine, 62i.

Rowland, H. A. 135a.

Russell, Bertrand, 3c, lic, 44d, 62f.

Rutherford, E. 138h.

Ryan, J. A. f48b, 166d.

salvation, see rebirth.

sanctions, 173be.

Saturn, 113, 118-9.

Schwab, Charles M. £167b, 168m.

science, 39, 85ce, iv, vi, vii, 2,10, 28a,
165b, whole book.

scientific management, 168}; see Taylor.

250

*‘serap of paper’’ 35c, f48b, 147e.

secondaries, 98w; see structure.

Sedgwick, Ellery, f167b.

selfish, see aristocrat.

self-preservation, law of, 164d, f175e.

sentence, 31-3, 37.

separation, 26; see dualism.

sex, 146, 98p, 154df, 166)-], 170.

Shakespeare, 155b.

sharp distinctions, ete. 52.

Shaw, James B. 2g, 3c.

Sidgwick, Alfred, 49p.

sin, 164c, 163.

Singer, I. 161b, 167h.

single surface ring, VIII.

simple, 71h.

sizing up men, Fe, 52c, 148, 157c, 162i,
167], 170, 176a; see measures.

snobs, 135c.

socialism, 175, 149}; see aristocrat.

sociology, 169, XVIII, XIX; social en-
vironment, 166c.

Socrates, 166p, 167k.

Soddy, F. 138h.

solar system, 110-22; birth, 111; end,
112f, 120a; gravity in, 1138, 114¢c;
retrograde motions, 118d; _ see plan-
etesimal, planets, sun, etc.

Sollas, W. J. 11h.

solution of any problem, 159, 33g, 40k.

soul, 152d, 153k, 46; woman’s, 170h.

sovereignty, 47h, 173bh.

space, V, 32g, 36, One; space and time
inseparable, 64, 150; see time.

specialist, vii, 188g, 149k, 1'700-q.

spectrum, 128, 156c; of smells, 138d;
see harmonic periodicity.

Spencer, Herbert, 36b, 144h.

Stallo, J. B. 49p.

standard universe, 28b; see nniverse.

static, static and dynamic, 73, f 74h,
f7G6a, 77b, 98}, 108d, 133, 135c, 138f,
150g.

Stefan’s law, 79c.

Steinmetz, C. P. 148c.

Storey, M. 163g.

storms, 120e, 122c.

structure, 15f, 86f, 76d, 83g, 100ej, 101i,
105, 110e, 128ef, 144c, 158c; see per-
son, machine.

subconscious, 153b, 15+.

subjectivism, iv, v.

submerged tenth, 168p;

subscripts, 71b.

Substance, 77i; see matter, Being.

sun, see solar system; heat of, 115;
spots, 120e, 122de.

Sunday, Wm. A. 166h.

Sundman, 83c.

superman, 145c.

surgery, 149rn, 176e.

swearing, 43k.

Swedenborg, E. 98m, f 166d.

symbol, 30, 53e.

systems, Ab, 20b, 47h.

ee

Taft, Wm. H. 163g, 173b, £167b.

see aristocrat.

251

tariff, 170k, 176dg.

Tarkington, Booth, f167b.

tautology, 34, dle.

Taylor, Frederick W. 168), Cc, f 94g,
f167b, 162hi, 163), 174¢.

taxes, 168in, 175e, f 176d.

teleology, 42d; see purpose.

telepathy, 101k, 146h, 152f.

temperance, 149e, 50f, f£166d; see bal-
ance.

temperature, 77-82, 71b, 110, 153d; see
heat, entropy.

theologian, theology, vii, 6, 39g, 48b,
49, 107h, 1443, 160d, 171lc; see aris-
tocrat, Christ, Trinity, rebirth.

theory, see qualitative; physical theo-
ries, X; defects of orthodox, 96.

Theresa, St. 20d, 170m.

thermodynamics, see heat, entropy.

Thompson, J. Arthur, 147c.

— Sanford FE. 163).

Thomson, Sir J. J. Ce, 15), 66b, 77b,
89h, 90c, 98ij, 100c, 118e, 137b, 138h.

three bodies, problem of, 83.

Tikhoff, 127f.

time, time and space, 36, 33g, V, 150-1,
158; economy of, 165; see space.

tips, 168¢.

titles, 167h, 1680.

toleration, 169.

Tolstoy, 162h, 167gi.

transcendentalist, iv, 36k.

‘Transcript, Boston Evening’’ 14d.

trick of words, iii, 2f, 9, 12, 20a, 98m.

Trinity, 24c, 27-9, 43h, 48-9, 62, 71,
88, 134aj, 151b, 157, 171be.

tropism, 158e, 146e.

truism, 35f, 12; see logic, identity.

UNIVERSE

truth, 28f, 47h, 49ist, 581;
tube of force, 98i.
Tunzlemann, G. W. de, 74af, 135d.
Turner, 122e.

two bodies, problem of, 83, 98e.

see reality.

U, 75-7, 136; see electricity, unifica-
tion, inverse square.

unification, 74f, IX, iii, A, 9, 66dh,
74d, 77g, 136, 138¢.

unit, 40c, 69b; see measurement, time,
space, etc.

universals, 20c.

universe, 25b; infinite ‘“‘number’’ of,
100g; outside of, 47fg, 100e (see
boundary); see One and Many, ete.

unknown, unknowable, 4c, 36b, 40);
see agnosticism.

upper ten, 168p; see aristocrat.

Utopias, 123.

?

vacuum tube phenomena, 135, 1l4lg.

value, 168; see payment, money.

Vance, 163g.

vibrations, see fluid theories, light.

V;, 100cf, 74d, 105a, 152a; see light.

volcano, 120e, 122i.

Vorse, Mary Heaton (Mrs. O’Brien),
166r, f167b, 170k.

vortex whirls, 90d, XI, Two.

Waals, J. D. Van der, 81-2, 84b, 89d,
104, 145e.

Walsh, J. J. f48b, 48d, 167d.

Wanamaker, John, f167b, 168m.

war, 176, 173abd, 174e, 35d; see mili-
tarist, aristocrat, ““blood and iron.”’

Ward, James, 150c, 151b, f165b.

Index Zoro

Warren, Maude Radford, 166r, f167b,
170k.

waves, 98y, XIII; see fluid theories.

wealth, inheritance of, 167h, 168m-o,
173i, f175e.

weight, 70-1;
see atom.

Weismann, A. 147.

Wells, H. G. 29c, 49a.

whirls, XI, Two; experimental, 101-2.

White, A. D. 48d.

Whitehead, A. N. 62f.

Whitman, Walt, 169h, I71fj.

Wilde, Oscar, 158g.

will, 157.

Wilson, Edmund B. 147d.

— Harry Leon, f167b.

— Woodrow, 159d, 164bd, 167g)k, 171f,
f172c, 173e, 174be.

woman, see feminism, man.

Wood, R. W. 130b.

Woodward, R. S. F, 171m.

words, iv, 27-8; cheap, 168i; inflection
of, f30b; have force, 52e; see logic,
sentence.

work, 167c-m;
see democracy.

world state, 176-7.

worry, 156e, 170r.

worship, 167d.

conservation of, 137c-g;

objectionable, f£174c;

X-rays, 101jk, 128ek.

Zeeman effect, 130e.

Zeno, 15g, 94d; see One and Many.
zero, 43; see infinity, number.
zodiacal light, 121.

Zoroaster, 32b.

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